POLICY PAPER Number 20, May 2010 Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS Why Neoconservatism Still Matters Justin Vaïsse POLICY PAPER Number 20, May 2010 Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS Why Neoconservatism Still Matters Justin Vaïsse This paper, originally published by the Lowy Institute in its “Perspectives” series and reprinted with its permission, is based on and expands upon the author’s forthcoming Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement, Cam- bridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, May 2010 (transla- tion by Arthur Goldhammer), especially chapter 7. Why Neoconservatism Still Matters ii F OREIGN P OLICY AT B ROOKINGS W HY N EOCONSERVATISM S TILL M AT T E R S he world started paying attention to the exis- WHAT NEOCONSERVATISM MEANS TODAY tence of American neoconservatives in 2002- T2003, as they stepped up their campaign in The label “neoconservative” was first used in the ear- favor of an invasion of Iraq. In the following years, ly 1970s by friends and enemies of a group of New their trajectory was generally seen as a short-lived ab- York intellectuals who were critical of the leftward erration, a rapid rise and fall ending in the failure turn that American liberalism had, in their view, tak- that was the Iraq intervention, discrediting once and en in the previous decade.1 What these intellectuals for all their idealistic militarism. In other words, neo- reacted against was a mix of social movements—like conservatives are now seen as something of the past. student protests, counterculture, black nationalism, radical feminism and environmentalism—and gov- This conventional view, however, is inaccurate on ernment overreach through Lyndon Johnson’s “War two counts. First, the neoconservatives never had the on Poverty” programs. While in no way defenders kind of overbearing influence on the Bush adminis- of the free market or the night-watchman state like tration many opponents credit them with, including the true National Review conservatives, they stressed on the Iraq war. Second, not only had this school of the limits of social engineering (through transfers of thought been active in American foreign policy de- wealth or affirmative action programs) and pointed bates for three decades before the Iraq episode, but out the dangers that the boundless egalitarian dreams it actually never left the Washington political and in- of the New Left had created for stability, meritocracy tellectual scene—even at the time of its greatest ebb, and democracy. Intellectuals such as Nathan Glazer, in 2005-2007. On the contrary, neoconservatism Seymour Martin Lipset, James Q. Wilson and Dan- remains, to this day, a distinct and very significant iel Patrick Moynihan coalesced around The Public voice of the Washington establishment. Interest, a magazine created by Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell in 1965, and a few years later around After offering a presentation of what neoconser- Commentary, whose editor was Norman Podhoretz. vatism really means, and contrasting it with other schools of thought in American foreign policy, this These original neoconservative were New York-based paper lays out the main reasons behind their contin- intellectuals, primarily interested in domestic issues, ued influence in the Obama era—their institutional, and they still regarded themselves as liberals. That is intellectual and political dynamism—and argues why the disconnect could not seem more complete that neoconservatives will play a meaningful role in between them and the latter-day neocons, who are shaping American foreign policy in the future. Washington-based political operatives identified with 1 “Neoconservatism” used in a friendly way: see Robert Bartley, “Irving Kristol and Friends,” Wall Street Journal, May 3, 1972, p. 20; as an epithet, see Michael Harrington, “The Welfare State and Its Neoconservative Critics,” Dissent, Autumn 1973, pp. 435–454. For other sources and historical aspects, see my Neoconservatism, op. cit., chapter 2. Why Neoconservatism Still Matters 1 F OREIGN P OLICY AT B ROOKINGS the right, interested exclusively in foreign policy, and Moscow, thereby, from the neoconservative perspec- who have a solid, if not excessive, confidence in the tive, legitimizing the Soviet regime rather than try- ability of the American government to enact social ing to change it. change—at least in Iraq or Afghanistan.2 There ex- ists, nonetheless, a tenuous link between the two Since the much tougher line they advocated failed groups, which explains why the label has travelled to win the favors of the Democratic Party (Jimmy through time. This link is provided by a third, inter- Carter remained, in their view, way too dovish), the mediate family of neoconservatives, the Scoop Jack- Scoop Jackson Democrats crossed party lines and son Democrats of the 1970s and 1980s—named went to work for the Ronald Reagan administra- after Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, a Democrat tion. They inspired part of Reagan’s foreign policy from Washington state—and the real ideological an- —including support for the “freedom fighters” to cestors of the contemporary neocons, the ones who harass the Soviet empire, especially in Afghanistan literally invented neoconservative foreign policy. and Central America, the defense build-up, the hard line on arms control, the “evil empire” rhetoric, and The Scoop Jackson Democrats were also born of a the creation of the National Endowment for De- reaction to the New Left, but this time, inside the mocracy. But ultimately, Reagan distanced himself Democratic Party, when Senator George McGovern from this line, especially during his second mandate, won the nomination to be the Democratic candi- not unlike the way George W. Bush did with the date against Richard Nixon in 1972. McGovern was neocons after 2005. seen by traditional Democrats as way too far to the left, both in domestic policy (he supported massive For all their differences, the first two families of neo- social programs and affirmative action through quo- conservatives—the New York intellectuals and the tas) and in foreign policy, where he advocated a hasty Scoop Jackson Democrats—had a few things in com- retreat from Vietnam, deep cuts in the defense bud- mon. They fought the same enemies, including left- get, and a neo-isolationist grand strategy. Coalescing ist liberalism, moral relativism and anti-Americanism. around Commentary, Scoop Jackson’s Senate office They shared journals and institutions (such as Com- and a group called the Coalition for a Democratic mentary, the Wall Street Journal opinion pages, and the Majority, Democratic operatives and intellectuals American Enterprise Institute). And a few neoconser- such as Richard Perle, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Eugene vatives of the first family, such as Pat Moynihan, Nor- Rostow, Ben Wattenberg, Joshua Muravchik, Elliott man Podhoretz, Midge Decter, and Nathan Glazer, Abrams, and others, tried to steer the Democratic became full-fledged neoconservatives of the second Party back to the center. They wanted to get back to family, while some Scoop Jackson Democrats such as the tradition of Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman Jeane Kirkpatrick got much closer to the original neo- and John Kennedy: progressive policies at home, conservatives on domestic issues. That is why the label muscular anti-communism abroad, including the ended up covering the two groups, even though many defense of human rights and fellow democracies. original neoconservatives, especially Irving Kristol, the That is why they found themselves battling not only most important figure of the movement, did not share the left wing of the Democrats, but also Nixon and the beliefs of the Scoop Jackson Democrats—and The Kissinger’s realist policy of détente, which included Public Interest, the flagship journal of the original neo- de-emphasizing ideological concerns and engaging conservatives, never dealt with foreign policy.3 2 On the contradiction between the original neoconservative criticism of social engineering at home and the current neoconservative support for nation-building in Afghanistan, Iraq or the Balkans, see Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. 3 On Irving Kristol’s differences with other neoconservatives, especially on foreign policy, see my article “Was Irving Kristol a Neoconservative?” Foreign Policy website, September 23, 2009, available at <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/23/was_irving_kristol_a_neoconservative>. Why Neoconservatism Still Matters 2 F OREIGN P OLICY AT B ROOKINGS Then, in the mid-1990s, at the very moment when years, have been close to this school of thought. neoconservatism was being declared dead because Neoconservatism has no religious, regional or eco- the Cold War had been won, a third family of neo- nomic base. It is in no way an organized force with conservatives appeared: the latter-day neocons, who a central authority. It is at most a network of think- coalesced around The Weekly Standard (launched ers sharing an intellectual outlook, or even simply in 1995), the American Enterprise Institute, the a “persuasion” or “tendency,” as Irving Kristol and Project for the New American Century (PNAC, Norman Podhoretz sometimes described it.4 Last 1997-2006), and figures such as Bill Kristol, son but not least, one should always keep in mind the of Irving Kristol, Robert Kagan, Gary Schmitt, versatility and fickleness of labels, and never make Max Boot and Doug Feith. They are the ideologi- a fetish of them. No two neoconservatives think cal heirs of the Scoop Jackson Democrats, but with the same on all issues, and many object to being some differences. First, they are now firmly located called neoconservatives in the first place. These are within the Republican family. The newcomers, the famous examples of people who are incorrectly la- younger neocons, were never Democrats or liber- beled neocons—such as John Bolton—but also per- als. It means, among other things, that they have sons whose views are not well ascertained, or have to somehow reconcile their foreign policy stance changed over time.