Election Issue: Militants in Libyan Politics A Militant Leadership Monitor Special Report Recovering From Several Decades of Gaddafi’s Rule

Quarterly Special Report u July 2012

A Focus on the Role of Militants in Libyan Politics

The Libyan Political Landscape: Between Local Fragmentation and National Democratic Ambitions By Dario Cristiani ...... 2

emerging leaders in : jihadists resorting to politics to create an islamic state By Camille Tawil ...... 6

from militia leader to defense minister: a biographical sketch of osama al-juwali Belhadj: one of many militant leaders By Dario Cristiani ...... 9 who participated in the Libyan elections

The Ideological Influence of “the blind sheikh” OmAr Abdel Rahman on Libyan Militants Militant Leadership Monitor, the By Michael W. S. Ryan ...... 10 Jamestown Foundation’s premier subscription-based publication, The Zintan Militia and the Fragmented Libyan State allows subscribers to access By Dario Cristiani ...... 13 unique biographies and insightful analyses about key militants and libyan elections: a timeline of key events leaders in countries around the By Jacob Zenn...... 16 world. Introduction The opinions expressed within In the aftermath of the revolution and the overthrow of Moammar Gaddafi, Libya is undergoing tremendous are solely those of the authors and changes. On July 7, the oil-rich North African country held its first national election in over four decades, do not necessarily reflect those of however the emergence of regionally based militias continue to pose a threat to Libya’s stability. While the The Jamestown Foundation. Libyan people are united by their hunger for legitimacy, the country is rife with militant groups, each defending their own specific interests while some groups espouse militant views of the West. This Special Report includes articles from Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown’s Global Terrorism This special supplement to Militant Leadership Monitor known as the Quarterly Special Report (QSR) assesses Analysis publication. the changing role of jihadists and militants in Libya as the country experiences its first ever democratic elections. It also looks ahead at some of the key actors shaping the internal struggle for authority and legitimacy in post- Gaddafi Libya. Jamestown analysts – Dario Cristiani, Michael Ryan, and Camille Tawil – highlight some of the efforts and security challenges involved in the creation of a new political system in Libya and the ideological factors influencing Libyan militant groups and the former fighters now turned politicians vying for power as a result of the recent elections.

Militant Leadership Monitor’s special QSR on Libya begins with Dario Cristiani’s analysis of the political and security landscape in Libya, and the fragmented society that has historically inhibited the effectiveness of a For comments or questions national government. Then Camille Tawil provides biographies of emerging leaders Abdel Hakim Belhadj, about our publications, please leader of al-Watan; Sami Al-Saadi, the leader of al-Umma; and Abdul Wahhab Qaid, a former leader of the send an email to Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). He analyzes their various political platforms and the consequences of if they gain seats in the new Libyan parliament, as well as his attitude. Mr. Tawil focuses on the significance of [email protected], or contact jihadists entering the political scene – it is revolutionary that the militants are seeking political means rather us at: than violence to effect the change they want to see. Following this analysis, Michael Ryan provides an up close look at Omar Abdel Rahman, “The Blind Sheik” currently incarcerated in the United States, whose ideological 1111 16th St. NW, Suite #320 influence is inspiring a new generation of militant jihadists in Libya. Next Dario Cristiani analyzes the rise of Washington, DC • 20036 militant groups in post- Gaddafi Libya with a portrait of the Zintan militia, and a biographical sketch of one of Tel: (202) 483-8888 its key leaders, Osama al-Juwali, who currently serves as Libyan Defense Minister. The QSR concludes with a Fax: (202) 483-8337 summary of key events that have transpired in Libya since the uprising began, leading up to the nation’s first elections. TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE MILITANT LEADERSHIP MONITOR, VISIT mlm.jamestown.org Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u July 2012 The Libyan Political Landscape: struggling to emerge as the sole holder of legitimate force and whose legitimacy is undermined by the rising popular Between Local Fragmentation and perception that it is a secretive and opaque body, which manages oil revenues and the country’s wealth along tribal, National Democratic Ambitions family and patronage lines. Dario Cristiani The following analysis will focus on providing a picture of the current political landscape of the country, explaining July 7, 2012 has become an historical date for Libya: it was why dynamics of local fragmentation have emerged so the day of the first national elections of its history, with strongly in the aftermath of the revolution. After analyzing 3,707 candidates running in 72 districts nationwide. These the roots of Libyan ontological fragmentations as settled elections formally signal the start of a new era in Libya. through centuries of lack of central authorities, socio- Whether this event will also signal the dawn of a transition cultural isolation and poor interaction of its people, the the to a more substantive and stable political and security system ongoing situation in the West, the East and the South of the remains to be seen. Dozens of political parties emerged in country will be explored, highlighting the militias, factions, Libya to compete in the elections, although only a few parties groups, and tribes that matter in the current Libyan context. were able to present candidates in all the constituencies, such as the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Justice Libyan Cleavages: A History of Fragmentation and Development Party; the Homeland Party of Belhadj, The National Front, heir of a well known opposition group to In itself, Libya has several scales and typologies of cleavages, Gaddafi during his rule; the National Centrist Party; and the ranging from cultural habits to social identities, political National Forces Alliance, a coalition of parties lead by former loyalties to ethnic identification, rural feelings to urbanized Prime Minister of the NTC . The electoral dynamics, and from desert to coastal vivacity. Libya, as known commission quoted preliminary figures: that the number of today, was established on December, 24 1951, and consists of voters was approximately 1.6 million, about 60% of voters three main areas: the eastern , known in as (AFP, July 8). Although the official results will not be known Barqah; the western and the internal . until five days after the election according to the UN envoy These three geographical regions present distinct and peculiar to the country Ian Martina, early reports suggest the alliance geo-cultural identities and geo-political orientations, as their lead by Jibril performed particularly well, while the Islamist history was largely characterized by separateness rather than parties performed worse than expected (, July 8). interaction, exacerbated by the physical characteristics of the Libyan geographical landscape. Although physical geography The situation in Libya in the days approaching the elections does not mechanically determine social, political and was characterized by mixed feelings: on one side, people were economic dynamics, it nevertheless plays a fundamental role excited to vote for the first time in their lives. Many Libyans in shaping specific paths of historical development. There are have known only the Jamahiriya (the political system enormous distances of severe desert environment dividing created by Gaddafi) and Gaddafi during their lives, and these regions – over 90% of Libya’s territory is desert; the therefore this occasion was indisputably a major “life event” poor and loose infrastructural network of roads and the lack for almost the entire population. Many Libyans recall that of suitable means of transportation have favoured, during the the bloody revolution leading to the overthrow of Gaddafi centuries, the emergence of distinct geo-cultural identities was fought essentially to provide them with more effective and self-sufficient, isolated and non-integrated economies opportunities for political participation. Accordingly, there with their own peculiar geopolitical orientations. was widespread enthusiasm to cast ballots. The three regions in Libya are distinct from a geo-cultural However, opposite the popular enthusiasm for the electoral point of view but they are similar in that each behaves process, there were continuous and persistent frictions that autonomously. Historically, they have merged together have been shaking the country since the end of the revolution only against those threats which have been perceived as such as continuous protests, above all, in those areas that have common. Thinking “local” is a major feature of the political been feeling marginalized by the ongoing crystallization of and social groups that inhabit Libya since the times of the new political balances as well as clashes between opposed Roman Empire, as evidenced by the consistent difficulty for militias, tribes and families in different areas of the country. a centralized power to impose its will on local tribes and Another issue has been the increasing loss of legitimacy of families. Even the , who arrived in Libya at the time of the National Transitional Council (NTC), which has been their westward expansion during the second caliphate (642 2 Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u July 2012 current era in Cyrenaica) and were successful in subduing legitimacy of the NTC is not helping this situation improve. local resistance, thanks to their command of the desert, Though security is currently stronger where militias are experienced several problems in attempts to impose their greater and well organized, there is a de facto autonomous own power on the tribes and people of these areas. For power controlling the territories, as it is the case in the cities decades, under the Ottoman rule, these areas were distinct of and Zintan, home to the biggest militias of the vilayets (provinces), holding rather loose links to Istanbul country. and the Sultan. Local notables, tribes and even some families used to enjoy a rather strong degree of political and legal As noted by Jacob Mundy: “Power in Libya is now heavily autonomy, and often refused to pay taxes to the Sultan. determined by three factors: the size and reach of each area’s militias; each militias’ role in the revolution; and each area’s This is a resistance, arguably similar, to what happened in economic independence.” Where there is not a sole militia the 2011 uprising against Gaddafi: tribes and families of controlling a specific portion of territory, the situation is the major Libyan cities merged together in a composite more volatile, as some militia members indulged allegedly and heterogeneous front against the common enemy. The in some micro-criminal actions, such as car-jacking, armed revolution showed once again the tribes in Libya retain a assaults and other crimes. fundamental social role in defining the political destiny of the country (al-Sharq al-Awsat, Feb. 22, 2011). However it is The Current Situation important to note that shortly after the end of the uprising, the anti-Gaddafi front started to show several signs of In , the situation remains more or less stable, although divisions and rising hostilities. it is based on an informal balance of power between all the militias which entered the city following the end of the During the early years of his rule, Gaddafi attempted to civil war. Micro-crime is on the rise, given the lack of an downplay the tribal system, opting for the abolition of tribes incumbent and recognized central power and the weak legal as a legal institution and changing the configuration of local environment, although the national police are beginning administrative units to reduce their tribal homogeneity. But, to step in. However, from a broad political perspective, the after a few years, the Brother Leader had to adopt a more situation is more positive than in other areas of the country. pragmatic approach and four tribes became the backbone of Indeed, the situation is much more complex and volatile Gaddafi’s support: al-Qadhafa, Gaddafi’s tribe; al-Warfala, in the Eastern and Southern parts of the country, where the biggest tribe in Libya estimated to represent one out political, economic and social grievances, as well as long of six million of Libyans; al-Megharha; and al-Tarhouna standing tribal, familial and personal disputes, undermine (Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 9 No. 17). general stability.

The toppling of Gaddafi in 2011 added another dimension to Tripoli and the West the existing divisions within Libya: between revolutionaries and loyalists to the former regime. The latter are yet to be The situation in Tripoli and the West is the most stable, completely wiped off the political map of Libya: several areas, although with some problems. Although the national such , , , and Riqdalin, remain police force is slowly and gradually taking control, Tripoli strongholds of the previous regime. remains a place where the significant availability of weapons and presence of several different militias who settled in the However, the major issue for the future of Libya is the city following the end of the revolution, make its security enormous presence of militiamen in the country, and the situation structurally volatile. abundance of weapons circulating in the country. There are allegedly as many as 200,000 militia members in a country of The west of the country, though relatively stable, is home to six million people – a ratio of 1:30 – with some small militias the most numerous, powerful and well-organized militias of named after the streets where their members live. The risks of the country, the Misrata and the Zintan, which also have the atomization of the Libyan security environment remain a major role in the current security environment in Tripoli. the most serious concern for the future of the country: the In terms of size, the most important is the Misrata militia: lack of an effective central authority is a powerful incentive allegedly comprised of over 20,000 members, largely young for a small group of militiamen to act on their own in order and without formal training and divided among several to advance their political and economic interests. Now, it is brigades. These militants got their training in the battlefield common to hear “it is different from the past; they have to during the uprising. It has been reported that several loyalist listen to us because we have weapons.” The ongoing crisis of forces committed mass atrocities in the city during the 3 Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u July 2012 uprising including rapes, tortures, and killings (al-Arabyia, of the Zintan militia also seized control of several oil and Aug. 30, 2011). Since the uprising, members of the Misrata industrial facilities, and patrolled the borders shared with militias have been accused by international human rights Tunisia and Algeria, thereby controlling the flow of licit and organizations of crimes against humanity (al Watan, April 9, illicit goods across the borders. Osama al-Juwali, one of its 2012), but they have also been recognized as one of the key leaders, was appointed Minister of Defense, a key political forces behind the overthrow of Gaddafi. Indeed, the unit that position in the new transitional cabinet in late 2011, and captured and killed Gaddafi in Sirte was from Misrata and several other members of the Zintan militia also currently this helped the militia to achieve a wider degree of respect hold government positions. and support among the revolutionary ranks. However, since the end of the revolution, forces from several areas of the The Situation in Eastern Libya country, mainly in the west, have accused the Misratans of pursuing de-facto autonomy to harness its strong economic The situation in the East of the country is much more complex power – Misrata and its surrounding area are home to several and volatile than in the west. The days before the elections industrial activities and Misrata’s geographical position were characterized by armed protesters making their makes it a fundamental trade hub for Libya: the port in the presence known, mainly in Benghazi and its surroundings. eastern neighborhood of Qasr Ahmad in Misrata is the On the morning of July 5, the main storage centre for most modern container port of the country, where more election materials was burned down by suspected federalist than half of the country’s container traffic takes place. It is arsonists in , where autonomist sentiment had also the sole Libyan port working on a round the clock basis. gained momentum over previous months (Libya Herald, Jul The economic importance of the area explains why Gaddafi’s 5). Pro-federalism demonstrators also reportedly attacked forces attempted to destroy it during the early phases of the the electoral commission’s headquarters in Benghazi on July civil war. 2, ransacking the building and taking out computers. The next day, thousands of demonstrators took to the streets of The Misrata militia is the most numerous, but it is not the the eastern city of Benghazi to protest the attack. most powerful and effective. The Zintan militia is the most important militia in the country in terms of effectiveness, In late June, the armed group called Army of Cyrenaica, the organization and strategic thinking. The Zintan militia military wing of the self-appointed Cyrenaica Transitional is named after the city of Zintan, home to roughly 50,000 Council, cut the main highway of the country through a people in the Nafusa Mountains of western Libya. Some checkpoint at Wadi al-Ahmar. They protested against Zintanis participated in the failed 1993 coup against Gaddafi. the political and economic marginalization of the east, They joined the 2011 uprising during its very early stages and threatening to maintain the checkpoint until authorities were responsible for the arrest of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, will recognize the existence of such unbalances and act son of Col. Gaddafi, in southern Libya (Jeune Afrique, concretely to reduce them (Libya Herald, June 26). In March, Nov 30, 2011). Most recently, they arrested and detained tribal leaders from the eastern part of the country gathered four members of International Criminal Court (ICC) on in Benghazi to express their intention to seek autonomy (al allegations of spying, releasing them only in early July (Al Jazeera, March 6, 2012) with rejecting Jazeera, Jun 26 – AP, Jul 3). this call, saying that authorities would be ready to intervene militarily to prevent that and accusing external Arab During the civil war, the Zintanis emerged as the most well- countries of pushing these claims (al Jazeera, March 7, 2012). trained and professional among the revolutionaries fighting Generally, however, sentiment favoring autonomy in the East against Gaddafi. Its leaders were all professionally trained is less widespread than generally believed as demonstrated by military officers who after the eruption of the revolution the rally organized to respond to the protests by supporters immediately defected from the national army. Among the of autonomy. militias, they are the most hierarchically organized – an effect of the military experiences of many of its members. Eastern Libya is a significant region and key for economic The effectiveness of the Zintanis’ capacity for strategic reasons, thanks to its oil infrastructure and facilities. The thinking emerged clearly when, during the latest phases of east of Libya is also home to the most conservative Islamist revolution, members from this militia began to seize control groups of the country. The city of Darna is recognized for of key economic and strategic assets. For example, when the the significant number of Jihadist fighters from the city who Zintans seized control of the Tripoli International Airport, went to Iraq to fight the American troops following Saddam which was handed back to the government in April 2012, Hussein’s fall in 2003. Additionally, the political party they demonstrated their power (, April 20). Members associated with the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood has its roots 4 Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u July 2012 in the east of the country, particularly in Benghazi and its traditionally divided into tribes or clans, typical in libya, surroundings, and is considered the strongest and the best Jordan, Egypt, and Gulf countries. The Zuwayya also organized in Libya. Many people outside of Eastern Libya see took part in the revolution against Gaddafi, supporting the the area’s power as a threat to other politicians and areas so revolutionary forces. Members of the Toubou tribes were there have been changes made to the electoral law in order involved also in clashes in Sabha with members of the to reduce the extent of power the East might gain from the Awlad Suleiman tribe, another group populating elections: the electoral law gave 60 seats to eastern Libya and the south-west of Libya. 102 to the west, with the remaining 38 going to the rest of the country. In the western part of Libya there is also a strong Berber presence (Berbers, also known as Imazighen, are an The Situation in the South indigenous ethnic group of west of the Nile Valley). The Imazighen, suffered from continuous and Though violence associated with political claims is stronger strong persecution under Gaddafi. For instance they were in the East, there is violence of a different origin escalating banned from publicly speaking, writing or printing anything in the South of Libya. Over the past few months, in the in their own tongue, Tamazight (al-Arabyia, Sept 28, 2011) southern areas there have been rising tensions between Nevertheless, the Imazighen emerged as a major player tribes and families populating these spaces. The southern in the post-Gaddafi environment. They were able, in spite part of Cyrenaica and the Fezzan have been historically the of the difficulties of the political environment during the most troubled and complicated areas to control for anyone Jamahiriya years, to preserve their identity, and escaped with the ambition to lead Libya. Subduing these areas to the attempts by Gaddafi to Arabize them. Now, they are calling formal control of a central and effective authority appears to for a clear recognition of their rights in the new constitution. be a particularly demanding task. During the months of the revolution, their relations with some part of the revolutionary camp remained strained. In As mentioned earlier, the weight of tribal allegiances remains the draft constitution produced in August 2011 they were important but should not be overestimated. In this area of not mentioned at all and suffered from political exclusion. the country where urbanization and the urban network has not been as intense as on the coast, tribal loyalties remain Conclusion particularly strong in defining the political landscape and informing power disputes. The major areas of tension are The first, historical ballot in Libya was a major step forward, , in the south-east of the country and Sabha, in the actual and symbolical, toward stabilization. However, to south-west. In Kufra, in February 2012, more than 100 understand to the extent to which the election represented people from the Toubou tribe were killed during a clash a breakthrough moment for the country will largely depend with the Zuwayya tribe (AFP, Feb 22). Allegedly, disputes on developments over the next few months. As explained between the two tribes started when the NTC appointed above, Libya has a long and complex history, in which Issa Abdel-Majid from the Toubou tribe to combat illegal dynamics of fragmentation, disorder and local thinking were trafficking at the borders with Chad. Abdel-Majid and his often stronger than unity, order and imagining a cohesive fellow tribesmen arrested six people from the Zuwayya national community. Generally, Libyan power groups tribe on allegations of smuggling (AP, Feb 21). At the end of merged together only when either external powers and their February, the Libyan National Army was dispatched to Kufra local supporters or an incumbent internal enemy – such to attempt to enforce peace but this intervention proved to be as Gaddafi – were perceived as extremely dangerous and ineffective and the situation worsened again. During the past unsustainable for their own interests. Libya contains several few months, the situation has worsened further as a result of social, political, culture and economic cleavages and 42 years the increasing hostility between the groups and dozens of of Gaddafi’s rule and the 2011 civil war have added further people have died in armed clashes. cleavages to an already structurally complex scenario. This peculiar history explains why, when the external or internal The Toubou tribe is a trans-national ethnic group mainly threat fades away, dynamics of fragmentation re-emerge and based in Chad but whose members can also be found in groups start to think once again more locally than nationally. Libya, Sudan and Niger. They joined the rebels rank during This was the very case in the aftermath of the revolution, the 2011 revolution and are now working to increase their when the heterogeneous bloc fighting again Gaddafi splinted controls over the particularly lucrative economic trans- into several groups and militias along tribal and city lines. Saharan flows. The Zuwayya are Arab , meaning At present, politics in Libya is more of an informal balance predominantly desert-dwelling Arabian ethnic groups of power between militias and local groups than an 5 Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u July 2012 institutionalized polity competing for power through regular turning into politicians. By competing in elections, these elections. The political and security situation in the country is jihadi leaders no longer will need to resort to using violence based on very fragile balances and, although the situation in in order to achieve their goal of establishing an ‘Islamic State’, Tripoli and the West has improved over the past few months but instead will try to do so peacefully by seeking the support and some groups have emerged as dominant in some areas, of the Libyan people through the ballot box. the situations in the East and the South remain particularly volatile, given the ongoing political, tribal and ideological This piece aims to shed light on three leading Libyan disputes between different actors of these areas. As already jihadists who were involved in the elections of the 200-seat stated, the elections of July 7 were very important but their ‘parliament’, the General National Congress: Abdel Hakim true meaning may be assessed only over the next months: Belhadj, Sami al-Saadi and Abdul-Wahhab Qaid, who were they could be either the first step forward as a new, truly all leaders of the now-defunct Libyan Islamic Fighting national and democratic Libya or the illusory calm before Group (LIFG). the storm, where local and narrower power interests will overwhelm the national desire to rebuild a country destroyed Abdel Hakim Belhadj politically and morally after the 42 years of Gaddafi’s ruthless and bloody rule. Abdel Hakim Belhadj is perhaps the most prominent of the three and the most hopeful among the jihadists of making Notes: the biggest gains in the July 7 elections of the General National Congress. His party, al-Watan (The Homeland), 1] However, tribes are not simply monolithic blocs and intra- is fielding candidates in all but one of the 13 constituencies tribal strains, fights and disagreements exist: for instance, designated to elect 80 members of the Congress from military officials belonging to the Warfala tribe attempted to the list of political parties (the 120 other members of the topple down Gaddafi in 1993 Congress are reserved for independent candidates).[1] Only the Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm, the Justice and 2] Jacob Mundy (2012), Militia politics in Libya’s Construction Party, has fielded more candidates than al- national elections, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/ Watan, which gives clear indication that the leaders of al- posts/2012/07/05/militia_politics_in_libyas_national_ Watan party think they are capable of achieving a good elections result in the coming elections.

Belhadj is al-Watan’s candidate in Tripoli, where he was born and grew up. He is contesting the constituency number 11 which includes three districts to the east of the capital: Tajoura, Souk al-Juma’a and al-Qarabouli. Although he no longer wears a military fatigue which has been replaced Emerging Leaders in Libya: with a suit and a tie, Belhadj will always be seen for what Jihadists Resorting to Politics to he has been: the emir (ruler, chief or commander in Islamic countries) of the LIFG, the jihadi group which he helped Create an Islamic Government form in Afghanistan in the early 1990s and which he led until his arrest in Bangkok and transfer to Tripoli in 2004. [2] Camille Tawil However, Belhadj’s support base does not necessarily depend solely on the like-minded jihadists who admire the role fter holding its first elections in almost half a century he played as an “Arab Afghan” against the communists in (the last elections were held under the late King Afghanistan, and later, his failed attempt to topple Gaddafi Idriss in 1965), much of the attention in Libya seems in the 1990s. His supporters may now include those who Ato be on who the winner will be, and whether or not Libya admire the role he played in the in August will follow the path of its neighbours, Tunisia and Egypt, and 2011 when he led his fighters intoBab al-Aziziya, Gaddafi’s elect its first ‘Islamic government’. headquarters in the Libyan capital.

But regardless of who the winner turns out to be, these Since that battle, Belhadj has been solidifying his position elections in themselves are important not only because they among the emerging rulers of Libya. As head of Tripoli’s are the first to be held in the country after the fall of Colonel Military Council, Belhadj led hundreds of fighters controlling Gaddafi’s regime, but also because they will see jihadi leaders a significant section of the Libyan capital. However, despite 6 Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u July 2012 speculations that he was going to be appointed as defence than Belhadj’s. Al-Saadi, for instance, is known as a religious minister in the government of Abdel-Raheem al-Kieb in scholar, having studied Islamic law in the Gulf during the November 2011 [3] that post went in the end to a member of 1990s. This religious background may have been a reason the Zintan rebels, who have been critical of Belhadj. [4] for his prominence in Afghanistan during the Taliban rule. He is reported to have been called ‘the Sheikh of the Arabs’ In April 2012, Belhadj announced his resignation from his by none other than Mulla Omar himself, the leader of the post as head of the Tripoli Military Council in order to Taliban movement, which clearly shows that even Mulla contest the July national elections. If his party fares well in Omar thought highly of al-Saadi’s religious arguments (Al- these elections, Belhadj may have a platform from which Hayat, December 4, 2004). to push forward his vision of the kind of Islamic State he wants to see in Libya. However, he has said many times that Al-Saadi’s fate mirrored that of Belhadj. The former was he wants a civil, not religious, state in Libya which should arrested in Hong Kong in 2004 and rendered to Libya be big enough to accept different opinions of Islamists and around the same time as Belhadj’s rendering from Bangkok liberals (Al-Hayat, September 18, 2011). to Tripoli. In prison, both men were allowed to meet with each other, and they both accepted to start negotiations with His vision of the new Libyan state is unclear, and may the Gaddafi regime. Al-Saadi was also a co-signer of the not actually be very different from the consensus in Libya Corrective Studies in 2009. However, al-Saadi does not seem which holds that the state should be ruled according to the to have been ready to go as far as Belhadj in compromising moderate understanding of the Sharia (Islamic law). with the Gaddafi regime. This difference became clear when Belhadj accepted, in 2009, to write Gaddafi a letter of In fact, Belhadj’s jihadi thoughts may have become more apology for the LIFG actions against his regime. Belhadj may moderate during the years he spent in prison in Tripoli, from have accepted to do this because he knew it was the only way 2004 until 2009. During these years, the Libyan authorities to secure the release of hundreds of LIFG prisoners. So, he allowed him visits by moderate Islamists, such as Sheikh signed the apology letter himself, something the rest of the Ali al-Sallabi, a leading Libyan Islamist living in leaders of the LIFG may not have been prepared to do. and considered close to the Muslim Brotherhood school of thought. Whether or not Belhadj was influenced by the When the uprising started against Gaddafi in February 2011, Brotherhood’s arguments of the need of moderation and al-Saadi was contacted by Libyans close to the regime to renouncing of violence, the emir of the LIFG was clear in see if he would accept the role of mediating with the rebels. distancing himself from the extreme violence carried out in However, he was reluctant to do so, having seen how the the name of jihad by al-Qaeda or affiliated groups. In 2009, Gaddafi forces were killing the peaceful demonstrators in the he rejected al-Qaeda’s methods in a major study he issued east of the country. Later during the uprising, al-Saadi tried with five others from the LIFG leadership; their work, or to flee Tripoli, where he was put under house arrest at his muraja’at, was called Corrective Studies. That document home in Hey al-Andalus (a western district of Tripoli). He was seen as the clearest representation of the new thinking was arrested again and sent to the Abu Slim notorious prison of the LIFG leaders and their rejection to carry out armed where he stayed until the fall of Gaddafi’s regime in August. insurgency to topple Muslim leaders. Thus, unlike Belhadj, al-Saadi had no role in the military battle to rid Tripoli of Gaddafi. Sami al-Saadi In the past few months, al-Saadi has become very vocal in Sami Al-Saadi is the leader of the al-Umma Party (full calling for the application of the Islamic Sharia in Libya. title: al-Umma al-Wasat Party, or the Middle Nation In January 2012, he called for the Sharia law to be the only Party), which is also contesting the July 7 elections. It could source of legislation in Libya. [5] Since then, similar calls be argued that this party is the main political party which for the application of Sharia have been made across Libya, succeeded that LIFG since main former LIFG leaders are including a major rally in June in Benghazi where armed linked to al-Saadi’s party. However, the argument is refutable men took to the streets carrying black banners similar to since many other former LIFG leaders are linked with those carried by al-Qaeda. [6] Belhadj’s party. Regardless, al-Saadi’s party has succeeded in attracting former LIFG leaders, especially among those Like Belhadj, al-Saadi is currently suing the British with religious credentials, such as Abdul Wahhab Qaid government for its alleged role in rendering him to Gaddafi (see below), which is probably attributable to the fact that in 2004. al-Saadi’s Islamic credentials may be considered stronger 7 Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u July 2012 Abdul Wahhab Qaid If they win seats in the next parliament, it would be Abdul Wahhab Qaid is another leader of the LIFG who has interesting to see how they will coexist with other political also become part of al-Saadi’s al-Umma Party. Qaid was trends in the National Congress, including those considered arrested by Gaddafi’s regime in 1995, at the beginning of the liberal or secular, both of whom the jihadists have criticised LIFG insurgency. Though Qaid was one of the top six LIFG in the past. leaders who signed the Corrective Studies in 2009, unlike Belhadj and al-Saadi who were both freed in March 2010, And although no party will be able to dominate the National the Gaddafi regime refused to release Qaid until February Congress (the parties have 80 seats compared to 120 seats for 2011. This reluctance in freeing him may have been related independents), a big win for Belhadj’s al-Watan may cause to fears that, if freed, he may try to flee the country and join some problems in Libya’s relations with the West, especially al-Qaeda in Afghanistan where his younger brother, Abu if he insists on suing Britain for its alleged role in helping the Yahya al-Libi, was based. But it should be noted that the Qaid American intelligence to render him to Gaddafi in 2004. senior was himself part of the Corrective Studies which denounced some of the al-Qaida’s practices, and therefore Camille Tawil is an investigative journalist and it would have been illogical to expect him to flee and join a Jamestown analyst who specializes in Islamist groups group which he criticised, unless the Gaddafi regime did not and movements. He is the author of Brothers In Arms: believe that he indeed meant what he had signed. The Story of Al-Qa’ida and the Arab Jihadists.

His release was also seen as an attempt to appease the Notes: Islamists (jihadists) in the hope that they would refrain from 1. According to the al-Watan party, it has fielded candidates joining the calls to join the uprising which began on February in all constituencies of Libya apart from constituency 17, 2011. In any case, soon after Qaid’s release from prison number 5 which includes Sirte, Gaddafi’s hometown. http:// in February 2011, he joined the Libyan rebels and became a wattan.ly/?p=149 fighter, like Belhadj, in the western mountains of Libya. 2. To see how Libya’s constituencies are divided, the Libyan His role after the success of the revolution was mainly National Election Commission has maps available on its military. He became the commander of the Libyan Border website at the following link: Guards force in Sabha, the capital of the south of Libya from http://www.hnec.ly/uploads/publisher/9_ntc_2012_14.pdf where his family originates. His military role became well- known during the recent tribal clashes in Sabha between 3. Belhadj left Libya to join the jihad against the Soviets in Arab and African tribes; he was a leading mediator in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. In 1993, he and other Libyan stopping the fight (Al-Jazeera, April 1, 2012). fighters in Afghanistan formed their own group, the LIFG. “Abdul Hakim Belhadj,” Almasdar, http://www.almasdar.tn/ His military post in the Border Guards is significant because management/article.php?id=7066 it allows him to control an important gate between Libya and the Sahel region, a route used not only by smugglers of goods 4. See the incident when the Zintan rebels detained Belhadj but also of weapons, which mainly go to al-Qaeda’s branch at Tripoli airport in November 2011; http://af.reuters.com/ in the Sahel and North Africa, as well as to other militant article/topNews/idAFJOE7AO00I20111125 groups such as the Tuaregs. 5. http://www.ashahed.net/mp3/monzer.mp3 Qaid has also appeared with al-Saadi in rallies, calling for the application of the Islamic Sharia. [9] He was also a leading 6. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ member during the formation of the al-Umma Party in ALeqM5jEsuH3jwdLRWqvQq7vMtuYTBSQZg?docId=CN April. [10] G.92a8e634140e4a65b582e6e5feb93c87.31

Conclusion 7. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tg49XuJrvbQ

The participation of jihadists in the Libyan elections is 8. http://hanein.info/vb/showthread.php?t=280059 a major turning point in their transformation from an underground, violent movement into a legal political party which seeks voters’ approval through the ballot box. 8 Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u July 2012 From Militia Leader to Defense Background Minister: A Biographical Sketch of His full name is Osama Abdul Salam Mohammand al Juwali. He was born in the city of Zintan in 1961 and is married Osama al-Juwali with children. According to the information provided in an article by Ean Libya, he received a teaching diploma Dario Cristiani in 1978, working thereafter as a school teacher. He then graduated from the Tripoli Military Academy in 1982 with a Like many other post-civil war contexts in the history of specialization in electronics, remaining in the academy as a humanity, it is not possible at present to draw a clear and trainer until 1987. During those years, he spent some months definitive dividing line between the figures of militant working for the army in Kufra and then he quit the army and political leaders who populate the landscape of post- in 1992, resigning with the rank of Captain. Al-Juwali then Gaddafi Libya. Many current personalities of the National started to work at the Vocational Guidance center in Yifrin, Transitional Council fought against Gaddafi’s forces and were part of the Libyan Ministry of Workforce and Training, –and in a way still are – militant leaders as well. As seen in where he remained until the eruption of the civil war (Ean this special QSR on Libya, Libyan politics is more of a messy Libya, March 28) interaction of parties, single personalities, militias, cities and tribes rather than an ordered polity. And these leaders are During the Libyan civil war al-Juwali developed a reputation now not only leaders of a militia but have officially entered as being a pragmatic and honorable commander. One of the game of politics. This is the case of Osama al-Juwali, the the major features that seems to characterize al-Juwali is his current Minister of Defense of the NTC, former head of the strong level of pragmatism. Nowhere was this more visible Zintan Military council and one of the prominent figures of than when his Zintani unit captured Saif-al Islam. The the Zintan militias. militia decided to keep him in the city of Zintan, claiming it

was the only place to guarantee his safety, avoiding the risk of Al-Juwali was a major commander of Zintan militia which revenge from revolutionaries in Tripoli. Rebuffing their calls has been the most effective and organized militia of Libya. for his execution al-Juwali stressed the Zintani tradition of He is a figure of particular interest because now he is a treating their prisoners in an honorable manner. Throughout politician. He maintains contact with his fellow Zintani Libyan history Zintanis have been recognized and are well- fighters and can count on his reputation as a member of the known for their reputation of being effective fighters and revolutionary forces to work in his favor while carrying out also of treating prisoners and enemies with dignity (Reuters, his job as defense minister. November 20). In a way, given what happened only one month earlier with , treating Saif-al Islam He is not the sole significant militant personality of as they would treat any other prisoner was a particularly the Zintan militia: Mukhtar al-Akhdar, Abdelhamid clever and pragmatic political move that demonstrated the Abouderbala, Abdullah Naker, just to mention a few of Zintanis were well disciplined and trained. the most important Zintani fighters, are important as well.

However, the reason so much focus is on al-Juwali is that he Another example of al-Juwali pragmatics was his approach is the most vivid example of the overlap between militia and toward the issue of militias after being appointed Defense normal politics that is charactering Libya presently. He was Minister. Unlike other members of the Libyan leadership, appointed Defense Minister in late November 2011 (Reuters, al-Juwali supported the need to have a milder approach November 22, 2011), shortly after the Zintani’s forces under towards the presence of militias. He aimed at integrating his command captured Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the son of the and co-opting these groups in the new legal and political former Libyan leader. His appointment signaled the political environment of Libya, supporting comprehension rather recognition of the effectiveness of militas and the need to than repression, stressing also the fact that these men incorporate former militia fighters, who were taking the lead represent those marginalized during Gaddafi’s era and of security in several areas of the country, into the political will bring new blood into the Libyan security forces (al- scene. Drawing militia leaders into government offices Jazeera, December 26, 2011). He did not set any deadline was also formal recognition of the political weight that the at that time although he suggested at the end of 2011 that Zintan militia had during the war against Gaddafi as well as six weeks was the minimum time needed in which to expect among his supporters and in the immediate aftermath of the some results concerning the normalization of the militias’ Libyan Revolution. presence (Reuters, December 19, 2011). So far, progress has

been slower than expected as, in some areas of the country, 9 Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u July 2012 militias still represent the most significant sources of power in terms of the formal and informal political and security in post revolutionary Libya. However, this approach was a environment of Libya and will also remain an important clear example of al-Juwali’s impressive pragmatism. figure in his interactions with the head of the NTC, Mustafa Abdul Jalil and the Prime Minister Abdurrahim al-Keib. Another example was his attempt to engage in dialogue with groups of Gaddafi supporters in Libya, keeping in mind that some of the regional realities of the country still associated with the previous regime, in an attempt to form a new national consensus. In late January, al-Juwali went to the former Gaddafi stronghold of Bani Walid in order to investigate the clashes that erupted in that period and negotiate with The Ideological Influence of pro-Gaddafi loyalists who were responsible for those clashes “The Blind Sheikh” Omar Abdel (al-Akhbar, January 25). This move was particularly brave given the reputation Zintanis had in dealing with supporters Rahman on Libyan Militants of the former regime: former Gaddafi loyalists, for example, were excluded from joining the ranks of the militia with no Michael W. S. Ryan exception. One of the specific features that made the Zintan militia so respected among the revolutionary ranks of Libyan Omar Abdel Rahman, the “Blind Sheikh,” is currently serving fighters was its strict policy of exclusion against supporters a life sentence in solitary confinement in Butner, North of the previous regime. This move by al-Juwali triggered an Carolina for conspiracy to commit numerous actual and abundance of criticism among the rank and file of Libyan planned terrorist attacks in the New York City area during fighters, as some revolutionaries accused him of collusion the early 1990s. In the land of his birth, Egypt, he is known and called for his resignation (Sahel Medias, January 29). for helping inspire the assassination of Anwar Sadat and the attempted assassination of Hosni Mubarak, while acting as Conclusion the leader of one of the bloodiest terrorist groups. While praised by Osama Bin Laden, who called for his release from Al-Juwali is the most visible example of the Libyan prison, his notoriety is not based on his association with phenomenon of a former militia leader joining politics al-Qaeda. Instead, he is a radical Islamic scholar and fiery without abandoning completely their “previous lives.” Over preacher of violent jihad, who has encouraged and justified the past few months, the most apparent political feature of terrorism carried out by others. He has consistently asserted al-Juwali that has contributed to his effectiveness has been that the United States is the greatest enemy of Islam. Many his strong degree of political flexibility toward militias in in the Jihadists movement lionize Rahman and to this day order to manage a complicated office such as the Ministry cite his words and example to justify terror in the name of of Defense in current Libya. However, his role also shows religion. Now, a terrorist group has surfaced in eastern Libya that this particular marriage of militiaman-politician will that has adopted his name as the title for their group, The likely dominate the Libyan political environment over the Battalions of the Prisoner Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman. next few years. Whether the militiamen will emerge over There is no way this group could have contact with Rahman the politician or vice versa, depends on the trajectory of or receive instructions from him. It is likely that they chose statehood that Libya will undertake in the future. his name to appeal to other Jihadists in eastern Libya, who might not choose to be associated with al-Qaeda, even as When al-Juwali joined the new Libyan government, he was American drones circle overhead. Using Rahman’s name no largely considered to be an outsider. However, over the past doubt is also intended to suggest that attacking American few months, he has been able to improve slightly the security citizens and institutions is justified as long as he remains a situation of Libya although his program of integrating prisoner in the United States. militias into the new Libyan security service has operated much slower than expected. The political situation remains The Birth of a New Jihadist Group particularly in flux, therefore it is difficult to asses what his political role will be in the coming years. For sure, he remains Since Gaddafi’s fall from power and eventual death (October one of the most important players of the Zintan militia and, 20, 2011), the Libyan government has struggled to exert also in case he will quit his government job over the next control over its fractious tribal and regional factions. In few months, he will remain a key player to keep an eye on eastern Libya, for example, the government is confronted

10 Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u July 2012 with strong Islamist voices challenging the compatibility of of Misrata and was the scene of a major struggle during democracy with Islam. Elsewhere, well-armed tribal factions the insurrection between rebel forces from Misrata and struggle for an advantage or revenge in an ongoing cycle pro-Gaddafi forces operating out of the smaller town. For of clan violence. In an echo of now familiar transnational whatever reason, some have claimed ethnic cleansing, the Jihadist movements, a series of recent attacks appear to stand largely black town of Tawargha’ was not only decimated, out from the rest of Libyan factional struggles by targeting advancing rebels forced its population to flee. The rebels Western interests while embracing a Jihadist ideology. claimed the population was pro-Gaddafi whereas the people Among others, they include attacks on the International of Tawargha’ claimed to be the victims of circumstance. If the Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Ben Ghazi (May 22), Battalions of Omar Abdel Rahman chose this town as an the bombing of the U.S. Consulate in Ben Ghazi (June 5), example of ICRC activities because they were related in some an attack on the British ambassador’s convoy in Ben Ghazi way to its inhabitants, the group would probably represent (June 11) and a second attack on ICRC offices, this time in a small minority faction striving for wider recognition. The Misrata (June 12). Battalions also claim that the attack on the ICRC, carried out by an RPG, was meant as a warning and not an attack Several news organizations reported that an anonymous designed to inflict great damage or loss of life. Libyan security official stated that a group calling itself the Battalions of the Prisoner Omar Abdel Rahman The Battalions end Declaration No. 1 concerning its attack on is responsible for some of these attacks. For example, the the ICRC offices in Ben Ghazi with a jihadist style warning: Egyptian news portal al-Wafd stated that the Libyan official “Finally, we do not recognize any borders when planning our revealed that the organization left pamphlets at the scene operations and have prepared a message that will arrive soon of the early morning bombing of the American Consulate in America as a response to [its] disturbing the serenity of claiming credit for the bombing. Al-Wafd also reported the skies of the proud city of Derna.” Derna is small coastal that the improvised explosive device near the gates of the city approximately half way between Ben Ghazi and the Consulate did not lead to any injuries. The reason given for the Egyptian border. It is remarkable for supplying half of Libya’s attack on the consulate was retaliation for “the assassination contribution to al-Qaeda’s fight against American forces in of Abu Yahya al-Libi,” whom al-Wafd characterized as “one Iraq. Although the number of young fighters from Derna of the most important planners for al-Qaeda and the second was small in absolute terms (only 52), it earned the town in command after its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.” Citing the reputation for being a hotbed of al-Qaeda sympathizers. the same source, Arabic news organizations also suggested Perhaps, for this reason, and the fact that Gaddafi claimed that the same group was responsible for the May attack on that the rebels were nothing but al-Qaeda, Derna residents the ICRC offices in Ben Ghazi. Since al-Libi’s reported death greeted Western journalists with signs in English asserting occurred only one day before the attack on the Consulate, for example, “We refuse to be linked with al-Qaeda & other it seems likely that the group seized on the justification for Terrorist Groups.” So, this likely small group (The Battalions an attack it had already planned and by using al-Libi’s name of the Prisoner Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman) is signaling hoped to gain greater notoriety than would be otherwise that it is not al-Qaeda and perhaps not the Libyan Islamic possible for a small attack by an unknown group. Fighting Group but is definitely jihadist in orientation and considers the United States and Western institutions to be Meanwhile, the group calling itself the Battalions in Libya the enemies of Islam. Nothing symbolizes this stance greater of the Prisoner Sheikh Abdel Rahman issued two formal than by associating themselves with the much more famous “declarations” on well-established jihadist websites. In these blind Egyptian Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman. declarations, the group took “complete responsibility” for the attacks on the ICRC offices in Ben Ghazi as well as the Who is Omar Abdel Rahman? American consulate there. Neither declaration specifically mentions al-Qaeda despite citing al-Libi. These declarations At this point the “Blind Sheikh” as Rahman is sometimes provide some clues to the character of the Abdel Rahman dubbed, should be a note in the history books concerning Battalions. For example, the organization gives its reasons the wave of violent jihadist groups spawned in the wake of for attacking the ICRC as retaliation for alleged Christian the Afghan struggle against the Soviet Union. In addition proselytizing of “ our brothers who migrated from the city to being adopted as the inspiration for an obscure Libyan of Tawargha’.” This seems an odd choice, when the Battalions terrorism cell, his name has entered the news most recently could have simply claimed that the ICRC was proselytizing when the new Muslim Brotherhood president of Egypt, Muslims. Tawargha’ is a small town about 30-40 km. south Mohammad Morsi, vowed to seek the release of all “political 11 Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u July 2012 prisoners:” including Omar Abdel Rahman. Another he did not support al-Gama’ah Islamiyyah renouncing signal that Rahman is reemerging as a cause célèbre was violence. the surprising request by a member of a visiting Egyptian delegation, Hani Nour Eldin, for the release of Rahman to In his long, rambling sentencing statement during his 1995 Egypt. The request was reported in Egyptian newspapers trial, Rahman claimed to be innocent, because he practiced partly to dispel rumors that the United States had arrested the only freedom of speech and religion. He identifies America Egyptian MP because he belongs to the new political party of as the enemy of Islam. He asks the judge not to lessen his the same Jihadist terror group that Omar Abdel Rahman led, sentence even as he claims to be a political prisoner. In fact, al-Gama’ah al-Islamiyyah (The Islamic Group). the U.S. justice system convicted Rahman of conspiring to blow up targets in an around New York City. Although Omar Abdel Rahman was born in 1938 in Gamaliyyah in the the conviction was based on an FBI sting operation, taped Egyptian delta to. Blind from an early age because of diabetes, conversations and photos proved that Rahman’s followers Rahman learned braille in order to master the Qur’an and had every intention of carrying out bloody attacks that were other traditional Islamic studies. Like most modern Salafist thwarted by their trial and conviction. Jihadists, Rahman is a follower of Sayyid Qutb and is steeped in the teachings of the medieval jurist, Ibn Taymiyyah. Secretary Clinton recently confirmed that Omar Abdel Unlike most Jihadists within al-Qaeda, however, he received Rahman will not be released from prison. His days of a formal religious degree from the prestigious al-Azhar inspiring violence in person are over. However, in a post-al- university and is steeped in the religious sciences that have Qaeda world, we should expect his name and the names of made him a formidable preacher and debater. Al-Zawahiri others like him to be used as rallying cries for Jihadist groups and the Blind Sheikh moved in the same Jihadist circles but like the “Battalions” in Libya. We should expect to confront were never friends. They found it impossible to collaborate other more dangerous groups following the concepts framed as head of rival Jihadist groups in Egypt. Like Ayman al- by al-Qaeda and other Jihadists such as Abdullah Azzam Zawahiri, Rahman was arrested on charges of involvement in and Omar Abdel Rahman. As long as Jihadist ideologues the assassination of Anwar Sadat. Like al-Zawahiri, Rahman are allowed to claim to be political prisoners or victims in was tortured in prison. Rahman was accused of issuing a a war against Islam, other Muslims in the Middle East and fatwa authorizing the assassination of Sadat, although he elsewhere may not recognize them for what they are. The was eventually released from prison because his fatwa did United States must continue to demonstrate that it is not an not specifically name Sadat. After his release from Egyptian enemy of Islam and must find a way to engage in the war prison, like al-Zawahiri, he travelled to Afghanistan where he of ideas against violent Jihadist groups that arise within the joined his former teacher at al-Azhar, Abdullah Azzam and less rigid political structures of the , even if they became close to Osama Bin Laden. Azzam was assassinated avoid invoking the al-Qaeda name. in Peshawar in 1989 and rather than follow Bin Laden, Omar Abdel Rahman moved to the United States in 1990 where his Dr. Michael W. S. Ryan is a Senior Fellow at Jamestown Farouq mosque in Jersey City became the gathering place of Foundation. His forthcoming book The Deep Battle: choice for Jihadists engaged in terrorist plots including the Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy Against America will be initial bombing of the Twin Towers in 1993. published by Columbia Universty Press.

Omar Abdel Rahman spent an entire career enabling violence Notes: and other forms of crime against Jews, Christians and other 1] In the federal system Rahman is cited as Omar Ahmad Muslims by providing extreme religious opinions, recruiting Rahman. See, http://www.bop.gov/iloc2/InmateFinderServl young men to participate in terrorist organizations like al- et?Transaction=NameSearch&needingMoreList=false&First Gama’ah al-Islamiyyah, serving as its leader, and providing Name=omar&Middle=&LastName=rahman&Race=U&Sex strategic advice. In his book, Knights Under the Prophet’s =U&Age=&x=0&y=0 Banner, his old rival Ayman al-Zawahiri cites Rahman 61 2] “The Battalions of Omar Abdel Rahman Bomb times. Al-Zawahiri uses Rahman’s justifications for violent American Consulate in Libya” (Arabic), al-Wafd website, jihad as arguments against Egyptian terrorist groups posted June 6, 2012. http://www.alwafd.org; also “The renouncing violence. Al-Zawahiri treats Rahman, even after Battalions of al-Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman Claims he was placed in solitary confinement in the United States, as Responsibility for Attack on the American Consulate in though he is still the head of al-Gama’ah al-Islamiyyah. He Libya,” (Arabic), al-Masry al-Youm website, posted July also states that Lynne Stewart, Rahman’s American Lawyer, 6, 2012. http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/900731 ; brought a message from Rahman in prison claiming that and “Unknown Libyan Group Claims Responsibility for 12 Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u July 2012 Bombing the American Consulate,” Islam Memo website: The Zintan Militia and the http://www.islammemo.cc/akhbar/arab/2012/06/12/151482. html. Fragmented Libyan State

3] For declaration #1, see the Muslim.net website, http:// Dario Cristiani www.muslm.net/vb/showthread.php; for declaration #2, see the Forum of the Pulpit of Jihadist Information, http:// ne of the major challenges for the future of Libya alplatformmedia.com concerns the presence on its soil of a variety of autonomous militias of various sizes, geographical 4] This is an apparent reference to the sighting of American Oorigin, ideology and organizational aims. The consequent drones over Derna. fragmentation of the security environment is a major obstacle for Libyan efforts to achieve an effective and functional 5] “’Gaddafi is the terrorist man’: Derna denies being al- statehood. Qaida hotbed” by Xan Rice for , May 12, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/12/ Efforts to integrate the militias into a new national army and derna-libya-gaddafi-al-qaida. police force have been stymied in part due to the unpopularity of Major General Khalifah Haftar, chief-of-staff of the 6] Eli Lake, “Member of Egyptian Terror Group Goes to Libyan National Army until he was replaced in early July Washington,” The Daily Beast, Jun 21, 2012. See also, al- ,2012. General Haftar appeared to have lost the confidence Youm7 website, “Islamic Group Requests Release of Omar of the government, with Transitional National Council Abdel Rahman,” (in Arabic) June 24 2012. http://www1. (TNC) chairman Mustafa Abd-al-Jalil reportedly describing youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=714420&SecID=97. the American-backed Haftar as “suspicious and arrogant” at an official meeting between al-Jalil and a number of militia 7] Ayman al-Zawahiri, Fursan Tahta Rayah al-Nabi 1st commanders (al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 12, 2011). On ed., (no publication data, 2009), 16. http://www.tawhed. January 3, Haftar was replaced as chief-of-staff by Colonel ws/a?a=3i806qpo Yusuf Mangush, who was promoted to general. Mangush, a Misrata native and retired officer from the Libyan military, 8] Ibid. 173. Stewart was convicted and sentenced in a joined the rebel forces after fighting began last spring, only federal court of providing material support to a terrorist to be captured by loyalist forces during the struggle for Brega group for her role in delivering messages to Rahman’s group in April. Though Mangush has the support of Abd al-Jalil in Egypt. She is currently incarcerated in Fort Worth, Texas. and Prime Minister Abd al-Rahim al-Kib, the powerful Rahman originally agreed to al-Gama’ah al-Islamiyyah Benghazi rebel faction have denounced his appointment renouncing violence, but changed his mind. It should be as “undemocratic” while promoting their own candidate, noted that al-Gama’ah al-Islamiyyah was responsible for General Salah Salem al-Ubaydah (AFP, January 3; Jeune the 1997 brutal slaughter of 58 tourists and four Egyptians Afrique, January 13). General al-Mangush is determined in Luxor, Egypt and many other attacks. to establish a supreme defense council and speed up the integration of militia fighters into the national army and 9] To read the entire statement, see the Intel Wire website, police, but he may need a greater level of support than he has http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/61HKRAHS-sentencing.htm. now to be successful (Jeune Afrique, January 13). Rahman’s statement begins on page 158. Libya’s Difficult Transition 10] “American State Department: Omar Abdel Rahman’s status will not change...Morsi has not made any contact on In political science, especially following the collapse of the his behalf.” (in Arabic) Al-Masry Al-Youm, July 2, 2012. Soviet Union, the term “transition” is mostly used to define http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/960496. those political processes leading to a – more or less – effective (liberal) democracy. In Libya, at present, it is impossible to use transition in this meaning, as the first step to start a transition to democracy is to have a government capable of imposing its rule on the people and groups in its national territory. The 42 years of theJamahiriya (State of the Masses) – a very personal Gaddafi creation lacking institutions typical of modern states – makes this an enormous challenge, even 13 Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u July 2012 in the event of a scenario (at present completely detached The killing of Gaddafi was not only the symbolic end of an from the reality on the ground) in which everyone in Libya era but visible proof that his rule cannot return to Libya. The acted to meet the need to create a functioning state without psychological relief this provided had another side to take seeking to advance narrow and factional interests at the same into account; the death of the common enemy opened the time. underlying structural fissions within the heterogeneous bloc of rebels who carried out the revolution. In this context, The success of this transition is strongly connected to how the presence of autonomous armed militias on the ground Libyans will be able to manage the thorny issue of militias represents a major obstacle to the normalization of the and the risk of starting a political shift to warlordism rather Libyan security environment. than democracy. The continuous clashes between different militias – the latest occurring in near Gharyan (50 miles Recent Clashes in Tripoli south of Tripoli), involving a militia from Gharyan pitted against another militia from neighboring Assabia – are At the end of November, fighters of the Zintan militia stopped a powerful reminder of the menace they pose to Libya’s Abdulhakim Belhadj at the Tripoli airport, accusing Belhadj increasingly volatile and fragmented security environment of travelling to Istanbul on a fake passport. Only after a direct (Reuters, January 14; AFP, January 16). One of the most intervention from Libyan interim leader Mustafa Abdul Jalil important and well organized groups in present-day Libya was he able to catch his flight (Tripoli Post, November 26, is the Zintan militia, which controls the Tripoli airport and 2011). Belhadj, head of the Tripoli Military Council, a former other institutions in the capital. The group has been the leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and one protagonist in several political and security incidents over of the most important figures in the anti-Gaddafi revolt, is the past few weeks. considered to be one of the main enemies of the Zintan group. His military council presents a direct challenge to the Zintan Moving on From the Jamahiriya State Brigade in the struggle to control the security of Tripoli. Like other militias active in the Libyan capital, establishing Libya as a unitary state has always been characterized by control over the city is considered to be a strategic necessity several internal fault lines, with ethnic, tribal, cultural and for these groups to enable them to advance their interests political cleavages characterizing its political and social and agendas in the new political balance. In this context, environment. These fault lines were exploited by Gaddafi control of the airport is considered fundamental. during his rule. For example, in the very early stages of his rule after the 1969 coup, Gaddafi tried to downgrade the The Zintan Brigade was the protagonist in another incident importance of the tribes, but, after a few years he understood at the Tripoli airport in early December last year, when the that it was impossible to maintain a strong grip on the country militia was involved in a fire fight with a convoy carrying without the support of at least some of the major tribes. The Major General . Two members of the militia resulting “divide and rule” policy was a major feature of the were killed and several injured (see Terrorism Monitor Gaddafi Jamahiriya (state of the masses). In the long run, Brief, December 16, 2011). Khalid al-Zintani, a spokesman stressing these divisions proved to be unsustainable and for the Zintan militia, said that members of his group did not was a key factor in explaining the eruption of the revolts in try to kill Haftar and that clashes occurred simply because no February 2011. one notified the Zintan revolutionaries of Haftar’s intention to travel to the airport (AP, December 11). Al-Zintani and It is no coincidence that the core of the revolt was the eastern Mukhtar al-Akhdar, the commander of Zintani fighters at city of Benghazi, the stronghold of the pre-Gaddafi Sanussi the airport, criticized the nascent National Army, of which monarchy and the area most penalized under Gaddafi. The Haftar is now the ex-commander-in-chief, saying that the Libyan east-west divide is a long standing feature of the presence and influence of this army on the ground is almost Libyan political and social landscape and is essential to nonexistent and adding that the Zintan Brigade will step understanding Libya’s fragmentation. The increasing weight down only once the new government authorities are able to of local, regional and tribal interests – which emerged fully guarantee security in Tripoli. Only a few days later, the clearly in the protests against the appointment of the new members of the Zintan militia were involved in another clash transitional government – is connected to this domestic with members of the neighboring Mashashiya, arresting 20 cleavage. Though very important, this dynamic is only one members of the tribe, which was considered loyal to Gaddafi’s of many working against the establishment of a unitary state regime (AFP, December 12, 2011). in Libya.

14 Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u July 2012 The Zintan Militia Benefits from Strong Organization services of the country. He stressed the fact that these men represent those marginalized during Gaddafi’s era and will The Zintan militia is named for Zintan, a city of roughly bring new blood into the Libyan security forces (al-Jazeera, 50,000 people in the Nafusa Mountains of western Libya. December 26, 2011). In his efforts, al-Juwali can count on The relationship of this city with Gaddafi’s regime was his growing reputation within the revolutionary forces as a always unsettled. Though located in that half of the country member of one of the most powerful Libyan militias with that benefited by the shift in the political balances following the support of a wide network of personal relations within it. the overthrow of the monarchy, Zintanis remained rather critical of Gaddafi and his Jamahiriya state. Some Zintanis Conclusion participated in the failed 1993 coup against Gaddafi that was organized by some members of the , Libya’s largest Apart from a powerful shared aim to get rid of Gaddafi, and most powerful Libyan tribe and usually regarded as a the various loose-knit groups of the rebel camp had little in power base for the Gaddafi regime (though this support common, leaving a general feeling of mistrust and suspicion was far from unanimous). Zintani fighters joined the 2011 as the main denominators of their relationship. Every militia revolution during its very early stages and were responsible has its own self-narrative and myth concerning its role and for arresting the fugitive Saif al-Islam Gaddafi in southern weight in destroying Gaddafi’s Jamahiriya. As shown by the Libya (Jeune Afrique, November 30, 2011). The charismatic recent clashes in and around Tripoli, the ability to obtain a founder of the Zintan militia, Muhammad Ali Madani, consensus among the militias seems slight and the possibility was killed by loyalist forces on May 1, 2011 (al-Arabiya, that these groups will voluntarily give up their arms and get September 7, 2011). out of Libyan streets appears to be remote. The Zintan militia is a rather powerful example of how much militias matter The Zintan Brigade has an inflexible approach in its in the current Libyan environment; well organized, tough, recruitment procedures - only those who can fully irreducibly anti-Gaddafi and even in a way reliable, they demonstrate that they were not attached to the previous patrol several areas of Tripoli and, although at odds with regime can join the group. As shown by the dispute with some residents and local groups, have been able to perform a the Mashashiya, the Zintan Brigade has a more general, more or less effective job of controlling their districts. Their non-negotiable approach of rejecting any possibility of role during the revolution bought them some credibility collaboration with people attached to the previous regime. amongst ordinary Libyans and other revolutionaries. With some other factions, however, relations remain tense, Another characteristic of the Zintan militia is their strong especially with groups vying for control of Tripoli such as and efficient organization, which allows them to implement the Tripoli Military Council, the Misrata militia and the an effective control of the areas under their informal rule. National Army. Unlike other Libyan militias that are composed mostly of civilian volunteers, the Zintan Brigade has a balanced but Any state pretending to be effective and functioning strictly hierarchical mix of civilian volunteers from Zintan cannot allow the presence of armed groups on its territory and former members of the Libyan national army who that act independently. The efforts of al-Juwali, a member defected in the early stages of the revolution and are now in of the Zintan group, will be aimed at integrating, rather command positions within the Brigade. than marginalizing, these militiamen in the new security structure of Libya. The presence of a militia member in the It is not surprising that a member of the Zintan militia, position of Minister of Defense is a vivid demonstration of Osama al-Juwali, was appointed Minister of Defense in the how much the militias matter. That the Minister is a member new transitional cabinet (al-Jazeera, November 22, 2011). of the Zintan militia displays the importance of this group Unlike other members of the Libyan leadership, al-Juwali and suggests that the next political moves by the Transitional has opted for a milder approach towards the militias, aimed Government will not be hostile to Zintani interests. at integrating and co-opting these groups. Al-Juwali says that time is needed to settle this situation, without setting The presence of an enormous number of “liberated” weapons any deadlines. In mid-December al-Juwali suggested that on the streets of Tripoli and the strong possibility that not six weeks was the minimum time needed in which to expect all the militias will be satisfied by the new political balance some results concerning the normalization of the militias’ make the outcome of the process started by al-Juwali very presence (Reuters, December 19, 2011). This stance is part of uncertain. Optimism regarding a settlement of the militia a wider pragmatic approach pursued by al-Juwali, who wants issue in Libya in the short term appears to be unrealistic. to integrate militiamen in the new military and security 15 Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u July 2012 Dario Cristiani is a PhD Candidate in Middle East control of Misrata after evicting State security forces loyal to and Mediterranean Studies at King’s College London. Gaddafi. Previously, he has been a teaching fellow in Political Science and Comparative Politics at the University of February 25 - Thousands of people return to the streets in Naples “L’Orientale” and a political analyst with the Tripoli. The dual military and civilian Mitiga International Power and Interest News Report (PINR). Airport, about 11 kilometres east of Tripoli, is taken over by anti-Gaddafi protesters in the afternoon after a series of defections.

February 27 – The UN Security Council passes Resolution 1970 imposing sanctions on Gaddafi and his family and Libyan Elections: A Timeline of refers the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court. Key Events February 28 - EU governments approve sanctions against 2011 Gaddafi and his closest advisers.

February 14 - Three days after the fall of Egyptian President March 5 - The rebel National Transitional Council (NTC) in Hosni Mubarak, Libyans post messages on social media Benghazi declares itself Libya’s sole representative. networks calling for demonstrations against the Gaddafi regime. March 6 - Pro-Gaddafi forces attempt to retake Misrata and send soldiers and into the city. The rebels allow the February 15 - The arrest of dissident lawyer Fethi Tarbel government forces to enter the center of the city so that they leads to a protest of about 200 people in Benghazi. can be surrounded and captured. Seven tanks enter Misrata but only three tanks make it all the way to the center before February 18 - Pro-government demonstrators take to the being trapped. streets in Tripoli in support of the Gaddafi regime. Separately, in Benghazi, among the tens of thousands of protesters take March 10 - Forces loyal to Gaddafi bomb the oil town of to the streets against the regime. At least 20 are killed and Brega and retake control of Zawiyah, about 50 kilometers 200 are wounded by pro-government forces. west of Tripoli. France recognizes the opposition Libyan NTC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. February 19 – New protests erupt in cities across the country, including al-Baida, Ajdabiya and Misrata. March 17 - The UN Security Council votes on Resolution 1973, which authorizes a no-fly zone over Libya and “all February 20 - Violence surges in Benghazi where necessary measures” to protect civilians against government protesters have taken control of the city. Anti-government forces. demonstrations also break out in Tripoli, and medical sources say that after six days of unrest the death toll stands March 19 - The first air strikes target Libya’s air defenses at least 219 people nationwide. and halt the advance of Gaddafi’s forces on rebel-controlled Benghazi. February 21 - In Benghazi, protesters loot weapons from the main security headquarters armory and seize the local radio March 24 - Hostilities continue, particularly in Misrata, station, starting their own broadcasts under the name Voice Ajdabiya and Zintan. of Free Libya. Demonstrators lower the Libyan flag from above the main courthouse and replace it with the flag of March 28 - Qatar becomes the first Arab country to recognize Libya’s old monarchy. Elsewhere, two senior air force pilots the NTC as Libya’s legitimate representative. fly their Dassault Mirage F1 fighter jets to Malta and request April 3 - Warplanes fly over Brega as anti-government forces political asylum after defying orders to bomb protesters. vie for control of the city. Government forces attack the towns of Zintan and Yafran. February 22 - Gaddafi makes a brief appearance on Libyan State television in which he says, “I am in Tripoli. Do not April 5 - A Turkish medical aid ship arrives in Turkey with believe the news of stray dogs.” injured Libyans from Misrata where fighting continues. Up February 24 – Protestors and anti-government militias take 16 Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u July 2012 to 13,600 people remain stranded at camps and transit points last of Gaddafi’s loyalist forces to surrender as he announces on the border with Libya. the return of the U.S. ambassador to Tripoli.

April 30 - A NATO missile attack on a house in Tripoli kills September 21 - The interim rulers say they have captured Gaddafi’s youngest son and three grandchildren. most of Sabha; only Gaddafi’s birthplace Sirte and the town of Bani Walid continue to resist. May 13 - The entirety of Misrata proper is under rebel control, with clashes still occurring in the southern suburb September 25 - The first Libyan crude oil shipment in of Hizam, the southeastern farmland of Zameena, and west months leaves from the port of Marsa el Hariga for Italy. of . October 12 - Gaddafi’s son Motassim is captured after he May 14 - The rebels reach the gates of Tawergha, near Tripoli. tries to escape Sirte.

June 27 - The ICC issues arrest warrants for Gaddafi, his son October 13 - NTC forces say they have control of the whole Saif al-Islam and intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senussi on of Sirte except neighborhood ‘Number Two’ where Gaddafi’s charges of crimes against humanity. forces are surrounded.

August 20 - Rebels take full control of the Zawiyah, including October 17 - NTC forces celebrate the capture of Bani Walid, the eastern parts. one of the final bastions of Gaddafi loyalists.

August 21 - The rebels enter Tripoli with little resistance. October 18 - U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton arrives in Gaddafi makes audio addresses over state television calling Libya on an unannounced visit and urges militias to unite. on Libyans to fight off the rebel “rats.” October 20 - Gaddafi is captured and killed as NTC fighters August 23 - The rebels overrun Gaddafi’s fortified Bab al- take his hometown Sirte, ending a two-month siege. Aziziya compound in Tripoli, trashing and looting symbols of his rule. October 21 - Gaddafi’s body lies in an old meat store on display for thousands of onlookers. August 29 - Gaddafi’s wife, his daughter Aisha and two of his sons enter Algeria. October 23 - Libya declares the liberation of the nation. “We have liberated our beloved country, with its cities, villages, September 1 - Libya’s interim rulers meet world leaders at a hill-tops, mountains, deserts and skies,” an NTC official says conference in Paris while Gaddafi, on the 42nd anniversary of his coming to power, urges his supporters to fight on. October 31 - Abdul Raheem al-Keeb is elected as the new interim prime minister. September 8 - Interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril arrives in Tripoli on his first visit since the city was taken by November 19 - Saif al-Islam is detained with several rebel forces. bodyguards near the town of Obari by fighters based near the western mountain town of Zintan September 13 - Interim government chief Mustafa Abdel Jalil makes his first speech in Tripoli to a crowd of 10,000. 2012 September 15 - French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron land in Libya to a January 1 - A draft election law is published. According to heroes’ welcome. the draft, 200 MPs will be elected. Members of the Gaddafi regime and family members of Gaddafi are barred from September 16 - The UN Security Council eases sanctions running. At least 10% of the MPs will be women, unless on Libya, including on its national oil company and central fewer female candidates run. bank. The UN General Assembly effectively recognizes the NTC. February 12 - Saadi Gaddafi is placed under house arrest in Niger after warning of a revolt against Libya’s new September 20 - U.S. President Barack Obama calls for the government. 17 Militant Leadership Monitor Quarterly Special Report u July 2012 February 16 - Libya marks the uprising’s first anniversary.

March 9 - Thousands of Libyans rally in Tripoli to denounce moves by leaders in the east to create a semi-autonomous territory, Cyrenaica. Martyrs’ Square is the focal point of demonstrations, with people chanting “No, no to federalism” and “Libya is one”. May 8 - Truckloads of armed men attack the Tripoli headquarters of Libya’s interim prime minister, Abdel Rahim el-Keeb, just weeks before a scheduled national election. The attackers are believed to be militiamen from the Nafusah Mountains, southwest of the capital, who are demanding payment for their work in fighting Gaddafi’s forces. The interim government had suspended a plan to pay such fighters because of rampant corruption, prompting protests.

May 19 - Residents in Benghazi vote in local elections. More than 400 people contest seats on the 44-member local council.

May 21 - Registration of voters, parties participating in elections and independent candidates that started at May 1 ends. In total 2,865,937 voters, or 80% of the 3.4 million electorate, registered for Libya’s first election in more than 50 years. In total 4,013 candidates registered for elections with 2,639 independent candidates.

June 10 - Libya announces that elections for the country’s constituent assembly initially scheduled to be held by June 19 have been postponed to July 7. The reason is that Libya’s transitional authorities have not completed the list of candidates and other arrangements for the election, including voter registration.

June 30 - Libyan protesters and militiamen storm the headquarters of the election commission in Benghazi, setting voting slips on fire, a week before the country is to hold its first general election in nearly five decades.

July 7 - The National Transistional Council supervises the first national elections in Libya in over 40 years for a 200 member General National Congress to replace the Council. The Congress will be responsible for choosing a prime minister, organizing parliamentary elections and to appoint a constitutional committee which will draft a constitution.

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