VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION

Libyan Militia Advocate of Hezbollah’s CAPTURED: Wali Leader Salah Badi Armed Rebellion: Salafist Ally in Jamal al- —The Self- A Profile of Lebanon: Ahmad Mashhadani Proclaimed Chadian Rebel Reveals Inner Abd al-Karim al- George Leader Dr. BRIEF Workings of IS Saadi Washington of Abakar Tollimi

FARHAN ZAHID ANDREW NICHOLAS A. HERAS RAFID JABOORI DARIO CRISTIANI MCGREGOR

VOLUME X, ISSUE 1 | JANUARY 2019

Al-Qaeda’s Man in the Indian Kashmir Their members are slightly more educated than Insurgency: Zakir Musa their predecessors. Born as Zakir Rashid Musa in the Tral area of Palwama district in 1990, Farhan Zahid Musa is a son of an Indian government civil

servant. Musa studied engineering at Apparently, al-Qaeda finds it difficult to lure in Chandigarh College in Punjab province, but fresh Islamist militants amid the rise of the dropped out in his third year and joined Hizb ul Islamic State (IS) in 2014 and the establishment Mujahedeen (HuM) in 2013 (HuffingtonPost.in, of its self-proclaimed Islamic Caliphate. This is December 16, 2018). With HuM, he conducted not the case in South Asia. Al-Qaeda Central terrorist attacks and engaged in other violent remains strong in the region, and core Islamist activities in the southern districts of Indian terrorist organizations orbiting around it have Kashmir. After the death of Burhan Wani, the not moved out of its circle. In Pakistan, Jamaat young Emir of Hizb ul Mujahedeen, in an Ansar al-Sharia pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda encounter with Indian security forces in 2016, Emir Ayman al-Zawahiri, while in India, the Musa ascended to replace him. He soon left Zakir Musa-led Ansar Ghazwa tul Hind (AGH) HuM to found AGH and declared his ambition surfaced in Indian Kashmir with openly pro-al- to establish an Islamic Caliphate and state in Qaeda stances. Kashmir. He denounced both the Pakistani Musa symbolizes a new generation of Islamist government and Hurriyat Conference (the terrorists operating in Indian Kashmir. This new political wing of the Indian Kashmir pro- generation appears far more radical in their independence parties). His anti-Hurriyat views views of violent Islamism and are actively were noticed when he threatened Kashmiri utilizing social media to profess their views.

!1 VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION leaders for calling their struggle political, instead them had left LeT to join AGH before being of Islamic. He said: killed by the security forces in a gun battle on August 1, 2017. He said: Our struggle is for implementation of Shariah. It is an Islamic They decided to join the cause of struggle… I am warning them Islam the moment they heard (Hurriyat leaders) not to play their about it and played a major role in politics. If they again try to formation of Ansar Ghawzat-Ul- become thorns in our path, the Hind (the Islamic name of the first thing we will do is behead you local al-Qaeda group),…those who and hang you in Lal Chowk. We used to call them traitors are will leave the infidels and kill you shamelessly paying homage to first (Wire India, May 15, 2017). them (Hindustan Times, August 5, 2017). The Global Islamic Media Front—the official online media wing of al-Qaeda Central— In December, 2018, six associates of Musa’s— accepted Zakir Musa’s pledge of allegiance and including his deputy Soliha, a.k.a Rehaan Khan officially announced that he was the leader of its —were killed in an encounter with police in associated group in Indian Kashmir. (Economic Palwama district after a shootout (NDTV, Times, July 14, 2018). December 22, 2018). That encounter showcased the growth of Musa’s AGH in Kashmir. Musa Currently he is one of the most-wanted terrorists himself was spotted in the Indian state of Punjab in Kashmir (Times of India, June 2, 2017). during the first week of December 2018, which Apart from his connections with his former led intelligence agencies to issue security alerts organization HuM, Musa is believed to be close about his presence in the Ferozpur and Bathinda to Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and his fighters districts (part of Malwa region) in Punjab. He work in tandem with them. Musa’s strategy was described as possibly being disguised as a appears to be attracting many Islamist militants Sikh (Indian Express, December 6, 2018). Musa from other Islamic insurgent groups in Indian is well acquainted with the area, as he studied Kashmir. For example, a number of HuM there until 2013. He may have been planning militants have left their organization to join terrorist strikes in Punjab, or developing inroads hands with Musa. The number of AGH with Sikh nationalist separatist groups. Indian members is rising according to Indian security intelligence and security agencies described assessments (India Today, July 6, 2017). Musa’s group as a small cell. After the deaths of Abu Dajana and Arif Lelhar Musa is held in high esteem among Islamist —two important military commanders of terrorist circles because of his affiliation with and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)—Musa claimed that they homage to al-Qaeda’s leadership, which were the first martyrs in the struggle for an considers his organization as accomplishing part Islamic Kashmir. Musa also stated that both of !2 VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION of its broader objectives. This indicates that Hezbollah’s Salafist Ally in Musa has grand designs of his own, which Lebanon: Ahmad Abd al- perhaps would constitute a new brand of Karim al-Saadi Islamist terrorism in the Indian Kashmir insurgency. Many Kashmiri protestors have been Nicholas A. Heras seen in the recent past carrying al-Qaeda and IS flags—a new but serious development in this part Recently, a senior Iranian national security of the world. official stated that his country would utilize its proxy forces in Lebanon and Gaza to unleash an “inferno” on Israel (Times of Israel [Jerusalem], January 29). These comments come as Israel has increased its military activities against Iran in Syria and conducted a campaign to remove tunnels built by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon that lead to northern Israel (Times of Israel [Jerusalem], January 28; Haaretz [Jerusalem], January 26). As tensions between Israel and Iran continue to grow over the future of Syria, Iranian-backed local militant actors in Syria and Lebanon are gaining power.

Ahmad Abd al-Karim al-Saadi (a.k.a. Abu Mihjan), a Lebanese-Palestinian Salafist militant commander of the U.S.-designated terrorist organization Usbat al-Ansar (League of the Supporters), is one such leader (U.S. Department of State, Accessed on February 1). It has murky ties to the global al-Qaeda organization, and it has been linked to a plot to kill the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon (Asharq al-Awsat, October 17, 2001). Despite this attention and pressure from the United States, Usbat al-Ansar remains influential within the broader Lebanese Salafist militant movement and acts as one of the powerbrokers within the Ain el-Helweh camp (YouTube, March 20, 2012). Usbat al-Ansar is estimated to have more than 2,500 armed members, with a core group of 800 full time

!3 VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION fighters, in the Ain el-Helweh camp fighters, including his brother Abu Tarik al-Saadi, Abu including Palestinian, Lebanese, and Syrian Mihjan is still believed to be the ultimate members. [1] Notably, despite its sectarian decision-maker of his organization. It was under affiliation, under al-Saadi’s leadership Usbat al- his leadership that Usbat al-Ansar was tied to its Ansar has been brought into Hezbollah’s most intensive period of operations against coalition, and the group’s representatives targets inside and outside of the Ain el-Hilweh participated in a conference in Tehran in camp: including against the leadership of rival December 2018 (al-Mustaqbal [Beirut], organizations, stores that sell alcohol, nightclubs, November 28, 2018; YouTube, March 20, 2012). and representatives of the Lebanese state, judiciary, and military (YouTube, March 20, Al-Saadi, 56, is a native of the Ain el-Helweh 2012; Asharq al-Awsat, October 17, 2001). In refugee camp, a major settlement within close recent years, especially due to concerns over the proximity of Lebanon’s southern coastal city of spread of Islamic State to the Lebanese- Saida. Believed to be a devout Salafist since his Palestinian camps, Usbat al-Ansar has engaged youth, al-Saadi is a veteran of the internecine more cooperatively with the Lebanese security Palestinian factional conflicts that have occurred services and other Palestinian factions, although in Ain el-Helweh. He made his reputation as a al-Saadi’s continued, underground role as the particularly effective operative in these battles (al- organization’s leader is still a controversial Nahar [Beirut], April 3, 2017; YouTube, March subject (el-Nashra [Beirut], January 28). 20, 2012).). He is a veteran of the still-existing, Lebanese-Palestinian, Ansar Allah (Partisans of Al-Saadi is representative of Iran’s efforts to God) movement, from which Usbat al-Ansar build a network of local militant leaders— developed as a splinter organization. Al-Saadi regardless of their sectarian affiliation—inside of has been on the run from Lebanese authorities Lebanon that will support Hezbollah’s influence. since 1995, on charges that he personally His sizable armed group, positioned in one of ordered the assassination of a prominent cleric Lebanon’s most sensitive areas, provides from a rival organization in the Ain el-Helweh Hezbollah and its allies with a Sunni ally in the camp (al-Nahar [Beirut], April 3, 2017; al-Araby Saida region, which has historically been a al-Jadid, August 29, 2014). source of trouble for Hezbollah. With Iran’s support, Hezbollah has built a coalition within Since al-Saadi went underground sometime in Lebanon that is not only able to assert influence the late 1990s, he has kept a low-profile. Though over the security structures of the Lebanese state, he is rumored to have mainly stayed within Ain but also has the capacity to subordinate most el-Helweh camp, it is also asserted that al-Saadi armed non-state actors within the country as traveled to Iraq to participate in the insurgency well. As the Assad government consolidates its against the U.S.-led coalition between 2003 and power in western Syria, and Iran builds military 2005 (al-Araby al-Jadid, August 29, 2014). infrastructure in western Syria to support Although the day-to-day operations of Usbat al- Hezbollah’s next war against Israel, local militant Ansar have been left to a small group of people, !4 VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION leaders such as al-Saadi are important CAPTURED: Wali Jamal al- complimentary pieces to Iran’s strategy. Mashhadani Reveals Inner Notes Workings of IS

[1] Interview with Lebanese expert on militant Rafid Jaboori movements in Lebanon. Interview conducted on January 30, 2019. On November 29, 2018, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) announced that it had arrested Jamal al-Mashhadani, a senior member of Islamic State (IS). Al-Mashhadani occupied senior positions in IS, including as the provincial ruler (ali) of IS’ self-districted provinces of North Baghdad, Kirkuk. He fought in some of IS’ landmark battles nearby Kirkuk in Iraq in 2014 and the battle of Palmyra in Syria in 2015. He was also commissioned to oversee the departments of training and administration in Syria (Iraqi National Intelligence Service, November 29, 2018).

Al-Mashhadani was the most senior member of IS to be arrested as a result of the campaign that began in 2014 and ended with the fall of the last IS-held urban areas in late 2017. In a statement released by the INIS, he was described as someone who played a major role in several operations and attacks that resulted in the deaths of many. The statement and the arrest of al- Mashhadani came as a rare direct message by the INIS, highlighting its role in the fight against IS. Along with the statement, a video of al- Mashhadani making confessions was provided to the Iraqi media (NAS News, November 29, 2018).

Jamal Khaleel Taha Zinad al-Mashhadani was born in the predominantly Sunni Muslim town of Tarmiyah just north of Baghdad in 1973. He followed a common career choice for young !5 VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION Sunni men who pursued careers in the army and Leadership Positions security forces under the regime of the Ba’ath Despite the fact that he was relatively new to IS, party of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. his credentials and experience as a former Al-Mashhadani graduated from the elite military officer and background and connections National Security College in Baghdad in the in the north Baghdad districts and towns made early 1990s and became an officer in the him a suitable candidate to fill in for the IS Wali, Directorate of Military Security (DMS), which who was injured in a bombing raid. Al- was in charge of internal security within the Mashhadani describes a meeting with the IS armed forces by ensuring soldiers and officers’ Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, attended by all loyalty and commitment to the rules and the regional rulers in Mosul in late 2014: regulations. [1] He looked very worried when his After the U.S.-led invasion of 2003 and the fall senior aide, Abu Muslim al- of the Ba’ath regime, al-Mashhadani found Turkmani, interrupted the meeting himself without a job, like many officers from the before its start to tell him that they disbanded former Iraqi army. Neither he nor the detected airplanes in the area and statement released upon his arrest shed any light there was an imminent threat of on why he was arrested by the U.S. military in coming under aerial bombing. The 2006. It is likely that he joined one of the non- Caliph fled the place immediately. jihadist insurgent groups like many of his comrades. Other sources suggested that he had IS was able to rearrange the meeting at another actually joined the new Iraqi security forces and site in the area the following day. This time al- became a major in the ministry of interior. No Mashhadani was able to give some insight about matter what exactly happened to him in the al-Baghdadi’s health condition. He indicates that years immediately after the invasion, he ended only a few months after al-Baghdadi made his up being arrested by the U.S. forces, which kept first, and so far, only recorded TV appearance, in him in prison until 2011 (NAS News, November July 2014, “he had considerably lost weight 29, 2018). [2] compared to the Mosul speech which he made only a few months earlier. He looked pale and Interestingly, he does not talk about any tired. I saw him taking diabetes medication.” [3] engagement with jihadists in prison. When he speaks about how he joined IS, he claims that his There was a one-on-one meeting with every wali recruiter, a man named by his kunya (traditional and al-Mashhadani was seen last. He was told to epithet) name only (Abu Zaid), was run his province until the recovery of the injured someone who knew him only briefly in the last wali. When that happened al-Mashhadani was week before their release. When both men reassigned and made wali of Kirkuk. In his first became free they met and Abu Zaid invited him commanding position north of Baghdad, al- to join IS. After weeks of hesitation, he accepted Mashhadani operated within a familiar and became a member of IS in 2011. environment. His hometown of Tarmiyah and !6 VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION other towns and villages nearby were spread fear regarding its nonconventional arsenal predominantly Sunni. The population was, in (Akhbaralaan, March 13, 2016). general, against the policies of the Shia-led Al-Mashhadani led the group during the battle government in Baghdad, especially under former of Haweejah, during which the group captured hardline Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki 13 Kurdish Peshmerga fighters. The men were (2006-2014). Although the area was never under put in metal cages and were displayed for the full IS control, it was very important to the public in Haweejah. IS was focused on its group’s overall strategy. It was a main launching message to terrify its enemies and demonstrate pad to attack Baghdad with bombings, and confidence. But al-Mashhadani reveals that even activities in the national capital have the utmost then, with Haweejah under their full control, the impact (Alsumaria, February 16, 2016). group was not completely confident and the Meanwhile, in Kirkuk, al-Mashhadani had new prisoners were quickly moved away from the and different challenges. adversaries’ lines to Mosul, where IS had more Chemical Warfare control (Youm7, February 22, 2015).

Oil-rich and ethnically-mixed, Kirkuk province is In Syria, al-Mashhadani also occupied a senior of strategic importance. Al-Mashhadani’s position and claimed to have fought in the battle appointment as a wali indicated significant of Palmyra in 2015. Eventually, as IS lost progress within IS. Although he comes from a territory, al-Mashhadani fled to Turkey, where he well-known Arab tribe, al-Mashhadani, who was was believed to have been arrested and released. known as Abu Safa, took up a new kunya, Abu He moved back to Baghdad, where he was Hamza al-Kurdi, to give the impression that he swiftly identified and arrested at his son’s home has some kind of Kurdish background. This was (Arabs Today, December 5, 2018). an apparent attempt to appeal to the radical Conclusion elements within the Kurdish community. It was also in line with IS measures to employ as many The INIS statement hails al-Mashhadani’s arrest of its Kurdish members as possible during as the termination of his direct threat, but apart military confrontations with the Peshmerga (Al- from the admission video, there has apparently Jazeera, March 21, 2015). not been a proper debriefing. Al-Mashhadani was an experienced security officer, which was Strategically, the 2016 attack on the town of his ticket into IS. His first appointment was as an Taza was not a particularly important battle for interrogator of Sunni locals who abandoned Islamic State. However, it was a significant event their jobs in the Iraqi security forces, to uncover for IS, as the group used some sort of chemical if those people would join IS or live under its weapon, for which al-Mashhadani was rule. He ascended in the ranks of IS and knew considered to be involved. The Taza attack was much about the group’s structure and personnel. one of the main battles fought during this time, His arrest should provide Iraqi authorities with a while he was Wali of Kirkuk. IS’ aim was to valuable source of information on IS members. !7 VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION This should help in tracking down fugitives and says that al-Baghdadi himself gave the orders to provide intelligence on how IS operated, which launch the chemical attack on Taza. Caliphs in will in turn provide Information on how the Islamic history were not necessarily the military group dominated parts of Iraq and Syria. commanders of their armies, but they still had a final say over their appointments and dismissals. There are, however, discrepancies in his It is believed that al-Baghdadi delegated some of narrative. For example, he claims that he was his powers to his senior aides who were former born in 1973 and admitted to the College of members of the Baath regime or Iraqi army. But National Security in 1989. That would mean he those people had actually become wholehearted was 16 when he finished high school, while the jihadists. In the days following IS's capture of usual age for finishing high school in Iraq is 18. most of Iraq's Sunni areas, the group cracked Concerning more recent and more significant down on the Ba’athists and showed that there events, he states that he was the wali of Kirkuk was only one power—the Islamic State. Al- when the Taza chemical attack took place in Mashhadani himself described how hesitant he March 2016, only to bizarrely claim that he was was when he was invited to join IS: transferred to Syria in early 2015. The contradictory timeline of his life and activities is There were many reasons for not challenged in the video of his confession. hesitation—first, I was not a believer in the group’s ideology; The confessions of al-Mashhadani and other second, I was a former officer in arrested walis give Insight into the structure of IS the old Iraqi army and I was under administration and the relations between its oath to be loyal to the Iraqi state. bodies and personnel. The position of wali is not autonomous: despite being in charge of a whole Al-Mashhadani eventually made the decision— province, a wali is not a member of the IS senior which was not easy—to abandon his past and leadership and has no say in its decision making. join IS. When he became an IS member, he gave They usually report to a senior aide to al- no indication of having any commitment to his Baghdadi, not to al-Baghdadi directly. Although past life under the Ba’ath party and its nationalist al-Mashhadani indicates that he was appointed ideology. by Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, a senior aide to al- After the military setbacks IS suffered during the Baghdadi (killed by a U.S. airstrike on August 18, past several years, many of the group’s leaders 2016), but a meeting with the Caliph was were killed. Members of the most senior essential to confirming his appointment. Al- command usually do not get arrested: they are Baghdadi is not, as some sources suggest, a either killed In air raids or on the battlefield. The puppet completely influenced by former security arrest of al-Mashhadani should be part of and military officers from Saddam Hussein’s meaningful efforts for a better understanding of regime. He is both the religious leader and the how IS operates. It should also help to shape a symbolic figure of the Caliphate, and still new strategy to deal with the group, which has directly makes critical decisions. Al-Mashhadani !8 VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION moved to another phase of its operations after Libyan Militia Leader Salah losing most of the territory it once controlled in Badi—The Self-Proclaimed Iraq and Syria. George Washington of Libya Notes Dario Cristiani [1] Full video of al-Mashhadani confessions was published on YouTube on Nov 29: https:// Introduction www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gb1Qdv-XS44 In November 2018, Salah Badi hit the [2] Ibid. international headlines when the UN Sanction [3] Ibid. Committee imposed a number of sanctions on him (UN, November 16, 2018, US Department of State, November 19, 2018; France Diplomatie, November 19, 2018; UK Foreign Office, November 16, 2018). This decision came a few days after reports that Badi had led another attack in the South area of Gaser Ben Ghashir and Tripoli’s old airport (Libya Herald, November 19, 2018). These sanctions, however, triggered angry reactions from a number of groups and personalities in Libya. Elders from —Badi’s hometown—took a harsh position against these actions by the international community, saying they undermined the spirit of the revolution, and people took the street to protests against them (Al-Marsad, November 19, 2018; Al-Nabaa Tv, November 19, 2018). The Head of the High Council of State (HCS) Khalid al-Mishri, criticized the sanctions, saying that they were "selective” while others noted that sanctions would have been more convincing if many of the other militia leaders named in the UN reports were included (Libya Al-Khabar, November 19, 2018; Al-Marsad, November 19, 2018).

!9 VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION In the wake of this decision, Salah Badi came Military Council in March 2011. He was placed more clearly into the international spotlight, in charge of controlling the southern area of the although he has been, since the very inception of town (GNC Facebook Page, November 6, 2012). the revolution, one of the most important Libyan According to Libyan press sources, he was one of leaders. In the days following the imposition of the fighters who oversaw the burial of the late sanctions, Salah Badi, speaking to an Italian Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi. Badi was journalist, compared himself to George filmed in a video that went viral in 2015, in Washington. He said that his struggle is similar which the body of Qadhafi was being taken to a to that of the first president of the United States, private cemetery and in which he spoke of recalling his role as commander of the patriot Qadhafi as a tyrant (Al-Chourouk, October 22, forces in the American Revolutionary War: “The 2015, Afrigatenews, October 22, 2015). During U.S. which is leading the free world was the war, Badi was one of the key leaders of the established by a militia guy. I am like revolutionary front and led the assault on the him” (Middle East Eye, November 27, 2018). airport during the battle of Misrata, one of the Whether or not this historical comparison is key battles of the Libyan civil war. After the end fitting, Salah Badi is one of the critical militia of the regime, he entered politics and won a seat leaders in Libya’s current political landscape, in the General National Congress in the with a peculiar and rather defined ideological parliamentary elections in June 2012, but he profile and significant support among a number resigned in January 2014 as, according to him, of groups in Misrata and other areas. there were a significant numbers of MPs who were representing areas supporting Qadhafi and Badi’s rise were working to undermine the creation of According to a CV published on the Facebook national democratic institutions (Al-Jazeera, page of the General National Congress (GNC), December 24, 2014; Afrigatenews, September Salah al-Din Omar Bashir Badi (known as Salah 20, 2018). Badi) was born on May 23, 1957 in the city of Badi’s time as a politician was controversial Misrata. He received his bachelor’s degree in though. He maintained the double role of military Aeronautical Sciences in 1980 in order politician and militia leader for almost two years, to specialize as a fighter pilot, after which he and he was accused of intimidating fellow MPs became a teacher at the Academy of Air Studies. by using his militiamen. He was one of the most He resigned in 1987, but his resignation was important supporters of the Political Isolation allegedly accepted only in 1992. He was placed law, among the most controversial post- on a travel ban list by Qadhafi’s regime, and was revolutionary political decisions taken in Libya, tried in 2007 on allegations of supporting a coup whose aim was to keep former Qadhafi’s officials d'état and the overthrow of the regime. He out of politics and which was a significant trigger immediately joined the ranks of the of the civil war in 2014. He considered himself revolutionary forces at the outbreak of the revolt, one of the last defenders of the revolution and becoming one of the leaders of the Misrata !10 VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION created the Jabhat al-Samud (the Steadfastness into the game—he firmly opposes both Khalifa Front) in June 2015, following the disintegration Haftar, Field Marshal of the Libyan National of the original Libya Dawn 1 (Libya Herald, Army, and Fayez Sarraj, Prime Minister of the June 18, 2015). Jabhat al-Samud was initially also Government of National Accord (GNA)—and known as the Libya Dawn Mark-2. This process has strong relations with Khalifa Ghwell, the started in April 2015, when the alliance began to Misratan who led the National Salvation fall apart after two of the most significant Government (NSG) and who attempted to Misratan brigades, Halboos and the 3rd Force, overthrow Sarraj several times. In 2017, Badi reached peace deals with their pro-House of threatened the GNA and Sarraj, saying that his Representatives opponents—respectively, the ultimate goal was to remove “Sarraj from Warshefana in the west and the Magraha in the Tripoli.” He worked with Ghwell to maintain south. Initially, the Samud front included about pressure on Sarraj and Tripoli’s militias seven Misratan brigades plus almost all those in (Afrigatenews, February 21, 2017; Libya Herald, Tripoli that were part of Libya Dawn Mark-1 July 7, 2018). He has often been accused of and later distanced themselves from Badi, being close to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and turning into his enemies (the TBR, Rada, to countries considered the main sponsors of Nawasi). The original declared aim was to “to that organization— and Turkey. Recently, protect the security of the capital” and protect its members of the Tripoli Revolutionaries’ Inhabitants from abductions and attacks, Brigades (TRB) accused Fathi Bachagha—the rejecting any compromise with enemies. new GNA Minister of the Interior, who now has problems with a number of Tripoli brigades—of The Samud Front has been responsible for some attempting to garner the support of Badi and the of the most significant security incidents in MB to strengthen his position (Ewan Libya, Tripoli over the past few years. In May 2017, December 28, 2018). In the past, when asked Badi launched an attack on the Abu Salim about his political ideology, Badi said that he did Central Security Force in an attempt to not agree with the MB’s philosophy, adding that, recapture the Rixos Hotel complex and the in his view, “a political party based upon a nearby Camp 77. Several members of the Abu religious view is pointless, especially in Libya Salim forces were killed in that attack. The camp where all of the population is Muslim” (Al- is next to the former Qadhafi compound in the Jazeera, December 24, 2014). However, while he capital’s Bab al-Aziziya area and was Badi’s might consider a party whose ideology is based headquarters until he lost it in the fighting that on religion pointless, all of his most important pushed GNC forces out of the capital. allies in Libya are linked to the MB, in one way Friends and Foes or another. Badi has a solid connection with Khalifa Ghwell, considered one of the most Badi has a very specific profile among Libyan prominent MB players in Libya. Many leaders militia leaders. He is firmly against all those with connections with the MB spoke against the actors who might seek to bring Qadhafists back sanctions imposed on Badi. The Included not !11 VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION only the aforementioned al-Mishri, but also al- revolution” (Al-Marsad, August 29, 2018; see Ghariani, the controversial Grand Mufti of MLM October 4, 2018). In this case, Badi acted Tripoli, who is considered a major element of out of tactical interest, as he saw in the action of the MB in Libya and who criticized the sanctions the al-Kani brigade an occasion to restart his as having been Imposed by the “colonial powers campaign to return to Tripoli. in the Security Council” (al-Marsad, November Conclusion 22, 2018). Another major ally of Badi is Tariq Durman, a former member of the Libyan Salah Badi is indisputably a crucial militant Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and staunch ally leader in today’s Libya, and he will have an of Ghariani, leader of the Ihsan Brigade in essential role in shaping the future of the Tripoli. The Ihsan Brigade is a group of hardline country. Different from other militia leaders who Islamists associated with Sheikh Ghariani, who are more tactical in their approach to conflict the TRB pushed out of Tripoli in December and alliances, Badi has a much clearer and more 2016. The TRB, a militia led by Haithem al- defined profile: he is against Haftar, Sarraj and Tajouri, took over the Ihsan headquarters in Abu the Tripoli brigades; he has deep and strong Salim (Al-Wasat, December 2, 2016; see MLM, connections to all the principal MB actors in December 10, 2018). [NOTE: I do not Libya (Ghwell, al-Ghariani, al-Mishri) and the understand the bolded text, as written: who took historical external sponsors of the MB in the over whose headquarters?] Badi also allegedly region (Qatar and Turkey). While his ideological has deep relations with Belhadj, the historic profile is rather clear, however, he cannot merely leader of the LIFG and a somewhat influential be considered a representative of a specific Islamist player in Libya. As for his international regional viewpoint or outside interests in Libya. connections, Badi has ties with Qatar and a He has solid support among the groups broad and well-established relationship with connected to him and remains a leader who Turkey (see TM, July 2017). He went to Istanbul made the defense of the principles of the 17 in 2015, and since then has moved back and February Revolution a vital interest. From this forth between there and Libya (Middle East Eye, point of view, he can be considered one of the Nov 27, 2018). He was in Turkey during the hardliners who see little room for any failed July 15, 2016 coup d'état there, and took to rapprochement with Qadhafi supporters or those the streets to celebrate Erdogan’s victory (Yeni who want to normalize relations with certain Safak, Nov 27, 2016). groups linked to the old regime. This hard stance also put him on a collision course with a number In the recent , Badi supported of other Misratan actors, and indeed the city, the 7th Brigade from Tarhouna, claiming that he which was very united at the time of the joined the battle to rescue Tripoli’s inhabitants revolution, has witnessed a significant and save them from “humiliation and differentiation of political positions and interests corruption, getting rid of the corrupted who are over the past few years—a process Badi played a poisoning the city and purifying the 17 February substantial role in. !12 VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION Advocate of Armed Rebellion: northern Chad to build a new coalition capable A Profile of Chadian Rebel of tackling President Déby and the powerful Leader Dr. Abakar Tollimi Chadian National Army (Armée National Tchadienne —ANT). Andrew McGregor Early Life

Twenty-eight years after taking power by force, Abakar Tollimi was born on August 5, 1964 in Chadian President Idriss Déby Itno faces the town of Fada in the Ennedi region of north- extremely difficult economic and security eastern Chad. After attending secondary school challenges. Chadians form one of the most in the Chadian capital of N’Djamena, Tollimi impoverished populations in the world, relying graduated from Morocco’s National School of on agro-pastoral pursuits for survival despite Administration and pursued further studies at being an oil-producing nation. Formed from the the Sorbonne in Paris, where he obtained a tiny Zaghawa minority to which Déby belongs doctorate in law in 2005. and notorious for its corruption, the regime nonetheless presents itself to the West as an Beginning in 1991, Tollimi spent 14 years in essential partner in the military struggle against public administration in Chad, including work as Islamist extremism in the Lake Chad region and an adviser on administrative affairs to President beyond. For nearly a decade, a once powerful but Déby (a Bidayat Zaghawa) (Khabar Tchad, June divided armed opposition has been forced to 3, 2016). While serving in that role in 2003, operate as mercenaries and bandits in Darfur Tollimi angered the president by objecting to and southern Libya. However, last summer they Déby’s planned response to the rebellion that began to make cross-border raids into northern had just broken out in neighboring Darfur. His Chad with the eventual goal of toppling the relationship with Déby continued to deteriorate Déby regime. in 2006 when the president learned Tollimi was forming a political party of his own, the Popular Unlike many of the rebel leaders, Dr. Abakar Rally for Progress (Rassemblement Populaire Pour la Tollimi is not a fire-breathing desert guerrilla, Justice—RPJ). According to Tollimi, Déby but the polished, well-mannered, French- warned him to “stay quiet, or I am capable of educated face of the Chadian rebellion. making you quiet” (Le Point Afrique, July 17, Equipped with a doctorate in law, Tollimi is also 2017). Tollimi took the advice seriously, and distinguished locally by his lineage as part of the departed Chad the next year to join the armed family of a chief of the Burogat Zaghawa clan opposition operating out of camps in Darfur of northern Chad (Le Point Afrique, July 17, with the connivance of the Sudanese 2017). [1] Having already played an important government. According to Tollimi: role in uniting and organizing the fractious Chadian opposition, it is likely that Tolllimi will I had no intention until 2005 to try to use the recent return of armed rebels to take up arms. When it is no longer possible to resort to a peaceful !13 VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION form of struggle, when one's own The FUC signed a peace agreement with Déby’s life is in danger and that one government in December 2006 that called for aspires to change the political life the rebels to be integrated into the ANT, but of his country, one must resort to many factions of the movement, including other means… Faced with the Tollimi’s, chose to remain in the field. By 2006, absence of a credible civilian the FUC had joined the Union of Forces for opposition, rebellion, the armed Democracy and Development (Union des Forces struggle, is the only way for pour la Démocratie et le Développement—UFDD) led possible change in Chad if we by dissident general Mahamat Nouri, the former want the development of this Chadian defense minister. Like General Nouri, country which is in debt in the core of the UFDD was largely Gura’an unimaginable proportions. Tubu. [4] Tollimi became the movement’s (Afrik.com, July 7, 2010). general secretary and led the UFDD delegation that helped negotiate the October 25, 2007 From the Sorbonne to the Battlefield Libyan-hosted Accords intended to end the At a time of growing tensions between rebellion. N’Djamena and Khartoum (fueled in large part The agreement collapsed almost immediately by the conflict in Darfur), rebel groups formed and, in late November 2007, the UFDD fought largely from ANT deserters attacked the border three battles with the ANT in the Hadjer town of Adré in the Ouaddaï region of Chad in Marfain (Hyena Mountain) region of eastern December 2005. That sparked a proxy war in Chad. The rebels were forced to withdraw which N’Djamena sponsored Darfuri rebels through the difficult terrain with heavy losses. against Khartoum while the latter sponsored Angered by alleged French intelligence and Chadian rebels against N’Djamena. Tollimi’s logistical support to the ANT during the RPJ, with its Burogat Zaghawa core, was one of operation, the UFDD declared it was in “a state the beneficiaries of Sudanese assistance. [2] of belligerence” with France and “other foreign In March 2006, the RPJ was the target of a forces,” a reference to EUFOR, a European government offensive in the movement’s peacekeeping force that was about to be operational zone along the border with Sudan deployed in Darfur (AFP, December 2, 2007). (BBC, March 21, 2006). The following month The UFDD feared EUFOR interference with its Tollimi was part of an attempt by the Front uni bases along Chad’s border with Darfur. Tollimi pour le changement FUC coalition to overthrow threatened the French reconnaissance planes and Déby’s regime by driving 800 kilometers from helicopters he claimed were overflying UFDD their bases near the border to attack N’Djamena. positions, saying the movement would soon be [3] The bold operation was repulsed inside the “obliged to respond to this intervention” (RFI/ capital by government forces on April 13, 2006. AFP/, November 30, 2007).

!14 VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION On February 2, 2008, 300 pickup trucks carrying Résistance—UFR) in 2009. An alliance of eight UFDD fighters arrived in N’Djamena after rebel movements based in Darfur, the UFR crossing the 800 km from their Darfur bases. began operations in the Salamat region of Tollimi told reporters via satellite phone that the southeastern Chad in May 2009. A series of rebels controlled everything except the counter-attacks by government forces failed to presidential palace, which would be stormed eliminate the movement. imminently (AFP, February 2, 2008; AFP/ Exile in France Reuters, February 2, 2008). This attack, like its predecessor two years earlier, was again N’Djamena and Khartoum came to an unexpectedly repulsed at the last moment. Much agreement to end their proxy war in early 2010, of the blame was assigned to Tollimi, who failed neither having benefited from it. Rebel leaders to fully commit his forces even as the regime who had once been given aid and shelter were tottered on the precipice. Tollimi would later now invited to pack up their bags in both claim he was busy trying to act as an interlocutor countries. As the UFR collapsed without Sudan’s with the 1,100-strong French garrison in support, Tollimi was deported from Sudan to N’Djamena, which the rebels feared might France, where he was given political refugee intervene on Déby’s side (Le Point Afrique, July status (RFI, July 18, 2010). 17, 2017). Soon after loyal ANT armored units Not all was bleak, however; in 2010, a prominent arrived to defend the palace, the rebels were French publishing house published an adaptation driven back into the bush in retreat. [5] of Tollimi’s doctoral thesis. Entitled La Résolution Afterwards, Tollimi explained his part in the des Conflits Frontaliers en Afrique, Éditions attempt to overthrow the president: L’Harmattan, , the work examines prevailing (and largely Western-based) methods of conflict I am one of those for whom the resolution used in Africa while analyzing how key is to put an end to the more traditional African methods of conflict dictatorship of Idriss Déby. If we resolution could assist in solving outstanding could have done it otherwise, we territorial disputes, a process Tollimi refers to as would have done it. Unfortunately, “the inculturation of international this man understands only the law” (Afrik.com, July 7, 2010). Asked in an language of force. For him, interview in 2008 which African politician or everything is a balance of power thinker he felt close to, Tollimi named Thabo and he respects only those who Mbeki (president of South Africa, 1999-2008), confront him with weapons Blaise Compaore (president of Burkina Faso, (Tchadvision, April 2008). 1987-2014), Paul Kagame (president of Rwanda, Tollimi, who appears to dwell in continual 2000 to present) and, most of all, Kwame political flux, became secretary general of the Nkrumah, “the father of pan- Union of Resistance Forces ( Union des Forces de la Africanism” (Tchadvision, April 2008).

!15 VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION In the meantime, Chad’s rebel movements As head of the CNRD, Tollimi used an interview relocated to Libya, where political chaos and to criticize the Chadian government’s rivalries provided work for mercenaries. Fighting mismanagement of the economy and the oil for both of the main sides of the conflict, the revenues that never seemed to lift the greater rebels were able to obtain funds, arms and population from poverty and despair. He said combat experience. Tollimi remained in France, that no one in the administration could “explain preparing for the day the rebels might be able to what we have done with the $2 billion in revenue return to Chad and confront Déby’s security that the sale of oil has brought in every year… forces. Tollimi noted at the time that the When a country does not pay the civil servants at international community typically condemns the end of the month or closes the end of the armed opposition to recognized governments. month by resorting to loans, we are in a state of This “reinforces dictatorships. The seizure of bankruptcy.” According to Tollimi, the president power by arms is condemned, but not the has deployed the Chadian military in various possession and maintenance of power by these military interventions as a “red rag he waves to same means” (Tchadenligne.com, May 5, 2011). the international community” to prove his essential role in regional security efforts: When the National Council of the Resistance for Democracy (Conseil Nationale de la Résistance pour la Démocratie— CNRD) was founded in March When we listen to speeches by 2017, Tollimi became its president. The Chad’s leaders, we gain the movement’s founding statement accused the impression that Chad is a haven of Déby regime of establishing “nepotism, peace, but in reality, the socio- clientelism, mismanagement and state political situation is explosive. kleptomania as a system of governance”(CNRD- Chad is the country with the Tchad, March 31, 2017). The movement also highest risk of implosion in the made efforts to include Chadian expatriate sub-region and this is likely to communities in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) engulf all of Central Africa if the and Dakar (Senegal) (Africa Intelligence, April international community and 19, 2017). friends of Chad do nothing about Declining oil prices led to protests against it (Tchadhanana.info, March 12, government austerity measures, which rocked 2018). the capital in February 2018. Déby responded by Tollimi turned down amnesty offered in May suspending 10 Chadian opposition parties while 2018, citing a continued lack of democracy (Le Tollimi called, unsuccessfully, for a national Monde/AFP, May 8, 2018). Recently, Tollimi has dialogue involving all political factions, including allegedly been playing a leading role in the expatriate Chadians, civil society groups and the National Front for Democracy and Justice in military (Jeune Afrique, February 16, 2018; al- Chad (Front de la Nation pour la Démocratie et la Wihda [N’Djamena], March 4, 2018). !16 VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION Justice au Tchad—FNJDT, created in July 2018), Tollimi sees a future in closer economic relations yet another rebel coalition consisting mainly of with China, possibly in an expanded role in Chadian fighters operating out of southern Chad’s southern oilfields: Libya. A video released by the new Front named Beijing is the economic power of Tollimi as the FNJDT chairman, though Tollimi tomorrow, and China already did not confirm the appointment allows us to no longer be offside on (TchadConvergence, July 27, 2018). The largest the chessboard of globalization. component of the coalition was provided by the What African would complain? Military Command for the Salvation of the China is a partner that does not Republic (Conseil de Commandement Militaire pour le pose as a donor of lessons, and that Salut de la République—CCMSR), which was is why it breaks with the old and involved in battles against Chadian government hypocritical practices of some forces in the Tibesti region of northern Chad other partners (Afrik.com, July 7, from August to October 2018. [6] 2010). On September 26, 2018, the FNJDT claimed to French material and political support have, have surprised and captured a team of 60 despite occasional friction between Paris and Chadian Arab and Tubu commandos in Murzuk N’Djamena, played a large role in maintaining (southwestern Libya). The commandos were the Déby regime in power. While Tollimi resents allegedly sent by Chad’s secret police, the French arms deliveries to government forces and National Security Agency (Agence Nationale de the use of French aircraft for military Sécurité—ANS), to assassinate the leaders of the reconnaissance, he still maintains that a common various Chadian rebel movements based in history and cultural and economic links to Libya (al-Wihda [N’Djamena], September 29, France must ultimately strengthen Franco- 2018). Chadian relations, though “this must be done in Tollimi and the Oil Industry a climate of neutrality and mutual respect” (Tchadvision, April 2008). Oil production in southern Chad provides over 60 percent of the national budget, but a large Conclusion proportion of these funds is lost to corruption or In early January 2019, Tollimi was one of 22 military spending, leaving the rest of the nation Chadians for whom Libyan arrest warrants were in dire poverty. Tollimi has pledged to honor issued in connection to attacks on the Sidra and commitments made by Chad in the oil sector al-Lanuf oil terminals on Libya’s Mediterranean (operated by both Western and Chinese firms), coast and the May 2017 Brak al-Shati attack that but believes a re-examination and “rectification” left 140 dead (See Terrorism Monitor, June 2, of certain clauses in the existing agreements is 2017). Nine Sudanese and six Libyans were also “indispensable” (Tchadvision, April 2008). included in the warrants with Libya appealing for international assistance in apprehending !17 VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION these individuals (al-Wihda [N’Djamena], accusations of human rights abuses. If the January 9). [7] regime can continue to find the funds to pay ANT salaries in a timely fashion, Tollimi may discover future attempts to overthrow Chad’s The CNRD protested Tollimi’s inclusion in the president from outside the country will be arrest warrants on the grounds that Tollimi had ultimately futile so long as Déby is intent on not set foot in Libya since signing the Sirte holding power. Accords in 2007 and had been conducting Notes “peaceful political activity” in France, where the CNRD is a legal political organization [1] The Burogat Zaghawa is a Zaghawa sub-clan (Makaila.fr, January 6). The warrants are a clear that resulted from intermarriage between the signal that legal options will now accompany the Gura’an Tubu and the Zaghawa. growing military pressure intended to force the [2] "They Came Here to Kill Us": Militia Chadian rebels from Libyan soil. Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Tollimi and his fellow rebels have failed to Eastern Chad,” Human Rights Watch, 2007, p. convince Paris of the necessity for regime change 69. in Chad, resulting in reports of French [3] In English literature on the movement, the intelligence and logistical support of Chadian FUC is often referred to by the alternate name government forces during the October and United Front for Democratic Change (UFDC). November fighting last year against the CCMSR around the Tibesti region town of Miski (Al- [4] “Alliance nationale pour le changement Wihda [N’Djamena], January 5). France and the démocratique/ National Alliance for Democratic rest of Europe are not seeking further instability Change (ANCD),” Small Arms Survey, Geneva, along the Chad-Libya border region, part of the M a r c h 2 0 1 1 , http:// route taken by sub-Saharan African migrants www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/ headed for Europe. docs/archive/other/armed-groups/HSBA- Armed-Groups-ANCD-March-2011.pdf N’Djamena hosts the military headquarters of France’s counter-terrorist Operation Barkhane, [5] See “Dr Abakar Tollimi SG UFDD à la tête and Chad’s military plays a leading role in the de colonne1,” YouTube, March 21, 2008, battle against Boko Haram and in the French- https://www.youtube.com/watch? sponsored counter-terrorist Sahel Group of Five v=AVMhyDpl0mE coalition (which also includes Mali, Mauritania, [6] See “War in the Tibesti Mountains – Libyan Burkina Faso and Niger). Under these Based Rebels Return to Chad,” AIS Special circumstances, Tollimi will likely find Western Report, November 12, 2018, https:// support for regime change in N’Djamena is www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=4308 minimal at present, regardless of misgivings regarding Déby’s seemingly endless rule and !18 VOLUME X, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2019 JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION [7] Other Chadian rebels cited in the warrants for mercenary offenses, murders and kidnappings in Libya include Mahamat Nouri, Ali Ahmat Abdallah, Adoum Hissein, Hassan Hissein, Timan Erdimi, Hassan Bouloumaye, Ali Oumar, Michelet Detapol, Mahamat Hakimi, Hamid Djorou Margui, Hassan Moussa Kelley, Mahamat Moussa Margui, Mahamat Mahdi Ali and Bichara Hadjar Erdi.

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