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No.56 April,1993 The Other Israel Newsletter of the Israeli Council for Israeli–Palestinian Peace April 1993 No 56 P.O.B. 2542 Holon, Israel 58125 Editorial Board: Uri Avnery, Matti Peled, Yaakov Phone /fax: (03) 5565804 Arnon, Haim Bar'am, Yael Lotan, Yossi Amitay Editor: Adam Keller – ISSN 0792-4615 – Assistant editor: Beate Zilversmidt NOW, IF EVER! On the days following the deportation of 415 arousing doubts as to the Israeli Supreme Court's Palestinians – a step proclaimed to be "a decisive impartiality and independence, and of increasing the blow upon Fundamentalist Terrorism" –Israeli pressure for sanctions upon Israel. Prime Minister Rabin enjoyed an unprecedented The United States found itself facing a dilemma. It 9l% popularity rate in the hastily conducted opinion would have been uncomfortable for Washington to polls. The nationalist opposition strongly supported veto the quite mild sanctions which were proposed this step, as did the docile "doves" inside the Rabin against Israel, immediately after the outgoing cabinet. President Bush provoked a military confrontation A month later, Rabin and his government faced a with Iraq over Saddam Hussein's alleged "non- more bleak prospect. The radical Muslim Hamas compliance with U.N. resolutions". On the other movement was far from broken by the deportation of hand, the newly-installed President Clinton had no its activists; in fact, it had gained enormous prestige intention of opening his term by imposing sanctions among the Palestinian population, and its armed on Israel. Furthermore, American diplomats were wing continued to launch daring attacks, such as becoming alarmed by the increasingly independent assassinating an agent of the Shabak (Israeli security and assertive role played by the new Egyptian U.N. service) in the heart of Jerusalem. The PLO Secretary-General. Quashing the sanctions initiative leadership – very much at the request of its seemed an appropriate way to clip Ghali's wings; but representatives in the Occupied Territories – to justify such a step the Americans needed to get at suspended Palestinian participation in the Washington least some concessions out of Rabin. peace talks, until the deportees' return. The week-long telephone negotiations with Warren International pressure upon the Rabin government Christopher, the new U.S. Secretary of State, were mounted: U.N. Secretary General Boutrous Ghali's conducted by Rabin personally; all other members of call for the imposition of sanctions on Israel the Israeli cabinet, including Foreign Minister gathered momentum, as the United States appeared Peres, were kept totally in the dark, until the moment hesitant about vetoing such a measure. Rabin asked them to ratify a finished agreement. With the specter of sanctions becoming increasingly Under its terms, the Israeli government undertook real, criticism became more widespread among the to bring back immediately one hundred of the Israeli pub1ic. Influential commentators and editorial deportees, and to shorten the others' period of exile writers called upon the government to reverse its from two years to one. decision and bring back the deportees. Many of The Americans, for their part, made a promise to Rabin's ministers would have preferred to do so – prevent further moves by the U.N., as well as but they spoke their mind only in anonimous exerting their influence upon the European community, interviews. which after the deportations suspended talks on The ministers hoped that the Supreme Court would economic cooperation with Israel. Moreover, the absolve them of responsibitlity, by ruling the Americans undertook to demand no further Israeli deportations to be illegal and ordering Rabin to concessions concerning the deportees, even should bring the deportees back. But the judges, too, the agreement be rejected by the Arab side. avoided responsibility. Long weeks of deliberation The right-wing opposition in Israel sharply criticised between "liberal" and "conservative" judges produced a Rabin for "having given in to pressure";* but in fact, unanimous compromise verdict: by means of com- Rabin had good reasons to feel relieved. However plicated juridical sophistry, the judges ruled that mild, sanctions against Israel would have been a deportations without a prior appeal were illegal to grave diplomatic precedent. Without totally losing start with – but that once they were carried out, the face, Rabin succeeded in averting them; his pre- government was under no obligation to return the decessors sometimes paid a higher price. (In 1957, deportees. Ben–Gurion withdrew Israeli forces from Sinai and Internationally, the verdict had the sole effect of the Gaza Strip, after President Eisenhower threatened 2 to support U.N. sanctions on Israel.) hope for a significant step by Israel at the negotiating The precedent which was created, instead, is one of table, there was little to motivate the Palestinians to an Israeli-American agreement legitimising very come to the Washington talks. But the Palestinians' partial Israeli compliance with U.N. resolutions. In a ability to press their demands depended, of course, to direct television broadcast from the Knesset, Israelis a great degree on the solidarity – or lack of it – could see a triumphant Rabin pointing out that shown by the other Arab participants and in returning one hundred deportees legitimises the particular by the Syrians. continued deportation of the remaining three hundred, Over the past months, Rabin and his associates and thus the principle of deportation. repeatedly spread rumours about an impending deal The same assesment was made on the Palestinian between Israel and Syria, regardless of developments side. The hundred "reprieved" deportees refused to on the Palestinian issue. While it is difficult to assess abandon their fellow exiles. Members of the negotiating how much there was behind these rumours, one thing team persisted in their refusal to return to the was obvious: they alarmed Israeli settlers on the Washington talks before the resolution of the Golan Heights, the area Israel seized from Syria in deportee crisis. 1967, who held angry demonstrations outside Rabin's Palestinian public opinion in the Occupied Territories office. For his part, however, Syrian President Assad became increasingly disenchanted with the peace maintained a deliberately vague position on whether process – not only because of the deportations, but or not Syria would carry on talks with Israel in the also because of the new repressive measures introduced absence of the Palestinians. by the Israely army, such as the bombarding with anti- During his Middle East tour, Secretary Christopher tank rockets of houses where the presence of introduced a new concept: the U.S. was to be, from "wanted" Palestinians is suspected. Since the Rabin now on, "a full partner" in the negotiations rather government took over, a 20% increase was marked in than a mere "honest broker" as its role was hitherto the number of Palestinians shot to death by the army defined. For some Israelis, this seemed to betoken – many of them children. With no improvement in the threat of American pressure upon the Rabin these conditions in sight, Palestinian negotiators government. But such pressure failed to materialise found it hard to explain to their constituency a return during Christopher's visit to Jerusalem. Meeting with to the talks. the Palestinian negotiators, Christopher received For its part, the Clinton Administration remained their six-point document, and gave the impression of faithfull to its agreement with Rabin. Washington's being sympathetic to the demands contained in it. total control over the U.N. was convincingly reasserted, The next day, however, after visiting Rabin's office at as the Security Council ratified the Rabin-Clinton the other side of Jerusalem, Christopher contended agreement and dropped the deportees issue from its himself with acting as a postman and delivering to the agenda. Palestinians Rabin's negative response. However, when Secretary of State Cristopher set Rabin also did not encounter any overt American out for a Middle East shuttle tour, he found the issue pressure on his visit to Washington, two weeks later. still very dominant on the Arab agenda and a major In fact, President Clinton went out of his way to stumbling block for the American plan to resume the express warmth and respect for his guest, in an Middle East peace talks. Without an Israeli renun- apparent effort to lay to rest the ghost of the Shamir- ciation of further deportations, as well as a significant Bush confrontations. reduction of violent measures in the Occupied In the background of the visit was the issue of U.S. Territories, the return of the Palestinians to the talks financial aid to Israel, fixed at three billion Dollars a seemed out of the question. In their meeting with year over the past two decades, but now threatened Cristopher the Palestinians raised also the problem by the growing unpopularity of foreign aid in general. of the totally inadequate scope of "Palestinian Senior Senators, known to be staunch allies of the Autonomy" as envisaged by the Rabin government. Israeli government, warned that such cuts are Already prior to the deportations, the Israeli virtually inevitable; it turned out, however, that the proposals, assigning a mere 6% of the Occupied axe will only fall with the 1994 U.S. budget – giving Territories to Palestinian control, caused great Rabin some respite on that front. discontent among the Palestinians. Rabin's hosts did
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