Thesis People Power from Liberation
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THESIS PEOPLE POWER FROM LIBERATION SQUARE TO ALEPPO: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE IN THE ARAB SPRING Submitted by: Philip Robert Olson Department of Political Science In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the degree of Master of Arts Colorado State University Fort Collins, Colorado Spring, 2017 Master’s Committee: Advisor: Gamze Cavdar Co-advisor: Dave McIvor Sven Egenhoff Copyright by Philip Robert Olson 2017 All Rights Reserved ABSTRACT PEOPLE POWER FROM LIBERATION SQUARE TO ALEPPO: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATIONS OF NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE IN THE ARAB SPRING Beginning with Gene Sharpe’s seminal work The Politics of Nonviolent Action (1974) strategic nonviolent action has been touted as an alternative to violent insurrection against repressive regimes, and, in its earliest hours, many touted the Arab Spring as a powerful example of nonviolent resistance in the face of longstanding and well-armed bastions of power. However, the epithet “Liberation Square” imprinted on the architectural center of the protests that overthrew Hosni Mubarak has faded, while the architectural centers of Aleppo, Manama, and Misrata no longer exist. However, the Arab Spring should not be forgotten by nonviolent actors. By mapping the methods, both the successes and failures, and the dynamics of resistance as it spread across the region this project forwards three central arguments regarding nonviolent action. First, participants in civil resistance do not maintain uniform agency across cases, and structural conditions play a significant role in determining the success of nonviolent resistance. Second, nonviolence should not be an ultimatum, and integrating violent strategies of resistance can bolster resiliency and strength. Finally, nonviolence is not a panacea, and should be contextualized within the political and economic contexts of resistance. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................. ii Chapter One- Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 Chapter Two- Literature Review .................................................................................................................. 7 (2.1) What is Strategic Nonviolent Action? ............................................................................................. 7 (2.2) Why is Strategic Nonviolent Action Effective? ............................................................................ 11 (2.3) Discussion ..................................................................................................................................... 14 (2.3.1) Conceptual Stretching and Radical Flanks .......................................................................... 14 (2.3.2) How Strategic is Nonviolent Resistance? The Agency-Structure Problem ......................... 18 (2.3.3) Is Nonviolent Resistance Generalizable Across Cases? ...................................................... 21 Chapter Three- Method, Data, and Case Selection ..................................................................................... 23 (3.1) Method .......................................................................................................................................... 23 (3.2) Data ............................................................................................................................................... 25 (3.3) Case Selection ............................................................................................................................... 26 Chapter Four- Tunisia and Egypt: Social Homogeneity and External Inaction .......................................... 29 (4.1) Case One: Tunisia ......................................................................................................................... 29 (4.1.1) The Nature of Social Homogeneity in Tunisia: ................................................................... 30 (4.1.2) The Reasons for External Indifference: ............................................................................... 33 (4.1.3) Nonviolent Resistance and the Jasmine Revolution: ........................................................... 34 (4.1.4) Discussion: ........................................................................................................................... 41 (4.2) Case Two: Egypt ........................................................................................................................... 42 (4.2.1) The Nature of Social Homogeneity in Egypt ....................................................................... 45 (4.2.2) The Reasons for External Indifference ................................................................................ 47 (4.2.3) Nonviolent Resistance and the Egyptian Revolution: .......................................................... 49 (4.2.4) Discussion: ........................................................................................................................... 53 (4.3) Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 55 Chapter Five- Syria and Bahrain: Social Heterogeneity, and Sectarian Incentives for External Intervention .................................................................................................................................................................... 60 (5.1) Case Three: Syria .......................................................................................................................... 61 (5.1.1) The Nature of Social Heterogeneity in Syria: ...................................................................... 62 (5.1.2) The Reasons for External Influence and Intervention: ........................................................ 64 (5.1.2) Nonviolent Resistance and the Syrian Uprising: ................................................................. 65 (5.1.4) Discussion: ........................................................................................................................... 70 (5.2) Case Four: Bahrain ........................................................................................................................ 72 (5.2.1) The Nature of Social Heterogeneity in Bahrain: .................................................................. 73 (5.2.2) The Reasons for External Intervention: ............................................................................... 75 (5.2.3) Nonviolent Resistance and the Bahraini Uprising: .............................................................. 77 (5.2.4) Discussion: ........................................................................................................................... 80 (5.3) Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 83 Chapter Six- Yemen and Libya: Fragile states, Tribalism, and Necessary Violence ................................. 86 (6.1) Case Five: Yemen ......................................................................................................................... 87 (6.1.1) The Complexity of Structural and Historical Conditions in Yemen .................................... 88 (6.1.2) Nonviolent Resistance and the Yemeni Revolution ............................................................ 93 (6.1.3) Discussion ............................................................................................................................ 95 (6.2) Case 6: Libya ................................................................................................................................. 97 iii (6.2.1) The Complexity of Structural and Historical Conditions in Libya: ..................................... 98 (6.2.2) Nonviolent Resistance and the Libyan Revolution: ........................................................... 103 (6.2.3) Discussion: ......................................................................................................................... 106 (6.3) Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 108 Chapter Seven- Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 112 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................. 118 iv Chapter One- Introduction In 2011, beginning with the self-immolation of a street-side fruit vendor in Sidi Bouzid Tunisia, a wave of protests embracing democratic ideals and the expansion of political freedoms swept through the Arab World. Lauded for their nonviolent emphasis in the face of notoriously repressive regimes, these protests initially forced Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali from power on January 14th, 2011, and subsequently ended Hosni Mubarak’s nearly 30 years as president of Egypt. Since, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen, as well as a number of other countries, have felt the effects of this spread of civil unrest, not to mention, in many cases, the marked increase in both political instability and civil war. Unfortunately, the inspirational moment that was the Arab Spring quickly gave way to what