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Israel, Middle East Review of the Year OTHER COUNTRIES Israel and the Middle East Israel X HE VIOLENCE THAT BEGAN in late 2000 and continued all through 2001—featuring Palestinian suicide bombings aimed at pro- ducing a maximum of Israeli casualties, and Israeli reprisals—did not abate in 2002; in fact, it intensified. Tough new measures by the Likud- led coalition, including stepped-up "targeted killings'1 of terror kingpins and large-scale incursions into Palestinian areas—such as Operation De- fensive Shield in the spring—brought only temporary halts to the attacks on Israelis and sharp criticism from around the world. An exception to the unsympathetic attitude toward Israel in world cap- itals was that of the American government. Although President George W. Bush became the first president explicitly to call for a Palestinian state, he delivered a speech on June 24 announcing that the Palestinian National Authority would have to undergo democratization, renounce terror, and select new leadership (that is, not Yasir Arafat) first. Toward the end of the year, with a U.S. strike on Iraq looming, the U.S., the UN, the European Union (EU), and the chief European powers promoted a "road map," charting steps that Israel and the Palestinians might take to reach an ultimate settlement. The security crisis loomed large over Israeli life. The economy, already hard-hit by more than a year of violence, suffered further blows. And while the Labor Party left the coalition and brought down the government on October 30 ostensibly over a budgetary matter, what was really at stake was whether Labor could devise a strategy for stopping the bloodshed that would be both different from Likud's and convincing to the voters. THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR SECURITY The Karine A With retired Marine general Anthony Zinni, the U.S. Middle East envoy, returning to the region on January 3, Israel eased its closure of 183 184 / AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 2003 parts of the West Bank. Troops were withdrawn from Jenin and parts of Ramallah, and the military encirclement of Tul Karm, Qalqilya, and Jenin ended. Yasir Arafat, however, remained confined to his compound in Ramallah, where he had been surrounded by Israeli tanks since mid- December 2001. Jibril Rajoub, head of the Palestinian preventive secu- rity forces on the West Bank, denounced what he called Israel's "fake withdrawal," designed, he said, to deceive Zinni. But all of this was overshadowed the next day, January 4, when Israeli chief of staff Shaul Mofaz announced that Israel's navy, the day before, had boarded and seized a ship, the Karine A, in the Red Sea. It was car- rying some 50 tons of arms intended for the Palestinian National Au- thority (PNA). The vessel was owned by the PNA and captained by a member of its naval police. The weapons found aboard, mostly of Iran- ian origin, included Katyusha rockets, antitank missiles, mortars, mines, advanced explosive equipment, rifles, and ammunition. Under the terms of the 1993 Oslo accords, the Palestinians were permitted only a limited amount of light arms for their police force. The PNA denied the Israeli assertions, claiming that they were con- cocted to undermine Zinni's mission. Indeed, Israel announced its find as Zinni was meeting with Arafat in Ramallah, after a breakfast meeting with Prime Minister Sharon. The announcement had the immediate ef- fect of shifting public focus away from Zinni to what Israel saw as con- tinuing Palestinian preparations for violence. In a radio interview that day, Dalia Rabin-Pelosoff, Israel's deputy defense minister, said that the seizure of the Karine A furnished "further proof that the Palestinian Au- thority has not changed its intention of achieving its aims through ter- rorism and violence." A spokesman for the Israel Defense Force (IDF) provided background information on the ship and its cargo. Apparently, at the start of the in- tifada in late 2000, Adel Mughrabi, a major buyer for the Palestinian weapons purchasing system, assisted by Juma'a Ghali, commander of the Palestinian naval police, started working with Hezballah and Iran to smuggle weapons. It took about seven months to arrange the shipment, and it was financed by Fuad Shubeiki, an Arafat confidant and financial advisor. According to the report, Mughrabi purchased the Karine A in Lebanon and had it sailed, with an ordinary crew, to Sudan, where a Palestinian crew headed by Captain Omar Akawi took over, and, in No- vember 2001, sailed the ship to Hodeida, Yemen. The next month Mughrabi ordered the ship to sail to Qeshm Island, Iran, where a ferry brought out its cargo in 80 large wooden crates. The weapons were stored ISRAEL / 185 in special floatable waterproof containers that, the army said, were pre- pared by Hezballah. The plan was for the ship to traverse the Suez Canal and then rendezvous in the Mediterranean with three smaller vessels, and these were to transport the arms to their final destination. But Is- rael, which had been monitoring the ship for some time, was not willing to let it get as far as the canal, and sent a force of naval commandos that took over the ship in a lightning operation about 500 km from the canal. On January 6, Prime Minister Sharon stood at a wharf in Eilat in front of the Karine A and a display of the arms it had carried, and told re- porters: "When Arafat gave the instructions to purchase the arms dis- covered on this ship, he made a strategic choice to bring about regional deterioration that could lead to war." Making the case even stronger against Arafat was the testimony of Akawi, the captain, in a prison in- terview filmed in the presence of Israeli interrogators and broadcast by Fox News. Asked who gave him the orders to pick up the shipment, he gave the name of Adel Awadallah, a top Arafat aide, and continued, "I am an officer in the navy. I am an employee of the Palestinian Author- ity. I take my salary from them." When asked whether it was possible that Awadallah could have been acting on his own, Akawi answered, "I don't know. I don't think so. One time I asked him why you are doing this and he said I am doing it for Palestine." Over the next few weeks, American officials repeatedly urged Arafat to clarify his role in the affair. On January 25, Secretary of State Colin Powell told a TV interviewer: "It's a pretty big smoking gun. I can't put it right at [Arafat] personally, but it is clear from all of the information available to us that the Palestinian Authority was involved." Powell said he thought Arafat "ought to acknowledge, as the first step toward mov- ing forward, that this has happened and they bear some responsibility for it happening, and give the international community, and especially the Israelis, some assurance that this kind of activity is going to stop. And do it in a way that will be persuasive. " With Sharon due to visit Washington on February 7, Powell made it clear that the U.S. would not renew contacts with Arafat until he com- plied with demands General Zinni had made of him, including the arrest of the three men who organized the Karine A arms ship and an end to the transfer of PA money to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 5 that Arafat "must act decisively to confront the sources of terror and choose once and for all the option of peace over violence. He cannot have it both ways." To be sure, the American administration was not about to let Sharon 186 / AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 2003 off the hook. In anticipation of the Bush-Sharon White House meeting, the Americans made it clear that they expected some "creative ideas" from the Israeli side to ease the strain on ordinary Palestinians, including a moratorium on house demolitions, lifting of road closures, and economic aid. Indeed, in late January Sharon met with three high-level Palestini- ans—Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala), the PA's number-two man Muhammad Abbas (Abu Mazen), and Muhammad Rashid, Arafat's financial adviser. According to Palestinian sources, the meeting—set up through contacts between Rashid and Sharon's son Omri, and, on a separate track, through businessman (and former Shin Bet official) Yossi Ginossar—took place with Arafat's blessing. Sharon reportedly came with suggestions for reaching a cease-fire and resuming negotiations as well as proposals for a long-term settlement. Agreement was reached on resuming security co- operation, and the two sides said they would convene again after Sharon returned from a planned trip to Washington. Later, Yasir Abd Rabbo, the PA's information minister, cited this meeting as proof that, despite Sharon's repeated declarations that negotiations would not be conducted under fire, "diplomatic talks are taking place." But with the Karine A affair still fresh, Sharon offered no concessions and the Americans did not press him. At the White House meeting, Sharon told Bush that it was essential to encourage the emergence of a different Palestinian leadership. "Arafat is not a partner and will not be a partner," he said to the president. "For an alternative leadership to emerge, Arafat's irrelevance must be made clear. This is a long process, but it could be shortened if the pressure on Arafat is increased." The pres- sure, he explained, would make Palestinians realize that Arafat is "use- less, that he is responsible for the suffering of the Palestinian population." Speaking to the press during the Sharon visit, Bush expressed his dis- pleasure with Arafat, saying: "Obviously, we were, at first, surprised, and then extremely disappointed when the Karine A showed up loaded with weapons, weapons that could have only been intended for one thing, which was to terrorize/ Powell received a letter from Arafat on February 10 regarding the Karine A affair.
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