The Italian Migration Policy in Libya

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The Italian Migration Policy in Libya Master’s Degree in Comparative International Relations Final Thesis The Italian Migration Policy in Libya Supervisor Ch. Prof. Laura Cerasi Ch. Prof. Antonio Trampus Graduand Silvia Zerboni 967216 Academic Year 2018 / 2019 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT __________________________________________________________ 4 INTRODUCTION ____________________________________________________ 12 CHAPTER 1. COLONIZED LIBYA: FROM ITALIAN AMBITIONS TO THE END OF THE COLONIAL PERIOD __________________________________________ 14 1.1 The Italian colonial goals and the peaceful penetration __________________ 14 1.2 The Italian invasion and the colonial penetration _______________________ 15 1.3 Libya during the First World War and the statute policy _________________ 17 1.4 The fascist reconquest and the Second World War ______________________ 19 1.5 The Four Power Commission of Investigation for the Former Italian Colonies 25 1.6 Conclusions: political and social developments in Libya during the Italian colonization _______________________________________________________ 27 CHAPTER 2. INDEPENDENT LIBYA ___________________________________ 32 2.1 The international context after the Second World War ___________________ 32 2.2 The United Nation Advisory Council and the Libyan independence _________ 33 2.3 The 1960s: the oil discovery and the socio-political changes ______________ 37 2.4 The 1st September Revolution, Gaddafi and the Jamahiriya _______________ 40 2.5 The Libyan Arab Republic’s new oil policy and Libyan foreign affairs ______ 44 2.6 The years of the embargo __________________________________________ 47 CHAPTER 3. THE START OF THE ITALO-LIBYAN COOPERATION ON MIGRATION ________________________________________________________ 53 3.1 The 1990s Open Door Policy in Libya ________________________________ 53 3.2 The Dini-Mountasser Joint Document ________________________________ 56 1 3.3 The general agreement on terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration __ 57 3.3 The other Italo-Libyan joint measures on Migration and the International Organization for Migration in Libya (IOM) ______________________________ 59 3.4 The Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation __________________ 62 3.5 The Tripoli Declaration and the Memorandum of Understanding __________ 66 CHAPTER 4. THE ITALIAN MIGRATION POLICY: A CASE OF EXTERNALIZATION? ________________________________________________ 71 4.1 Migration as a “new” challenge for the international community __________ 71 4.2 The misrepresentation of migratory flows to Italy _______________________ 75 4.3 The process of externalisation ______________________________________ 79 4.4 Externalization: delegation of sovereignty or bilateral cooperation? ________ 88 4.5 Conclusions ____________________________________________________ 94 CHAPTER 5. THE RESULTS OF THE ITALIAN MIGRATION POLICY _______ 96 5.1 The current situation in Libya: Chaos after Gaddafi _____________________ 96 5.2 The Italian role in the Libyan situation ______________________________ 104 5.3 The Libyan migratory route toward Europe and the current Italian situation 108 5.4 The migratory “emergence” and the new Libyan bargaining power _______ 116 5.5 The Italy’s dilemma: security versus human rights concerns _____________ 121 5.6 Conclusions: Libyan current situation and the Italian migration policy _____ 124 CONCLUSIONS ____________________________________________________ 126 BIBLIOGRAPHY ___________________________________________________ 129 Books and articles _________________________________________________ 129 Agreements and Resolutions __________________________________________ 133 SITOGRAPHY ______________________________________________________ 136 2 APPENDIX ________________________________________________________ 138 A) UN Security Council Resolution n. 731/1992 (21 January 1992) ___________ 138 B) UN Security Council Resolution n. 748/1992 (31 March 1992) ____________ 140 C) Accordo per la collaborazione nella lotta al terrorismo, alla criminalità organizzata, al traffico illegale di stupefacenti e di sostanze psicotrope ed all’immigrazione clandestina (13 December 2000) ________________________ 145 D) Trattato di Amicizia, Partenariato e Cooperazione tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Grande Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare Socialista (30 August 2008) _______ 150 E) UN Security Council Resolution S/Res/1970 (26 February 2011) __________ 161 F) Extraordinary European Council Declaration (20 April 2011) ____________ 170 G) Memorandum di intesa sulla cooperazione nel campo dello sviluppo, del contrasto all'immigrazione illegale, al traffico di esseri umani, al contrabbando e sul rafforzamento della sicurezza delle frontiere tra Io Stato della Libia e la Repubblica Italiana (2 February 2017) ___________________________________________ 175 3 ABSTRACT Le storie di Italia e Libia si intrecciano già da molto tempo, ma i recenti sviluppi storici e geopolitici hanno riacceso i riflettori sul paese nordafricano. A seguito di un excursus storico riguardante le diverse fasi delle relazioni italo-libiche, questa tesi si propone di analizzare l’attuale politica migratoria italiana in Libia. L’ex colonia entrò nel mirino italiano già agli inizi del ‘900, quando immagini propagandistiche italiane la dipingevano come un paese tanto fertile quanto malgovernato, abitato da popolazioni seminomadi che non erano in grado di sfruttare le immense risorse del territorio. La Libia venne, dunque, vista dall’Italia come un’opportunità imperdibile di affermare potere e prestigio sulla scena internazionale: iniziò così il periodo della cosiddetta “penetrazione pacifica”, con cui il governo italiano favorì soprattutto l’arrivo di capitali, che si rivelò, tuttavia, di poco successo. Era necessaria una vera e propria operazione militare per procedere all’effettiva conquista del territorio: iniziò, così, nel settembre 1911 la guerra di Libia, la prima pietra di una colonizzazione italiana, che, tuttavia, non riuscì mai a sconfiggere completamente la resistenza. In madrepatria ci si aspettava una campagna rapida e incruenta, dando per scontato che i militari italiani sarebbero stati accolti come liberatori. Ma la storia fu ben diversa. Nonostante l’esercito italiano fosse moderno, innovativo e ben equipaggiato, la colonizzazione non fu né semplice né pacifica. Al contrario, la popolazione scelse di unirsi alle truppe ottomane per resistere all’invasore e il conflitto divenne, agli occhi dei libici, una guerra contro l’imperialismo europeo, per la difesa del proprio territorio, della propria cultura e religione. Tuttavia, agli inizi del Novecento, l’Impero Ottomano si trovava dilaniato da conflitti interetnici e instabilità interna, soprattutto nei Balcani, e non aveva le forze per continuare la guerra in Libia. Decise così di arrendersi e firmare la pace di Ouchy il 18 ottobre 1912. Nonostante nel trattato non vi fosse alcun riferimento alla sovranità italiana sul paese, essa fu riconosciuta da tutte le potenze internazionali e la Libia fu divisa in due regioni, Tripolitania e Cirenaica, poste ciascuna sotto il comando di un governatore. Ad ogni modo, la resistenza non si arrese e, seppur molto debole e frammentata internamente, continuò la sua battaglia tramite attacchi di guerriglia ed attentati. 4 Con lo scoppio della Prima Guerra Mondiale, il governo italiano iniziò a ritirare parte dei suoi contingenti per impiegarli sul fronte europeo. Tuttavia, proprio le rivalità interne alla resistenza libica e l’incapacità delle diverse tribù di agire in modo coordinato, vanificarono qualsiasi tentativo di indipendenza. Lo stesso accadde con l’introduzione della politica degli statuti, una nuova forma di amministrazione indiretta che avrebbe confermato la leadership italiana sul territorio, tutelando libertà e tradizioni locali, che non venne, però, mai implementata, principalmente a causa dell’instabilità interna e delle lotte di potere tra tribù rivali. In seguito, con l’avvento del regime fascista, la conquista italiana divenne ancora più dura: l’esercito cominciò a distruggere tutto ciò che permetteva ai ribelli di sopravvivere, cercando di destabilizzare la vita agricola ed economica del paese. Con il pretesto di dover riportare la pace, in quegli anni vennero adottate misure sempre più brutali, come la deportazione di intere tribù e la costruzione di campi di concentramento. Il 24 gennaio 1932, il governatore Badoglio proclamò la definitiva sconfitta dei ribelli e la pacificazione della Libia. A questo punto, il paese era pronto per il vero intervento coloniale. Gli anni che seguirono furono ricchi di investimenti in molti settori, quali l’agricolo e l’industriale, ma anche in quelli di educazione ed istruzione. L’amministrazione Balbo (1933-1940) cercò anche di migliorare i rapporti tra la popolazione locale e il governo italiano e di trovare un equilibrio tra la maggioranza libica e la minoranza italiana, per evitare il diffondersi di idee radicali e nazionalistiche, come successo nei vicini paesi arabi. Ci pensò lo scoppio della Seconda Guerra Mondiale, e la successiva sconfitta italiana, a cambiare le sorti del paese: nel 1945, la Libia fu divisa in tre amministrazioni differenti e posta sotto il controllo britannico (Tripolitania e Cirenaica) e francese (Fezzan). Qualche anno più tardi, con l’avvento della decolonizzazione, la comunità internazionale si interrogò anche sulle sorti della Libia, finché il 24 dicembre 1951 venne proclamata la sua indipendenza. I primi anni di vita del nuovo Stato furono tutt’altro che semplici: la Libia non aveva né risorse
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