Om Smolansky

O. M. SMOLANSKY (Bethlehem, Pa., U.S.A.) Khrushchev and the Yemeni Revolution (1962-1964): An Analysis of Soviet Policy and Attitudes* . In September, 1962, the ancient kingdom of Yemen, situated in the southwestern corner of the Arabian peninsula, was thrown into a state of turmoil which was to pervade the country's political and economic life for many years to come. Unlike earlier upheavals, which often marked the passing of power from one Imam to another and were usually resolved by an interplay of internal forces, the 1962 revolution sought the abolition of the Imamate itself and, for this reason, had far-reaching regional and international repercussions. Leading among them was the involvement of other Arab states, above all Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in the conflict. Along with their clients, the great powers once again became entangled in the web of inter-Arab politics. As the United States endeavored to balance its commitments to Saudi Arabia with a desire to maintain reasonably normal relations with Egypt, Great Britain and the USSR (though not to the same degree) found themselves on the opposite sides of the fence, lending moral and somee material backing to the contending factions in the Yemeni civil war. To the Soviet Union, the conflict in southwest Arabia was important because it constituted a struggle between "progressives" and "reactionaries," which presented a new opportunity to weaken Western positions in the Arab East, and because Egypt, Moscow's chief client in the Middle East, had become actively involved. However, while the USSR was concerned with the outcome of the Yemeni events, Soviet options in influencing their course were rather limited. To appreciate the complexity of the problem which Nikita Khrushchev had faced in this situation, it is necessary to examine briefly both Egypt's role in Yemen as well as Russia's past dealings with Imams Yahya (1904-1948) and Ahmad. Revolution and Egyptian Involvement t The death of the despotic Imam Ahmad, who had ruled Yemen since 1949, was announced on September 19, 1962. He was succeeded by Crown Prince Muhammad al-Badr who, upon acceding to the throne, displayed an interest in domestic reforms and 1 promised to pursue a policy of nonalignment. The new Imam had no chance to initiate reforms or implement new policies. On September 27, Radio San'a announced that a group of army officers had ousted al-Badr, "This article was written under the auspices of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs and the Middle East Institute of Columbia University, where the author spent the 1972/73 academic year as a Senior Research Fellow. 1. For more details, see David Holden, Farewell to Arabia (New York, 1966), p. 89; Harold Ingrams, The Yemen: Imams, Rulers, and Revolutions (New York, 1963), p. 128; and Ivison Macadam, ed., The Annual Register of WorldAffairs, 1962 (New York, 1963), p. 296. 33 abolished the monarchy, and established the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR). The new fled from the regime was headed by Colonel 'Abdallah al-Sallal. The wounded Imam in capital to gather support from the traditionally pro-Imamate Zaydi tribesmen the 2 northern and eastern provinces of Yemen and from Saudi Arabia.2 In early October, Sallal announced that the revolution had succeeded in crushing internal opposition. However, as soon became evident, the situation in Yemen was far from stable. By the latter half of October, the country was engulfed in a full-scale civil war. The republicans were supported by Egyptian forces, including air force, armored, and mechanized units, while the royalists were receiving substantial military and financial backing from Saudi Arabia. By the end of 1962, the republicans appeared in control of "the central triangle contained between San'a, Taiz, and Hodeida," "while the forces of the Imam held the mountainous areas in northern and eastern Yemen where prohibitive terrain neutralized the Egyptians' preponderance in armor and artillery, not to mention their undisputed control of the skies. 3 It may be safely assumed that without the massive military and, to a lesser extent, economic and financial assistance from Cairo, the Yemeni Republic would not have survived. The reasons which prompted President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir to commit his resources and prestige to the defense of Sallal so soon after enduring a stunning defeat in his attempts to lead the "march toward Arab unity" (i.e., Syria's defection from the United Arab Republic in September, 1961) lay, in part, in the history of Egyptian- Yemeni and Egyptian-Saudi relations and also in 'Abd al-Nasir's own vision of the role which Cairo was to play in the Arabian peninsula and elsewhere in the Arab world. Imam Ahmad, understandably, had been upset by the overthrow of Egypt's King Faruq in July, 1952. Remembering the assassination of his father, Imam Yahya, by a group of dissidents supported by the Aden-centered Free Yemeni Party,4 Ahmad was well aware of the dangers to his regime created by the establishment in the Arab East of revolutionary outposts which could be used as rallying points for his internal political opposition. At the same time, however, the Imam felt more immediately threatened by Great Britain's activities in areas adjacent to southwestern Yemen.5 In 1952, the United Kingdom, resuming its "forward policy" in the Aden Protectorate, had begun extending British influence over territories which earlier had been beyond its jurisdiction. As noted by Manfred Wenner, "Imam Ahmad took violent exception to these measures, which aimed at the amalgamation of the numerous small shaykhdoms and principalities in the Protectorates into a strong political unit under the control of a non-Yemeni and non-Arab power." Ahmad's attitude was understandable in the light of his conviction that "the British intended to remain in Aden forever, thereby eliminating Yemen's reversionary claim to that territory."6 The Imam also feared that this British-controlled entity would be used by Yemeni dissidents as a base from which to stage and direct anti-government activities. Since Cairo, for reasons of its own, also opposed the consolidation of the British position in Aden, an important community of interest between Yemen and Egypt 2. For more details, see Macadam,pp. 296-297. 3. Idem. 4. For background material on the anti-Imam activities in the late 1940's and early 1950's, see Manfred W. Wenner,Modern Yemen, i918-1966 (Baltimore, 1967), pp. 91-100. 5. For a good background survey of the tangled Anglo-Yemenirelations, see Holden, pp. 32-41. 6. Wenner, p. 175. .

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