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Livni wins election victory but Netanyahu to be new prime minister? Israel’s 2009 Knesset elections By Dr. Ralf Hexel, FES Israel, February 13, 2009–02–17 1. On February 10, 2009, early elections were held for Israel’s 18th Knesset. A total of 5,278,895 Israelis with the right to vote were called upon to elect people to fill the 120 seats in their parliament. In all, 65.2% of the eligible population actually cast their votes, 2% up on the last elections. 2. Israel’s political system is unstable. A highly splintered party constellation and a threshold of just 2% of the vote per parliamentary seat lead to frequent changes of government. 3. In the wake of the Gaza war, the election campaign was utterly dominated by the issue of security and the rise of the right-wing populist politician, Avigdor Lieberman. 4. The elections confirmed the right-wing shift in Israeli society. The right-wing/ultra-Orthodox camp won 65 out of the 120 seats. The left-wing parties suffered a dramatic defeat. The Labour Party won just 13 seats, and Meretz 3. The strongest party was the centrist Kadima, with 28 seats, followed by Likud (27), and Yisrael Beitenu (15). 5. The election winner, Kadima’s Tsipi Livni, will probably not become the new prime minister. Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu has the right-wing camp behind him, and will very likely be charged by Israel’s President, Shimon Peres, to form a government. 6. A number of options are available for the government coalition. The most likely scenario is a center-right government led by Benjamin Netanyahu, which also includes Kadima. 7. Difficult times are ahead for the Middle East peace process, since the victorious right-wing camp rejects concessions to the Palestinians. The Obama Administration will play a key position here, since it supports the two-state solution and wants to help a peace settlement achieve a breakthrough. 1 The elections for the 18th Knesset took governing Kadima Party, failed to form a place on February 10, 2009. A total of new government, new elections had to be 5,278,895 registered voters were called called. upon to vote for the 120 representatives in There are two main reasons for Israel’s the new Israeli parliament. A total of unstable governments. The first is its 3,416,587 votes were cast, corresponding enormously splintered party constellation, a to a turnout of 65.2%. direct expression of the highly During the 2006 elections, the heterogeneous population of Israel, a corresponding figure was 63.2%. county of immigration par excellence. A total of 33 parties or joint lists ran for Parties in Israel are set up not just along election. Twelve of them managed to enter political ideological lines, but also on the parliament. basis of ethnic and religious affiliations, as The political composition of the 18th well as specific group interests (e.g. the Knesset is as follows: Pensioners’ Party). The second reason is a) Center: Kadima (28 seats) the low threshold of just 2%. In the 17th b) Leftist parties: Labour Party, Meretz (16 Knesset, there were a total of eleven seats) parties (originally, twelve). The party with c) Rightist parties: Likud, Yisrael Beitenu, the most seats was Kadima (29). However, National Union, Jewish Home (49 seats) it needed three other parties – Labour (19), d) Religious/ultra-Orthodox parties: Shas, Shas (12), and the Gil Pensioners Party (6) United Torah Judaism (16 seats) – in order to reach the number of seats e) Arab parties: United Arab List, Hadash, needed for a viable coalition. As a result, Balad (11 seats) relatively small parties enjoy disproportionately great political influence, Why were new elections called early ? as well as a major potential to bring Since 1988, no Israeli government has pressure to bear so as to push their managed to serve the whole of its four-year political demands through. term of office. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was forced to resign his position on The election – a yearning for security September 21, 2008 after just two and a and simple answers half years in government, in the wake of Two phenomena determined the elections corruption charges and ongoing police for the 18th Knesset. The first was the investigations. When Foreign Minister Tsipi Israeli armed forces’ Operation Cast Lead, Livni, his successor as chair of the which was waged for 22 days (December 2 27, 2008 through January 17, 2009) Netanyahu. In 1999, Lieberman set up his against Hamas, which rules the Gaza Strip. own party, Yisrael Beitenu, which primarily The upshot of this military operation was targets the million or so Israelis who have that after the fighting came to an end, the arrived in Israel from the former Soviet election campaign focused exclusively on Union in the last 20 years. In the 1999 security issues and future Israeli policy elections, he was able to immediately win a toward the Palestinians and Israel’s Arab parliamentary seat. Under Ariel Sharon, he neighbors. While economic and became minister of infrastructure and sociopolitical questions, as well as social transport. For a short while in the Olmert policy topics, played a role prior to the government, he was minister for strategic military operation, by its end they had affairs. practically vanished from the election campaign’s agenda. This was in no way At the beginning of December, in other changed by the worsening global economic words before the beginning of the Gaza crisis, whose effects can already be seen war, Yisrael Beitenu was forecast to win clearly in Israel in the form of a drastically eight seats in the new Knesset. A increasing number of redundancies. The development then began which is a very topic of security became the dominant vivid expression of the shift to the right in theme of the electoral campaign. Israeli public opinion that accompanied the The second phenomenon was the meteoric Gaza war. The overwhelming majority of rise of Avigdor Lieberman , originally from Jewish Israelis had given unlimited support the Soviet Union, chairman of the right- to the military operation in the Gaza Strip wing nationalist Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our from the very start. When the operation Home) party, previously represented in the was terminated, more than half of them Knesset with 11 representatives. Born in thought this was a mistake and the fighting Kishinev (Moldova) in 1958, Lieberman should have been continued. They connect immigrated to Israel in 1978, and joined the Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Likud Party while studying political science Strip with the experience of Hamas’ firing at the Hebrew University. As a result of his rockets at Israeli territory on a massively friendship with Benjamin Netanyahu, who increasing scale. became the surprise prime minister in Lieberman managed pick up on this 1996, he first became Likud Secretary- atmosphere, characterized by fear and General, and then Director-General of the uncertainty, and to make skilful use of it. Prime Minister's Office under Benjamin After the start of the truce, using pithy, 3 populist slogans he challenged the Israel’s Arab citizens, together with the government and army to continue fighting, land on which they live, would be made and to “finish the business,” i.e. to subject to the Palestinian Authority, while in completely annihilate Hamas. At the same return, Jewish settlements in the West time, he managed to stir up public opinion Bank would be annexed by Israel. What he against the Arabs and the Arab parties in is proposing, in point of fact, is a population Israel by using racist slogans and transfer, resettling Arab citizens – who, accusations. During the war, against the after all, make up 20% of the country’s background of the large number of civilian population – outside Israel. When it comes casualties, Israel’s Arab sector sided to the question of Jerusalem, he is in favor publicly with the Palestinians in the Gaza of dividing the city, i.e. making its Arab Strip, accusing the Israeli army of neighborhoods part of a future Palestinian genocide: whereupon Lieberman accused State. Israel’s Arab citizens of disloyalty toward In Lieberman’s public appearances and their state. Using the slogan, “No political rhetoric, he can be compared with citizenship without loyalty,” he began a European right-wing nationalist populists campaign which embodied the central like Jean-Marie Le Pen and Jörg Haider. message of his electoral campaign. He Like them, he uses feelings of fear and also announced a legislative initiative to discrimination in order to mobilize force the country’s Arab citizens to take an nationalist and racist emotions, so as to oath of loyalty to the State of Israel. direct these against minorities. The fact is Another openly racist electoral slogan of that Israelis have been rendered insecure his campaign was, “Only Lieberman by the nuclear threat from Iran, Hamas’ understands Arabic.” These statements rocket attacks, and the economic crisis. had an immediate impact, because simple They are looking at the future with concern. answers go down well in difficult times of Such feelings are the classical breeding war and crises. ground of rightist thinking. In times of When it comes to dealing with Hamas, crises, people long for a strong man to lead Lieberman rejects any and all dialogue, them, and Lieberman is making use of this and demands the uncompromising use of longing. military force. In the context of the peace For Israel’s political culture, it is disastrous process, he proposes an idea of mutual that none of the country’s leading exchanges of territory with the politicians have unambiguously distanced Palestinians.
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