The Iranian Ambitions: a Yemeni Lesson for Syrians

The Iranian Ambitions: A Yemeni Lesson for Syrians

Policy Studying Unit 9th July 2016

Harmoon Centre for Contemporary Studies

Harmoon Centre for Contemporary Studies is an independent, nonprofit, research, cultural and media institution. Its main focus is to conduct studies and researches about the Arab region, especially Syria. It also works towards cultural and media development, enhancing the civil society performance, and spreading democratic awareness and values of dialogue, as well as respect for human rights. The Centre also provides consultation and training services in political and media .fields to all Syrians on the basis of Syrian national identity To achieve its objectives, the Centre conducts its activities through five specialized units, (1) Policy Studies Unit, (2) Social Researches Unit, (3) Books Review Unit, .(4) Translation and Arabization Unit, and (5) Legal Unit A set of action programs are also adopted, such as the program for Political Consultations and Initiatives; Program for Services, Media Campaigns, and Public Opinion Making Program; Program for Dialogue Support and Civil and Cultural Development Program; Syria Future Program. The Centre may add new programs depending on the actual needs of Syria and the region. In implementing its programs, the Centre deploys multiple mechanisms, including lectures, workshops, seminars, conferences, training courses, as well as paper and .electronic press

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Contents I. Introduction ...... 2 Second, the Manifestations of Iranian Politics in Yemen ...... 3 Third: Yemen as a Strategic Anchor ...... 4 Fourth: Iran and Slogans of "Defiance" and "Resistance to Israel." ...... 5 Fifth: The Repercussions of the Iranian Politics in Yemen, and the Arab Regional System ...... 7 Sixth: The Political Future of the Yemen as a State ...... 9 Seventh: Kuwaiti Deadlock Negotiations ...... 10

I. Introduction After the victory of the "Islamic Revolution" in 1979, it didn’t take long for Iran to start building and implementing its strategy of "exporting the revolution" to the outside world; and the Arab world in particular. The leader of the “Islamic Council”, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who led that revolution, did not deny the existence of such strategy when he announced in February 1980: "We will export our revolution to the whole world; so that everyone will know why we carried out our revolution", and he added: "We are exporting our revolution to the whole world, because our revolution is Islamic... and we will continue our fight against the superpowers." Consequently, and to path the way for implementing this strategy, few months after the success of the revolution, Iran began to develop its relations with many Arab countries, including Syria, Lebanon, Algeria, the Palestinian organizations, Libya, and Yemen.

Ever since, Iran has sought to strengthen its ties with these countries, utilising big misleading slogans, such as (fighting Israel, and the liberation of Jerusalem), to serve implicit national political goals, disguised as religious goals. It is true that this strategy has served Iran immensely, but still it has caused significant damage as well. It has provided Iran with a strong and complex relationship with some organizations, however, leading it away from whole other countries. One of the first results of these policies is the Iraqi-Iranian war (1980 to 1988), which claimed the lives of more than a million and a half million people, followed by the Iranian interference in Lebanon, attempting to establish a mini-state within the state, first through the Amal movement, and then by founding Hezbollah, which in turn succeeded in becoming an armed entity, outlawing the Lebanese legitimacy, and driven directly by Tehran.

Moving to Yemen, Iran has found a proper ally in the Houthis. It showered them with money and weapons, and trained their fighters, and motivated them ideologically; turning them into an armed force, an instrument to stir unrest and turmoil, and harass neighbouring powers. They even went as far as starting a war with the Yemeni army, consuming and exhausting it with four consecutive wars, until they got hold of the capital Sanaa in September 2014. They have even teamed up with the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to assist in the draining of the Yemeni youth revolution.

Second, the Manifestations of Iranian Politics in Yemen From the dawn of the Arab Spring revolutions, Iran focused its efforts and directed its policies in the region to drain these revolutions, including the Yemeni revolution. It worked intensively to ensure the flow of arms to the rebels, whether by smuggling them into Saada, or through financial support to enable purchasing them from the Yemeni markets. According to a 2009 report by the American Stranfor Center for Security Consultancy, Iran has established a base in Eritrea to supply the Houthis with weapons. Using smugglers, weapons would be transported from the port of Assab, to both ports of Midi and Al-Lehia; to Saada province, where the Houthis stronghold is.

In the period between late 2011 and early 2012, Iran has intensified its political contact with the Houthis, and increased arms shipments to them, as part of what is described by military officials, and US Intelligence experts, as an Iranian effort to expand Tehran's influence in the entire Middle East, through arming its allies of entities, organizations and militias.

Third: Yemen as a Strategic Anchor Regardless of the sectarian outlook of the Iranian interference in Yemen, Iran has sought, through its interference there, to achieve several objectives, such as the expansion of its regional influence as a precaution against any losses that could be inflicted by the Arab Spring revolutions. That could be related to the fact that Tehran has realised that its ally in Damascus would fall sooner or later; thus to avoid the risks, they started searching for a new influence in the Arab world, where potential large losses could be compensated, losses like those that could be expected as a result of the change in Syria.

Iran has realized that the possibility of extending its influence to Yemen, could not be achieved in a unified community and under the sovereignty of a dominant and stable government; therefore, in order to strengthen its allies, it worked on creating an explosive military situation, and a state of chaos that could be the background for re-balancing the power in the area. On top of that, since the outbreak of Yemen's revolution, Iran’s scheme included funding twenty media outlets, both paper and electronic, applying to obtain permits to seven different newspapers, and the launching of ten websites for individuals and groups, all of which were carrying out the same propaganda. In addition to that, three satellite channels addressed to the Yemeni public has been financed, managed by three established pro-Iran media outlets; which were, the Lebanese channel Al-Manar, the Iranian channel Al-Alam, and the third one was an Iraqi channel. Training courses for media cadres were being offered, organized in Beirut by Lebanese organizations, and connected to Iran. Yemeni officials have confirmed that these activities not only targeted the Yemen, but also the whole of the Arab Gulf states, and Saudi Arabia in particular.

On top of that, in an attempt to sabotage the situation in Aden as well, Iran contacted (the Southern Movement), which had some of its members trained in Tehran, and asked the leaders of the movement to recruit and train 6,500 young fighters; in addition to its ongoing support to the Houthis movement in the north. It is worth to mention that since the outbreak of the Yemeni Youth Revolution, Iran had sought to entice 1,200 fighters from Sana'a, Aden, Taiz, Saada, and sent them to Syria and Lebanon for military training at the hands of Hezbollah fighters, and then transferred them to the city of Qom in Iran; where they would be mobilised and turned into sabotage cells, controlled by Iran, and to be used when needed.

Fourth: Iran and Slogans of "Defiance" and "Resistance to Israel." Under the pretext of resistance to Israel, and under the pretext of fighting it, Iranians have worked to access many Arab countries. Since the early eighties of the last century, the former Syrian president, Hafez Al-Assad, worked on building an alliance with Iran, to serve both his regime’s interest and that of Iran simultaneously. The prevailing circumstances at that time helped him and made him succeed through this alliance, especially during the Iraq - Iran war, when he successfully blackmailed the Arab Gulf countries and Iran at the same time. Since then, Iran has been looking forward to extending its control over Syria.

Not for once, the Iranians were honest in their slogans against the Israeli occupation, and it was not a surprise to many when the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, declared in

August 2006, that his country "does not pose a threat to Israel", followed by his deputy and brother in law, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaie, in July 2008, confessing that Iran is "a friend of the Israeli people,", not forgetting the (Iran Gate) scandal with its relation to the Israeli arms out.

What is actually more important to the Iranians than "the reluctance against Israel”, on the ground and not just in slogans, is the fight against the Syrian people and their determination to finish off their revolution, and to save the regime, either by sending the Revolutionary Guards forces, or their sectarian militias, exceeding eighty thousands of fighter, or cross- training Houthis repels and sending them to Syria; where it is certain that hundreds of them are fighting alongside the Syrian regime thugs, having attended the camps of Hezbollah in Lebanon, before being transferred to the Syrian front. Some insiders confirm the old Syrian regime's relationship with the Houthi, stretching back to before the outbreak of the revolution, and that their symbolic participation in Syria confirms the coherence of the system allied with the “defiant” Assad regime. Furthermore, the Houthis believe that the fall of the Syrian regime is the end to their project in Yemen; because it will cut them off from their contacts in Lebanon and Iran. In this way, in Syria, they are fighting the Assad’s battle, as if it is their own battle.

Fifth: The Repercussions of the Iranian Politics in Yemen, and the Arab Regional System The Iranian policies have left serious implications and consequences in the Arab region, affecting most of the Arab world. It seems that King Abdullah, the King of Jordan, was not in the least wrong when he warned of the danger of what he called, at that time, the threat of the Shiite Crescent. But now it seems that there are two of them not just one single crescent. One starts from the south extending up to Sudan, and the other is from the north extending up to Syria and Lebanon.

We have seen how Iraq has been turned into the front yard of Tehran, bringing the loyalists to power, and establishing and supporting armed Shiite militias, such as Asaeb Ahl Alhaq, the Mahdi Army, the Badr Corps, and more than other fourteen armed factions, all of which are involved in the Civil War, and in the shedding of the Iraqi blood. We have seen how divisions between Sunnis and Shiites have expanded, even turning Iraq into armed "cantons", abstaining from peaceful co-existence, and raising the death toll, so far, to over a million and a half million people, including children, women and the elderly.

Also, and from the first day of the revolution, Iran was strongly present in the Syrian scene, stressing its support to the regime; claiming to maintain the focus of the "reluctance and resistance" against the Zionist project in the region. Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, which is part of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran, was moving between Syria and Iraq as he pleased, running a war here, another there.

In Yemen, if not for the coup of the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, on the Gulf initiatives, and his alliance with the Houthis, the Iran-backed repels, would not have taken over Sanaa, and most areas of Yemen. Even Kuwait was not safe from Iran’s policy, neither Bahrain too, nor the Arab Ahwaz which was occupied, and had its Arab identity blurred by Iran, in 25 April 1922, under the complicity of Britain.

The effects of the Iranian policy was not absent from the Egyptian arena neither, where the Iranians presented their precious consultancy to the former president, Mohamed Morsi; in the area of applying the Iranian model of the Welayat al-Faqih, aiming to open up the door to religious tourism to some of the sites in Egypt; to achieve a cultural and ideological breakthrough, leading to polarization, and appended to the political and economic centre of Alwali al-Faqih.

It should be noted, that the signing of the Iranian nuclear deal with the West, and the subsequent release of the previously frozen Iranian assets and funds, have had a great positive impact on the Iranian power in the region and other implications and repercussions on the overall Arab region, and in the context of these implications, the following can be determined:

1. Iran's expansion in Yemen: Since the launch of the Yemenis' revolution on 11 April 2011, Iran has sought to exploit the state of political instability in Sanaa; to expand its influence, after strengthening this influence in Baghdad, Damascus and Lebanon.

2. Effects on the security of the Arab Gulf: especially that Yemen has a major strategic importance for the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council; as it represents a strategic and security dimension to them. 3. The escalation of Al-Qaida related Terrorism: It is clear from the reaction on the growth of the Houthi movement in Yemen that this type of terrorism has escalated in an unprecedented way.

Sixth: The Political Future of the Yemen as a State There are several possible scenarios concerning the future of Yemen, these two are the most likely to happen:

1. The scenario involving division: This scenario could be invoked by the Houthis and Iran, in case their alliance with Ali Abdullah Saleh failed to control Yemen and its future. It seems that this scenario has no chance under the operation “Storm of Resolve”, and the growing strength of the Yemeni resistance, but it is the most likely scenario in light of the inability to reach a solution that satisfies all parties, along with the Iranians manipulating the negotiations in Kuwait, leading to a failed government. 2. The scenario approaching Somalization: this scenario is based on producing a state of instability, or a state of chaos, that could lead to civil war, motivated by a sectarian conflict that will not end in the near future.

Seventh: Kuwaiti Deadlock Negotiations Operation "Storm of Resolve" started on 25 March 2015, and then transformed into operation "Restore Hope". The Security Council adopted resolution No. 2216, on Yemen, and negotiations began in Kuwait in the 21 April 2016, and continued for months and months, without reaching any agreement. Because the objectives of operation Storm of Resolve were, since the beginning, to bring back all the Yemeni parties to a political resolution, to return power to its legitimate holders, and to respond to the Iranian interference in the Arab affairs, who was trying to besiege the region through Yemen, the Arab states participating in the Arab Alliance, consistently stressed out the importance of the negotiations, which may lead to a political solution, and that is after having destroyed most of the heavy weapons and ballistic missiles.

However, the Iranian interference in the negotiations, hand in hand with Hezbollah in Lebanon, has prevented reaching any political agreement so far, especially that the Iran- backed Houthis have insisted on getting what looks like a blocking minority, in an attempt to clone Hezbollah's experience in Lebanon. The UN commissioner, Ismail Weld El-Cheikh, referred to a large gap in the negotiations, which focused on five points: the withdrawal of militias and armed groups, the handover of their heavy and medium-sized arms to the state, agreeing on temporary security measures, and re-instating governmental institutions, the resumption of an all-inclusive political dialogue, and the creation of a special committee to deal with detainees and prisoners. These five items were not accepted by the Iranian-backed Houthis, demanding - in response - to form a government of national unity; to manage the transition.

The political reality of the Yemen indicates that the legitimate authority will not accept, in any case, that any political Yemeni party would use pressure and blackmail disguised as (veto power), and will not accept any political solution that does not remove the heavy weapons. Neither the legitimate Yemeni authority, nor their politically influential neighbours will accept to repeat the Lebanese Taif agreement, which excluded certain parties from the disarmament of heavy weapons, on the pretext of special conditions.

What we can be sure of that the Yemeni experience in changing the regime, was built on the flawed overthrowing of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the president who was partially dethroned, and such removal has not trimmed the claws of the military and security bodies. This is some experience that is worthy of contemplation and is to be benefited from, especially by Syrians who should not accept a flawed removal of Bashar Assad, because any untidy removal will lend the Syrian condition to something that is far worse than that of what we see now in Yemen.