Trump and the Future of US Grand Strategy US Grand Strategy Is at a Crossroads

CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich N0. 212, September 2017, Editor: Matthias Bieri

Trump and the Future of US Grand Strategy US grand strategy is at a crossroads. Will Washington continue to pursue internationalism, as most of the establishment would prefer, or does the election of Donald Trump and his embrace of populist conservative nationalism indicate that the US is about to turn its back on the liberal world order? The answer will play a significant role in determining the nature of world politics in the coming years.

By Jack Thompson

US grand strategy between 1992 and 2016 was, in retrospect, remarkably consistent. Even though the foreign policy records of the post-Cold War presidents – Bill Clin- ton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama – differed, sometimes dramatically, they shared fundamental assumptions about international politics and the strategy the US should pursue to maximize the safety and prosperity of its citizens.

Judging from each administration’s Na- tional Security Strategy reports – which are mandated by Congress – and other official documents, they all advocated a muscular version of liberal internationalism. This en- tailed the core objectives of military predominance – albeit paired with a network of security alliances and membership in international organizations – the lowering of For decades, a bipartisan commitment to internationalism was a cornerstone of US grand strategy. But the trade barriers, and the spread of democracy. Trump presidency represents at least a partial break with this longstanding consensus. M. Segar / Reuters In addition, each administration viewed legal immigration as desirable economically and acceptable culturally. change, regardless of which political party tions. Furthermore, his ambivalence about This agenda also served a wider objective – was in power – largely held true. the liberal world order – and the level of the maintenance and spread of the liberal enthusiasm that this has generated amongst world order. This policy of enlightened But the election of Donald Trump has his supporters – raise fundamental ques- self-interest, with the US benefitting as thrown into doubt the future of this pat- tions about the future of US grand strategy much as its partners and allies, was consis- tern. The president represents at least a par- and the international system. tent with mainstream thinking after 1945. tial break from the post-1945 consensus. In When it came to grand strategy, at least, contrast to his predecessors, he espouses a The US in a Changing World Order the truism about continuity in US foreign zero-sum philosophy – foreign policy is The ascent of Trumpism can only be un- policy – that there is a lot more of it than about “winning” at the expense of other na- derstood against the backdrop of a rapidly

Grand Strategy: an Overview However, there is also a dark side to ex- panding free trade (and to its cousin, tech- Grand strategy can be defined, in brief, as a nation’s attempt to coordinate all aspects of its foreign nological change). Many Americans have policy – diplomatic, economic, and military – in order to achieve short- and long-term objectives. seen their incomes stagnate, or their jobs Perhaps the most notable modern example was the policy of containment that the US and its allies pursued during the Cold War. A useful starting point for understanding US grand strategy is disappear altogether, and inequality is at the National Security Strategy. Though these documents are often criticized as products of the highest level ever. This has generated bureaucratic busywork that lack specifics, as a historical source each NSS offers insights. They can significant opposition to trade liberaliza- highlight the contemporary context in which grand strategy was being developed – the 2002 NSS tion – and immigration – and engendered can only be understood within the context of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, for distrust of the political and economic elite. instance – and the broad themes that administrations hoped to emphasize. This is not surprising, because Washington has mostly failed to help those that have struggled to adapt to the globalized economy, and also failed to react constructively to the resulting political backlash. evolving world order. We are witnessing play a more active role in world politics, as the emergence – or rather the return to – a the US has long demanded. All of these shortcomings have contributed genuinely multipolar system. Not since be- to a sense that the US is in decline. Wheth- fore the Second World War has interna- A more vigorous EU foreign policy is es- er or not this is true – scholars disagree – is tional politics been characterized by such a sential for many reasons, not least because somewhat beside the point. Many, at home complicated and varied power structure. the US needs help in confronting some and abroad, believe that the US is a fading stubborn regional challengers. In spite of power, and this perception has important Several aspects of this emerging system re- vigorous efforts to contain it, North Korea implications for its grand strategy. quire the close attention of US policymak- has established a viable nuclear weapons ers. The most important is the rise of Chi- program and will probably soon master the Trumpism and Grand Strategy na. With the world’s largest population and technology necessary to strike the west Though the conservative establishment em- active military and, by some measures, the coast of the US with an intercontinental braced the foreign policy consensus after largest GDP, China is a superpower and – ballistic missile. In doing so, it has destabi- the late 1940s, many in the grassroots and compelled by a fierce nationalism – has be- lized East Asia. It has further complicated on the fringes of the Republican Party nev- gun to act like one. In recent years, it has relations with China, which is Pyongyang’s er reconciled themselves to international- begun to challenge US interests, especially only ally. It has also increased uncertainty ism. Over the years, extremists such as Pat- in the South China Sea. Beijing has called about US security guarantees in Seoul and rick Buchanan harnessed these impulses in into question US predominance in the Tokyo, where the fear is that Washington passionate challenges to the conservative world’s most important waterway and be- will be less likely to confront North Korea mainstream. These efforts, though quixotic, gun to undermine Washington’s alliances once its territory is under threat. This makes prevented the extinction of an alternative in East Asia. It has also sought to test US it more likely that South Korea and Japan worldview – conservative nationalism in- leadership in other realms. Initiatives such will seek independent nuclear deterrents. stead of internationalism; military strength as the “One Belt, One Road” project and employed unilaterally instead of on behalf the Regional Comprehensive Economic Thanks to the negotiation of the Joint of the liberal order; protectionist policies Partnership seek to place China at the cen- Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA) that would ostensibly benefit workers and ter of Asia’s economic future. in 2015, Iran’s nuclear program is, at least for the moment, less Trump’s successful presidential Another persistent headache for US strate- worrisome than that of North gists has been the resurgence of Russia. Korea. However, its foreign campaign reintroduced populist Moscow’s interventions in Ukraine and policy is, in some ways, even nationalism to the conservative Syria, its knack for exploiting the fault lines more problematic. The US con- in NATO, its interference in the 2016 US siders Tehran to be the fore- mainstream. presidential election, and the growth and most state sponsor of terror. In modernization of its nuclear arsenal – now addition, its interventions in hot spots industry at home, not overseas; and skepti- the world’s largest – have all served as a re- throughout the Middle East, most notably cism about expertise and elite leadership. minder that Russia is one of only two in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, have hin- countries, along with China, that can chal- dered US plans for those countries. Trump’s successful presidential campaign lenge the US on a global scale. reintroduced populist nationalism to the The evolution of the international economy conservative mainstream. He blamed free Russia’s reemergence has, in many ways, re- has troubled policy-makers at least as much trade and immigration for the plight of newed the importance of Europe in US as geopolitics. Free trade has benefited mil- working-class whites, called into question strategic planning. However, it has also lions of Americans, especially in urban areas longstanding security alliances, flouted called into question the future of the rela- and on the coasts, and contributed to rela- democratic norms, and accused political tionship. Though most US analysts believe tively steady domestic economic growth. It and economic elites of using globalization that Europe will continue to be a vital part- has also been an integral part of grand strat- to enrich themselves at the expense of the ner, even optimists wonder how European egy since the end of Second World War, rest of the country. In other words, he re- policy-makers will solve their internal buoying allies and creating an interlocking jected the foundations of the liberal world challenges – the Eurozone and migrant web of economic relationships that form a order. As an alternative, he touted a path crises and Brexit, to name just a few – and cornerstone of the liberal world order. that maximized the national interest at the

expense of other nations – an approach he Partisan Views on Internationalist Policies called “America First”.

Trump’s message was effective, first and foremost, because the domestic political context has shifted dramatically in recent years. That wages are stagnant or falling in real terms is hardly news – this has been occurring for decades – but the extent of the problem was highlighted by the economic recession in 2008. Furthermore, the nation has been growing more diverse for years, but the election of Barack Obama sharpened the concerns of culturally conservative whites about multiculturalism. And many of Trump’s supporters regard the advances of competitors such as China and Russia not as a consequence of multi- polarity, but as the result of the alleged fecklessness of previous administrations and their dedication to the liberal order. However, the influence of the conservative nomic Council, co-wrote an opinion piece internationalists has been countered by in The Wall Street Journal that rejected the But the extent of the opposition to interna- some of the president’s closest political notion of a “global community” and cele- tionalism should not be overstated. The aides, who advocate an extreme version of a brated realpolitik in world affairs. Such mainstream of the Democratic Party – nationalist foreign policy. Even after the de- language is consistent with the fact that though not always the grassroots left – parture of former White House Chief Trump never refers to democratic values or supports policies conducive to maintaining Strategist Steve Bannon, they remain for- the desirability of defending the liberal the liberal world order. Even on the right, midable. Though their efforts to downgrade world order. His harsh criticism of close al- opposition to internationalism lies, such as Germany, is unprecedented. is far from universal. Republi- The conservative national cans in business and with uni- The Future of US Grand Strategy versity degrees, for instance, security establishment is almost We will have a better sense of the state of tend to be sympathetic to much universally opposed to Trumpism. the battle between the extreme nationalists of the internationalist agenda. and the conservative internationalists later Most notably, the conservative this year, when the administration releases national security establishment is almost the importance of relations with the EU its first National Security Strategy. How- universally opposed to Trumpism, a fact and NATO have met with only partial suc- ever, we can already evaluate the extent to that is now at the heart of the fight over the cess, they have had more luck in other bat- which Trump represents a departure from future of US grand strategy. tles. One is the promotion of protectionism: the post-1945 consensus and highlight the Trump administration withdrew from questions that will bear watching during Advantage Nationalists the Trans-Pacific Partnership deal and has the remainder of the president’s tenure. Trump has made limited headway in im- signaled its intent to renegotiate the North plementing his worldview, due in part to American Free Trade Agreement. They Trump’s election has altered, for the fore- the lack of a coherent plan for governing scored another victory on immigration. The seeable future, the nature of US grand and the fact that some of his key decisions, president signed an executive order to ban strategy by imparting legitimacy to popu- such as on immigration, are subject to immigrants from a number of Muslim-ma- list conservative nationalism. Prior to oversight by Congress and the courts. jority countries – though this has been Trump, it lurked on the fringes of the Re- challenged in court – and has proposed a publican Party, resonating with much of But perhaps the most important factor in reform of the system that would halve legal the base but shunned by elites. Now, how- limiting Trump is that conservative inter- immigration. The nationalists have also ever, nationalists occupy some of the high- nationalists staff much of the administra- been effective in opposing international est positions in government and are busily tion. Indeed, the vast majority of the agreements, as Trump has withdrawn the cultivating opinion leaders who will ensure Republican Party’s foreign policy estab- US from the Paris climate accord and indi- that these ideas endure. In one sign of the lishment espouses internationalism – and cated that he will likely end US participa- times, the mission of the most influential many of them are critical of Trumpism. In tion in the Iran nuclear deal. new policy journal, American Affairs, is the spite of his reluctance to hire those whose dissemination of conservative nationalist loyalty could be questioned, the president More generally, these advisors have suc- arguments (though it is ambivalent about chose several such men for key positions. ceeded in injecting a note of extreme na- Trump). (See also American Affairs and These figures have fought to maintain at tionalism into the administration’s rhetoric. U.S. Foreign Policy, 2017.) least some internationalist priorities. They Even internationalists in the administra- have enjoyed some notable successes, in- tion have been affected. H.R. McMaster, Populist nationalism is here to stay. But it is cluding reinforcing the importance of alli- the National Security Advisor, and Gary still too early to conclude that the US has ances in Europe and East Asia. Cohn, the Director of the National Eco- reached an inflection point where a major-

ity of the country rejects internationalism. der – has been abandoned, but there is as tionalism as a given. A more nationalistic Most of the political establishment abhors yet no coherent replacement. If the nation- US would damage transatlantic relations, Trump’s foreign policy – and that still alist approach triumphs, the likelihood of not only affecting specific areas of coopera- counts for something. However, in an age military conflict becomes significantly tion – the JCPOA would have been impos- of diminishing influence for members of higher, though thankfully still remaining sible without close US-EU collaboration – the political elite and a fragmented media relatively low overall, thanks in part to the but also more abstract ones, such as the landscape, it means less than it would have effect of nuclear deterrence. If internation- common commitment to promoting dem- in years past. Moreover, in a sobering de- alism reasserts itself, war is still a possibility, ocratic values. velopment, even if many elected Republi- but at least there will be more time and op- cans clearly distrust or even loathe Trump, portunity for diplomacy. More broadly, the contest between inter- the fact that the base of the party remains nationalism and nationalism will have im- staunchly supportive of the president has Relations with Russia, Iran, and North Ko- plications for how Americans conceptual- constrained conservative opposition to his rea will also demand attention. The inter- ize world affairs. Will the US continue to nationalist approach entails view international politics primarily In fact, the entire relationship several advantages, including through an optimistic lens? This was an the support of allies and inter- overarching theme between 1945 and with China is now in flux. national institutions, but it re- 2016, as successive administrations mostly quires patience and the willing- managed to balance threat perceptions policies. In other words, the balance could ness to settle for partial victories. The with a conviction that the US and the rest still tip in either direction. populist nationalist alternative, which em- of the world benefited from vigorous en- phasizes freedom from the constraints of gagement. Or will a darker perspective This matters, because the US faces critical alliances and international law and norms, predominate, one that regards interaction questions. When it comes to trade, for in- is ill-suited to solving such problems with the outside world as more likely to do stance, will the protectionist impulse – gal- peacefully. If nationalism remains influen- harm? The debate currently raging in the vanized by growing inequality and eco- tial, look for more volatility in these rela- Trump administration will do much to de- nomic anxiety – prevail, or will the US tionships. This means policymaking at the termine which of these visions prevails, remain a force for liberalization? China, in extremes – from Trump’s desire to establish and the result will have consequences for particular, is a target for protectionists, and friendly relations with an autocratic and the entire global order. if the nationalists have their way, a trade revanchist Russia, at one end of the spec- war, with profound implications for the en- trum, to his inclination to end the JCPOA, tire world, will likely follow. in spite of its efficacy, on the other. (See also Trump Preparing to End Iran Nuke In fact, the entire relationship with China Deal, 2017.) Dr Jack Thompson is a Senior Researcher at the is now in flux. The approach of previous ad- Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich. ministrations – a mixture of carrot and Such behavior is worrying for many – not He is, amongst others, the author of Understand- sticks designed to encourage Beijing to in- least for Europeans, whose foreign and se- ing Trumpism: the New President’s Foreign Policy tegrate peacefully into the liberal world or- curity policies have long taken US interna- (2017).

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