View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives The Libyan Rebellion: With Media as a Weapon A study of a modern insurgency’s effort to influence international media By Amund Bakke Foss Master’s thesis – Peace and Conflict Studies, Department of Political Science UNIVERSITY OF OSLO May, 2012 II The Libyan Rebellion: With Media as a Weapon A study of a modern insurgency’s effort to influence international media By Amund Bakke Foss Master’s thesis – Peace and Conflict Studies, Department of Political Science UNIVERSITY OF OSLO May, 2012 III © Amund Bakke Foss 2012 The Libyan Rebellion: With Media as a Weapon Amund Bakke Foss http://www.duo.uio.no/ Trykk: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo IV Abstract “The success of this revolution I owe to two: First is God. Second is the journalist.” (Mohammed Elkish, head of the international media unit, NTC) During the spring of 2011 thousands of international journalists entered rebel-held eastern Libya to report on the popular uprising that rapidly developed into a full-blown civil war. The revolutionary insurgency was in need of both international legitimacy and support for their struggle, and they got what they wanted: Support from the western public, and military support in form of a UN certified air based bombing campaign against their adversary, Muammar Gaddafi. This qualitative study examines how the Libyan rebel movement organized, strategized and worked to facilitate for, and influence, international journalists during the conflict. The research is based on interviews with international journalists, Libyan rebel activists, and people in leading positions in the Libyan rebel movement, the National Transitional Council. I will show how the rebels saw international journalist and massive media attention as a vital weapon in their struggle. Without this kind of attention the rebels hardly believe they would have succeeded, and they assume that their uprising could have been stifled. The rebels also believe their intense media efforts helped drum up the support for the UN Security Council’s decision to intervene in the conflict through a military campaign. I will show how the rebel movement’s media organization was relatively large, was structured, and emerged from below. There was no clear plan from the beginning, but as events intensified both strategy and organizing evolved rapidly. Their own ‘Rebel Media Center’ was central in this work. The rebels used propaganda as a part of their strategy, at times they mislead and produced false information, and many journalists used this information uncritically. I will argue that during the war in Libya there was a mutual dependence between the journalists and the rebels. Both groups needed each other to achieve what they wanted. This win-win situation helped the rebels’ cause, and by savvy and intense efforts they managed to take advantage of the situation and benefit from it. V Acknowledgements Working with this project has been a memorable experience. I want to thank those who helped me on the way: Fritt Ord, for believing in my project and helping me economically. My supervisor Roy Krøvel, who has given me helpful advise and support from the beginning to the end. My family, especially my brother Andreas, for support. The students on 9th floor, and my other friends, that had to bear my daily frustration during the winter of 2012, as I struggled to get a visa to Libya. Øyvind, for coffee breaks. Gruppa, for much needed online non-academic breaks and fun. The journalists that have helped me, especially Yama Wolusmal and Åsne Seierstad. All my informants, who gave of their time and knowledge. Their willingness to share their experiences from the war in Libya has been crucial for this project. Finally, thanks to Idris, my Libyan friend, who helped me during my stay. I would love to come back. Amund Bakke Foss, Oslo, May 2012 VI Content 1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1 2 Existing literature and theory ............................................................................................... 5 2.1 Types of insurgency ...................................................................................................... 5 2.2 Strategy: Time, space, legitimacy and support ............................................................. 7 2.3 Importance of legitimacy and support........................................................................... 8 2.4 Propaganda.................................................................................................................. 10 2.5 Journalism and the CNN effect ................................................................................... 12 3 Background ........................................................................................................................ 16 3.1 Physical, human terrain and economy......................................................................... 16 3.2 Gaddafi, tribes, allegiance and military ...................................................................... 17 3.3 The Arab spring and first stages of the civil war ........................................................ 19 3.4 The formation of NTC................................................................................................. 20 3.5 International reactions and intervention...................................................................... 20 3.6 Western popular support of intervention..................................................................... 23 3.7 Stalemate, negotiations and end of the conflict........................................................... 23 3.8 The rebels’ wrongdoings............................................................................................. 25 4 Method ............................................................................................................................... 26 4.1 Choice of qualitative research and interview .............................................................. 26 4.2 Research planning and trip to Libya ........................................................................... 28 4.3 Design/sample ............................................................................................................. 29 4.4 Transcription and analysis........................................................................................... 32 4.5 Verification.................................................................................................................. 33 5 Results and analysis ........................................................................................................... 36 5.1 The journalists............................................................................................................. 36 5.1.1 Rebels’ enthusiasm towards journalists ............................................................... 36 5.1.2 Rebel media organization, seen by journalists ..................................................... 38 5.1.3 The rebels’ message to the journalists.................................................................. 41 5.1.4 Hostility towards the media, and propaganda ...................................................... 43 5.1.5 Why the war was popular among journalists ....................................................... 46 5.2 Young helpers and activists......................................................................................... 47 5.2.1 Media Center – Organization and work ............................................................... 47 VII 5.2.2 Diaspora activists: Organization .......................................................................... 51 5.2.3 Motivation and the belief in the power of media ................................................. 53 5.2.4 The activists’ message.......................................................................................... 56 5.3 National Transitional Council ..................................................................................... 57 5.3.1 An emerging organization.................................................................................... 57 5.3.2 Views on legitimacy and support in relation to media......................................... 60 5.3.3 The motivation for a comprehensive media effort ............................................... 62 5.3.4 Propaganda efforts................................................................................................ 64 6 Conclusion.......................................................................................................................... 68 Bibliography............................................................................................................................. 72 Appendix:................................................................................................................................. 77 VIII IX 1 Introduction It was an overwhelming welcome. On February 23, 2011, three days after Muammar Gaddafi’s men fled Benghazi, CNN’s Ben Wedeman was the first international journalist to enter the rebel-held eastern Libya. Tens of thousands of rallying citizens met him, praising his presence and thanking him for being there. His live report was the first TV-pictures the world could see from the popular uprising. “I almost feel that I am not up to the task of conveying the significance of what