Polish Journal of Science №22 (2019) Vol. 5 Issn 3353

POLISH JOURNAL OF SCIENCE №22 (2019) VOL. 5 ISSN 3353-2389 Polish journal of science:  has been founded by a council of scientists, with the aim of helping the knowledge and scientific achieve- ments to contribute to the world.  articles published in the journal are placed additionally within the journal in international indexes and li- braries.  is a free access to the electronic archive of the journal, as well as to published articles.  before publication, the articles pass through a rigorous selection and peer review, in order to preserve the scientific foundation of information.

Editor in chief –J an Kamiński, Kozminski University Secretary – Mateusz Kowalczyk

Agata Żurawska – University of Warsaw, Poland Jakub Walisiewicz – University of Lodz, Poland Paula Bronisz – University of Wrocław, Poland Barbara Lewczuk – Poznan University of Technology, Poland Andrzej Janowiak – AGH University of Science and Technology, Poland Frankie Imbriano – University of Milan, Italy Taylor Jonson – Indiana University Bloomington, USA Remi Tognetti – Ecole Normale Superieure de Cachan, France Bjørn Evertsen – Harstad University College, Norway Nathalie Westerlund – Umea University, Sweden Thea Huszti – Aalborg University, Denmark Aubergine Cloez – Universite de Montpellier, France Eva Maria Bates – University of Navarra, Spain Enda Baciu – Vienna University of Technology, Austria

Also in the work of the editorial board are involved independent experts

1000 copies POLISH JOURNAL OF SCIENCE Wojciecha Górskiego 9, Warszawa, Poland, 00-033 email: [email protected] site: http://www.poljs.com

CONTENT

CULTUROLOGY Sazhniev M. THE POLITICAL NATURE OF UKRAINE’S RUSSIFICATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE TERM RUSSIAN- SPEAKING UKRAINIAN AS A DESTRUCTIVE ETHNOCULTURAL FACTOR ...... 3

JURIDICAL SCIENCES Blikhar M. Plekhanova A. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL WARRANTIES RIGHTS SOME ISSUES OF INTERSECTORAL REGULATION OF AND FREEDOM OF HUMAN AND CITIZEN ...... 10 RELATIONS UNDER THE CONTRACT OF DONATION .. 26 Galavov A. Ramazanov A. THE MAIN DIRECTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT OF ISSUES OF DETERMINATION OF OFFICIAL ORGANIZED SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT OF LAW CRIME IN LAW ENFORCEMENT ...... 28 ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY ...... 14 Sharipov R. Jamaludinova M. DETERMINATION AND FEATURES OF THE PROBLEMS OF QUALIFICATION AND COMPOSITION OF CRIMES OF ART. 127.1 AND ART. DIFFERENTIATION OF FRAUD USING PAYMENT CARDS 127.2 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN OR IN THE FIELD OF COMPUTER INFORMATION ...... 18 FEDERATION ...... 30 Kulduev Sh. Shestakov A., Hajiyev Kh. TO THE QUESTION OF CORRELATION OF MOTIVE AND ON THE ISSUE OF ENSURING THE SAFETY OF PURPOSES OF COMMISSION OF CRIME AND THEIR PARTICIPANTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AS THE CLASSIFICATION ...... 20 MAIN TASK OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS ...... 35 Plekhanov E. SOME ASPECTS OF APPLYING THE EUROPEAN UNION EXPERIENCE IN THE REGULATION OF RELATIONS WITH CONSUMERS IN RUSSIA ...... 23

PHILOLOGICAL SCIENCES Khizhinskaya M. Zakamulina M. THE PLACE OF RHETORIC IN THE SPEECHES OF FRENCH LANGUAGE CHARTER ACCEPTANCE IN IRANIAN POLITICIANS ON THE EXAMPLE OF HASSAN QUEBEC AND ITS LINGUISTIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ROUHANI'S SPEECH AT THE 74TH SUMMIT OF THE UN IMPLICATIONS ...... 43 GENERAL ASSEMBLY ...... 39 Konovalova E. Baydasheva E. СПОСОБЫ ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ ФРАНЦУЗСКИХ THE COLOR AS A PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR IN ЗАИМСТВОВАНИЙ В ПОЛЬСКОМ ЯЗЫКЕ ...... 48 THE LANGUAGE OF MEDICINE ...... 40 Takhtarova S., Abuzyarova D. COMMUNICATIVE MITIGATION IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE ...... 51

PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES Afanaseva O. Strelkov V., Safoshin A., FEATURES OF THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE Barankin S., Shulepov M. PROFESSIONS OF WORKING SPECIALTIES AND EXTREME STYLE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNIVERSITY ...... 62 STAFF ...... 55 Byundyugova T. A STUDY OF OCCUPATIONAL STRESS OF EMPLOYEES OF COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATION ...... 57 POLISH JOURNAL OF SCIENCE № 22, 2019 3 CULTUROLOGY

THE POLITICAL NATURE OF UKRAINE’S RUSSIFICATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE TERM RUSSIAN-SPEAKING UKRAINIAN AS A DESTRUCTIVE ETHNOCULTURAL FACTOR

Sazhniev M. Melitopol Boghdan Khmelnytskyi State Pedagogical University, orcid.org/0000-0001-5462-4423

Abstract The essay demonstrates political component of Russian language and culture dissemination in the Ukraine, the nature of the synthetic atomization of society and the separation of Russian-speaking Ukrainians as an independent part of society, which is destructive attitude towards the nation. Political events and the war with the Russian Federation have shown the importance of taking into account the political factor of social ethnic identification in the first place, and demonstrated the need for a clear demarcation of the nation and diasporas in the country that has previously gone through the historic phase of Russification and the destruction of an autochthonous culture. Keywords: Ukrainian culture, Russian culture, Russian culture bearer, disinformation, irrational reality.

Linguistic and cultural identity in the former So- hand here, we can not agree with Communist attempt viet Union and Ukraine is often researched without tak- to unite ‘proletarians are as one nation’, despite Mos- ing into account the prior methods and consequences of cow had manipulative support of communist ideas with the Russification policy that took place and remains as force and lies they spread in societies, spreading their the major external influence on the formation of cul- own cultural influence also. The Communist regime in tural space in the present and historical perspective. The the USSR set the goal of embracing the world with analysis of Russian-speaking people among the popu- ‘proletarian revolutions’, while seizing power in the lation of the Ukraine and rest of the ex-USSR countries countries they destroyed the personal space of people, should take into account the actual ethnic identity of the wiped out the nation to create a ‘Soviet man’. In fact, carriers of Russian culture and language, consider the this purpose is similar to the Nazi’s regime Aryan na- dynamics of the processes of the formation and spread tion and cultural domination over other non-Germanic of the Russian language in the context of political in- peoples. But Nazism ideology felt after World War II, fluence, the result of the authoritarian political system Germany undergone denazification and the negative at- aimed at the destruction of national-cultural identity, titude toward Nazism was accepted by the world. Still the forced Moscow substitution of an autochthonous the destruction of non-Russian cultures in occupied culture with Russian, as during the Soviet Union as in countries of the USSR and the Russian Federation re- the modern era. Dehumanization of a large scale in the mains only debatable issues. Interaction of communism information space, the physical threats of a direct mili- with the world was based on disinformation and people tary invasion from Russia, the actual state of Ukrainian manipulation. Moscow's action against neighboring na- culture in the occupied territories are affecting people tions should be taken into account for any cultural in- forcing them to submit to major threat, and this influ- vestigation of ex-USSR countries, in fact the current ence cannot be ignored or considered a normal part of ‘hybrid’ Ukrainian - Russian is the first real step toward the cultural reanimation and restoring of sustainable Ukrainians nation reanimation, and the beginning of culture (Yekelchyk 1999). Russification, as part of the normalization of Moscow culture influence on Ukraine. political conquest of Moscow is not a natural spread of Ammon Cheskin and Angela Kachuyevski em- the culture to ex-USSR countries. In addition, the Rus- phasize analyze on the types of ethnic co-relationships sian political model excludes the possibility of frank as ‘T’ and ‘L’ type throw self identification as - "we" discussion of the suppression, forced cultural influence and "they", but Ukraine has undergone period of ‘So- and crimes against humanity that took place before and viet people’ creation, the linguistic-cultural identity were used again since 2014. Instead Russia conceal cur- was distorted by external political processes and mod- rent geopolitical goals, avoid any discussion of the lin- ern synthetic and politicized separation of the Ukrain- guistic situation, they mislead and frankly deceives ex- ian population into "Russian-speaking Ukranians". It ternal observers, defending their own political interests. has nothing in common with ethnic self-identification Cultural and ethnic identification and self-identi- and should be studied either as a unique phenomenon fication for ex-USSR countries including Ukraine can of a mixed nation or as a result of brutal Moscow's pol- not be considered apart from the historical-political icy towards non-Russian nations (Cheskin, Kachuyev- context and the present threats and terror from Russian. ski 2018). Russian-speaking people among Ukrainians For example, we can not investigate the cultural differ- are not a unique phenomenon, Russian language was ences in the population of North and South Korea, ex- politically implemented into all the countries of the for- cluding the political impact of events on people, more- mer USSR with wide range of methods including eth- over, if we exclude exterior factors in Korean war nocide, only the Baltic States used an opportunity for 1950-1953 and study only an ethnic component, in this the national restoration and helped forming a natural di- case the division of Korea would be shown as a civil aspora of Russians also for those who did not want or war, that is not corresponding to reality. From the other could not become a part of a national country. And by 4 POLISH JOURNAL OF SCIENCE № 22, 2019 2014 Russian diaspora in Baltic states demonstrated, east, Moscow's official position on ‘protecting Russian- unwillingness of political destabilization for political speakers, constant threat of a full-scale Russian inva- for political purpose to ‘protect the Russian-speaking sion, destructive role of pro-Russian mass media and population’, but in Ukraine this thesis and political ele- social networks, ongoing dehumanization of Ukrainian ment of destabilization was used to synthetic division national consciousness. Spreads of fear and language of and atomization of Ukrainian society in 2014, that hatred in social networks continues, the Russian Feder- helped Russia to conceal invasion and start undeclared ation media and their cultural product, are continue to war. put numerous controversies in the Ukrainian society, Some political elites in Ukraine helped this covert- paralyzing sustainable linguistic and cultural restora- ops thesis to exist due to the prior occupation of tion. And these actions have the goal not to protect Rus- Ukraine, when a significant percentage of the central sian culture, but on the contrary, brings threat to the and regional elites were formed thought Soviet para- population of Ukraine despite ethnic self-identification digms with despise to national self-consciousness, sup- (Nozhenko 2006); in fact, an aggressive attitude to- port of the Soviet ideas regarding Ukrainian culture as wards Ukrainian culture and language is spread, people a "hostile element". From 1991 till 2014 Ukrainians living in Ukraine are dehumanized and Ukrainian na- used to populism and lies of the main political elites, tion is threatened with destruction on an example of which shifted their public position to everything possi- Crimea occupation in 2014 and a crushing attitude of ble just to stay at power. They used any means to ma- "Army DPR-LPR" towards Ukrainian culture. nipulate the population using also Moscow’s ‘linguistic This new irrational reality world is a dangerous separation’ thesis at a wide scale. As a result, the Party place, as there are a number of people who accept as of Regions and President Yanukovych became the normal occupying a sovereign territory on the basis of apotheosis of an anti-national idea in Ukraine, which cultural influence, ignoring borders, breaking up agree- led to the weakening of the country, atomized society ments, forgetting forceful methods of ‘Russification’ and created conditions for the military aggression of and ethnocide crimes against Ukrainians in the 20th cen- Russia and for the ongoing occupation of part of the tury. So both in media and in propaganda Russian cul- country. ture bearers are individuals whose cultural self-identi- In a course of history Moscow's artificially and fication is based on modern or classical Russian cul- with brutal methods spreaded the Russian language in ture and they reflect national, linguistic or social Ukraine, in particular - through the destruction of the connection to Russians but not to another country or nationally conscious part of the population, and the pro- nation, even if they do not belong to the Russian nation. hibition of all Ukrainian literary, dramatic and oral Self-identification reflects a real situation, when cul- work; through the elimination of Ukrainian culture cen- tural affinity influences both political decisions and ters in the Ukrainian places of residence; through the public opinion of those people, while widely used ‘Rus- arrest of Ukrainian scholars and clergy, and their re- sian speaking people’ is incorrect and used in propa- placement with Russian representatives. The process of ganda against Ukraine only to involve more people in Russification took place through the compulsory study hate-speech. From Russian ethno-social politics, we of Russian language and literature in Ukraine schools, can say that there are two important trends: through monetary supplement of Russian teachers. - they want a nation to be identified only by a lan- Ukrainians schools were closed and replaced with Rus- guage spoken without any historical or ethnic back- sian schools, Moscow ordered transition of existing ground, just for a language; Ukrainian schools to the Russian language. There de- - calling people who speak Russian but are not eth- ported the population of Ukraine beyond its borders, nic Russians or Russian citizens as those people to be made changes into the Ukrainian spelling to bring it identified from outside as Russians or as specific ‘third’ closer to Russian, Ukraine workers who were removed category of nation that is mixed and is ‘half Russian- during the war with their factories were forbidden to half Ukrainian’. return home. For decades Moscow repressed Ukrainian It is done constantly but on the example of Ukrain- culture defenders, dehumanized the Ukrainian people ian events in 2014-2018 we see that they in fact con- in general, writing and scientific theses had to be only verted the language in culture identifier for exterior ob- in Russian, and those scientific works were approved in servers and used passionate Russian culture bearers as Moscow only, all Ukrainian scientific and fictional collaborates in the warfare against Ukraine and the works were undergoing censorship and national culture Ukrainian nation. was considered ‘hostile element’. Even after the col- Under such circumstances it is impossible to in- lapse of the USSR, Moscow was preparing to defend its vestigate the identity and cultural situation without po- gains in promoting Russian culture, for CIS countries litical influence of Moscow not only in the occupied the Russian language meant to be the only official lan- territories but also throughout Ukraine, at least until the guage. Only the Baltic States prevented this by allow- aggressor retreat, formally recognize his own defeat, ing citizens to clearly self-identify and identify them- Russian leaders will be sentenced to international the selves as they want, thereby effectively preventing (ca- courts and Russian Federation refuse from aggressive sus belle) the reason for the war that the Russian expansion and future "protection of Russian-speaking" Federation used against Ukraine in 2014. (ie, the destruction of non-Russian cultures and lan- Also we can not ignore the contemporary political guages). On the example of Baltic states we see that influence on the population of Ukraine - the occupation ethno-cultural normalization is possible after nation of Crimea and East of the Ukraine, ongoing war in the recognizes the consequences of past crimes, fight of the POLISH JOURNAL OF SCIENCE № 22, 2019 5 interference in the interior restoration of the cultural nations after USSR crush, and the lack of an unambig- heritage. While the Russian Federation policy on "pro- uous answer to the aggressor and the neutrality of ex- tecting" people who speak Russian does not protect ternal observers is a crime of non-interference for the people from the pressure, but the use of Russian as the destiny of these nations and future political events that main language of communication in the society and is will occur it countries fall to Russia command again. directed to the mandatory need to know exclusively Thirdly, it is Russia that undoubtedly uses its own Russian language for communication and not to know strength and is interested in the lack of symmetrical re- another, in including Ukrainian in Ukraine. Thus, given action from the world democracies, having strong posi- the current state and the spread of Russian, the forced tions for further interfering in the interior affairs and depression of the Ukrainian language and culture, the life of neighboring countries citizens, it uses all means Russian Federation denies Ukrainians the right to own available including war and annexation and war with and use their own Ukrainian language in their own Ukraine and Georgia demonstrated it clearly. For country. This principle is created by historical events Ukraine the cultural influence is used as an official rea- and is supported by modern political processes. And the son for war - casus belle for Russian-Ukrainian war proliferation of Russian culture continues with all 2014, invasion and occupation are used to impose Rus- means, including military aggression and annexation, sian cultural and social dominance. Disinformation in the possession of the population in Russian, and its free Russian military campaign creates discourse and deep- origination is becoming a factor against the autochtho- ens the dissonance, expanding Russian culture and and nous culture. The abandonment of native language and leveling out the national culture and language in the culture leads to slowing down of its development, victim country. Since 2014, the information war and worsens the economic development of culture carriers, disinformation campaign of the Russian Federation in- as a proxy army of the DPR-LNR and directly by the tervention in most popular information sources - creat- Russian Federation uses intimidation, mockery of the ing conspiracy theories, spreads information on non- carriers of Ukrainian culture, has defined its own cul- existent events, thus distorting actual reality, the politi- tural influence factor as a sufficient reason for interven- cal "war of edits" has started in Wikipedia, massive tion in the internal policies, including the threat of a Russian propaganda content is spread in blogs and full-scale and ongoing covert war, and occupation. video-streams, fake accounts in social networks are cre- It is Ukraine's refusal to protect its own cultural ated to controverse the event to the highest emotional space, the lack of political will to weaken the domi- degree, etc. (Pomerantsev, Weiss ). nance of the Russian language and culture, the absence Let's single out several criteria of the occupation of a national security policy to protect its own culture, regime that influenced the consciousness of people and and this led to the further synthetic spread of the Rus- the state of Ukraine. The first and most important crite- sian language and culture as a factor of destabilization rion is Russification and ethnocide, which was hidden of society in Ukraine, and eventually to the official behind the ideology of communism about "equality of cause annexation of territory and military conflict. This peoples" (Laver 2004; Cloud 1975). Russification as an gives the aggressor an opportunity to actually hide the instrument of assimilation was widely used by the Rus- war with Ukraine, the Russian disinformation legend sian Empire and the USSR, which demonstrates the "Russian-language civil war against Ukrainian-lan- complete assimilation of the small peoples (Rodkie- guage". wicz 1998; Polvinen 2007; Staliūnas 2007). Afterwards And when considering political influence of the the policy of "Russification" under the USSR has been Russian federation on neighboring countries, which substantially expanded in methods including the Ho- were clearly demonstrated in Georgia and Ukraine we lodomor, the mass migration of autochthonous peoples want to outline the main components that the Russian beyond the borders of their own country, eradication of Federation uses to create a conflict among ex-USSR native cultural elites (Scherbak 1997). countries that are its political and cultural adversaries. Russian Federation defines the language as a sign First, the Russian Federation prevails over all former of belonging of people of any nationality to "Russians" USSR countries both in military-political potential, and regardless of their origin, country of residence, or any in economic power, in the demographic aspect. Russia other features, which is similar to ‘Soviet nation’ type. has nuclear weapons, which they repeatedly mentioned This is clearly seen on the example of the formation of as an element of military might they would definitely a linguistic space in the Russian Federation itself, use in the mass media at the beginning of the aggression which is known to have about 100 different languages in Ukraine in 2014. None of the former USSR countries from 14 different language families (Alpatov 2005), the separately can be equal to the of the Russian Federation Russian is introduced as the main state language in or- in any of these aspects. der to replace the native cultures of autochthonous peo- Secondly, the policy pursued in the Russian Em- ples and erase their identity. pire and in the USSR was aimed at dehumanizing a dif- The same politics was held towards all peoples in ferent, non-Russian nation, replacing the autochtho- the Moscow conquered countries in the USSR, not only nous culture with Russian, destructing the resistance as a factor of cultural influence on the former Soviet with all means possible, including the genocide. And Union, but as a factor in ethnic identity, attitude to- unlike the victims of Nazism, the victims of the com- wards carriers, political manipulation, and intentional munist regime are still considered to be the subject of double-mindedness in defining nationalities in the debate and aggressor is a partner for this discussions. USSR. In Ukraine, as in the rest of the post Soviet coun- Russia continues the policy of destroying neighboring tries without policy of protecting national culture, the 6 POLISH JOURNAL OF SCIENCE № 22, 2019 Russian language replaces the national. Undoubtedly, distorted meaning to denounce previous agreements it is impossible to resolve the issue of protecting the and wage a war for territories and expansion. And this cultural environment in Ukraine by radical methods, thesis is constantly repeated on all levels of communi- but stabilizing and restoring Ukrainian culture is a mat- cation including official ones, recently ‘Russian culture ter of national security. bearers’ were named the main reason to annex Crimea, By 2014, the Russification of Ukraine was not as Italian ambassador in Ukraine Salvini said: ‘There considered by people as a threat to Ukraine's statehood, are some historically Russian areas, in which there are but as Russia began invading Crimea and the East of a Russian culture and tradition, and which therefore le- Ukraine, declaring interests of taking over Donetsk, gitimately belong to the Russian Federation,’ when ad- Luhansk, Kharkiv, Mykolayiv, Zaporizhye, Kherson mitting the reason why he considered Crimea a legally and Odesa regions with one proclaimed reason - to pro- Russian territory (Curridori 2018). The way Russian tect the Russian-speaking population. However, the dy- government spread disinformation in Ukraine, attempt- namics of the processes launched by the RF testifies, ing to recruit militants and to break Ukrainian society however, absence of wide support to physically eradi- from inside, using mass and social-media became a cate Ukrainians, despite extreme aggression and hate precedent, political instrument and example for modern speech that Russian mass media motivated people to informational warfare (Etter L., 2017). kill with the main reason for aggression was the so- From June 25, 2014, the war with the Russian Fed- called "Russian-speaking protection". Russian Federa- eration received all the characteristics of the fourth gen- tion proclaimed casus belli as “protection of Russian eration of war, although in fact the date of its beginning speaking” Ukrainians, but armed warfare itself was in- can be considered as the period from February 20 to 27, itiated as part of the Russian military invasion itself. 2014. According to the declared intentions, the Russian And as a part of this war, disinformation campaign re- Federation has not achieved its goals and will continue peated thesis about Ukraine inner cultural and language the war, President Putin called the official pretext for conflict, as a cover-ops in mass media to disguise inva- the military aggression to penetrate and replace the sion and distort understanding of the situation. Ukrainian national culture with the Russian imperial And as we see on the example of Ukraine, tactics world perception. For Ukraine, since 2014, the issue of of war was: to bring culture in; do their best to wide- linguistic identity has put the strategic need to preserve spread and even dominate it; officially claim a political the integrity of the cultural and linguistic space to pre- threat to “Russian culture bearers” and then proclaim vent the emergence of social instability, the loss of po- the necessity to protect people with all means including litical control and direct military aggression from the military. Russian culture bearers may not be connected Russian Federation. Various methods of influence are to the aggressor by any trait: not as citizens, not as eth- aimed at mild "unwinding" of the population on de- nic Russians, not even as Russian supporters – but they structive actions, loss of manageability and creation of were adapted in Russian culture, they accept imperial- conditions and reasons for military aggression of the istic visions of USSR, sometimes they understand and Russian Federation under the slogan "protection of speak Russian. And since 2014 this is a sufficient rea- Russian-speakers". And the creation of a "sufficient son for every country to be invaded by another country, reason" for the Russian attack was publicly voiced in especially if country is weakened with any political the slogans of Russian politicians, the media, the fig- events. On 24 June 2014 Putin said “Russia will always ures of Russian culture, and backed up by the military's protect ethnic Russians in Ukraine and those Ukrainian own actions on the occupation of the Crimea and the people who feel not only the ethnical but cultural and eastern part of Ukraine. In addition to Ukraine, the cul- linguistic connection towards Russia, those who feel tural factor and "linguistic and ethnic identity" were themselves a part of Russian world” (‘Natsionalnyi ak- used to start the war, forming same marginal "Do- tsent’, 2014; ‘BBC News Russkaya sluzhba’, 2014). netsk/Lugansk republics" as before - Transnistria, And it is not just an idea - to interpret the term ‘ethnos’ North Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Russification of Kö- in such a way, but this is a precedent, if left unpunished nigsberg and the dissemination of cultural values of the and ignored, can be used by any aggressor, as a reason Russian Federation extends influence on Germany. to claim ‘casus belli’. The world will never be the same Since 2014 for Russia, the language and distribution of after the interpretation of ‘ethnos’ in this way, as this Russian culture is "casus belle" and after the occupation interpretation ignores national self-identification for all of Crimea, no country can feel safe. The distribution of the countries and nations. the Russian language is carried out as a lesser language And Moscow has not only made Russian culture a de jure, but de facto is aimed to be recognition as the ‘casus belli’, they clearly stated that if someone claims main language. At the same time, the resistance to ex- himself Russian on any territory, then the Russian Fed- pansion of Russian cultural, attempts to keep it within eration can use their troops to “pacify” a foreign nation the framework of smaller languages, leads to aggres- and protect those self-proclaimed ‘Russians’. Moscow sive rhetoric from the Russian Federation, which hides clearly stated, that they will do anything including us- further military and geopolitical goals "protecting Rus- age of military force, to ‘protect’ anyone who publicly sia." sympathize Russians. (‘Russia today’, 2014; ‘Sovyet In no way should Russians receive more rights Federatsii Federalnogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Feder- than other small languages in Ukraine and should be in atsii’, 2014). They created a new idea and are con- the framework of international legislation on small lan- stantly repeating that thesis about “language and cul- guages. The universal state should only be for the au- ture” to further destabilization of national countries, use POLISH JOURNAL OF SCIENCE № 22, 2019 7 tochthonous language. This is a question of national se- USSR countries, including Ukraine. The cultural situa- curity of any territorial territory close to the Russian tion on the territory of Ukraine was distorted due to the Federation, and Ukraine is not an exception. The cur- Russian occupation, assimilation and dehumanization rent distribution of Russian was not as natural or dias- of Ukrainian nation and culture for 400 years, known pora, but mainly by conquered territories and Russifi- acts of ethnocide against Ukrainians in central and cation, genocide and the resettlement of peoples in and Eastern Ukraine in the 20th century (Khmara, 1975). out of the Ukraine. The dehumanization of other non- And while Ukrainian culture was oppressed and de- Russian cultures and languages was distinct and ex- stroyed, Russian culture and language was spread in- tremely angry in the Soviet period, however, the nega- stead. More affected were big cities and, considering tive chauvinistic attitude of the Russians towards the geography, ‘Russification’ effect was stronger on the rest of the nation’s remains. Here is what Orest Sub- territories that remained under Moscow’s control for a telny says about this: "Another method that he used was longer period of time, constantly destroying and substi- the regime for russification in Ukraine, was to encour- tuting native Ukrainian culture. age the resettlement of Russians here and the Ukraini- This culture projection is done with little effort as ans' eviction." (Subtelny 1993). But Jacob Ornstein "as in public opinion term ‘Russians’ is not equal to the a result of this policy, the social prestige of the Ukrain- ‘Russian nation’, but to a person that was educated in ian language dropped sharply, while the Russians, on Russian culture and accepts it as native, no matter the contrary, rose. Thus, Ukrainian emigrants in the which nation he or she is in fact. “Russian” is an impe- West testified that the use of the Ukrainian language as rialistic characteristic and self-identification as a part of an educated citizen was perceived not merely as a the Russian Federation, the USSR, the Russian Empire mauvais ton, but as a manifestation of nationalism, an etc. with expansionist intends towards the world and re- act of political disobedience. The Ukrainian-speaking jection of true self-identification. Specifics of Russian respondent told me how he was forced to change his culture is deceiving “others, hostile, all other nations as language to Russian while he was taking care of a girl- conquered as other not yet”, resentment, expansionism. woman, so that he would not be described as a "village It comes out to be the fundamental rule – to bear torture bourgeois" (Ornstein 1959). As a result, Russians and and torture others. Communism is an apotheosis of other people who recognized themselves as Russians to anti-individualism and “ressentiment without glory/re- get rid of bullying and much serious problems in- spect/pride” (Herpen, 2015). Russian presidential elec- creased in Ukraine from 9% in 1926 to 22% in 1989. tion of 2018 clearly showed a great support of the re- The constancy of institutions set up by the Rus- gime by citizens with 67.5% voter turnout 76.69% sians in their hatred policies is manifested in particular voted for Vladimir Putin. Russian people voted for the in relation to the Russian ethnos to the outside world current regime, despite the variety of antidemocratic in- from 2014, when Ukrainian culture and Ukrainians in itiatives, despite or even due to the wars in Ukraine, the occupied territories were dehumanized, destroyed Syria, sanctions and anti-disinformation campaign. The and changed into Russian. The hysteria of Crimean Russian elections cannot be representative as their so- Mashru and V. Putin's political support in the spring of ciology, but voter’s reaction before and after them in- 2014 in social networks and personal communication dicates that people of the Russian Federation are mostly have clearly demonstrated unqualified, sincere hatred satisfied with the regime, its wrongdoing and world re- towards the Ukrainian language and culture. As some action, ‘betting on’ a strong and deceitful leader (Ross, researchers consider resentment of Russian culture and 2018). Russians to the rest of the world, has a long historical And spoken language as a reason for culture dif- period (Guseinov 2001). The total hatred to another ferentiation was used in Russian disinformation cam- culture, especially to one free from the violent influence paign on the solid basis. People in the modern world are of Moscow, became the main feature of Russian poli- identifying nations mostly by linguistic traits, while the tics, which designed popular hatred for the destruction importance of national customs and traditions is re- of other cultures in the conquered territories duced in most countries and not considered to be im- (Medvedev 2014). portant in the globalization era (Stokes, 2017). And the National-cultural aspect in this conquest plays a Russian Federation is constantly forming mass opinion major role. The background for the war in Ukraine was in the world thesis that Ukraine is ‘separated’ by the “to protect the Russian speaking people”. But narrative language, thus ‘Russian speakers’ belong to the Rus- ‘Russian speaking’ is distorting understanding the situ- sian civilization. And this thesis was repeated not only ation for the outer world. In fact, there never was a lan- against Ukraine, but against all the ex-USSR countries guage problem in Ukraine prevented understanding that try to normalize the cultural situation after years of among people, division of the Ukrainians on parts that forceful ‘Russification’ that goes on even now. In dis- cannot to communicate with each other due to different information campaign of irrational reality, they conceal common languages. In fact, Ukrainians both know and facts why and how the Russian language and culture speak as their native language as Russian. Ukrainian was spread in neighbor countries. language is the only state official language, it is taught Humiliation of foreign nation is done constantly in schools and Universities, all movies are shown in and even in naming Ukraine. In Russian culture Ukrainian, before the 2014 only discomfort for people Ukraine is not considered to be a country, the cultural in switching from one to another was known. Russian tradition of Russians is naming “at the Ukraine”, con- Federation did their best to widen own culture to ex- sidering Ukraine as a territory, but never saying “in Ukraine” as a norm of the Russian language naming an 8 POLISH JOURNAL OF SCIENCE № 22, 2019 independent country. In mass and social media, Rus- 4. Pomerantsev, P. Weiss M. (2014) ‘The Men- sian citizens and Russian culture-bearers humiliate ace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Infor- Ukrainian culture and customs, considering Ukrainians mation, Culture and Money.’ [online] available at: as subordinated to the Russian state and Russian peo- https://www.stratcomcoe.org/peter-pomerantsev-mi- ple. Russia strips Ukraine of its history, while distorting chael-weiss-menace-unreality-how-kremlin-weapon- it and appropriating Ukrainian historical as own, pro- izes-information-culture-and claiming that Ukraine is a ‘failed state’ without its own 5. Laver, O. (2004) ‘Dynamics of the Number history. And it's not just a politics and propaganda, but of Eastern Ukrainian Diaspora in the 20th Century and the mass chauvinistic attitude of Russians towards Its Role in the Future of Ukraine’ // Problems of Ukraine and Ukrainians. In general, they resemble pat- Ukrainian History: Facts, Judgments, Searches: Inter- ronage towards European amd ex-USSR countries, in- state. save sciences 12 / Ed. O. Ganzha, S. Kulchytsky. cluding Ukraine as an imperialistic metropoly attitude - K.: NANU Institute of History of Ukraine, 2004. - P. toward its colonies (‘Disinformation Review’ 2018). 321–344. Conclusions. 6. Chmara, S. (1975) ‘Ethnocide of Ukrainians Cultural affinity and way of thinking plays a major in the USSR’ // Ukrainian Herald. Sec.7–8 - Paris - To- role here. Israeli politician, human rights activist Natan ronto - Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1975. Shcharanskyi (GP Van Den Berg, WB Simons - Cal. 7. Rodkiewicz, W. ‘Russian Nationality Poli- W. Int'l LJ, 1981 - HeinOnline. The Soviet Union and tics in the Western Province of the Empire (1863- Human Rights Legislation: The Shcharansky Case) de- 1905).’ Lublin 1998. ISBN 8387833061. scribed Soviet people, motivation and ideology: "the 8. Polvinen, T. (1995) ‘Imperial Borderland. Soviet Union was a country that tried to create a breed Bobrikov and the Attempted Russification of Finland of people without memory, to deprive them of their 1898-1904.’ C. Hurst & Co. Publishers 1995. ISBN identity. And these extreme forms of Bolshevism, 1850652295. which led to the deaths of tens of millions of people, 9. Staliūnas, D. (2007) ‘Making Russians. are returned today in the form of postmodernism, with- Meaning and Practice of Russification in Lithuania and out proletarian dictatorship, but with the same idea that Belarus After 1863.’ Amsterdam: Rodopi 2007. ISBN people without memory, without religion, without na- 978-90-420-2267-6. tional solidarity, people for whom history means noth- 10. Scherbak, N.G. (1997) ‘National Tsarist pol- ing - this is, they say, very good, because then there will icy in the Right-Bank Ukraine (second half of the XIX be no wars. This is a dangerous philosophy, it makes - early XX century): taught. manual’ // Kyiv National life meaningless, and people are weak in the struggle University. Taras Shevchenko, 1997, 90s. ISBN 5- for democracy and freedom. Memory is also about very 7763-9036-2 difficult events, which are usually taught and educated 11. Alpatov, V. (2015) ‘Language situation in much better than positive memories. If a person escapes the regions of Russia’ / Vladimir Alpatov. - 2005. - №2. from the memories of a personal tragedy, he ultimately [online] available at: http://www.strana- becomes mentally ill. If a person has the courage to sur- oz.ru/2005/2/yazykovaya-situaciya-v-regionah-sov- vive, that person becomes stronger. The same thing remennoy-rossii, accessed September 2015. happens to peoples. Today, every great nation in Eu- 12. ‘Natsionalnyiy aktsent’ (2014). Putin snova rope, including Ukraine, is engaged in a dialogue with zayavil o zaschite russkoyazyichnogo naseleniya na itself. And this way of self-search is important. As Ukraine [Putin once more declared protection of Rus- knowledge of one’s own history is an important part of sian-speaking people at the Ukraine]. [online] available the self-affirmation of the nation and the successful de- at: http://nazaccent.ru/content/12147-putin-snova-za- velopment of the country” (Shcharanskyi 2017). But yavil-o-zashite-russkoyazychnogo.html accessed June we can definitely say that without world support and 2014] clear understanding of political threats, Ukraine has, it 13. ‘BBC News Russkaya sluzhba’ (2014). will not stand against Russian aggression in all fronts Putin obeschaet "zaschischat russkih" na Ukraine opened against it - military, economical, mass-media, vsegda [Putin promises he will always ‘protect Russian diplomatic and ethno-cultural including. people’ in Ukraine]. [online] available at: https://www.bbc.com/russian/rus- References sia/2014/06/140624_putin_deauthorisa- 1. Yekelchyk, S. (2015) ‘National Heroes for a tion_ukraine_reax accessed June 2014] New Ukraine: Merging the Vocabularies of the Dias- 14. ‘Russia today’ (2014). Putin: Neobhodimo pora, Revolution, and Mass Culture’, Ab Imperio, 3, obespechit interesyi russkoyazyichnogo naseleniya 97. yugo-vostoka Ukrainyi [Putin: (we) Should provide in- 2. Cheskin, A. & Kachuyevski, A. 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POLISH JOURNAL OF SCIENCE №22 (2019) VOL. 5

ISSN 3353-2389

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