2016 Country Review

Libya

2016 Country Review

http://www.countrywatch.com Table of Contents

Chapter 1 1 Country Overview 1 Country Overview 2 Key Data 6 Libya 7 Africa 8 Chapter 2 10 Political Overview 10 History 11 Political Conditions 16 Political Risk Index 116 Political Stability 131 Freedom Rankings 146 Human Rights 158 Government Functions 165 Government Structure 170 Principal Government Officials 182 Leader Biography 188 Leader Biography 188 Foreign Relations 195 National Security 221 Defense Forces 227 Chapter 3 229 Economic Overview 229 Economic Overview 230 Nominal GDP and Components 232 Population and GDP Per Capita 234 Real GDP and Inflation 235 Government Spending and Taxation 236 Money Supply, Interest Rates and Unemployment 237 Foreign Trade and the Exchange Rate 238 Data in US Dollars 239 Energy Consumption and Production Standard Units 240 Energy Consumption and Production QUADS 241 World Energy Price Summary 242 CO2 Emissions 243 Agriculture Consumption and Production 244 World Agriculture Pricing Summary 247 Metals Consumption and Production 248 World Metals Pricing Summary 251 Economic Performance Index 252 Chapter 4 264 Investment Overview 264 Foreign Investment Climate 265 Foreign Investment Index 269 Corruption Perceptions Index 282 Competitiveness Ranking 293 Taxation 302 Stock Market 303 Partner Links 303 Chapter 5 304 Social Overview 304 People 305 Human Development Index 306 Life Satisfaction Index 310 Happy Planet Index 321 Status of Women 330 Global Gender Gap Index 333 Culture and Arts 343 Etiquette 344 Travel Information 346 Diseases/Health Data 355 Chapter 6 361 Environmental Overview 361 Environmental Issues 362 Environmental Policy 363 Greenhouse Gas Ranking 364 Global Environmental Snapshot 375 Global Environmental Concepts 386 International Environmental Agreements and Associations 400 Appendices 424 Bibliography 425 Libya

Chapter 1 Country Overview

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Country Overview

LIBYA

Located in Northern Africa, Libya is bordered by the countries of Tunisia and Algeria to the west, Niger and Chad to the south, Sudan to the south east, Egypt to the east, and the Mediterranean Sea to the north. Due to its mainly desert landscape, Libya is a sparsely populated country relative to its land area. Population density is about 50 people per square kilometer (80 per square mile) in the two northern regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, but falls to less than one person per square kilometer (1.6 per square mile) elsewhere. Ninety percent of the people live in less than 10 percent of the area, primarily along the coast. More than half the population is urban. In total, the population of Libya is more than six million.

Libyans are primarily a mixture of Berbers and Arabs; today, there is little distinction remaining between these two groups. Other ethnic and national groups represented in Libya include Tunisian, Egyptians, Italians, Greeks, Maltese, Indians and Pakistanis. Sunni Islam has the most adherents in Libya. Arabic is the official language, and although the use of Italian dates back to Libya's colonial history. French and English are also spoken in some quarters in Libya. The literacy rate is quite high in Libya, relative to the rest of the world at 83 percent, however, that rate belies the distinction of the genders whereby men enjoy markedly higher rates of literacy when compared with females.

In terms of history, Libya was conquered by the Arabs in the seventh century; in the following centuries, its indigenous people were Arab-ized as they adopted the religion of Islam, as well as the Arabic language and culture. In the mid-16th century, Libya was conquered again -- this time by the Ottoman Turks. Libya remained part of the Ottoman Empire until Italy invaded its territory in 1911. A year later, Libya became an Italian colony. After World War II, British and French forces occupied the area until a United Nations resolution made Libya an independent nation state 1951. The discovery of oil in 1959 transformed Libya into a wealthy nation state, by international standards. Indeed, Libya is considered a country with "high human development," according to the Human Development Index (HDI), which is formulated by the United Nations Development Program.

A monarchy ruled Libya until 1969 when a military coup d'etat led by Muammar Qadhafi seized power. Qadhafi abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the country to be the new Libyan Arab

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Republic. In fact, the official name of the country was formalized as the extraordinarily lengthy "Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya." The term "Jamahiriya" denotes a state of the masses in theory, although in practice, it translates into an authoritarian state. In terms of policy, Qadhafi's confrontational stances on matters of foreign affairs, as well as Libya's reputation as a state sponsor of terrorism, led to heightened tensions with the West in the 1980s, and Libya's position as an increasingly isolated country in global context. When Libya was blamed for the bombing of a Pan-American flight that exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, the country was regarded as something of a rogue state, with Qadhafi having the dubious distinction as being a pariah in the international community. In 1992, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Libya. Those United Nations sanctions were lifted in the fall of 2003, only after Libya accepted responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing.

In late 2003, Libya revealed its ambitions to develop weapons of mass destruction and announced that it would end the program and renounce terrorism. Since then, Libya has made significant strides in normalizing relations with Western nations. However, that progress saw some degree of a setback -- at least with regard to the United States -- in 2009 when a Scottish court decided to free Abdel Baset al-Megrahi -- the terrorist responsible for the bombing of the Pan American flight that exploded over the town of Lockerbie -- on compassionate grounds. This move reminded the world of Libya's past record as a state-sponsor of terrorism and raised questions about the United Kingdom's complicity in the questionable decision. The case became marred by further controversy after a Times of London news story was published suggesting an "oil for freedom" deal between Libya and the United Kingdom.

In 2011, Libya returned to the forefront of the international purview with its burgeoning anti- government/pro-democracy protest movement, and concomitantly, the Qadhafi regime's harsh and violent response to the people. Libya was one of many countries in the region of North Africa and the Middle East being subject to such mass action. Indeed, the pro-democracy campaigns in the region had already n the first half of February 2011 led to the ousting of long-time Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011, and the resignation of long-serving Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Now, Qadhafi was experiencing the greatest threat to his presidential tenure coming from the streets of Libya as the transformational winds of Tunisia's "Jasmine Revolution" and Egypt's "Nile Revolution" swept across theMaghreb and the Middle East.

Update --

When the uprising in Libya began, all signs on the ground at the time were pointing toward a likely end to rule by Qadhafi. The question remained as to how long it would take for the people to liberate themselves from Qadhafi's grip, and how much blood would have to be shed before that end ensued.

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Months later, when pro-Qadhafi forces were carrying out relentless and bloody assault against opposition-held areas, the answer to those questions became clearer. If the Qadhafi regime could command the loyalty of its forces, the chances of a quick end to the chaos in Libya were quite small. Instead, it was quite possible that Qadhafi could squash the uprising with the gratuitous use of military might against his own people. But the harsh squashing of the uprising was unlikely to eliminate the anger and hatred for the Qadhafi regime by the people in the eastern part of this country -- now clearly divided between pro-Qadhafi and anti-Qadhafi factions. In fact, there were fears that it could fuel the slide into a civil war.

Clearly, the decision by the international community to intervene into the conflict, for the purpose of protecting the opposition, transformed the landscape, no doubt changing the momentum of the pro-Qadhafi factions. Since the goals of Security Council Resolution 1973 and the resulting "Operation Odyssey Dawn" were not expressly inclusive of "regime change," it was initially thought that Qadhafi could prevail at the helm of Libya. Now, with the G8 countries making it clear that Qadhafi no longer held legitimacy, it was apparent that a fight to the end was in the offing. It was likely that the country itself might ultimately see some transformation, since the division between east and west has only amplified. But even stalemate in Libya between pro-rebel east and pro-government west provided no blueprint for a future resolution, with rebel-held Misrata in the west standing as a flashpoint in the ongoing conflict. The rebel advance in August 2011 augured the possibility of an end in the offing, and reports of the fall of the last Qadhafi strongholds and the death of the former Libyan leader himself in October 2011, hinted toward a Qadhafi-free future, and raised hopes for a new and free Libyan nation state.

As the spirit of regional unrest transfixed the region, the final chapter in this story was yet to be written. That being said, the post-colonial structure of the Arab world in the Maghreb and the Middle East would be affected by the pro-democracy wave washing over the region. Ultimately, as Libya's political situation in 2011 has ended in a relatively similar manner as Tunisia and Egypt, regime change would simply open the door to further transformational action. The people of the region have been explicit in expressing their high expectations that actual policy reforms will ensue, that greater freedom will win the day, and that rule by the prevailing political elites in Arab countries will end. Nevertheless, as has been seen by similar popular uprisings that brought down regimes in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (notably out of the Middle East but still subject to post-uprising political discontent), celebration today can often be followed by disappointment and disillusionment tomorrow over the slow pace of change.

It was hoped that the sweeping removal of all remnants of the Qadhafi regime --quite a different scenario than cases in Egypt and Tunisia -- along with careful planning by Libya's Transitional National Council, working in concert with the international community, would facilitate a peaceful and effective transition for Libya.

To that end, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the secretary general of NATO, asserted: "Now is the time

Libya Review 2016 Page 4 of 437 pages Libya to create a new Libya -- a state based on freedom, not fear; democracy, not dictatorship; the will of the many, not the whims of a few." He continued, "That transition must come peacefully. It must come now. And it must be led and defined by the Libyan people." Rasmussen made it clear that NATO would support Libya's transition, saying, "NATO is ready to work with the Libyan people and with the Transitional National Council, which holds a great responsibility. They must make sure that the transition is smooth and inclusive, that the country stays united, and that the future is founded on reconciliation and respect for human rights."

As noted above, there were plans in the works for elections to take place by the middle of 2012 in a country without any electoral infrastructure or a recent legacy of democratic participation. The new elected body would be tasked with drafting a constitution containing guarantees of freedom and basic human rights, organizing a referendum to ratify the draft constitution, and the formation of an interim government pending a presidential election. On one hand, the prospect of constructing a new political infrastructure was daunting; on the other hand, being unhindered by the legacy of past could turn out to be a benefit. As noted by Mustafa Mohammed Abdul Jalil, the chairman of the National Transitional Council (NTC), the intent was to build a new Libya founded on the principles of "freedom, equality and transparency.

However, post-Qadafi Libya in recent times has been marked by conflict, turbulence, and violent power struggles between rival factions. United Nations-sponsored peace talks have ended in failure. Instead, the country has continued to slip into the abyss of failed state status. Meanwhile, the terror group, Islamic State, was taking advantage of the power chasm in Libya as rival militias fought for ascendancy

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Key Data

Region: Africa

Population: 7131872

Climate: Mediterranean along coast; dry, extreme desert interior.

Languages: Arabic, Italian, English

Currency: 1 Libyan dinar (LD) = 1,000 dirhams

Holiday: Revolution Day, 1 September (1969)

Area Total: 1759540

Area Land: 1759540

Coast Line: 1770

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Libya

Country Map

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Africa

Regional Map

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Chapter 2 Political Overview

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History

Libya's History in Brief

For most of their history, the people of Libya have been subjected to varying degrees of foreign control, mostly from Mediterranean empires. The Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Greeks, Romans, Spaniards, Vandals and Byzantines ruled all or parts of Libya. Although the Greeks and Romans left impressive ruins at Cyrene, Leptis Magna and Sabratha, little else remains today to testify to the presence of these ancient cultures.

Muslim Arabs conquered Libya in the seventh century C.E. as they proceeded to conquer all of North Africa and the Iberian peninsula concurrent with the spread of Islam. In the following centuries, most of the indigenous peoples adopted Islam and the Arabic language and culture. The Ottoman Turks conquered the country in the 16th century. Libya then became part of the Ottoman Empire for the following four centuries, although local rulers remained virtually autonomous.

Italy invaded in 1911 and after years of resistance the country became an Italian colony. In 1934, Italy adopted the name "Libya" (used by the Greeks for all of North Africa, except Egypt) as the official name of the colony, which consisted of the Provinces of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan. King Idris I, Emir of Cyrenaica, led Libyan resistance to Italian occupation between the two World Wars.

Following World War II, British and French forces occupied the area. From 1943 to 1951, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were under British administration, while the French controlled Fezzan. In 1944, King Idris returned from exile in Cairo, but he declined to resume permanent residence in Cyrenaica until the removal in 1947 of some aspects of foreign control. Finally, under the terms of the 1947 peace treaty with the Allies, Italy relinquished all claims to Libya.

On Nov. 21, 1949, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution stating that Libya should become independent before Jan. 1, 1952. King Idris I represented Libya in the subsequent U.N. negotiations. When Libya declared its independence on Dec. 24, 1951, it was the first country to achieve independence through the United Nations. Libya was proclaimed a constitutional and a hereditary monarchy under King Idris I.

The discovery of significant oil reserves in 1959 and the subsequent income from petroleum sales enabled what had been one of the world's poorest countries to become wealthy. This

Libya Review 2016 Page 11 of 437 pages Libya transformation also signaled a growing independence in foreign affairs, resulting from the financial autonomy generated by petroleum revenues. The period also marked the beginnings of Libya's radicalism in politics, its posture toward Arab-Israeli relations, and an increasingly anti-Western sentiment.

In 1976, Libya's leader, Muammar al-Qadhafi, introduced a plan to reorganize the Libyan state. The plan essentially ensured that the country would be run by a new representative body called the General People's Congress, or GPC. Muammar al-Qadhafi remained the de facto chief of state and secretary general of the GPC until 1980, when he gave up his office. He continues to control the Libyan government through direct appeals to the masses, a pervasive security apparatus, and powerful revolutionary committees. Qadhafi exercises absolute power with the assistance of a small group of trusted advisers, who include relatives from his home base in the Sirte region, which lies between the rival provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.

Qadhafi has spearheaded a number of controversial measures, especially in the realm of international relations. His subversive support for anti-Western terrorist activities led to international economic sanctions. Indeed, in 1988, Libyan authorities were alleged to have harbored the perpetrators of the bombing of a Pan-American flight that exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland.

Economic sanctions and other forms of alienation took a toll on Libya. In recent years, there has been a noticeable decrease in provocative statements coming from Libya's leadership, presumably in the hope that Libya will be able to rejoin the larger community of nation states enjoying the economic prosperity of the post Cold-War world. In addition, Libya offered compensation to victims of the Pan American bombing; although a full statement of responsibility did not occur at that time. This measure on Libya's part suggested a serious desire to end the country's pariah status among the community of nation states.

Note on History: In certain entries, open source content from the State Department Background Notes and Country Guides have been used. A full listing of sources is available in the Bibliography.

Editor's Note on the 2011 Season of Unrest:

Libya Review 2016 Page 12 of 437 pages Libya strongholds to the east. Unapologetic for his ruthless tactics and in the face of worldwide condemnation, Qadhafi called for the crushing of the resistance movement by all means necessary and "without mercy."

In response to the audacious move by Qadhafi to attack and kill his own people, the United Nations Security Council on Feb. 26, 2011, voted unanimously to impose sanctions on Libya and to refer the Qadhafi regime to the International Criminal Court for alleged crimes against humanity. Then on March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security Council authorized a "no fly zone" against Libya, with an international coalition commencing air strikes on military targets in that country, with an eye on protecting the Libyan people from the Qadhafi regime. By the close of March 2011, NATO had taken control of the operation, the rebels were reconstituting their efforts at taking control of eastern towns, and the Qadhafi regime said it welcomed an African Union plan for a ceasefire and resolution.

But a month later in late April 2011, Libya was in a state of stalemate -- roughly divided between pro-rebel eastern Libya and pro-Qadhafi western Libya. Misrata -- the only rebel-held city in the west -- was a flashpoint for the conflict. The fact that ground on either side could be so quickly gained and/or lost augured negatively for a quick end to the chaos in Libya. It was clear that the rebel movement was highly disorganized and reliant on the air strikes to make any progress in their efforts to secure territory. They certainly had neither professional training nor efficient weaponry to rely upon in their efforts. On the other hand, the pro-Qadhafi forces were demonstrating that they were only being restrained by the threat of air strikes.

While this reality might be viewed as discouraging news for the protest movement, they took solace in the news that Qadhafi's regime appeared to be splintering from within, as evidenced by a constant parade of high level defections. From May 2011 onward, there was some progress from within the rebels' ranks, as British and French helicopters, operating under the aegis of the prevailing NATO mission, were stepping up air attacks inside Libya. As well, the rebel cause received support from the international community, which provided both diplomatic support and financial aid to the Transitional National Council (TNC). The TNC, based in the opposition stronghold of Benghazi, has been composed of opposition leaders, technocrats and diplomats from the Qadhafi regime who defected to the opposition to protest the Qadhafi regime's crackdown, and reformers. The TNC has been in close contact with the international community, including the United Nations and NATO, with an eye on ensuring a peaceful and effective transition in the post-Qadhafi period to come.

By mid-August 2011, the rebels were advancing on Tripoli and the Qadhafi regime was being isolated. The rebel advance into Tripoli on Aug. 21, 2011 augured the possibility of an end in the offing, and hinted toward a Qadhafi-free future.

The rebels advantageous footing seemed to have occurred as a result of effective military strategy.

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Moving from Libya’s Nafusa Mountains, rebel fighters made considerable progress in advancing toward Tripoli and, as noted here, gained the upper hand in the Zawiya to the west of Tripoli -- a strategic transit point along the Qadhafi regime's supply line. The rebels' control of Zawiya and several other towns along the road towards the Tunisian border, as aforementioned, meant that the Qadhafi regime and its supporters were now boxed in and isolated in Tripoli -- the apparent "last stand" in the fight by Qadhafi's inner circle to hold onto power in Libya. For the rebels, though, Tripoli represented the final battle in the fight to liberate the country from Qadhafi's repression. Many rebel fighters were claiming "zero hour" was finally on Qadhafi and his coterie in Tripoli.

According to international media, the rebels were soon engaging in clashes with pro-government loyalists in some areas in and around the capital city, while they were being met with little pro- government resistance elsewhere. Notably, in the eastern Tajoura district, as well as the districts of Soug Jomaa and Arada, clashes between people opposed to the Qadhafi regime and pro- government loyalists were been reported to be ongoing. Yet there were also reports of Qadhafi loyalist fighters surrendering to rebels. In addition, there were also some reports of celebration by Tripoli residents waving pre-revolutionary flags* and cheering convoys of rebel fighters as they rolled through the streets of Tripoli. At that time on Aug. 20, 2011, it was difficult to determine if such scenes were random or widespread.

There was some sense that the government remained in tact with Libyan Information Minister Moussa Ibrahim continuing to give updates and asserting that the capital city remained under Qadhafi control. Ibrahim also warned that up to 65,000 "professional soldiers" remained in Tripoli and stood ready to defend Qadhafi and the regime. But by Aug. 21, 2011, according to the Associated Press, rebel fighters were finding their way easily from the western outskirts of Tripoli into the center of the Qadhafi stronghold. Rebels had swarmed what had been referred to as Green Square -- a rallying point for the Qadhafi regime -- and announced it would be renamed Martyrs Square.

The rebels were also claiming the capture of three of Qadhafi's sons. Luis Moreno Ocampo, the chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Court, said that Saif al-Islam, who was already facing earlier arrest warrants for crimes against humanity during the crackdown -- should be transferred to The Hague to face justice. However, subsequent broadcasts from Tripoli seemed to indicate that Saif al-Islam was freely operating in Tripoli, and dismissing any threat to his freedom by either the TNC or the ICC. Qadhafi himself was nowhere in sight, although his messages compelling supporters to take to the streets of Tripoli and "purify it" from "the rats" were still being broadcast.

Libya Review 2016 Page 14 of 437 pages Libya departing the Qadhafi compound at Bab al-Azizia.

At the international level, United States President Barack Obama signaled the international community's belief that the Qadhafi era was coming to an end. President Obama said that the "iron fist" of the Qadhafi regime had reached a "tipping point." In a a written statement, the United States president asserted: "Tripoli is slipping from the grasp of a tyrant." President Obama went on to urge Qadhafi to expressly step down, saying, "The surest way for the bloodshed to end is simple: Moammar Qadhafi and his regime need to recognize that their rule has come to an end. Qadhafi needs to acknowledge the reality that he no longer controls Libya. He needs to relinquish power once and for all." President Obama also reiterated his country's recognition of the Transitional National Council (TNC) as the only legitimate governing authority in Libya.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the secretary general of NATO, echoed President Obama's words, saying: "The Qadhafi regime is clearly crumbling. The sooner Qadhafi realizes that he cannot win the battle against his own people, the better -- so that the Libyan people can be spared further bloodshed and suffering." Rasmussen also promised its continued assistance in ensuring a peaceful transition of power.

A day later on Aug. 22, 2011, as some resistance continued in Tripoli from Qadhafi stalwarts, and as Qadhafi himself remained in hiding, President Obama delivered another statement on the situation in Libya. The theme of his second address in as many days was focused on the international coalition's unprecedented success in helping Libyan rebels to achieve its aims. But the United States leader paid tribute primarily to the Libyan rebels who fought for their own freedom. He also warned that the fighting was "not over yet" and demanded again that Qadhafiexplicitly acknowledge that "his rule is over."

United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron likewise called for Qadhafi to unambiguously relinquish power, noting that the Libyan autocrat had "committed appalling crimes against the people of Libya and he must go now to avoid any further suffering for his own people."

In terms of post-Qadhafi government, there was a draft transition document by the TNC, which provides for the crafting of a new constitution within three months, with elections to be held six months after that deadline. The draft notes that any constitution would contain guarantees freedom and basic human rights. As noted by Mustafa Mohammed Abdul Jalil, the chairman of the TNC, the opposition sought to build a new Libya founded on the principles of "freedom, equality and transparency. The TNC additionally announced that it would soon transfer its center of operations from Benghazi to Tripoli, essentially formalizing the reality that Libya's future was now in new hands.

Indeed, it was quite likely that the rebels' brazen prediction was coming to pass: "Zero Hour" was finally descending on the Qadhafi regime in Libya.

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*** Note that CountryWatch now features the pre-revolutionary flag of Libya (i.e. before Qadhafi's establishment of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in 1977), which has been adopted by the Transitional National Council (TNC). This move is intended to ensure CountryWatch's expressed policy of adhering to United States' measures of official recognition. To that end, the Obama administration in the United States has recognized the TNC as the only legitimate governing authority in Libya. ***

Editor's Note written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, ww.countrywatch.com. See Bibliography for sources.

Political Conditions

Political Chronology of the Qadhafi Power Center

King Idris I ruled the Kingdom of Libya until he was overthrown in a military-led coup d'etat on Sept. 1, 1969, while out of the country for medical treatment. The new regime, headed by the Revolutionary Command Council, or RCC, abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the new Libyan Arab Republic. Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi emerged as leader of the RCC and eventually as the de facto chief of state, an unofficial position he continues to hold today.

After consolidating his control of the RCC, Qadhafi moved to implement the goals of his regime, which reflected a blend of Islamic codes, socialism and radical Arab nationalism. The RCC's motto became "freedom, socialism and unity." It pledged itself to remove backwardness, take an active role in the plight of the Palestinians, promote Arab unity, and encourage domestic policies based on social justice, non-exploitation, and an equitable distribution of wealth.

An early objective of the new government was withdrawal of all foreign military installations from Libya. Following negotiations, British military installations at Tobruk and nearby El Adem were closed in March 1970, and United States facilities at Wheelus Air Force Base near Tripoli were closed in June 1970. That July, the Libyan government ordered the expulsion of several thousand

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Italian and Jewish residents. By 1971, libraries and cultural centers operated by foreign governments were ordered closed as well.

The Constitutional Proclamation of Dec. 11, 1969, designated the RCC as the supreme executive and legislative authority in Libya. The RCC itself was a collegial body in which issues and policies were debated until consensus was developed to establish a unified position. As the RCC's chairman, however, Qadhafi was the dominant figure in the revolutionary government. Although he lacked absolute authority to impose his will on his RCC colleagues, they generally de ferred to him as the primary leader and spokesman.

The RCC appointed the members of the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers was responsible collectively to the RCC, which could dismiss the prime minister individually or accept the resignation of other ministers. The prime ministers' resignation automatically caused the resignation of the entire Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers also was charged with executing general policy in accordance with RCC decisions. When these decisions required new laws, the Council of Ministers drafted legislation for the RCC's consideration. Promulgation was by RCC decree.

After 1969, numerous cabinet shuffles occurred, sometimes in reaction to dissension within the Council of Ministers and threats against the RCC and at other times in attempts to balance or modify the mix of civilian and military members of the cabinet. Qadhafi became prime minister in January 1970, but by 1972, he increasingly l eft routine administrative tasks to another RCC member, Major Abdel Salam Jallud, in order to devote himself to revolutionary theory.

In July 1972, Jallud assumed the position of prime minister. At the time there was speculation in the foreign press that the new Council of Ministers' composition indicated dissension within the RCC and the diminishing of Qadhafi's authority; these notions proved erroneous, however, at least regarding the latter point. Qadhafi retained the positions of chairman of the RCC, commander in chief of the armed forces and president of the mass political organization, the Arab Socialist Union, or ASU, and he personally administered the oath of office to Jallud.

Although Qadhafi took increasing control of the government, he also attempted to achieve greater popular participation in local government. In 1973, he announced the start of a "cultural revolution" in schools, businesses, industries and public institutions to over see administration of those organizations in the public interest. Qadhafi's continuing dedication to revolutionary theorizing led to an April 1974 decree relieving him of his other political, administrative and protocol duties so that he might devote all of his time to his primary interest.

Jallud assumed the functions Qadhafi relinquished; he had already been performing many of them unofficially. Despite the fact that Qadhafi retained the position of commander in chief of the armed forces, speculation again arose that his power and authority were waning. Instead, the RCC decree

Libya Review 2016 Page 17 of 437 pages Libya appeared only to have formalized a division of labor between Qadhafi's theoretical interests and Jallud's practical political and administrative interests, a division that had existed informally for some time.

The executive system comprising the RCC and the Council of Ministers continued to operate into 1977. A number of serious conflicts within the RCC took place during this time. Qadhafi's regime was seriously threatened, but not destroyed, by an attempted coup d'etat in 1975.

In late 1976, Qadhafi emerged from relative isolation to resume leadership of the RCC. On the seventh anniversary of the Revolution, Sept. 1, 1976, Qadhafi introduced a plan to reorganize the Libyan state. The plan's primary feature was a proposal that a new representative body called the General People's Congress, or GPC, replace the RCC as the supreme instrument of government. A five-member General Secretariat was created to stand at the apex of the GPC.

The details of the plan were included in the draft Declaration of the Establishment of the People's Authority, adopted by the GPC in an extraordinary session on March 2, 1977. The declaration included several basic points: the establishment of popular direct authority through a system culminating in the GPC; the assignment of responsibility for defending the homeland to every man and wo man through general military training; and the change in the country's name to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

The word "Jamahiriya" is derived from the Arabic word "Jamahiriya," meaning "republic." Qadhafi coined the word "Jamahiriya"; it has no official translation but unofficially has been translated as a "state of the masses," "people's authority," or "people's power." According to Qadhafi, the "Jamahiriya" system was to be "a state run by the people without a government," and it heralded the dawn of a new, more advanced stage in humanity's political evolution.

The GPC also adopted resolutions that designated Qadhafi as its secretary general; created the General Secretariat of the GPC, which comprised the remaining members of the defunct RCC; and appointed the General People's Committee, which replaced the Council of Ministers, its members now called secretaries rather than ministers. For symbolic reasons, initially no secreta ry of defense was appointed within the General People's Committee, with defense having become the responsibility of all citizens.

Abroad, Libyan embassies were re-designated as "people's bureaus," as Qadhafi tried to portray Libyan foreign policy as an expression of the popular will. The people's bureaus, aided by Libyan religious, political, educational and business institutions overseas, both expressed and exported Qadhafi's revolutionary philosophy abroad.

In the 1980s competition between the official Libyan government and military hierarchies and the revolutionary committees was growing. An attempted -- but abortive -- coup d'etat in May 1984,

Libya Review 2016 Page 18 of 437 pages Libya apparently mounted by Libyan exiles with internal support, led to a short-lived reign of terror in which thousands were imprisoned and interrogated. An unknown number were executed. Qadhafi used the revolutionary committees to search out alleged internal opponents associated with the coup d'e tat attempt, thereby accelerating the rise of more radical elements inside the Libyan power hierarchy.

On the matter of external affairs, Libya claimed leadership of Arab and African revolutionary forces and sought active roles in various international organizations. As such, Libya was increasingly implicated in a number of terrorist activities. Libya's support of such terrorist activities resulted in a controversial air strike by the United States against the country in 1986. Libyan authorities were also alleged to have harbored the perpetrators of the bombing of a Pan-American flight that exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988.

In January 1986, the United States government introduced sanctions which froze Libyan assets and banned commercial and financial transaction with Libya. The United Nations imposed an air and arms embargo and a ban on some oil equipment in 1992 and 1993, largely as a result of Libya's refusal to hand ove r accused terrorists. A decade later, the United States Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, or ILSA. The act intended to force the country to comply with United Nations Security Resolution 1192; to end its support for terrorism; and to try to stop it from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction.

Meanwhile, the Libyan war with Chad in the 1980s led to domestic shortages of consumer goods, although the extent of these shortages was lessened by smuggling facilitated by the country's substantial petroleum wealth. In 1988, faced with rising public dissatisfaction with shortages in consumer goods and setbacks in Libya's war with Chad, Qadhafi began to curb the power of the revolutionary committees and to institute some domestic reforms. The regime released many political prisoners and eased restrictions on foreign travel by Libyans. Private businesses were again permitted to operate.

In 1992, however, Liby a's refusal to turn over accused terrorists led to United Nations sanctions. Further internal difficulties and discontent, as a result of the sanctions, led to another attempted coup d'etat in 1993. Qadhafi's security forces launched a pre-emptive strike against the alleged coup d'etat plotters in the military, and among the Warfallah tribe.

Since then, Qadhafi has pursued a harsh anti-Islamic fundamentalist policy domestically, presumably viewing fundamentalism as a potential rallying point for opponents of the regime. Ministerial positions and military commanders are also frequently shuffled to diffuse potential threats to Qadhafi's authority. Despite these measures, internal dissent continues. Widespread arrests, accompanied by public "confessions" from regime opponents, and allegations of torture or executions take place. More recently, the government has sought to counter popular discontent over deteriorating economic conditions with appeals to nationalism i n the face of international

Libya Review 2016 Page 19 of 437 pages Libya sanctions.

For some time subsequent to the Pan American bombing, pressure from the United States did not stop Qadhafi from making provocative statements or taking controversial stances. The United States placed Libya on a list of countries suspected of supporting terrorism. As a result, stringent restrictions were placed on American dealings with the Libyan government and businesses and tourism were prohibited.

In response to the withdrawal of multinational investment in Libya, Qadhafi called on the American-based "Nation of Islam" to increase the political power of minorities in the United States in such a way as would undermine popular support for these governmental policies.

In the late 1990s, in order to stave off threats to his power base, Qadhafi pursued a two-tiered approach to policy. Domestically, he adopted a harsh anti-Islamic fundamentalist policy coupled with strident nationalism. In April 2000, Libya executed three Islamic militants extradited from Jordan for links to international terrorist organizations. Qadhafi publicly denounced Islamics as heretics in a statement made in June 2000. The Fighting Islamic Group is one Islamic group that challenges the legitimacy of the present Libyan government and works towards its eventual removal from power.

Several hundred political prisoners are being held in Libyan prisons, many of which are allegedly associated with banned Islamic groups. No independent non-governmental organizations, political parties or human rights groups exist in Libya. Amnesty International asserts that the protections accorded to human rights in Libya continue to be limited and illusory at best. Numerous human rights groups and advocates likewise raise charges consistent with those raised by human rights and non-governmental organizations. Qadhafi denies these charges, and claims that there are no political prisoners being held in Libya.

In a televised speech on Sept. 30, 2000, Qadhafi invited human rights groups to visit Libya, but the Libyan government has so far failed to respond to initiatives from such groups. Several cases of Libyans living abroad being forcefully returned to the country have been reported. The use of torture is widespread, in particular during incommunicado detention.

The government has repeatedly failed to protect workers from West African countries from racist attacks. In October 2000, black African workers were attacked by mobs, and at least 150 people were killed. Following the attacks, large numbers of West African migrant workers were expelled from Libya. Libya is host to around 1.5 million migrant workers. With an unemployment rate around 25 percent and a rather dire economic situation for the ordinary Libyan, popular resentment against immigrants is easily inflamed.

Internationally, Qadhafi's policy revolves around t he establishment of closer economic ties with

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Europe and the West. Since late 1999, high level contacts have taken place between Libya and Italy, Japan, Russia and Venezuela.

As the effects of American-led sanctions decrease, European economic activity has been on the rise and it is likely that Libya will be drawn into the more general pattern of regional trade relations that exist between the European Union and the states of North Africa. In May 2000, The Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Europe's largest oil company, and Lasmo Plc, Britain's second largest exploration company, entered into talks with the Libyan government about investing in energy projects there.

In addition, Qadhafi has substantially reoriented Libyan foreign policy away from a pan-Arab focus towards one that concentrates on the unity of African states and Islamic populations worldwide. This shift in policy is the deliberate result of the lack of support that Libya has felt it re ceived from Arab states during the long-standing United Nations embargo following the Pan American/Lockerbie bombing (mentioned above). Qadhafi has been a driving the transformation of the Organization of African Unity's into an African Union.

On another front, 170 companies participated in an international conference on development and investment in Libya in November 2000. It was hoped that a five-year development plan (2001- 2005) would foster economic growth and open up the Libyan market to foreign investments. The scope of these activities evidenced Libya's desire to break the international isolation in which it has existed for the last decade. Whereas the private sector was forbidden in the past, it is now tolerated. However, little has been done to encourage it, and even the powerful Secretary General of the People's General Congress, Muhammad Zenati, denounced the country's bureaucratic drags in vital sectors of the economy in September 2001. Zenati called fo r the effective implementation of the modernization of Libya's economic laws. With a slowdown in the international economy and lower oil-prices, Libya's need for economic modernization was more urgent than ever before.

The economic and political future of Libya has remained closely interconnected with developments in its relations to the international community. Despite the five-year extension of United States sanctions, signed into law in August 2001, Libya is likely to break out of its isolation. Qadhafi's personal engagement in the creation of an African Union has made him popular among many African leaders. Qadhafi's condemnation of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and his support for America's right to self-defense, has not earned him a place in the American anti-terrorism coalition, but there is growing dissatisfaction with the sanctions within the United States. Indeed, international sanctions were suspended when Libya extradited suspects in the Pan Am/Lockerbie case. The trial did not establish Libyan government involvement in the case, however, Libya's subsequent settlement offer to the victims' families suggests some level of tacit responsibility.

Meanwhile, Libya's vast oil and gas reserves are of crucial interest to international entities, including U.S. companies, and as more international companies are joining in the clamor to end

Libya Review 2016 Page 21 of 437 pages Libya sanctions, Libya's isolation seems to be broken, and the country is slowly returning to the international community. Qadhafi's support for Robert Mugabe's land seizures in Zimbabwe, however, may present a large obstacle to his re-integration aspirations.

In 2002, it was clear that the result of these simultaneous trends in Libyan politics was that the position of Qadhafi appeared secure and the immediate future of the existing regime appeared stable. Although domestic Islamic and secular opposition existed, it seemed to have been neutralized. Overseas opposition was, likewise, apparent. Still, it was divided along factional and ideological lines and, thus, posed little real threat to the ruling regime. As a result, Qadhafi was, in fact, preparing his son to replace him when he cedes power.

In 2003, Libya was one of two parties involved in a mini-imbroglio at the Arab League summit. Specifically, Libya decided to recall its ambassador to Saudi Arabia after a verbal contretemps ensued between the two countries' leaders during the Arab League summit. Libya also contemplated whether or not to continue its membership in the Arab League. The disagreement, which was broadcast live on television, occurred when Qadhafi accused Saudi Arabia of striking an alliance with the American "devil" during the first Gulf War. The Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah responded to the accusation by angrily asking, "Who exactly brought you to power? You are a liar and your grave awaits you." The summit was temp orarily suspended following the vitriolic exchange.

The issue of international relations loomed large in 2003. In August, Libya transferred $2.7 billion in funds to the Bank for International Settlements in Switzerland to compensate the families of the victims (259 passengers and 11 residents) of the Pan American flight which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988 (mentioned above). With responsibility now taken by Libya for the bombing, the United Kingdom and Bulgaria worked together to offer a United Nations resolution aimed at removing sanctions against Libya, which were imposed in 1992.

A vote on the new resolution was placed on hold after France raised objections about the compensation that was offered in regard to the bombing of a French UTA airliner, which exploded over Niger in 1989, killing 170 people on board. The original compensation package was $34 million -- a vastly smaller sum than the amount offered for the Locke rbie bombing. The French government demanded that the amount be significantly increased. Earlier, in 2002, several of the French victims' families had launched a lawsuit against Libya for $2.2 billion compensation. On Sept. 11, 2003, Libya agreed to a compensation deal with the relatives of those killed in the French airliner under which families would receive funds from a charity headed by a son of Qadhafi -- not from the Libyan state. At the time of writing, no details had been disclosed, but the agreement successfully opened the way for United Nations sanctions on Tripoli to be finally lifted.

In another surprising development, in December 2003, Libya announced it was abandoning its efforts to build a weapons program, which had included plans to develop atomic bombs and other

Libya Review 2016 Page 22 of 437 pages Libya banned weaponry. A few days later, Libya said that it had agreed to impromptu inspections by the United Nations nuclear arms watchdog agency -- the International Atomic E nergy Agency (IAEA).

Some reports have said that Tripoli's policy announcement was the result of secret negotiations between Libya, the United States and the United Kingdom starting in March. Other reports, however, suggested that the secret negotiations with Libya had been ongoing for several years.

Regardless, the shift in policy by Tripoli had the potential to make way for an end to United States sanctions, as well as the return of multinational oil companies.. Even after the United Nations lifted its sanctions against Libya earlier in the year, the United States left its sanctions in place until April 2004, when Libya announced it was abandoning its weapons of mass destruction program. In September 2004, United States President George W. Bush lifted his country's trade embargo on Libya as a reward for Tripoli's decision to give up weapons of mass destruction. Libya was expected to pay more than $1 billion in compensation t o the families of the victims of the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie in 1988. The United States kept several terrorism-related sections in place, however.

For its part, the government of Libya in 2004 expressed the view that economic development was more important than the pursuit of arms. Libya's Prime Minister Shkri Ghanem said, "We are turning our swords into ploughshares and this step should be appreciated and followed by all other countries."

United States intelligence officials said Libya's policy shift had come from Muammar al-Qadhafi. They noted that al-Qadhafi may have been motivated by his own concerns following the Iraq war, a desire to end Libya's isolation and his positioning as something of a pariah, as well as anxieties about the domestic threats to his own rule. The latter rationale, however, seemed to fly in the face of an increasingly stable Libya.

Nevertheless, Libya 's government in Tripoli acted quickly following its announcement. A key Libyan diplomat met with Mohammed El Baradei, the head of the IAEA, in Vienna. In those discussions, Libya agreed to open its atomic facilities to unannounced inspections, a measure that exceeds existing demands of the main nuclear arms control treaty, called the nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, of which Libya is a signatory. Libya, thus, agreed to sign the treaty's Additional Protocol, which allows more intrusive inspections. The measure may well harken a new beginning for Libya's re-integration into the global community.

In 2004, the IAEA said it was investigating reports that North Korea made clandestine sales of uranium to Libya at a time when that country was attempting to develop nuclear weapons. A report in the New York Times stated that the IAEA uncovered evidence that Pyongyang had provided Tripoli with nearly two tons of uranium in 2001. The New York Times report also noted that the uranium sent to Libya could not have been used as nuclear fuel unless it was enriched in

Libya Review 2016 Page 23 of 437 pages Libya centrifuges. The report went on to state that Libya had been constructing centrifuges and had a plan to purchase equipment from a black market network run by Pakistan's former nuclear chief, Abdul Qadeer Khan, who admitted to selling nuclear secrets to Libya, Iran and North Korea.

Also in 2004, presumably in an attempt to continue to build better relations with the international community, Libya agreed to pay $35 million in compensation to victims of the bombing of a Berlin nightclub that took place in 1986.

The year 2004 also saw five foreign nationals given the death sentence for deliberately infecting approximately 400 Libyan children with the HIV/AIDs virus. The case was set for appeal the next year.

In 2005, the Supreme Court overturned the death penalties that had been imposed on five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor who were convicted of infecting Libyan children with the HIV/AIDs virus. The court also called for a retrial to be convened. The case drew international attention due to the global nature of the players involved in the controversial case.

Then, May 2006 marked the period in which the United States announced that it was removing Libya from its list of state-sponsors of terrorism. The United States also announced that it would renew full diplomatic ties with Libya. The United States Assistant Secretary of State David Welch also announced that the United States planned to upgrade the liaison office in the Libyan capital city of Tripoli to a full embassy. In making that announcement he said that the shift would allow the United States and Libya "to engage more effectively on all issues."

Note: Relations with Libya were frozen for more than two decades, and in 1988, it blamed Libya for orchestrating the bombing of a Pan American flight that killed 270 people. After Libya made reparations for such activities and renounced its bid to develop weapons of mass destruction in 2004, the United States lifted many of its economic sanctions against Libya. However, arms exports were prohibited and investments were limited.

Meanwhile, in early 2006, attention was on foreign relations when Libya said that it would close its embassy in Denmark to protest a series of caricatures depicting the Islamic Prophet Muhammad as a terrorist in a Danish newspaper. Tripoli accused Copenhagen of failing to act against the cartoons in the Jyllands-Posten's newspaper saying, "Because the Danish media had continued to show disrespect to the Prophet Muhammad and because the Danish authorities failed to take any action on that, Libya decided to close its embassy in Copenhagen." Libya also said that it would take enact unspecified "economic measures" against Denmark.

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The Danish government has maintained its position that it cannot intervene in matters involving free speech. To this end, Prime Minister Rasmussen said, "The government can in no way influence the media. And the Danish government and the Danish nation as such cannot be held responsible for what is published in independent media." For its part, the Jyllands-Posten said that the caricatures had been intended to test the boundaries of expression about Islam and that it did not intend to impugn that religion.

During his trip to Libya in 2007, newly-inaugurated French President Nicolas Sarkozy forged an arms agreement with Libya. At stake was the purchase by Libya of French anti-tank missiles and radio communications systems valued at about $405 million. It was the first such agreement with a Western country since the lifting of the European Union embargo in 2004. Francois Hollande, the opposition Socialists leader in France, called for a parliamentary inquiry into the deal, as well as French-Libyan negotiations on the matter. Sarkozy has said that he would welcome such a move.

In July 2007, the controversial court case involving the death sentences of five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor in the HIV/AIDs case discussed above came to the fore again. At issue was the decision to commute their death penalties to life in prison instead. Subsequently, the European Union forged a deal in which all six of the foreign nationals were released.

The year 2008 began with Libya taking over the rotating presidency of the United Nations Security Council for a period of one month. The position effectively moved Libya from the position of perennial global pariah into the realm of improved international standing.

In February 2009, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi was elected as chairman of the African Union at the bloc's summit in Ethiopia. As such, he would replace outgoing Chairman Jakaya Kikwete, the president of Tanzania. Qadhafi's stint as African Union leader would last for a one-year period. While he has gained notoriety for his stance in favor of African unity, some African leaders were said to be skeptical about the choice of Qadhafi to lead the 53-member bloc, due to his dramatic style.

In August 2009, Libya's past record as a state-sponsor of terrorism was on full display in the aftermath of the decision by a Scottish court to free Abdel Baset al-Megrahi -- the man responsible for the bombing of the Pan American flight that exploded over the town of Lockerbie in 1988.

Libya Review 2016 Page 25 of 437 pages Libya parliament, he said, "It is a matter of great regret that Mr. Megrahi was received in such an inappropriate manner. It showed no compassion or sensitivity to the families of the 270 victims of Lockerbie." Indeed, the matter has been a source of embarrassment for the Scots at home who were chagrined to see their flag being waved in Libya in support for the return of a convicted terrorist.

On the other side of the Atlantic -- and home to many of the Lockerbie victims -- the United States Department of State made it clear that it "passionately" disagreed with the decision. Still, the United States acknowledged that the matter would not rupture good relations with the United Kingdom. State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said: "We made it quite clear that we disagreed passionately with this decision, because we thought it sent the wrong signal to, not only the families, but also to terrorists. But I really discourage you from thinking that we necessarily have to have some kind of tit-for-tat retaliation because of it. I just don't see it - not with Britain." That said, there remained grassroots rumblings of a trade boycott of Scotland as a result of the situation.

The case became marred by further controversy after a Times of London news story was published suggesting an "oil for freedom" deal between Libya and the United Kingdom. But on Aug. 31, 2009, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown said that al-Megrahi was not released as part of an oil exploration deal with Libya. The office of the prime minister insisted there was no deal associated with the release of al-Megrahi, and denied the Times of London charge that the move was made in order to facilitate oil exploration rights in Libya by the British energy company, British Petroleum (BP).

This issue was evoked again in 2010 when BP was in the news due to a massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The disaster in Gulf intersected with global politics as BP was subject to increased scrutiny, ultimately resting on the question of whether that company played a role in the early release of the Libyan Lockerbie bomber al-Megrahi, and spurring debate again as to whether or not BP lobbied for his release in exchange for lucrative oil deals in Libya. In fact, BP acknowledged that it had conveyed concern over the slow action being taken to transfer Megrahi out of British jurisdiction and home to Libya. The company stopped short of admitting that it played a part in the release of the terrorist.

As well, British Prime Minister David Cameron, in the United States for meetings with President Barack Obama, dismissed a request for a new investigation into the matter. Scottish Secretary, Michael Moore, insisted before the House of Commons that the decision to release the Libyan terrorist was made "in good faith." Still, with this scandal brewing, pressure was building on both sides of the Atlantic -- in the United States for a investigation into the allegations against BP related to the bomber's release, and in the United Kingdom for a full and independent inquiry into the bombing itself and the decision to grant a terrorist freedom on compassionate grounds.

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Special Report:

Season of Unrest in Libya

Summary:

Coming on the heels of the successful "Jasmine Revolution" in Tunisia and the "Nile Revolution" in Egypt, protests by thousands of pro-democracy demonstrators in Libya resulted in the liberation of the eastern part of the country. As part of a brutal crackdown aimed at shoring up power in the government's center of Tripoli, the Qadhafi regime opened fire on anti-government protesters before commencing a brutal military offensive against opposition strongholds to the east. Unapologetic for his ruthless tactics and in the face of worldwide condemnation, Qadhafi called for the crushing of the resistance movement by all means necessary and "without mercy."

In response to the audacious move by Qadhafi to attack and kill his own people, the United Nations Security Council, on Feb. 26, 2011, voted unanimously to impose sanctions on Libya and to refer the Qadhafi regime to the International Criminal Court for alleged crimes against humanity. Then, on March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security Council authorized a "no fly zone" against Libya, with an international coalition commencing air strikes on military targets in that country, with an eye on protecting the Libyan people from the Qadhafi regime. By the close of March 2011, NATO had taken control of the operation, the rebels were reconstituting their efforts at taking control of eastern towns, and the Qadhafi regime said it welcomed an African Union plan for a ceasefire and resolution.

While this reality might have been viewed as discouraging news for the protest movement, they took solace in the news that Qadhafi's regime appeared to be splintering from within, as evidenced by a constant parade of high level defections. From May 2011 onward, there was some progress from within the rebels' ranks, as British and French helicopters, operating under the aegis of the prevailing NATO mission, were stepping up air attacks inside Libya.

In mid-August 2011, the rebels were advancing on Tripoli, the Qadhafi regime was being isolated. All indications pointed to the notion that rebel fighters -- now far more organized -- were

Libya Review 2016 Page 27 of 437 pages Libya attempting to lay siege on Tripoli in what was being dubbed "Operation Mermaid." In many senses, the "end game" was in sight.

By September 2011, Tripoli had fallen to the rebels, and only two remaining pro-Qadhafi strongholds remained: Qadhafi's hometown of Sirte and Bani Walid. Fierce fighting was reported in these two areas, with a special emphasis on Sirte, where Qadhafi -- still evading captivity -- was believed to be hiding.

Meanwhile, Interpol issued arrest warrants for Qadhafi, his son, and his former intelligence chief, all three of whom were subject to charges of crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC). As well, the human rights group, Amnesty International, issued a report detailing abuses committed by the Qadhafi regime and its loyalists during the civil war unfolding there.

It should be noted that pro-Qadhafi loyalists had crossed the southern border of the country into Niger, while members of Qadhafi's family had taken refuge in Algeria. Despite the international community's demands that members of Qadhafi's inner coterie be returned to Libya to face justice, both Niger and Algeria were taking positions at odds with global consensus.

Certainly, in the realm of foreign relations, world powers were now recognizing the Transitional National Council (TNC) as the lone legitimate governing authority of Libya. With the United Nations General Assembly voting overwhelmingly to transfer control over Libya's seat at the international body to the TNC, the Qadhafi regime's claim on power in Libya was consigned to the history books.

On the domestic political landscape, an interim government was soon formed in Libya, with Mahmoud Jibril at the helm of that cabinet, and with Mustafa Abdel-Jalil functioning as the TNC head.

In mid-October 2011, reports were emerging that Bani Walid had fallen to the transitional authority fighters, and that Sirte was moving towards a similar fate. Indeed, on Oct. 20, 2011, Libyan transitional authorities declared that Sirte -- the final pro-Qadhafi stronghold -- had fallen, Qadhafi had died, and Libya's national liberation was at hand. Indeed, it was quite likely that the rebels' brazen prediction was coming to pass: "Zero Hour" was finally descending on the Qadhafi regime in Libya.

Attention would likely soon focus on the massive challenge of building a new Libyan nation state with all the instruments and structures needed for stable and democratic governance.

Background:

On Feb. 16, 2011, thousands of protesters took to the streets of Libyan cities, including the

Libya Review 2016 Page 28 of 437 pages Libya country's second largest city of Benghazi, and smaller cities ofal- Bayda, Dernah, and Misrata. The protesters held rallies in which they decried the ruling regime and demanded that long-serving Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi, step down from power. In Benghazi, hundreds of anti- government protesters became embroiled in violent clashes with police, leaving several people injured. Some protesters hurled petrol bombs and stones at police and interests, even setting vehicles ablaze, and spurring the police to respond with water cannons and rubber bullets.

The eruption of unrest in 2011 appeared to have been sparked by the arrest of Fathi Terbil, a well- known government critic, who has lobbied on behalf of prisoners allegedly tortured by Libyan security forces at the infamous Abu Salim jail in Tripoli in 1996. While Terbil was released soon after his detainment, that event -- in conjunction with the events unfolding in Tunisia and Egypt -- seemed to have inspired protesters to attend these rallies and call for an end to the 42-year long Qadhafi regime.

But while the Terbil case ignited the ire of the Libyan citizenry, the climate of discontent in Libya has been ongoing for some time. One of the prevailing grievances for the people of Libya has been the plunder of the country's extensive oil wealth to the benefit of Qadhafi, his family, and his coterie. Indeed, Libya has been home to the largest reservoirs of oil on the African continent, with a full two-thirds of the country unexplored. Yet despite these resources, schools in Libya have become rundown, and a significant portion of the population has lived under the poverty line. The fact that so many people have not enjoyed the benefits of this oil wealth has been a matter of contention for a citizenry frustrated with the endemic graft and corruption in the Libyan system. Also of note was the fact people were wary of rule by Qadhafi, who had the dubious distinction of being a brutal despot at the helm of one of the harshest and most repressive regimes in the Arab world.

For his part, Qadhafi offered a speech broadcast nationally, which gave no direct acknowledgment of the mass action unfolding in Libya, although he asserted that the "revolutionaries" would win the day. Indeed, Qadhafi appeared to applaud the fall of regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, depicting them as pro-Western entities quite distinct from Libya. He said, "Down with the enemies, down with them everywhere; down with the puppets everywhere, the puppets are falling, the autumn leaves are falling!" Qadhafi continued, "The puppets of the USA, the puppets of Zionism are falling."

Meanwhile, Libyan authorities suggested the protests in that country were limited and made it clear that further actions of that type would not be tolerated. There were reports that security forces and snipers were taking up positions in key cities across the country. An official statement was issued that read as follows: "The clashes last night were between small groups of people - up to 150. Some outsiders infiltrated that group. They were trying to corrupt the local legal process which has long been in place. We will not permit that at all, and we call on Libyans to voice their issues through existing channels, even if it is to call for the downfall of the government."

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Nevertheless, by Feb. 17, 2011, at least 15 people had died in Benghazi indicating renewed violence. Then, a day later on Feb. 18, 2011, reports from the city's area of el-Kish reportedly pointed to the deaths of at least more three people, and injuries to more than a dozen others.

Escalation:

On Feb. 20, 2011, the situation in the Libyan city of Benghazi was reported to be dire as a result of the brutal crackdown by the authorities on the protesters. For two days, the military unleashed an aggressive assault on protesters taking to the streets demanding democracy and an end to the autocracy that has governed Libyan politics for decades. The assault by the military was characterized by some as "a massacre" as the massive list of casualties was being publicized. While reports differed on the precise numbers, the general consensus was that, in just days, the death toll had exponentially escalated from 15 to well over 200, and the number of people injured was closing in on 1,000.

The sharp increase in the level of violence in such a short period of time appeared to have occurred as a result of the aforementioned massive assault by the Libyan military on the anti- Qadhafi protesters using machine guns, mortars, large caliber weapons, and missiles. Significantly, security forces opened fire on funeral mourners who were trying to bury the victims of the past days' bloodshed. Several of the deaths and critical injuries were said to have been the result of gunshots to the heads and chests of protesters. While security forces said that their actions were in response to the protesters' hurling of fire bombs, the anti-government factions said that the authorities carried out an unprovoked attack on them. The violence appeared to be unrelenting as defiant protesters continued to take to the streets despite the clear and present threat to their lives by the country's security forces.

At the start of the military assault, United States President Barack Obama weighed in on the situation, condemning the violence against the protesters in Libya, Bahrain, and Yemen. He said, "I am deeply concerned about reports of violence in Bahrain, Libya and Yemen. The United States condemns the use of violence by governments against peaceful protesters in those countries and wherever else it may occur." He continued "The United States urges the governments of Bahrain, Libya and Yemen to show restraint in responding to peaceful protests and to respect the rights of their people." Days later, as the violence increased, the United States said that it was "gravely concerned" by the violence gripping Libya. United Kingdom Foreign Minister William Hague offered his country's position, saying that the Libyan government's actions were "unacceptable." He warned that Libya's actions "would result in worldwide condemnation." From France, Laurent Wauquiez the Minister for European Affairs, condemned Libya's "totally disproportionate" use of force against the protesters. The European Union also entered the fray by decrying the violent crackdown by the Libyan authorities. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Qadhafi regime was undaunted by the litany of criticism coming from the global community, and instead threatened to suspend cooperation with the European Union

Libya Review 2016 Page 30 of 437 pages Libya over illegal migration if the European bloc dared to encourage the burgeoning pro-democracy movement in Libya.

Despite the alarmingly high death toll, reports emerged out of Libya suggesting that the protest movement was seeing some success. Eyewitness reports conveyed via the social networks, Twitter and Facebook, indicated that army barracks in Benghazi had fallen, and that the city was in a state of chaos with government buildings destroyed or on fire. It should be noted that there was no independent verification of this claim. Indeed, all reporting from Libya has been severely hampered by the fact that Libya has been subject to media and Internet restrictions, with international journalists virtually absent from the scene of activity. Still, there were emerging reports that Benghazi was coming under the control of anti-government activists, with police and troops forced into a retreat mode.

By Feb. 20, 2011, the mass anti-Qadhafi protests were expanding from Benghazi and smaller towns and cities into the capital city of Tripoli. There, thousands of protesters were embroiled in bloody clashes with pro-Qadhafi loyalists. Police used tear gas and gunfire to try to disperse and subdue the protesters in the central Green Square and army snipers were spotted on rooftops in the surrounding area. The sound of gun shots and other weaponry indicated that the security forces were trying to repel the uprising, which had now reached Tripoli. The composition of the security forces was viewed as suspicious, with some suggestions that in addition to official security forces, the Qadhafi regime had also deployed foreign mercenaries (possibly from neighboring Chad) onto the streets to open fire on the demonstrators.

While the Libyan government had the advantage of heavy and abundant weaponry to use against the protesters, it was losing the moral argument in the public sphere. In a blow to the legitimacy of the ruling Qadhafi regime, Libya's envoy to the Arab League, Abdel Moneim al-Honi, announced that he had resigned from his post in protest of his government's decision to open fire on the pro- democracy demonstrators in Benghazi. He said that he was now "joining the revolution." Additionally, reports by the news network Al-Jazeera -- now operating on the ground in Libya -- indicated that army units were defecting and joining the opposition protests, presumably in response to the regime's harsh crackdown. At a Benghazi hospital, troops from a "Thunderbolt" army squad brought in wounded members of their unit and made it known that they had fought Qadhafi's elite Praetorian Guard and now stood in solidarity with the popular revolt. In another stunning development, Libya's ambassador to China, Hussein Sadiq al Musrati, resigned from his post during an on-air interview with Al-Jazeera. He additionally urged other diplomatic staff to follow in his footsteps, and called on the army to act decisively to stop the bloodshed.

Perhaps feeling the pressure from the popular uprising, the Qadhafi regime hinted that some type of reform agenda in the offing. Seif al-Islam Qadhafi -- the son of Libyan leader -- said during a nationally-televised address that the government would soon advance an "historic national initiative," which could potentially include changes to the penal code, the loosening of media

Libya Review 2016 Page 31 of 437 pages Libya restrictions, as well as movement towards an official constitution. However, the younger Qadhafi did not contain his statements to promises for the future, aimed at assuaging an enraged public. Instead, Seif al-Islam Qadhafi asserted that his father's grip on power would ultimately endure and that the Libyan leadership intended to stand against the popular revolt, even if Col. Qadhafi was "the last man standing." Seif al-Islam Qadhafi said: "Our spirits are high and the leader Muammar Qadhafi is leading the battle in Tripoli, and we are behind him as is the Libyan army." The younger Qadhafi additionally issued a threat to the protesters already in the streets risking their lives; he pledged that the military would enforce the country's security by any means necessary. Further, Seif al-Islam Qadhafi warned Libya was not like Egypt or Tunisia, and that continued unrest would only lead to civil war. The younger Qadhafi explained that Libya was not a society with political parties, and instead, it was divided by clans and tribes. This complex tribal structure, he observed, could easily collapse into civil war.

But tribal leaders made it clear they were on the side of the protesters, even speaking out forcefully against Qadhafi's harsh tactics. Of crucial importance was a declaration by Shaikh Faraj al Zuway, the leader of the eastern Al-Zuwayya tribe, during an interview with Al-Jazeera in which he threatened to cut off oil exports if the Libyan government did not cease its "oppression of protesters." In related developments, hundreds of thousands of people belonging to the Tuareg tribe of southern Libya said they were joining the popular revolt. Their announcement came on the heels of a similar declaration of solidarity with the protest movement by the Warfala tribe, whose members number around one million. Already, the Tuareg towns of Ghat and Ubary had reported that protesters were attacking government buildings and police stations.

By Feb. 21, 2011, clashes between security forces and protesters were ongoing in Tripoli for a second consecutive night. Eyewitness accounts reported that military jets were flying over the capital in what appeared to be a reinvigorated crackdown on Tripoli -- the base of Qadhafi's power. Both Al-Jazeera and the BBC reported that Tripoli was a city under siege, with military jets firing live ammunition on anti-government demonstrators. Heavy fighting was also reported between in areas to the west of Tripoli.

The day Feb. 21, 2011, was noted for a series of revelations about the situation in Libya. Perhaps the most disturbing news was that 11 soldiers who had refused to fire on civilians in Benghazi were executed by their commanding officers. CNN broadcast footage purportedly showing the burned and mutilated bodies of the soldiers. In another development, two Libyan fighter pilots arrived in the Mediterranean country of Malta seeking political asylum, having refused to comply with orders to carry out the aerial bombardment of the Libyan people.

Presumably due to the tragic events unfolding in Libya, several officials broke ties with the Qadhafi regime. A number of Libya’s diplomatic missions abroad renounced Qadhafi due to his brutal assault on the protesters and pledging their allegiance to the people of Libya instead. Of significance was the claim by Libya's deputy envoy to the United Nations, Ibrahim Dabbashi, that

Libya Review 2016 Page 32 of 437 pages Libya the Qadhafi regime was guilty of genocide. Dabbashi urged the international community to intervene with an eye on ending the crisis. From Libya, Qadhafi's own Justice Minister Mustapha Abdul Jalil resigned from the government over the regime's "excessive use of violence."

The revised death toll had escalated exponentially, with up to 800 people now estimated to have died in only days. It was unclear how the situation in Libya would ultimately play out, and if the time for the Qadhafi regime was over. For his part, Qadhafi appeared on state television for a few seconds, seemingly to show that he was still in Tripoli and to dispel the rumors that he had fled the country for Venezuela. Nevertheless, it was patently clear that Libya was in a state of chaos. Indeed, Libya was now seeing the bloodiest revolt to shake the Arab world in recent times. From the limited journalistic and eyewitness reports on the ground in Libya, street fighting was rampant and major cities appeared to have descended into some degree of anarchy with protesters at war with loyalists of the regime. It was also certainly apparent that the Libyan authorities had unleashed the harshest and most brutal crackdown of any Arab country upon its people during the season of unrest gripping the Middle East and the Maghreb.

An emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council took place on Feb. 22, 2011, to focus on the situation in Libya. Ahead of that meeting, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki- moon reportedly telephoned Qadhafi to demand an end to the violence. After the meeting, the United Nations Security Council issued a strong condemnation of the brutal crackdown on protesters in Libya and demanded an "immediate end" to the violence.

Meanwhile, world powers were escalating the tenor of their condemnations of Qadhafi and the ruling regime. United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton offered a hard line statement on behalf of the Obama administration reviling the violence as follows: "We join the international community in strongly condemning the violence in Libya." Secretary of State Clinton also demanded an end to the bloody crackdown on the people, saying, "Now is the time to stop this unacceptable bloodshed." Secretary of State Clinton additionally emphasized Libya's responsibility to protect its citizens' rights, including freedom of speech and assembly. The foreign ministers of the European Union issued a joint statement decrying the "ongoing repression against demonstrators," and rebuking the Qadhafi regime for the violent deaths of civilians. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen excoriated Qadhafi and his coterie for their "indiscriminate use of violence against peaceful protesters in Libya" and deplored the loss of life. Rasmussen expressed fulsome support for the democratic aspirations of the Libyan people, asserting, "The people of Libya, like many others in the wider Middle East, have expressed a strong desire for democratic change. Their legitimate aspirations must be addressed. Freedom of expression and assembly are fundamental rights which cannot be denied." Rasmussen also noted that stability could only be realized through democracy. He said, "As the Secretary General of an alliance of democracies, I strongly believe that democracy is the only solid basis for long-lasting stability. In the long run, no society can ignore the will of the people, because the desire for

Libya Review 2016 Page 33 of 437 pages Libya freedom resides in every human being."

On Feb. 22, 2011, Qadhafi returned to the media spotlight to deliver another message to the people of Libya and the world. This time, his address lasted well over an hour in contrast to the few seconds he was shown on television days earlier. Asserting that he had no official or formal position in Libyan government from which to resign, Qadhafi defiantly declared that he would remain as the head of the revolution and made the claim that he was responsible for bringing glory to Libya. He also blamed the West -- primarily the United States and the United Kingdom -- for encouraging the protests and trying to destabilize Libya, and insisted that he had nothing to do with brutal use of force by mercenaries and the army against the civilian population. During his speech, Qadhafi said that the protests were "serving the devil" and he made frequent references to the anti- government protesters as "cockroaches," "rats," and "traitors" who were under the influence of drugs. Qadhafi instructed his supporters to act on his behalf as follows: "Come out of your homes, attack them in their dens. Withdraw your children from the streets. They are drugging your children, they are making your children drunk and sending them to hell." Perhaps most disturbingly, Qadhafi urged his supporters to take to the streets to attack the "cockroaches," to confront the "gangs," to and "cleanse Libya house by house" -- a position that could well be interpreted as the incitement of house to house massacres. While Qadhafi was no stranger to bizarre behavior and predilections, this speech by the Libyan leader could well be distinguished as an exercise in extreme eccentricity.

Not surprisingly, the international community reacted in shock and disbelief, while anti-government protesters in Benghazi (now under opposition control) threw shoes in disgust at the image of Qadhafi on screens as he delivered his speech. In Tripoli, though, gunfire was the main sound in the streets of the capital city as the Libyan leader sought to hold onto power. Of course, Qadhafi's very power base was receding in size, leaving only Tripoli and points west under his apparent control. Yet even in western towns such as Misrata, Sabratha, and Zawiya, there were reports of uprisings and revolt, although the thoroughfares toward the Tunisian border remained under Qadhafi's control. To the east, it was clear that the opposition was consolidating its gains, and even encroaching closer and closer to points surrounding the capital. Indeed, residents of Benghazi looted the supply of weapons from the army and police and were reportedly headed towards Tripoli for battle, with an eye on toppling Qadhafi once and for all.

Within the capital city of Tripoli on Feb. 23, 2011, there was little sense of exuberance or impending victory as forces loyal to Qadhafi were guarding the city, often roaming the streets and shooting indiscriminately at people brave enough to leave their houses. To that end, the authorities were either intent on presenting a picture of false normalcy or tasked with luring people out into the open as text messages from the government urged people to go back to work. However, few people paid heed to that message, preferring to huddle in their homes rather than expose themselves to the gunfire outside.

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There were several reports emerging that paramilitary troops were carrying out mass killings and disposing of bodies in cars and trucks. They were then erasing the evidence of the bloodshed from the streets, and during security checks on people lucky enough to remain alive, their phones and cameras were destroyed -- presumably in an effort to conceal the extent of the human devastation. That human devastation appeared to be real and not imagined with eyewitnesses and journalists noting that people were killed at point blank range outside the headquarters for state television, and in a line while waiting for bread in the Fashloum district. Meanwhile, news outlets, including CNN, showed footage of dead soldiers en masse who were apparently assassinated for refusing to fire on civilians. As well, two more pilots refused to carry out orders to bomb civilian targets, instead decided to parachute from their jets, leaving them to crash instead.

Foreign nationals were desperate to escape the crossfire of violence and chaos sweeping over Libya. Various countries including the United States, China, and the nation states of Europe, sent jets, ships, and ferries to evacuate people. Libyan diplomats abroad have increasingly rejected any remaining allegiance to Qadhafi, insisting that they now spoke only on behalf of the Libyan people, and calling for the United Nations to impose a no-fly zone over the country in protest. From within Libya, Interior Minister Abdel Fattah Younes al-Abidi joined Justice Minister Mustapha Abdeljalil who earlier resigned from cabinet, to join the protest movement on behalf of the people. But former Justice Minister Mustapha Abdeljalil returned to the spotlight with a startling accusation during an interview with a Swedish newspaper that Qadhafi personally ordered the 1988 bombing of the Pan Am flight that exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland. While Qadhafi had already acknowledged some complicity in the bombing, the revelation that he was personally responsible for that act of terrorism was sure to leave political wounds around the world.

Meanwhile, United States President Barack Obama addressed the chaos unfolding in Libya, blasting the Libyan regime for its "outrageous" and "unacceptable" actions and warning that his administration was considering a "full range of options." French President Nicolas Sarkozy suggested that the European Union might cut off economic ties with Libya in response to the latest developments. As well, with the situation deteriorating and with rising evidence that the Libyan government used warplanes to bomb civilian protesters, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human RightsNavi Pillay said that the international body might move forward with the proposal to declare a no-fly zone over Libya, for the purpose of preventing further such attacks.Pillay said, "There's an immediate need for that level of protection."

On that same day -- Feb. 24, 2011 -- Qadhafi returned to the public purview, now placing the blame for the uprising in Libya on the terror enclaveal-Qaida. Qadhafi said in state television that the al-Qaida spiritual leader, Osama bin Laden, had given Libyan youth hallucinogenic pills in their coffee, which spurred their desire to revolt. He noted that al-Qaida militants were "exploiting" the country's youth by feeding them "hallucinogenic pills in their coffee with milk, like Nescafe." Qadhafi's son was also in the public spotlight as he insisted that reports of the death toll numbering

Libya Review 2016 Page 35 of 437 pages Libya over 800 (perhaps as high as 1,000) were exaggerated, even saying on state television, "Talking about hundreds and thousands (killed) is a joke." However, Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini was himself noting that estimates of the death toll moving as high as 1,000 were "credible."

Feb. 24, 2011, was marked by violence in cities close to Tripoli that appeared to be moving out of Qadhafi's grip. In Zawiya to the west of Tripoli, an army unit opened fire on a mosque where anti- government protesters were taking refuge. According to the Associated Press, a doctor at a field clinic at the mosque claimed that at least 10 people died there. But the anti-government protesters were undeterred by the assault, regrouping once again and gathering at a square close to the mosque. In Misrata, which also was supposedly slipping out of Qadhafi's control, army units attacked a small airport using rocket-propelled grenades and mortars to attack anti-government protesters guarding the compound with automatic rifles and hunting rifles. The protest element was able to successfully gain control of an anti-aircraft gun and use it against the military units, forcing them into retreat. Both cases appeared to be spurred by reprisal attacks by pro-Qadhafi forces aimed at holding control over Tripoli, which was quickly becoming the site of the Libyan leader's last stand. Now some of Qadhafi's inner circle were defecting from his camp -- including his own cousin, Gadhaf al-Dam, who said he had left the country in protest of the government's harsh crackdown. But even so, Libyans living in Tripoli were trying to survive under extremely dangerous conditions. Pro-Qadhafi militias composed of both Libyans and foreign mercenaries were roaming the streets, firing guns at random, and even launching raids on people's homes in the city. Some residents were being dragged from their homes into the streets leaving hysterical family members inside, who were terrified about the fate of their loved ones. The militias were also searching hospitals for protesters who were injured on the streets. It seemed that the pro-Qadhafi elements were now prepared to terrorize Libyans in Tripoli, all for the purpose of forcing the residents of the capital city to remain in a defensive position and disconnected from the momentum of the revolt.

On Feb. 25, 2011, anti-government protesters in Tripoli came under heavy gunfire. According to eyewitnesses, militias and government troops opened fire on protesters coming out of mosques following Friday prayers, leaving several people dead or wounded. Elsewhere in the city, as some protesters braved the hostile street conditions to demonstrate against the Qadhafi regime, they too were hit by gunfire. The gunmen -- some perched as snipers on rooftops and others in the streets - - used automatic weapons and an anti-aircraft gun to strike down the people. Outside of Tripoli in Misrata, which had been reported to be slipping into opposition hands, pro-Qadhafi forces launched an attack on that city's air base. They were successful regaining control of part of the base as they battled with anti-Qadhafi uprising protesters.

Speaking again on state television, Qadhafi was ratcheting up his rhetoric against the protesters saying, "We shall destroy any aggression with popular will. With the armed people, when necessary we will open the weapons depots. So that all the Libyan people, all the Libyan tribes can be armed. Libya will become a red flame, a burning coal."

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Alarm from the International Community:

Feb. 25, 2011 saw the United Nations Human Rights Council hold an emergency meeting in Geneva to address the situation in Libya. High Commissioner for Human Rights,Navi Pillay , condemned the Qadhafi regime in Libya for its actions as follows: “In brazen and continuing breach of international law, the crackdown in Libya on peaceful demonstrations is escalating alarmingly with reported mass killings, arbitrary arrests, detention and torture of prisoners."Pillay also demanded for "more state action and intervention" to protect Libyan civilians, who were now under direct fire from pro-Qadhafi forces in Tripoli.

In the chamber of the Human Rights Council, there was a unanimous vote to suspend Libya’s membership. However, that development was overshadowed by the startling declaration by an official of the Libyan mission, who said that he and all his cohorts were resigning their posts en masse and standing with the Libyan people. The declaration was met with a standing ovation from the crowded chamber while United States ambassador, Eileen Donahoe, offered a congratulatory handshake. As Libyan diplomats strove to distance themselves from the brutality of the Qadhafi regime, Libyan deputy ambassador, Ibrahim Dabbashi, had no qualms about describing Qadhafi as a "madman," and warned that thousands more would lose their lives in Tripoli since the Libyan leader would never relinquish power voluntarily, the bloodshed of the people notwithstanding.

In other developments, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called on the international body's Security Council to take "concrete action" to protect Libyan civilians, saying "the violence must stop" and those responsible for "so brutally shedding blood" must be compelled to face justice. Ban cited the human rights violations committed by Gaddafi's regime, and specifically noted that the death toll in the Libyan uprising now exceeded 1,000. Ban also noted that well over 22,000 people were displaced as they fled across the borders, and that a humanitarian crisis was in the offing.

Various Western countries were considering diplomatic pressure to be levied against Libya. France and the United Kingdom were calling for the United Nations to approve an already drafted a resolution that would impose on Libya an arms embargo, sanctions, and which would isolate the Libyan leadership. The United Nations Security Council was expected to soon meet to consider that draft resolution. French President Nicolas Sarkozy took a strong stand against the Libyan leader, expressly demanding that Qadhafi resign from power, given the atrocities levied against civilians. NATO made it clear that it would not be intervening militarily, however, it was ready and willing to assist in the evacuation of refugees from the line of fire.

Meanwhile, the United States was reportedly working on the imposition of sanctions; White House Press Secretary Jay Carney said that the Obama administration in the United States would move "to put pressure on the regime" and said that the White House planned to impose unilateral

Libya Review 2016 Page 37 of 437 pages Libya sanctions on Libya. That said, in what could only be regarded as an understatement, given the events unfolding in Libya, Carney said: "Colonel Qadhafi has lost the confidence of his people." He then increased the tenor of the criticism, noting that Qadhafi's legitimacy had been "reduced to zero." But after word came that the last American citizens had finally been evacuated from Libya via a chartered jet, the Obama administration waited only minutes before not only ratcheting up its rhetoric, but also moving forward aggressively against the Qadhafi regime. Indeed, the United States closed its embassy in Tripoli, effectively suspending relations with Libya, imposed unilateral sanctions against Libya, including the freezing of billions in government assets and the freezing American-held assets of Qaddafi and family. The Obama administration additionally warned that Qadhafi and his cadre would be subject to war crimes prosecution. To that end, the United States made it clear that it would support a resolution presented at the United Nations Security Council calling for Qadhafi to be referred to the International Criminal Court for alleged crimes against humanity.

The Obama administration had been criticized by Republican foes for not being more vociferous in its condemnation of Qadhafi and his regime in Libya, however, now it had come to light that President Obama's primary concern was preventing a hostage crisis involving American citizens in Libya. With the American citizens now out of harm's way, he was free to take a more confrontational stance in regard to the Qadhafi regime. Accordingly, on Feb. 26, 2011, President Obama called for Qadhafi to resign, issuing a statement as follows: "When a leader's only means of staying in power is to use mass violence against his own people, he has lost the legitimacy to rule and needs to do what is right for his country by leaving now."

Note that on Feb. 26, 2011, in response to the audacious moves by Qadhafi to attack and kill his own people, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to impose sanctions on Libya via United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970. The United Nations Security Council also moved to refer the Qadhafi regime to the war crime tribunal for an investigation into crimes against humanity. The United Nations Security Council explained that the goal of its actions was: "...deploring the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including the repression of peaceful demonstrators." The council also unequivocally rejected "the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan government."

On Feb. 27, 2011, several other countries, including Canada, imposed asset freezes on Libya, while the European imposed an arms embargo, visa ban, and a package of sanctions on that country.

On Feb. 28, 2011, the West sent aid to the eastern part of Libya, now under opposition control, in the hopes of boosting the prospects of the revolt movement. France deployed two airplanes carrying both medicine and doctors to Benghazi. As well, the United States military deployed naval and air units close to Libya. According to the Pentagon, the United States wanted to have flexibility in the context of a "contingency plan" with regard to the situation in

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Libya. At the same time, British Prime Minister David Cameron said he was working with allied countries to establish a military no-fly zone over Libya; he also indicated that contingencies might even include military action saying, "We do not in any way rule out the use of military assets" in dealing with Qadhafi's regime."

On the ground in Libya, the Qadhafi regime was not only trying to hold the capital of Tripoli and surrounding areas, but it also appeared to be preparing to strike opposition targets. The opposition stronghold in the east would not be helped by the fact that it had limited supplies of weapons and ammunition. Still, the opposition was not withdrawing from its battle with pro-Qadhafi forces in Zawiya and Misrata around Tripoli. Yet despite these conditions, Qadhafi issued the startling proclamation that all Libyans loved him -- the fact that eastern part of the country was in revolutionary mode notwithstanding. United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Dr. Susan Rice, characterized Qadhafi's statement as "delusional."

By the first week of March 2011, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, said he would move forward with an investigation of Qadhafi and his coterie for crimes against humanity. Moreno-Ocampo said, "During the coming weeks, the office will investigate who are the most responsible for the most serious incidents, for the most serious crimes committed in Libya." He also did not foreclose the idea of investigating the opposition, should the need arise.

Around the same time, Interpol issued an "orange alert" effectively paving the way for member states to enforce sanctions against Qadhafi and his inner circle.

In other developments, the Netherlands said that three of its marines were captured by pro-Qadhafi forces in Sirte as they attempted to evacuate two civilians. As well, a British diplomatic team was detained close to Benghazi but later released; the team was reportedly attempting to make contact with the leadership of the opposition.

On the diplomatic front, there was consideration of a mediation offer by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. However, some elements of the opposition were now increasingly calling for the United Nations to back military action against Qadhafi forces. For its part, the international community appeared reluctant to directly enter the fray. Indeed, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, who was traveling in Egypt, warned that military intervention by the international community in Libya would yield "absolutely negative" repercussions.

That being said, the United States was hardening its stance against Libya with President Obama calling for Qadhafi to resign; at a news conference, he said: "The violence must stop. Muammar Qadhafi has lost the legitimacy to lead and he must leave." President Obama also said that he had authorized the use of military aircraft to help evacuate tens of thousands of migrant workers desperate to flee Libya. United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron echoed President

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Obama's demand that Qadhafi resign.

Qadhafi Regime in Crackdown Mode:

On the ground in Libya, fighting was ongoing with Qadhafi determined to hold onto power despite having lost the eastern part of the country. On March 3, 2011, the Qadhafi regime ordered air strikes on the town of Brega. One of Qadhafi's sons, Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, appeared to confirm the aerial bombing of Brega when he said in an interview with Sky News, "First of all the bombs [were] just to frighten them [the opposition] to go away. Not to kill them." Qadhafi's son explained that it was necessary to take control of Brega due to its oil interests. He said, "I'm talking about the harbor and the oil refinery there. Nobody would allow the militia to control Brega. It's like allowing someone to control Rotterdam harbor in Holland."

The government also used air power in the form of a warplane to bomb the opposition-held port town of Ajdabiya, and used helicopter gunships to attack the eastern coastal town of Bin Jawad and the port city of Ras Lanuf -- home to an airfield and an oil refinery. These towns and cities have all been in opposition hands of late, suggesting that government forces were now using offensive operations against the opposition outside of Tripoli.

Battles were also being waged in Zawiya, where pro-Qadhafi forces were attempting to wrest control from the opposition there. Misrata was supposedly still in opposition hands although battles for control there were ongoing' eye witnesses said that government forces arrived in that city in tanks and opened fire on the people. On the outskirts of Tripoli following prayers on March 4, 2011, as anti-Qadhafi protesters gathered to rally, government militias and police fired tear gas and used batons to disperse the crowds. Pro-Qadhafi forces would be helped in their efforts due to the news that hundreds mercenaries from the Tuareg community in Mali were providing reinforcements.

By the second week of March 2011, pro-Qadhafi forces were in a re-invigorated fight to wrest Zawiya from opposition control using tanks and artillery. Over a period of successive days, control over Zawiya changed hands a number of times. Early on March 11, 2011, it appeared that government forces had secured control of Zawiya. Earlier, pro-Qadhafi forces had been carrying out air strikes and heavily shelling the oil port of Ras Lanuf, forcing opposition fighters in retreat mode. In other developments, the international media became part of the story unfolding in Libya when it was revealed that Qadhafi's security forces detained and assaulted a BBC news team en route to the aforementioned city of Zawiya where battles were ongoing. The three journalists were held in detainment for close to 24 hours, brutally beaten, placed in hooded garments, and subjected to mock executions in what the BBC characterized as "abusive treatment." After their release and exit from Libya, the BBC journalists reported that while they were being held in detention, they witnessed the torture of Libyan detainees, some of whom were opposition activists from Zawiya.

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On the diplomatic front, a meeting of NATO defense ministers was scheduled to take place on March 10, 2011. Military options for dealing with the crisis in Libya, including a possible establishment of a "no-fly zone," were expected to be discussed at the meeting although it was unlikely that the regional defense group would move toward any immediate action. Moreover, the general consensus was that no action by the international community would be taken without clear jurisdiction under international law. For its part, Libya dispatched several envoys to various countries in the world, presumably in its own desire to reach out diplomatically on behalf of the Qadhafi regime.

By March 13, 2011, pro-Qadhafi forces claimed to have routed opposition forces in Brega. The government's forces attacked Brega with air strikes, and by hurling rockets and bombs from warships and tanks, in the effort to sweep opposition activists and fighters from that city. However, opposition forces said that after their initial withdrawal, they advanced to Brega once again and managed to capture some fighters from Qadhafi's elite Khamis Brigade. These developments aside, it was apparent that momentum was on the side of Qadhafi's fighters, who were emboldened to strike and were reversing gains made by the anti-government forces in the previous weeks.

At issue has been the terrain on Libya's main coastal highway running from Tripoli to opposition- held territory in the east. Control over Brega held particular importance since it was located less than 150 miles from the main opposition stronghold of Benghazi. In fact, now the only major population base between Qadhafi's expanding power center and Benghazi was the town of Ajdabiya. Should pro-government forces capture that town, then the chance of advancing towards Benghazi for a potentially bloody confrontation was extremely high. With this possibility in mind, opposition forces in Ajdabiya were preparing for an attack by Qadhafi's army by evacuating people, storing up weapons, fuel, and provisions, and trying to secure the roadways to the town.

On March 16, 2011, pro-Qadhafi forces were carrying out an assault using tanks, artillery, and warplanes on the aforementioned town of Ajdabiya -- the last town standing en route to the main rebel-held city of Benghazi. Opposition forces were trying to hold them off but were clearly being slammed by superior weaponry. Also at stake was the city of Misrata about 125 miles from Tripoli where pro-Qadhafi forces appeared to be advancing towards an assault against opposition fighters there. By March 16, 2011, pro-Qadhafi forces were pounding Misrata with artillery and tanks, and homes and mosques were reported to have been bombed there. Nevertheless, opposition forces were said to attempting to hold off the pro-government troops.

Meanwhile, the New York Times said on the same day (March 16, 2011) that four of its journalists who were reporting from Ajdabiya were missing. The New York Times said that it received information suggesting that the journalists had been detained by Libyan government forces.

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All eyes were on the roads east to Benghazi and Tobruk where rebels were reportedly still holding sway, although anxieties were on the rise in Benghazi in anticipation of an assault there by government forces. Indeed, Saif al-Islam Qadhafi indicated that such fears were justified, warning in an interview with Euronews, "Everything will be over in 48 hours. "

With such a possibility in sight, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) withdrew its staff from Benghazi. Jalal al-Gallal, a member of the Transitional National Council in Benghazi, warned that a massacre could very well be in the offing there, and called on the international community to intervene. In an interview with the BBC , he said: "He [Qadhafi] will kill civilians, he will kill dreams, he will destroy us. It will be on the international community's conscience."

It should be noted, though, that the momentum now enjoyed by pro-Qadhafi forces could potentially be stymied by the reality of dwindling supply lines on that side of the battle lines. Also potentially problematic for Qadhafi was the increasing clamor for the establishment of a "no-fly zone" over Libya. While a difficult endeavor as it would require military operations to destroy Libyan air defenses, the notion of a "no-fly zone" was gaining support as the bloodshed in Libya increased. Indeed, the Arab League took the unprecedented step on March 12, 2011, of asking the United Nations Security Council to impose the proposed "no-fly zone" above Libya. As well, representatives from the Libyan opposition were calling for Western powers to move forward with this idea and met with United States Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton in France to consider the plan.

By March 16, 2011, French President Nicolas Sarkozy had urged the United Nations Security Council to back a draft resolution that would include a military "no-fly zone" on the basis of Qadhafi's "murderous actions against his people." In a letter dispatched to the international bloc, President Sarkozy wrote, "Let's save the martyred Libyan people together. Time is now counted in days, or even hours. The worst would be for the Arab League's call and the Security Council's decisions to fail because of armed force." This move has been backed by the United Kingdom. The United States lauded the Arab League for its call for a "no-fly zone," and in so doing, appeared to indicate tacit support for such a move, if it were authorized by the United Nations Security Council. However, there has been a strong strain of reticence regarding military intervention on the parts of Russia and China who both wield veto power at the Security Council. Still, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in an interview with the BBC that she expected decisions to be made in the near future that would help protect the people of Libya. Secretary Clinton also noted that "all options" were on the proverbial table in dealing with the Qadhafi regime in Libya.

"No fly zone" authorized; international community launches air strikes:

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On March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security Council backed a resolution authorizing a "no-fly zone" over Libya and the use of "all necessary measures" for the purpose of protecting civilians from attack by the Qadhafi regime. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 stopped short of an invasion and allowing the foreign occupation of Libya. That being said, it strengthened the sanctions and arms embargo against Libya. Speaking of the imperative to back the resolution, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said of the Qadhafi regime's brutal assault on the Libyan people, "We cannot let these warmongers do this, we cannot abandon civilians."

The support for the resolution crossed the crucial nine vote mark with 10 affirmative votes from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Portugal, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon, South Africa, Nigeria, Gabon, and Colombia. There were no negative votes although there were five abstentions, including veto-empowered Russia and China. Brazil, India and Germany also abstained due to fears that military intervention would serve only to escalate the crisis. Nevertheless, this outcome was illustrative of a remarkable level of international consensus on the need to take action against the Qadhafi regime in Libya. Accordingly, any action taken against Libya would now occur under the aegis international law.

While Republican critics in the United States had claimed that the Obama administration was not leading on this issue, in fact, it took a significantly short period of time for the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and their allies to forge consensus in backing this resolution in the United Security Council. Crucially, Lebanon -- an Arab country -- had been one of sponsors of Security Council Resolution 1973, the spirit of which had been backed by the Arab League.

The timing of this multilateral measure was significant since the Qadhafi regime had only hours earlier warned of a harsh and imminent crackdown on Benghazi. In fact, Qadhafi himself warned that his forces would descend on Benghazi "tonight" and that there would be "no mercy." Indeed, air strikes by Qadhafi's forces were reported to have already started with the Benghazi airport as that initial target. Not surprisingly , opposition factions in Benghazi reacted with joy at the news of the passage of the resolution. Indeed, the people Benghazi went from the feeling that they had been abandoned by the international community to being empowered to continue their resistance. On the other side of the equation, the government of Libya said that the resolution was a sign of United Nations "aggression."

Enforcing the "no-fly zone" and protecting Libyan civilians would likely start with a demand for a ceasefire. Assuming that the Qadhafi regime was not willing to adhere to a ceasefire, then the multilateral options would include some degree of military intervention, with the immediate objective being the elimination of Libyan air power. To that end, the United States was not expected to participate in any first strikes; those moves were more likely to be taken up by the French who had been vociferous advocates of strong action against the Qadhafi regime. There were also indications that at least two Arab countries were prepared to provide logistical support in the endeavor.

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In the immediate aftermath of the passage of Security Council Resolution 1973, Libya announced an immediate ceasefire. However, that announcement did not coincide with action on the ground in Libya where government troops continued its assault against opposition target.

In the United States, President Barack Obama emphasized the imperative to support limited military engagement in Libya for expressed humanitarian purposes, and in concert with the international community. President Obama noted that while the United States would provide military support for the action, there would be absolutely no United States ground forces involved in the endeavor. But President Obama did not lose the opportunity to provide a tactic contrast between the Libya situation and the war in Iraq started under former President George W. Bush, which did not have the sanction of international jurisprudence. President Obama said, "This is the way the international community is supposed to operate." United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron took the same approach in an address to the British people saying that the action being taken against Libya in the form of Security Council Resolution 1973 was "legal" -- a clear rebuke to the action taken by former Prime Minister Tony Blair in the war in Iraq.

At the Paris summit on March 19, 2011, French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that French fighter aircraft were already in the air and ready to attack, should the decision be made to commence an assault against Libyan military targets. He said during a news conference, "For the moment and already, our planes are over the city preventing air attacks." The French president then asserted of the international community's resolve: "Our determination is total." Critics of the French leader have accused him of trying to shore up his low approval ratings at home by using the Libyan situation as an excuse to show his leadership credentials. That being said, France has not been a country with a consistent record of sanguine international intervention. Indeed, France was a strong and vociferous opponent of the Iraq war.

After the Paris summit on March 19, 2011, acting under the aegis of international law in the form of Security Council Resolution 1973, joint coalition forces from the international community launched air strikes against mostly coastal military targets in Libya. Their objective was to nullify the Libyan's military's air advantage against the opposition forces, and ultimately, to protect the Libyan people from a brutal assault by the Qadhafi regime. The enforcement of Security Council Resolution 1973 began with Tomahawk cruise missiles being fired from American and British warships and submarines, and French warplanes, including Rafale and Mirage 2000 fighter jets, carrying out strikes from the air over Libya. The sound of anti-aircraft gunfire could be heard from the ground in Libya.

The military campaign by joint international forces included the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada and Italy. Other countries joining the effort included Spain, Belgium, Norway, and Denmark. A day later on March 20, 2011, the Middle Eastern of Qatar announced that it was also part of the global effort to subdue Qadhafi's regime from carrying out a brutal

Libya Review 2016 Page 44 of 437 pages Libya crackdown against the people of Libya. Qatar was expected to join the air patrols for the "no fly zone."

Speaking during an interview with the United States media, United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen said on March 20, 2011 that the initial phase of the international action, dubbed, "Operation Odyssey Dawn," was successful. Admiral Muller noted that the initial focus was on Libyan air defenses and that the pro-government forces' advance on the opposition stronghold of Benghazi had been halted. British Defense Secretary Liam Fox gave an almost identical assessment as Mullen, noting that the international coalition's early operations in Libya had been "very successful." Most of Libya's air defense interests were reported to have been struck as well as some of the air fields. Admiral Muller in the United States emphasized the fact that Qadhafi was not specifically on the target list of the international coalition's efforts, intimating that the expressed objective of "Operation Odyssey Dawn" was not regime change, as was the case in the 2003 war in Iraq.

That being said, late on March 20, 2011, reports from Libya suggested that Qadhafi's compound had been attacked, seemingly by cruise missiles. The international coalition later said that the compound had functioned as a "command and control center" for the Qadhafi regime, thus the decision to strike against this structure.

Meanwhile, jet fighters from various coalition countries joined the French in attacking Qadhafi military targets across the coastal regions of the country. For its part, the government of Libya condemned the actions of the international coalition. Libyan Parliament Speaker Mohammed Abul-Qassim al-Zwai characterized the international coalition's air strike offensive on military targets as a "barbaric armed attack." The official line from the Libyan government was given support by the African Union, which said that it opposed a military intervention in Libya, suggesting that what was transpiring in that country was an internal affair.

By March 22, 2011, even in the face of air strikes from the international coalition, Qadhafi's forces were still carrying out attacks using snipers, shelling, and tanks in the coastal city of Misrata, which had been a particular target of the Libyan leader's aggression over the course of the week. Now, the attacks by the pro-Qadhafi troops on the people of Misrata were being described as unrelenting, with the conventional wisdom suggesting that neither Qadhafi's forces nor the opposition rebels were capable of fully holding sway in that city. Moreover, the opposition forces had the disadvantage of insufficient weaponry and no trained military forces to assist with strategy. Battles were also ongoing in Ajdabiya to the east with a similar dynamic as Misrata. The pro- government forces were certainly under pressure while the anti-government rebels were too disorganized to be able to fully benefit from the shift momentum. Accordingly, an indeterminate phase of conflict was expected to continue for some time making those cities de facto battlegrounds. In Tripoli, as the international air campaign proceeded, hitting a military port and equipment weapons equipment warehouses, Libyan forces responded with anti-aircraft fire.

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Qadhafi himself seemed defiant and undeterred by the fact that his country was being bombarded by international forces. In a public appearance at his Bab Al-Aziziya residential compound in Tripoli, Qadhafi promised victory as follows: "In the short term, we'll beat them, in the long term, we'll beat them." He also declared, "This is a time of glory that we are living." It should be noted that a United States fighter jet participating in the air strikes crashed on March 21, 2011 in eastern Libya just outside of Benghazi. The crash was reportedly due to mechanical failure and both crewmen ejected safely and landed in farmland. One of the pilots was picked up by a rescue helicopter while the second pilot was rescued by rebels.

On March 23, 2011, international coalition forces were trying to shore up the opposition rebels under harsh attack in Misrata by carrying out air strikes in that western city. While the offensive caused Qadhafi's forces to pull back, rooftop snipers were still striking civilians. As before, Misrata and Ajdabiya continued to function as battlegrounds. As well, Qadhafi's forces were now carrying out its own assault against the people of Zintan close to the border with Tunisia. Explosions were reported in Tripoli indicating that action was taking place there. In addition to an expanded air offensive by the international coalition, there were also reports that naval patrols were commencing off the Libyan coast, with the goal of enforcing the arm embargo against the Qadhafi regime. On March 24, 2011, the international coalition had targeted both aircraft, radars, and military bases in Juffra and Sabha in the heart of Libya.

In other developments, United States President Obama addressed his country's involvement in the military engagement in Libya, noting that while "regime change" in Libya was certainly part of United States foreign policy, the United States in this instance would militarily adhere to the specific parameters of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. Furthermore, President Obama noted that the United States intended to turn over the lead in the air assault to other countries. Speaking at a news conference in El Salvador during a regional visit to Latin America, President Obama outlined the United States' limited involvement as follows: "When this transition takes place, it is not going to be our planes that are maintaining the no-fly zone. It is not going to be our ships that are necessarily enforcing the arms embargo. That's precisely what the other nations are going to do." Certainly, on March 24, 2011, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton confirmed that the United States' leadership role would be transferred to NATO. Earlier, Secretary Clinton also indicated that Qadhafi associated may have been encouraging an exit strategy for the Libyan leader -- a move that she said the United States would enthusiastically encourage.

At the diplomatic level, plans were in the works for a meeting on March 25, 2011 between representatives of both the Qadhafi regime and the opposition rebels in the Ethiopian city of Addis Ababa. The objective, according to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, was to facilitate a ceasefire and political solution. In this diplomatic arena, both the Africa Union and the Arab League were making joint efforts to mediate a ceasefire and craft a blueprint to end the crisis plaguing Libya. A Libyan delegation from the Qadhafi regime indicated that it was amenable to a

Libya Review 2016 Page 46 of 437 pages Libya suggested plan for an internationally-monitored ceasefire and resolution. The plan would include the creation of a transitional authority, which would be charged with implementing political reforms and holding elections. Notably, there were no representatives from the transitional body, which represents the anti-government forces.

By the last weekend in March 2011, the coalition air strikes were continuing their efforts in Misrata, which had been the only western Libyan city in rebel hands -- but under the siege of pro-Qadhafi fighters for some time. Under threat of aerial raids by French jets, pro-government forces in Misrata were reported to have periodically stopped their offensive there. That being said, pro-Qadhafi forces were able to fire mortar shells in the city during the daytime hours when air raids were not taking place. French jets were also striking at Zintan with the objective of easing the circumstances of civilians in that city. British military jets were said to be targeting Libyan military vehicles in Ajdabiya. As well, the United States asserted that collective air strikes had successfully eliminated Qadhafi's ability to move around heavy weaponry.

The international coalition was continuing strikes on Tripoli over the course of the last weekend in March 2011. In fact, the operation appeared to be wider in scope than the capital with explosions reported close to the region of Gaser Ben Ghasher region. As well, Qadhafi's hometown of Sirte was said to be experiencing coalition air strikes as well.

On March 27, 2011, the opposition forces -- buoyed by the air strikes from the coalition-- were revitalized and reconstituting their efforts against the pro-Qadhafi forces. Indeed, they had now managed to reverse many of the military losses endured in the period before the start of coalition strikes. Notably, the opposition rebels had regained control of the main oil towns in eastern Libya, including Brega, Es Sider, Ras Lanuf, Zueitina, and Tobruk. In Brega, reports came that the opposition rebels had managed to retake complete control of that port city following a decisive battle.

Note that on March 27, 2011, NATO assumed overall responsibility for the military action in Libya. Following a special session of NATO ambassadors, Secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced: "NATO allies have decided to take on the whole military operation in Libya under the United Nations Security Council resolution." He continued, "Our goal is to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack. NATO will implement all aspects of the United Nations resolution. Nothing more, nothing less." This development fulfilled United States President Barack Obama's pledge to hand over control of the operations as quickly as possible to NATO.

On March 28, 2011, United States President Barack Obama offered a national address detailing his country's involvement in the military air assault in Libya. In that address, President Obama made it clear that his country had a responsibility to act to avoid a potential massacre in Benghazi, and that failing to do so would have “stained the conscience of the world.” President Obama

Libya Review 2016 Page 47 of 437 pages Libya emphasized that the United States' actions would be limited, conducted entirely under the aegis of international law, and consistent with the provisions of the prevailing security resolution. President Obama stopped short of endorsing the forced removal of Qadhafi from power, recalling the invasion of Iraq as follows: “To be blunt, we went down that road in Iraq. Regime change there took eight years, thousands of American and Iraqi lives, and nearly a trillion dollars. That is not something we can afford to repeat in Libya.”

On the ground in Libya at the close of March 2011, after an initial advance by the rebels, pro- Qadhafi troops were taking advantage of a lull in the air strikes to regain the ground lost in the previous days. Notably, the rebels had by March 31, 2011 advanced to the oil town of Brega but were forced to pull back due to heavy shelling by Qadhafi's forces there. The fact that ground on either side could be so quickly gained and/or lost augured negatively for a quick end to the chaos in Libya. It was clear that the rebel movement was highly disorganized and reliant on the air strikes to make any progress in their efforts to secure territory. They certainly had neither professional training nor efficient weaponry to rely upon in their efforts. On the other hand, the pro-Qadhafi forces were demonstrating that they were only being restrained by the threat of air strikes. Indeed, United States military sources warned that only 25 percent of the government's military capacity had been curtailed.

While this reality might be viewed as discouraging news for the protest movement, they could, perhaps, take solace in the news that Qadhafi's regime appeared to be splintering from within. On March 31, 2011, the news emerged that two top officials had defected from Libya. First came the news that Libyan Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa had arrived in the United Kingdom where British officials confirmed that he had resigned from office in Qadhafi's government. Given his intimate knowledge of the Qadhafi regime, and even the infamous Lockerbie bombing, it was quite likely that his revelations could bode ill for Qadhafi and his stalwarts, should there be crimes levied in international court. However, Moussa Koussa was himself not granted immunity from prosecution in the United Kingdom. Not 24 hours after the news of Moussa Koussa's defection came the announcement that senior Libyan diplomat and former Foreign Minister Ali Abdessalam Treki was no longer aligned with the government. Instead, he appeared to have joined forces with the opposition in calling for a reformed and democratic Libya saying, "We should not let our country fall into an unknown fate. It is our nation's right to live in freedom, democracy and a good life."

While the Qadhafi regime dismissed the importance of these defections, in fact, these developments appeared to demonstrate that within the upper echelons of the Qadhafi regime, there was some recognition that their tenure might be over. As noted by United Kingdom Foreign Secretary William Hague, “The resignations show that Gaddafi's regime, which has already seen significant defections to the opposition, is fragmented, under pressure and crumbling from within. Gaddafi must be asking himself who will be the next to abandon him.”

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Note that as of the start of April 2011, after a lull in air strikes, the aerial bombardment from the international coalition resumed. One blemish on the scenario was a report that about 14 opposition rebels had been killed by friendly fire in the air strikes. The Transitional National Council of the opposition rebels admitted that undisciplined rebel fighters may have fired into the air, possibly provoking an air strike on their convoy.

Fighting was ongoing across the country, notably in the eastern oil town of Brega where a stalemate was unfolding, which could be viewed as a microcosm for the entire national scenario. Government troops had uneasy control of the city but would not engage with opposition rebels due to the risk of air strikes from the NATO-controlled international coalition. At the same time, the rebels were limited by their lack of training and equipment from moving forward in the fight to liberate the country. On the diplomatic agenda, the Libyan government sent a team to Europe to discuss a ceasefire; however, there was no indication that this gesture meant that Qadhafi was ready to cede power.

By April 7, 2011, the anti-Qadhafi rebel movement had been pushed back to an area around the town of Ajdabiya. They had also been subject to what may well have been another incident of friendly fire. That is to say, at least five opposition fighters died when their convoy was hit by apparent NATO air strikes outside the eastern oil port of Brega.

Meanwhile, in the first week of April 2011, NATO was itself being hit by criticism for taking to long to act with air strikes. General Abdul Fattah Younis of the anti-Qadhafi rebels was reported to have said, "NATO is letting the people of Misrata die every day." For its part, NATO expressed concern that pro-Qadhafi forces in Misrata were using human shields, specifically traveling in civilian vehicles with heavy armor stored within. In so doing, it was difficult for NATO air strikes to yield optimal results. In an interview with BBC News, NATO spokeswoman, Oana Lungescu, responded by saying that Misrata remained a priority but that Qadhafi's forces were using special tactics to protect themselves and their weapons. She also noted that NATO had intensified its air assault on Libya by around 50 percent and destroying a full third of the Qadhafi regime's military capacity. The United Nations Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, weighed into the equation, warning that the scenario in Misrata was "critical" and urging "a temporary cessation of hostilities in the area so that people can get themselves and their families out of harm's way."

The success or challenges of the air strikes notwithstanding, it was evident that the Qadhafi regime was feeling significant pressure. Of note was the fact that Qadhafi had dispatched a letter to United States President Barack Obama demanding that the United States withdraw from its " crusader, colonialist and hostile alliance against Libya." The White House confirmed receipt of the letter and United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton indicated that it would have little bearing on her country's stance regarding Libya. She said, "Mr. Qadhafi knows what he must do. There needs to be a ceasefire, his forces need to withdraw from the cities they've taken at great cost.

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There needs to be a decision made about his departure from power and his departure from Libya. The sooner that occurs and the bloodshed ends the better it will be for everyone." For the moment, though, the situation in Libya was very much one of stalemate.

Diplomatic Agenda in Spring 2011

By the close of the first week of April 2011, the diplomatic agenda was at the forefront of the narrative in Libya when the Qadhafi government said that it accepted an African Union-brokered plan for a truce. Following a meeting on April 10, 2011, South African President Jacob Zuma announced that the Libyan government had accepted an African Union peace proposal to end the conflict in that country, which had been ongoing for two months. Central to the proposal was the call for an immediate ceasefire, the delivery of humanitarian aid, the protection of foreign nationals, a suspension of NATO air strikes, and dialogue between the two sides with an eye on a political settlement.

In an interview with Agence France Presse, Shamsiddin Abdulmolah spoke on behalf of the rebels and expressed skepticism about the proposal, noting, "The world has seen these offers of ceasefires before and within 15 minutes [Qadhafi] starts shooting again." Mustafa Gheriani, a spokesperson for the anti-Qadhafi opposition rebels said in an interview with Reuters that while the African Union-brokered plan would be entertained, ultimately, "The Libyan people have made it very clear that Qadhafi must step down." A formal response to the peace proposal came on April 11, 2011 when Mustafa Abdul-Jalil, a former justice minister and the leader of the Benghazi-based Transitional National Council, said that the proposal "did not respond to the aspirations of the Libyan people" and was instead a plan of political reform. He continued, "The African Union initiative does not include the departure of Qadhafi and his sons from the Libyan political scene, therefore it is outdated. Any future proposal that does not include this, we cannot accept."

For its part, the African Union would not comment on the prospect of Qadhafi's exit from power, however, Ramtane Lamamra, the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security said, "It's up to the Libyan people to choose their leaders democratically."

NATO responded to the peace proposal by encouraging solutions that stretch beyond the military component. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen asserted, "There can be no solely military solution to the crisis in Libya." As well, a spokesperson for NATO, Oana Lungescu, said: "We welcome all contributions to the broad international effort aimed at stopping the violence against the civilian population in Libya." Still, NATO continued its air strikes and accused the Qadhafi government of shelling civilian areas of Libya.

Despite its supportive words about the diplomatic initiative undertaken by the African Union, NATO officials appeared doubtful of its success. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen warned that the Qadhafi regime had announced ceasefires before but "they did not

Libya Review 2016 Page 50 of 437 pages Libya keep their promise." The NATO head was not alone in this view as several European officials appeared to eschew the notion of negotiating for Libya's future until Qadhafi and his cadre were gone from the political scene. The Italian government appeared to indicate that it did not believe the Qadhafi regime would abide with a ceasefire given its past record. Across the Atlantic in the United States, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton indicated that her country wanted to see a transition that would include the exit of the Qadhafi regime from Libya. Meanwhile, United Kingdom Foreign Secretary William Hague said that any ceasefire would have to adhere to conditions set forth in the prevailing United Nations resolutions.

Although the Qadhafi regime said that it was interested in a ceasefire, Qadhafi's forces continued to pound the only rebel-held city in the west, exacerbating the conditions in Misrata as being in a state of siege. In mid-April, 2011, Human Rights Watch accused the Qadhafi regime of using cluster bombs in Misrata, effectively increasing civilian casualties by dispersing explosives over a wide range of ground.

In mid-April 2011, both the military and diplomatic campaigns in Libya appeared to be in a state of impasse. The fighting that ensued on April 17, 2011 on the coastal highway en route to the oil town of Brega between Libyan opposition rebels and pro-Qadhafi fighters appeared to be illustrative of that stalemate. The rebels were unable to make more progress than the outskirts of Brega, having come under heavy fire by rockets. Meanwhile, the Libyan opposition rebels were working hard to defend their eastern frontline at Ajdabiyah. In this way, the divide between the rebel East and the pro-Qadhafi west of Libya prevailed as before. The rebel movement lamented their lack of modern weaponry, claiming that an improved arms arsenal would held their advance to the west.

Apart from the continued air support from NATO, the assistance offered from the Western powers came not in the form of weapons but via a rare and expressly stated joint statement, affirming the international community's commitment to seeing a post-Qadhafi Libya. That joint statement by the leaders of France, the United States, and the United Kingdom, warned that there could be no peace in Libya if Qadhafi remained in power. The statement appeared to be a cautionary message to the Qadhafi regime that it would be met with continuing opposition from the international community, including -- but not limited to -- continuing NATO military engagement. Indeed, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, United States President Barack Obama, and United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron asserted that NATO would not stop its military operations but would continue in its mission to protect Libyan civilians. The three leaders also made it clear that they did not envision a future Libya with the current leadership at the helm, and that allowing Qadhafi to remain in power would be akin to betraying the Libyan people. The three world leaders called for a new post-Qadhafi Libya in which "a genuine transition from dictatorship to an inclusive constitutional process can really begin, led by a new generation of leaders."

Later Military Developments

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Qadhafi's forces were meanwhile intensifying their brutal attack on Misrata and yielding a significant death toll. On April 20, 2011 alone, doctors on the ground said that at least 100 people had died in the city. As discussed below in the section titled "Humanitarian Scenario," as April 2011 entered its third week, the situation in the besieged rebel-held city took a dark turn as Libyan government troops carried out a relentless assault, attacking indiscriminately while using rocket attacks and snipers, and leaving a heavy death toll. Among the dead were two international journalists -- British-born Oscar-nominated film director, Tim Hetherington, and New York-based photographer, Chris Hondros, who worked for Getty Images and won the prestigious Robert Capa Gold Medal. A Ukrainian doctor was also one of the victims. Libyan officials said that the deaths of the journalists and other foreign nationals were "sad" but such consequences were likely in warfare; they also denied that their forces were attacking indiscriminately, as reported on the ground by international journalists, including Hetherington before his death.

NATO strikes appeared insufficient to hold off these attacks, with NATO commanders admitting that air power and the circumscribed objectives of the mission have limited the organization's efforts to protect civilians. In a separate development on the sea, as NATO was enforcing a naval blockade of Libya, it took control of a Libyan tanker. As street fighting was raging on in Misrata, Libyan rebels saw success on the other part of the country as they captured the Wazin post on Tunisian border. This development came as a result of fierce fighting in that part of the country and resulted in Libyan troops fleeing across the border and surrendering to the Tunisian military.

On April 20, 2011, the rebel Transitional National Council of Libya again rejected the Qadhafi regime's offer of a ceasefire or truce for the reasons already discussed above. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy had dispatched military advisers to Libya to assist the rebels in refining their tactical strategies in the fight against government forces. As well, United States Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that his country would be sending drones to assist in the military mission in Libya, aimed at advancing the "precision capability" of the air strikes. The rebels could be helped by financial assistance from Kuwait, which said that it would earmark $180 million for use by the Transitional National Council. These moves illustrated the international community's clear allegiance to the rebels and underlined the objective to see a post-Qadhafi Libya. Not surprisingly, the Libyan government warned that "consequences" were in the offing.

As April 2011 entered its final week, the focus was Misrata, which was seeing much bloodshed as pro-Qadhafi forces carried out a brutal assault, marked by random rocket and gun attacks, on the city despite so-called orders from the government for a ceasefire. That ceasefire was intended to give tribal leaders time to negotiate with the rebel opposition forces. Clearly, as before, such efforts could not be implemented in a country now beset by inflamed emotions on both sides. According to an interview with a captured pro-Qadhafi fighter by Agence France Presse, the tide may have been turning toward the rebels in Misrata. The fighter suggested that many government troops wanted to surrender but were keeping up the fight out of fear that they might be executed by anti-government rebel forces. Subsequent reports from the ground in Libya appeared to

Libya Review 2016 Page 52 of 437 pages Libya indicate that rebels in Misrata were holding off pro-Qadhafi forces, however, the city was yet enduring bombardment from government forces.

On April 24, 2011, loud explosions were reported in the Libyan capital of Tripoli and the sound of NATO jets flying overhead were also heard. The blasts were so strong that they knocked three television stations -- Libyan Television, Jamahiriya and Shababiya TV -- off the air temporarily. It was subsequently determined that two NATO missiles hit Qadhafi's Bab al-Azizia presidential compound where significant damage was reported to have resulted across a wide space.

It was yet to be determined if these latest setbacks for the Qadhafi regime indicated that it was losing its grip on power. Given Qadhafi's access to assets -- including billions of dollars in gold reserves -- it was plausible that he and his coterie could keep up the fight for many months to come. However, NATO air strikes had, to this point, managed to destroy up to a full third of the Libyan government's military equipment, stymied supply routes, and placed many military factions on the defensive. Indeed, the addition of armed Predator drones served to intensify the pressure on Qadhafi by the international coalition. As well, at least one of Qadhafi's sons was said to have died in a drone attack. Moreover, the Libyan military's withdrawal from Misrata in the western part of the country has signified that there was no sharp division between pro-rebel east and pro- government west in this country. Such a dividing line could have potentially served as the foundation for a future settlement. Now, the more likely conclusion to the conflict in Libya would be an outright victory of one side over the other, although the opposition rebels have not foreclosed the possibility of a negotiated settlement, so long as the Qadhafi regime steps away from the reins of power completely.

Meanwhile, for Libyans living in the western part of the country -- generally regarded as more pro- Qadhafi in orientation -- the military effort by rebels and NATO has delivered a symbolic message that the continuation of the Qadhafi regime at the helm would mean everyday challenges and difficulty for regular people. Whether or not those quotidian realities would translate into diminished popular support for Qadhafi in the western part of Libya was yet to be seen.

In mid-May 2011, rebels were celebrating the capture of Misrata's strategically-located airport following a long and difficult battle. The victory marked the rebels' success after months of heavy fighting that left the city under continuous siege and subject to a looming humanitarian crisis. The government forces were in retreat mode there, with some soldiers donning civilian clothing and trying to flee. By May 18, 2011, the rebel forces appeared to be in control of not just the airport but Misrata itself, effectively expanding the zone of command in the only major rebel-held city in the western part of the country.

Meanwhile, the capital of Tripoli was under air attack with reports emerging of explosions and smoke around the Qadhafi government compound in the area of Bab al-Aziziya. The strikes came after state television claimed that key members of the Qadhafi regime were meeting with tribal

Libya Review 2016 Page 53 of 437 pages Libya leaders there. The Qadhafi regime has said that NATO strikes are aimed at assassinating the Libyan leader. At the same time, a defiant Qadhafi has mocked Western powers saying that he is safe in a venue where NATO bombs "cannot reach" him. Speculation abounded -- mostly emanating from Italian government sources -- that Qadhafi had actually been wounded in the bombings and left Tripoli. Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini also suggested that the combination of NATO air strikes and international pressure was further exacerbating "the disintegration of the regime from the inside." Of course, it should be noted that the Libyan government was dismissing all of these claims -- from the Libyan leader's alleged injury to his exit from Tripoli. Moreover, state television soon showed Qadhafi -- who had not been seen on television for some time -- alive, well, and condemning the "crusader cowards" for their assault.

While Western powers have said they would like to see regime change in Libya, NATO insists that its mission is only to execute the security council mandate. That being said, various Western powers have made clear that they are offering operational assistance to the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC). Indeed, NTC chairman Mustafa Abdul Jalil has met with British Foreign Secretary William Hague and British Finance Minister George Osborne. Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski actually traveled to rebel-held eastern Libya to express support for the uprising, but stopped short of recognizing the NTC. As well, the United States has sent non- military aid to Libyan rebels in Benghazi.

Also in mid-May 2011, a mystery was brewing over the missing status of Oil Minister Shukri Ghanem. While there were reports that Ghanem was in Tunisia, there was uncertainty about the reason for the reported visit. Tunisian officials confirmed that he crossed the border and was headed for the island of Djerba, but his ultimate destination was unknown. The Libyan government insisted that Ghanem was in Tunisia on official business, although the authorities admitted that they had lost touch with him. Libyan rebels said that there had no information related to a possible defection at the time. However, subsequent reports emerged that Ghanem has indeed defected from Libya. The likely defections of the head of Libya's National Oil Corporation and a former prime minister could well be interpreted as highly significant. Indeed, this development underlined the previous suggestion that there were fractious divisions within the Qadhafi regime, with some individuals bowing to international pressure.

At the international level, mid-May 2011 was marked by the decision by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), to seek the arrest warrants for those responsible for crimes against humanity in Libya. This move was the result of the United Nations Security Council inquiry into the crisis in Libya. Qadhafi, his son, Seif al-Islam Qadhafi, and the Libyan head of intelligence, Abdullah al-Sanoussi, were reported to be on that list. Only a week earlier, Moreno-Ocampo accused Qadhafi loyalists of persecuting and killing civilians in a systematic manner as they sought to crackdown on anti-government rebels. Moreno-Ocampo asserted that he was in possession of evidence that pro-Qadhafi forces had attacked civilians in their homes, shot at protesters using live ammunition, shelled at demonstrators and those

Libya Review 2016 Page 54 of 437 pages Libya participating in funeral processions, and positioned snipers in key positions for the expressed purpose of killing people as they left mosques. Now, Moreno-Ocampo was additionally charging that the Qadhafi regime has targeted opposition figures in areas still under government control. He said, "Qadhafi's forces prepare lists with names of alleged dissidents. They are being arrested, put into prisons in Tripoli, tortured and made to disappear." He continued, "These are not just crimes against Libyans, they are crimes against humanity as a whole."

The Qadhafi regime has denied these allegations and there was some speculation that it might now eschew a negotiated settlement, preferring to harden its defiant stance. Nevertheless, the international arrest warrants would effectively isolate Libya on the global scene since now, since United Nations member states would be obligated to arrest individuals on the list if they were to arrive in member states' territory. United Nations member states do not always act on this obligation; certainly, despite a prevailing indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on crimes against humanity, including genocide in Darfur, a handful of African countries have allowed him to enter their territory without arresting him.

Nevertheless, the NTC (the rebels' official political umbrella entity) has welcomed the case by the ICC against the Qadhafi regime. As well, NATO has said that Moreno-Ocampo's announcement was "further proof that the international isolation of the Qadhafi regime is growing every day." As stated by Oana Lungescu, a spokeswoman for NATO, "It is hard to imagine that a genuine transition in Libya can take place while those responsible for widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population remain in power." Perhaps not surprisingly, human rights groups have also applauded the move to make the Qadhafi regime accountable for their alleged crimes against humanity. Yet to be seen would be the determination of judges on the evidence brought forth by Moreno-Ocampo. The judges at the ICC would decide whether to confirm the charges and issue international arrest warrants, as called for by Moreno-Ocampo.

Note that as May 2011 came to a close, United States President Obama, on a European trip, joined with British Prime Minister David Cameron in affirming NATO commitment to enforcing the safety of Libyan citizens, under the aegis of the existing United Nations mandate. Prime Minister Cameron revisited the position that there was no future for Libya with Qadhafi at the helm, while President Obama warned Qadhafi and his regime that NATO would not relax its efforts. In fact, both leaders made it clear that they would be intensifying the effort against the Qadhafi regime in Libya, with Prime Minister Cameron saying, "The President and I agree we should be turning up the heat in Libya."

On May 27, 2011, the international community augmented its existing stance against the Qadhafi regime in Libya when world leaders at the G8 Summit in France put forth a collective call for Qadhafi to resign as the leader of that country. In an important development, Russia -- which has not been supportive of the NATO effort in Libya -- added its voice to the calls for Qadhafi to exit the political scene, saying that the Libyan leader had lost political legitimacy. It should be noted,

Libya Review 2016 Page 55 of 437 pages Libya though, that several African politicians, such as former South African President Thabo Mbeki and former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, have expressed skepticism about the NATO mission in Libya. Nevertheless, the two-page communique by the G8 leadership read as follows: "Qadhafi and the Libyan government have failed to fulfill their responsibility to protect the Libyan population and have lost all legitimacy. He has no future in a free, democratic Libya. He must go."

On a parallel track, there were reports that South African President Jacob Zuma – on behalf of an African Union mediation panel -- would try to forge an exit strategy for Qadhafi; whether or not this effort would see success was yet to be determined.

Meanwhile, reports emerged asserting that pro-government forces were laying landmines in the rebel-held western Libyan city of Misrata. Clashes in Misrata were ongoing days later with heavy fighting reported to be taking place there by the close of May 2011. By the start of June 2011, although largely relegated to ground attacks, pro-government forces were still on the offensive in Misrata where they carried out an assault at a checkpoint there. There were additional reports of clashes between rebels and pro-Qadhafi forces in the Western mountains around that period. Pro- Qadhafi forces were also reported to be shelling towns of Nalut and Zintan. In Misrata, by the second week of June 2011, government forces were carrying out another assault there.

Earlier, at the close of May 2011, it was clear that despite his efforts to broker a negotiated end to the conflict gripping Libya between pro-Qadhafi and anti-Qadhafi elements, South African President Zuma had not seen success. Instead, Qadhafi had made it abundantly clear that he would not step down from power, and that he would not leave Libya. Both NATO and the Libyan rebels had emphasized that Qadhafi's exit from the political scene in Libya would be a key component of any ceasefire deal. With Qadhafi's standing firm, the effort by the African Union had ended in failure.

Now, there were suggestions that as the war stretched on, there could be shortages of food, medicine, and even arms, that could stymie Qadhafi's hold on power. To this end, Panos Moumtzis, the United Nations humanitarian coordinator for Libya said in an interview with Reuters that some supplies would last for only weeks. Moumtzis said, "I don't think there's any famine, malnutrition. But the longer the conflict lasts the more the food stocks supplies are going to be depleted, and it's a matter of weeks before the country reaches a critical situation." he continued, "The food and the medical supplies is a little bit like a time bomb. At the moment it's under control and it's okay. But if this goes on for quite some time, this will become a major issue."

Gaps in Qadhafi's hold on power were on display in Tripoli -- supposedly the Libyan leader's stronghold -- when some witnesses reported substantial anti-government protests there on May 30, 2011. Those protests ended when security forces dispersed the crowd. That being said, the occurrence itself bolstered claims by the opposition that the anti-Qadhafi movement was widening. Certainly it was true that a wide swath of government officials from inside Qadhafi's coterie --

Libya Review 2016 Page 56 of 437 pages Libya including Foreign Minister Ali Abdussalam Treki and scores of military officers -- had apparently cut ties with the regime. As June 2011 began, the rebel movement in Benghazi would be helped by a decision from the Italian government to open a consulate there and to offer a sizable aid package to the rebels. Speaking of this decision, Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini said, "I think the Qadhafi regime is over and I firmly believe that it is over for a simple reason: we are talking about a person whose closest friends are defecting. He lost his legitimacy in Libya."

Striking a similar tone about the inevitability of the end of the Qadhafi regime, NATO Secretary- General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that the NATO effort was enjoying success and that Qadhafi was on his way out. As reported by the Financial Times, Rasmussen said: “Our operation in Libya is achieving its objectives. We have seriously degraded Qadhafi’s ability to kill his own people. Qadhafi's reign of terror is coming to an end. He is increasingly isolated at home and abroad. Even those closest to him are departing, defecting or deserting."

As well, on the military front, British and French helicopters, operating under the aegis of the prevailing NATO mission, were stepping up air attacks inside Libya. The oil port of Brega was one of the targets in this regard, along with the capital city of Tripoli. Analysts said that the use of helicopter air attacks would facilitate precision in hitting desirable pro-Qadhafi targets inside Libya. That being said, helicopters would clearly be far more vulnerable to counter-attack from the ground than higher flying jets. Speaking of the NATO effort, British Foreign Minister William Hague said, "As long as Qadhafi continues to abuse his people, we will continue and intensify our efforts to stop him from doing so." In Benghazi, the center of the rebel movement, the rebel council leader, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, applauded the use of air attacks by helicopters saying, "We welcome any measures that would expedite the departure of Qadhafi and his regime."

By June 7, 2011, Qadhafi had adopted an obstreperous stance, saying he would stay on in Libya. He said, "We only have one choice. This is our country and we shall stay here till the end -- dead, alive, victorious. It doesn't matter." He defiantly declared that he would prefer death and martyrdom over surrender. Qadhafi made this vow on an audio message broadcast on Libyan state media. According to BBC News, the Libyan leader also urged his supporters to gather in support at his Tripoli compound even in the face of NATO air and missile strikes there. In fact, NATO was carrying out heavy strikes on the capital, expanding to day time attacks, with "bunker busting" bombs hitting a military barracks near the compound, as well as the compound itself.

Meanwhile, yet more members of the Qadhafi governmeent were departing the fold; Libyan Labor Minister Al-Amin Manfur reportedly defected to the rebel side in Benghazi. There were also suggestions that despite Qadhafi's defiant stance, some individuals within his circle were already indicating interest in a potential transition of power. From Australia, Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd suggested that Qadhafi's end "may come sooner than many of you in this room may think." Speaking from Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates, Secretary Clinton said, "There have been

Libya Review 2016 Page 57 of 437 pages Libya numerous and continuing discussions by people close to Qadhafi and we are aware that those discussions include among other matters the potential for a transition." The United States' top diplomat stopped short of offering details.

In a related development on June 9, 2011, CNN reported that the high command of NATO was signaling that air strikes were now actively targeting Qadhafi and his inner circle. Fran Townsend, a former National Security adviser to the Bush administration and now a CNN contributor, said that NATO sources told her that the NATO mission allowed for the targeting of the "command and control" of Libyan military operations intent on harming the civilian population of Libya. Accordingly, Qadhafi -- as the commander in chief -- was fair game. This interpretation was echoed as plausible by former NATO Supreme Commander Wesley Clark on CNN. It should be noted, though, that United States President Obama had earlier stated that regime change in Libya was not part of the objective of the NATO mission. That being said, as the crisis has dragged on in Libya, it could be that the current approach had evolved organically as a result of the conditions "in country." At home in the United States by mid-June 2011, President Obama and his government were facing criticism about the country's involvement in the Libya mission, with opponents seeking legal clarification. Regardless, it was certainly true that NATO strikes were intensifying in Tripoli and particularly in the area of the presidential palace and military command zones.

By mid-June 2011, the Libyan rebels were making small but significant gains in their efforts to topple Qadhafi from power as they managed to move westward from Misrata towards Tripoli. Around the same time, NATO jets dropped leaflets above the city of Zlitan, to the west of Misrata, depicting visual warnings of an imminent offensive and urging government troops to defect from their At the same time, the rebels reported to the media that they were told by NATO to hold steady in the area between Misrata and Zlitan, in anticipation of aerial bombardment by NATO aircraft. Still, they were often forced to flee the thoroughfares between the two cities due to artillery fire, and there were anxieties about being hit by friendly NATO fire in the impending strikes.

Bombardment of Tripoli was ongoing, with smoke and explosions reported coming from the direction of Qadhafi's Bab al-Aziziya compound. The rebels had their own challenges to deal with; more than 20 were reported to have died in fighting in the eastern part of the country while they were being attacked by Qadhafi forces in the western mountains. There were some reports that the rebels were able to take control of a few villages in the western mountains that had been in pro- Qadhafi hands.

Developments in mid-2011

In mid-June 2011, there were reports that the rebels were attempting to move into government- held territory to east of Tripoli; according to Reuters, the exchange of heavy artillery fire was heard close to near the city of Zlitan. That said, even with these gains, and the assaults on Tripoli

Libya Review 2016 Page 58 of 437 pages Libya by NATO aircraft, Qadhafi remained entrenched in power in Libya. By the close of June 2011 on the war front, anti-Qadhafi forces said they were pressing forward towards the capital city of Tripoli. In fact, there were reports of fighting at Bir al-Ghanam and Bir Ayyad, to the south west of Tripoli. The rebel leadership said that efforts were also being made to approach Tripoli from the east. The double effort from east and west could potentially place pressure on Qadhafi's stronghold.

In the first week of July 2011, rebels were still trying to advance towards Tripoli from two fronts. Rebel fighters moving from the Western Mountains had made gains in Al-Qawalish, with an eye on taking control of the main highway leading northwards to the capital. Then on the Mediterranean coast, rebels were advancing west from Misrata towards Zlitan -- a government-controlled town en route to Tripoli. It should be noted that these gains were still insufficient to shift the military balance to favor the rebels against pro-Qadhafi forces. By mid-July 2011, the United Kingdom announced that it was increasing its military support for the rebels. On the ground, the rebel movement was reporting success in its advance on the oil town of Brega, while NATO forces were blasting Tripoli. As July entered its final week, NATO warplanes were reported to bombed both military and civilian sites in the Libyan capital of Tripoli, leaving several people dead and injured, according to reports on state television. Another area targeted in that bombing run was Bab Al- Aziziyah -- the location of the residence of Qadhafi. As well, the city of Khomes to the east of Tripoli and the coastal city of Zlitan were respectively hit by NATO bombs. For his part, Qadhafi has maintained the view this ongoing assault on Libya by NATO would have no effect.

In a mysterious and disturbing twist, on July 29, 2011, it was reported that the military commander of the Libyan rebels was arrested and later killed. According to the rebel National Transitional Council (NTC) , General Abdel Fattah Younes was called to the NTC panel for questioning about military operations but never arrived for that appointment; later, he was reported to have died at the hands of assailants. Two aides to Younes also died in the attack. There was great mystery surrounding the death of Younes, who was not entirely trusted by the rebel movement due to his earlier crackdowns on dissidents when he served in the Qadhafi regime as Interior Minister. There were rumors that Younes and his two aides were arrested close to Libya's eastern front.

By the start of August 2011, there were reports that the youngest son of Qadhafi, Khamis Qadhafi, had been killed in a NATO airstrike in the western town of Zlitan. Khamis Qadhafi served as commander of one of the Qadhafi regime's most important military brigades. The information from the ground in Libya suggested that he may have been a casualty of a strike by NATO forces on an ammunition depot and military police facility in Zlitan. It should be noted that the Qadhafi regime denied claims about the death of Khamis Qadhafi. Days later, Libyan state television was broadcasting images of an individual purported to be Khamis Qadhafi. Meanwhile, NATO was addressing claims of civilian casualties at Zlitan saying that the airstrike aimed for a legitimate military target and care was taken to avoid hurting people.

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By the middle of August 2011, in the aftermath of a rebel offensive, fighting took place in the city of Zawiya to the west of the capital. While the Qadhafi regime insisted that it still held sway over Zawiya, the advance of the rebels in that zone certainly demonstrated that the government's hold there was slipping. Zawiya, which was very much a gateway to the neighboring country of Tunisia, was of strategic importance as it resided along the remaining supply route for the Qadhafi regime in the capital; its fall to rebel hands would effectively isolate the Libyan government in Tripoli.

Note that on Aug. 16, 2011, it was reported that the pro-Qadhafi military in Libya had fired a Scud missile from an area close to the coastal city of Sirte in the direction of the rebel-held city of Brega. The unprecedented move ended harmlessly as the missile landed in the desert. Nevertheless, it demonstrated that pro-Qadhafi forces were willing to go to extremes to hold onto power as rebels advanced on Tripoli. By Aug. 18, 2011, news reports had emerged that rebels had taken control over a key oil refinery just outside of Zawiya. These reports were in contradiction to claims by the Libyan prime minister, who asserted that government forces were in control there. In Zawiya itself, the reports on the ground suggested that rebels were consolidating their control there.

In addition to Zawiya, rebels had also advanced onto the town of Garyan to the south of Tripoli. Garyan was also viewed as a strategic interest since control by rebels there would effectively cut off the other main route to the capital. Indeed, should these two successes for the rebels hold, it would signal a shift in the dynamic on the ground in Libya, effectively bolstering the rebels against the Qadhafi regime. It was yet unrealistic to believe that the rebels could successfully carry out an assault on Tripoli. In fact, it would yet to be seen if they could hold onto control of Zawiya and Garyan.

For his part, Qadhafi remained defiant. In a nationally-broadcast audio message, he called on his supporters to resist the rebels, which he referred to as "rats,' and in fact, work to defeat them. He issued the following charge: "Advance, challenge, pick up your weapons, and go to the fight to liberate Libya inch by inch from the traitors and NATO." He continued, "Get ready to fight... The blood of martyrs is fuel for the battlefield."

Diplomatic Agenda in mid-2011

On the diplomatic front, the rebel movement in Benghazi was helped by decisions from several Western governments to acknowledge them as the legitimate governing authority of Libya, and via sizable aid packages. The United States was joined by Italy and France in earmarking further aid to the Libyan rebels. In an interview with Reuters, Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini offered as much as $586.1 million in cash and fuel aid, and also backed frozen Libyan assets. France was also reported to be giving the rebel movement "preferential loans." In the region, Turkey, along

Libya Review 2016 Page 60 of 437 pages Libya with Kuwait, were promising the rebels financial assistance.

Diplomatic support was coming from the international community as several countries joined the United States and France in recognizing the Libyan Transitional Council (TNC) as the legitimate governing authority in Libya. By mid-2011, that list included the France, Italy, Spain, the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Canada and Germany. Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, as well as the entire Arab League joined that list in August 2011. Of course, as noted above, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez went in the opposite direction and has made it clear that his country recognizes only the Qadhafi regime as the government of Libya.

For his part, Qadhafi insisted that international recognition of the rebels was "worthless" and dismissed calls from Western and regional powers for him to step down from the reins of power. Qadhafi made it clear that he would never willingly leave Libya. Indeed, in mid-July 2011, as reported by Radio France Internationale, Qadhafi said: "I am ready to sacrifice myself for my people. ... I will never quit this land sprinkled with the blood of my ancestors." In August, with rebels bearing down on strategic cities and towns, Qadhafi was calling on his supporters to fight and resist the rebels, as noted above.

The Qadhafi regime has periodically asserted that it accepts an African Union-brokered plan for a truce, geared toward ending the conflict in Libya. Central to the proposal was the call for an immediate ceasefire, the delivery of humanitarian aid, the protection of foreign nationals, a suspension of NATO air strikes, and dialogue between the two sides with an eye on a political settlement. Optimism about the implementation of such a peace plan has been limited as a result of three factors: 1. Even as the Qadhafi regime has formally accepted the notion of a truce, its forces were simultaneously violating that truce as they carried out hard-line offensives in key regions; (2) Anti-Qadhafi rebels have made it clear that they were not interested in a future regime with Qadhafi family members or stalwarts at the helm, and they could not consider peace unless Qadhafi's forces withdrew from their attacks; (3) The African Union could hardly be regarded as a fair broker in the matter since Libya has been a main source of funding for the regional body since its inception.

Separate from the AU, various countries have, at times, carried out parallel efforts to try to bring an end to the conflict. There were reports from Saif al-Islam, son of the Libyan leader, that the Qadhafi regime was in talks with the French government. At the start of July 2011, China had dispatched diplomats to meet with the transitional rebel authorities in Benghazi. This gesture signaled the international community's concerns about an end to the conflict in Libya, which had been ongoing for months despite NATO intervention under the legal aegis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. At a news briefing in Beijing, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said: "China believes that the present situation cannot go on and a political resolution to find a way out of the Libyan crisis must be found as soon as possible." By the third week of July 2011, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was reported to be meeting with his Libyan

Libya Review 2016 Page 61 of 437 pages Libya counterpart, Abdul Ati al-Obeidi, to discuss a political resolution to the crisis. Lavrov emphasized the need to end the bloodshed and move to a diplomatic track. As well, Turkey was advancing a post-Qadhafi plan for Libya, the Libyan leader's insistence that he was holding onto power notwithstanding. Clearly, as has been discussed in this report, these overtures were not leading to an end to the conflict in Libya.

An end to Qadhafi's lock on power?

On Aug. 18, 2011, according to NBC News, United States officials hinted that Qadhafi's days at the helm of Libya might soon be over. At the time, there were rumors about a possible plan for Qadhafi and his family to leave Libya. But a day later, all signs suggested that a military advance by rebels on Qadhafi's stronghold of Tripoli was in the immediate offing. By Aug. 19, 2011, heavy fighting, explosions, and gunfire were reported in the Libyan capital. All indications pointed to the notion that rebel fighters were attempting to lay siege on Tripoli in what was being dubbed "Operation Mermaid."

The rebels' advantageous footing seemed to have occurred as a result of effective military strategy. Moving from Libya’s Nafusa Mountains, rebel fighters made considerable progress in advancing toward Tripoli and, as noted here, gained the upper hand in the Zawiya to the west of Tripoli -- a strategic transit point along the Qadhafi regime's supply line. The rebels' control of Zawiya and several other towns along the road towards the Tunisian border, as aforementioned, meant that the Qadhafi regime and its supporters were now boxed in and isolated in Tripoli -- the apparent "last stand" in the fight by Qadhafi's inner circle to hold onto power in Libya. For the rebels, though, Tripoli represented the final battle in the fight to liberate the country from Qadhafi's repression. Many rebel fighters were claiming "zero hour" was finally on Qadhafi and his coterie in Tripoli.

That being said, the job of carrying out an assault on Tripoli would be a complicated and difficult one. It was no small task to lay siege on a major city that had months to prepare for this moment. Still, according to BBC News, the rebels were now well-equipped to accomplish this goal, having taken control of an oil refinery and now being better armed with munitions than Qadhafi's forces. As well, according to rebels on the ground, weapons were transported in a clandestine manner by sea from Benghazi to Tripoli. In fact, Al Jazeera reportedly managed to intercept Libyan military radio, which indicated a sense of frustration among pro-government forces about the lack of fuel and ammunition. In terms of fighting power, rebels had apparently done extensive pre-planning of "sleeper cells" within Tripoli who rose up to join forces with arriving rebels to take the fight to Qadhafi loyalists. It was clear that the once-disorganized rebel forces had morphed into a far more sophisticated enclave, and their assault on the capital was the result of careful coordination.

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Soug Jomaa and Arada, clashes between people opposed to the Qadhafi regime and pro- government loyalists were been reported to be ongoing. Yet there were also reports of Qadhafi loyalist fighters surrendering to rebels. In addition, there were also some reports of celebration by Tripoli residents waving pre-revolutionary flags* and cheering convoys of rebel fighters as they rolled through the streets of Tripoli. At that time on Aug. 20, 2011, it was difficult to determine if such scenes were random or widespread.

There was some sense that the government remained intact with Libyan Information Minister Moussa Ibrahim continuing to give updates and asserting that the capital city remained under Qadhafi control. Moussa Ibrahim also warned that up to 65,000 "professional soldiers" remained in Tripoli and stood ready to defend Qadhafi and the regime. But by Aug. 21, 2011, according to the Associated Press, rebel fighters were finding their way easily from the western outskirts of Tripoli into the center of the Qadhafi stronghold. Qadhafi himself was nowhere in sight, although his messages compelling supporters to take to the streets of Tripoli and "purify it" from "the rats" were still being broadcast.

In truth, it was difficult conclude that the Qadhafi regime remained in control of the government. Certainly, the rebels had seen a significant victory when they took control of the well-equipped elite Khamis Brigade. The rebels were able to take possession of truckloads of weapons, fortifying their munitions stores against remaining loyalist forces. They were also able to free about 300 political prisoners from a jail in Tripoli and raid a warehouse, further adding to their supplies of food and ammunition. Rebels had swarmed what had been referred to as Green Square -- a rallying point for the Qadhafi regime -- and announced it would be renamed Martyrs Square.

By the early hours of Aug. 22, 2011, it appeared that most of Tripoli was under rebel control, with the exception of some pro-Qadhafi zones, such as the Bab Al-Azizia stronghold in western Tripoli. Later on that day, fierce battles between rebels and Qadhafi loyalists were ongoing in parts of Tripoli. Rebel forces said in an interview with the BBC that their forces were coming under fire from tanks departing the Qadhafi compound at Bab al-Azizia. Meanwhile, international journalists were trapped at the Rixos Hotel, with the streets around that building under the control of armed Qadhafi loyalists and mercenaries. By the night of Aug. 22, 2011, there were reports that pro- Qadhafi fighters fired a scud missile somewhere in the vicinity of the town of Sirte.

Meanwhile, the rebels were claiming the capture of Qadhafi's son. On al-Jazeera news, Mustafa Mohammed Abdul Jalil, the chairman of the National Transitional Council (NTC), confirmed the claim, saying that Saif al-Islam had been arrested and was in NTC custody. Soon thereafter, it was also reported that another son -- Mohammed Qadhafi -- had been captured and was under house arrest, and a third son -- Saadi Qadhafi -- was in TNC custody. Luis Moreno Ocampo, the chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Court, said that Saif al-Islam, who was already facing earlier arrest warrants for crimes against humanity during the crackdown -- should be transferred to The Hague to face justice.

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It should be noted that on Aug. 22, 2011, there were subsequent reports in the international media that Mohammed Qadhafi had escaped house arrest. Also, Saif al-Islam was shown on global broadcasts freely-celebrating at the Rixos Hotel, taunting the rebel movement, claiming that his father was safe, and insisting that the Qadhafi regime remained in control of the country.

In other developments, Information Minister Ibrahim, who was warning about the threat of 65,000 loyal and professional soldiers in Tripoli, was simultaneously opening the door to diplomacy. According to BBC News, Ibrahim called for talks with the rebels, saying: "If you want peace, we are ready." The theme of diplomacy in this message appeared to bolster the perception that Qadhafi's grip on power was crumbling. It was indeed quite likely that the rebels' brazen prediction was coming to pass: "Zero Hour" was finally descending on the Qadhafi regime in Libya.

United States President Barack Obama signaled the international community's belief that the Qadhafi era was coming to an end. President Obama said that the "iron fist" of the Qadhafi regime had reached a "tipping point." In a written statement, the United States president asserted: "Tripoli is slipping from the grasp of a tyrant." President Obama went on to urge Qadhafi to expressly step down, saying, "The surest way for the bloodshed to end is simple: Moammar Qadhafi and his regime need to recognize that their rule has come to an end. Qadhafi needs to acknowledge the reality that he no longer controls Libya. He needs to relinquish power once and for all." President Obama also reiterated his country's recognition of the Transitional National Council (TNC) as the only legitimate governing authority in Libya.

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On the other side of the equation, Qadhafi received the unwavering support of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who was on the record saying: "We only recognize one government - the one led by Qadhafi."

On Aug. 23, 2011, heavy fighting broke out between rebel fighters and Qadhafi loyalists at the Bab al-Azizia compound. The clashes went on for several hours. One reporter from al-Jazeera died after being caught in the cross-fire of the violence. Ultimately, the rebels were able to take control of the Bab al-Azizia compound, where a large cache of weapons were found.

Not one to stay out of the spotlight despite being in hiding, Qadhafi gave an audio address the Libyan people. He wasted no time in dismissing the battle victory of the rebels at the Bab al-Azizia compound, saying that the retreat of pro-government fighters was a "tactical move." Consistent with his rhetoric to date, Qadhafi struck a defiant tone, vowing either "death" or "victory" in the fight against "aggression." The main spokesperson of the Qadhafi regime, Moussa Ibrahim, resumed a confrontational stance promising that more than 6,500 thousand pro-Qadhafi fighters were now in Tripoli and stood ready to fight the rebels. It should be noted that he had earlier made the claim that 65,000 "professional soldiers" remained in Tripoli for that very purpose. Moussa Ibrahim additionally asserted that the Qadhafi regime was in control of up to 80 percent of the capital and vowed to to turn Libya into a "burning volcano and a fire under the feet of the invaders."

It should be noted that the Bab al-Azizia was viewed as one of the remaining bastions of Qadhafi's control in Tripoli. As such, apparent battle victory on this ground was regarded as a symbolic victory in the fight against the Qadhafi regime. Indeed, it was being touted as a pivotal turn in the Libyan revolution of 2011 with British Foreign Minister William Hague saying, "We're in the death throes of this regime, it's a good thing that we've reached that point, the people of Libya have fought their way to that point against violent repression."

That being said, there remained pockets of resistance in the capital, including the Abu Salim and al- Hadba districts, and near the Hotel Rixos, where many international journalists were being held as apparent human shields by Qadhafi loyalists. It was only on Aug. 24, 2011, that the journalists were finally released thanks to the negotiating efforts of a Jordanian news producer who was herself being held there.

Aug. 24, 2011, also saw a barrage of Scud missiles being launched from Sirte, the birthplace of Qadhafi, at rebel-held Misrata. The missiles were all intercepted by an American warship before landing in the city. Still, the terrorizing incidents raised the anxieties of civilians in Misrata that a fatal incident might occur in the future. Perhaps motivated by the desire to prevent such a devastating result, rebel fighters were advancing to Sirte. En route to that new battlefield on Aug. 25, 2011, they were encountering resistance from pro-Qadhafi fighters.

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Aug. 25, 2011, also saw further clashes between rebels and pro-Qadhafi loyalists in Tripoli. As well, Qadhafi was heard on audio once again -- this time calling for his supporters to take to the streets in a show of force against the rebels. He said, "Bring out the men and women this time to purify Tripoli. Bring out the young inside Tripoli to protect all alleyways and districts... They must fight and not give up." Qadhafi also dismissed the threat of death for his loyal supporters, suggesting that guns were being fired without any lethal effect as he said, "I call upon you to organize a million man march that will fight this time, that will fill the streets and fill the squares. Do not fear the shelling. These are blank shells that scare you."

It should be noted that even as he demanded that his supporters take to the streets and face bullets in support of him, Qadhafi himself remained in hiding. At the same time, the rebels and the TNC made it clear that ultimate victory would only come when Qadhafi was captured or killed. There were suspicions that he remained in the area of Tripoli albeit not at the Bab al-Azizia compound, which was an obvious target of the opposition forces. Still, underneath the complex, there was access to a complicated network of tunnels across the city. It was plausible that Qadhafi was able to move to a safe house via the tunnel network. With an eye on apprehending the Libyan despot, the TNC announced that it was offering a $1.7 million bounty for Qadhafi's capture, dead or alive. NATO confirmed that it was assisting the TNC in this regard by providing intelligence.

At the close of August 2011, reports had emerged that Qadhafi's wife, two sons (Muhammed and Hannibal), and daughter, had all managed to escape to Algeria. The matter was evolving into a diplomatic imbroglio, with the Algerian authorities initially denying that aconvoy of heavily armored vehicles had crossed the border, and then later with the Algerian ambassador to the United Nations saying that the members of the Qadhafi family had been received "on humanitarian grounds." The move was perhaps not surprising since Algeria was yet to recognize the TNC as the legitimate governing authority of Libya. For its part, the TNC decried the fact that members of the Qadhafi family were able to elude facing justice. Indeed, the TNC made it quite clear that Algeria's complicity with the Qadhafi family was being regarded as "an act of aggression against the Libyan people and against the wishes of the Libyan people." The TNC also promised to use all legal means to return the criminals" and ensure that they would eventually be brought to justice in Libya.

A more gruesome scenario also dominated the scene at the close of August 2011, manifest by the rebels' discovery of four mass graves. According to international media, one such grave in Tripoli - - significantly located situated behind the barracks of the Khamis Brigade controlled by the son of Qadhafi -- contained the bodies of dozens of slain soldiers who refused to fight on behalf of the regime. There were also eyewitness accounts emerging about the execution of at least 100 other soldiers under orders of Khamis Qadhafi. Other mass graves were reportedly discovered outside of Tripoli at Brega and Ras Lanuf. Khamis Qadhafi himself returned to the public purview with new claims that he had been killed in a clash near Bani Walid; as noted above, previous claims of

Libya Review 2016 Page 66 of 437 pages Libya his death turned out to be untrue. There were additional reports that the same clash resulted in the deaths of a Qadhafi brother in law as well as the head of the intelligence services, Abdullah al- Sanussi. As noted below, the International Criminal Court had already issued an arrest warrant for Sanussi for crimes against humanity.

Also at the close of August 2011, the TNC was placing further pressure on pro-Qadhafi elements, declaring that loyalists of the regime in Sirte -- where fighting was ongoing -- and other such towns should surrender within days or face military wrath. The head of the TNC, Jalil, issued the ultimatum during a news conference in Benghazi and warned that if no indication of surrender came by the start of September 2011, then the rebels would bring an end to the situation using military force. While one Qadhafi son -- al-Saadi -- was at the time reported to be seeking favorable terms of surrender for himself personally, Saif al-Islam (the offspring facing war crimes at The Hague) was vowing to carry on fighting.

Efforts to negotiate a peaceful surrender in Sirte and other remaining pro-Qadhafi strongholds, such as Bani Walid, were ongoing at the start of September 2011.

Also in the first week of September 2011, reports emerged that a heavily-armed convoy of pro- Qadhafi loyalists had crossed the southern border of the country into Niger. The convoy, which was carrying money and gold, was said to have been made up of Tuareg fighters from Niger who were recruited by Qadhafi to fight on his behalf. Another convoy had already entered Niger and reportedly included some of Qadhafi's aides. Among them was Qadhafi's security chief, Mansour Daw. Qadhafi himself remained a fugitive from justice at the time, with authorities in Niger denying that the Libyan despot was among those traveling in the aforementioned convoys that entered that country.

On Sept. 7, 2011, rumors and reports were circulating that Qadhafi himself was fleeing south towards the border with Niger, possibly en route to safe haven in Burkina Faso. The TNC said that it hoped the government of Niger would assist in stopping Qadhafi from eluding justice. To that end, the TNC had dispatched a delegation to Niger to discuss the matter of preventing Qadhafi and his cadre from infiltrating the border with Niger. But the foreign minister of that country said that there was no way of closing the border with Libya to prevent fugitive Qadhafi from escaping into Niger -- essentially following the path of aides and loyalists. Foreign Minister Mohamed Bazoum said, "We have no means to close the border... It is too big and we have very, very small means for that." At the same time, the government of Burkina Faso denied any truth to speculation that it would welcome Qadhafi. As well, Qadhafi himself was heard speaking on Syrian media, seemingly from inside Libya, in which he denied fleeing to Niger, casting such notions as lies and promising to defeat the TNC and NATO.

It should be noted that the United States called on the government of Niger to arrest any senior Qadhafi officials identified within its borders, while the TNC warned that Niger would be penalized

Libya Review 2016 Page 67 of 437 pages Libya if it was revealed to have helped Qadhafi escape. It was yet to be seen if the democratically- elected government of Niger, which had already recognized the TNC as the legitimate authority of Libya, would flex its muscles in the international arena.

As September entered its second week, it was reported that one Qadhafi's sons arrived in Niger. Justice Minister Marou Amadou confirmed that Saadi Qadhafi was traveling in a convoy to Agadez in northern Niger. Amadou acknowledged that Saadi Qadhafi would be allowed to remain in Niger on humanitarian grounds. This development was sure to complicate bilateral relations between TNC-led Libya and the new government of Niger. The same path of problematic bilateral relations could follow with Guinea-Bissau, which announced on Sept. 12, 2011, that it would welcome Qadhafi to the fold, should he wish to leave Libya.

Around the same time, fierce clashes were breaking out in remaining pro-Qadhafi strongholds such as Sirte, Jufra, and Bani Walid, and rebels were again issuing an ultimatum for surrender by pro- Qadhafi forces there. Interim Libyan Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril warned that TNC troops would respond if they were attacked. But pro-Qadhafi forces showed no sign of either surrender or acknowledging this warning; instead, they fired rockets at TNC forces in Sirte and Ben Walid.

NATO entered the fray by carrying out missile strikes on Qadhafi targets. Earlier, NATO indicated that its role in Libya had not come to an end. As earlier stated by NATO spokesperson Oana Lungescu at the end of August 2011, "NATO still has a job to do in Libya." A month later in September 2011, NATO spokesperson Colonel Roland Lavoie also made clear that it would continue to strike at "command and control centers" in Libya.

Note that on Sept. 9, 2011, Interpol issued arrest warrants for Qadhafi, his son, and his former intelligence chief, all three of whom were subject to charges of crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Days later on Sept. 13, 2011, the human rights group, Amnesty International, issued a report detailing abuses committed by the Qadhafi regime and its loyalists during the civil war unfolding there, but also warned that the rebel forces were not blameless. Amnesty International accused the Qadhafi regime of "mass killing of prisoners, torture, enforced disappearances, and arbitrary arrests." Amnesty International also demanded that the TNC control its rebels and investigate questionable treatment of pro-Qadhafi detainees. At the diplomatic level, the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to transfer control over Libya' seat at the international body to the TNC.

End Game in Sight?

In mid-September 2011, anti-Qadhafi forces were still carrying out assaults on Sirte and Bani Walid -- two of the remaining strongholds of the fugitive former Libyan leader. They were being met with fierce resistance and were often forced into retreat mode by Qadhafi loyalists. TNC fighters said in interviews with the BBC that they had incurred some losses in these endeavors. On Sept.

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22, 2011, the interim leadership was claiming that three main towns around the Jufra oasis had been captured, which would aid in cutting off pro-Qadhafi elements from escaping southward from Bani Walid and Sirte. As before, rebels were still encountering stiff resistance in these remaining strongholds.

As September 2011 was drawing to an end, conflict between anti-Qadhafi fighters and Qadhafi loyalists continued in Sirte, with the BBC reporting the exchange of machine-gun fire, rockets and artillery shells. According to Reuters, TNC snipers were in restraint mode and not yet advancing to the city center. In the city center, though, pro-Qadhafi snipers were in full fighting mode, with reports emerging of street-to-street clashes. On Sept. 29, 2011, reports were emerging that TNC troops had taken control over the airport at Sirte. NATO forces were now said to be targeting command and control facilities in Sirte.

On the domestic political landscape in Libya, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the chairman of the Transitional National Council (TNC), had arrived for the first time in Tripoli and was greeted by cheering crowds. Meanwhile, as discussed above, the United Nations General Assembly had voted overwhelmingly to transfer control over Libya' seat at the international body to the interim Libyan authority, known as the Transitional National Council (TNC). This development set the stage for the interim Libyan leader, Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, to attend the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Sept. 20, 2011. It would be the first time in decades that Libya would be represented on the world stage by a new center of power.

In New York, Jalil was scheduled to meet United States President Barack Obama. Meanwhile, two other Western leaders -- British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy -- made historic trips to post-Qadhafi Libya, where they were welcomed as heroes as a result of NATO's efforts to support the rebel effort in that country.

In terms of governance, a key figure in the transitional leadership, Mahmoud Jibril, announced that an interim government would soon be formed in Libya. The TNC was additionally making it known that efforts would be made to bring Libyan oil production on stream in short order. The TNC's effort to govern post-Qadhafi Libya would also be helped by a discovery of $23 billion in the country's central bank.

Note that on Oct. 3, 2011, the head of Libya's TNC, Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, said that a de facto cabinet, has been finalized and would be led by Mahmoud Jibril, who would also hold the foreign ministry's portfolio. For his part, Jibril made clear that he had no intention of holding the leadership post in a future Libyan government, when the country had achieved full liberation from the Qadhafi regime. He pointed toward the holdout towns such as Sirte and Bani Walid, and indicated that he would leave his post when these areas were under TNC control.

At the start of October 2011, there was a mass exodus of civilians from Sirte, as close to 10,000

Libya Review 2016 Page 69 of 437 pages Libya residents took advantage of the truce being observed by the TNC before launching a final assault of sorts. Most of the resident were pro-Qadhafi in orientation and were thusly subject to rigorous searching at checkpoints. Pro-Qadhafi forces, who had refused to surrender, were cornered in Sirte. There, fierce battles were taking place and rebel forces were suffering heavy losses.

Meanwhile, there was a report that Libya's former Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi was arrested in Tunisia and sentenced to six months in prison for entering the country illegally. Already core members of the Qadhafi family had sought refuge in Algeria where the government of that country was far more hospitable, even refusing to extradite the Qadhafi cabal to Libya to face justice. News also earlier emerged about convoys of Qadhafi aides and pro-Qadhafi loyalists, including Saadi Qadhafi (son of the deposed leader), crossing the southern border of the country into Niger.

Both the TNC and the international community had urged the governments of foreign countries not to follow the path of Algeria, essentially warning Niger that it should not allow Qadhafi or his inner coterie to escape justice. The new and democratically-elected government of Niger had already recognized the TNC as the legitimate government of Libya and it appeared anxious to remain in good standing with the international community. Still, Niger's acceptance of Saadi Qadhafi within the borders augured negatively for bilateral relations. Those bilateral relations plummeted at the close of September 2011 when the prime minister of Niger said Saadi Qadhafi would not be extradited, even though Interpol had issued an arrest warrant for him. In an interview with Agence France Presse, Prime Minister Brigi Rafini said, "There's no question of him being extradited to Libya for the moment." He claimed that Saadi Qadhafi would not receive a fair trial in Libya. By mid-October 2011, pro-Qadhafi media in Syria had confirmed the death of Qadhafi's son, Khamis, who was twice previously been thought to have died. For his part, at the start of October 2011, the older Qadhafi remained a fugitive from justice.

As intimated above, Interpol had already issued arrest warrants for Qadhafi, his son Seif-al-Islam, and his former intelligence chief, Abdullah al-Sanussi -- all three of whom were subject to charges of crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC). At issue has been the Qadhafi regime's harsh crackdown on protesters, which have included reports of the disappearance, torture, and even deaths of dissidents, as well as the use of "rape as a weapon." Qadhafi's case would not be helped by evidence that pro-government forces laid landmines in the rebel-held western Libyan city of Misrata. For its part, the Qadhafi regime has maintained the view that it did not recognize the ICC court and remained undeterred by the threat of arrest warrants.

Those alleged crimes against humanity were detailed by the human rights group, Amnesty International, which issued a report on the abuses committed by the Qadhafi regime and its loyalists during the civil war unfolding there. It should be noted that the report by Amnesty International also warned that the rebels were not blameless as regards human rights abuses during

Libya Review 2016 Page 70 of 437 pages Libya the rebellion gripping Libya.

Note: As reported in a report by the United Nations Human Rights Council, which came to the fore in the spring of 2011, the estimated death toll in Libya since the start of the uprising was between 10,000 and 15,000. But at the start of September 2011, the Transitional National Council said in an interview with Reuters that the death toll in the fight to liberate Libya was now as high as 50,000.

A State of Liberation

In mid-October 2011, bulldozers demolished Qadhafi's Bab al-Aziziya compound in Tripoli. The interim authorities said that it was essential to "tear down the symbol of tyranny." But only days later, the entire political landscape in Libya may have been shifted from symbolic transformation to actual transformation.

On Oct. 17, 2011, TNC fighters asserted they had raised their flag over Bani Walid and that they had control over 90 percent of the town. The liberation of this former Qadhafi stronghold was quite a milestone since the siege of Bani Walid had gone on for weeks and resulted in heavy casualties.

The remaining "major battlefield" was Qadhafi's hometown of Sirte, where the deposed former leader was believed to be hiding. Qadhafi loyalists were putting up a strong fight there and utilizing sniper fire to repel the advance of TNC fighters. Then, in the early hours of Oct. 20, 2011, news emerged that Sirte had finally fallen into the hands of TNC fighters. The TNC fighters or "rebels" now controlled the entire country.

In many senses, the fall of the final Qadhafi stronghold, which was also the hometown of the former Libyan leader, manifested the end of the war in Libya that had been ongoing for months. Indeed, the TNC has said that the collapse of Bani Walid and Sirte would augur the national liberation of Libya.

Yet the real climax of the national liberation war in Libya came hours later on Oct. 20, 2011, when the news agency, Reuters, broke the news that Qadhafi had been apprehended in Sirte. Additional reports from on the ground in Libya from Reuters and the BBC asserted that Qadhafi had, in fact, been killed.

While the United States Department of State was reluctant to immediately confirm these reports, cable news services across the world -- from MSNBC in the United States to al Jazeera in the Middle East -- were circulating photographs and videotaped footage, supposedly taken by TNC fighters, depicting a shirtless man resembling Qadhafi covered in blood, appearing to be either dead or critically injured.

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The news of Qadhafi's death was hardening from the realm of "unconfirmed reports" to the sphere of strong assertion when Libyan Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril said during a news conference in Tripoli that Qadhafi was indeed dead. "We have been waiting for this moment for a long time. Moammar Qadhafi has been killed," said Jibril. Along with Qadhafi, one of his sons, and the head of security, were also reported to have died. Qadhafi's body was said to be in Misrata. Libyan citizens responded to the collective news by taking to the streets in Tripoli to celebrate the news of the death of the flamboyant and eccentric former despot, with an unsavory legacy of terrorism.

Across the world in the United States, as the evidence pointed towards the fall of Sirte and the death of Qadhafi, the White House prepared to address the situation unfolding in Libya. Finally, in an address from the White House, President Barack Obama said, "Today we can definitively say that the Qadhafi regime has come to an end... and one of world's longest serving dictators is no more. The dark shadow oftyranny has been lifted."

That being said, the actual details of Qadhafi's death remained murky. There were some news reports that Qadhafi was attempting to flee Sirte in a convoy and was hit by a NATO air strike. For its part, NATO was able to confirm that its jets struck a convoy of Qadhafi loyalists departing Sirte, but the regional security bloc clearly stated that it had no knowledge whether or not Qadhafi was in the convoy. The TNC offered a different version of events, stating instead that Qadhafi was found hiding in a drainage pipe in Sirte, where he was apprehended and shot. Yet another variation of the events that transpired suggested that Qadhafi was in a district of Sirte and had been injured during a gunfight between loyalists and TNC fighters. The general consensus was that Qadhafi was apprehended alive and was being transferred to a hospital in Misrata; his death occurred either en route to Misrata or when he arrived there.

NBC News appeared to connect the disparate renditions of the fate of Qadhafi, reporting that a NATO strike (carried out by a United States drone) attacked the aforementioned convoy just outside of Sirte without knowledge of who was actually in that caravan of vehicles. The strike left Qadhafi injured and he took refuge in the so-called drainage pipe, where he was ultimately apprehended alive. There was no conclusive information as to whether or not Qadhafi was executed at that point or succumbed to his injuries. Videotaped footage certainly seemed to coincide with reports that Qadhafi was injured but alive at the time of his capture, but likely diedafterward in a manner still not known.

Days after Qadhafi's death, Omran al-Oweib -- the commander of the rebel forces who captured the fugitive former Libyan leader -- offered some clarity during an interview with the BBC. He said that Qadhafi had been captured alive in the drainage pipe. Qadhafi was partially dragged from that point, but also partially walked a short distance on his own, before collapsing as a consequence of gunfire. Medical reports indicated that Qadhafi was killed by a gunshot to the head; however, there was no conclusive information as to who was responsible for the fatal bullet. One version of

Libya Review 2016 Page 72 of 437 pages Libya the account was that Qadhafi was killed in cross-fire of gunshots, while a rebel has claimed responsibility for shooting Qadhafi in seemingly extra-judicial manner. The questionable circumstances of Qadhafi's death has,unsurprisingly, resulted in a loud clamor for an investigation into the matter.

Regardless of the precise details, this news marked the end of 42 years of autocratic rule in Libya under the iron fist of Qadhafi. "Zero Hour" had finally descended on the Qadhafi regime in Libya. The Libyan interim head of government, Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, announced that the TNC would soon declare his country to be officially in "a state of liberation."

To that end, on Oct. 23, 2011, Libya's transitional government declared the national liberation of the country before a rejoicing crowds at a venue now called "VictorySquare" in the eastern city of Benghazi, where the anti-Qadhafi revolt began months earlier. The leader of the TNC, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, paid homage to the fighters who gave their lives for the liberation of Libya, saying: "I pray for the souls of the martyrs who were waiting for this day." He also called on Libyans to move beyond the civil war and look towards the future, for the sake of national unity. He said, "Today we are one flesh, one national flesh. We have become united brothers as we have not been in the past. I call on everyone for forgiveness, tolerance and reconciliation. We must get rid of hatred and envy from our souls. This is a necessary matter for the success of the revolution and the success of the future Libya."

At the end of October 2011, prosecutors at the International Criminal Court in The Hague were in informal talks with Qadhafi's fugitive son, Saif al-Islam, aimed at negotiating his surrender. The notion of surrender might be attractive to Saif al-Islam given the controversial end to his father. Prosecutors in The Hague promised that Saif al-Islam, who was wanted on charges of crimes against humanity, would be granted a fair trial. That being said, there were reports that Saif al- Islam was looking to escape to Zimbabwe, controlled by President Robert Mugabe, who was ally of Qadhafi.

Meanwhile, with Libya now liberated, the term "rebels" was effectively rendered null and void as Libya moved towards a Qadhafi-free future. Libya would now have to contend with the massive challenge of building a new nation state with all the instruments and structures needed for stable and democratic governance. There were plans in the works for elections to take place by June 2012 in a country without any electoral infrastructure or a recent legacy of democratic participation. The new elected body would be tasked with drafting a constitution, organizing a referendum to ratify the draft constitution, and the formation of an interim government pending a presidential election.

Faced with the objective of providing stabilizing support for the Libyan people's hard-fought victory, while at the same time ensuring that the Libyan story was ultimately written by the Libyan people, United States President Barack Obama said: "The United States is committed to the

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Libyan people. You have won your revolution." He continued, "The Libyan people now have a responsibility to build an open democratic Libya that stands as a great rebuke to Qadhafi's dictatorship." Following the declaration of national liberation, President Obama congratulated Libyans, saying: "After four decades of brutal dictatorship and eight months of deadly conflict, the Libyan people can now celebrate their freedom and the beginning of a new era of promise."

The death of Qadhafi -- the world's most wanted man in the aftermath of the elimination of terrorist leader Osama bin Laden -- could well be viewed as a vindication of United States President Barack Obama's foreign policy. That foreign policy has been characterized by limited military engagement within a multilateral framework of international structures, combined with the judicious use of refined geopolitical and military intelligence. It was a position the Obama administration wasted no time in claiming with great enthusiasm. As stated by Vice President Joseph Biden in an apparent contrast to the previous Bush administration's invasion of Iraq: "In Libya, the United States only spent two billion dollars and lost not one American life."

On Nov. 1, 2011, the Transitional National Council (TNC) of Libya announced that the country would be led by a new prime minister -- Abdurrahim el-Keib -- at the helm of the new transitional government. El-Keib won 26 votes -- a bare majority in the TNC -- beating 10 rivals and becoming the new prime minister and head of government of Libya. El-Keib, a resident of the United States for three decades who was earned a doctorate from North Carolina State University, was a member of the anti-Qadhafi opposition. According to CNN, it was unknown when El-Keib returned to Libya. Nevertheless, the election of the new prime minister came on the heels of a promise by outgoing Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, who repeatedly said he would step down when Libya was liberated from the Qadhafi regime. That day came a week earlier on the national day of liberation on Oct. 23, 2011. For his part, El-Keib would hold the office of head of government through a transitional period in which a new constitution would be crafted, followed by the holding of landmark elections. Meanwhile, in a development marking the end of the military engagement in Libya, the United Nations Security Council voted to end the no-fly zone over Libya at the stroke of midnight on Nov. 1, 2011.

The Qadhafi legacy emerged on Nov. 19, 2011 when the late former Libyan leader's son, Saif al- Islam, was captured near the southern town of Obari in Libya. According to a commander of the Zintan militia, Saif al-Islam was seized along with several associates as they tried to escape to neighboring Niger. Soon thereafter, there were reports that the head of intelligence under the former Qadhafi regime, Abdullah al-Sanussi, had also been captured. Saif al-Islam and Abdullah al-Sanussi were the last members of the Qadhafi regime to be either captured or killed. It should be noted that Saif-al-Islam and Abdullah al-Sanussi, along with the now-deceased Qadhafi, were wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged crimes against humanity. ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo had earlier requested arrest warrants on against Qadhafi, his son, Saif al-Islam, and others on prevailing charges, specifically manifest by the

Libya Review 2016 Page 74 of 437 pages Libya murder and persecution of civilians. Still, it was unlikely that Saif-al-Islam would actually face justice at the ICC in The Hague since the new authorities in Libya were advocating that the younger Qadhafi face trial at home. During an interview with the media, interim Prime Minister Abdurrahim al-Keib promised a fair trial, saying, "We assure Libyans and the world that Saif al- Islam will receive a fair trial."

Humanitarian Scenario

Meanwhile, the humanitarian story unfolding could only be understood as disturbing. As discussed above, the situation in the besieged rebel-held city of Misrata was dire, resulting in April 2011 in the deaths of two renowned international journalists, and a death toll on April 20, 2011, alone of more than 100 people there. While the actual death toll across Libya since the start of the uprising could not be quantified, human rights agencies in April 2011 suggested that more than 1,000 people had been killed at that time. There were certainly reports that hundreds of people had disappeared for reasons unrelated to combat. There were fears that those persons -- almost all anti-government protesters -- were victims of torture and execution.

Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the International Criminal Court's prosecutor, suggested that the evidence was building to try and convict key members of the Qadhafi regime of crimes against humanity. By the close of April 2011, the United Nations had deployed a team from its Human Rights Council to Libya to investigate allegations of human rights violations and abuses there. At issue has been the Qadhafi regime's harsh crackdown on protesters, which have included reports of the disappearance, torture, and even deaths of dissidents. For its part, the Libyan government denied culpability for any such allegations, and said that it supports the United Nations human rights inquiry. But at the start of June 2011, it was not known if this stated support would prevail now that the International Criminal Court was interested in pursuing the Libyan leadership on the basis of alleged crimes against humanity. Qadhafi's case would not be helped by the aforementioned reports that pro-government forces were laying landmines in the rebel-held western Libyan city of Misrata.

Problems for the Qadhafi regime increased when the International Criminal Court prosecutor at the United Nations issued the disturbing findings that the Qadhafi regime used "rape as a weapon" in its campaign against protesters and opposition members. This announcement could lead to further charges of crimes against humanity against the Libyan regime.

Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo had already requested arrest warrants on against Qadhafi, his son, Saif al-Islam, and others on prevailing charges of crimes against humanity committed. Note that by June 27, 2011, the International Criminal Court (ICC) had officially issued an arrest warrant for Libyan leader, Qadhafi, on the basis of crimes against humanity, specifically manifest by the murder and persecution of civilians. Arrest warrants were also issued for Qadhafi's son, Saif al-Islam, and the head of intelligence, Abdullah al-Sanussi. For its part, the Qadhafi regime

Libya Review 2016 Page 75 of 437 pages Libya maintained the view that it did not recognize the ICC court and remained undeterred by the threat of arrest warrants.

That confidence may have dissipated by August 2011 when rebels reportedly took control of Tripoli, and as three Qadhafi sons were taken into the custody of the Transitional National Council (TNC). More importantly, as discussed above, Luis Moreno Ocampo, the chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC), called for Saif al-Islam -- who was already facing an arrest warrant for crimes against humanity during the crackdown -- to be transferred to The Hague to face justice. However, subsequent news from Tripoli made it apparent that despite reports of his detainment, Saif al-Islam was freely operating in parts of Tripoli, and dismissing any threat to his freedom by either the TNC or the ICC. Still, in September 2011, Interpol issued arrest warrants for Qadhafi, his son, and his former intelligence chief. Around the same time, the human rights group, Amnesty International, issued a report detailing abuses committed by the Qadhafi regime and its loyalists during the civil war unfolding there, but also warned that the rebel forces were not blameless.

As noted above, on Nov. 19, 2011 Saif al-Islam was captured near the southern town of Obari in Libya. According to a commander of the Zintan militia, Saif al-Islam was seized along with several associates as they tried to escape to neighboring Niger. Soon thereafter, there were reports that the head of intelligence under the former Qadhafi regime, Abdullah al-Sanussi, had also been captured. Saif al-Islam and Abdullah al-Sanussi were the last members of the Qadhafi regime to be either captured or killed. As stated here, Saif-al-Islam and Abdullah al-Sanussi, along with the now-deceased Qadhafi, were wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged crimes against humanity, specifically manifest by the murder and persecution of civilians. Still, it was unlikely that Saif-al-Islam would actually face justice at the ICC in The Hague since the new authorities in Libya were advocating that the younger Qadhafi face trial at home. During an interview with the media, interim Prime Minister Abdurrahim al-Keib promised a fair trial, saying, "We assure Libyans and the world that Saif al-Islam will receive a fair trial."

Meanwhile, according to the Associated Press, a report by the United Nations Human Rights Council that came to the fore in the spring of 2011, suggested that the estimated death toll in Libya since the start of the uprising was between 10,000 and 15,000. But at the start of September 2011, the Transitional National Council said in an interview with Reuters that the death toll in the fight to liberate Libya was now as high as 50,000.

Concluding Note:

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To that end, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the secretary general of NATO, asserted: "Now is the time to create a new Libya -- a state based on freedom, not fear; democracy, not dictatorship; the will of the many, not the whims of a few." He continued, "That transition must come peacefully. It must come now. And it must be led and defined by the Libyan people." Rasmussen made it clear that NATO would support Libya's transition, saying, "NATO is ready to work with the Libyan people and with the Transitional National Council, which holds a great responsibility. They must make sure that the transition is smooth and inclusive, that the country stays united, and that the future is founded on reconciliation and respect for human rights."

Leaked documents detailing plans for post-Qadhafi Libya indicated United Nations proposals for 200 military observers and 190 United Nations police "in country" as part of a stabilization plan. Of course, such a plan would only be implemented if the request was made directly by the TNC and sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council. It should be noted that at the close of August 2011, the TNC had rejected the provisions of this plan, effectively eschewing the notion of United Nations forces in Libya. As of the close of October 2011, there were no known plans to implement international forces in Libya.

In a development marking the end of the military engagement in Libya, the United Nations Security Council voted to end the no-fly zone over Libya at the stroke of midnight on Nov. 1, 2011.

Update

On Dec. 24, 2011, Libya -- which has been subject to foreign control from Europe, Asia, and Africa, for most of its existence -- celebrated its national independence for the first time in 42 years. The occasion commemorated the formation of the united Libyan Kingdom under King Idris on Dec. 24, 1951. The occasion, which has been widely regarded as the start of Libya's modern history, ceased to be marked as a day of national celebration during the Qadhafi era. Instead, the Qadhafi regime chose to mark only the Sept. 1, 1969, date of the coup that brought the late ousted Libyan leader to power. Now, with the Qadhafi era over and with Libya charting a new path,

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Libyans from the capital in Tripoli to other cities across the country took to the streets to celebrate the country's history. The celebrations would also include participation by members of Libya's interim government, the Transitional National Council.

In February 2012, officials in Niger said they would not be extraditing Saadi Qadhafi, the son of the former Libyan leader, to Libya due to concerns that he might be killed in his home country. Instead, officials in Libya said that Saadi Qadhafi would be turned over to the International Criminal Court. For his part, Saadi Qadhafi struck a defiant tone in an interview with al-Arabiya, saying that pro-Qadhafi elements were organizing their efforts against the Transitional National Council in Libya. He also appeared to foment conflict as he said, "I call everyone to be prepared for this uprising, and be ready for the zero hour. Because when it happens, it will a real uprising." The younger Qadhafi additionally anticipated his return to Libya in short order.

The provocative rhetoric from the younger Qadhafi served only to motivate Libyan interim authorities to renew their deamds that Saadi Qadhafi be arrested. National Transitional Council spokesman Mohammed Nasr al-Hraizi said in a statement issued by the Libyan government: "Saadi used the asylum he was granted in Niger on humanitarian basis to carry out acts of aggression against the Libyan people and their glorious revolution." Indeed, with Saadi Qadhafi promising a new revolution in Libya, authorities in Niger placed the son of the former Libyan leader under house arrest.

Meanwhile, the Transitional National Council in Libya did not seem overly concerned about the imminent return of pro-Qadhafi forces to the country, potentially posing a threat to the interim authorities . Instead, the Transitional National Council was preparing for landmark democratic elections in Libya. On the road to those elections, which could be held before June 2012, the transitional authorities adopted a new electoral law and said it was committed to democratic elections. As well, the United Nations mission in Libya said it was assisting the interim government in developing mechanisms and procedures needed to host the first elections to be held in Libya in 40 years. A statement from the United Nations mission in Libya read as follows: "The first free election for over four decades will provide an opportunity for Libyans to exercise their democratic rights to participate in a process which will shape the future of their country."

In March 2012, civic leaders in eastern Libya declared the oil-rich region to be a semi- autonomous zone following a meeting in Benghazi. They explained that they made the decision to respond to the historic neglect of the region, which was once known as Cyrenaica.

This development only served to increase tensions with the governing Transitional National Council (TNC) in the capital city of Tripoli. NTC leader, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, excoriated external players for inciting disunity in Libya, which could well give way to partition. He blamed such players for hijacking the Libyan revolution that freed the country from the grip of now deceased Qadhafi.

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Nevertheless, the thrust for some sort of autonomy has found resonance in eastern Libya with many people in the region responding positively to the idea of having their own parliament, police force, legal system, and even their own capital (Benghazi). The proposal, though, would leave foreign policy to the domain of the federal powers in Tripoli. Ahmed al-Zubair, a political prisoner under Qadhafi and a member of the TNC, was appointed to serve as the leader of a governing Cyrenaica council. Advocates of the proposal said that federalism would preserve unity while also extending autonomy to the region. The move, if it proved to be sustainable, could possibly pave the way for a new system of administrative division in Libya based on historic regional divisions of Libya. Other than Cyrenaica in the east, Libya was divided into Tripolitania in the northwest and Fezzan in the southwest.

It should be noted that by the middle of the month (mid-March 2012), fights had broken out in Benghazi between supporters and opponents of Cyrenaica's proposal to become a semi- autonomous entity.

At the start of April 2012, clashes between ethnic Berbers and Arabs residents in Libya left more than a dozen people dead and scores more injured. The clashes in the predominantly Berber town of Zuwara in western Libya were ongoing for several days, prompting the Transitional National Council (TNC), which now governs post-Qadhafi Libya, to send a delegation to the area. The TNC said that its representatives would be tasked with implementing and enforcing a ceasefire. Interior Minister Fawzi Abdel A'al said that both sides were asked "to restrain themselves... because there will be no winner in this battle." But the clashes were not limited to Zuwara. A week earlier, rival militias were embroiled in a bloody conflict in the southern city of Sabha, which left around 150 people dead. The scenes in Zuwara and Sabha raised questions about the stability of Libya in the post-Qadhafi era, and under the administration of the TNC. For its part, the TNC, which has no real central authority, has the difficult task of trying to assert its authority over tribal groups that have harbored long-standing regional rivalries.

The start of April 2012 was also marked by the refusal of the Libyan Transitional National Council (TNC) to hand over the son of former leader, to the International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague. In keeping with a prevailing arrest warrant for alleged crimes against humanity committed during the 2011 war of liberation, the ICC was pressing the Libyan interim authorities to send Saif al-Islam Qadhafi to The Hague to face justice. But the TNC said they wanted Qadhafi's son to be tried by Libyan courts. Yet to be determined was the matter of whether or not the Libyan national judicial system would be able to bring Saif al-Islam Qadhafi to justice in an independent and impartial manner.

In a separate development, the government of Mauritania announced that it had "agreed in principle" to extradite Abdullah al-Senussi, the former head of intelligence service during the regime of Qadhafi, to Libya. In 2011, the International Criminal Court had issued warrants against

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Qadhafi (now deceased), his son Saif Islam (as discussed above), as well as and al-Senussi on charges of crimes against humanity during the uprising of that year, which ultimately led to a popular revolution and the end of the Qadhafi regime.

At the start of June 2012, an armed Libyan militia occupied the main Tripoli airport, with the aim of securing the release of their leader. That leader of the al-Awfia brigade was reportedly detained when he tried to enter the Libyan capital with two tanks and no identity documents. His detainment was shrouded in mystery; the government claimed that his tanks and weapons were seized and he returned home, but there were suggestions of a subsequent kidnapping. Fighters from the al-Awfia brigade arrived in Tripoli with the intent of securing the release of their leader. They drove armored trucks onto the airport runway and forced flight diversions. After an exchange of gunfire, security forces were able to apprehend the al-Awfia fighters without casualties, and restore order. According to Omar Khadrawi, Libya's deputy interior minister, "The authorities have complete control over the airport." It was unknown as to whether the situation was resolved - - even in part -- because the government made concessions to the militia.

In August 2012, the Libyan capital of Tripoli was hit by twin car bombings that left two people dead and several others injured. One explosion occurred close to the former military academy for women, while the second explosion happened in close proximity to the interior ministry. Both attacks took place as crowds amassed for prayers in celebration of the Muslim occasion of Eid ul- Fitr that marks the end of the holy month of Ramadan. The new Libyan authorities placed the blame for these bombings on Qadhafi loyalists.

The August 2012 bombings constituted a significant return to violence in Tripoli since the ousting of former leader, Muammar Qadhafi, in 2011. That being said, Tripoli was not without unrest in the post-Qadhafi period. As noted above, in June 2012, an armed Libyan militia occupied the main Tripoli airport, with the aim of securing the release of their leader. That leader of the al- Awfia brigade was reportedly detained when he tried to enter the Libyan capital with two tanks and no identity documents. His detainment was shrouded in mystery; the government claimed that his tanks and weapons were seized and he returned home, but there were suggestions of a subsequent kidnapping. As well, as noted above, the eastern city of Benghazi has seen several attacks in the post-Qadhafi period, along with the thrust for an autonomous region to be established in the east called Cyrenaica.

Landmark Elections

Libya was set to hold its first democratic elections on June 19, 2012 (since delayed to July 7, 2012 as noted below). Voting would be held to elect the members of a 200-strong Constituent Assembly, which would be tasked with drafting a new constitution and the formation of a government. These would be the first democratic national elections in 60 years.

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Ahead of the landmark elections, Libyan authorities banned the formation of political parties based on religion, tribe, or ethnicity. Still, the religious element would not be gone completely as members of the Muslim Brotherhood were contesting the elections under the aegis of the Justice and Construction Party.

Then, at the start of June 2012, there were some rumblings about a possible delay of the elections until July 2012 due to logistical concerns. To that end, the country's electoral committee soon announced that the forthcoming constituent assembly elections would be held on July 7, 2012.

On that day -- July 7, 2012 -- Libyans went to the polls to cast their ballots in the historic elections. There were some reports of disturbances in the cities of Brega, Ras Lanuf, and Ajdabiya, as gunmen tried to disrupt the vote process. In Ajdabiya, the violence left at least one person dead. Nevertheless, voter turnout was said to be high at 60 percent and many voters were reported to be carrying the black, red and green flag of the Libyan revolution. There were also shouts of "Libya is Free" by voters participating in the democratic process -- for the first time in the lives for most middle-aged and young people.

That revolution of 2011 started in eastern Libya, and it was from that part of the country that a growing sense of post-revolutionary discontent was brewing. At issue was the fact that the new Constituent Assembly would be dominated by western constituencies (100 seats in all), while the east would only have 60 seats, and the south would have the remaining 40 seats. The division of constituencies, to the benefit of the western part of the country, and to the detriment of the oil-rich east, suggested that the regional power balance of the Qadhafi era would prevail at the structural level, even after these elections. With an eye on registering their discontent, some former rebels reportedly had a hand in shutting down several oil terminals, including those at Brega, Ras Lanouf and Sidra, and in so doing disrupted Libya's oil exporting capacity.

For its part, the Transitional National Council of Libya attempted to defuse the regional tensions by declaring that the incoming Assembly (no longer dubbed to be a "Constituent Assembly") would not, in fact, be given the task of administering the drafting of the new constitution. Instead, its duties would be curtailed to simply forming a new government, with a separate vote set to take place in the future as regards the constitutional drafting plan.

There were no immediate official results. However, the liberal and secularist alliance claimed to be in the lead. Faisal Krekshi, the secretary general of the Alliance of National Forces (which is actually led by Mahmoud Jibril) suggested that the liberal/secular bloc was emerging as the big election winner. That claim was not confirmed by Nouri al-Abar, the head of Libya's election commission, who said that the vote count was ongoing.

By mid-July 2012, news had emerged that the liberal and secularist alliance, known as the Alliance

Libya Review 2016 Page 82 of 437 pages Libya of National Forces of interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, had won a landslide victory in Benghazi as well as several eastern cities, and was leading the vote overall. It should of course be noted that the strong performance of the liberal alliance did not guarantee that it would dominate the Assembly, since the majority of seats were earmarked for independents.

On July 18, 2012, the Libyan election results were announced -- Jibril's bloc won 39 out of the 80 seats reserved for political parties. The Muslim Brotherhood's party has garnered 17 seats. That result certainly showed a triumph for liberal and secularist elements in Libya. That being said, the lion's share of seats in the 200-seat Assembly -- 120 seats -- would be held by victorious independent candidates. As such, it was yet to be seen if any ideological realm would have the advantage in the full Assembly. Stated differently, the overall orientation of the body was unclear.

That being said, there were, at least, limited indications amidst the 80 party seats that Libya would buck the trend seen in other "liberated" Arab Spring countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, as Libyans had voted to give political power to the liberals and secularists rather than Islamists. For his part, rebel Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, who was now the leader of the liberal coalition (Alliance of National Force), was calling for the formation of a unity government. He said, "We extend an honest call for a national dialogue to come altogether in one coalition, under one banner ... This is an honest and sincere call for all political parties operating today in Libya." He continued, "There was no loser or winner ...Whoever wins, Libya is the real winner."

Note that in August 2012 the new Libyan interim Assembly elected former opposition activist and moderate Islamist Mohammed Magarief as its president. In that role, Magarief would have the responsibility of leading the effort to appoint a prime minister and pass legislation until full parliamentary elections could be held under a new constitution.

On Oct. 7, 2012, Libyan Prime Minister-elect Mustafa Abu Shagur was dismissed from his post after failing for to win parliamentary approval for a new cabinet. Shagur had been seeking parliamentary ratification for the formation of an "emergency government" with a reduced number of ministries; however, he could only muster limited support in the General National Congress (GNC). Earlier, his previous attempt to form a government was rejected in parliament due to the fact that it was not regionally representative. But it was the second failed vote that effectively ended his hopes to lead the new Libyan government. The deputy prime minister for more than a year, serving interim leader Abdurrahim al-Keib, Shagur was Libya's first elected prime minister in the post-Qadhafi era. Clearly, the scene was set for a new head of government to be elected. To that end, the GNC had less than a four-week period to accomplish that goal. On Oct. 14, 2012, it was Ali Zidane who was elected to be Libya's new head of government by the GNC. Now, Zidane would have to convene consultations aimed at forming a government of national unity.

Special Report

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U.S. ambassador and other State Department officials killed in attack on consulate in Libya; issue becomes domestic flashpoint in U.S.

On Sept. 11, 2012, militants stormed the United States consulate in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi yielding deadly consequences. Reports from the ground in Libya indicated that at least one United States state department official was killed and other Americans were wounded in the ensuing fracas, and that the embassy compound was set ablaze. That state department official was later revealed to be Ambassador Christopher Stevens who, along with other officials, died when unidentified armed men stormed the consulate compound and unleashed a volley of gunfire, grenades, and handmade bombs. Security forces returned fire but were overwhelmed for a time until the gunmen were repelled. Ambassador Stevens and the other State Department officials (another victim was identified as Sean Smith, a state department employee) died when the militants fired rockets at them as they tried to seek safety, according to Reuters News. (It should be noted that several media outlets, including BBC News and Al Jazeera, have stated that the ambassador died of suffocation, presumably from the smoke and fire produced by the rocket attack.)

The violence was sparked by a film that was said to possess anti-Islamic inclinations. The film, "Innocence of Muslims," appeared to be of amateur quality but was promoted by an ultra- conservative church pastor in Florida, Terry Jones, who was in the international spotlight in 2010 over his plan to burn Korans. A trailer of the film was released on YouTube and translated into Arabic around the same time as another film with negative Islamic depictions, titled "Mohammad, Prophet of Muslims," was circulating in the public purview. Together, the publicity surrounding these filmic productions resulted in a massive outcry with Muslims saying that they were insulting to the Islamic Prophet Mohammad.

Meanwhile, the apparent film producer, Sam Bacile, was reported to have maintained a defiant stance in an interview with the media. Speaking from an undisclosed location, Bacile said "Islam is a cancer" and asserted that his work was intended to be a provocative political statement. He insisted that it would help expose Islam's flaws to the world. In the interview reported by Reuters, Bacile appeared unaffected by the news that the negative reception of his film may have contributed to the tragedy unfolding in Libya. He said, "I feel the security system (at the embassies) is no good. America should do something to change it." Of course, the media has subsequently reported that Bacile was a pseudonym, with the identity of the producer being linked to Nakoula Basseley Nakoula -- an apparent Coptic Christian who was convicted of bank fraud. It was clear that a great deal of mystery increasingly surrounded the anti-Islamic treatise.

Blame for the violence and the killings initially fell the Islamist extremist militia, known as the Ansar al-Sharia brigade. There were other reports suggesting the involvement of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb -- an offshoot of the terror base, al-Qaida -- in the Libyan attack, with United

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States officials hinting that the assault may have been a planned operation. Stated differently, the attack in Libya might be distinct from other protests unfolding in other parts of the region over the controversial anti-Islamic film. Instead, there was initial fear that it may have been an operation intended to be carried out on the anniversary of the September 11, 2001, terror attacks in the United States 11 years prior, and it may have utilized the convenient "cover" of these mass protests. The rationale for such an attack, other than being of a pure Jihadist orientation, remained unclear; however, it was possible that al-Qaida sought revenge over the killing of al-Qaida deputy leader, Abu Yahya al-Libi, who died in a drone strike earlier in the year. Notably, al-Qaida confirmed the death of al-Libi, whose name itself translates into "the Libyan" on Sept. 11, 2012 -- the very day of the attack in Libya. That being said, this was simply a theory in a still-evolving story, which has focused on the mass unrest spreading across the Muslim world. (See "Update" below for more information about the emerging terror connection to the Benghazi tragedy.)

The Libyan government was quick to distance itself from the violence directed at Ambassador Stevens and the other State Department officials and to emphasize its strong ties to the United States. Libyan deputy Prime Minister Mustafa Abu Shagour condemned the killing of the American diplomats, characterizing the violence as cowardly. Additionally, Libya's interim President Mohammed Magarief apologized to the United States over the deaths of the American diplomats, characterizing the bloodshed as "cowardly criminal acts." As well, Libya's deputy envoy to the United Nations, Ibrahim Dabashi, pledged that there would be an investigation into the violence. In remarks in front of the United Nations Security Council, Dabashi referred to Ambassador Stevens' death as follows: "We cannot understand how this group, or these persons, could have eliminated such a wonderful person."

Speaking on behalf of her country, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton responded to the death of the State Department diplomats in Libya with the following statement: "We are heartbroken by this terrible loss." The statement continued, "Some have sought to justify this vicious behavior as a response to inflammatory material... The United States deplores any intentional effort to denigrate the religious beliefs of others. But let me be clear: There is never any justification for violent acts of this kind."

For his part, President Barack Obama condemned "in the strongest possible terms the outrageous and shocking" attack. Speaking from the Rose Garden at the White House, he paid tribute to the tragic end of Ambassador Stevens' life, referencing the veteran diplomat's role in the overthrow of Libya's former dictatorial leader, Qadafi, saying: "It is especially tragic that Chris Stevens died in Benghazi because it is a city that he helped to save." President obama vowed to bring to justice those who carried out the attack that killed Ambassador Stevens and other diplomatic personnel in Libya. To this end, President Obama said: "Justice will be done." He also indicated an emerging belief that the attack in Benghazi might be connected to terrorism, as he asserted: "No acts of terror will ever shake the resolve of this great nation."

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It should be noted that the president ordered security at diplomatic missions be intensified around the world, and additionally deployed an anti-terrorism team consisting of experts from the Marines to Libya to bolster security there in the aftermath of the attack.

Protests spread across the Muslim World; embassies of Western powers attacked

Protests over the same film erupted in the Egyptian capital city of Cairo as well as the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, with the United States embassy being the main target in both cases. The protests soon spread to embassies of Western countries located in various other Muslim countries including Lebanon, Bangladesh, Tunisia, Sudan, Nigeria, as well as the Palestinian territory of Gaza, while unrest persisted in Egypt and Yemen. German and British embassies were attacked in Tunisia and Sudan; in several Muslim countries, as protests spread, there were reports of deaths. The government of Yemen, like the government of Libya, was quick to express condemnation over the attacks on the United States' embassies. However, there has been concern over the weakness of the new Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi's response, prompting United States President Obama to characterize Egypt as neither an ally nor an enemy, effectively placing relations with post-Nile Revolution Egypt in the category of "to be determined." Egyptian authorities soon stepped up their efforts to repel the protesters in that country.

Libyans attack Islamist compound in retaliation for Ambassador Stevens' killing

As September 2012 entered its final week, tens of thousands marched in Benghazi to show their opposition to armed militias in Libya. On Sept. 21, 2012, a mass of Libyans registered their outrage over the killing of Ambassador Stevens by storming the compound of the Islamic extremist militia Ansar al-Shariah Brigade, which was suspected of being involved in the attack. The crowd forced militia fighters out of the premises and set the building ablaze. Fighters from Ansar al-Shariah at first tried to disperse the crowd using gunfire, but soon abandoned the compound as they were overwhelmed by the wave of outraged and angry Libyans screaming "No to militias." While no deaths were reported in the assault on the building, the action was a clear message that regular Libyans rejected the orientation of extremism in their country, only recently liberated from the tyranny of the Qadhafi regime.

Politics and the terrorism link to Benghazi tragedy

In late September 2012, United States Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, following on the heels of the president's words in the Rose Garden of the White House, publicly connected the attack at the United States diplomatic mission in Benghazi with terrorism. She noted that there was quite possibly a link with an al-Qaida affiliate in the region, perhaps even al-Qaida in the Maghreb. Soon thereafter, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta offered a more definitive assessment as follows: "It was a terrorist attack. As we determined the details of what took place there and how that attack took place, it became clear that there were terrorists who had planned that attack."

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As well, the office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), James Clapper, attempted to address the shifting explanation of what transpired in Benghazi. DNI spokesperson, Shawn Turner explained that intelligence initially concluded that the attack on the diplomatic mission was sparked in the aftermath of the violent protests in Egypt. He continued, "We provided that initial assessment to Executive Branch officials and members of Congress, who used that information to discuss the attack publicly and provide updates as they became available. As we learned more ... we revised our initial assessment to reflect new information indicating that it was deliberate and organized terrorist attack carried out by extremists."

Republicans were quick to pounce on the evolving explanation, first claiming that it was clear the killing of Ambassador Stevens was part of a terrorist attack, and later suggesting that the White House may have attempted a "cover up" of the true events that transpired in Benghazi. Specifically, they alleged that the Obama administration was trying to hide the fact that an act of terrorism may have taken place, since such an occurrence would mar President Obama's national security record. That being said, in the wake of the attack, Libyan officials were themselves quite clear in their belief that the assault on the United States diplomatic mission was the work of terrorists. As well, President Barack Obama himself used the following words only one day after the attack (as noted above): "No acts of terror will ever shake the resolve of this great nation." Thus, some observers noted that if a "cover up" was afoot, it was not a particularly well-plotted one since the president himself was referencing the possibility of terrorism.

By the second week of October 2012, about a month ahead of the 2012 presidential election, the Republican chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Rep. Darrell Issa, convened emergency hearings, charging that security failures at the embassy in Benghazi led to the death of Ambassador Stevens and three other Americans in Libya. For Democrats, the hearings constituted a transparent attempt to embarrass the Obama administration for inadequate diplomatic security at the embassy in Benghazi. But as noted in an article by Dana Milbank in the Washington Post, diplomatic security may have been less than optimal largely due to budget cuts brought about by Republicans in Congress. To that end, Milbank wrote: “For fiscal 2013, the GOP-controlled House proposed spending $1.934 billion for the State Department’s Worldwide Security Protection program — well below the $2.15 billion requested by the Obama administration. House Republicans cut the administration’s request for embassy security funding by $128 million in fiscal 2011 and $331 million in fiscal 2012. (Negotiations with the Democrat- controlled Senate restored about $88 million of the administration’s request.) Last year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned that Republicans’ proposed cuts to her department would be “detrimental to America’s national security” — a charge Republicans rejected.

On Oct. 15, 2012, Secretary of State Clinton said in an interview with CNN that she, and not the White House, took responsibility for the security situation in Benghazi, leading up to the Sept. 11, 2012 terrorist attack at the consulate there that left four Americans, including the ambassador,

Libya Review 2016 Page 87 of 437 pages Libya dead. She said: "I take responsibility." Secretary of State Clinton also explained that the state of "confusion" in the aftermath of the attack contributed to inconsistent, and sometimes confusing, explanations of the cause of the attack in Libya, and the actual motivation of those responsible. She said that she was taking public responsibility for what happened because she wanted "to avoid some kind of political gotcha."

But the issue was, indeed, becoming a political flashpoint. As noted above, House Republicans were determined to argue that the Obama administration was to be blamed for either insufficient security or a cover up. The matter was slipping into the presidential race where Republican nominee, Mitt Romney, was arguing that the situation in Libya was illustrative of President Obama's "unraveling" foreign policy.

In a pre-election presidential debate in the United States in mid-October 2012, there was a question from selected voters on the subject of Libya and foreign policy. The Republican candidate attempted to draw President Obama into a contretemps over the administration's handling of the terror attack in Benghazi. Romney suggested that the president waited two weeks before characterizing the incident as a terror attack, saying, "It took the president 14 days before he called the attack in Benghazi an act of terror." But President Obama was sanguine in his knowledge that he had, on the day after the attack, promised in a speech from the White House Rose Garden the following: "No acts of terror will ever shake the resolve of this great nation." Romney seemed unwilling to let go of his confidence in the two week timeline, although the moderator, Candy Crowley, confirmed that the president had indeed called the attack "an act of terror" on Sept. 12, 2012.

By Oct. 24, 2012, emails correspondence between the States Department, the White House, and intelligence officials, revealed that the aforementioned Islamist group, Ansar al-Sharia, had claimed responsibility for the attack. Some critics of the Obama administration in the United States suggested that the emails would place pressure on the White House. That is to sat, they might reinforce Republican claims that there was some sort of obfuscation involved in the situation, as well as a reluctance by the White House to acknowledge the terrorism element. However, the Ansar al-Sharia connection was not a new revelation. As noted above, right after the attack on the Benghazi consulate, there were immediate reports the Ansar al-Sharia brigade was to blame. Immediate reports, though, could not be considered conclusive. The group's claim of responsibility on Facebook, as noted by Secretary of State Clinton, was not the same as proof. Indeed, extremist groups often surface to claim responsibility for attacks even when they are not involved; they do so in order to garner (dubious) cachet for the successful execution of acts of terrorism. Secretary of State Clinton said that the review board she appointed to investigate the attack would be "looking at everything," instead of "cherry picking one story here or one document there."

Nevertheless, it was expected that the political dimensions of the Benghazi would continue to dominate the landscape in the United states, with oversight committees in the House of

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Representatives and the Senate expected to look into the matter themselves. Meanwhile, it should be noted that the government of Tunisian government arrested Tunisian national in connection with the consulate attack in Libya.

In January 2013, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave testimony to committees in both houses of Congress over the handling of the attack by terrorists on the American consulate in Benghazi on Sept. 11, 2012. During her testimony, Secretary Clinton took responsibility for the security failures that led to the attack, which ended fatally for Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans. The matter spurred a heated partisan debate, with many Republicans accusing the Obama administration of trying to obfuscate the terrorist element of the attack, even though both President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Clinton wasted no time in characterizing the attack as such. Secretary of State Clinton tearfully recalled accompanying President Barack Obama to receive the bodies of the four victims. As well, Secretary Clinton accepted all the recommendations of a non-partisan inquiry board looking into the attack and security lapses, saying: "Nobody is more committed to getting this right. I am determined to leave the state department and our country safer, stronger and more secure."

Unrest in Libya

On April 4, 2013, masked gunmen launched an attack on a police station in the Libyan capital of Tripoli. The incident started when the 10 masked men armed with rifles forced their way into the police station, tied up police officers on the premises, and released freed five men being detained there. Also in the first week of April 2013, an adviser to Prime Minister Ali Zeidan was abducted by assailants just outside Tripoli. In the same period of early April 2013, just as control over a Tripoli jail was supposed to have been transferred from an armed group of men to Libyan authorities, that armed cabal stormed the justice ministry. The incidents were clear reminders that even in the post-Qadhafi era in Libya, the country remained unstable and insecure terrain, marked by ongoing power struggles between armed rival camps.

On April 23, 2013, a car bomb exploded close to the compound of the French embassy in the Libyan capital city of Tripoli. The explosion occurred in the morning and damaged the embassy, as well as several buildings in the area including two villas and several shopping establishments. Because the embassy compound was empty at the time of the apparent terrorist attack, there were no deaths and limited casualties - two security guards and a young girl were injured in the blast.

Libya Review 2016 Page 89 of 437 pages Libya end, French President Francois Hollande issued his own statement, as follows: "France expects the Libyan authorities to ensure that all possible light is shed on this unacceptable act so that the perpetrators are identified and brought to justice."

The attack on the French embassy in Tripoli came less than a year after militants stormed the American consulate in Benghazi, resulting in the death of Ambassador Chris Stevens. Both incidences cast a harsh light on the reality that even in the aftermath of the Qadhafi era, Libya was beset by instability, and foreign interests posed a particularly attractive target for extremists militants of the type believed to be responsible for both attacks on diplomatic entities.

Note that at the start of May 2013, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States released surveillance photos of three individuals who were on the grounds of the United States Special Mission in Benghazi when it was attacked on Sept. 11, 2012. The attack resulted in the death of Chris Stevens, the U.S. ambassador to Libya, and three other Americans. The FBI was hoping that the release of the three men on the United States diplomatic compound would spur the memories of persons able to shed light on the violent attack, and thus assist in bringing those responsible to justice. The FBI did not specifically identify these three men as suspects although, according to NBC News, the agency has 45 possible persons on a list of "persons suspected of involvement in the attack." Meanwhile, an anonymous source from United States law enforcement told CNN News that it was believed that al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula may have played a role in attacks on the consulate office in Libya.

In mid-August 2013, Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan emphatically declared that he had no intention of resigning from power despite the political turmoil rocking the country. At issue was the combination of a spate of resignations in the Libyan government, along with the increasingly alarming security crisis facing the country. But for his part, Prime Minister Ali Zeidan said that as long as he enjoyed the confidence of the National General Congress -- Libya's parliament -- there was no reason for him to step down. Prime Minister Zeidan further noted that given the turbulence facing Libya, his resignation would, in fact, create a political vacuum and thus exacerbate Libya's difficulties.

Also in mid-August 2013, members of Libya's minority Berber community, known as the Amazigh, stormed the country's parliament building in Tripoli. They were no reports of injuries associated with the assault although there was evidence of vandalism; as well, documents belonging to members of parliament were reported to have been stolen.

At issue was the Amazigh's demand that the future constitution recognize their culture, including their language and ethnicity. Composed of less than 10 percent of the Libyan population, the Amazigh claim to have roots in Libya prior to the arrival of Arab settlers who now dominate the country and who installed their Islamic religion across the region. Despite their historic ties to the land that makes up contemporary Libya, the Amazigh have long suffered discrimination, and

Libya Review 2016 Page 90 of 437 pages Libya particularly repression at the hands of the former Qadhafi regime. For his part, Muammar Qadhafi, who was deposed in 2011, viewed the Amazigh as a blight on his vision of a homogenous Arabic Libya. As such, under his leadership, the Amazigh language, the distinctive Tamazight script, and even the usage of Amazigh names, were respectively banned in Libya.

Given their central role in the 2011 revolution against the Qadhafi regime, especially in the Nafusa mountains, the Amazigh were anxious and impatient to see their culture finally receive respect.

There was no secret to the fact that despite hopes for a burgeoning democracy in Libya in the post-Qadhafi era, in fact, the country was mired by violence, lawlessness, and unrest, and plagued by bloodshed at the hands of various factions, ranging from former rebels to supporters of the ousted Qadhafi regime, not to mention Islamists and other extremists.

On Oct. 5, 2013, gunmen ambushed and killed 15 soldiers at a military checkpoint to the south of Tripoli. The area -- a known stronghold of former leader, Muammar Qadhafi -- suggested that the assailants may have been hostile to the current Libyan government that came to power in the aftermath of 2011 revolution.

But the political turmoil in Libya took a particularly ominous turn on Oct. 10, 2013, when reports were emerging that the Libyan head of government, Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, was abducted by a group of 100 armed men believed to be former rebels (vis a vis stalwarts of Qadhafi). Media reports indicated that Zeidan was seized from the Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli. A statement from the government of Libya read as follows: "The head of the government Ali Zeidan was taken at dawn this morning by gunmen to an unknown place for unknown reasons." Government sources further stated that Zeidan was taken to an undisclosed location by former rebels who participated in the uprising that ousted the former Qadhafi regime from power, but who were now part of a militia.

It was not known if this apparent abduction was related to the fact that Prime Minister Zeidan had recently called on the West to assist in the effort to halt the rise of extremism and militancy in Libya, and to help deal with the fact that Libya was increasingly becoming a base for the transfer of weapons across the region. There were also suggestions that militias may have acted against Zeidan in retaliation for a United States commando raid into Libyan territory that ended in the capture of a senior al-Qaida suspect, Anas al-Liby.

A militia groups said it carried out the abduction of Zeidan on the basis of an order from the prosecutor general. The militia group claimed it was acting in accordance with Libya's criminal code relating to "crimes and misdemeanors harmful to state security. However, the country's justice minister, Salah al-Marghani, denied that the prosecutor general had issued an arrest warrant in the first place.

Several hours after reports of his abduction first surfaced, Prime Minister Zeidan was released

Libya Review 2016 Page 91 of 437 pages Libya from captivity. There was limited information about the details surrounding his release; however, during a cabinet meeting that was televised, Zeidan was shown thanking those responsible for his escape and thus lending evidence to the belief that it involved a clandestine security operation.

Prime Minister Zeidan also characterized his short abduction brief as an "attempted coup," and placed the blame on his political opponents. In a nationally-televised address, Prime Minister Zeidan announced that an opposition political party with seats in the congress was behind his kidnapping. Referring to that political party as a "dangerous minority," the prime minister delivered the following accusation: "When they failed to bring down the government through democratic means, they resorted to the use of force." The prime minister further said that his abduction "bears the hallmarks of an attempted coup d'etat against legitimacy."

The threat to security in Libya continued on Oct. 18, 2013 when masked gunmen in Benghazi killed a military police commander, Ahmed al-Barghathi, just as he departed his home. While there was no claim of responsibility, it was apparent that Barghathi was the latest security official targeted for assassination since the 2011 revolution that terminated the Qadhafi regime in Libya. Indeed, over the course of the period from 2012 to 2013, as many as 80 high profile security officials from the military or police have been assassinated in Libya. For his part, Barghathi gained notoriety as an official who fought against the pro-Qadhafi forces. As such, there was speculation that latent pro-Qadafi entities who survived the revolution may have been biding their time to take up arms against those viewed as opponents to Qadhafi and enablers of the revolution.

In mid-November 2013, Libya was plagued by a spate of deadly clashes. As many as 47 people were killed and more than 500 others were injured. The outbreak of violence occurred on Nov. 15, 2013 when gunmen from a Misrata militia opened fire on protesters , who were themselves trying to force them to leave their headquarters in the capital city of Tripoli. The protesters were seemingly registering their frustration with the militias' tactics of intimidatin, which led to the abduction of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan in October 2013 and the kidnapping of Libyan deputy intelligence chief Mustafa Nuh in November 2013.

The violent response of the Misrata militia to the demonstration served only to invigorate the outrage of the civilian population. Moreover, leaders in the city of Tripoli declared a three day general strike and called on residents to take to the streets to protest against the militias. By Nov. 18, 2013, the city of Misrata's own local council and its council of elders entered the fray by ordering all militia groups to withdraw from Tripoli within 72 hours. Misrata's own local council and its council of elders made it clear that the security of Tripoli was the purview of the Libyan government and not that of militias. It was to be seen if the Misrata militia would heed the call and exit Tripoli.

As November 2013 entered its final week, the militia handed over their base to the Ministry of Defense and the Libyan air force, although it was not known if militia members were actually

Libya Review 2016 Page 92 of 437 pages Libya withdrawing from Tripoli. Regardless, Prime Minister Ali Zeidan hailed the development, saying during a news conference, "The weapons that were in the hands of these groups was the security threat and now this threat has disappeared."

It should be noted that such militias came in to being during the Libya revolution of 2011, and they played a central role in ousting the Qadhafi regime from power. But years later, they have refused to demobilize and disarm, and had a difficult time integrating into the new political landscape in Libya. Indeed, they have continued to function as self-appointed security entities whose actions have often at odds with the government.

Note that incidences of violence continued in Libya in the first week of December 2013 with the killing of an American teacher in Libya's eastern city of Benghazi. Ronnie Smith who taught chemistry at the international school in Benghazi was reported to have been shot to death as he was jogging in the Fweihat residential district. There was no immediate claim of responsibility; however, residents of Benghazi have long decried the rise of several extremist militia groups in the city, which they say are responsible for regular assassinations, frequent bombings, and other acts of terrorism. Indeed, on the same day of Smith's death, three Libyan soldiers were killed in Benghazi.

Special Note on U.S. special forces action in Libya:

In October 2013, United States special forces raided terrorist enclaves in Libya, Somalia, and Afghanistan. In Libya, the action by United States special forces ended in the capture of a senior al-Qaida official -- Nazih Abdul-Hamed Nabih al-Ruqai'I, also known as Anas al-Libi -- a stalwart of the notorious terrorist Jihadist leader, Osama Bin Laden. Al-Libi has long been regarded as the orchestrator of the 1998 bombings of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and has thus been on the radar of United States anti-terrorism officials for some time. Now, in 2013, he was captured from the Libyan capital of Tripoli.

Following his capture, al-Liby was detained on a United States vessel in the Mediterranean for a week during which he was interrogated by intelligence officials. He was then transferred to the United States to face justice for his alleged role in the United States embassy bombings in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi and the Tanzanian capital of Dar-es-Salaam in 1998. It should be noted that al-Liby has denied having a role in the two embassy bombings in 1998. In a New York federal court on Oct. 15, 2013, he entered a plea of not guilt. The hearing was then adjourned until Oct. 22, 2013. In Libya, the government demanded an explanation for the raid that resulted in al-Liby's capture. In the United States, Secretary of State John Kerry defended the actions of his country saying that the actions of al-Liby made him a "legal and appropriate target."

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New president for Libya:

In June 2013, Mohamed al-Magarief resigned as the head of the General National Congress and thus the de facto president; the interim parliament elected Nuri Abu Sahmayn to replace him. An independent member of parliament and ethnic Berber, Sahmayn would serve as the head of state until fresh elections could be held.

Special Note on mandate for Libya's interim parliament:

In the second week of February 2014, the mandate for Libya's interim parliament expired and members extended their own authority. Members of the interim parliament, which came into being in 2012 after the fall of the Qadhafi regime, said they needed more time to draft a post-Qadhafi constitution. They said that if they failed to draft the constitution in 60 days, then they would hold fresh elections for a new interim assembly.

In response, thousands of Libyans in Tripoli and Benghazi took to the streets to demand the dissolution of the existing interim General National Congress (GNC). They argued that the GNC had made little discernible progress in Libya's political transition, and instead had remained embroiled in a power struggles -- largely between the nationalist National Forces Alliance (NFA) on one side, and the Justice and Construction Party (JCP), the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, on the other side.

The public's outrage over the lack of effectiveness of the GNC was exacerbated by the fact that it had done little to address the problems caused by militias. An ongoing rivalry between the Zintani brigade, which was loosely aligned with the NSA, and the Misrata militia, which held some links with the Islamist JCP, has only added to the country's political complications. Meanwhile, one militia had even managed to abduct Prime Minister Ali Zeidan -- if only for a short duration -- in the latter part of 2013. The incident drew into sharp relief the government's inability to bring stability to Libya.

Also of note was the fact that militias in the eastern part of the country (one led by a former rebel leader) had blockaded several ports, thus damaging oil exports than the country's main revenue source. As such, the political crisis rocking the country was fueling an emerging economic crisis.

It seemed that the outrage of the people held resonance. On Feb. 17, 2014, the GNC announced that fresh elections would be called "as early as possible." GNC President Nouri Abusahmain said that an election law would be approved by the end of March 2014, presumably with elections to follow, although an actual schedule was not disclosed.

Note that by the start of March 2014, political instability in Libya presented itself when protesters

Libya Review 2016 Page 94 of 437 pages Libya stormed the GNC. Two members of Libya's parliament were shot and wounded as they attempted to escape the scene. These protesters were demanding that the members of the GNC resign, that the GNC be dissolved, and that a precise date be set for elections.

Qadhafi son extradited from Niger:

Political drama continued as the first week of March 2014 came to a close when the government of Niger extradited Saadi Qadhafi -- the son of former Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi -- to Libya to face justice. Since the 2011 revolution that ended with the ousting and death of the older Qadhafi, the son fled the country, ulitmately seeking safe have in Niger. Until this time, Niger had been reluctant to extradite Qadafi; however, with a prevailing "red notice" from Interpol compelling countries to arrest him, Qadhafi was now in custody in Tripoli where he would face justice for abuses such as shooting protesters when he was the chief of Libya's special forces.

Libya PM dismissed over oil tanker blockade:

In March 2014, March 2014, Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan was dismissed as the country's head of government by the Libyan parliament. He had served as the head of government since 2012. The parliament made that decision after the government failed to stop rebels from defying a blockade and taking control of an oil tanker. That incident was the latest act of defiance from rebel militias who refuse to disarm after the former Qadhafi regime was ousted from power. Instead, they have increased their control over swaths of the country, maintaining domain over fiefdoms, while demanding a larger share of the profits from the oil revenue in Libya along with greater autonomy.

This latest humiliation of the government at the hands of the rebels -- in the form of the oil tanker debacle -- appeared to have motivated the parliament to make the decision to remove Zeidan from his post as prime minister. For some time, Zeidan's government has been under fire for failing to deal with rebel militias in the aftermath of the anti-Qadhafi revolution. Defense Minister Abdullah al-Thanni was named to be the interim prime minister until the parliament could find concurrence on a permanent replacement.

Separate from the oil tanker blockade scandal, Zeidan was subject to investigation due to suspicions that he was involved in the embezzlement of public funds. As such, the country's state prosecutor imposed a travel ban on Zeidan. But late on March 12, 2014, Zeidan was reported to have defied the travel ban in his effort to flee the country. He was reported to have been spotted in Malta, en route to another European country. Because of Zeidan's background as one who spent years living in exile in Germany, all expectations were that he may have returned to that country.

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Later in March 2014, following the removal of Zeidan from the post of prime minister, Abdullah Al-Thinni was named to be Libya's interim prime minister.

Update: on unrest in Libya

In the third week of March 2014, a bomb exploded on the runway of an airport in the Libyan capital city of Tripoli. According to the Libyan transport minister, an explosive device was planted on the runway of the country's main airport -- Tripoli International Airport -- and was detonated using a timer. The incident was illustrative of the deteriorating security landscape in Libya, especially since the Tripoli airport was one of the most secure installations in the country, being subject to heavy guard. Security personnel responded to the explosion, while airport authorities cancelled flights and shut down functions at the airport for several hours. Suspicions fell on hardened militias that have been outsmarting and outgunning the country's official police and military forces, and who have successfully raided and seized several government offices and oil fields.

Governmental Machinations:

As noted above, in late March 2014, following the removal of Zeidan from the post of prime minister, Abdullah Al-Thinni was named to be Libya's interim prime minister. But in late April 2014, after only about a month on the job, Thinni stepped down from office out of concern for the safety of his family who were threatened by militias. Now, as the parliament attempted to choose a replacement for Thinni, Libya's abysmal landscape of insecurity was brought into sharp relief with the storming of the parliament by gunmen. There were reports of gunshots and injuries. the armed gunman who attacked the parliament were allied with an ex general, Khalifa Haftar, and they were demanding that lawmakers hand over power to a legal commission until elections could be held later in the year. The mayhem led to the decision to suspend the voting. A fresh round of voting would instead be attempted in the first week of May 2014.

In the first week of May 2014, another attempt was made in the Libyan parliament to elect a prime minister. This event ended successfully with Ahmed Maitig, a businessman and hotel owner, being chosen to be the new head of government. Maitig said he intended to form a small "emergency" government, with limited technocratic priorities such as rebuilding security and military institutions with modern standards of technology. There would also be the implementation of a transitional system of justice, which would deal with grievances and offer support to the judiciary. To these ends, Maitig said: "I want to form a crisis government. The government will be based on four pillars -- to improve state control and sovereignty, rebuild the security and military institutions, start national reconciliation, and find urgent solutions for transitional justice and grievances."

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But Maitig was foiled from moving forward with his proposed agenda when the legal department of the country's Justice Ministry ruled that Maitig's election was illegal. Maitig, who was supported by independents and Islamist members of parliament, did not have the support of rival factions who launched a challenge against his election. That challenge saw success with the legal ruling discussed here.

At the close of May 2014, the outgoing interim prime minister -- Al-Thinni -- refused to cede power and placed the blame on conflicting orders from a deeply divided parliament. Al-Thinni insisted that he would hold onto his post as prime minister until the matter was resolved by members of parliament in the General National Congress.

By the start of June 2014, Libya's Supreme Court also ruled that parliament's election of Maitig as prime minister was unconstitutional. The move essentially removed Maitig from the political scene and officially reinstated Al-Thinni as prime minister. Al-Thinni's hold on power was thought to be a helpful development in assuaging rebels who have occupied several oil ports in the eastern part of the country. Those rebels were prepared to go forward with an accord to unblock access to the ports if Al-Thinni was the head of government; however, they made it known that they would not go forward with the deal if Maitig was prime minister.

Primer on snap parliamentary elections in Libya

Snap parliamentary elections were held in Libya on June 25, 2014, in the hopes of settling the country's tumultuous political landscape.

Ahead of the elections, the leadership of the country was a source of consternation. In February 2014, the mandate for Libya's interim parliament expired and members extended their own authority. Members of the interim parliament, which came into being in 2012 after the fall of the Qadhafi regime, said that they needed more time to draft a post-Qadhafi constitution. They said that if they failed to draft the constitution in 60 days, then they would hold fresh elections for a new interim assembly.

The public's outrage over the lack of effectiveness of the GNC was exacerbated by the fact that it

Libya Review 2016 Page 97 of 437 pages Libya had done little to address the problems caused by militias. An ongoing rivalry between the Zintani brigade, which was loosely aligned with the NSA, and the Misrata militia, which held some links with the Islamist JCP, has only added to the country's political complications. Meanwhile, one militia had even managed to abduct then-Prime Minister Ali Zeidan (if only for a short duration) in the latter part of 2013. The incident drew into sharp relief the government's inability to bring stability to Libya.

It seemed that the outrage of the people held resonance. The GNC soon announced that fresh elections would be called "as early as possible." GNC President Nouri Abusahmain said that an election law would be approved by the end of March 2014, presumably with elections to follow, although an actual schedule was not disclosed at the time.

Libya's leadership continued to be marked by turmoil when in March 2014, Prime Minister Zeidan was dismissed as the country's head of government by the Libyan parliament. He had served as the head of government since 2012. The parliament made that decision after the government failed to stop rebels from defying a blockade and taking control of an oil tanker. That incident was the latest act of defiance from rebel militias who refuse to disarm after the former Qadhafi regime was ousted from power. Instead, they have increased their control over swaths of the country, maintaining domain over fiefdoms, while demanding a larger share of the profits from the oil revenue in Libya along with greater autonomy. This latest humiliation of the government at the hands of the rebels -- in the form of the oil tanker debacle -- appeared to have motivated the parliament to make the decision to remove Zeidan from his post as prime minister. Separate from the oil tanker blockade scandal, Zeidan was subject to investigation due to suspicions that he was involved in the embezzlement of public funds.

Following the removal of Zeidan from the post of prime minister, Abdullah Al-Thinni was named to be Libya's interim prime minister. But in late April 2014, after only about a month on the job, Thinni stepped down from office out of concern for the safety of his family who were threatened by militias. As the parliament attempted to choose a replacement for Thinni, Libya's abysmal landscape of insecurity was brought into sharp relief with the storming of the parliament by anti- Islamist gunmen demanding that lawmakers hand over power to a legal commission until elections could be held later in the year.

In the first week of May 2014, another attempt was made in the Libyan parliament to elect a prime minister. This event ended successfully with Ahmed Maitig, a businessman and hotel owner, being chosen to be the new head of government. But Maitig was foiled from moving forward as the head of government when the legal department of the country's Justice Ministry ruled that Maitig's

Libya Review 2016 Page 98 of 437 pages Libya election was illegal. Maitig, who was supported by independents and Islamist members of parliament, did not have the support of rival factions who launched a challenge against his election.

By the start of June 2014, Libya's Supreme Court ruled that parliament's election of Maitig as prime minister was unconstitutional. The move essentially removed Maitig from the political scene and officially reinstated Al-Thinni as prime minister. Al-Thinni's hold on power was thought to be a helpful development in assuaging rebels who have occupied several oil ports in the eastern part of the country. Those rebels were prepared to go forward with an accord to unblock access to the ports if Al-Thinni was the head of government; however, they made it known that they would not go forward with the deal if Maitig was prime minister.

At the end of the month, attention was refocused on the parliamentary polls even though little progress had been made on the goal of drafting a new constitution. Despite hopes that a new parliament would bring stability to the country, voter turnout on June 25, 2014, was dismal at less than 15 percent while fighting was reported in the eastern city of Benghazi. The actual election involved candidates running as independents rather than as party representatives in an effort to prevent factionalism from marring the process. It was to be seen who would win the 200 seats in the new parliamentary body -- now called the House of Representatives.

Special Report: United States captures top suspect in Benghazi embassy attack

In mid-June 2014, as the result of a secret operation ordered by President Barack Obama, United States Special Operations forces captured Ahmed Abu Khattala, the suspected leader of the 2012 attack on the United States' diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya. Khattala was removed from Libya and would ultimately face justice in the United States. As discussed above, that attack resulted in the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and other Americans.

The capture of Khattala was the culmination of a two-year long investigation, which was made more difficult as a result of the politically tumultuous landscape in Libya. At home in the United States, Republicans have long sought to make political hay of the Benghazi tragedy, trying to link it to poor handling of embassy security by the Obama White House and then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. It should be noted that a commission led by diplomatic veteran, Thomas R. Pickering, and Admiral Mike Mullen, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concluded that while there were “systemic failures” and “management deficiencies” by State Department officials in protecting the Benghazi diplomatic mission, there was simply no evidence of a cover-up by the Obama administration, as alleged by some Republicans.

Libya Review 2016 Page 99 of 437 pages Libya administration was the question of whether a United States commando operation on Libyan soil would present complications for the fragile Libyan government dealing with ongoing political chaos. Now, however, in June 2014, President Obama made the decision to go forward with the operation, which -- much like the operation to capture or kill Osama bin Laden in a raid into Pakistani territory -- also ended in success. This time, however, the suspect was apprehended alive and would face justice in the United States.

A statement from the United States Pentagon made it clear that all special operations personnel had departed Libya safely with Khattala in custody. That statement read as follows: “All U.S. personnel involved in the operation have safely departed Libya.”

President Obama, for his part, noted that the capture of Khattala was a partial fulfillment of his promise to locate those responsible for the attack on the United States diplomatic mission in Benghazi, and bring them to justice. He said, “Since the deadly attacks on our facilities in Benghazi, I have made it a priority to find and bring to justice those responsible for the deaths of four brave Americans.” Speaking of the effort by United States intelligence, law enforcement, and military personnel to locate and seize, President Obama said, "Because of their courage and professionalism, this individual will now face the full weight of the American justice system.”

It should be noted that Dr. Susan Rice -- part of President Obama's national security team and the ambassador to the United Nations at the time in 2012 -- was pilloried by Republicans for saying during interviews that the Benghazi embassy attack was motivated by the (aforementioned) video that raised the ire of Muslims across the Middle East. Republicans said she was not casting the attack as terrorism even though President Obama himself characterized the Benghazi attack as such during a speech in the White House rose garden shortly after the bloodshed.

Fast-forward two years to 2014, and in a report by the New York Times, Khattala was on the record describing the reasoning for the attack as being anger over the infamous video that mocked Islam. The New York Times article noted the following: "On the day of the attack, Islamists in Cairo had staged a demonstration outside the United States Embassy there to protest an American- made online video mocking Islam, and the protest culminated in a breach of the embassy’s walls — images that flashed through news coverage around the Arab world. As the attack in Benghazi was unfolding a few hours later, Mr. Abu Khattala told fellow Islamist fighters and others that the assault was retaliation for the same insulting video, according to people who heard him."

The article continued with this other assertion by Khattala that he was not only responsible for the attack but had been driven to take revenge for the insulting video: "But Mr. Abu Khattala told other Libyans in private conversations during the night of the attack that he was moved to attack the diplomatic mission to take revenge for an insult to Islam in an American-made online video."

For Republicans, this news would likely blunt their continued attacks on Rice, who was now

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President Obama's national security adviser; instead, their attention remained on lingering accusations that the White House had concealed key details related to the Benghazi attack, along with displeasure that Khattala was being brought to the United States to face justice instead of being isolated at Guantanamo Bay.

Latest Developments (as of 2014)

In July 2014, Libyan authorities confirmed that they were going ahead with plans to move the country's parliament to Benghazi despite the security crisis plaguing that eastern port city. Rather than house the parliamentary body in the capital of Tripoli, the plan to move the parliament to Benghazi was being motivated by the government's intent to reconstruct and redevelop the tumultuous eastern realm of the country, which was subject to neglect by the previous Qadhafi regime. As well, the Libyan authorities hoped that the move would facilitate more of a governing imprint in the part of the country known as a hotbed of unrest.

Libya's abysmal landscape of insecurity was the focus of global attention in the summer of 2014 when rival militias embroiled in vicious fighting took their battle to the Tripoli airport.

The middle of 2014 was marked by successive battles between the Misrata-based Islamist Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room (LROR) and the militia of Zintan, which left several people dead. As well, most of the aircrafts and key facilities at the airport were destroyed as a result of relentless pounding by Grad rockets. Moreover, the Zintain militia had retained control over the area where it had held sway since the ousting of former leader, Muammar Qadhafi in 2011.

It should be noted that the Zintan militia was allied with the anti-Islamist Qaaqaa and al-Sawaiq factions, along with a handful of former Qadhafi forces. The Misrata-based Islamist Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room (LROR) was aligned with pro-Islamist brigades.

In the years that followed the end of the Qadhafi regime, the new government of Libya has unsuccessfully tried to disarm and wrest control from various militias, such as those from Zintan and Misrata. Those militias, which played a central role in the revolution that helped end the Qadhafi regime, were not integrating well into the new political landscape of Libya, and instead remained embroiled in ongoing turf battles, power struggles, and quasi-warlordism seen in lawless failed states across the world. Still, since Libya no longer had a properly functioning army, the militias served the purpose of providing security in certain regions of the country. In fact, some of them were on the payroll of the government for this very reason. The problem for the government was that, unlike the army, these militias could not easily be controlled by a central government.

A temporary ceasefire at the Tripoli airport went into effect on July 30, 2014, to allow firefighters to try to gain control over a burning fuel depot that was struck by a rocket. However, by the start

Libya Review 2016 Page 101 of 437 pages Libya of August 2014, the burning fuel tanks continued to pose a risk, with the possibility of an explosion being high. As well, the fighting between the rival Zintan and Misrata militias had resumed. At the start of August 2014, the death toll in Tripoli stood at about 200 victims since the start of the fighting weeks prior.

In Benghazi, a combined cabal of former rebels and Islamists militias from the terror group, Ansar al-Sharia, charged and overran an army base. It should be noted that this combined cabal were now operating under the aegis of the self-declared Benghazi Shura Council. After the fighting subsided there, the bodies of 75 people were discovered -- most of them being soldiers. It was clear Libya was beset by the worst violence and bloodshed since the revolution of 2011 that ended with the ousting of the former Qadhafi regime.

As of mid-August 2014, the fighting was going on in Tripoli; however, a United Nations delegation was in Libya to convene talks with the rival factions and hopefully broker a ceasefire agreement.

No such ceasefire was in the immediate offing, however, as on Aug. 18, 2014, pro-Islamist Misrata militias in Tripoli were being struck by aerial bombardment. Those air strikes killed several people and injured dozens more, and constituted an escalation of the Zintan versus Misrata conflict, which hitherto this point had been limited to ground battles involving artillery and rockets.

It was soon revealed that a renegade general -- Khalifa Haftar -- was behind the air strikes. While Haftar was not aligned with either militia, units under his control were instrumental in an anti- Islamists campaign in Benghazi months prior. Now, in August 2014, Haftar's air defense commander, Saqer al-Jouroushi, was confirming that the Khalifa Haftar air defense team was responsible for the air strikes, as he said, "We, the Operation Dignity, officially confirm to have conducted air strikes on some militias' locations belonging to Misrata militias."

By Aug. 23, 2014, fighting continued at Tripoli's main airport as Misrata militia fighters from a faction called "operation Dawn" claimed that it had captured facility. In fact, the terminal was burned to the ground, surrounding structures were damaged, and the aircrafts were destroyed. If the Misrata militia's claim of control was verified, it would be a blow to the apparent effort by General Haftar discussed just above. General Haftar continued to be under futher pressure a week later when it was reported that Islamists were carrying out assaults aimed at seizing control over the airport at Benghazi. More than a dozen of Haftar's fighters were killed during those clashes.

In the last week of August 2014, the New York Times reported that the United Arab Emirates and Egypt were launching clandestine operations into Libya, aimed at quelling the ascendancy of the Islamist militias and movements that have gained steamed and destabilized the region in the aftermath of the so-called Arab Spring of 2011. It should be noted that Egypt has denied its engagement in such an exercise, while the United Arab Emirates declined to comment on the

Libya Review 2016 Page 102 of 437 pages Libya matter. As well, the United States has said that it was not consulted in regard to any theoretical (i.e. unconfirmed) air strikes by the United Arab Emirates and Egypt into Libya.

As August 2014 came to a close, the government of Libya admitted that it no longer had control over any state institutions in Tripoli. It should be noted that the National Oil Corporation and the Central Bank were state enterprises located in Tripoli. The situation in the capital had been chaotic for some time, forcing parliamentary functions to take place in the eastern city of Tobruk instead. But the open admission that government ministries in Tripoli were now in the hands of the Islamist Misrata militia signaled a particularly disturbing descent into anarchy on the Libyan political scene.

At the start of September 2014, the annex of the United States embassy in Tripoli was reported to be in the hands of armed gunmen. Embassy staff noted that the annex was actually vacant and the main body of the embassy remained under protection, while all sensitive materials had been removed from the premises prior to the aforementioned evacuation of embassy staff.

By the second week of September 2014, the action was in Benghazi where government forces were afraid that eastern city would fall to Islamist militants from the group called Ansar al-Sharia. Islamists already had control over Derna located between Benghazi and Tobruk where the elected parliament was being convened since Tripoli was out of its control. In many senses, Libya was slipping into failed state status, much like Somalia, with a fragile internationally-recognized government, but large swaths of national terrain controlled by Islamic extremists.

Meanwhile, the fighting was yielding political repercussions. The newly-elected parliament, or House of Representatives, composed mostly of moderates, federalists and liberals, had been vocal in its condemnation of extremist Islamists, such as the Operation Dawn faction of the Misrata militia. Indeed, they went so far as to brand the Misrata militia as terrorists. However, the Islamist Misrata forces rejected the authority of the newly-elected parliament, and instead moved to establish its own parallel legislative branch of government based on the previous General National Congress (GNC).

On Sept. 1, 2014, Libya's parliament, the House of Representative, re-appointed Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni as the head of government and charged him with forming a "crisis" administration. The move was rejected by the Islamists who said they would be re-convening the former GNC and appointing an Islamist, Omar al-Hasi, as a counter-head of government. Thus, at the start of September 2014, Libya was under the military and legislative control of two rival entities, setting the stage for a dangerous national security scenario and whispers of a descent into civil war.

Note: In the last week of September 2014, Libya's elected parliament approved Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni's new cabinet. An initial proposal for the cabinet was rejected on the basis of it being too large; a second proposal of a more modestly sized cabinet was accepted by the House of

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Representatives. Of note was the fact that there was no ministerial portfolio for oil; instead, Libya's oil industry was to be administered by the state-controlled National Oil Corporation (NOC). Also of note was the fact that the new elected parliament had been convened in the eastern city of Tobruk. That decision to convene parliament in Tobruk was made in response to the raging violence among rival militias in Tripoli and Benghazi.

The dire landscape of Libya was illustrated by the fact that the government was reportedly considering a request for intervention by international forces to stabilize the country. However, it was difficult to see any one country or multinational bloc being prepared to intervene into the Libyan fiasco. Indeed, the United Nations had already withdrawn its staff from Libya on the basis of the tumultuous security landscape in that country, while the United States had removed its embassy staff from Libya out of fear that another Benghazi-style attack on its personnel could emerge.

By the close of October 2014, as noted above, Prime Minister Thinni made clear that he was ready to engage in peace talks with his rivals who had control over Tripoli. He noted that concessions would have to be made in the interests of national unity as he said, "We open the doors of dialogue with our brothers on the condition that there be concessions from all sides." That dialogue proposal did not extend to the armed Misrata militia discussed above, but rather to the politicians aligned with the militia who were participating in the rival parliament established in Tripoli. It was to be seen if such talk, set to be held in Sudan, would actually yield results or if Libya would fall further along the path towards "failed state" status.

In early November 2014, the political scene, however, turned even more tumultuous when the Libyan Supreme Court declared the parliament in Tobruk, dominated by moderates, federalists, and liberals, to be unconstitutional. The Tripoli-based court issued this controversial ruling despite the fact that it had been formed following democratic elections and was internationally recognized. The ruling served only to flare the existing divisions between the two rival parliaments and plunge the country even deeper into political crisis. It should be noted that in mid-November 2014, the head of the United Nations support mission in Libya, Bernardino Leon, made it clear that the international community recognized the elected parliament sitting in Tobruk as the legitimate representative of Libyans, despite the Supreme Court ruling.

Meanwhile, in the first week of November 2014, unrest and turmoil continued to rock Libya with gunmen storming Libya's El Sharara oilfield in the southern part of the country and shutting down production there. The identity of the gunmen was unknown although there were suggestions that they were linked to the Islamist Misrata militia discussed here. At the same time, the shutdown would undoubtedly affect Libyan oil production -- something guaranteed to exacerbate the existing budget crisis gripping the country.

By the second week of November 2014, the violence in Libya reached disturbing depths when

Libya Review 2016 Page 104 of 437 pages Libya three youth activists, known for their reporting via social media, were found beheaded in the eastern city of Derna. To date, beheadings have been rare occurences in Libya. But with Islamist militants in the area declaring their allegiance to the vicious and barbaric terror group, Islamic State (at the time plaguing Iraq and Syria), suspicion rested on allied Libyan Islamists.

Libya on the brink (as of 2015)

Summary of the political landscape

For some time, Libya has been plagued by violence and unrest and at risk of slipping into failed state status. At issue has been the conflict between two rival factions in Libya -- one anti-Islamic entity allied with the internationally recognized government led by Prime Minister Abdullah al- Thini, another extremist Islamic enclave aligned with "Libya Dawn" forces, which forcibly took over the capital of Tripoli and established their own parallel government.

Amidst the state of turmoil rocking Libya, a plan was afoot for United Nations-backed talks in Geneva intended to end the political crisis. In the years that followed the end of the Qadhafi regime, the new government of Libya has unsuccessfully tried to disarm and wrest control from various militias, such as those from Zintan and Misrata. It should be noted that the Zintan militia was allied with the anti-Islamist Qaaqaa and al-Sawaiq factions, along with a handful of former Qadhafi forces. The Misrata-based Islamist Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room (LROR) was aligned with pro-Islamist brigades. Those militias, which played a central role in the revolution that helped end the Qadhafi regime, were not integrating well into the new political landscape of Libya, and instead remained embroiled in ongoing turf battles, power struggles, and quasi-warlordism seen in lawless failed states across the world. Still, since Libya no longer had a properly functioning army, the militias served the purpose of providing security in certain regions of the country. In fact, some of them were on the payroll of the government for this very reason. The problem for the government was that, unlike the army, these militias could not easily be controlled by a central government.

By late summer 2014, the government of Libya admitted that it no longer had control over any state institutions in Tripoli. In September 2014, fighting plagued Benghazi and government forces were afraid that eastern city would fall to Islamist militants. Islamists already had control over Derna located between Benghazi and Tobruk where the elected parliament was being convened since Tripoli was out of its control. In many senses, Libya was slipping into failed state status, much like Somalia, with a fragile internationally recognized government, but large swaths of national terrain controlled by Islamic extremists.

Meanwhile, the fighting was yielding political repercussions. The newly elected parliament, or House of Representatives, composed mostly of moderates, federalists and liberals, had been vocal

Libya Review 2016 Page 105 of 437 pages Libya in its condemnation of extremist Islamists, such as the Operation Dawn faction of the Misrata militia. Indeed, they went so far as to brand the Misrata militia as terrorists. However, the Islamist Misrata forces rejected the authority of the newly elected parliament, and instead moved to establish its own parallel legislative branch of government based on the previous General National Congress (GNC).

At the start of 2015, there were hopes that the United Nations-brokered talks would yield results -- and quite possibly, a cessation of violence. That objective was met with news that a ceasefire was in the offing. Following the first round of talks on Jan. 18, 2015, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) applauded the unilateral announcements by the parties in Libya of a ceasefire, aimed at creating a conducive environment to resolve the conflict rocking Libya in the long-term. A statement by UNSMIL read as follows: "A truce will also allow humanitarian aid to flow to the displaced and the needy in affected areas and will encourage international organizations to resume full operations in the country." On the agenda for the future was a plan to form a unity government. In the third week of January 2015, there were suggestions that the truce was at risk due to ongoing feuds between varying factions; however, the United Nations said it would pursue a new round of negotiations at the end of the month.

But in late January 2015, armed gunmen stormed a luxury hotel in Tripoli, opening fire and killing at least nine people including four foreign nationals. One United States contractor was among the dead. The attack ended violently when the gunmen detonated a grenade. The five-star Corinthia Hotel was a prime target since it has been frequented by Libyan officials and foreign diplomats. The hotel's security forces were able to preclude a higher death toll by evacuating guests after the gunmen forced their way through the security perimeter and the reception area. Included in the list of survivors was the prime minister of Tripoli, Omar al-Hassi, and a delegation from the United States. A militant group linked with the notorious terror group, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) claimed responsibility for the hotel attack. They said the assault was carried out as an act of revenge for the death of a suspected Libyan al-Qaida operative, Abu Anas al-Liby, in the United States.

In early February 2015, violence erupted at the ports of Es Sider and Ras Lanuf on the Mediterranean coast between the two main rival Libyan factions. Forces loyal to Prime Minister Thinni were embroiled in an effort to repel fighters launching an advance on behalf of the rival government. In a separate incident, an attack on the defunct al-Mabruk oil field to the south of Sirte in Libya left a dozen people -- both Libyan and foreign nationals (Filipinos and Ghanaians) -- dead. The terror group, Islamic State, took responsibility for the attack, which resulted in the brutal beheadings and gunshot killings of the victims. It should be noted that the rival government in Tripoli claimed the killings were the work of "Qaddafi loyalists."

As the first week of February 2015 came to a close, the eastern city of Benghazi was the site of violence when soldiers pursued and fired on jeep filled with explosives, leading to an explosion that

Libya Review 2016 Page 106 of 437 pages Libya killed two people and injured two others. The eruption of violence occurred in a region where Benghazi pro-government forces aligned with Prime Minister Thinni have been embroiled in battles with Islamists.

Meanwhile, as Libya sunk further into the abyss of lawlessness, the notorious terror group, Islamic State, was making its imprint on Libya clear. Indeed, in February 2015, a new battleground in the fight against Islamic State emerged in Libya when more than 20 Coptic Christians from Egypt were brutally killed. In keeping with the terror group's favorite mode of assassination, the victims were beheaded. As with the horrific immolation of a Jordanian pilot by Islamic State at the start of 2015 in Syria, the decapitations of the Egyptian Christian workers in Libya stood as an imprimatur for yet another Arab country to enter the global effort to defeat the Islamist Jihadist terror group.

Six weeks earlier at the start of January 2015, masked gunmen kidnapped the 13 Coptic Christians in northern Libya. The Coptic Christians were workers from Egypt living at a residential compound in the city of Sirte. The gunmen entered the compound and demanded to see identification papers of the workers; Christians and Muslims were separated with the Christians being taken away in handcuffs. A week prior, a group of seven Christians from Egypt were similarly attacked and kidnapped from a phony checkpoint in the same Libyan city of Sirte. In a separate attack, an Egyptian-born Coptic Christian doctor and his wife were attacked and killed in their own home in Sirte. These acts of kidnapping and murder, with Coptic Christians as the targets, appeared to be the latest manifestation of the manifold instability plaguing Libya. In the post-Qadhafi era, Libya was now beset by violence at the hands of rival militias, and a stronghold for extremist fighters aligned with Islamic State for whom Christians present a prime target for attack.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi declared a week of national mourning and banned all travel by Egyptian citizens to Libya. President Sisi also asserted that it was his country's prerogative to exact retribution and that there was a global war emerging as the world confronted Islamist Jihadists. Soon, Egyptian forces were striking various Islamic State satellite targets in Libya -- from terror training camps and sites to weapons depots in the city of Derna. Meanwhile, Libya forces -- under the instruction of the internationally recognized government of that country, and in coordination with Egypt -- were hitting Islamic State targets in Sirte and Bin Jawad. Egyptian authorities soon said that the plan would be to target all Islamic State locations in Libya. They also called on the United States-led international coalition against Islamic State to provide support to Egypt in its efforts against the bloodthirsty Islamist Jihadist terror group.

Later in February 2015, Libya was struck by violence when Islamic State militants launched a spate of suicide attacks, resulting in the deaths of 40 people. The terrorists packed cars with explosives, which were then detonated in the eastern town of Qubbah with deadly results. The three explosions took place at the town council of Qubbah, the local security office, and a gas station.

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Islamic State said the attacks were being carried out in retaliation for Egyptian air strikes on pro- ISIL targets in Derna, Libya. The claim of responsibility statement by Islamic State of Cyrenaica read as follows: "They killed and wounded tens in revenge for the bloodshed of Muslims in the city of Derna." On the other side of the equation, Libyan Parliamentary Speaker Aguila Saleh, whose house was located in close proximity to the town council that was struck, said in an interview with Al Arabiya television, "We are announcing seven days of mourning for the victims of Qubbah. I think this operation was revenge for what happened in Derna."

Meanwhile, the process to try to settle tumultuous Libya continued as United Nations-brokered talks resumed on Feb. 11, 2015, in the town of Ghadames on the border with Algeria. Delegates from Libya's rival factions were convened for talks with United Nations mediators in separate meetings. The aim was to find a resolution to the political crisis and broker a ceasefire. The United Nations was pursuing these ends by first seeking a deal on a unified government, and then pursuing a ceasefire. It was to be seen if these talks would be any more successful than a previous meeting in Geneva. Of concern were hardline militant elements on the ground in Libya who might not assent to any deal ultimately advanced in these meetings.

The United Nations-brokered negotiations came to an abrupt halt at the start of March 2015 due to double suicide bombings in the eastern part of Libya. Representatives from Libya's elected parliament announced withdrew from the talks in outrage.

A week later, tensions between the two rival forces in conflict in Libya reached new heights in the first week of the month. At issue was an attack by two warplanes of the self-declared (but not internationally recognized) government on the town of Zintan, which was allied with the elected government. In response, Libyan government forces, led by General Khalifa Haftar, carried out air strikes on the Matiga airport in Tripoli where rival forces, known as Libya Dawn, have held sway since mid-2014. It should be noted that Haftar was himself sworn in as the army commander for the internationally recognized government of Libya. A spokesperson for General Haftar's forces issued the following statement: "We have conducted air strikes on Maitiga airport. We will not stop bombing Maitiga because it is illegal and allows warplanes to take off and bomb Zintan."

In another development in the same period, Islamists aligned with the rival government shelled and stormed the Bahi and Mabrouk oilfields, ultimately damaging a pipeline to the Es Sidra oil port.

Despite these negative developments and the temporary exit from the peace negotiating table, representatives from Libya's elected parliament announced that they would return to the United Nations-brokered talks aimed at rescuing the country from its descent into civil war. A spokesperson from the legislative body said that members had voted in favor of resuming the "peace dialogue."

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Bomb attack at police training center in Libyan town of Zliten; Islamic State claims responsibility

In the second week of January 2016, a bomb blast left close to 50 people dead and around 120 injured in the western Libyan town of Zliten. The attack occurred as 400 police recruits gathered at a police training facility in Zliten -- a strategically located town between Tripoli and Misrata. It was the worst single terrorist attack in Libya since the fall of the Qadhafi regime during the so- called Arab Spring. While there was no immediate claim of responsibility for what was reported to be a truck bombing, suspicion quickly rested on Islamist extremists who have increasingly overrun Libya, and who have exploited the power chasm in Libya.

At issue was an ongoing power struggle rocking the country. The conflict was between the two rival factions in Libya -- one anti-Islamic entity allied with the internationally recognized government led by Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thini, another extremist Islamic enclave aligned with "Libya Dawn" forces, which forcibly took over the capital of Tripoli and established their own parallel government. But as it evolved, it also created an opportunity for Islamist terrorists allied with the notorious group, Islamic State, to increasingly operate from an African base in the Libyan city of Sirte. Thus, it was not surprising that after the attack in Zliten, Islamic State terrorists soon claimed responsibility, making clear that it was behind the appalling bloodshed. In an official statement, the terror group declared: "This operation is one in a series of the battle of Abu al-Mughira al-Qahtani, which will not stop until we liberate all Libya."

It should be noted that Islamic State actually claimed responsibility for a car bombing that left seven people dead in the oil city of Ras Lanuf in the same period, as well as an attack on the oil port of Es Sider. That attacks, which went on for several days and left 11 guards dead, were viewed as a transparent attempt by Islamic State to control Libya's oil interests.

Note: The signing of a United Nations-brokered peace agreement between the two rival political factions in Libya at the close of 2015 offered an opportunity for Libya to stabilize, and for authorities to refocus their energies on national security. Indeed, there were high hopes that the signing of the accord would open the door for the international community to enter the equation to assist Libya in the fight against Islamic State, which was now using Libyan terrain, centered in the city of Sirte, as an African satellite center from which to launch Jihadist attacks.

Special Report:

Breakthrough as rival factions finally sign United Nations-brokered unity deal in Libya; questions remain about unity government

Libya Review 2016 Page 109 of 437 pages Libya

Going back to mid-2014, the government of Libya admitted that it no longer had control over any state institutions in Tripoli. In September 2014, fighting plagued Benghazi and government forces were afraid that eastern city would fall to Islamist militants. Islamists already had control over Derna located between Benghazi and Tobruk where the elected parliament was being convened since Tripoli was out of its control. In many senses, Libya was slipping into failed state status, much like Somalia, with a fragile internationally recognized government, but large swaths of national terrain controlled by Islamic extremists.

Meanwhile, the fighting was yielding political repercussions. The newly elected parliament, or House of Representatives, composed mostly of moderates, federalists and liberals, had been vocal in its condemnation of extremist Islamists, such as the Operation Dawn faction of the Misrata militia. Indeed, they went so far as to brand the Misrata militia as terrorists. However, the Islamist Misrata forces rejected the authority of the newly elected parliament, and instead moved to establish its own parallel legislative branch of government based on the previous General National Congress (GNC).

Libya Review 2016 Page 110 of 437 pages Libya ceasefire, aimed at creating a conducive environment to resolve the conflict rocking Libya in the long-term. A statement by UNSMIL read as follows: "A truce will also allow humanitarian aid to flow to the displaced and the needy in affected areas and will encourage international organizations to resume full operations in the country." On the agenda for the future was a plan to form a unity government. In the third week of January 2015, there were suggestions that the truce was at risk due to ongoing feuds between varying factions; however, the United Nations said it would pursue a new round of negotiations at the end of the month.

The next several months were mired by violence and made the goals of the United Nations- brokered resolution something of an exercise in futility. Indeed, as Libya sunk further into the abyss of lawlessness, the notorious terror group, Islamic State, was making its imprint on Libya clear.

That being said, by the start of June 2015, United Nations-sponsored peace talks resumed between the rival factions. On the agenda was the aim of trying the end the bloody power struggle that had embroiled the country in recent times. United Nations special envoy for Libya, Bernardino Leon, outlined the high stakes of the negotiations as follows: "To not reach an agreement and continue the confrontation is not an option. The country is really at its limit." With the previous round of talks producing the blueprint for a (hopefully) sustainable accord, there were high hopes that this round of talks would bring a conclusion to the process. To this end, Special Envoy Leon said of the document under discussion, "This should be the final draft because may be this the final opportunity for Libya." Leon again emphasized that time was of the essence, as he added, "It is a crucial time."

On June 8, 2015, the United Nations presented a draft proposal for a Libyan unity government to rival factions. Special Envoy Leon urged Libyans to embrace the plan, which he said was intended to rescue the country from continued turmoil. As he advanced the draft unity proposal, he said, "Today, the people of Libya have their eyes on this gathering, on you, in the hope that you'll save your country and your people from protracted conflict. I am full of hope that this draft represents a fair and reasonable way forward." Central to the United Nations plan was the establishment of a unity government that would remain in place for a year, as well as the recognition of the pro-Western parliament elected in 2014 as the only legal legislative body. It was to be seen how both sides would respond to the proposal.

Libya's internationally recognized parliament rejected the plan discussed just above and opted to suspend its participation in United Nations-brokered peace talks. In an interview with the Associated Press in mid-June 2015, Essa Abdel-Kauoum -- a spokesperson for the Tobruk-based internationally recognized parliament -- said that Special Envoy Leon had acquiesced to the demands of the Islamist faction and presented a proposal that would give more power to an illegitimate entity. Abdel-Kauoum said, "Leon brought us to square one ... to appease an ideological group in a horrible way. He succumbed to extortion." Abdel-Kauoum also made clear

Libya Review 2016 Page 111 of 437 pages Libya that his delegation would not be present at the next scheduled talks to be held in Germany.

Not surprisingly, Libya's political Islamists had rave reviews for the proposal tabled by Special Envoy Leon, with Mohammed Sawan of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood declaring, "We think this has achieved a tangible positive improvement which should be taken seriously and built upon to reach an agreement that ends the political division and achieves stability."

With these two vastly different interpretations of the proposal at stake, it was fair to say that the peace process in Libya was at an impasse.

By October 2015, with an expiration date of Oct. 20, 2015, looming ahead, Libya's elected parliament voted to extend its mandate until a new legitimately elected parliament could be elected. This decision promised to create complications for the United Nations envoys attempting to broker a resolution to end the political crisis rocking Libya. Indeed, those United Nations brokers had themselves set Oct. 20, 2015 as their own deadline to bring the two rival sides together and form a unity government.

On Oct. 9, 2015, the United Nations envoy for Libya, Bernardino Leon, moved forward with a proposal aimed at forming a government of national unity government, and specifically named Fayez Sarraj as the prime minister at the helm of that administration. Speaking from Morocco, Envoy Leon said: "After a year of work in this process, after working with more than 150 Libyan personalities from all the regions, finally the moment has come in which we can propose a national unity government." He added, "All of them will work as a team. This was not an easy task." It was to be seen if Sarraj would be accepted as a consensus candidate. It was also to be determined if the elected and internationally recognized government of Libya based in Tobruk, as well as the rival self-appointed Islamist body based in Tripoli, would respectively support the national unity plan.

As October 2015 came to a close, the United Nations-brokered unity deal stalled after the elected parliament in Tobruk voted to reject the draft agreement intended to bring an end to the crisis rocking Libya.

Hardliners from the rival factions continued to reject the deal over the next few months. However, the peace process was revitalized in November 2015, with the United Nations asserting that it would undertake a fresh push for a national unity deal, with particular emphasis on security issues. Of concern was the rise of Islamic State in the region, and the fact that the terror group now held power over a stronghold in the city of Sirte. Martin Kobler, a German diplomat who had replaced Bernardino Leon as the United Nation's envoy dealing with the Libyan crisis, said that he would restart dialogue between the rival factions. Kobler outlined his objectives as follows: "Continuity of the dialogue process and building on what has been achieved to date is the way forward." On the agenda would be a meeting of negotiators from interest parties as well as the

Libya Review 2016 Page 112 of 437 pages Libya members of a presidential council, which would be transformed into the executive branch of a future power sharing government.

Ultimately, a mid-December 2015 timeline was set for the rival factions of Libya to finally sign the United Nations-brokered unity deal. To that end, on Dec. 17, 2015, the two sides signed the agreement bringing a fresh sense of hope to Libya, potentially rescuing the country from slipping further into a failed state morass. The provision in the deal calling for a presidential council to lead a unity government remained a source of contention; however, it did not stop delegates from the two sides from signing the agreement. By the close of December 2015, the United Nations Security Council had unanimously endorsed the agreement via a security council resolution. It was to be seen, however, if the fragile deal would be sustained in the foreseeable future, or, if it would collapse before stability could be restored to Libya. In a sign of hope, Fayez al-Sarraj was quickly chosen to be the prime minister-designate at the helm of a national unity government.

It should be noted that the signing of the accord would open the door for the international community to enter the equation to assist Libya in the fight against Islamic State, which was now using Libyan terrain, centered in the city of Sirte, as an African satellite center from which to launch Jihadist attacks.

January 2016 was marked by the establishment of the new presidential council, which would lead the new executive branch of government, in keeping with the provisions of the aforementioned United Nations-brokered plan. However, Libya's internationally recognized parliament based in Tobruk voted to reject the unity government, The common complaint by members of parliament was that the terms of the agreement were favorable to the militias who were responsible for the destabilization of the country. However, the legislative chamber was not fully stonewalling the peace process, as they called for a new demanding a new unit government proposal should be submitted for consideration.

By mid-February 2016, Libya's presidential council issued a new unity government lineup again with Sarraj at the helm, which would have to be considered by the internationally recognized parliament based in Tobruk. There was some immediate resistance from a handful of members of parliament;however, the envoys from the United Nations continued to urge members of parliament to support the new unity government, and thus allow the country the opportunity to attend to its terrorism challenges.

Editor's Note on Islamic State

Libya Review 2016 Page 113 of 437 pages Libya that it aims to establish an Islamic "caliphate" that would be ruled according to Islamic Shari'a law. Its ambitions are Jihadists and not simply limited to Iraq and Syria; in fact, ISIL has made clear that it intends to extent its control to Jordan and Lebanon. A satellite venue of Islamic State has opened up in post-Arab Spring Libya as extremists have taken advantage of the power chasm there. Another ambition for ISIL is the cause of Palestine. Adherents are required to swear their allegiance to the ISIL leader, Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai, known in the public sphere as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Baghdadi's appeal has, to some degree, been fed by his mystery as he has only rarely been seen in public.

In terms of legacy, ISIL is actually an outgrowth of al-Qaida in Iraq, led by the Jordanian-born terrorist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. After Zarqawi's death in 2006, al-Qaida in Iraq transposed itself into Islamic State in Iraq. Although it was weakened by the United States-led "surge" in Iraq to deal with the Sunni insurgency, and which included the involvement of Sahwa (Awakening) councils by Sunni Arab tribesmen , Islamic State in Iraq experienced a resurgence in 2010 under Baghdadi. Once Syria was embroiled in a civil war in 2011, Islamic State was able to establish a foothold in Syria, essentially uprooting other extremist and terror groups, such as al-Nusra Front and al-Qaida, by 2013, and ultimately holding control over wide swaths of territory from Syria to Iraq as of 2014, and extending to Libya as of 2015. ISIL's ability to take over Anbar province and then the northern city of Mosul in Iraq in 2014 were key developments in the entrenchment of ISIL in the region.

ISIL's genocidal practices have been characterized most acutely by their infamous and gruesome beheadings of foreign nationals and apostates, but have also included other revolting and repugnant means of execution, such as crucifixions, immolations, and mass shootings. These bloodthirsty techniques of terror and tactics of murder, which are professionally videotaped and disseminated for maximum effect, have been so ghastly that other militant Islamist movements have sought to distance themselves from ISIL. Indeed, the Yemeni wing of al-Qaida (known as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula) went so far as to note that beheadings, and the videotaping of decapitations, were to be regarded as un-Islamic. Meanwhile, Lebanon-based Hezbollah, which has been deemed to be a terrorist organization by some countries of the West, made clear that ISIL's tactics of terror were inhumane. These stances by al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and Hezbollah suggested that even among extremists, militants, Jihadists, and Islamist terrorists, there remained some degree of a "code" that ISIL had apparently violated.

It should be noted that ISIL's barbarism and brutality has had a double effect. First, the brutality appears to have functioned as a recruitment tool for other murderous Islamist extremists across the world. To date, it is not known how many ISIL fighters exist in the Middle East although estimates suggest that as many as 30,000 Islamic State fighters are in the Iraq-Syria region. These fighters come from across the world although, as Libya has slipped further into failed state status, it is believed to be the largest single source of terrorists to the cause. That being said, ISIL has attracted disgruntled youth from Europe and the Americas as well, with recruits often traveling

Libya Review 2016 Page 114 of 437 pages Libya through Turkey to enter ISIL-controlled territory. Second, even as ISIL's barbarism has been a recruitment tool, it has simultaneously stimulated the reluctant engagement of a United States-led international coalition in an anti-Islamic State mission.

Socio-economic strife is a popular -- and often facile -- explanation for extremism and activism. It certainly applies to the roots of the Arab Spring and specifically the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, for example, but does not apply to ISIL. Yes, the power chasms created in the wake of the Arab Spring -- specifically in Libya but also in other countries in the region -- certainly created the conditions for recruitment. But creating fertile ground for recruitment still does not address the reason why people would be attracted to ISIL. Likewise, the call for more education may have resonance in countries where young people are educated only about Islam in Madrassas, or in impoverished regions where people simply have no access to education at all. But these cases do not properly apply to ISIL recruits and symathizers. The problem is not a lack of education -- most of these recruits are computer savvy and were recruited via the Internet while using their own laptops or in Internet cafes. Indeed, many youth ISIL recruits were from middle class or even wealthy families -- certainly not backgrounds without marked by socio-economic hardship. Recruits and sympathizers are also not necessarily from strict Muslim families; indeed, there were reports that many ISIL recruits were actually fairly new to hardline Islam with translations of instructional introductory texts on Islam being a particularly popular purchase for them.

It would seem that many recruits to ISIL appeared to be the same type of profile as vulnerable youth likely to join gang or cults, susceptible to brainwashing, and thus excellent candidates for adherence to Islamic State's religious ideology.

That being said, to properly understand the attraction of ISIL, it is imperative to address the ideological appeal of hardline and regressive Islam, which embraces barbaric practices of execution, such as beheadings and crucifixion, while integrating socio-governing practices such as conquest and the enslavement of women. Well-meaning public figures have cast these tactics of terror and abuses of humanity as "perversions" of Islam. Left unsaid is that fact that they are actually clear dictates that come from historic Islam, and which have been embraced by ISIL as the "true" path to salvation, irrespective of the fact that their pratices are a violation of modern understandings of human rights.

Indeed, Islamic State must be an apocalyptic and millenarian death cult, with a strict Medieval interpretation of Islam at the core and a gruesome theatre of murder as the main attraction. Relying on apocalyptic prophesies of Islamic Jihadist ascendancy and an ultimate "Day of Judgement," the expansion of Islamic State territory in Iraq and Syria, and even Libya, was being understood as a sign of "victory." Stated differently, the rapid rate of expansion (read: victory) by ISIL in Iraq and Syria in 2014 functioned to empower sympathizers and recruits to the ISIL cause.

Given this paradigm, the only prescription for defeat would be the disruption of what looks like

Libya Review 2016 Page 115 of 437 pages Libya an unstoppable juggernaut by ISIL. That being said, the texture of that defeat would have to be carefully -- and globally -- crafted since ISIL militants believe in the apocalyptic prophesy of a "final" confrontation with the West. Rather than facilitating that end, international stakeholders have noted that the preferable path would be to target this Islamist Jihadist terror entity as part of a global coalition. With United States-led air strikes only going so far to destroy ISIL, there would ultimately be a need for ground forces. An effective strategy against ISIL would be one that looks to Arab "boots on the ground" rather than feeding the hunger by Islamists for a Crusades-style war with the West.

It should be noted that Islamic State is sometimes pejoratively referred to as "Daesh." Islamic State rejects this term of reference, which sounds roughly in Arabic to the words "Daes" which means "one who crushes something underfoot" and "Dahes" which means "one who sows discord." For precisely these negative associations, the enemies of Islamic State have increasingly used the term "Daesh" to describe the terror group in defiance.

-- February 2016

Written by Dr. Denise Coleman, Editor in Chief and Executive Vice President, www.countrywatch.com; see Bibliography for general reference sources; supplementary sources used in this report include: Al-Jazeera, Associated Press, CNN, BBC, the Times of London, The Guardian, Reuters.

Political Risk Index

The Political Risk Index is a proprietary index measuring the level of risk posed to governments, corporations, and investors, based on a myriad of political and economic factors. The Political Risk Index is calculated using an established methodology by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on varied criteria* including the following consideration: political stability, political representation, democratic accountability, freedom of expression, security and crime, risk of conflict, human development, jurisprudence and regulatory transparency, economic risk, foreign investment considerations, possibility of sovereign default, and corruption. Scores are assigned from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the highest political risk, while a

Libya Review 2016 Page 116 of 437 pages Libya score of 10 marks the lowest political risk. Stated differently, countries with the lowest scores pose the greatest political risk. A score of 0 marks the most dire level of political risk and an ultimate nadir, while a score of 10 marks the lowest possible level of political risk, according to this proprietary index. Rarely will there be scores of 0 or 10 due to the reality that countries contain complex landscapes; as such, the index offers a range of possibilities ranging from lesser to greater risk.

Country Assessment

Afghanistan 2

Albania 4

Algeria 6

Andorra 9

Angola 4

Antigua 8

Argentina 4

Armenia 4-5

Australia 9.5

Austria 9.5

Azerbaijan 4

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Bahamas 8.5

Bahrain 6

Bangladesh 3.5

Barbados 8.5-9

Belarus 3

Belgium 9

Belize 8

Benin 5

Bhutan 5

Bolivia 5

Bosnia-Herzegovina 4

Botswana 7

Brazil 7

Brunei 7

Bulgaria 6

Burkina Faso 4

Burma (Myanmar) 4.5

Burundi 3

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Cambodia 4

Cameroon 5

Canada 9.5

Cape Verde 6

Central African Republic 3

Chad 4

Chile 9

China 7

China: Hong Kong 8

China: Taiwan 8

Colombia 7

Comoros 5

Congo DRC 3

Congo RC 4

Costa Rica 8

Cote d'Ivoire 4.5

Croatia 7

Cuba 4-4.5

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Cyprus 5

Czech Republic 8

Denmark 9.5

Djibouti 4.5

Dominica 7

Dominican Republic 6

East Timor 5

Ecuador 6

Egypt 5

El Salvador 7

Equatorial Guinea 4

Eritrea 3

Estonia 8

Ethiopia 4

Fiji 5

Finland 9

Fr.YugoslavRep.Macedonia 5

France 9

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Gabon 5

Gambia 4

Georgia 5

Germany 9.5

Ghana 6

Greece 4.5-5

Grenada 8

Guatemala 6

Guinea 3.5

Guinea-Bissau 3.5

Guyana 4.5

Haiti 3.5

Holy See (Vatican) 9

Honduras 4.5-5

Hungary 7

Iceland 8.5-9

India 7.5-8

Indonesia 6

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Iran 3.5-4

Iraq 2.5-3

Ireland 8-8.5

Israel 8

Italy 7.5

Jamaica 6.5-7

Japan 9

Jordan 6.5

Kazakhstan 6

Kenya 5

Kiribati 7

Korea, North 1

Korea, South 8

Kosovo 4

Kuwait 7

Kyrgyzstan 4.5

Laos 4.5

Latvia 7

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Lebanon 5.5

Lesotho 6

Liberia 3.5

Libya 2

Liechtenstein 9

Lithuania 7.5

Luxembourg 9

Madagascar 4

Malawi 4

Malaysia 8

Maldives 4.5

Mali 4

Malta 8

Marshall Islands 6

Mauritania 4.5-5

Mauritius 7

Mexico 6.5

Micronesia 7

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Moldova 5

Monaco 9

Mongolia 5

Montenegro 6

Morocco 6.5

Mozambique 4.5-5

Namibia 6.5-7

Nauru 6

Nepal 4

Netherlands 9.5

New Zealand 9.5

Nicaragua 5

Niger 4

Nigeria 4.5

Norway 9.5

Oman 7

Pakistan 3.5

Palau 7

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Panama 7.5

Papua New Guinea 5

Paraguay 6.5-7

Peru 7

Philippines 6

Poland 8

Portugal 7.5

Qatar 7.5

Romania 5.5

Russia 5.5

Rwanda 5

Saint Kitts and Nevis 8

Saint Lucia 8

Saint Vincent and Grenadines 8

Samoa 7

San Marino 9

Sao Tome and Principe 5.5

Saudi Arabia 6

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Senegal 6

Serbia 5

Seychelles 7

Sierra Leone 4.5

Singapore 9

Slovak Republic (Slovakia) 8

Slovenia 8

Solomon Islands 6

Somalia 2

South Africa 7

Spain 7.5

Sri Lanka 5

Sudan 3.5

Suriname 5

Swaziland 5

Sweden 9.5

Switzerland 9.5

Syria 2

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Tajikistan 4.5

Tanzania 6

Thailand 6.5

Togo 4.5

Tonga 7

Trinidad and Tobago 8

Tunisia 6

Turkey 7

Turkmenistan 4.5

Tuvalu 7

Uganda 6

Ukraine 3.5-4

United Arab Emirates 7

United Kingdom 9

United States 9.5

Uruguay 8

Uzbekistan 4

Vanuatu 7

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Venezuela 4

Vietnam 5

Yemen 3

Zambia 4.5

Zimbabwe 3

*Methodology

The Political Risk Index is calculated by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on the combined scoring of varied criteria as follows --

1. political stability (record of peaceful transitions of power, ability of government to stay in office and carry out policies as a result of productive executive-legislative relationship, perhaps with popular support vis a vis risk of government collapse)

2. political representation (right of suffrage, free and fair elections, multi-party participation, and influence of foreign powers)

3. democratic accountability (record of respect for political rights, human rights, and civil liberties, backed by constitutional protections)

4. freedom of expression (media freedom and freedom of expression, right to dissent or express political opposition, backed by constitutional protections)

5. security and crime (the degree to which a country has security mechanisms that ensures safety of citizens and ensures law and order, without resorting to extra-judicial measures)

6. risk of conflict (the presence of conflict; record of coups or civil disturbances; threat of war; threats posed by internal or external tensions; threat or record of terrorism or insurgencies)

7. human development (quality of life; access to education; socio-economic conditions; systemic concern for the status of women and children)

8. jurisprudence and regulatory transparency (the impartiality of the legal system, the degree of transparency within the regulatory system of a country and the durability of that structure)

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9. economic conditions (economic stability, investment climate, degree of nationalization of industries, property rights, labor force development)

10. corruption ( the degree of corruption in a country and/or efforts by the government to address graft and other irregularities)

Editor's Note:

As of 2015, the current climate of upheaval internationally -- both politically and economically -- has affected the ratings for several countries across the world.

North Korea, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Zimbabwe -- retain their low rankings.

Several Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen were downgraded in recent years due to political instability occurring in the "season of unrest" sweeping the region since 2011 and continuing today. The worst downgrades affected Syria where civil war is at play, along with the rampage of terror being carried out by Islamist terrorists who have also seized control over part of Syrian territory. Iraq has been further downgraded due to the rampage of Islamist terrorists and their takeover of wide swaths of Iraqi territory. Libya has also been downgraded further due to its slippage into failed state status; at issue in Libya have been an ongoing power struggle between rival militias. Yemen continues to hold steady with a poor ranking due to continued unrest at the hands of Houthi rebels, secessinionists, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and Islamic State. Its landscape has been further complicated by the fact that it is now the site of a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Conversely, Tunisia and Egypt have seen slight upgrades as these countries stabilize.

In Africa, Zimbabwe continues to be one of the bleak spots of the world with the Mugabe regime effectively destroying the country's once vibrant economy, and miring Zimbabwe with an exceedingly high rate of inflation, debilitating unemployment, devolving public services, and critical food shortages; rampant crime and political oppression round out the landscape. Somalia also sports a poor ranking due to the continuing influence of the terror group, al-Shabab, which was not operating across the border in Kenya. On the upside, Nigeria, which was ineffectively dealing with the threat posed by the terror group, Boko Haram, was making some strides on the national security front with its new president at the helm. Mali was slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and Islamists. But the Central African Republic was downgraded due to the takeover of the government by Muslim Seleka rebels and a continued state of lawlessness in that country. South Sudan -- the world's newest nation state -- has not been officially included in this assessment;

Libya Review 2016 Page 129 of 437 pages Libya however, it can be unofficially assessed to be in the vicinity of "3" due to its manifold political and economic challenges. Burkina Faso, Burundi and Guinea have been downgraded due to political unrest, with Guinea also having to deal with the burgeoning Ebola crisis.

In Europe, Ukraine was downgraded due to the unrest facing that country following its Maidan revolution that triggered a pro-Russian uprising in the eastern part of the country. Russia was also implicated in the Ukrainian crisis due to its intervention on behalf of pro-Russian separatists, as well as its annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Strains on the infrastructure of southern and eastern European countries, such as Serbia, Croatia, and Hungary, due to an influx of refugees was expected to pose social and economic challenges, and slight downgrades were made accordingly. So too, a corruption crisis for the Romanian prime minister has affected the ranking of that country. Meanwhile, the rankings for Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy were maintained due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone nation, was earlier downgraded due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, no further downgrade was added since the country was able to successfully forge a bailout rescue deal with creditor institutions. Cyprus' exposure to Greek banks yielded a downgrade in its case.

In Asia, Nepal was downgraded in response to continuous political instability and a constitutional crisis that prevails well after landmark elections were held. Both India and China retain their rankings; India holds a slightly higher ranking than China due to its record of democratic representation and accountability. Increasing violence and political instability in Pakistan resulted in a downgrade for this country's already low rating. Meanwhile, Singapore retained its strong rankings due to its continued effective stewardship of the economy and political stability.

In the Americas, ongoing political and economic woes, as well as crime and corruption have affected the rankings for Mexico , Guatemala, and Brazil. Argentina was downgraded due to its default on debt following the failure of talks with bond holders. Venezuela was downgraded due to its mix of market unfriendly policies and political oppression. For the moment, the United States maintains a strong ranking along with Canada, and most of the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean; however, a renewed debt ceiling crisis could cause the United States to be downgraded in a future edition. Finally, a small but significant upgrade was attributed to Cuba due to its recent pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the Unitd States.

Source:

Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com

Updated:

2015

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Political Stability

The Political Stability Index is a proprietary index measuring a country's level of stability, standard of good governance, record of constitutional order, respect for human rights, and overall strength of democracy. The Political StabilityIndex is calculated using an established methodology* by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on a given country's record of peaceful transitions of power, ability of a government to stay in office and carry out its policies vis a vis risk credible risks of government collapse. Threats include coups, domestic violence and instability, terrorism, etc. This index measures the dynamic between the quality of a country's government and the threats that can compromise and undermine stability. Scores are assigned from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the lowest level of political stability and an ultimate nadir, while a score of 10 marks the highest level of political stability possible, according to this proprietary index. Rarely will there be scores of 0 or 10 due to the reality that countries contain complex landscapes; as such, the index offers a range of possibilities ranging from lesser to greater stability.

Country Assessment

Afghanistan 2

Albania 4.5-5

Algeria 5

Andorra 9.5

Angola 4.5-5

Antigua 8.5-9

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Argentina 7

Armenia 5.5

Australia 9.5

Austria 9.5

Azerbaijan 5

Bahamas 9

Bahrain 6

Bangladesh 4.5

Barbados 9

Belarus 4

Belgium 9

Belize 8

Benin 5

Bhutan 5

Bolivia 6

Bosnia-Herzegovina 5

Botswana 8.5

Brazil 7

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Brunei 8

Bulgaria 7.5

Burkina Faso 4

Burma (Myanmar) 4.5

Burundi 4

Cambodia 4.5-5

Cameroon 6

Canada 9.5

Cape Verde 6

Central African Republic 3

Chad 4.5

Chile 9

China 7

China: Hong Kong 8

China: Taiwan 8

Colombia 7.5

Comoros 5

Congo DRC 3

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Congo RC 5

Costa Rica 9.5

Cote d'Ivoire 3.5

Croatia 7.5

Cuba 4.5

Cyprus 8

Czech Republic 8.5

Denmark 9.5

Djibouti 5

Dominica 8.5

Dominican Republic 7

East Timor 5

Ecuador 7

Egypt 4.5-5

El Salvador 7.5-8

Equatorial Guinea 4.5

Eritrea 4

Estonia 9

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Ethiopia 4.5

Fiji 5

Finland 9

Fr.YugoslavRep.Macedonia 6.5

France 9

Gabon 5

Gambia 4.5

Georgia 5

Germany 9.5

Ghana 7

Greece 6

Grenada 8.5

Guatemala 7

Guinea 3.5-4

Guinea-Bissau 4

Guyana 6

Haiti 3.5-4

Holy See (Vatican) 9.5

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Honduras 6

Hungary 7.5

Iceland 9

India 8

Indonesia 7

Iran 3.5

Iraq 2.5

Ireland 9.5

Israel 8

Italy 8.5-9

Jamaica 8

Japan 9

Jordan 6

Kazakhstan 6

Kenya 5

Kiribati 8

Korea, North 2

Korea, South 8.5

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Kosovo 5.5

Kuwait 7

Kyrgyzstan 5

Laos 5

Latvia 8.5

Lebanon 5.5

Lesotho 5

Liberia 3.5-4

Libya 2

Liechtenstein 9

Lithuania 9

Luxembourg 9.5

Madagascar 4

Malawi 5

Malaysia 8

Maldives 4.5-5

Mali 4.5-5

Malta 9

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Marshall Islands 8

Mauritania 6

Mauritius 8

Mexico 6.5-7

Micronesia 8

Moldova 5.5

Monaco 9.5

Mongolia 6.5-7

Montenegro 8

Morocco 7

Mozambique 5

Namibia 8.5

Nauru 8

Nepal 4.5

Netherlands 9.5

New Zealand 9.5

Nicaragua 6

Niger 4.5

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Nigeria 4.5

Norway 9.5

Oman 7

Pakistan 3

Palau 8

Panama 8.5

Papua New Guinea 6

Paraguay 8

Peru 7.5

Philippines 6

Poland 9

Portugal 9

Qatar 7

Romania 7

Russia 6

Rwanda 5

Saint Kitts and Nevis 9

Saint Lucia 9

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Saint Vincent and Grenadines 9

Samoa 8

San Marino 9.5

Sao Tome and Principe 7

Saudi Arabia 6

Senegal 7.5

Serbia 6.5

Seychelles 8

Sierra Leone 4.5

Singapore 9.5

Slovak Republic (Slovakia) 8.5

Slovenia 9

Solomon Islands 6.5-7

Somalia 2

South Africa 7.5

Spain 9

Sri Lanka 5

Sudan 3

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Suriname 5

Swaziland 5

Sweden 9.5

Switzerland 9.5

Syria 2

Tajikistan 4.5

Tanzania 6

Thailand 6

Togo 5

Tonga 7

Trinidad and Tobago 8

Tunisia 5

Turkey 7.5

Turkmenistan 5

Tuvalu 8.5

Uganda 6

Ukraine 3.5-4

United Arab Emirates 7

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United Kingdom 9

United States 9

Uruguay 8.5

Uzbekistan 4

Vanuatu 8.5

Venezuela 4.5-5

Vietnam 4.5

Yemen 2.5

Zambia 5

Zimbabwe 3

*Methodology

The Political Stability Index is calculated by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on the combined scoring of varied criteria as follows --

1. record of peaceful transitions of power ( free and fair elections; adherence to political accords)

2. record of democratic representation, presence of instruments of democracy; systemic accountability

3. respect for human rights; respect for civil rights

4. strength of the system of jurisprudence, adherence to constitutional order, and good governance

5. ability of a government to stay in office and carry out its policies vis a vis risk credible risks of government collapse (i.e. government stability versus a country being deemed "ungovernable")

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6. threat of coups, insurgencies, and insurrection

7. level of unchecked crime and corruption

8. risk of terrorism and other threats to national security

9. relationship with regional powers and international community; record of bilateral or multilateral cooperation

10. degree of economic strife (i.e. economic and financial challenges)

Editor's Note:

As of 2015, the current climate of upheaval internationally -- both politically and economically -- has affected the ratings for several countries across the world. The usual suspects -- North Korea, Afghanistan, and Somalia -- retain their low rankings. The reclusive and ultra-dictatorial North Korean regime, which has terrified the world with its nuclear threats, has exhibited internal instability. Of note was a cut-throat purge of hundreds of high ranking officials deemed to be a threat to Kim Jung-un. Despite their attempts to recover from years of lawlessness, war, and warlordism, both Afghanistan and Somalia continue to be beset by terrorism and turmoil. In Afghanistan, while international forces have seen success in the effort against the terror group, al- Qaida, the other Islamist extremist group, the Taliban, continues to carry out a vicious insurgency using terrorism. In Somalia, while the government attempts to do the nation's business, the terror group, al-Shabab continues to make its presence known not only in Somalia, but across the border into Kenya with devastating results/ Also in this category is Iraq, which continues to be rocked by horrific violence and terrorism at the hands of Islamic State, which has taken over wide swaths of Iraqi territory.

Syria, Libya, and Yemen have been added to this unfortunate echelon of the world's most politically unstable countries. Syria has been mired by the twin hazards of 1. a civil war as rebels oppose the Assad regime; and 2. the rampage of terror being carried out by Islamic State, which also seized control over vast portions of Syrian territory. Meanwhile, the post-Qaddhafi landscape of Libya has devolved into chaos as rival militias battle for control -- the elected government of the country notwithstanding. Rounding out this grim triad is Yemen, which was dealing with a Houthi rebellion, secesionists in the south, as well as the threat of terrorism from al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula as well as Islamic State, while also being the site of a proxy war between Shi'a Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia.

Meanwhile, several Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, and

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Bahrain were downgraded in recent years due to political instability occurring in the "season of unrest" sweeping the region since 2011 and continuing today. All three of these countries have stabilized in recent years and have been upgraded accordingly. In Bahrain, the landscape had calmed. In Egypt, the secular military-backed government has generated criticism for its crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood; however, the country had ratified the presidency via democratic elections and were on track to hold parliamentary elections as the country moved along the path of democratization. Perhaps the most impressive story was coming out of Tunisia -- the country whose Jasmine Revolution sparked the entire Arab Spring -- and where after a few years of strife, a new progressive constitution was passed into law and a secular government had been elected to power. Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain have seen slight upgrades as these countries stabilize.

In Africa, the Central African Republic was downgraded the previous year due to the takeover of the government by Muslim Seleka rebels. Although the country has been trying to emerge from this crisis, the fact of the matter was that it was difficult to halt the precipitous decline into lawlessness in that country. Zimbabwe has maintained its consistently poor ranking due to the dictatorial regime of Mugabe, who continues to hold a tight grip on power, intimidates the opposition, squashes dissent, and oppresses the white farmer population of the country. Moving in a slightly improved direction is Nigeria, which has sported abysmal ratings due to the government's fecklessness in dealing with the threat posed by the Islamist terror group, Boko Haram. Under its newly-elected government, there appears to be more of a concerted effort to make national security a priority action item. Mali was also slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and Islamists. Political instability has visited Burkina Faso and Burundi as the leaders of those countries attempted to side-step constitutional limits to hold onto power. In Burundi, an attempted coup ensued but quelled, and the president won a (questionable) new term in office; unrest has since punctuated the landscape. In Burkina Faso, the political climate has turned stormy as a result of a successful coup that ended the rule of the president, and then a putsch against the transitional government. These two African countries have been downgraded as a result.

It should be noted that the African country of South Sudan -- the world's newest nation state -- has not been officially included in this assessment; however, it can be unofficially assessed to be in the vicinity of "3" due to its manifold political and economic challenges. Guinea has endured poor rankings throughout, but was slightly downgraded further over fears of social unrest and the Ebola heath crisis.

Libya Review 2016 Page 144 of 437 pages Libya corruption charges against the prime minister. Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy were downgraded due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone nation, was downgraded the previous year due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, the country successfully forged a rescue deal with international creditors and stayed within the Euro zone. Greek voters rewarded the hitherto unknown upstart party at the polls for these efforts. As a result, Greece was actually upgraded slightly as it proved to the world that it could endure the political and economic storms. Meanwhile, Germany, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries continue to post impressive ranking consistent with these countries' strong records of democracy, freedom, and peaceful transfers of power.

In Asia, Nepal was downgraded in response to continuous political instability well after landmark elections that prevails today. Cambodia was very slighly downgraded due to post-election instability that has resulted in occasional flares of violence. Despite the "trifecta of tragedy" in Japan in 2011 -- the earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and the resulting nuclear crisis -- and the appreciable destabilization of the economic and political terrain therein, this country has only slightly been downgraded. Japan's challenges have been assessed to be transient, the government remains accountable, and there is little risk of default. Both India and China retain their rankings; India holds a slightly higher ranking than China due to its record of democratic representation and accountability. Increasing violence and political instability in Pakistan resulted in a downgrade for this country's already low rating.

In the Americas, Haiti retained its downgraded status due to ongoing political and economic woes. Mexico was downgraded due to its alarming rate of crime. Guatemala was downgraded due to charges of corruption, the arrest of the president, and uncertainty over the outcome of elections. Brazil was downgraded due to the corruption charges erupting on the political landscape, the stalling of the economy, and the increasingly loud calls for the impeachment of President Rousseff. Argentina was downgraded due to its default on debt following the failure of talks with bond holders. Venezuela was downgraded due to the fact that the country's post-Chavez government is every bit as autocratic and nationalistic, but even more inclined to oppress its political opponents. Colombia was upgraded slightly due to efforts aimed at securing a peace deal with the FARC insurgents. A small but significant upgrade was attributed to Cuba due to its recent pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the Unitd States. Meanwhile, the United States, Canada, Costa Rica, Panama, and most of the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean retain their strong rankings due to their records of stability and peaceful transfers of power.

In the Pacific, Fiji was upgraded due to its return to constitutional order and democracy with the holding of the first elections in eight years.

In Oceania, Maldives has been slightly downgraded due to the government's continued and rather relentless persecution of the country's former pro-democracy leader - former President Nasheed.

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Source:

Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com

Updated:

2015

Freedom Rankings

Freedom in the World

Editor's Note: This ranking by Freedom House quantifies political freedom and civil liberties into a single combined index on each sovereign country's level of freedom and liberty. The initials "PR" and "CL" stand for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, respectively. The number 1 represents the most free countries and the number 7 represents the least free. Several countries fall in the continuum in between. The freedom ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results.

Trend Country PR CL Freedom Status Arrow

Afghanistan 6 ? 6 Not Free

Albania* 3 3 Partly Free

Algeria 6 5 Not Free

Libya Review 2016 Page 146 of 437 pages Libya

Andorra* 1 1 Free

Angola 6 5 Not Free

Antigua and Barbuda* 3 ? 2 Free

Argentina* 2 2 Free

Armenia 6 4 Partly Free

Australia* 1 1 Free

Austria* 1 1 Free

Azerbaijan 6 5 Not Free

Bahamas* 1 1 Free

Bahrain 6 ? 5 Not Free ?

Bangladesh* 3 ? 4 Partly Free

Barbados* 1 1 Free

Belarus 7 6 Not Free

Belgium* 1 1 Free

Belize* 1 2 Free

Benin* 2 2 Free

Bhutan 4 5 Partly Free

Bolivia* 3 3 Partly Free

Libya Review 2016 Page 147 of 437 pages Libya

Bosnia-Herzegovina* 4 3 Partly Free

Botswana* 3 ? 2 Free

Brazil* 2 2 Free

Brunei 6 5 Not Free

Bulgaria* 2 2 Free

Burkina Faso 5 3 Partly Free

Burma 7 7 Not Free

Burundi* 4 5 Partly Free ⇑

Cambodia 6 5 Not Free ⇓

Cameroon 6 6 Not Free

Canada* 1 1 Free

Cape Verde* 1 1 Free

Central African Republic 5 5 Partly Free

Chad 7 6 Not Free

Chile* 1 1 Free

China 7 6 Not Free

Colombia* 3 4 Partly Free

Comoros* 3 4 Partly Free

Libya Review 2016 Page 148 of 437 pages Libya

Congo (Brazzaville ) 6 5 Not Free ⇓

Congo (Kinshasa) 6 6 Not Free ⇓

Costa Rica* 1 1 Free

Cote d’Ivoire 6 5 Not Free

Croatia* 1 ? 2 Free

Cuba 7 6 Not Free

Cyprus* 1 1 Free

Czech Republic* 1 1 Free

Denmark* 1 1 Free

Djibouti 5 5 Partly Free

Dominica* 1 1 Free

Dominican Republic* 2 2 Free ⇓

East Timor* 3 4 Partly Free

Ecuador* 3 3 Partly Free

Egypt 6 5 Not Free

El Salvador* 2 3 Free

Equatorial Guinea 7 7 Not Free

Eritrea 7 7 ? Not Free

Libya Review 2016 Page 149 of 437 pages Libya

Estonia* 1 1 Free

Ethiopia 5 5 Partly Free ⇓

Fiji 6 4 Partly Free

Finland* 1 1 Free

France* 1 1 Free

Gabon 6 5 ? Not Free ?

The Gambia 5 5 ? Partly Free

Georgia 4 4 Partly Free

Germany* 1 1 Free

Ghana* 1 2 Free

Greece* 1 2 Free

Grenada* 1 2 Free

Guatemala* 4 ? 4 Partly Free

Guinea 7 6 ? Not Free

Guinea-Bissau* 4 4 Partly Free

Guyana* 2 3 Free

Haiti* 4 5 Partly Free

Honduras 4 ? 4 ? Partly Free

Libya Review 2016 Page 150 of 437 pages Libya

Hungary* 1 1 Free

Iceland* 1 1 Free

India* 2 3 Free

Indonesia* 2 3 Free

Iran 6 6 Not Free ⇓

Iraq 5 ? 6 Not Free

Ireland* 1 1 Free

Israel* 1 2 Free

Italy* 1 2 Free

Jamaica* 2 3 Free

Japan* 1 2 Free

Jordan 6 ? 5 Not Free ?

Kazakhstan 6 5 Not Free ⇓

Kenya 4 4 ? Partly Free

Kiribati* 1 1 Free

Kosovo 5 ? 4 ? Partly Free ?

Kuwait 4 4 Partly Free

Kyrgyzstan 6 ? 5 ? Not Free ?

Libya Review 2016 Page 151 of 437 pages Libya

Laos 7 6 Not Free

Latvia* 2 1 Free

Lebanon 5 3 ? Partly Free

Lesotho* 3 ? 3 Partly Free ?

Liberia* 3 4 Partly Free

Libya 7 7 Not Free

Liechtenstein* 1 1 Free

Lithuania* 1 1 Free

Luxembourg* 1 1 Free

Macedonia* 3 3 Partly Free ⇑

Madagascar 6 ? 4 ? Partly Free

Malawi* 3 ? 4 Partly Free

Malaysia 4 4 Partly Free

Maldives* 3 ? 4 Partly Free

Mali* 2 3 Free

Malta* 1 1 Free ⇓

Marshall Islands* 1 1 Free

Mauritania 6 5 Not Free

Libya Review 2016 Page 152 of 437 pages Libya

Mauritius* 1 2 Free

Mexico* 2 3 Free

Micronesia* 1 1 Free

Moldova* 3 ? 4 Partly Free

Monaco* 2 1 Free

Mongolia* 2 2 Free ⇑

Montenegro* 3 2 ? Free ?

Morocco 5 4 Partly Free ⇓

Mozambique 4 ? 3 Partly Free

Namibia* 2 2 Free

Nauru* 1 1 Free

Nepal 4 4 Partly Free

Netherlands* 1 1 Free

New Zealand* 1 1 Free

Nicaragua* 4 4 ? Partly Free

Niger 5 ? 4 Partly Free

Nigeria 5 4 Partly Free ⇓

North Korea 7 7 Not Free ⇓

Libya Review 2016 Page 153 of 437 pages Libya

Norway* 1 1 Free

Oman 6 5 Not Free

Pakistan 4 5 Partly Free

Palau* 1 1 Free

Panama* 1 2 Free

Papua New Guinea* 4 3 Partly Free

Paraguay* 3 3 Partly Free

Peru* 2 3 Free

Philippines 4 3 Partly Free ⇓

Poland* 1 1 Free

Portugal* 1 1 Free

Qatar 6 5 Not Free

Romania* 2 2 Free

Russia 6 5 Not Free ⇓

Rwanda 6 5 Not Free

Saint Kitts and Nevis* 1 1 Free

Saint Lucia* 1 1 Free

Saint Vincent and

Grenadines* 2 1 Free

Libya Review 2016 Page 154 of 437 pages Libya

Samoa* 2 2 Free

San Marino* 1 1 Free

Sao Tome and Principe* 2 2 Free

Saudi Arabia 7 6 Not Free

Senegal* 3 3 Partly Free

Serbia* 2 ? 2 Free

Seychelles* 3 3 Partly Free

Sierra Leone* 3 3 Partly Free

Singapore 5 4 Partly Free

Slovakia* 1 1 Free ⇓

Slovenia* 1 1 Free

Solomon Islands 4 3 Partly Free

Somalia 7 7 Not Free

South Africa* 2 2 Free

South Korea* 1 2 Free

Spain* 1 1 Free

Sri Lanka* 4 4 Partly Free

Sudan 7 7 Not Free

Libya Review 2016 Page 155 of 437 pages Libya

Suriname* 2 2 Free

Swaziland 7 5 Not Free

Sweden* 1 1 Free

Switzerland* 1 1 Free ⇓

Syria 7 6 Not Free

Taiwan* 1 ? 2 ? Free

Tajikistan 6 5 Not Free

Tanzania 4 3 Partly Free

Thailand 5 4 Partly Free

Togo 5 4 ? Partly Free

Tonga 5 3 Partly Free

Trinidad and Tobago* 2 2 Free

Tunisia 7 5 Not Free

Turkey* 3 3 Partly Free ⇓

Turkmenistan 7 7 Not Free

Tuvalu* 1 1 Free

Uganda 5 4 Partly Free

Ukraine* 3 2 Free

Libya Review 2016 Page 156 of 437 pages Libya

United Arab Emirates 6 5 Not Free

United Kingdom* 1 1 Free

United States* 1 1 Free

Uruguay* 1 1 Free

Uzbekistan 7 7 Not Free

Vanuatu* 2 2 Free

Venezuela 5 ? 4 Partly Free

Vietnam 7 5 Not Free ⇓

Yemen 6 ? 5 Not Free ?

Zambia* 3 4 ? Partly Free

Zimbabwe 6 ? 6 Not Free

Methodology: PR and CL stand for political rights and civil liberties, respectively; 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free rating. The ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results.

? ? up or down indicates a change in political rights, civil liberties, or status since the last survey. ⇑ ⇓ up or down indicates a trend of positive or negative changes that took place but that were not sufficient to result in a change in political rights or civil liberties ratings of 1-7.

* indicates a country’s status as an electoral democracy.

Source:

This data is derived from the latest edition of Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2010 edition.

Libya Review 2016 Page 157 of 437 pages Libya

Available at URL: http://www.freedomhouse.org

Updated:

Reviewed in 2015

Human Rights

Human Rights in Libya

Overview

The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is an authoritarian military regime. The human rights situation improved slightly in recent years as Libya is trying to reintegrate into the international community. Still, serious abuses remain.

Law 71 bans group activity based on any political ideologies in opposition to the principles of Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi. Hundreds of individuals are in prison for violating this law. The fate of dozens of prisoners is unknown. Violators of the law can be put to death. According to one Libyan group, more than 250 political prisoners have disappeared.

Security forces in Libya monitor the population for dissenters of the regime. Self-censorship among journalists and academics is the norm. There are no private radio or television stations or mainstream newspapers. The state-controlled media does not criticize the government.

The internet is the only access to uncensored news and dozens of opposition or independent websites are quickly emerging as a result; the government is working to restrict access to those sites.

No truly independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operate in Libya. The two human rights groups which exist in Libya are somehow linked to the government.

Libya has no asylum law. Thousands of foreigners, mostly sub-Saharan Africans who seek refuge in Libya, are often forcibly deported back to their country of origin.

The government recently initiated some reforms. The People’s Court, a body which had tried most political cases without due process, was abolished. New penal and criminal procedure codes

Libya Review 2016 Page 158 of 437 pages Libya are being drafted. The government says it will examine some past human rights violations, most notably the 1998 deaths of prisoners in Abu Selim prison by prison guards. It has also started to periodically allow scrutiny from human rights groups after many years of denying entry into Libya.

Special Report:

Editor's Note on the 2011 Season of Unrest:

Coming on the heels of the successful "Jasmine Revolution" in Tunisia and the "Nile Revolution" in Egypt, protests by thousands of pro-democracy demonstrators in Libya resulted in the liberation of the eastern part of the country in the early part of 2011. As part of a brutal crackdown aimed at shoring up power in the government's center of Tripoli, the Qadhafi regime opened fire on anti- government protesters before commencing a brutal military offensive against opposition strongholds to the east. Unapologetic for his ruthless tactics and in the face of worldwide condemnation, Qadhafi called for the crushing of the resistance movement by all means necessary and "without mercy."

Libya Review 2016 Page 159 of 437 pages Libya prevailing NATO mission, were stepping up air attacks inside Libya. As well, the rebel cause received support from the international community, which provided both diplomatic support and financial aid to the Transitional National Council (TNC). The TNC, based in the opposition stronghold of Benghazi, has been composed of opposition leaders, technocrats and diplomats from the Qadhafi regime who defected to the opposition to protest the Qadhafi regime's crackdown, and reformers. The TNC has been in close contact with the international community, including the United Nations and NATO, with an eye on ensuring a peaceful and effective transition in the post-Qadhafi period to come.

The rebels advantageous footing seemed to have occurred as a result of effective military strategy. Moving from Libya’s Nafusa Mountains, rebel fighters made considerable progress in advancing toward Tripoli and, as noted here, gained the upper hand in the Zawiya to the west of Tripoli -- a strategic transit point along the Qadhafi regime's supply line. The rebels' control of Zawiya and several other towns along the road towards the Tunisian border, as aforementioned, meant that the Qadhafi regime and its supporters were now boxed in and isolated in Tripoli -- the apparent "last stand" in the fight by Qadhafi's inner circle to hold onto power in Libya. For the rebels, though, Tripoli represented the final battle in the fight to liberate the country from Qadhafi's repression. Many rebel fighters were claiming "zero hour" was finally on Qadhafi and his coterie in Tripoli.

Libya Review 2016 Page 160 of 437 pages Libya

The rebels were also claiming the capture of three of Qadhafi's sons. Luis Moreno Ocampo, the chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Court, said that Saif al-Islam, who was already facing earlier arrest warrants for crimes against humanity during the crackdown -- should be transferred to The Hague to face justice. It should be noted that on Aug. 22, 2011, there were subsequent reports in the international media that Mohammed Qadhafi had escaped house arrest. Also, Saif al-Islam was shown on global broadcasts freely-celebrating at the Rixos Hotel, claiming that his father was safe and that the Qadhafi regime remained in control of the country. Qadhafi himself was nowhere in sight, although his messages compelling supporters to take to the streets of Tripoli and "purify it" from "the rats" were still being broadcast.

By Aug. 22, 2011, it appeared that most of Tripoli was under rebel control, with the exception of some pro-Qadhafi pockets, such as the Bab Al-Azizia stronghold in western Tripoli. Later on that day, fierce battles between rebels and Qadhafi loyalists were ongoing in parts of Tripoli. Rebel forces said in an interview with the BBC that their forces were coming under fire from tanks departing the Qadhafi compound at Bab al-Azizia. Meanwhile, international journalists were trapped at the Rixos Hotel, with the streets around that building under the control of armed Qadhafi loyalists and mercenaries. By the night of Aug. 22, 2011, there were reports that pro- Qadhafi fighters fired a scud missile somewhere in the vicinity of the town of Sirte.

Libya Review 2016 Page 161 of 437 pages Libya freedom. He also warned that the fighting was "not over yet" and demanded again that Qadhafiexplicitly acknowledge that "his rule is over."

Indeed, it was quite likely that the rebels' brazen prediction was coming to pass: "Zero Hour" was finally descending on the Qadhafi regime in Libya.

Humanitarian Scenario

Libya Review 2016 Page 162 of 437 pages Libya reports that pro-government forces were laying landmines in the rebel-held western Libyan city of Misrata.

That confidence may have dissipated somewhat by August 2011 when rebels took control of Tripoli, and as three Qadhafi sons were taken into the custody of the Transitional National Council (TNC). More importantly, as discussed above, Luis Moreno Ocampo, the chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Court, called for Saif al-Islam -- who was already facing an arrest warrant for crimes against humanity during the crackdown -- to be transferred to The Hague to face justice. However, subsequent broadcasts from Tripoli seemed to indicate that Saif al-Islam was freely operating in Tripoli, and dismissing any threat to his freedom by either the TNC or the ICC.

Meanwhile, according to the Associated Press, a new report by the United Nations Human Rights Council, suggested that the estimated death toll in Libya since the start of the uprising was between 10,000 and 15,000.

Human Development Index (HDI) Rank:

See full listing of the Human Development Index located in the Social Overview of this report for this country's current rank.

Human Poverty Index Rank:

33rd out of 103

Libya Review 2016 Page 163 of 437 pages Libya

Gini Index:

N/A

Life Expectancy at Birth (years):

77 years

Unemployment Rate:

30%

Population living on $1 a day (%):

N/A

Population living on $2 a day (%):

N/A

Population living beneath the Poverty Line (%):

N/A

Internally Displaced People:

N/A Note-Some 12,000 foreign refugees are currently seeking asylum in Libya

Total Crime Rate (%):

N/A

Health Expenditure (% of GDP):

Libya Review 2016 Page 164 of 437 pages Libya

Public: 1.6%

% of GDP Spent on Education:

N/A

Human Rights Conventions Party to:

• International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide • International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights • International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights • Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women • Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment • Conventions on the Rights of the Child

*Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index that measures the level of well-being in 177 nations in the world. It uses factors such as poverty, literacy, life-expectancy, education, gross domestic product, and purchasing power parity to assess the average achievements in each nation. It has been used in the United Nation’s Human Development Report since 1993.

*Human Poverty Index Ranking is based on certain indicators used to calculate the Human Poverty Index. Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40, adult literacy rate, population without sustainable access to an improved water source, and population below income poverty line are the indicators assessed in this measure.

*The Gini Index measures inequality based on the distribution of family income or consumption. A value of 0 represents perfect equality (income being distributed equally), and a value of 100 perfect inequality (income all going to one individual).

*The calculation of the total crime rate is the % of the total population which has been effected by property crime, robbery, sexual assault, assault, or bribery (corruption) related occurrences.

Government Functions

Libya Review 2016 Page 165 of 437 pages Libya

Note: At the time of writing, Libya was undergoing a transition from control by the Qadhafi regime, to control by an opposition led Transitional National Council, and onward towards emerging democracy. Please see Editor's Note below

Type: Transitional state. Under the Qadhafi regime, Libya was a Jamahiriya (a state of the masses) in theory, governed by the populace through local councils. In practice, Libya was an authoritarian state under the autocratic leadership of Qadhafi until 2011 when the season of unrest took hold in Libya, ultimately ending the Qadhafi regime's grip on power. A different type of government was expected to be formed in Libya under the aegis of the Transitional National Council. See Editor's Note below. As well, Libya hosted landmark elections in 2012, as discussed in the "Elections Primer" below.

Editor's Note on the 2011 Season of Unrest: Coming on the heels of the successful "Jasmine Revolution" in Tunisia and the "Nile Revolution" in Egypt, protests by thousands of pro-democracy demonstrators in Libya resulted in the liberation of the eastern part of the country. As part of a brutal crackdown aimed at shoring up power in the government's center of Tripoli, the Qadhafi regime opened fire on anti-government protesters before commencing a brutal military offensive against opposition strongholds to the east. Unapologetic for his ruthless tactics and in the face of worldwide condemnation, Qadhafi called for the crushing of the resistance movement by all means necessary and "without mercy."

But a month later in late April 2011, Libya was in a state of stalemate -- roughly divided between pro-rebel eastern Libya and pro-Qadhafi western Libya. Misrata -- the only rebel-held city in the

Libya Review 2016 Page 166 of 437 pages Libya west -- was a flashpoint for the conflict. The fact that ground on either side could be so quickly gained and/or lost augured negatively for a quick end to the chaos in Libya. It was clear that the rebel movement was highly disorganized and reliant on the air strikes to make any progress in their efforts to secure territory. They certainly had neither professional training nor efficient weaponry to rely upon in their efforts. On the other hand, the pro-Qadhafi forces were demonstrating that they were only being restrained by the threat of air strikes.

In mid-August 2011, the rebels were advancing on Tripoli, the Qadhafi regime was being isolated. All indications pointed to the notion that rebel fighters -- now far more organized -- were attempting to lay siege on Tripoli in what was being dubbed "Operation Mermaid." In many senses, the "end game" was in sight.

On the domestic political landscape, an interim government was soon formed in Libya, with Mahmoud Jibril at the helm of that cabinet, and with Mustafa Abdel-Jalil functioning as the TNC

Libya Review 2016 Page 167 of 437 pages Libya head.

Attention would likely soon focus on the massive challenge of building a new Libyan nation state with all the instruments and structures needed for stable and democratic governance.

In late 2011, the Transitional National Council (TNC) of Libya announced that the country would be led by a new prime minister -- Abdurrahim el-Keib -- at the helm of the new transitional government. As well, Libya was set to hold its first democratic elections on June 19, 2012 (since delayed to July 2012). Voting would be held to elect the members of a 200-strong constituent assembly to draft a new constitution and form a government. Ahead of that vote, Libyan authorities banned the formation of political parties based on religion, tribe, or ethnicity.

Executive Branch: Note on chief of state: Until 2011, revolutionary leader Col. Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI (September 1969- August 2011); note - held no official title, but was de facto chief of state. Note that as of 2011, the United States and many other world powers recognize the opposition-led Transitional National Council (TNC) as the only legitimate governing authority in Libya.

Note on new prime minister: On Oct. 7, 2012, Libyan Prime Minister-elect Mustafa Abu Shagur was dismissed from his post after failing for to win parliamentary approval for a new cabinet. Shagur had been seeking parliamentary ratification for the formation of an "emergency government" with a reduced number of ministries; however, he could only muster limited support in the General National Congress (GNC). Earlier, his previous attempt to form a government was rejected in parliament due to the fact that it was not regionally representative. But it was the second failed vote that effectively ended his hopes to lead the new Libyan government. The deputy prime minister for more than a year, serving interim leader Abdurrahim al-Keib, Shagur was Libya's first elected prime minister in

Libya Review 2016 Page 168 of 437 pages Libya the post-Qadhafi era. Clearly, the scene was set for a new head of government to be elected. To that end, the GNC had less than a four-week period to accomplish that goal. On Oct. 14, 2012, it was Ali Zidane who was elected to be Libya's new head of government by the GNC. Now, Zidane would have to convene consultations aimed at forming a government of national unity.

Legislative Branch: Under the Qadhafi regime, there was a unicameral General People's Congress, composed of 760 seats; members elected indirectly through a hierarchy of people's committees. Note that since 2011, the United States and many other world powers recognize the opposition-led Transitional National Council (TNC) as the only legitimate governing authority in Libya. A new government is expected to be formed under a constitution yet to be crafted. See "Editors Note" above for details.

Judicial Branch: Under the Qadhafi regime, there was a Supreme Court. Note that since 2011, the United States and many other world powers recognize the opposition-led Transitional National Council (TNC) as the only legitimate governing authority in Libya. A new government is expected to be formed under a constitution yet to be crafted. See "Editors Note" above for details.

Constitution: None; note - following the September 1969 military overthrow of the Libyan government, the Revolutionary Command Council replaced the existing constitution with the Constitutional Proclamation in December 1969; in March 1977, Libya adopted the Declaration of the Establishment of the People's Authority.

Note that since 2011, the United States and many other world powers recognize the opposition-led Transitional National Council (TNC) as the only legitimate governing authority in Libya. A new government is expected to be formed under a constitution yet to be crafted. See "Editors Note" above for details.

Legal System: Under Qadhafi regime, based on Italian and French civil law systems and Islamic law; separate religious courts; no constitutional provision for judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction.

Note that as of 2011 and well into 2012, the United States and many other world powers recognize the opposition-led Transitional National Council (TNC) as the only legitimate governing authority in Libya. A new government is expected to be formed under a constitution yet to be crafted. See

Libya Review 2016 Page 169 of 437 pages Libya

"Editors Note" above for details.

Administrative Divisions: 22 states (shabiyat, singular - shabiyat); Al Butnan, Al Jabal al Akhdar, Al Jabal Al Gharbi, Al Jafarah, Al Jafrah, Al Kafrah, Al Maraj, Al Marqab, Al Murzuq, Al Wahat, An Nuqat al Khams, Az Zawiyah, Banghazi, Darnah, Ghat, Misratah, Nalut, Sibha, Surt, Tarabulus, Wadi al Hayat, Wadi ash Shati

Government Structure

Names under Qadhafi regime: conventional long form: Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya conventional short form: Libya local long form: Al Jamahiriyah al Arabiyah al Libiyah ash Shabiyah al Ishtirakiyah al Uthma local short form: none

Libya Review 2016 Page 170 of 437 pages Libya

While this reality might have been viewed as discouraging news for the protest movement, they

Libya Review 2016 Page 171 of 437 pages Libya took solace in the news that Qadhafi's regime appeared to be splintering from within, as evidenced by a constant parade of high level defections. From May 2011 onward, there was some progress from within the rebels' ranks, as British and French helicopters, operating under the aegis of the prevailing NATO mission, were stepping up air attacks inside Libya.

On the domestic political landscape, an interim government was soon formed in Libya, with Mahmoud Jibril at the helm of that cabinet, and with Mustafa Abdel-Jalil functioning as the TNC head.

Libya Review 2016 Page 172 of 437 pages Libya

Attention would likely soon focus on the massive challenge of building a new Libyan nation state with all the instruments and structures needed for stable and democratic governance.

Key figures in the TNC in 2011-- Chairman Mustafa Abdul Jalil; Vice Chairman Abdul Hafiz Ghoga; Chairman of the Executive Board Mahmoud Jebril

Note: On Nov. 1, 2011, the Transitional National Council (TNC) of Libya announced that the country would be led by a new prime minister -- Abdurrahim el-Keib -- at the helm of the new transitional government. El-Keib won 26 votes -- a bare majority in the TNC -- beating 10 rivals and becoming the new prime minister and head of government of Libya. El-Keib, a resident of the United States for three decades who was earned a doctorate from North Carolina State University, was a member of the anti-Qadhafi opposition. According to CNN, it was unknown when El-Keib returned to Libya.

Nevertheless, the election of the new prime minister came on the heels of a promise by outgoing Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, who repeatedly said he would step down when Libya was liberated from the Qadhafi regime. That day came on the national day of liberation on Oct. 23, 2011. For his part, El-Keib would hold the office of head of government through a transitional period in which a new constitution would be crafted, followed by the holding of landmark elections.

See "Editor's Note" above regarding the political situation in Libya in 2011 and 2012. See below

Libya Review 2016 Page 173 of 437 pages Libya for information on the landmark elections of 2012.

Note on president (2012-2013): Note that in August 2012 the new Libyan interim Assembly elected former opposition activist and moderate Islamist Mohammed Magarief as its president. In that role, Magarief would have the responsibility of leading the effort to appoint a prime minister and pass legislation until full parliamentary elections could be held under a new constitution.

New president for Libya (since 2013): In June 2013, Mohamed al-Magarief resigned as the head of the General National Congress and thus the de facto president; the interim parliament elected Nuri Abu Sahmayn to replace him. An independent member of parliament and ethnic Berber, Sahmayn would serve as the head of state until fresh elections could be held.

Prime minister (as of 2014): See below

Note on prime minister (2012): On Oct. 7, 2012, Libyan Prime Minister-elect Mustafa Abu Shagur was dismissed from his post after failing for to win parliamentary approval for a new cabinet. Shagur had been seeking parliamentary ratification for the formation of an "emergency government" with a reduced number of ministries; however, he could only muster limited support in the General National Congress (GNC). Earlier, his previous attempt to form a government was rejected in parliament due to the fact that it was not regionally representative. But it was the second failed vote that effectively ended his hopes to lead the new Libyan government. The deputy prime minister for more than a year, serving interim leader Abdurrahim al-Keib, Shagur was Libya's first elected prime minister in the post-Qadhafi era. Clearly, the scene was set for a new head of government to be elected. To that end, the GNC had less than a four-week period to accomplish that goal. On Oct. 14, 2012, it was Ali Zidane who was elected to be Libya's new head of government by the GNC. Now, Zidane would have to convene consultations aimed at forming a government of national unity.

Note on Libya PM (as of 2014): Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan was dismissed as the country's head of government by the Libyan parliament on March 12, 2014. Abdullah Al-Thinni was then named to be Libya's interim prime minister. But in late April 2014, after only about a month on the job, Thinni stepped down from office. In May 2014, Ahmed Maitig became Libya's new prime minister. His election came after a period of political turmoil. That turmoil continued when Al-Thinni refused to vacate his post in favor of Maitig, as discussed below. Al-Thinni returned to the fore as head of government following court ruling, as discussed below.

Libya Review 2016 Page 174 of 437 pages Libya

Turmoil surrounding new prime minister (since May 2014): In March 2014, Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan was dismissed as the country's head of government by the Libyan parliament. He had served as the head of government since 2012. The parliament made that decision after the government failed to stop rebels from defying a blockade and taking control of an oil tanker. That incident was the latest act of defiance from rebel militias who refuse to disarm after the former Qadhafi regime was ousted from power. Instead, they have increased their control over swaths of the country, maintaining domain over fiefdoms, while demanding a larger share of the profits from the oil revenue in Libya along with greater autonomy.

In March 2014, following the removal of Zeidan from the post of prime minister, Abdullah Al- Thinni was named to be Libya's interim prime minister. But in late April 2014, after only about a month on the job, Thinni stepped down from office out of concern for the safety of his family who were threatened by militias. Now, as the parliament attempted to choose a replacement for Thinni, Libya's abysmal landscape of insecurity was brought into sharp relief with the storming of the parliament by gunmen. There were reports of gunshots and injuries. the armed gunman who attacked the parliament were allied with an ex general, Khalifa Haftar, and they were demanding that lawmakers hand over power to a legal commission until elections could be held later in the year. The mayhem led to the decision to suspend the voting. A fresh round of voting would instead be attempted in the first week of May 2014.

Libya Review 2016 Page 175 of 437 pages Libya ends, Maitig said: "I want to form a crisis government. The government will be based on four pillars -- to improve state control and sovereignty, rebuild the security and military institutions, start national reconciliation, and find urgent solutions for transitional justice and grievances."

Primer on 2012 Election in Libya: originally slated for June 19, 2012; postponed to July 7, 2012 --

Ahead of the landmark elections, Libyan authorities banned the formation of political parties based

Libya Review 2016 Page 176 of 437 pages Libya on religion, tribe, or ethnicity. Still, the religious element would not be gone completely as members of the Muslim Brotherhood were contesting the elections under the aegis of the Justice and Construction Party.

By mid-July 2012, news had emerged that the liberal and secularist alliance, known as the Alliance of National Forces of interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, had won a landslide victory in Benghazi as well as several eastern cities, and was leading the vote overall. It should of course be

Libya Review 2016 Page 177 of 437 pages Libya noted that the strong performance of the liberal alliance did not guarantee that it would dominate the Assembly, since the majority of seats were earmarked for independents.

On July 18, 2012, the Libyan election results were announced -- Jibril's bloc won 39 out of the 80 seats reserved for political parties. The Muslim Brotherhood's party has garnered 17 seats. That result certainly showed a triumph for liberal and secularist elements in Liby. That being said, the lion's share of seats in the 200-seat Assembly -- 120 seats -- would be held by victorious independent candidates. As such, it was yet to be seen if any ideological realm would have the advantage in the full Assembly. Stated differently, the overall orientation of the body was unclear.

Mandate for Libya's interim parliament expires; political transition in crisis: In the second week of February 2014, the mandate for Libya's interim parliament expired and members extended their own authority. Members of the interim parliament, which came into being in 2012 after the fall of the Qadhafi regime, said that they needed more time to draft a post- Qadhafi constitution. They said that if they failed to draft the constitution in 60 days, then they would hold fresh elections for a new interim assembly.

Libya Review 2016 Page 178 of 437 pages Libya with the Islamist JCP, has only added to the country's political complications. Meanwhile, one militia had even managed to abduct Prime Minister Ali Zeidan -- if only for a short duration -- in the latter part of 2013. The incident drew into sharp relief the government's inability to bring stability to Libya.

Primer on 2014 parliamentary elections in Libya June 25, 2014 --

Snap parliamentary elections were held in Libya on June 25, 2014, in the hopes of settling the country's tumultuous political landscape.

The public's outrage over the lack of effectiveness of the GNC was exacerbated by the fact that it had done little to address the problems caused by militias. An ongoing rivalry between the Zintani brigade, which was loosely aligned with the NSA, and the Misrata militia, which held some links with the Islamist JCP, has only added to the country's political complications. Meanwhile, one militia had even managed to abduct then-Prime Minister Ali Zeidan (if only for a short duration) in the latter part of 2013. The incident drew into sharp relief the government's inability to bring stability to Libya.

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In the first week of May 2014, another attempt was made in the Libyan parliament to elect a prime minister. This event ended successfully with Ahmed Maitig, a businessman and hotel owner, being chosen to be the new head of government. But Maitig was foiled from moving forward as the head of government when the legal department of the country's Justice Ministry ruled that Maitig's election was illegal. Maitig, who was supported by independents and Islamist members of parliament, did not have the support of rival factions who launched a challenge against his election.

Libya Review 2016 Page 180 of 437 pages Libya helpful development in assuaging rebels who have occupied several oil ports in the eastern part of the country. Those rebels were prepared to go forward with an accord to unblock access to the ports if Al-Thinni was the head of government; however, they made it known that they would not go forward with the deal if Maitig was prime minister.

Note that in July 2014, Libyan authorities confirmed that they were going ahead with plans to move the country's parliament to Benghazi despite the security crisis plaguing that eastern port city. Rather than house the parliamentary body in the capital of Tripoli, the plan to move the parliament to Benghazi was being motivated by the government's intent to reconstruct and redevelop the tumultuous eastern realm of the country, which was subject to neglect by the previous Qadhafi regime. As well, the Libyan authorities hoped that the move would facilitate more of a governing imprint in the part of the country known as a hotbed of unrest.

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Political Parties and Leaders: As follows --

Al-Watan (Homeland) Party Justice and Construction Party or JCP [Muhammad SAWAN] National Forces Alliance or NFA [Mahmoud JIBRIL, founder] (includes many political organizations, NGOs, and independents) National Front (initially the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, formed in 1981 as a diaspora opposition group) Union for the Homeland [Abd al-Rahman al-SUWAYHILI]

Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal and technically compulsory

Principal Government Officials

Government of Libya

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On the domestic political landscape, an interim government was soon formed in Libya, with Mahmoud Jibril at the helm of that cabinet, and with Mustafa Abdel-Jalil functioning as the TNC head.

Attention would likely soon focus on the massive challenge of building a new Libyan nation state with all the instruments and structures needed for stable and democratic governance.

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Key figures in the TNC in 2011-- Chairman Mustafa Abdul Jalil; Vice Chairman Abdul Hafiz Ghoga; Chairman of the Executive Board Mahmoud Jebril

See "Editor's Note" above regarding the political situation in Libya in 2011 and 2012. See below for information on the landmark elections of 2012.

New president for Libya (since 2013): In June 2013, Mohamed al-Magarief resigned as the head of the General National Congress and

Libya Review 2016 Page 185 of 437 pages Libya thus the de facto president; the interim parliament elected Nuri Abu Sahmayn to replace him. An independent member of parliament and ethnic Berber, Sahmayn would serve as the head of state until fresh elections could be held.

Prime minister (as of 2014): See below

This latest humiliation of the government at the hands of the rebels -- in the form of the oil tanker debacle -- appeared to have motivated the parliament to make the decision to remove Zeidan from

Libya Review 2016 Page 186 of 437 pages Libya his post as prime minister. For some time, Zeidan's government has been under fire for failing to deal with rebel militias in the aftermath of the anti-Qadhafi revolution. Defense Minister Abdullah al-Thanni was named to be the interim prime minister until the parliament could find concurrence on a permanent replacement.

At the close of May 2014, the outgoing interim prime minister -- Al-Thinni -- refused to cede

Libya Review 2016 Page 187 of 437 pages Libya power and placed the blame on conflicting orders from a deeply divided parliament. Al-Thinni insisted that he would hold onto his post as prime minister until the matter was resolved by members of parliament in the General National Congress.

-- as of 2014

Leader Biography

Leadership of Libya

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On the domestic political landscape, an interim government was soon formed in Libya, with Mahmoud Jibril at the helm of that cabinet, and with Mustafa Abdel-Jalil functioning as the TNC head.

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Attention would likely soon focus on the massive challenge of building a new Libyan nation state with all the instruments and structures needed for stable and democratic governance.

Key figures in the TNC in 2011-- Chairman Mustafa Abdul Jalil; Vice Chairman Abdul Hafiz Ghoga; Chairman of the Executive Board Mahmoud Jebril

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United States for three decades who was earned a doctorate from North Carolina State University, was a member of the anti-Qadhafi opposition. According to CNN, it was unknown when El-Keib returned to Libya.

See "Editor's Note" above regarding the political situation in Libya in 2011 and 2012. See below for information on the landmark elections of 2012.

Prime minister (as of 2014): See below

Note on prime minister (2012):

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Turmoil surrounding new prime minister (since May 2014): InMarch 2014, Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan was dismissed as the country's head of government by the Libyan parliament. He had served as the head of government since 2012. The parliament made that decision after the government failed to stop rebels from defying a blockade and taking control of an oil tanker. That incident was the latest act of defiance from rebel militias who refuse to disarm after the former Qadhafi regime was ousted from power. Instead, they have increased their control over swaths of the country, maintaining domain over fiefdoms, while demanding a larger share of the profits from the oil revenue in Libya along with greater autonomy.

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Libya Review 2016 Page 194 of 437 pages Libya with modern standards of technology. There would also be the implementation of a transitional system of justice, which would deal with grievances and offer support to the judiciary. To these ends, Maitig said: "I want to form a crisis government. The government will be based on four pillars -- to improve state control and sovereignty, rebuild the security and military institutions, start national reconciliation, and find urgent solutions for transitional justice and grievances."

Foreign Relations

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General Relations

Since 1969, Qadhafi has determined Libya's foreign policy. His principal foreign policy goals have been Arab unity; the elimination of Israel; the advancement of Islam; support for Palestinians; the elimination of outside, particularly Western, influence in the Middle East and Africa; and support for a range of "revolutionary" causes.

Disappointed with the lack of support from Arab countries in Libya struggle to end sanctions against his country, Qadhafi has since 1998 focused more of his foreign policy on Africa. Most notably, Qadhafi has been a driving force behind the ongoing transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the African Union. Still, by accepting visits and forming close relations with maverick states such as Belarus and Iraq (during the regime of Saddam Hussein), and supporting Zimbabwean President Mugabe's policy of taking land from white farmers, Libya continued to partly preserve its pariah-label.

Some shift in position, however, has occurred in recent years, as discussed below. In short, the year 2005 marked the commencement of economic rapprochement with the United States, which blossomed more fully in 2006 after years of frozen bilateral ties and apparent involvement in notorious terror cases. Then in 2007, newly-inaugurated French President Nicolas Sarkozy forged an arms agreement with Libya. At stake was the purchase by Libya of French anti-tank missiles and radio communications systems valued at about $405 million. It was the first such agreement with a Western country since the lifting of the European Union embargo in 2004.

See "Editor's Note" below related to events of the Libyan Season of Unrest in 2011, the end of the Qadhafi era, and the transformation of the geopolitical landscape.

Regional Relations

Arab World

Disappointed with the support from Arab leaders in his fight against the international sanctions on

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Libya, Qadhafi has gone from being a champion of the Arab cause to a champion for the African cause.

Qadhafi's more visible focus has been on consolidating Libyan radical nationalism. Libyan foreign policy has been portrayed, as an expression of the popular will. However, this diminution in support for these formerly central causes should not be interpreted as their abandonment by Qadhafi. He remains opposed to any peace agreement with Israel and has been vocal in his disapproval of other Arab and Islamic states that have sought to establish or improve relations with Israel. He lambasted Mauritania for upgrading its relations with Israel after an agreement between t he two states was signed in October 1999.

Libya's maverick leader remain critical of Arab and world leaders, and did not participate in the U.N. Millennium Summit or the Arab and Islamic summits held in 2000. Qadhafi criticizes the efficiency of the United Nations and calls for extensive reform of the world organization. After the October 2000 Arab League summit in Cairo, Qadhafi said in an interview with the independent Qatari-based satellite channel, al-Jazeera, that "Arab leaders are incapable of responding to the expectations of the Arab masses."

For the same reasons, Qadhafi refused to take part in the November 2000 meeting of the Organization of Islamic Conference in Qatar, further angering Arab leaders. Qadhafi refused to attend the March 2002 Arab League summit, decrying the location of the summit, Lebanon, a country with which Libya has been on poor terms since 1978. When the largely-applauded Saudi peace plan concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was announced to be discussed during the 2002 Arab League summit, Qadhafi denounced the plan and vehemently threatened to quit the League.

Egypt-Libyan relations have significantly improved over the last few years. The two countries have expanded their economic cooperation. In August 2001, the two countries agreed to set up a joint $100 million oil and gas company to transport Libyan oil into Egypt and Egyptian gas into Libya. Also, together with Iraq and Syria, Egypt and Libya have agreed to form a customs union by 2005. The agreement is a first steps toward creating a common Arab market.

On the foreign policy front, Egypt and Libya have agreed to coordinate their African policies, and in particular toward Sudan. In August 1999, a peace plan for Sudan was launched, but so far little progress have been made. Egypt and Libya have both experienced domestic problems with Islamic opposition groups, and share an interest in Sudan which i s known to harbor radical Islamic groups. Both countries also oppose the secession of Sudan, a solution favored by Washington.

Libya has also improved relations and economic ties with the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Tunisia as marked by the resumption of air links and diplomatic visits between May and July 2000. In November 2000, Morocco and Libya signed cooperation agreements seeking to promote

Libya Review 2016 Page 197 of 437 pages Libya investment and guarantee environmental conservation. In August 2001, Libya signed a series of accords with Algeria. The agreements are aimed at revitalizing economic cooperation, and covered the areas of investment, economy, trade, finance, education and security.

In January 2001, Morocco's King Hussein visited Libya, and extensive talks on political, economic, regional and international issues were held. The two countries share a desire for improved regional cooperation, and hope to resume the dialog between five Western Arab countries (Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Maurita nia) and five European countries in the Mediterranean region (France, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Malta). The dialogue was suspended shortly after the Lockerbie incident.

Libyan-Lebanese relations have remained strained since 1978 when the Lebanese Shia leader Musa Sadr, and two other Lebanese citizens, disappeared during a trip to Libya.

In 2003, Libya decided to recall its ambassador to Saudi Arabia after a verbal contretemps ensued between the two countries' leaders during the Arab League summit. Libya also contemplated whether or not to continue its membership in the Arab League. The disagreement, which was broadcast live on television, occurred when Qadhafi accused Saudi Arabia of striking an alliance with the American "devil" during the first Gulf War. The Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah responded to the accusation by angrily asking, "Who exactly brought you to power? You are a liar and your grave awaits you." The summit was temporarily suspended following the vitrioli c exchange.

Africa

While Libya's policy toward black Africa in the 1970s and 1980s was inconsistent and volatile, a more consistent and pragmatic approach has marked the late 1990s. In July 1999, Qadhafi attended the Organization of African Unity, or OAU, annual assembly for the first time since 1977. At the summit, Qadhafi's vision for African union received further discussion and consideration, and Qadhafi remains the driving force behind the project to unify the 53 African states into an African European Union style organization with common political, economic, legal and military institutions.

A draft constitutive act of the AU was adopted at the 36th OAU summit, and during the 37th summit in July 2001, African leaders voted to replace the OAU with the African Union, also known as the AU. The one-year transformation process will end when the first assembly of the AU will be held in Pretoria, South Africa in July 2002.

Consistent with this new foreign policy direction, Qadhafi has assumed the role of peacemaker and mediator of global conflict and problems. He used the 1999 OAU meeting to intercede in the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In April 2000, Libya offered diplomatic and financial aid to the Ivory Coast in its bid to return to civilian rule following a military coup. In May 2000, Libya pledged to

Libya Review 2016 Page 198 of 437 pages Libya cancel a portion of Tanzania's US$46 million debt and reorient the remainder for investment. Also, in May, Libya dispatched a number of its helicopters to Liberia to help evacuate wounded U.N. peacekeepers released from captivity in Sierra Leone and dispatched senior diplomats to the Philippines to secure the release of foreign hostages being held there. Libya was also the sponsor of a peace plan to end the civil conflict in Chad. Chad signed the agreement in early 2002.

As noted above, February 2009 saw Qadhafi was elected as chairman of the African Union at the bloc's summit in Ethiopia. As such, he would replace outgoing Chairman Jakaya Kikwete, the president of Tanzania. Qadhafi's stint as African Union leader would last for a one-year period. While he has gained notoriety for his stance in favor of African unity, some African leaders were said to be skeptical about the choice of Qadhafi to lead the 53-member bloc, due to his dramatic style.

Other Significant Relations

After the 1969 coup, Qadhafi closed American and British bases on Libyan territory and partially nationalized all foreign oil and commercial interests in Libya. He played a key role in introducing oil as a political weapon for challenging the West. He hoped that an oil price rise and embargo in 1973 would persuade the West, especially the United States, to end support for Israel.

Qadhafi rejected both Soviet Communism and Western capitalism, seeking an allegedly middle course. Libya's relationship with the former Soviet Union involved massive Libyan arms purchases from the Soviet bloc and the presence of thousands of its advisers. Libya's use, and heavy loss, of Soviet-supplied weaponry in its war with Chad was a notable breach of an apparent Soviet-Libyan understanding not to use the weapons for activities inconsistent with Soviet objectives. As a result, Soviet-Libyan relations reached their lowest point in mid-1987.

Since the fall of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, Libya has concentrated upon expanding diplo matic ties with Third World countries and increasing its commercial links with Europe and East Asia. Libya recently has made substantial investments in international financial institutions and petroleum refining and marketing operations. These foreign investments, however, have been the target of varying enforcement actions under U.N. Security Council Resolution 883, which imposed a limited freeze on Libyan assets abroad.

After the December 1988 bombing of the Pan American flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, that killed 270 people, Libya was urged to extradite the alleged perpetrators either to the United States or the United Kingdom for trial. Libya refused those terms, stating it would extradite the suspects only to neutral sites for trial. In 1992, the U.N. Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Libya for its refusal to extradite. After years of stagnation on the issue, in the summer of 1998, Libya agreed to extradite the accused terrorists to The Hague, for trial u nder Scottish law. On April 5, 1999, the

Libya Review 2016 Page 199 of 437 pages Libya two suspects were handed over.

The trial began on May 3, 2000, and ended on Jan. 18, 2001. The Jan. 31, 2001, verdict convicted sent Adbel Baset al-Megrahi to life in prison, while it acquitted his co-defendant Lamen Khalifa Fhimah.

Although Europe has grown closer to Libya in the aftermath of the handing over of the Lockerbie suspects, the United States identified four criteria that had to be met before it would abandon its unilateral sanctions on Libya. These requirements included the cessation of Libyan support for international terrorism, cooperation with the prosecution in the Lockerbie bombing trial, an acceptance of official responsibility for the past actions of government officials and the compensation of the relatives of the bombing regardless of the outcome of the trial. U.S. government personnel admitted that it is the last criterion which remained most problematic as the others have been substanti ally satisfied or are of lesser importance.

Meanwhile, the United States had been cautiously reassessing its relations with Libya for some time. In early 2000, a mission was sent to evaluate the need for a continuation of the travel ban presently imposed on Americans wanting to visit Libya. In June 2000, the U.S. government officially changed the official classification of Libya from a "rogue state" to a "state of concern" reflecting the positive changes that are occurring in Libya.

The Bush administration was faced with balancing the victims' families' demands for compensation over the Lockerbie tragedy, and the need for a serious reassessment of its policy towards Libya as other countries normalize their ties with Libya. In August 2001, President Bush signed into law a five-year extension of the Iran Libya Sanctions Act. In early September 2001, Libya called for a breakthrough in relations with the U.S. and Europe, and extended a one-year ultimatum urging U.S. oil companies to return to Libya. American licenses had been kept on ice since President Reagan ordered U.S. companies to leave Libya 15 years ago.

Qadhafi's increasingly regional credibility and his presence in almost every African crisis and his firm fight against Islamic fundamentalism (within Libya as well as in Sudan) made Libya an important regional player, and an increasingly useful ally in the region.

Libya's involvement as mediator in the dispute between the Philippine's government and Muslim separatists was intense, and resulted in the release of all Western hostages in September 2000. Libya is believed to have paid a ransom of around $1 million for each hostage, sponsored by a mysteriously well-endowed charity fund headed by Qadhafi's son, Seif al-Islam. The freed hostages were flown to Libya to thank Qadhafi personally, and the media coverage of the event provided a boost to Qadhafi's image, and was a significant step in the proc ess of improving Libya's international reputation.

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Qadhafi strongly condemned the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., and later said that America has the right to retaliate. Libya also called for an international conference to define terrorism, protested the killings of civilians, and offered humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. Yet despite counter-terrorism cooperation from Libya, the country, together with Syria, Sudan North Korea, Iran and Cuba, is not considered a part of the international anti-terror coalition.

Relations between Libya and Italy have significantly improved over the last few years. In July 1999, Italy officially apologized for the suffering it caused the Libyan people during the 1911 occupation. In October 2000, the Italian government agreed to pay $260 million in compensation for the damages Italian forces caused during Italy's colonial period. Italy is Libya largest trading partner, and has argued for the international community's normalization of ties with Libya, following its handing over of the Libyan suspects in the Lockerbie case.

China's foreign minister visited Libya in January 2001, and further improved the close and friendly relationship between the two countries. China remain firmly opposed to the economic sanctions on Libya, while Libya is eager to develop ties with China, and also looks to establishing a Chinese- African strategic partnership of cooperation. A Chinese-African ministerial forum was held in Beijing in 2000. Libya and China are both developing countries who wish to play an increasing role in world affairs.

Libya was an important military client of the Soviet Union, and Russia recently developed closer ties to Libya. President Vladimir Putin was expected to visit Libya in the near future, hoping to further improve the relationship, which has been soured by Libya's unwillingness to accept and settle an estimated debt of $3-4 billion. The presidential visit and attempts to improve relations must be seen in connection with Russian aspirations to sell Libya advanced weaponry, and to promote cooperation in the fields of trade, economy, science and technology.

In December 1999, Libyan authorities detained one Palestinian and six Bulgarian health workers on charges they deliberately infected hundreds of Libyan children with the HIV virus in an attempt to destabilize the Libyan state. Qadhafi went so far as to accuse the CIA or Massad of conspiring with the healthcare workers to infect the children with HIV. The healthcare workers maintained their innocence and some have accused the Libyan authorities of using torture and other abuses in order to coerce a confession from them. The trial had been postponed 14 times by mid-February 2002 when the People's Court of Tripoli dropped the charges of conspiracy against the healthcare workers and suggested the case be extradited to the Prosecutor-General's Office. In February 2002 Bulgarian President Georgi Paranov made it clear to the Libyan President that he wanted to retain diplomatic and economic ties to the country regardless of the outcome of the trial. The trial eventually took place and ended in 2004 with the sentence of death for the doctor and nurses found guilty. An appeal was in the works in 2005 as discussed below.

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Intending to repair its image as a state-sponsor of terrorism, in August 2003, Libya transferred $2.7 billion in funds to the Bank for International Settlements in Switzerland to compensate the families of the victims (259 passengers and 11 residents) of the Pan American flight which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988 (mentioned above). With responsibility now taken by Libya for the bombing, the United Kingdom and Bulgaria worked together to offer a United Nations resolution aimed at removing sanctions against Libya, which were imposed in 1992.

A vote on the new resolution was placed on hold after France raised objections about the compensation that was offered in regard to the bombing of a French UTA airliner, which exploded over Niger in 1989, killing 170 people on board. The original compensation package was $34 million -- a vastly smaller sum than the amount offered for the Lockerbie bombing. The French government demanded that the amount be significantly increased. Earlier, in 2002, several of the French victims' families had launched a lawsuit against Libya for $2.2 billion compensation. On Sept. 11, 2003, Libya agreed to a compensation deal with the relatives of those killed in the French airliner under which families would receive funds from a charity headed by a son of Qadhafi -- not from the Libyan state. In 2004, however, the Libyan government agreed to pay compensation to the victims of the French bombing. Also in 2004, Libya agreed to pay $35million in compensation to the victims of the bombing of a Berlin nightclub in 1986. The agreements successfully opened the way for United Nations sanctions on Tripoli to be finally lifted.

Meanwhile, in another surprising development, in December 2003, Libya announced that it was abandoning its efforts to build a weapons program, which had included plans to develop atomic bombs and other banned weaponry. A few days later, Libya said that it had agreed to impromptu inspections by the United Nations nuclear arms watchdog agency -- the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Some reports indicated that Tripoli's policy announcement was the result of secret negotiations between Libya, the United States and the United Kingdom starting in March. Other reports, however, suggested that the secret negotiations with Libya had been ongoing for several years.

Regardless, the shift in policy by T ripoli had the potential to make way for an end to United States sanctions, as well as the return of multinational oil companies. Even after the United Nations lifted its sanctions against Libya earlier in the year, the United States left its sanctions in place until April 2004, when Libya announced it was abandoning its weapons of mass destruction program. In September 2004, United States President George W. Bush lifted his country's trade embargo on Libya as a reward for Tripoli's decision to give up weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. kept several terrorism-related sections in place, however.

Also in 2004, the IAEA said it was investigating reports that North Korea made clandestine sales of uranium to Libya at a time when that country was attempting to develop nuclear weapons.

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Then, in May 2006, the United States announced that it was removing Libya from its list of state- sponsors of terrorism. The United States also announced that it would renew full diplomatic ties with Libya. The United States Assistant Secretary of State David Welch also announced that the United States planned to upgrade the liaison office in the Libyan capital city of Tripoli to a full embassy. In making that announcement he said that the shift would allow the United States and Libya "to engage more effectively on all issues."

Libya Review 2016 Page 203 of 437 pages Libya the opposition Socialists leader in France, called for a parliamentary inquiry into the deal, as well as French-Libyan negotiations on the matter. Sarkozy has said that he would welcome such a move.

Scotland's Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill justified the decision on compassionate grounds since al-Magrahi was terminally ill with prostate cancer. MacAskill said the decision "was not based on political, economic or diplomatic considerations" but was one that he made alone and he would have to live with the consequences. MacAskill conceded that Libya had acted wrongly by giving al-Megrahi a hero's welcome when he arrived back home on Libyan soil. In an address to parliament, he said, "It is a matter of great regret that Mr. Megrahi was received in such an inappropriate manner. It showed no compassion or sensitivity to the families of the 270 victims of Lockerbie." Indeed, the matter has been a source of embarrassment for the Scots at home who were chagrined to see their flag being waved in Libya in support for the return of a convicted terrorist.

Libya Review 2016 Page 204 of 437 pages Libya of an oil exploration deal with Libya. The office of the prime minister insisted there was no deal associated with the release of al-Megrahi, and denied the Times of London charge that the move was made in order to facilitate oil exploration rights in Libya by the British energy company, British Petroleum or BP.

Relations between Libya's post-Qadhafi regime and the West -- particular with global leaders such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France -- were expected to see new positive heights thanks to NATO's efforts in protecting rebel forces from the Qadhafi regime. See Editor's Note below for details related to Libya's liberation war against the Qadhafi regime in 2011.

NOTE:

Editor's Note on the 2011 Season of Unrest:

Summary:

Libya Review 2016 Page 205 of 437 pages Libya the crushing of the resistance movement by all means necessary and "without mercy."

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On the domestic political landscape, an interim government was soon formed in Libya, with Mahmoud Jibril at the helm of that cabinet, and with Mustafa Abdel-Jalil functioning as the TNC head.

Attention would likely soon focus on the massive challenge of building a new Libyan nation state with all the instruments and structures needed for stable and democratic governance. Notably, the United Nations mission in Libya said it was assisting the interim government in developing mechanisms and procedures needed to host the first elections to be held in Libya in 40 years

Another huge issue for the new Libyan government involves the realm of foreign policy as several members of the former Qadhafi regime have sought refuge in neighboring countries. For example, in February 2012, officials in Niger said they would not be extraditing Saadi Qadhafi, the son of the former Libyan leader, to Libya due to concerns that he might be killed in his home country. Instead, officials in Libya said that Saadi Qadhafi would be turned over to the International Criminal Court. Meanwhile, another surviving Qadhafi son, Saif al-Islam, along with Abdullah al- Sanussi ( the head of intelligence under the former Qadhafi regime) were were wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged crimes against humanity, specifically manifest by the murder and persecution of civilians. Whether they would actually face justice at the ICC in The Hague was to be seen since the new authorities in Libya were advocating that the younger Qadhafi face trial at home.

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Special Report

U.S. ambassador and other State Department officials killed in attack on consulate in Libya; issue becomes domestic flashpoint in U.S.

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Protests spread across the Muslim World; embassies of Western powers attacked

Libyans attack Islamist compound in retaliation for Ambassador Stevens' killing

Politics and the terrorism link to Benghazi tragedy

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Libya Review 2016 Page 211 of 437 pages Libya dead. She said: "I take responsibility." Secretary of State Clinton also explained that the state of "confusion" in the aftermath of the attack contributed to inconsistent, and sometimes confusing, explanations of the cause of the attack in Libya, and the actual motivation of those responsible. She said that she was taking public responsibility for what happened because she wanted "to avoid some kind of political gotcha."

Nevertheless, it was expected that the political dimensions of the Benghazi would continue to dominate the landscape in the United states, with oversight committees in the House of

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Special Note

Attacks on French and American diplomatic missions --

The French government condemned the attack with the French foreign ministry issuing the following statement: "In conjunction with the Libyan authorities, our government departments will make every effort to ensure that all light be shed on the circumstances of this heinous act and its perpetrators quickly identified." But France also hard a sharp demand for the Libyan government to assist in determining who was responsible for the attack and ensuring accountability. To that end, French President Francois Hollande issued his own statement, as follows: "France expects the Libyan authorities to ensure that all possible light is shed on this unacceptable act so that the perpetrators are identified and brought to justice."

Special Note:

U.S. special forces carry out terrorist raids in Libya

Special Report:

United States captures top suspect in Benghazi embassy attack

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In mid-June 2014, as the result of a secret operation ordered by President Barack Obama, United States Special Operations forces captured Ahmed Abu Khattala, the suspected leader of the 2012 attack on the United States' diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya, that tragically ended with the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and other victims. Khattala was removed from Libya and would ultimately face justice in the United States.

The plans for the capture of Khattala was in the works for some time but required approval from President Obama whose administration wanted to ensure that all the evidence and witness testimony was intact for a successful prosecution in the future. Also of concern to the Obama administration was the question of whether a United States commando operation on Libyan soil would present complications for the fragile Libyan government dealing with ongoing political chaos. Now, however, in June 2014, President Obama made the decision to go forward with the operation, which -- much like the operation to capture or kill Osama bin Laden in a raid into Pakistani territory -- also ended in success. This time, however, the suspect was apprehended alive and would face justice in the United States.

It should be noted that Dr. Susan Rice -- part of President Obama's national security team and the ambassador to the United Nations at the time in 2012 -- was pilloried by Republicans for saying

Libya Review 2016 Page 215 of 437 pages Libya during interviews that the Benghazi embassy attack was motivated by the (aforementioned) video that raised the ire of Muslims across the Middle East. Republicans said she was not casting the attack as terrorism even though President Obama himself characterized the Benghazi attack as such during a speech in the White House rose garden shortly after the bloodshed.

For Republicans, this news would likely blunt their continued attacks on Rice, who was now President Obama's national security adviser; instead, their attention remained on lingering accusations that the White House had concealed key details related to the Benghazi attack, along with displeasure that Khattala was being brought to the United States to face justice instead of being isolated at Guantanamo Bay.

Special Report

U.S. air strike in Libya kills Islamist terrorist Belmokhtar responsible for audacious 2013 attack on Algerian gas field

On June 15, 2015, it was reported that a United States air strike on the city of Ajdabiya in Libya had killed Mokhtar Belmokhtar -- the Algerian-born Islamist warlord and terrorist who was believed to be behind the attack at a gas plant in 2013 in Algeria. That attack involved the siege of the Amenas gas field, the kidnapping of 800 people and the deaths of dozens of victims -- many of whom were foreign nationals simply trying to make a living. Reports of Belmokhtar by Chadian forces had surfaced later in 2013 during an anti-terrorism operation in Mali, but were always regarded as spurious. The questionable nature of those claims was highlighted now in 2015 with the more definitive announcement from the United States authorities in which they made clear that Belmokhtar had been targeted in the 2015 strike in Libya discussed here. As noted by a spokesperson for the United States Pentagon, Colonel Steve Warren, "Belmokhtar has a long

Libya Review 2016 Page 216 of 437 pages Libya history of leading terrorist activities as a member of AQIM, is the operational leader of the al- Qaida-associated al-Murabitoun organization in north-west Africa, and maintains his personal allegiance to al-Qaida." For its part, the government of Libya said the United States strike against Belmokhtar had been carried out with its consent.

Special Report

Egyptian Christians killed by Islamic State terrorists in Libya; Egypt retaliates with air strikes on Islamic State targets in Libya --

In mid-February 2015, a new battleground in the fight against Islamic State emerged in Libya when more than 20 Coptic Christians from Egypt were brutally killed. In keeping with the terror group's favorite mode of assassination, the victims were beheaded. As with the horrific immolation of a Jordanian pilot by Islamic State at the start of 2015 in Syria, the decapitations of the Egyptian Christian workers in Libya stood as an imprimatur for yet another Arab country to enter the global effort to defeat the Islamist Jihadist terror group.

The ghastly targeting of Christians by Islamic State reached a new nadir in mid-February 2015. As discussed here, videotaped footage emerged depicting the gruesome beheadings of the more than 20 Coptic Christians from Egypt who had been kidnapped by Islamic State terrorists in Libya. As has become a favored pattern by Islamic State, the revolting recording showed the victims dressed in orange jumpsuits, forced to kneel down and then decapitated in a barbaric theatre of horror. Adding to the tragedy was the fact that most of the victims were from impoverished villages in Upper Egypt who were seeking work in Libya due to their socio-economic plight.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi declared a week of national mourning, banned all travel by Egyptian citizens to Libya, and made a point of visiting St Mark's Cathedral in Cairo to offer his condolences to the Coptic Christian Pope Tawadros II. For its part, the Coptic Christian Church

Libya Review 2016 Page 217 of 437 pages Libya of Egypt expressed grave sadness over the deaths of the victims but said it was "confident" that the Egyptian authorities would respond appropriately.

To that end, Egyptian President Sisi condemned the repugnant murders of Coptic Christians, calling their assassins "inhuman criminal killers." The Egyptian leader wasted little time in asserting that it was his country's prerogative to exact retribution. Sisi also made clear that there was a global war emerging as the world confronted Islamist Jihadists. He said, "Egypt and the whole world are in a fierce battle with extremist groups carrying extremist ideology and sharing the same goals."

Soon, Egyptian forces were striking various Islamic State satellite targets in Libya -- from terror training camps and sites to weapons depots in the city of Derna. Meanwhile, Libya forces -- under the instruction of the internationally-recognized government of that country, and in coordination with Egypt -- were hitting Islamic State targets in Sirte and Bin Jawad. Egyptian authorities soon said that the plan would be to target all Islamic State locations in Libya. They also called on the United States-led international coalition against Islamic State to provide support to Egypt in its efforts against the bloodthirsty Islamist Jihadist terror group.

On Feb. 17, 2015, Egyptian President Sisi called for a United Nations resolution facilitating an international intervention into Libya. In an interview with French media, he explained that there was no other alternative, as he declared, "We will not allow them to cut off the heads of our children."

Days later, Libya was struck by violence when Islamic State militants launched a spate of suicide attacks, resulting in the deaths of 40 people. The terrorists packed cars with explosives, which were then detonated in the eastern town of Qubbah with deadly results. The three explosions took place at the town council of Qubbah, the local security office, and a gas station.

Islamic State said the attacks were being carried out in retaliation for Egyptian air strikes on pro- ISIL targets in Derna, Libya (as discussed above). The claim of responsibility statement by Islamic State of Cyrenaica read as follows: "They killed and wounded tens in revenge for the bloodshed of Muslims in the city of Derna." On the other side of the equation, Libyan Parliamentary Speaker Aguila Saleh, whose house was located in close proximity to the town council that was struck, said in an interview with Al Arabiya television, "We are announcing seven days of mourning for the victims of Qubbah. I think this operation was revenge for what happened in Derna."

Note that in May 2015, Islamic State continued to take advantage of the power chasm in Libya as rival militias fought for ascendancy by seizing control over the airport at Sirte. In fact, the seizure of the airport in Sirte was only the latest advance in the city in recent times, with most of Sirte falling to Islamic State weeks earlier. Also seized by Islamic State was the Great Man Made River irrigation project that supplies fresh water to Libyan cities. By the start of June 2015, Libyan

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Islamist militias were embroiled in fighting with Islamic State forces as the area devolved further into a morass of turmoil.

Editor's Note on Islamic State

Islamic State (alternatively referred to as ISIL and ISIS), has gained notoriety for its particularly brutal tactics, ranging from the abductions and mass murders of religious and ethnic minorities, which they view as apostates, and their beheadings of soldiers and journalists. The group has said that it aims to establish an Islamic "caliphate" that would be ruled according to Islamic Shari'a law. Its ambitions are Jihadists and not simply limited to Iraq and Syria; in fact, ISIL has made clear that it intends to extent its control to Jordan and Lebanon. A satellite venue of Islamic State has opened up in post-Arab Spring Libya as extremists have taken advantage of the power chasm there. Another ambition for ISIL is the cause of Palestine. Adherents are required to swear their allegiance to the ISIL leader, Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai, known in the public sphere as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Baghdadi's appeal has, to some degree, been fed by his mystery as he has only rarely been seen in public.

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Given this paradigm, the only prescription for defeat would be the disruption of what looks like an unstoppable juggernaut by ISIL. That being said, the texture of that defeat would have to be carefully -- and globally -- crafted since ISIL militants believe in the apocalyptic prophesy of a "final" confrontation with the West. Rather than facilitating that end, international stakeholders have noted that the preferable path would be to target this Islamist Jihadist terror entity as part of a global coalition. With United States-led air strikes only going so far to destroy ISIL, there would ultimately be a need for ground forces. An effective strategy against ISIL would be one that looks to Arab "boots on the ground" rather than feeding the hunger by Islamists for a Crusades-style war with the West.

Written by Dr. Denise Coleman, Editor in Chief, www.countrywatch.com

National Security

External Threats

The Libyan government has only recently begun to make amends for a historically reckless foreign policy. Throughout much of Moammar al-Qaddafi's rule, Libya was a major significant sponsor of global terrorism, earning it the enmity of a host of nations, most notably the United States. A history of tumultuous relations with neighboring countries further contributed to Libya's isolation. In recent years, the Qaddafi administration has taken significant towards improving the country's

Libya Review 2016 Page 221 of 437 pages Libya standing in the world community. Outside of a few lingering issues, Libya's specific relations with other countries in the region have also improved. Despite Libyan government's public efforts to enhance the nation's image, recent events do cast some doubt on the degree to which it has truly renounced terrorism.

The Libyan government has a longstanding history of involvement in global terrorism. Qaddafi came to power after orchestrating a successful coup in 1969. He quickly turned his attention to causes that resonated throughout the Arab world, including the promotion of Islam, the expulsion of Western influences from the Middle East and Africa, the eradication of Israel, support for Palestinians, and greater cohesion amongst Arab states. In pursuit of his political agenda, he promoted the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) use of oil embargoes. He also sponsored terrorist violence throughout the world. He reportedly provided varying degrees of support to a wide range of militant organizations outside of Libya. The Libyan government allegedly played a more direct role in several spectacular acts of violence, including: the 1986 bombing of the La Belle Discotheque in Berlin (three dead, 229 wounded), the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland (280 dead), and the 1989 bombing of French airliner Union Transit Airlines (UTA) flight 772 over Niger (170 dead).

Libya's patronage of terrorist violence did not go unpunished. The United States (U.S.) withdrew its ambassador to Libya in 1972 and closed its embassy there in 1979. That same year, the U.S. government declared Libya a state-sponsor of terrorism (for more information on the specific implications of that label, see the section pertaining to state-sponsors of terrorism in the U.S. Department of State report entitled Patterns of Global Terrorism. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, The U.S. government imposed progressively harsher sanctions upon Libya, culminating in a total ban on trade in 1986. In April 1986, the U.S. bombed targets near Tripoli and Benghazi, in retaliation for Libya's alleged role in the Berlin nightclub bombing. In January 1992, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 731, which called upon the Libyan government to cooperate with investigations into the Pan Am and UTA bombings, surrender the suspected perpetrators, pay compensation to the families of victims, and generally end its support for terrorism. The United Nations (U.N.)-imposed sanctions on Libya in March 1992 as a result of its failure to comply with Resolution 731. In 1998, the Arab League voted not to challenge the U.N. sanctions.

It addition to its links to terrorism, the Qaddafi administration's dealings with neighboring countries also contributed to Libya's status as a global pariah. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, it periodically intervened in the internal affairs of Chad, invariably garnering enemies in the process. In 1972, The Libyan government opportunistically sent troops to occupy a resource-rich region of Chad - which was engulfed in a civil war at the time- known as the Aozou strip. After a one-year interlude, fighting resumed there in 1980, between forces under the command of President Goukouni Oueddei and those loyal to Minister of Defense Hissein Habre. Libyan troops entered Chad to support Goukouni. Harshly criticized at home for fostering such close ties to the Libyan

Libya Review 2016 Page 222 of 437 pages Libya government, Goukouni requested that it remove its troops. Libya partially acquiesced, withdrawing its forces only as far as the Aozou Strip. It was enough, however, to allow Habre to seize control of the country. In 1983, Libya renewed its active support of Habre's opposition. France and Zaire intervened to protect Habre. In 1984, France and Zaire agreed to withdraw their troops from Chad, if Libya would respond in kind. France and Zaire complied, but Libyan forces continued to occupy the northern third of Chad. Habre ultimately succeeded in expelling the majority of them. The two nations agreed to a ceasefire in 1987. With support from Libya, however, one of Habre's generals, Idriss Deby, overthrew him in December 1990.

Similarly, the Libyan government has a history of friction with its northern neighbor, Tunisia. The two countries dissolved an agreement to form a union in 1974 and severed diplomatic ties in 1976. They restored them a year later. Relations deteriorated again in 1980, when Libyan-trained rebels made an unsuccessful attempt to seize the Tunisian town of Gafsa. In 1982, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) settled a dispute over the partition of the oil-rich continental shelf off of Tunisia and Libya's mutual coastline, ruling in Libya's favor. In 1985, the neighbors again suspended diplomatic relations when Libya expelled Tunisian workers and instigated military threats against Tunisia. Through relations were officially normalized in 1987, Tunisia joined the host of countries that supported U.N. sanctions against Libya.

After years of isolation, the Libyan government began to undertake measures aimed at fostering its reintegration into the global community in the late 1990s. Shedding its image as a sponsor of terrorism has been central to that initiative. In 1999, the Libyan government surrendered two of the suspects in the Lockerbie bombing, precipitating a suspension of U.N. sanctions. In January 2001, a Scottish court (based in the Netherlands) convicted one of the suspects and acquitted the other. The Libyan government provided monetary compensation to the families of victims of the UTA bombing. It paid the families of the Pan Am victims attack between US$ 4 and US$10 million each and has agreed to pay them more, pending the lifting of U.S. sanctions and the removal of Libya from its State Sponsors of Terrorism list. The Libyan government has agreed to provide cash settlements to those wounded in the La Belle bombing, as well. In a December 2003 letter directed to the U.N. Security Council, the Libyan government officially renounced terrorism. Libya also agreed to end programs aimed at developing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), an extremely significant step towards reconciliation with the international community. The U.N. permanently lifted sanctions against Libya in September 2003. The U.S. followed suit a year later, but at that time had not yet removed Libya from its State Sponsors of Terrorism list.

The year 2005 also marked the commencement of economic rapprochement with the United States when Libya held its auction of oil and gas exploration licences. The occasion marked the return of United States energy companies to Libya for the first time in more than two decades. Then, May 2006 marked the period in which the United States announced that it was removing Libya from its list of state-sponsors of terrorism. The United States also announced that it would renew full diplomatic ties with Libya.

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Outside of a few unresolved matters, Libya's relations with neighboring countries have also generally improved. Qaddafi's repentant overtures have served to strengthen Libya's ties to Tunisia in particular. The Tunisian government supported the lifting of U.N sanctions against Libya in 2003. The two countries have since begun to develop significant commercial links. Relations with Chad have remained generally stable since 1990, perhaps in part because the Libyan backed President of Chad Idriss Deby managed to stay in power. Also, a 1994 International Court of Justice decision granted sovereignty of the Aozou Strip to Chad, essentially resolving a longstanding point of contention between the two countries. Chadian rebels from the Aozou Strip established a base in Libya, however, a continuing source of tension between the two countries. Libya remains engaged in a passive territorial dispute over a 12,350 square mile border zone in southeastern Algeria. Likewise, Libya claims an approximately 9,650-square mile area inside of Niger, though it has not pressed the matter in recent years.

Despite the Libyan government's overt efforts to foster better relations with the outside world, recent events call into question the degree to which it has truly changed its stance on terrorism. In April 2000, a faction of the Philippine-based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) abducted 11 Malaysians and 10 foreign nationals from the Sipadan resort in the Malaysian province of Sabah. The Libyan government paid several million dollars for their release. There is some lingering debate as to whether or not the gesture was made in good faith, or as a surreptitious means to funnel money to ASG. Also, in an August 2004 statement to U.S. Department of Justice officials, suspected terrorist Abdulrahman Alamoudi indicated that he had been involved in a 2003 plot to assassinate Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah. He further alleged that the Libyan government had orchestrated the plan.

***See Note below on the fall of the Qadhafi regime in 2011. ***

Crime

Libya has a moderately high crime rate, including incidents of theft and burglary.

Insurgencies

Comprised largely of Muslim extremists who fought together in Afghanistan, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) emerged in the mid-1990s with the stated goal of overthrowing Moammar Qadhafi's government, which it considers unholy. LIFG militants have periodically clashed with government forces since the organization came into existence. In 1996 the group claimed responsibility for a failed attempt to assassinate Qadhafi.

*** See Note below on fall of the Qadhafi regime in 2011. ***

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Terrorism

The Libyan government's longtime support of terrorism led to global ostracism (see above section on external threats). In addition to its historic role as a sponsor of terrorist violence, the Libyan government has become the target of it, as well. Comprised largely of Muslim extremists who fought together in Afghanistan, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) emerged in the mid- 1990s with the stated goal of overthrowing Moammar Qaddafi's government, which it considers unholy. LIFG militants have periodically clashed with government forces since the organization came into existence. In 1996 the group claimed responsibility for a failed attempt to assassinate Qaddafi. Allegedly linked to the al-Qaida network, LIFG is believed to have played a role in planning simultaneous suicide bombings that took place in Casablanca, Morocco in May 2003.

Note

See "Political Conditions" for developments related to the release of the Libyan Lockerbie bomber, which could well have consequences for Libya's reputation on the global scene.

UPDATE:

Editor's Note on the 2011 Season of Unrest:

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On the domestic political landscape, an interim government was soon formed in Libya, with Mahmoud Jibril at the helm of that cabinet, and with Mustafa Abdel-Jalil functioning as the TNC head.

Attention would likely soon focus on the massive challenge of building a new Libyan nation state with all the instruments and structures needed for stable and democratic governance.

NOTE: As of 2015, Libya's national security landscape was marked by tumult and turmoil. Rival militias who fought to liberate the country from Qadhafi years before were now fighting each other for control. The result was a country in a state of political chaos and security crisis. See "Political Conditions" for details.

Defense Forces

Military Data

Military Branches: In transition; government has affiliated Army, Air Force and Navy forces

Eligible age to enter service:

18 years of age for mandatory and voluntary

Mandatory Service Terms:

N/A

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Manpower in general population-fit for military service: males age 16-49: 1,511,144 females age 16-49: 1,458,934

Manpower reaching eligible age annually: males: 59,547 females: 57,070

Military Expenditures-Percent of GDP:

N/A

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Chapter 3

Economic Overview

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Economic Overview

Overview

Libya is a mostly desert country. Severe climate conditions and poor soils have limited its agricultural output. Richly endowed with energy resources, Libya’s economy is heavily dependent on the oil and gas sector. With a relatively small population, Libya's substantial oil revenues give it one of the highest per capita GDPs (US$15,700 in 2014) in Africa.

Economic conditions in Libya started to deteriorate in the mid-1980s with the fall of world oil prices, and worsened in the 1990s as a result of United Nations-imposed economic sanctions following the Lockerbie bombing. Since the lifting of international sanctions in 2003 and 2004, Libya has made efforts to liberalize its economy and foreign trade, resulting in increased economic growth and macroeconomic stability. Libya’s macroeconomic performance has been strong in recent years, as reflected in the acceleration in GDP growth and large fiscal and current account surpluses. Despite the decline in oil revenue, the impact of the global economic crisis on Libya was limited in 2009, with non-oil growth remaining buoyant. In early 2011, the Arab Spring wreaked havoc on the Libyan economy as citizens protested against Moammar Gaddafi’s rule. Oil production was halted. The eastern part of the country in particular was home to terrible economic conditions. The sewage facilities in Banghazi were reportedly more than forty years old. A civil war backed by an unprecedented NATO air campaign erupted, further eroding the country’s economy and banking system, and finally resulting in Gaddafi’s death in October 2011. Before his death, in September 2011, the International Monetary Fund pledged to help Libya’s National Transitional Council – formed in the wake of the civil war – in its efforts to promote rapid and sustainable economic recovery. Over the long term, the IMF said it was ready to help through technical assistance, policy advice and financial support if requested. In the short term, the council was challenged with restoring oil production to generate revenues, stabilizing the currency, reestablishing a payment system and introducing sound public financial management. In early November 2011, the head of the new government made few concrete pledges of economic policy. One of them was to promote Islamic finance, which prohibits the lending of money for interest and other practices violating religious principles. While GDP was estimated to have contracted sharply in 2011, as of April 2012 crude oil output had reached 90 percent of pre-conflict levels, boosting hydrocarbon exports and raising the budget and current account surpluses. The National Oil Corporation (NOC) set a goal of nearly doubling oil production to 3 million bbl/day by 2012, but the goal was unlikely to be met by the target date.

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As of 2012, Libya still faced a long road ahead in liberalizing its primarily socialist economy, but the revolution probably increased the opportunity for entrepreneurial activity and the evolution of a more market-based economy. Overall, economic activity was expected to increase in 2012 with crude oil production reaching pre-conflict levels. Reconstruction expenditure and the release of pent-up private demand were expected to facilitate an improvement in non-hydrocarbon sectors.

In 2013, Libya suffered from a crisis that crippled its economy. Many of the country’s oil facilities were shuttered at the end of July as groups demanded political rights and benefits, putting pressure on the government and helping support the price of crude oil on global markets. By mid- November, oil exports from Libya's western Mellitah port resumed after protests ended, allowing a large oilfield to ramp up production and providing some relief from the crisis. The International Monetary Fund estimated Libya’s economy would shrink by 5.1 percent in 2013. Prime Minister Ali Zeidan cautioned that the government would have trouble covering its budget unless the oil industry was allowed to operate. In an effort to appease protesters demanding better benefits and medical treatments, Libya in October 2013 said it would increase oil workers’ pay by 67 percent and build two oil refineries in the east and the south to address grievances.

Libya recorded an economic downturn in the second half of 2013, mainly due to disruptions to oil production caused by the mounting protests at the country’s major oilfields and export terminals. Production levels reached as low as 200 000-300 000 bpd in October 2013. Oil production was expected to gradually resume and boost GDP growth in 2014 and 2015, according to the African Development Bank.

A rival rebel government and parliament in Tripoli was established in August 2014, leading to widespread concern among oil traders and Libya's trading partners about where the country’s oil revenues were going.

The state sector in Libya was large and growing, with the majority of the Libyan workforce receiving a government salary in 2014. Sharply decreased revenues and increased payments for state salaries and for subsidies on fuel and food resulted in an estimated budget deficit about 50 percent of GDP in 2014, up significantly from about 4 percent in 2013. Libya’s economic transition away from Qadhafi’s notionally socialist model toward a market-based economy stalled as revenues shrank, political uncertainty grew, and security deteriorated. Rival political factions in late 2014 were competing for control of the central bank and the national oil company, while funding for economic reform and infrastructure projects had stopped.

By June 2015, Reuters had reported that Libya's public finances - wracked by a dramatic loss in oil revenue that had been exacerbated by a power struggle between rival governments – were failing. Authorities were planning cuts to petrol subsidies as well as delaying public salary payments and banning imports.

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"Libya is on the verge of economic and financial collapse," U.N. Special Envoy Bernadino Leon, who has been trying to end a power struggle between the two governments, was quoted by Reuters as saying.

Since 2014, the central bank had frozen infrastructure projects, limited spending to basic public salaries and food and petrol subsidies. The dinar currency had lost 35 percent of its value against the dollar since January alone. Oil production, meanwhile, had fallen to 400,000 barrels a day, or a quarter of what was the case in 2011.

Economic Performance

Following rapid growth from 2005 to 2007, growth slowed in 2008 and 2009 due to a decline in oil production as a result of the global economic crisis. But the large public expenditure program helped moderate the impact on non-oil growth, which remained strong in 2009. By 2010, growth had rebounded but the economy contracted in 2013.

According to CountryWatch estimated calculations for 2014:

Real GDP growth rate was: 23 percent The fiscal deficit/surplus as percent of GDP (%) was: 24.8 percent Inflation was measured at: -14.4 percent

Updated in 2015

*Please note that the figures in our Economic Performance section are estimates or forecasts based on IMF-based data that are formulated using CountryWatch models of analysis.

Supplementary Sources: The Washington Post, The Economist, International Monetary Fund and Reuters

Nominal GDP and Components

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

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Nominal GDP (LCU 42.479 103.340 83.302 52.320 40.690 billions)

Nominal GDP Growth Rate -55.1545 143.273 -19.3904 -37.1924 -22.2286 (%)

Consumption (LCU billions) 11.302 19.907 23.254 20.256 28.615

Government Expenditure 6.728 11.852 13.845 12.060 17.036 (LCU billions)

Gross Capital Formation 20.185 35.555 41.534 36.179 15.300 (LCU billions)

Exports of Goods & 23.291 77.085 58.671 17.528 8.860 Services (LCU billions)

Imports of Goods & 19.027 41.058 54.002 33.702 29.121 Services (LCU billions)

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Population and GDP Per Capita

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Population, total (million) 5.923 6.004 6.086 6.168 6.252

Population growth (%) -1.9533 1.368 1.366 1.347 1.362

Nominal GDP per Capita 7,171.87 17,211.86 13,687.48 8,482.49 6,508.32 (LCU 1000s)

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Real GDP and Inflation

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005 18.053 36.916 31.913 24.244 22.767 base)

Real GDP Growth Rate (%) -62.0764 104.485 -13.5519 -24.0309 -6.0925

GDP Deflator (2005=100.0) 235.302 279.936 261.030 215.807 178.725

Inflation, GDP Deflator (%) 18.252 18.969 -6.7537 -17.3248 -17.1829

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Government Spending and Taxation

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Government Fiscal Budget 23.366 45.978 58.133 44.178 40.839 (billions)

Fiscal Budget Growth Rate -53.7783 96.773 26.437 -24.0053 -7.5581 (percentage)

National Tax Rate Net of 39.111 72.299 65.739 40.893 21.315 Transfers (%)

Government Revenues Net of 16.614 74.714 54.762 21.395 8.673 Transfers (LCU billions)

Government Surplus(-) -6.7520 28.736 -3.3710 -22.7830 -32.1660 Deficit(+) (LCU billions)

Government Surplus(+) -15.8949 27.807 -4.0467 -43.5455 -79.0514 Deficit(-) (%GDP)

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Money Supply, Interest Rates and Unemployment

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Money and Quasi-Money (M2) 55.953 62.994 66.959 66.732 51.898 (LCU billions)

Money Supply Growth Rate (%) 24.000 12.583 6.294 -0.3387 -22.2286

Lending Interest Rate (%) 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 15.359

Unemployment Rate (%) 17.649 19.000 18.934 18.836 17.193

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Foreign Trade and the Exchange Rate

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Official Exchange Rate 1.224 1.262 1.271 1.272 1.369 (LCU/$US)

Trade Balance NIPA ($US 3.484 28.558 3.673 -12.7208 -14.7990 billions)

Trade Balance % of GDP 10.038 34.863 5.606 -30.9147 -49.7930

Total Foreign Exchange 110.539 124.648 119.714 93.615 86.357 Reserves ($US billions)

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Data in US Dollars

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Nominal GDP ($US billions) 34.707 81.915 65.516 41.148 29.721

Exports ($US billions) 19.030 61.103 46.144 13.785 6.471

Imports ($US billions) 15.546 32.546 42.472 26.506 21.270

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Energy Consumption and Production Standard Units

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Petroleum Consumption 182.169 238.013 242.000 248.989 247.447 (TBPD)

Petroleum Production (TBPD) 500.819 1,472.46 979.883 504.076 516.109

Petroleum Net Exports 318.650 1,234.44 737.883 255.088 268.661 (TBPD)

Natural Gas Consumption (bcf) 191.937 202.355 229.088 220.875 224.096

Natural Gas Production (bcf) 277.670 432.317 424.615 425.861 465.877

Natural Gas Net Exports (bcf) 85.733 229.962 195.527 204.985 241.781

Coal Consumption (1000s st) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Coal Production (1000s st) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Coal Net Exports (1000s st) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Nuclear Production (bil kwh) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Hydroelectric Production (bil 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 kwh)

Renewables Production (bil 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 kwh)

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Energy Consumption and Production QUADS

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Petroleum Consumption (Quads) 0.3890 0.5082 0.5167 0.5317 0.5284

Petroleum Production (Quads) 1.069 3.165 2.099 1.101 0.8808

Petroleum Net Exports (Quads) 0.6803 2.657 1.582 0.5693 0.3525

Natural Gas Consumption (Quads) 0.1958 0.2064 0.2337 0.2253 0.2286

Natural Gas Production (Quads) 0.2829 0.4395 0.4322 0.4406 0.4067

Natural Gas Net Exports (Quads) 0.0872 0.2331 0.1985 0.2153 0.1781

Coal Consumption (Quads) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Coal Production (Quads) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Coal Net Exports (Quads) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Nuclear Production (Quads) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Hydroelectric Production (Quads) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Renewables Production (Quads) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

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World Energy Price Summary

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Petroleum-WTI ($/bbl) 95.054 94.159 97.943 93.112 48.709

Natural Gas-Henry Hub ($/mmbtu) 3.999 2.752 3.729 4.369 2.614

Coal Thermal-Australian ($/mt) 121.448 96.364 84.562 70.130 57.511

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CO2 Emissions

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Petroleum Based (mm mt C) 8.690 11.354 11.544 11.878 11.804

Natural Gas Based (mm mt C) 3.114 3.283 3.717 3.584 3.636

Coal Based (mm mt C) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Total CO2 Emissions (mm mt C) 11.804 14.637 15.261 15.461 15.440

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Agriculture Consumption and Production

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Corn Total Consumption 336.628 629.054 663.390 668.126 557.247 (1000 metric tons)

Corn Production 2.855 2.891 2.888 3.493 3.255 (1000 metric tons)

Corn Net Exports -333.7733 -626.1628 -660.5018 -664.6335 -553.9919 (1000 metric tons)

Soybeans Total Consumption 0.0790 0.0790 0.0270 0.0189 0.0154 (1000 metric tons)

Soybeans Production 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1000 metric tons)

Soybeans Net Exports -0.0790 -0.0790 -0.0270 -0.0189 -0.0154 (1000 metric tons)

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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Rice Total Consumption 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1000 metric tons)

Rice Production 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1000 metric tons)

Rice Net Exports 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1000 metric tons)

Coffee Total Consumption 2,838.00 7,023.00 9,870.00 13,584.05 11,654.54 (metric tons)

Coffee Production 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (metric tons)

Coffee Net Exports -2838.0000 -7023.0000 -9870.0000 -13584.0519 -11654.5385 (metric tons)

Cocoa Beans Total 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Consumption (metric tons)

Cocoa Beans Production 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (metric tons)

Cocoa Beans Net Exports 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

(metric tons)

Wheat Total Consumption 998.051 1,823.39 2,063.53 2,116.51 1,630.09 (1000 metric tons)

Wheat Production 165.631 201.059 199.687 200.659 177.214 (1000 metric tons)

Wheat Net Exports -832.4198 -1622.3313 -1863.8393 -1915.8550 -1452.8759 (1000 metric tons)

Libya Review 2016 Page 246 of 437 pages Libya

World Agriculture Pricing Summary

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Corn Pricing Summary 291.684 298.417 259.389 192.881 169.750 ($/metric ton)

Soybeans Pricing Summary 540.667 591.417 538.417 491.771 390.417 ($/metric ton)

Rice Pricing Summary ($/metric 458.558 525.071 473.989 425.148 386.033 ton)

Coffee Pricing Summary 5.976 4.111 3.076 4.424 3.526 ($/kilogram)

Cocoa Beans Pricing Summary 2.980 2.392 2.439 3.062 3.135 ($/kilogram)

Wheat Pricing Summary 316.264 313.242 312.248 284.895 203.177 ($/metric ton)

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Metals Consumption and Production

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Copper Consumption 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1000 mt)

Copper Production 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1000 mt)

Copper Net Exports (1000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 mt)

Zinc Consumption 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1000 mt)

Zinc Production 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1000 mt)

Zinc Exports 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1000 mt)

Lead Consumption 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1000 mt)

Lead Production 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1000 mt)

Libya Review 2016 Page 248 of 437 pages Libya

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Lead Exports 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1000 mt)

Tin Consumption 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1000 mt)

Tin Production 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1000 mt)

Tin Exports 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1000 mt)

Nickel Consumption 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1000 mt)

Nickel Production 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1000 mt)

Nickel Exports 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (1000 mt)

Gold Consumption 5,099.49 5,258.00 5,430.79 5,795.07 4,636.58 (kg)

Gold Production 2,556.17 2,635.63 2,722.24 2,904.84 2,803.43 (kg)

Gold Exports -2543.3181 -2622.3724 -2708.5505 -2890.2297 -1833.1488 (kg)

Silver

Libya Review 2016 Page 249 of 437 pages Libya

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Consumption 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (mt)

Silver Production 13,725.00 14,401.18 14,634.00 15,144.32 13,918.03 (mt)

Silver Exports 13,725.00 14,401.18 14,634.00 15,144.32 13,918.03 (mt)

Libya Review 2016 Page 250 of 437 pages Libya

World Metals Pricing Summary

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Copper ($/mt) 8,828.19 7,962.35 7,332.10 6,863.40 5,510.46

Zinc ($/mt) 2,193.90 1,950.41 1,910.26 2,160.97 1,931.68

Tin ($/mt) 26,053.68 21,125.99 22,282.80 21,898.87 16,066.63

Lead ($/mt) 2,400.81 2,064.64 2,139.79 2,095.46 1,787.82

Nickel ($/mt) 22,910.36 17,547.55 15,031.80 16,893.38 11,862.64

Gold ($/oz) 1,569.21 1,669.52 1,411.46 1,265.58 1,160.66

Silver ($/oz) 35.224 31.137 23.850 19.071 15.721

Libya Review 2016 Page 251 of 437 pages Libya

Economic Performance Index

The Economic Performance rankings are calculated by CountryWatch's editorial team, and are based on criteria including sustained economic growth, monetary stability, current account deficits, budget surplus, unemployment and structural imbalances. Scores are assessed from 0 to 100 using this aforementioned criteria as well as CountryWatch's proprietary economic research data and models.

Econ.GNP Bank Monetary/ growth or stability Currency Government Empl./ decline/ risk stability Finances Unempl. forecast

0 - 100 0 - 100 0 - 100 0 - 100 %

North Americas

Canada 92 69 35 38 3.14%

United States 94 76 4 29 3.01%

Western Europe

Austria 90 27 30 63 1.33%

Belgium 88 27 19 23 1.15%

Cyprus 81 91 16 80 -0.69%

Denmark 97 70 45 78 1.20%

Finland 89 27 41 33 1.25%

Libya Review 2016 Page 252 of 437 pages Libya

France 87 27 18 27 1.52%

Germany 86 27 22 21 1.25%

Greece 79 27 5 24 -2.00%

Iceland 90 17 2 34 -3.04%

Italy 85 27 37 24 0.84%

Ireland 92 27 11 10 -1.55%

Luxembourg 99 27 28 66 2.08%

Malta 77 27 41 51 0.54%

Netherlands 91 27 26 74 1.30%

Norway 98 44 10 76 1.08%

Portugal 77 27 13 20 0.29%

Spain 83 27 9 3 -0.41%

Sweden 94 72 54 32 1.23%

Switzerland 97 86 55 77 1.53%

United Kingdom 85 12 9 37 1.34%

Central and Eastern Europe

Albania 44 60 33 6 2.30%

Armenia 45 59 49 30 1.80%

Libya Review 2016 Page 253 of 437 pages Libya

Azerbaijan 56 4 84 99 2.68%

Belarus 59 21 83 98 2.41%

Bosnia and Herzegovina 34 68 69 N/A 0.50%

Bulgaria 58 75 88 49 0.20%

Croatia 69 68 94 9 0.18%

Czech Republic 80 89 29 70 1.67%

Estonia 72 90 66 92 0.80%

Georgia 36 60 53 56 2.00%

Hungary 70 66 26 54 -0.16%

Latvia 67 100 65 44 -3.97%

Lithuania 65 91 87 79 -1.65%

Macedonia (FYR) 53 69 56 2 2.03%

Moldova 23 36 81 67 2.50%

Poland 74 74 38 12 2.72%

Romania 62 56 70 62 0.75%

Russia 73 18 90 8 4.00%

Serbia 48 49 52 5 1.97%

Libya Review 2016 Page 254 of 437 pages Libya

Montenegro 39 27 73 1 -1.70%

Slovak Republic 80 62 30 14 4.06%

Slovenia 81 27 36 65 1.12%

Ukraine 41 11 57 N/A 3.68%

Africa

Algeria 57 18 96 7 4.55%

Angola 49 1 97 N/A 7.05%

Benin 19 91 20 N/A 3.22%

Botswana 68 58 76 N/A 6.33%

Burkina Faso 16 91 13 N/A 4.41%

Burundi 2 91 6 N/A 3.85%

Cameroon 26 91 91 N/A 2.58%

Cape Verde 52 87 4 N/A 4.96%

Central African Republic 9 91 32 N/A 3.18%

Chad 22 91 89 N/A 4.42%

Congo 52 87 87 N/A 12.13%

Côte d’Ivoire 25 91 82 28 2.98%

Dem. Republic

Libya Review 2016 Page 255 of 437 pages Libya

Congo 4 91 47 N/A 5.44%

Djibouti 31 76 50 N/A 4.47%

Egypt 37 20 24 69 5.01%

Equatorial Guinea 82 91 85 N/A 0.94%

Eritrea 1 3 1 18 1.81%

Ethiopia 6 45 8 N/A 6.96%

Gabon 64 91 96 N/A 5.36%

Gambia 8 48 86 N/A 4.82%

Ghana 9 11 69 N/A 4.50%

Guinea 10 7 91 N/A 3.03%

Guinea-Bissau 5 91 46 N/A 3.47%

Kenya 20 41 59 N/A 4.11%

Lesotho 13 40 12 N/A 2.98%

Liberia 12 73 74 N/A 5.92%

Libya 73 2 94 N/A 5.22%

Madagascar 4 22 24 N/A -1.02%

Malawi 7 25 55 N/A 5.96%

Mali 20 91 82 N/A 5.12%

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Mauritania 15 13 93 N/A 4.58%

Mauritius 65 52 56 55 4.10%

Morocco 37 72 48 26 3.23%

Mozambique 12 23 71 N/A 6.45%

Namibia 40 39 62 N/A 1.70%

Niger 10 91 21 N/A 4.41%

Nigeria 30 6 61 N/A 6.98%

Rwanda 21 40 68 N/A 5.39%

Sao Tome & Principe 1 61 100 N/A 3.40%

Senegal 24 91 63 N/A 3.44%

Seychelles 60 67 97 N/A 4.01%

Sierra Leone 5 10 39 N/A 4.77%

Somalia 2 38 59 N/A 3.19%

South Africa 61 37 70 N/A 2.59%

Sudan 16 5 73 N/A 5.52%

Swaziland 32 44 79 N/A 1.09%

Tanzania 15 45 32 N/A 6.17%

Togo 8 91 92 N/A 2.56%

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Tunisia 50 61 44 39 4.00%

Uganda 11 17 54 N/A 5.59%

Zambia 29 20 49 N/A 5.84%

Zimbabwe 0 8 16 N/A 2.24%

South and Central America

Argentina 66 3 80 36 3.50%

Belize 47 76 80 N/A 1.00%

Bolivia 32 51 61 81 3.99%

Brazil 71 47 78 11 5.50%

Chile 78 25 92 73 4.72%

Columbia 47 52 34 47 2.25%

Costa Rica 60 42 39 57 3.45%

Ecuador 43 76 75 64 2.51%

El Salvador 35 76 67 N/A 1.04%

Guatemala 46 59 58 N/A 2.52%

Honduras 27 47 58 N/A 2.00%

Mexico 69 42 52 61 4.07%

Nicaragua 23 49 42 N/A 1.75%

Libya Review 2016 Page 258 of 437 pages Libya

Panama 66 76 72 45 5.00%

Paraguay 35 46 66 16 5.27%

Peru 59 66 75 22 6.33%

Suriname 58 26 81 59 4.02%

Uruguay 70 26 27 N/A 5.71%

Venezuela 55 1 28 13 -2.63%

Caribbean

Antigua & Barbuda 72 76 15 N/A -2.01%

Bahamas 74 76 45 87 -0.50%

Barbados 67 76 33 15 -0.50%

Bermuda N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Cuba 45 76 18 95 0.25%

Dominica 53 76 65 N/A 1.40%

Dominican Republic 54 39 43 4 3.50%

Grenada 63 76 48 N/A 0.80%

Guyana 28 56 17 N/A 4.36%

Haiti 11 27 89 N/A -8.50%

Jamaica 42 9 85 19 -0.28%

Libya Review 2016 Page 259 of 437 pages Libya

St Lucia 55 76 67 N/A 1.14%

St Vincent & Grenadines 49 76 95 N/A 0.50%

Trinidad & Tobago 82 37 77 72 2.13%

Middle East

Bahrain 84 76 62 91 3.48%

Iran 51 19 40 58 3.01%

Iraq 48 9 8 N/A 7.27%

Israel 87 62 12 48 3.20%

Jordan 41 51 3 N/A 4.10%

Kuwait 96 4 99 N/A 3.10%

Lebanon 63 54 2 N/A 6.00%

Oman 76 16 88 N/A 4.71%

Qatar 99 16 83 N/A 18.54%

Saudi Arabia 76 8 98 N/A 3.70%

Syria 61 24 40 N/A 5.00%

Turkey 75 23 27 60 5.20%

United Arab Emirates 96 24 98 94 1.29%

Libya Review 2016 Page 260 of 437 pages Libya

Yemen 28 2 78 N/A 7.78%

Asia

Afghanistan 17 70 74 N/A 8.64%

Bangladesh 13 43 25 N/A 5.38%

Bhutan 24 55 5 N/A 6.85%

Brunei 78 19 99 75 0.48%

Cambodia 18 67 42 N/A 4.77%

China 54 90 19 68 11.03%

Hong Kong 89 76 14 82 5.02%

India 31 38 34 35 8.78%

Indonesia 42 46 37 31 6.00%

Japan 88 89 6 71 1.90%

Kazakhstan 62 13 76 42 2.40%

Korea North 18 65 23 N/A 1.50%

Korea South 83 63 22 85 4.44%

Kyrgyz Republic 24 15 84 88 4.61%

Laos 17 54 7 N/A 7.22%

Macao 91 76 14 82 3.00%

Libya Review 2016 Page 261 of 437 pages Libya

Malaysia 68 65 44 90 4.72%

Maldives 44 55 17 N/A 3.45%

Mongolia 33 5 77 93 7.22%

Myanmar 3 41 72 N/A 5.26%

Nepal 3 14 25 N/A 2.97%

Pakistan 19 15 31 41 3.00%

Papua New Guinea 75 50 11 N/A 7.96%

Philippines 30 48 53 43 3.63%

Singapore 93 75 63 40 5.68%

Sri Lanka 38 22 10 N/A 5.50%

Taiwan 84 88 35 89 6.50%

Tajikistan 6 6 60 97 4.00%

Thailand 56 64 90 96 5.46%

Turkmenistan 51 53 68 N/A 12.00%

Uzbekistan 40 10 60 100 8.00%

Vietnam 25 12 20 N/A 6.04%

Pacific

Australia 96 63 31 46 2.96%

Libya Review 2016 Page 262 of 437 pages Libya

Fiji 46 53 3 N/A 2.06%

Marshall Islands 27 76 46 N/A 1.08%

Micronesia (Fed. States) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

New Caledonia 96 73 51 52 2.00%

New Zealand 98 73 51 52 2.00%

Samoa 34 88 64 N/A -2.77%

Solomon Islands 14 71 1 N/A 3.36%

Tonga 26 57 38 N/A 0.60%

Vanuatu 33 58 47 N/A 3.80%

Source:

CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com

Updated:

This material was produced in 2010; it is subject to updating in 2012.

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Chapter 4

Investment Overview

Libya Review 2016 Page 264 of 437 pages Libya

Foreign Investment Climate

Background

The Libyan economy depends primarily upon revenues from the oil sector, which contribute about 95% of export earnings, 25% of GDP, and 60% of public sector wages. The weakness in world hydrocarbon prices in recent times reduced Libyan government tax income and constrained economic growth. Substantial revenues from the energy sector coupled with a small population give Libya one of the highest per capita GDPs in Africa, but little of this income flows down to the lower orders of society.

The non-oil manufacturing and construction sectors, which account for more than 20% of GDP, have expanded from processing mostly agricultural products to include the production of petrochemicals, iron, steel, and aluminum. Climatic conditions and poor soils severely limit agricultural output, and Libya imports about 75% of its food. Libya's primary agricultural water source remains the Great Manmade River Project, but significant resources are being invested in desalinization research to meet growing water demands. .

Libyan officials in the past five years have made progress on economic reforms as part of a broader campaign to reintegrate the country into the international fold. This effort picked up steam after UN sanctions were lifted in September 2003 and as Libya announced in December 2003 that it would abandon programs to build weapons of mass destruction. The process of lifting US unilateral sanctions began in the spring of 2004; all sanctions were removed by June 2006, helping Libya attract greater foreign direct investment, especially in the energy sector. Libyan oil and gas licensing rounds continue to draw high international interest; the National Oil Corporation (NOC) set a goal of nearly doubling oil production to 3 million bbl/day by 2012. In November 2009, the NOC announced that that target may slip to as late as 2017.

Libya faces a long road ahead in liberalizing the socialist-oriented economy, but initial steps - including applying for WTO membership, reducing some subsidies, and announcing plans for privatization - are laying the groundwork for a transition to a more market-based economy.

Foreign Investment Assessment

Openness to Foreign Investment

Libya encourages foreign investment in order to develop certain underdeveloped regions, improve

Libya Review 2016 Page 265 of 437 pages Libya technology, diversify its economy and help aid its internal markets. In 1997, the Authority for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment was established to facilitate foreign investment and oversee the application process. Foreign investment was approved for the following industries: tourism, agriculture, health and services sectors, in form of currency, equipment, and patents.

As part of the review process, the potential investor must declare that its company or any branch of its company has never had any facilities, including offices, factories or plants, in Israel, nor owned shares in or offered services to an Israeli business. In addition, the investor must give a list of all of the companies in which shares are held and what companies hold shares in the investor's company and the percentage of shares held.

Libya's relations with the international community have been strained since the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland that killed 270 people. On April 15, 1992, the United Nations imposed economic sanctions on Libya for refusing to extradite two Libyan nationals accused of carrying out the attack. UN sanctions were expanded in November 1993 to include a freeze on Libyan funds overseas, a ban on the sale of oil equipment for oil and gas export terminals and refineries, and tougher restrictions on civil aviation and the supply of arms. On August 5, 1996, the United States imposed additional sanctions on Libya. This action -- the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996 -- extended U.S. sanctions on Libya to cover foreign companies that make new investments of $40 million or more over a 12-month period in Libya's oil or gas sectors. According to official Libyan figures, UN sanctions since 1992 have cost Libya more than $24 billion, the hardest-hit sector being the oil industry (with an estimated $5 billion in lost revenues). The U.S. embargo on Libya prevented any American company from investing in or doing business with Libya. In response to Libya's extradition of the Lockerbie suspects, the U.S. lifted sanctions banning the sale of food and medicine to Libya in April 1999.

See "Political Conditions" for more recent developments related to Libya's relationship with the world, as well as the changes to the sanctions regime.

Transparency of Regulatory System

The government dominates the economy through complete control of the country's oil resources, which account for almost all export earnings and approximately 30 percent of the gross domestic product. Oil revenues constitute the principal source of foreign exchange. Much of the country's income has been lost to waste, corruption, and attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction and acquire conventional weapons. Despite efforts to diversify the economy and encourage private sector participation, the economy continues to be constrained by a system of extensive controls and regulations covering prices, credit, trade, and foreign exchange. The government's mismanagement of the economy has caused high levels of inflation, increased import prices, and hampered economic expansion, which has resulted in a decline in the standard of living for the majority of citizens in recent years. Significant increases in the world price of oil boosted petroleum

Libya Review 2016 Page 266 of 437 pages Libya revenues this year, masking the negative domestic impact of the country's economic policy.

Labor Force

Total: 1.59 million

By occupation: agriculture 17%, industry 29%, services 54%

Agriculture and Industry

Agriculture products: wheat, barley, olives, dates, citrus, vegetables, peanuts, soybeans; cattle

Industries: petroleum, iron and steel, food processing, textiles, handicrafts, cement

Import Commodities and Partners

Commodities: machinery, transport equipment, semi-finished goods, food, consumer products

Partners: Italy 27.8%, Germany 10.5%, UK 7%, Tunisia 6.3%, France 5.8%, Turkey 4.6%

Export Commodities and Partners

Commodities: crude oil, refined petroleum products, natural gas

Partners: Italy 39.1%, Spain 13.5%, Germany 13.5%, Turkey 7.1%, France 6.1%

Telephone System

Telephones- main lines in use: 750,000

Telephones- mobile cellular: 100,000

General Assessment: telecommunications system is being modernized; mobile cellular telephone system became operational in 1996

Domestic: microwave radio relay, coaxial cable, cellular, tropospheric scatter, and a domestic satellite system with 14 earth stations

International: country code - 218; satellite earth stations - 4 Intelsat, NA Arabsat, and NA Intersputnik; submarine cables to France and Italy; microwave radio relay to Tunisia and Egypt; tropospheric scatter to Greece; participant in Medarabtel

Internet

Libya Review 2016 Page 267 of 437 pages Libya

Internet Hosts: 67

Internet users: 160,000

Roads, Airports, Ports and Harbors

Railways: 0 km

Highways: 83,200 km

Ports and harbors: Al Khums, Banghazi, Darnah, Marsa al Burayqah, Misratah, Ra's Lanuf, Tubruq, Tripoli, Zuwarah

Airports: 139; w/paved runways: 59

Legal System and Considerations

Libya’s legal system is based on Italian civil law system and Islamic law. Libya has separate courts for religious matters but there is no constitutional provision for judicial review of legislative acts. The government has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction.

Dispute Settlement

Article 24 of the Law of Foreign Capitals Investment Encouragement states that investment disputes will be dealt with within the jurisdiction of Libyan courts. However, should the dispute involve a citizen of a country with which Libya has a bilateral investment treaty, other means of arbitration according to the treaty will be available.

Corruption Perception Ranking

See the full list, as reported by Transparency International, from the least to most corrupt countries. Typically, Libya is ranked as one of the most corrupt nations in the world.

Cultural Considerations

Libya is a predominately Muslim culture and though it is not considered fundamentalist, one should always respect and adhere to Muslim customs.

In Libya’s realm of protocol, one should not enter a room or home without knocking or coughing to announce one's presence. One should also not shout, laugh too loudly or sing during meal times. Note that it is appropriate to cover the mouth when laughing.

One should also be prepared for the separation between the genders and the rules concerning the appropriate behavior of each sex, especially in social situations. Men and women should not kiss,

Libya Review 2016 Page 268 of 437 pages Libya hug, hold hands or mingle in public. Even married couples should exercise reticence in their displays of affection.

For more information see:

United States’ State Department Commercial Guide

Foreign Investment Index

The Foreign Investment Index is a proprietary index measuring attractiveness to international investment flows. The Foreign Investment Index is calculated using an established methodology by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on a given country's economic stability (sustained economic growth, monetary stability, current account deficits, budget surplus), economic risk (risk of non-servicing of payments for goods or services, loans and trade-related finance, risk of sovereign default), business and investment climate (property rights, labor force and laws, regulatory transparency, openness to foreign investment, market conditions, and stability of government). Scores are assigned from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the lowest level of foreign investment viability, while a score of 10 marks the highest level of foreign investment viability, according to this proprietary index.

Country Assessment

Afghanistan 2

Albania 4.5

Algeria 6

Andorra 9

Angola 4.5-5 Libya Review 2016 Page 269 of 437 pages Libya

Angola 4.5-5

Antigua 8.5

Argentina 5

Armenia 5

Australia 9.5

Austria 9-9.5

Azerbaijan 5

Bahamas 9

Bahrain 7.5

Bangladesh 4.5

Barbados 9

Belarus 4

Belgium 9

Belize 7.5

Benin 5.5

Bhutan 4.5

Bolivia 4.5

Bosnia-Herzegovina 5

Libya Review 2016 Page 270 of 437 pages Libya

Botswana 7.5-8

Brazil 8

Brunei 7

Bulgaria 5.5

Burkina Faso 4

Burma (Myanmar) 4.5

Burundi 4

Cambodia 4.5

Cameroon 5

Canada 9.5

Cape Verde 6

Central African Republic 3

Chad 4

Chile 9

China 7.5

China: Hong Kong 8.5

China: Taiwan 8.5

Colombia 7

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Comoros 4

Congo DRC 4

Congo RC 5

Costa Rica 8

Cote d'Ivoire 4.5

Croatia 7

Cuba 4.5

Cyprus 7

Czech Republic 8.5

Denmark 9.5

Djibouti 4.5

Dominica 6

Dominican Republic 6.5

East Timor 4.5

Ecuador 5.5

Egypt 4.5-5

El Salvador 6

Equatorial Guinea 4.5

Libya Review 2016 Page 272 of 437 pages Libya

Eritrea 3.5

Estonia 8

Ethiopia 4.5

Fiji 5

Finland 9

Former Yugoslav Rep. of Macedonia 5

France 9-9.5

Gabon 5.5

Gambia 5

Georgia 5

Germany 9-9.5

Ghana 5.5

Greece 5

Grenada 7.5

Guatemala 5.5

Guinea 3.5

Guinea-Bissau 3.5

Guyana 4.5

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Haiti 4

Holy See (Vatican) n/a

Hong Kong (China) 8.5

Honduras 5.5

Hungary 8

Iceland 8-8.5

India 8

Indonesia 5.5

Iran 4

Iraq 3

Ireland 8

Israel 8.5

Italy 8

Jamaica 5.5

Japan 9.5

Jordan 6

Kazakhstan 6

Kenya 5

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Kiribati 5.5

Korea, North 1

Korea, South 9

Kosovo 4.5

Kuwait 8.5

Kyrgyzstan 4.5

Laos 4

Latvia 7

Lebanon 5

Lesotho 5.5

Liberia 3.5

Libya 3

Liechtenstein 9

Lithuania 7.5

Luxembourg 9-9.5

Madagascar 4.5

Malawi 4.5

Malaysia 8.5

Libya Review 2016 Page 275 of 437 pages Libya

Maldives 6.5

Mali 5

Malta 9

Marshall Islands 5

Mauritania 4.5

Mauritius 7.5-8

Mexico 6.5-7

Micronesia 5

Moldova 4.5-5

Monaco 9

Mongolia 5

Montenegro 5.5

Morocco 7.5

Mozambique 5

Namibia 7.5

Nauru 4.5

Nepal 4

Netherlands 9-9.5

Libya Review 2016 Page 276 of 437 pages Libya

New Zealand 9.5

Nicaragua 5

Niger 4.5

Nigeria 4.5

Norway 9-9.5

Oman 8

Pakistan 4

Palau 4.5-5

Panama 7

Papua New Guinea 5

Paraguay 6

Peru 6

Philippines 6

Poland 8

Portugal 7.5-8

Qatar 9

Romania 6-6.5

Russia 6

Rwanda 4 Libya Review 2016 Page 277 of 437 pages Libya

Rwanda 4

Saint Kitts and Nevis 8

Saint Lucia 8

Saint Vincent and Grenadines 7

Samoa 7

San Marino 8.5

Sao Tome and Principe 4.5-5

Saudi Arabia 7

Senegal 6

Serbia 6

Seychelles 5

Sierra Leone 4

Singapore 9.5

Slovak Republic (Slovakia) 8.5

Slovenia 8.5-9

Solomon Islands 5

Somalia 2

South Africa 8

Libya Review 2016 Page 278 of 437 pages Libya

Spain 7.5-8

Sri Lanka 5.5

Sudan 4

Suriname 5

Swaziland 4.5

Sweden 9.5

Switzerland 9.5

Syria 2.5

Tajikistan 4

Taiwan (China) 8.5

Tanzania 5

Thailand 7.5-8

Togo 4.5-5

Tonga 5.5-6

Trinidad and Tobago 8-8.5

Tunisia 6

Turkey 6.5-7

Turkmenistan 4

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Tuvalu 7

Uganda 5

Ukraine 4.5-5

United Arab Emirates 8.5

United Kingdom 9

United States 9

Uruguay 6.5-7

Uzbekistan 4

Vanuatu 6

Venezuela 5

Vietnam 5.5

Yemen 3

Zambia 4.5-5

Zimbabwe 3.5

Editor's Note:

As of 2015, the global economic crisis (emerging in 2008) had affected many countries across the world, resulting in changes to their rankings. Among those countries affected were top tier economies, such as the United Kingdom, Iceland, Switzerland and Austria. However, in all these cases, their rankings have moved back upward in the last couple of years as anxieties have eased. Other top tier countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy, suffered some

Libya Review 2016 Page 280 of 437 pages Libya effects due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone nation, was also downgraded due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, Greece's position on the precipice of default incurred a sharper downgrade than the other four euro zone countries mentioned above. Cyprus' exposure to Greek bank yielded a downgrade in its case. Slovenia and Latvia have been slightly downgraded due to a mix of economic and political concerns but could easily be upgraded in a future assessment, should these concerns abate. Meanwhile, the crisis in eastern Ukraine fueled downgrades in that country and neighboring Russia.

Despite the "trifecta of tragedy" in Japan in 2011 -- the earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and the resulting nuclear crisis -- and the appreciable destabilization of the economic and political terrain therein, this country has only slightly been downgraded. Japan's challenges have been assessed to be transient, the government remains accountable, and there is little risk of default. Both India and China retain their rankings; India holds a slightly higher ranking than China due to its record of democratic representation and accountability.

There were shifts in opposite directions for Mali and Nigeria versus the Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, and Burundi. Mali was slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and Islamists. Likewise, a new government in Nigeria generated a slight upgrade as the country attempts to confront corruption, crime, and terrorism. But the Central African Republic was downgraded due to the takeover of the government by Seleka rebels and the continued decline into lawlessness in that country. Likewise, the attempts by the leaders of Burundi and Burkina Faso to hold onto power by by-passing the constitution raised eybrows and resulted in downgrades.

Political unrest in Libya and Algeria have contributed to a decision to marginally downgrade these countries as well. Syria incurred a sharper downgrade due to the devolution into de facto civil war and the dire security threat posed by Islamist terrorists. Iraq saw a similar downgrade as a result of the takeover of wide swaths of territory and the threat of genocide at the hands of Islamist terrorists. Yemen, likewise, has been downgraded due to political instability at the hands of secessionists, terrorists, Houthi rebels, and the intervention of external parties. Conversely, Egypt and Tunisia saw slight upgrades as their political environments stabilize.

At the low end of the spectrum, devolving security conditions and/or economic crisis have resulted in countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Zimbabwe maintaining their low ratings.

The United States continues to retain its previous slight downgrade due to the enduring threat of default surrounding the debt ceiling in that country, matched by a conflict-ridden political climate. In the case of Mexico, there is limited concern about default, but increasing alarm over the security situation in that country and the government’s ability to contain it. In Argentina, a default to bond holders resulted in a downgrade to that country. Finally, a small but significant upgrade was attributed to Cuba due to its recent pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the

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Unitd States.

Source:

CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com

Updated:

2015

Corruption Perceptions Index

Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index

Editor's Note:

Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index is a composite index which ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials. This index indicates the views of national and international business people and analysts about the levels of corruption in each country. The highest (and best) level of transparency is indicated by the number, 10. The lower (and worse) levels of transparency are indicated by lower numbers.

Rank Country/Territory CPI 2009 Surveys Confidence Score Used Range

1 New Zealand 9.4 6 9.1 - 9.5

2 Denmark 9.3 6 9.1 - 9.5

3 Singapore 9.2 9 9.0 - 9.4

3 Sweden 9.2 6 9.0 - 9.3

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5 Switzerland 9.0 6 8.9 - 9.1

6 Finland 8.9 6 8.4 - 9.4

6 Netherlands 8.9 6 8.7 - 9.0

8 Australia 8.7 8 8.3 - 9.0

8 Canada 8.7 6 8.5 - 9.0

8 Iceland 8.7 4 7.5 - 9.4

11 Norway 8.6 6 8.2 - 9.1

12 Hong Kong 8.2 8 7.9 - 8.5

12 Luxembourg 8.2 6 7.6 - 8.8

14 Germany 8.0 6 7.7 - 8.3

14 Ireland 8.0 6 7.8 - 8.4

16 Austria 7.9 6 7.4 - 8.3

17 Japan 7.7 8 7.4 - 8.0

17 United Kingdom 7.7 6 7.3 - 8.2

19 United States 7.5 8 6.9 - 8.0

20 Barbados 7.4 4 6.6 - 8.2

21 Belgium 7.1 6 6.9 - 7.3

22 Qatar 7.0 6 5.8 - 8.1

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22 Saint Lucia 7.0 3 6.7 - 7.5

24 France 6.9 6 6.5 - 7.3

25 Chile 6.7 7 6.5 - 6.9

25 Uruguay 6.7 5 6.4 - 7.1

27 Cyprus 6.6 4 6.1 - 7.1

27 Estonia 6.6 8 6.1 - 6.9

27 Slovenia 6.6 8 6.3 - 6.9

30 United Arab Emirates 6.5 5 5.5 - 7.5

31 Saint Vincent and the 6.4 3 4.9 - 7.5 Grenadines

32 Israel 6.1 6 5.4 - 6.7

32 Spain 6.1 6 5.5 - 6.6

34 Dominica 5.9 3 4.9 - 6.7

35 Portugal 5.8 6 5.5 - 6.2

35 Puerto Rico 5.8 4 5.2 - 6.3

37 Botswana 5.6 6 5.1 - 6.3

37 Taiwan 5.6 9 5.4 - 5.9

39 Brunei Darussalam 5.5 4 4.7 - 6.4

39 Oman 5.5 5 4.4 - 6.5

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39 Korea (South) 5.5 9 5.3 - 5.7

42 Mauritius 5.4 6 5.0 - 5.9

43 Costa Rica 5.3 5 4.7 - 5.9

43 Macau 5.3 3 3.3 - 6.9

45 Malta 5.2 4 4.0 - 6.2

46 Bahrain 5.1 5 4.2 - 5.8

46 Cape Verde 5.1 3 3.3 - 7.0

46 Hungary 5.1 8 4.6 - 5.7

49 Bhutan 5.0 4 4.3 - 5.6

49 Jordan 5.0 7 3.9 - 6.1

49 Poland 5.0 8 4.5 - 5.5

52 Czech Republic 4.9 8 4.3 - 5.6

52 Lithuania 4.9 8 4.4 - 5.4

54 Seychelles 4.8 3 3.0 - 6.7

55 South Africa 4.7 8 4.3 - 4.9

56 Latvia 4.5 6 4.1 - 4.9

56 Malaysia 4.5 9 4.0 - 5.1

56 Namibia 4.5 6 3.9 - 5.1

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56 Samoa 4.5 3 3.3 - 5.3

56 Slovakia 4.5 8 4.1 - 4.9

61 Cuba 4.4 3 3.5 - 5.1

61 Turkey 4.4 7 3.9 - 4.9

63 Italy 4.3 6 3.8 - 4.9

63 Saudi Arabia 4.3 5 3.1 - 5.3

65 Tunisia 4.2 6 3.0 - 5.5

66 Croatia 4.1 8 3.7 - 4.5

66 Georgia 4.1 7 3.4 - 4.7

66 Kuwait 4.1 5 3.2 - 5.1

69 Ghana 3.9 7 3.2 - 4.6

69 Montenegro 3.9 5 3.5 - 4.4

71 Bulgaria 3.8 8 3.2 - 4.5

71 FYR Macedonia 3.8 6 3.4 - 4.2

71 Greece 3.8 6 3.2 - 4.3

71 Romania 3.8 8 3.2 - 4.3

75 Brazil 3.7 7 3.3 - 4.3

75 Colombia 3.7 7 3.1 - 4.3

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75 Peru 3.7 7 3.4 - 4.1

75 Suriname 3.7 3 3.0 - 4.7

79 Burkina Faso 3.6 7 2.8 - 4.4

79 China 3.6 9 3.0 - 4.2

79 Swaziland 3.6 3 3.0 - 4.7

79 Trinidad and Tobago 3.6 4 3.0 - 4.3

83 Serbia 3.5 6 3.3 - 3.9

84 El Salvador 3.4 5 3.0 - 3.8

84 Guatemala 3.4 5 3.0 - 3.9

84 India 3.4 10 3.2 - 3.6

84 Panama 3.4 5 3.1 - 3.7

84 Thailand 3.4 9 3.0 - 3.8

89 Lesotho 3.3 6 2.8 - 3.8

89 Malawi 3.3 7 2.7 - 3.9

89 Mexico 3.3 7 3.2 - 3.5

89 Moldova 3.3 6 2.7 - 4.0

89 Morocco 3.3 6 2.8 - 3.9

89 Rwanda 3.3 4 2.9 - 3.7

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95 Albania 3.2 6 3.0 - 3.3

95 Vanuatu 3.2 3 2.3 - 4.7

97 Liberia 3.1 3 1.9 - 3.8

97 Sri Lanka 3.1 7 2.8 - 3.4

99 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.0 7 2.6 - 3.4

99 Dominican Republic 3.0 5 2.9 - 3.2

99 Jamaica 3.0 5 2.8 - 3.3

99 Madagascar 3.0 7 2.8 - 3.2

99 Senegal 3.0 7 2.5 - 3.6

99 Tonga 3.0 3 2.6 - 3.3

99 Zambia 3.0 7 2.8 - 3.2

106 Argentina 2.9 7 2.6 - 3.1

106 Benin 2.9 6 2.3 - 3.4

106 Gabon 2.9 3 2.6 - 3.1

106 Gambia 2.9 5 1.6 - 4.0

106 Niger 2.9 5 2.7 - 3.0

111 Algeria 2.8 6 2.5 - 3.1

111 Djibouti 2.8 4 2.3 - 3.2

111 Egypt 2.8 6 2.6 - 3.1 Libya Review 2016 Page 288 of 437 pages Libya

111 Egypt 2.8 6 2.6 - 3.1

111 Indonesia 2.8 9 2.4 - 3.2

111 Kiribati 2.8 3 2.3 - 3.3

111 Mali 2.8 6 2.4 - 3.2

111 Sao Tome and Principe 2.8 3 2.4 - 3.3

111 Solomon Islands 2.8 3 2.3 - 3.3

111 Togo 2.8 5 1.9 - 3.9

120 Armenia 2.7 7 2.6 - 2.8

120 Bolivia 2.7 6 2.4 - 3.1

120 Ethiopia 2.7 7 2.4 - 2.9

120 Kazakhstan 2.7 7 2.1 - 3.3

120 Mongolia 2.7 7 2.4 - 3.0

120 Vietnam 2.7 9 2.4 - 3.1

126 Eritrea 2.6 4 1.6 - 3.8

126 Guyana 2.6 4 2.5 - 2.7

126 Syria 2.6 5 2.2 - 2.9

126 Tanzania 2.6 7 2.4 - 2.9

130 Honduras 2.5 6 2.2 - 2.8

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130 Lebanon 2.5 3 1.9 - 3.1

130 Libya 2.5 6 2.2 - 2.8

130 Maldives 2.5 4 1.8 - 3.2

130 Mauritania 2.5 7 2.0 - 3.3

130 Mozambique 2.5 7 2.3 - 2.8

130 Nicaragua 2.5 6 2.3 - 2.7

130 Nigeria 2.5 7 2.2 - 2.7

130 Uganda 2.5 7 2.1 - 2.8

139 Bangladesh 2.4 7 2.0 - 2.8

139 Belarus 2.4 4 2.0 - 2.8

139 Pakistan 2.4 7 2.1 - 2.7

139 Philippines 2.4 9 2.1 - 2.7

143 Azerbaijan 2.3 7 2.0 - 2.6

143 Comoros 2.3 3 1.6 - 3.3

143 Nepal 2.3 6 2.0 - 2.6

146 Cameroon 2.2 7 1.9 - 2.6

146 Ecuador 2.2 5 2.0 - 2.5

146 Kenya 2.2 7 1.9 - 2.5

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146 Russia 2.2 8 1.9 - 2.4

146 Sierra Leone 2.2 5 1.9 - 2.4

146 Timor-Leste 2.2 5 1.8 - 2.6

146 Ukraine 2.2 8 2.0 - 2.6

146 Zimbabwe 2.2 7 1.7 - 2.8

154 Côte d´Ivoire 2.1 7 1.8 - 2.4

154 Papua New Guinea 2.1 5 1.7 - 2.5

154 Paraguay 2.1 5 1.7 - 2.5

154 Yemen 2.1 4 1.6 - 2.5

158 Cambodia 2.0 8 1.8 - 2.2

158 Central African Republic 2.0 4 1.9 - 2.2

158 Laos 2.0 4 1.6 - 2.6

158 Tajikistan 2.0 8 1.6 - 2.5

162 Angola 1.9 5 1.8 - 1.9

162 Congo Brazzaville 1.9 5 1.6 - 2.1

162 Democratic Republic of 1.9 5 1.7 - 2.1 Congo

162 Guinea-Bissau 1.9 3 1.8 - 2.0

162 Kyrgyzstan 1.9 7 1.8 - 2.1

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162 Venezuela 1.9 7 1.8 - 2.0

168 Burundi 1.8 6 1.6 - 2.0

168 Equatorial Guinea 1.8 3 1.6 - 1.9

168 Guinea 1.8 5 1.7 - 1.8

168 Haiti 1.8 3 1.4 - 2.3

168 Iran 1.8 3 1.7 - 1.9

168 Turkmenistan 1.8 4 1.7 - 1.9

174 Uzbekistan 1.7 6 1.5 - 1.8

175 Chad 1.6 6 1.5 - 1.7

176 Iraq 1.5 3 1.2 - 1.8

176 Sudan 1.5 5 1.4 - 1.7

178 Myanmar 1.4 3 0.9 - 1.8

179 Afghanistan 1.3 4 1.0 - 1.5

180 Somalia 1.1 3 0.9 - 1.4

Methodology:

As noted above, the highest (and best) level of transparency with the least perceived corruption is indicated by the number, 10. The lower (and worse) levels of transparency are indicated by lower numbers.

According to Transparency International, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) table shows a

Libya Review 2016 Page 292 of 437 pages Libya country's ranking and score, the number of surveys used to determine the score, and the confidence range of the scoring.

The rank shows how one country compares to others included in the index. The CPI score indicates the perceived level of public-sector corruption in a country/territory.

The CPI is based on 13 independent surveys. However, not all surveys include all countries. The surveys used column indicates how many surveys were relied upon to determine the score for that country.

The confidence range indicates the reliability of the CPI scores and tells us that allowing for a margin of error, we can be 90% confident that the true score for this country lies within this range.

Note:

Kosovo, which separated from the Yugoslav successor state of Serbia, is not listed above. No calculation is available for Kosovo at this time, however, a future corruption index by Transparency International may include the world's newest country in its tally. Taiwan has been listed above despite its contested status; while Taiwan claims sovereign status, China claims ultimate jurisdiction over Taiwan. Hong Kong, which is also under the rubric of Chinese sovereignty, is listed above. Note as well that Puerto Rico, which is a United States domain, is also included in the list above. These inclusions likely have to do with the size and fairly autonomous status of their economies.

Source:

Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index; available at URL: http://www.transparency.org

Updated:

Uploaded in 2011 using most recent ranking available; reviewed in 2015.

Competitiveness Ranking

Editor's Note:

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The Global Competitiveness Report’s competitiveness ranking is based on the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), which was developed for the World Economic Forum. The GCI is based on a number of competitiveness considerations, and provides a comprehensive picture of the competitiveness landscape in countries around the world. The competitiveness considerations are: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary education, higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication, and innovation. The rankings are calculated from both publicly available data and the Executive Opinion Survey.

GCI 2010 GCI 2010 GCI 2009 Change Country/Economy Rank Score Rank 2009-2010

Switzerland 1 5.63 1 0

Sweden 2 5.56 4 2

Singapore 3 5.48 3 0

United States 4 5.43 2 -2

Germany 5 5.39 7 2

Japan 6 5.37 8 2

Finland 7 5.37 6 -1

Netherlands 8 5.33 10 2

Denmark 9 5.32 5 -4

Canada 10 5.30 9 -1

Hong Kong SAR 11 5.30 11 0

United Kingdom 12 5.25 13 1

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Taiwan, China 13 5.21 12 -1

Norway 14 5.14 14 0

France 15 5.13 16 1

Australia 16 5.11 15 -1

Qatar 17 5.10 22 5

Austria 18 5.09 17 -1

Belgium 19 5.07 18 -1

Luxembourg 20 5.05 21 1

Saudi Arabia 21 4.95 28 7

Korea, Rep. 22 4.93 19 -3

New Zealand 23 4.92 20 -3

Israel 24 4.91 27 3

United Arab Emirates 25 4.89 23 -2

Malaysia 26 4.88 24 -2

China 27 4.84 29 2

Brunei Darussalam 28 4.75 32 4

Ireland 29 4.74 25 -4

Chile 30 4.69 30 0

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Iceland 31 4.68 26 -5

Tunisia 32 4.65 40 8

Estonia 33 4.61 35 2

Oman 34 4.61 41 7

Kuwait 35 4.59 39 4

Czech Republic 36 4.57 31 -5

Bahrain 37 4.54 38 1

Thailand 38 4.51 36 -2

Poland 39 4.51 46 7

Cyprus 40 4.50 34 -6

Puerto Rico 41 4.49 42 1

Spain 42 4.49 33 -9

Barbados 43 4.45 44 1

Indonesia 44 4.43 54 10

Slovenia 45 4.42 37 -8

Portugal 46 4.38 43 -3

Lithuania 47 4.38 53 6

Italy 48 4.37 48 0

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Montenegro 49 4.36 62 13

Malta 50 4.34 52 2

India 51 4.33 49 -2

Hungary 52 4.33 58 6

Panama 53 4.33 59 6

South Africa 54 4.32 45 -9

Mauritius 55 4.32 57 2

Costa Rica 56 4.31 55 -1

Azerbaijan 57 4.29 51 -6

Brazil 58 4.28 56 -2

Vietnam 59 4.27 75 16

Slovak Republic 60 4.25 47 -13

Turkey 61 4.25 61 0

Sri Lanka 62 4.25 79 17

Russian Federation 63 4.24 63 0

Uruguay 64 4.23 65 1

Jordan 65 4.21 50 -15

Mexico 66 4.19 60 -6

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Romania 67 4.16 64 -3

Colombia 68 4.14 69 1

Iran 69 4.14 n/a n/a

Latvia 70 4.14 68 -2

Bulgaria 71 4.13 76 5

Kazakhstan 72 4.12 67 -5

Peru 73 4.11 78 5

Namibia 74 4.09 74 0

Morocco 75 4.08 73 -2

Botswana 76 4.05 66 -10

Croatia 77 4.04 72 -5

Guatemala 78 4.04 80 2

Macedonia, FYR 79 4.02 84 5

Rwanda 80 4.00 n/a n/a

Egypt 81 4.00 70 -11

El Salvador 82 3.99 77 -5

Greece 83 3.99 71 -12

Trinidad and Tobago 84 3.97 86 2

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Philippines 85 3.96 87 2

Algeria 86 3.96 83 -3

Argentina 87 3.95 85 -2

Albania 88 3.94 96 8

Ukraine 89 3.90 82 -7

Gambia, The 90 3.90 81 -9

Honduras 91 3.89 89 -2

Lebanon 92 3.89 n/a n/a

Georgia 93 3.86 90 -3

Moldova 94 3.86 n/a n/a

Jamaica 95 3.85 91 -4

Serbia 96 3.84 93 -3

Syria 97 3.79 94 -3

Armenia 98 3.76 97 -1

Mongolia 99 3.75 117 18

Libya 100 3.74 88 -12

Dominican Republic 101 3.72 95 -6

Bosnia and Herzegovina 102 3.70 109 7

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Benin 103 3.69 103 0

Senegal 104 3.67 92 -12

Ecuador 105 3.65 105 0

Kenya 106 3.65 98 -8

Bangladesh 107 3.64 106 -1

Bolivia 108 3.64 120 12

Cambodia 109 3.63 110 1

Guyana 110 3.62 104 -6

Cameroon 111 3.58 111 0

Nicaragua 112 3.57 115 3

Tanzania 113 3.56 100 -13

Ghana 114 3.56 114 0

Zambia 115 3.55 112 -3

Tajikistan 116 3.53 122 6

Cape Verde 117 3.51 n/a n/a

Uganda 118 3.51 108 -10

Ethiopia 119 3.51 118 -1

Paraguay 120 3.49 124 4

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Kyrgyz Republic 121 3.49 123 2

Venezuela 122 3.48 113 -9

Pakistan 123 3.48 101 -22

Madagascar 124 3.46 121 -3

Malawi 125 3.45 119 -6

Swaziland 126 3.40 n/a n/a

Nigeria 127 3.38 99 -28

Lesotho 128 3.36 107 -21

Côte d'Ivoire 129 3.35 116 -13

Nepal 130 3.34 125 -5

Mozambique 131 3.32 129 -2

Mali 132 3.28 130 -2

Timor-Leste 133 3.23 126 -7

Burkina Faso 134 3.20 128 -6

Mauritania 135 3.14 127 -8

Zimbabwe 136 3.03 132 -4

Burundi 137 2.96 133 -4

Angola 138 2.93 n/a n/a

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Chad 139 2.73 131 -8

Methodology:

The competitiveness rankings are calculated from both publicly available data and the Executive Opinion Survey, a comprehensive annual survey conducted by the World Economic Forum together with its network of Partner Institutes (leading research institutes and business organizations) in the countries covered by the Report.

Highlights according to WEF --

- The United States falls two places to fourth position, overtaken by Sweden and Singapore in the rankings of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 - The People’s Republic of China continues to move up the rankings, with marked improvements in several other Asian countries - Germany moves up two places to fifth place, leading the Eurozone countries - Switzerland tops the rankings

Source:

World Economic Forum; available at URL: http://www.weforum.org

Updated:

2011 using most recent ranking available; reviewed in 2015.

Taxation

The corporate income tax rate in Libya is based on income level. Companies with an income of less than LD 10,000 are subject to a 20 percent tax rate. Income between LD 10,000 and LD 30,000 is subject to a tax of LD 2,000 and an additional 25 percent. Income between LD 30,000 and LD 60,000 is subject to a charge of LD 7,000 and additional 30 percent. For companies with an income between LD 60,000 and LD 100,000 there is a charge of LD 16,000 and an additional

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40 percent. For income between LD 100,000 and LD 150,000 there is a charge of LD 32,000 and an additional 45 percent tax. Companies with an income greater than LD 150,000 are subject to a charge of LD 54,500 and a tax of 60 percent. Capital gains and dividends are included in taxable income.

Stock Market

There is no stock market in Libya.

Partner Links

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Chapter 5 Social Overview

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People

Cultural Demography

Libyans are primarily a mixture of Berbers and Arabs; today, there is little distinction remaining between these two groups. Libya is also home to many tribal groups, including the Tuareg and the Warfala. Other ethnic and national groups represented in Libya include Tunisian, Egyptians, Italians, Greeks, Maltese, Indians and Pakistanis. Sunni Islam has the most adherents in Libya. Arabic is the official language, and although the use of Italian dates back to Libya's colonial history. French and English are also spoken in some quarters in Libya. The literacy rate is quite high in Libya, relative to the rest of the world at 83 percent (as noted below), however, that rate belies the distinction of the genders whereby men enjoy markedly higher rates of literacy when compared with females.

Cultural and Economic Legacy

In terms of history, Libya was conquered by the Arabs in the seventh century; in the following centuries, its indigenous people were Arab-ized as they adopted the religion of Islam, as well as the Arabic language and culture. In the mid-16th century, Libya was conquered again -- this time by the Ottoman Turks. Libya remained part of the Ottoman empire until Italy invaded its territory in 1911. A year later, Libya became an Italian colony. After World War II, British and French forces occupied the area until a United Nations resolution made Libya an independent nation state 1951. The discovery of oil in 1959 transformed Libya into a wealthy nation state, by international standards. Indeed, Libya is considered a country with "high human development" (as discussed

Libya Review 2016 Page 305 of 437 pages Libya below), according to the Human Development Index (HDI), which is formulated by the United Nations Development Program.

Human Development

In terms of health and welfare, the infant mortality rate in Libya is 21.94 deaths per 1,000 live births. Life expectancy at birth for the total population is 77 years of age (males: 74.81 years; females: 79.44 years) . In recent years, the population growth rate was estimated to be 2.33 percent, and the fertility rate 3.34 children per woman, according to recent numbers. The literacy rate for the total population is 82.6 percent, although it is markedly higher for males at 92.4 percent than for females at 72 percent.

About 6.6 percent of GDP in this country is spent on health expenditures. Access to water and sanitation in this country is regarded to be average, although there may be obstacles in rural areas.

A notable measure of human development is the Human Development Index (HDI), which is formulated by the United Nations Development Program. The HDI is a composite of several indicators, which measure a country's achievements in three main arenas of human development: longevity, knowledge and education, as well as economic standard of living. The HDI places Libya in the high human development category, at 53rd place. Although the concept of human development is complicated and cannot be properly captured by values and indices, the HDI, which is calculated and updated annually, offers a wide-ranging assessment of human development in certain countries, not based solely upon traditional economic and financial indicators.

Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, www.countrywatch.com . See Bibliography for list of general research sources.

Human Development Index

Human Development Index (Ranked Numerically)

The Human Development Index (HDI) is used to measure quality of life in countries across the world. The HDI has been compiled since 1990 by the United Nations Development Programme

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(UNDP) on a regular basis. The HDI is a composite of several indicators, which measure a country's achievements in three main arenas of human development: longevity, education, and economic standard of living. Although the concept of human development is complicated and cannot be properly captured by values and indices, the HDI offers a wide-ranging assessment of human development in certain countries, not based solely upon traditional economic and financial indicators. For more information about the methodology used to calculate the HDI, please see the "Source Materials" in the appendices of this review.

Very High Human High Human Medium Human Low Human Development Development Development Development

1. Norway 43. Bahamas 86. Fiji 128. Kenya

2. Australia 44. Lithuania 87. Turkmenistan 129. Bangladesh

88. Dominican 3. New Zealand 45. Chile Republic 130. Ghana

4. United States 46. Argentina 89. China 131. Cameroon

132. Myanmar 5. Ireland 47. Kuwait 90. El Salvador (Burma)

6. Liechtenstein 48. Latvia 91. Sri Lanka 133. Yemen

7. Netherlands 49. Montenegro 92. Thailand 134. Benin

135. 8. Canada 50. Romania 93. Gabon Madagascar

9. Sweden 51. Croatia 94. Surname 136. Mauritania

137. Papua 10. Germany 52. Uruguay 95. Bolivia New Guinea

11. Japan 53. Libya 96. Paraguay 138. Nepal

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12. South Korea 54. Panama 97. Philippines 139. Togo

13. Switzerland 55. Saudi Arabia 98. Botswana 140. Comoros

14. France 56. Mexico 99. Moldova 141. Lesotho

15. Israel 57. Malaysia 100. Mongolia 142. Nigeria

16. Finland 58. Bulgaria 101. Egypt 143. Uganda

17. Iceland 59. Trinidad and Tobago 102. Uzbekistan 144. Senegal

18. Belgium 60. Serbia 103. Micronesia 145. Haiti

19. Denmark 61. Belarus 104. Guyana 146. Angola

20. Spain 62. Costa Rica 105. Namibia 147. Djibouti

21. Hong King 63. Peru 106. Honduras 148. Tanzania

149. Cote 22. Greece 64. Albania 107. Maldives d'Ivoire

23. Italy 65. Russian Federation 108. Indonesia 150. Zambia

24. Luxembourg 66. Kazakhstan 109. Kyrgyzstan 151. Gambia

25. Austria 67. Azerbaijan 110. South Africa 152. Rwanda

26. United 68. Bosnia and Kingdom Herzegovina 111. Syria 153. Malawi

27. Singapore 69. Ukraine 112. Tajikistan 154. Sudan

28. Czech 155. Republic 70. Iran 113. Vietnam Afghanistan

Libya Review 2016 Page 308 of 437 pages Libya

71. The former Yugoslav 29. Slovenia Republic of Macedonia 114. Morocco 156. Guinea

30. Andorra 72. Mauritius 115. Nicaragua 157. Ethiopia

158. Sierra 31. Slovakia 73. Brazil 116. Guatemala Leone

159. Central 32. United Arab 117. Equatorial African Emirates 74. Georgia Guinea Republic

33. Malta 75. Venezuela 118. Cape Verde 160. Mali

161. Burkina 34. Estonia 76. Armenia 119. India Faso

35. Cyprus 77. Ecuador 120. East Timor 162. Liberia

36. Hungary 78. Belize 121. Swaziland 163. Chad

164. Guinea- 37. Brunei 79. Colombia 122. Laos Bissau

123. Solomon 165. 38. Qatar 80. Jamaica Islands Mozambique

39. Bahrain 81. Tunisia 124. Cambodia 166. Burundi

40. Portugal 82. Jordan 125. Pakistan 167. Niger

168. Congo 41. Poland 83. Turkey 126. Congo RC DRC

127. Sao Tome 42. Barbados 84. Algeria and Principe 169. Zimbabwe

Libya Review 2016 Page 309 of 437 pages Libya

85. Tonga

Methodology:

For more information about the methodology used to calculate the HDI, please see the "Source Materials" in the appendices of this Country Review.

Reference:

As published in United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report 2010.

Source:

United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index available at URL: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/

Updated:

Uploaded in 2011 using ranking available; reviewed in 2015

Life Satisfaction Index

Created by Adrian G. White, an Analytic Social Psychologist at the University of Leicester, the "Satisfaction with Life Index" measures subjective life satisfaction across various countries. The data was taken from a metastudy (see below for source) and associates the notion of subjective happiness or life satisfaction with qualitative parameters such as health, wealth, and access to basic education. This assessment serves as an alternative to other measures of happiness that tend to rely on traditional and quantitative measures of policy on quality of life, such as GNP and GDP. The methodology involved the responses of 80,000 people across the globe.

Rank Country Score

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1 Denmark 273.4

2 Switzerland 273.33

3 Austria 260

4 Iceland 260

5 The Bahamas 256.67

6 Finland 256.67

7 Sweden 256.67

8 Iran 253.33

9 Brunei 253.33

10 Canada 253.33

11 Ireland 253.33

12 Luxembourg 253.33

13 Costa Rica 250

14 Malta 250

15 Netherlands 250

16 Antiguaand Barbuda 246.67

17 Malaysia 246.67

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18 New Zealand 246.67

19 Norway 246.67

20 Seychelles 246.67

21 Saint Kitts and Nevis 246.67

22 United Arab Emirates 246.67

23 United States 246.67

24 Vanuatu 246.67

25 Venezuela 246.67

26 Australia 243.33

27 Barbados 243.33

28 Belgium 243.33

29 Dominica 243.33

30 Oman 243.33

31 Saudi Arabia 243.33

32 Suriname 243.33

33 Bahrain 240

34 Colombia 240

35 Germany 240

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36 Guyana 240

37 Honduras 240

38 Kuwait 240

39 Panama 240

40 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 240

41 United Kingdom 236.67

42 Dominican Republic 233.33

43 Guatemala 233.33

44 Jamaica 233.33

45 Qatar 233.33

46 Spain 233.33

47 Saint Lucia 233.33

48 Belize 230

49 Cyprus 230

50 Italy 230

51 Mexico 230

52 Samoa 230

53 Singapore 230

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54 Solomon Islands 230

55 Trinidad and Tobago 230

56 Argentina 226.67

57 Fiji 223.33

58 Israel 223.33

59 Mongolia 223.33

60 São Tomé and Príncipe 223.33

61 El Salvador 220

62 France 220

63 Hong Kong 220

64 Indonesia 220

65 Kyrgyzstan 220

66 Maldives 220

67 Slovenia 220

68 Taiwan 220

69 East Timor 220

70 Tonga 220

71 Chile 216.67

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72 Grenada 216.67

73 Mauritius 216.67

74 Namibia 216.67

75 Paraguay 216.67

76 Thailand 216.67

77 Czech Republic 213.33

78 Philippines 213.33

79 Tunisia 213.33

80 Uzbekistan 213.33

81 Brazil 210

82 China 210

83 Cuba 210

84 Greece 210

85 Nicaragua 210

86 Papua New Guinea 210

87 Uruguay 210

88 Gabon 206.67

89 Ghana 206.67

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90 Japan 206.67

91 Yemen 206.67

92 Portugal 203.33

93 Sri Lanka 203.33

94 Tajikistan 203.33

95 Vietnam 203.33

96 Bhutan 200

97 Comoros 196.67

98 Croatia 196.67

99 Poland 196.67

100 Cape Verde 193.33

101 Kazakhstan 193.33

102 South Korea 193.33

103 Madagascar 193.33

104 Bangladesh 190

105 Republic of the Congo 190

106 The Gambia 190

107 Hungary 190

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108 Libya 190

109 South Africa 190

110 Cambodia 186.67

111 Ecuador 186.67

112 Kenya 186.67

113 Lebanon 186.67

114 Morocco 186.67

115 Peru 186.67

116 Senegal 186.67

117 Bolivia 183.33

118 Haiti 183.33

119 Nepal 183.33

120 Nigeria 183.33

121 Tanzania 183.33

122 Benin 180

123 Botswana 180

124 Guinea-Bissau 180

125 India 180

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126 Laos 180

127 Mozambique 180

128 Palestinian Authority 180

129 Slovakia 180

130 Myanmar 176.67

131 Mali 176.67

132 Mauritania 176.67

133 Turkey 176.67

134 Algeria 173.33

135 Equatorial Guinea 173.33

136 Romania 173.33

137 Bosnia and Herzegovina 170

138 Cameroon 170

139 Estonia 170

140 Guinea 170

141 Jordan 170

142 Syria 170

143 Sierra Leone 166.67

Libya Review 2016 Page 318 of 437 pages Libya

144 Azerbaijan 163.33

145 Central African Republic 163.33

146 Republic of Macedonia 163.33

147 Togo 163.33

148 Zambia 163.33

149 Angola 160

150 Djibouti 160

151 Egypt 160

152 Burkina Faso 156.67

153 Ethiopia 156.67

154 Latvia 156.67

155 Lithuania 156.67

156 Uganda 156.67

157 Albania 153.33

158 Malawi 153.33

159 Chad 150

160 Côte d'Ivoire 150

161 Niger 150

Libya Review 2016 Page 319 of 437 pages Libya

162 Eritrea 146.67

163 Rwanda 146.67

164 Bulgaria 143.33

165 Lesotho 143.33

166 Pakistan 143.33

167 Russia 143.33

168 Swaziland 140

169 Georgia 136.67

170 Belarus 133.33

171 Turkmenistan 133.33

172 Armenia 123.33

173 Sudan 120

174 Ukraine 120

175 Moldova 116.67

176 Democratic Republic of the Congo 110

177 Zimbabwe 110

178 Burundi 100

Libya Review 2016 Page 320 of 437 pages Libya

Commentary:

European countries, such as Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria resided at the top of the ranking with highest levels of self-reported life satisfaction. Conversely, European countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine ranked low on the index. African countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe and Burundi found themselves at the very bottom of the ranking, and indeed, very few African countries could be found in the top 100. Japan was at the mid-way point in the ranking, however, other Asian countries such as Brunei and Malaysia were in the top tier, while Pakistan was close to the bottom with a low level of self-identified life satisfaction. As a region, the Middle East presented a mixed bad with Saudi Arabians reporing healthy levels of life satisfaction and Egyptians near the bottom of the ranking. As a region, Caribbean countries were ranked highly, consistently demonstrating high levels of life satisfaction. The findings showed that health was the most crucial determining factor in life satisfaction, followed by prosperity and education.

Source:

White, A. (2007). A Global Projection of Subjective Well-being: A Challenge To Positive Psychology? Psychtalk 56, 17-20. The data was extracted from a meta-analysis by Marks, Abdallah, Simms & Thompson (2006).

Uploaded:

Based on study noted above in "Source" ; reviewed in 2015

Happy Planet Index

The Happy Planet Index (HPI) is used to measure human well-being in conjunction with environmental impact. The HPI has been compiled since 2006 by the New Economics Foundation. The index is a composite of several indicators including subjective life satisfaction, life expectancy at birth, and ecological footprint per capita.

As noted by NEFA, the HPI "reveals the ecological efficiency with which human well-being is delivered." Indeed, the index combines environmental impact with human well-being to measure

Libya Review 2016 Page 321 of 437 pages Libya the environmental efficiency with which, country by country, people live long and happy lives. The countries ranked highest by the HPI are not necessarily the ones with the happiest people overall, but the ones that allow their citizens to live long and fulfilling lives, without negatively impacting this opportunity for either future generations or citizens of other countries. Accordingly, a country like the United States will rank low on this list due to its large per capital ecological footprint, which uses more than its fair share of resources, and will likely cause planetary damage.

It should be noted that the HPI was designed to be a counterpoint to other well-established indices of countries' development, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which measures overall national wealth and economic development, but often obfuscates the realities of countries with stark variances between the rich and the poor. Moreover, the objective of most of the world's people is not to be wealthy but to be happy. The HPI also differs from the Human Development Index (HDI), which measures quality of life but not ecology, since it [HPI] also includes sustainability as a key indicator.

Rank Country HPI

1 Costa Rica 76.1

2 Dominican Republic 71.8

3 Jamaica 70.1

4 Guatemala 68.4

5 Vietnam 66.5

6 Colombia 66.1

7 Cuba 65.7

8 El Salvador 61.5

9 Brazil 61.0

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10 Honduras 61.0

11 Nicaragua 60.5

12 Egypt 60.3

13 Saudi Arabia 59.7

14 Philippines 59.0

15 Argentina 59.0

16 Indonesia 58.9

17 Bhutan 58.5

18 Panama 57.4

19 Laos 57.3

20 China 57.1

21 Morocco 56.8

22 Sri Lanka 56.5

23 Mexico 55.6

24 Pakistan 55.6

25 Ecuador 55.5

26 Jordan 54.6

27 Belize 54.5

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28 Peru 54.4

29 Tunisia 54.3

30 Trinidad and Tobago 54.2

31 Bangladesh 54.1

32 Moldova 54.1

33 Malaysia 54.0

34 Tajikistan 53.5

35 India 53.0

36 Venezuela 52.5

37 Nepal 51.9

38 Syria 51.3

39 Burma 51.2

40 Algeria 51.2

41 Thailand 50.9

42 Haiti 50.8

43 Netherlands 50.6

44 Malta 50.4

45 Uzbekistan 50.1

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46 Chile 49.7

47 Bolivia 49.3

48 Armenia 48.3

49 Singapore 48.2

50 Yemen 48.1

51 Germany 48.1

52 Switzerland 48.1

53 Sweden 48.0

54 Albania 47.9

55 Paraguay 47.8

56 Palestinian Authority 47.7

57 Austria 47.7

58 Serbia 47.6

59 Finland 47.2

60 Croatia 47.2

61 Kyrgyzstan 47.1

62 Cyprus 46.2

63 Guyana 45.6

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64 Belgium 45.4

65 Bosnia and Herzegovina 45.0

66 Slovenia 44.5

67 Israel 44.5

68 South Korea 44.4

69 Italy 44.0

70 Romania 43.9

71 France 43.9

72 Georgia 43.6

73 Slovakia 43.5

74 United Kingdom 43.3

75 Japan 43.3

76 Spain 43.2

77 Poland 42.8

78 Ireland 42.6

79 Iraq 42.6

80 Cambodia 42.3

81 Iran 42.1

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82 Bulgaria 42.0

83 Turkey 41.7

84 Hong Kong 41.6

85 Azerbaijan 41.2

86 Lithuania 40.9

87 Djibouti 40.4

88 Norway 40.4

89 Canada 39.4

90 Hungary 38.9

91 Kazakhstan 38.5

92 Czech Republic 38.3

93 Mauritania 38.2

94 Iceland 38.1

95 Ukraine 38.1

96 Senegal 38.0

97 Greece 37.6

98 Portugal 37.5

99 Uruguay 37.2

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100 Ghana 37.1

101 Latvia 36.7

102 Australia 36.6

103 New Zealand 36.2

104 Belarus 35.7

105 Denmark 35.5

106 Mongolia 35.0

107 Malawi 34.5

108 Russia 34.5

109 Chad 34.3

110 Lebanon 33.6

111 Macedonia 32.7

112 Republic of the Congo 32.4

113 Madagascar 31.5

114 United States 30.7

115 Nigeria 30.3

116 Guinea 30.3

117 Uganda 30.2

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118 South Africa 29.7

119 Rwanda 29.6

120 Democratic Republic of the Congo 29.0

121 Sudan 28.5

122 Luxembourg 28.5

123 United Arab Emirates 28.2

124 Ethiopia 28.1

125 Kenya 27.8

126 Cameroon 27.2

127 Zambia 27.2

128 Kuwait 27.0

129 Niger 26.9

130 Angola 26.8

131 Estonia 26.4

132 Mali 25.8

133 Mozambique 24.6

134 Benin 24.6

135 Togo 23.3

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136 Sierra Leone 23.1

137 Central African Republic 22.9

138 Burkina Faso 22.4

139 Burundi 21.8

140 Namibia 21.1

141 Botswana 20.9

142 Tanzania 17.8

143 Zimbabwe 16.6

Source: This material is derived from the Happy Planet Index issued by the New Economics Foundation (NEF).

Methodology: The methodology for the calculations can be found at URL: http://www.happyplanetindex.org/

Status of Women

Overview

The 1969 Constitutional Proclamation granted women total equity with men in Libya. However, traditional attitudes and practices continue to contradict the law.

Major improvements related to access to education and employment for women have been realized

Libya Review 2016 Page 330 of 437 pages Libya in recent years. Women who were born before the 1969 revolution generally stayed in the home and had significantly lower education levels then their younger counterparts. Women aged 35- years-old and younger are more likely to receive an education and participate in the wage-earning workforce of which they comprise 20 percent - a substantial increase over the past decade.

The Libyan government ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women in May 1989, albeit with reservations due to conflicts with Islamic Law. Today, these reservations still stand in the way of full ratification of the convention.

Gender Related Development Index (GDI) Rank:

Not Ranked

Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) Rank:

Not Ranked

Female Population:

2.8 million

Female Life Expectancy at birth:

79 years

Total Fertility Rate:

3.6

Maternal Mortality Ratio:

Total Number of Women Living with HIV/AIDS:

N/A

Ever Married Women, Ages 15-19 (%):

Mean Age at Time of Marriage:

Libya Review 2016 Page 331 of 437 pages Libya

Contraceptive Use Among Married Women, Any Method (%):

49%

Female Adult Literacy Rate:

72%

Combined Female Gross enrollment ratio for Primary, Secondary and Tertiary schools:

100%

Female-Headed Households (%):

N/A

Economically Active Females (%):

25.9%

Female Contributing Family Workers (%):

N/A

Female Estimated Earned Income:

N/A

Seats in Parliament held by women (%):

Lower or Single House: N/A Upper House or Senate: N/A

Year Women Received the Right to Vote:

1964

Year Women Received the Right to Stand for Election:

1964

Libya Review 2016 Page 332 of 437 pages Libya

*The Gender Development Index (GDI) is a composite index which measures the average achievement in a country. While very similar to the Human Development Index in its use of the same variables, the GDI adjusts the average achievement of each country in terms of life expectancy, enrollment in schools, income, and literacy in accordance to the disparities between males and females.

*The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) is a composite index measuring gender inequality in three of the basic dimensions of empowerment; economic participation and decision-making, political participation and decision-making, and power over economic resources.

*Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is defined as the average number of babies born to women during their reproductive years. A TFR of 2.1 is considered the replacement rate; once a TFR of a population reaches 2.1 the population will remain stable assuming no immigration or emigration takes place. When the TFR is greater than 2.1 a population will increase and when it is less than 2.1 a population will eventually decrease, although due to the age structure of a population it will take years before a low TFR is translated into lower population.

*Maternal Mortality Rate is the number of deaths to women per 100,000 live births that resulted from conditions related to pregnancy and or delivery related complications.

*Economically Active Females are the share of the female population, ages 15 and above, whom supply, or are able to supply, labor for the production of goods and services.

*Female Contributing Family Workers are those females who work without pay in an economic enterprise operated by a relative living in the same household.

*Estimated Earned Income is measured according to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in US dollars.

Global Gender Gap Index

Editor's Note:

The Global Gender Gap Index by the World Economic Forum ranks most of the world’s countries in terms of the division of resources and opportunities among males and females. Specifically, the ranking assesses the gender inequality gap in these four arenas:

Libya Review 2016 Page 333 of 437 pages Libya

1. Economic participation and opportunity (salaries and high skilled employment participation levels) 2. Educational attainment (access to basic and higher level education) 3. Political empowerment (representation in decision-making structures) 4. Health and survival (life expectancy and sex ratio)

2010 rank 2010 2010 2009 2009 2008 2008 2007 among rank score rank score rank score rank 2009 countries

Country

Iceland 1 0.8496 1 1 0.8276 4 0.7999 4

Norway 2 0.8404 2 3 0.8227 1 0.8239 2

Finland 3 0.8260 3 2 0.8252 2 0.8195 3

Sweden 4 0.8024 4 4 0.8139 3 0.8139 1

New 5 0.7808 5 5 0.7880 5 0.7859 5 Zealand

Ireland 6 0.7773 6 8 0.7597 8 0.7518 9

Denmark 7 0.7719 7 7 0.7628 7 0.7538 8

Lesotho 8 0.7678 8 10 0.7495 16 0.7320 26

Philippines 9 0.7654 9 9 0.7579 6 0.7568 6

Switzerland 10 0.7562 10 13 0.7426 14 0.7360 40

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Spain 11 0.7554 11 17 0.7345 17 0.7281 10

South Africa 12 0.7535 12 6 0.7709 22 0.7232 20

Germany 13 0.7530 13 12 0.7449 11 0.7394 7

Belgium 14 0.7509 14 33 0.7165 28 0.7163 19

United 15 0.7460 15 15 0.7402 13 0.7366 11 Kingdom

Sri Lanka 16 0.7458 16 16 0.7402 12 0.7371 15

Netherlands 17 0.7444 17 11 0.7490 9 0.7399 12

Latvia 18 0.7429 18 14 0.7416 10 0.7397 13

United 19 0.7411 19 31 0.7173 27 0.7179 31 States

Canada 20 0.7372 20 25 0.7196 31 0.7136 18

Trinidad and 21 0.7353 21 19 0.7298 19 0.7245 46 Tobago

Mozambique 22 0.7329 22 26 0.7195 18 0.7266 43

Australia 23 0.7271 23 20 0.7282 21 0.7241 17

Cuba 24 0.7253 24 29 0.7176 25 0.7195 22

Namibia 25 0.7238 25 32 0.7167 30 0.7141 29

Luxembourg 26 0.7231 26 63 0.6889 66 0.6802 58

Mongolia 27 0.7194 27 22 0.7221 40 0.7049 62

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Costa Rica 28 0.7194 28 27 0.7180 32 0.7111 28

Argentina 29 0.7187 29 24 0.7211 24 0.7209 33

Nicaragua 30 0.7176 30 49 0.7002 71 0.6747 90

Barbados 31 0.7176 31 21 0.7236 26 0.7188 n/a

Portugal 32 0.7171 32 46 0.7013 39 0.7051 37

Uganda 33 0.7169 33 40 0.7067 43 0.6981 50

Moldova 34 0.7160 34 36 0.7104 20 0.7244 21

Lithuania 35 0.7132 35 30 0.7175 23 0.7222 14

Bahamas 36 0.7128 36 28 0.7179 n/a n/a n/a

Austria 37 0.7091 37 42 0.7031 29 0.7153 27

Guyana 38 0.7090 38 35 0.7108 n/a n/a n/a

Panama 39 0.7072 39 43 0.7024 34 0.7095 38

Ecuador 40 0.7072 40 23 0.7220 35 0.7091 44

Kazakhstan 41 0.7055 41 47 0.7013 45 0.6976 32

Slovenia 42 0.7047 42 52 0.6982 51 0.6937 49

Poland 43 0.7037 43 50 0.6998 49 0.6951 60

Jamaica 44 0.7037 44 48 0.7013 44 0.6980 39

Russian 45 0.7036 45 51 0.6987 42 0.6994 45 Federation

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France 46 0.7025 46 18 0.7331 15 0.7341 51

Estonia 47 0.7018 47 37 0.7094 37 0.7076 30

Chile 48 0.7013 48 64 0.6884 65 0.6818 86

Macedonia, 49 0.6996 49 53 0.6950 53 0.6914 35 FYR

Bulgaria 50 0.6983 50 38 0.7072 36 0.7077 25

Kyrgyz 51 0.6973 51 41 0.7058 41 0.7045 70 Republic

Israel 52 0.6957 52 45 0.7019 56 0.6900 36

Croatia 53 0.6939 53 54 0.6944 46 0.6967 16

Honduras 54 0.6927 54 62 0.6893 47 0.6960 68

Colombia 55 0.6927 55 56 0.6939 50 0.6944 24

Singapore 56 0.6914 56 84 0.6664 84 0.6625 77

Thailand 57 0.6910 57 59 0.6907 52 0.6917 52

Greece 58 0.6908 58 85 0.6662 75 0.6727 72

Uruguay 59 0.6897 59 57 0.6936 54 0.6907 78

Peru 60 0.6895 60 44 0.7024 48 0.6959 75

China 61 0.6881 61 60 0.6907 57 0.6878 73

Botswana 62 0.6876 62 39 0.7071 63 0.6839 53

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Ukraine 63 0.6869 63 61 0.6896 62 0.6856 57

Venezuela 64 0.6863 64 69 0.6839 59 0.6875 55

Czech 65 0.6850 65 74 0.6789 69 0.6770 64 Republic

Tanzania 66 0.6829 66 73 0.6797 38 0.7068 34

Romania 67 0.6826 67 70 0.6805 70 0.6763 47

Malawi 68 0.6824 68 76 0.6738 81 0.6664 87

Paraguay 69 0.6804 69 66 0.6868 100 0.6379 69

Ghana 70 0.6782 70 80 0.6704 77 0.6679 63

Slovak 71 0.6778 71 68 0.6845 64 0.6824 54 Republic

Vietnam 72 0.6776 72 71 0.6802 68 0.6778 42

Dominican 73 0.6774 73 67 0.6859 72 0.6744 65 Republic

Italy 74 0.6765 74 72 0.6798 67 0.6788 84

Gambia, 75 0.6762 75 75 0.6752 85 0.6622 95 The

Bolivia 76 0.6751 76 82 0.6693 80 0.6667 80

Brueni 77 0.6748 77 94 0.6524 99 0.6392 n/a Darussalem

Albania 78 0.6726 78 91 0.6601 87 0.6591 66

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Hungary 79 0.6720 79 65 0.6879 60 0.6867 61

Madagascar 80 0.6713 80 77 0.6732 74 0.6736 89

Angola 81 0.6712 81 106 0.6353 114 0.6032 110

Bangladesh 82 0.6702 82 93 0.6526 90 0.6531 100

Malta 83 0.6695 83 88 0.6635 83 0.6634 76

Armenia 84 0.6669 84 90 0.6619 78 0.6677 71

Brazil 85 0.6655 85 81 0.6695 73 0.6737 74

Cyprus 86 0.6642 86 79 0.6706 76 0.6694 82

Indonesia 87 0.6615 87 92 0.6580 93 0.6473 81

Georgia 88 0.6598 88 83 0.6680 82 0.6654 67

Tajikistan 89 0.6598 89 86 0.6661 89 0.6541 79

El Salvador 90 0.6596 90 55 0.6939 58 0.6875 48

Mexico 91 0.6577 91 98 0.6503 97 0.6441 93

Zimbabwe 92 0.6574 92 95 0.6518 92 0.6485 88

Belize 93 0.6536 93 87 0.6636 86 0.6610 94

Japan 94 0.6524 94 101 0.6447 98 0.6434 91

Mauritius 95 0.6520 95 96 0.6513 95 0.6466 85

Kenya 96 0.6499 96 97 0.6512 88 0.6547 83

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Cambodia 97 0.6482 97 104 0.6410 94 0.6469 98

Malaysia 98 0.6479 98 100 0.6467 96 0.6442 92

Maldives 99 0.6452 99 99 0.6482 91 0.6501 99

Azerbaijan 100 0.6446 100 89 0.6626 61 0.6856 59

Senegal 101 0.6414 101 102 0.6427 n/a n/a n/a

Suriname 102 0.6407 102 78 0.6726 79 0.6674 56

United Arab 103 0.6397 103 112 0.6198 105 0.6220 105 Emirates

Korea, Rep. 104 0.6342 104 115 0.6146 108 0.6154 97

Kuwait 105 0.6318 105 105 0.6356 101 0.6358 96

Zambia 106 0.6293 106 107 0.6310 106 0.6205 101

Tunisia 107 0.6266 107 109 0.6233 103 0.6295 102

Fiji 108 0.6256 108 103 0.6414 n/a n/a n/a

Guatemala 109 0.6238 109 111 0.6209 112 0.6072 106

Bahrain 110 0.6217 110 116 0.6136 121 0.5927 115

Burkina 111 0.6162 111 120 0.6081 115 0.6029 117 Faso

India 112 0.6155 112 114 0.6151 113 0.6060 114

Mauritania 113 0.6152 113 119 0.6103 110 0.6117 111

Libya Review 2016 Page 340 of 437 pages Libya

Cameroon 114 0.6110 114 118 0.6108 117 0.6017 116

Nepal 115 0.6084 115 110 0.6213 120 0.5942 125

Lebanon* 116 0.6084 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Qatar 117 0.6059 116 125 0.5907 119 0.5948 109

Nigeria 118 0.6055 117 108 0.6280 102 0.6339 107

Algeria 119 0.6052 118 117 0.6119 111 0.6111 108

Jordan 120 0.6048 119 113 0.6182 104 0.6275 104

Ethiopia 121 0.6019 120 122 0.5948 122 0.5867 113

Oman 122 0.5950 121 123 0.5938 118 0.5960 119

Iran 123 0.5933 122 128 0.5839 116 0.6021 118

Syria 124 0.5926 123 121 0.6072 107 0.6181 103

Egypt 125 0.5899 124 126 0.5862 124 0.5832 120

Turkey 126 0.5876 125 129 0.5828 123 0.5853 121

Morocco 127 0.5767 126 124 0.5926 125 0.5757 122

Benin 128 0.5719 127 131 0.5643 126 0.5582 123

Saudi Arabia 129 0.5713 128 130 0.5651 128 0.5537 124

Côte 130 0.5691 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a d'Ivoire*

Mali 131 0.5680 129 127 0.5860 109 0.6117 112

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Pakistan 132 0.5465 130 132 0.5458 127 0.5549 126

Chad 133 0.5330 131 133 0.5417 129 0.5290 127

Yemen 134 0.4603 132 134 0.4609 130 0.4664 128

Belarus n/a n/a n/a 34 0.7141 33 0.7099 23

Uzbekistan n/a n/a n/a 58 0.6913 55 0.6906 41

*new country 2010

Commentary:

According to the report’s index, Nordic countries, such as Iceland, Norway, Finland, and Sweden have continued to dominate at the top of the ranking for gender equality. Meanwhile, France has seen a notable decline in the ranking, largely as a result of decreased number of women holding ministerial portfolios in that country. In the Americas, the United States has risen in the ranking to top the region, predominantly as a result of a decreasing wage gap, as well as higher number of women holding key positions in the current Obama administration. Canada has continued to remain as one of the top ranking countries of the Americas, followed by the small Caribbean island nation of Trinidad and Tobago, which has the distinction of being among the top three countries of the Americans in the realm of gender equality. Lesotho and South African ranked highly in the index, leading not only among African countries but also in global context. Despite Lesotho still lagging in the area of life expectancy, its high ranking was attributed to high levels of female participation in the labor force and female literacy. The Philippines and Sri Lanka were the top ranking countries for gender equality for Asia, ranking highly also in global context. The Philippines has continued to show strong performance in all strong performance on all four dimensions (detailed above) of the index. Finally, in the Arab world, the United Arab Emirates held the highest-rank within that region of the world; however, its placement near the bottom of the global list highlights the fact that Arab countries are generally poor performers when it comes to the matter of gender equality in global scope.

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Source:

This data is derived from the latest edition of The Global Gender Gap Report by the World Economic Forum.

Available at URL: http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNetwork/index.htm

Updated:

Based on latest available data as set forth in chart; reviewed in 2014

Culture and Arts

Cultural Considerations

As is the case with other African nations, Libyan culture is a blend of other cultures with roots in Berber, African and Turkish cultures. It has managed to keep its traditional folk aspect alive, especially in its more remote regions. Libya is a predominately Muslim culture and though it is not considered fundamentalist, one should always respect and adhere to Muslim customs.

The Berbers were the original community of the country. Jewish and Italian communities also lived in Libya in large numbers until the last half of the 20th century. The herdsmen and traders are found in the southern part of the country and are also known as the "Blue Men of the Desert.”

Leptis Magna formerly a prominent city of the Roman Empire, is one of the country’s most impressive archaeological and historic sites.

The country’s influence from other cultures is reflected in its food, which on a day-to-day basis is simple and includes fruit, vegetables, grains, milk and dates. A spicy version of couscous, made of chick peas and hot peppers, is the country’s national food.

Umm el-Khair is a famous Libyan poet.

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The national language is Arabic and local and traditional Arabic music is quite popular outside of the country as well. Some of the popular forms of music are Malauf, Chabi and Arab classical music. The famous instruments which are played by the local people are zokra which is a bagpipe, flute, tambourine, oud and darbuka. In modern times, Nasser Mizdawi is an artist that has fused local Arabic music with European pop.

One should also be prepared for the separation between the genders and the rules concerning the appropriate behavior of each sex, especially in social situations. Men and women should not kiss, hug, hold hands or mingle in public. Even married couples should exercise reticence in their displays of affection.

Research sources include: http://www.placesonline.com/africa/libya/culture_and_geography.asp http://travel.mapsofworld.com/libya/culture.html http://www.hejleh.com/countries/libya.html

Etiquette

Cultural Dos and Taboos

• The traditional Muslim greeting is "A-salaam a-laykum" ("Peace be upon you"), to which the reply is "w-laykum o a-salaam" ("And upon you be peace"). The traditional handshake is also acceptable; women may extend their hand if they wish to be greeted in this manner; a nod and smile may also suffice. • Titles are preferable to first names, especially in the case of elders or superiors. The word "haji" can be used for a Muslim who has been on pilgrimage to Mecca. • Normally, one should be prepared to remove one's shoes before entering a building or a home. When one removes one's shoes, the soles of the shoes are placed together, preventing the sole from being pointed at anyone. Also, among Muslims, one should never show the bottom of one's feet as it is considered offensive. Be sure not to walk on prayer mats, which will likely be present

Libya Review 2016 Page 344 of 437 pages Libya within homes. • If one is invited into the home of a local family, it is customary to take a gift to the host or hostess. Baked goods, chocolates, or a bag of sweets, are good choices. More elaborate offerings, such as a beautiful ornament, possibly from one's own country, would constitute an acceptable gift between business associates. A finely made compass, symbolizing the direction of Mecca to a devout Muslim, would constitute a thoughtful gesture on the part of the giver, and would most assuredly be treasured by the recipient. • There are also a number of prohibitions and customs involving food that one should adhere to in a Muslim country. For example, one should also note that the consumption of alcohol or pork is strictly disallowed. One should also avoid wasting bread. Breadcrumbs should never be brushed to the ground as it is considered to be sacred. • In conversation, good topic choices include the country's history, current or modern achievements, sports and culture. Generally, discussions about politics or religion should be avoided. Before embarking upon any kind of business discussion, one should ask after one's counterpart's health and life. Men should be careful not to bring up the subject of women unless one's counterpart does so first. A simple inquiry as to the health of a wife or daughter can be considered inappropriate. • One should always use the right hand in preference to the left. The left hand is considered unclean in the Muslim world and as such, one should never eat with the left hand. Likewise, one should avoid gesturing with the left hand while making sure that gifts are received with the right hand. Of course, it is acceptable to use both hands when one is insufficient. One should also avoid pointing at another person, and one should never use the North American "thumbs up" gesture as is considered to be vulgar throughout the Muslim world. • In the realm of protocol, one should not enter a room or home without knocking or coughing to announce one's presence. One should also not shout, laugh too loudly or sing during meal times. Note that it is appropriate to cover the mouth when laughing. • Generally, visitors are urged to acquaint themselves with the calendar and traditions of Islam, such as the fasting, daily prayer and practices. Praying five times daily, for example, is customary and affects the schedule of all events and practices in Muslim countries. During the period of Ramadan, for instance, fasting and prayer is mandatory for Muslims. • Be prepared for the separation between the genders and the rules concerning the appropriate behavior of each sex, especially in social situations. Men and women should not kiss, hug, hold hands or mingle in public. Even married couples should exercise reticence in their displays of affection. • This is a predominantly Muslim culture and although it is not considered to be a fundamentalist Islamic country, clothing should be appropriate to this environment. Business wear is typically more conventional; suits are the norm for both men and women, although more casual attire may also be permissible. Western women should try to be more restrained in regard to makeup and jewelry. Both men and women should dress modestly. Tight, revealing clothing is simply not acceptable, while shorts, bikinis and short hems are objectionable. Necklines should be high and sleeves should come to the elbows. Hemlines should be well below the knee, if not ankle length.

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While the rules for men's attire is not as strict, men must keep their chest covered in public and should never wear shorts in public.

Travel Information

Please Note

This is a generalized travel guide and it is intended to coalesce several resources, which a traveler might find useful, regardless of a particular destination. As such, it does not include travel warnings for specific "hot spot" destinations.

For travel alerts and warnings, please see the United States Department of State's listings available at URL: http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/alertswarnings.html

Please note that travel to the following countries, based on these warnings, is ill-advised, or should be undertaken with the utmost precaution:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Honduras, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories of West Bank and Gaza, Philippines areas of Sulu Archipelago, Mindanao, and southern Sulu Sea, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Yemen.

International Travel Guide

Checklist for Travelers

1. Take out travel insurance to cover hospital treatment or medical evacuation. Overseas medical costs are expensive to most international travelers, where one's domestic, nationalized or even private health insurance plans will not provide coverage outside one's home country. Learn about

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"reciprocal insurance plans" that some international health care companies might offer. 2. Make sure that one's travel insurance is appropriate. If one intends to indulge in adventurous activities, such as parasailing, one should be sure that one is fully insured in such cases. Many traditional insurance policies do not provide coverage in cases of extreme circumstances. 3. Take time to learn about one's destination country and culture. Read and learn about the place one is traveling. Also check political, economic and socio-cultural developments at the destination by reading country-specific travel reports and fact sheets noted below. 4. Get the necessary visas for the country (or countries) one intends to visit - but be aware that a visa does not guarantee entry. A number of useful sites regarding visa and other entry requirements are noted below. 5. Keep in regular contact with friends and relatives back at home by phone or email, and be sure to leave a travel itinerary. 6. Protect one's personal information by making copies of one's passport details, insurance policy, travelers checks and credit card numbers. Taking copies of such documents with you, while leaving another collection copies with someone at home is also good practice for travelers. Taking copies of one's passport photograph is also recommended. 7. Stay healthy by taking all possible precautions against illness. Also, be sure to take extra supplies of prescription drugs along for the trip, while also taking time to pack general pharmaceutical supplies, such as aspirin and other such painkillers, bandages, stomach ailment medication, anti- inflammatory medication and anti-bacterial medication. 8. Do not carry illicit drugs. Understand that the punishment for possession or use of illegal drugs in some countries may be capital punishment. Make sure your prescription drugs are legal in the countries you plan to visit. 9. Know the laws of one's destination country and culture; be sure to understand the repercussions of breaking those laws and regulations. Often the transparency and freedoms of the juridical system at home is not consistent with that of one's destination country. Become aware of these complexities and subtleties before you travel. 10. For longer stays in a country, or where the security situation is volatile, one should register one's self and traveling companions at the local embassy or consulate of one's country of citizenship. 11. Women should take care to be prepared both culturally and practically for traveling in a different country and culture. One should be sure to take sufficient supplies of personal feminine products and prescription drugs. One should also learn about local cultural standards for women, including norms of dressing. Be aware that it is simply inappropriate and unsafe for women to travel alone in some countries, and take the necessary precautions to avoid risk-filled situations. 12. If one is traveling with small children, one should pack extra supplies, make arrangements with the travel carrier for proper seating that would adequately accommodate children, infants or toddlers. Note also that whether one is male of female, traveling with children means that one's hands are thus not free to carry luggage and bags. Be especially aware that this makes one vulnerable to pickpockets, thieves and other sorts of crime. 13. Make proper arrangements for accommodations, well in advance of one's arrival at a

Libya Review 2016 Page 347 of 437 pages Libya destination. Some countries have limited accommodation, while others may have culturally distinctive facilities. Learning about these practicalities before one travels will greatly aid the enjoyment of one's trip. 14. Travel with different forms of currency and money (cash, traveler's checks and credit cards) in anticipation that venues may not accept one or another form of money. Also, ensuring that one's financial resources are not contained in one location, or by one person (if one is traveling with others) can be a useful measure, in the event that one loses a wallet or purse. 15. Find out about transportation in the destination country. In some places, it might be advisable to hire a local driver or taxi guide for safety reasons, while in other countries, enjoying one's travel experience may well be enhanced by renting a vehicle and seeing the local sights and culture independently. Costs may also be prohibitive for either of these choices, so again, prior planning is suggested.

Alert to American Travelers

Please see the "Travel Warning" issued by the United States Department of State regarding travel to Libya. If Americans decide to ignore the warning for Libya, please see the "Tips for Travelers" directly below.

Tips for Travelers

• Register with your country's embassy on arrival, even if only in Libya for a short time.

• Check with your embassy, consulate, or appropriate government institution related to travel before traveling.

• Credit cards and checks are not widely accepted; you should bring enough $US to cover your entire stay, with some left over for emergencies.

• Ensure you have travel insurance including medical insurance.

• Enter next of kin details into the back of your passport.

• Strict punishments are in force for possession or use of drugs and alcohol. The importation of pork products is also banned.

• Libya is a conservative Islamic country; please respect local laws and customs e.g. by dressing acceptably, covering shoulders and avoiding short or revealing clothes.

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• Only take photographs in recognized tourist sites.

• The standard of driving can leave something to be desired; be careful when driving. Wear seat belts. Keep speed down on long journeys.

• Libya is a very large country, 95 percent of which is desert. Caution is required if traveling to the Sahara and trips into the desert are best taken with an organized tour and guide. Leave your itinerary with a contact your home country.

• Do not overstay your visa.

Note: This information is directly quoted from the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Sources: United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Business Culture: Information for Business Travelers

For more general information on etiquette in Libya, see our Cultural Etiquette page.

Sources: United States Department of State Commercial Guides

Online Resources Regarding Entry Requirements and Visas

Foreign Entry Requirements for Americans from the United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1765.html

Visa Services for Non-Americans from the United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/visa/visa_1750.html

Visa Bulletins from the United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_1360.html

Visa Waivers from the United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/without_1990.html - new

Passport and Visa Information from the Government of the United Kingdom http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/

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Visa Information from the Government of Australia http://www.dfat.gov.au/visas/index.html

Passport Information from the Government of Australia https://www.passports.gov.au/Web/index.aspx

Passport Information from the Government of Canada http://www.voyage.gc.ca/preparation_information/passport_passeport-eng.asp

Visa Information from the Government of Canada http://www.voyage.gc.ca/preparation_information/visas-eng.asp

Online Visa Processing by Immigration Experts by VisaPro http://www.visapro.com

Sources: United States Department of State, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government of Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Useful Online Resources for Travelers

Country-Specific Travel Information from United States http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1765.html

Travel Advice by Country from Government of United Kingdom http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/

General Travel Advice from Government of Australia http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/General

Travel Bulletins from the Government of Australia http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/TravelBulletins/

Travel Tips from Government of Australia http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/tips/index.html

Travel Checklist by Government of Canada http://www.voyage.gc.ca/preparation_information/checklist_sommaire-eng.asp

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Travel Checklist from Government of United Kingdom http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/staying-safe/checklist

Your trip abroad from United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/brochures/brochures_1225.html

A safe trip abroad from United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/safety/safety_1747.html

Tips for expatriates abroad from United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/living/residing/residing_1235.html

Tips for students from United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/living/studying/studying_1238.html http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/brochures/brochures_1219.html

Medical information for travelers from United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/health/health_1185.html

US Customs Travel information http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/travel/

Sources: United States Department of State; United States Customs Department, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government of Australia; Government of Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Other Practical Online Resources for Travelers

Foreign Language Phrases for Travelers http://www.travlang.com/languages/ http://www.omniglot.com/language/phrases/index.htm

World Weather Forecasts http://www.intellicast.com/ http://www.wunderground.com/ http://www.worldweather.org/

Worldwide Time Zones, Map, World Clock http://www.timeanddate.com/ http://www.worldtimezone.com/

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International Airport Codes http://www.world-airport-codes.com/

International Dialing Codes http://www.kropla.com/dialcode.htm http://www.countrycallingcodes.com/

International Phone Guide http://www.kropla.com/phones.htm

International Mobile Phone Guide http://www.kropla.com/mobilephones.htm

International Internet Café Search Engine http://cybercaptive.com/

Global Internet Roaming http://www.kropla.com/roaming.htm

World Electric Power Guide http://www.kropla.com/electric.htm http://www.kropla.com/electric2.htm

World Television Standards and Codes http://www.kropla.com/tv.htm International Currency Exchange Rates http://www.xe.com/ucc/

Banking and Financial Institutions Across the World http://www.123world.com/banks/index.html

International Credit Card or Automated Teller Machine (ATM) Locator http://visa.via.infonow.net/locator/global/ http://www.mastercard.com/us/personal/en/cardholderservices/atmlocations/index.html

International Chambers of Commerce http://www.123world.com/chambers/index.html

World Tourism Websites http://123world.com/tourism/

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Diplomatic and Consular Information

United States Diplomatic Posts Around the World http://www.usembassy.gov/

United Kingdom Diplomatic Posts Around the World http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/embassies-and-posts/find-an-embassy-overseas/

Australia's Diplomatic Posts Around the World http://www.dfat.gov.au/missions/ http://www.dfat.gov.au/embassies.html

Canada's Embassies and High Commissions http://www.international.gc.ca/ciw-cdm/embassies-ambassades.aspx

Resources for Finding Embassies and other Diplomatic Posts Across the World http://www.escapeartist.com/embassy1/embassy1.htm

Safety and Security

Travel Warnings by Country from Government of Australia http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/

Travel Warnings and Alerts from United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_1764.html http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/pa/pa_1766.html

Travel Reports and Warnings by Government of Canada http://www.voyage.gc.ca/countries_pays/menu-eng.asp http://www.voyage.gc.ca/countries_pays/updates_mise-a-jour-eng.asp

Travel Warnings from Government of United Kingdom http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/ http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/? action=noTravelAll#noTravelAll

Sources: United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the United States Department of State, the Government of Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

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Other Safety and Security Online Resources for Travelers

United States Department of State Information on Terrorism http://www.state.gov/s/ct/

Government of the United Kingdom Resource on the Risk of Terrorism http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front? pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1044011304926

Government of Canada Terrorism Guide http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/terrorism-terrorisme.aspx?lang=eng

Information on Terrorism by Government of Australia http://www.dfat.gov.au/icat/index.html

FAA Resource on Aviation Safety http://www.faasafety.gov/

In-Flight Safety Information for Air Travel (by British Airways crew trainer, Anna Warman) http://www.warman.demon.co.uk/anna/inflight.html

Hot Spots: Travel Safety and Risk Information http://www.airsecurity.com/hotspots/HotSpots.asp

Information on Human Rights http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/

Sources: The United States Department of State, the United States Customs Department, the Government of Canada, the Government of United Kingdom, the Government of Australia, the Federal Aviation Authority, Anna Warman's In-flight Website, Hot Spots Travel and Risk Information

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Diseases/Health Data

Please Note: Most of the entry below constitutes a generalized health advisory, which a traveler might find useful, regardless of a particular destination.

As a supplement, however, reader will also find below a list of countries flagged with current health notices and alerts issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Please note that travel to the following countries, based on these 3 levels of warnings, is ill-advised, or should be undertaken with the utmost precaution:

Level 3 (highest level of concern; avoid non-essential travel) --

Guinea - Ebola Liberia - Ebola Nepal - Eathquake zone Sierra Leone - Ebola

Level 2 (intermediate level of concern; use utmost caution during travel) --

Cameroon - Polio Somalia - Polio Vanuatu - Tropical Cyclone zone Throughout Middle East and Arabia Peninsula - MERS ((Middle East Respiratory Syndrome)

Level 1 (standard level of concern; use practical caution during travel) -

Australia - Ross River disease Bosnia-Herzegovina - Measles Brazil - Dengue Fever Brazil - Malaria Brazil - Zika China - H7N9 Avian flu Cuba - Cholera Egypt - H5N1 Bird flu Ethiopia - Measles Germany - Measles Japan - Hand, foot, and mouth disease (HFMD)

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Kyrgyzstan - Measles Malaysia -Dengue Fever Mexico - Chikungunya Mexico - Hepatitis A Nigeria - Meningitis Philippines - Measles Scotland - Mumps Singapore - Hand, foot, and mouth disease (HFMD) South Korea - MERS ((Middle East Respiratory Syndrome) Throughout Caribbean - Chikungunya Throughout Central America - Chikungunya Throughout South America - Chikungunya Throughout Pacific Islands - Chikungunya

For specific information related to these health notices and alerts please see the CDC's listing available at URL: http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/notices

Health Information for Travelers to Libya

Food and waterborne diseases are the number one cause of illness in travelers. Travelers' diarrhea can be caused by viruses, bacteria, or parasites, which are found throughout the region and can contaminate food or water. Infections may cause diarrhea and vomiting (E. coli, Salmonella, cholera, and parasites), fever (typhoid fever and toxoplasmosis), or liver damage (hepatitis). Make sure your food and drinking water are safe. (See below.)

Malaria is a preventable infection that can be fatal if left untreated. Prevent infection by taking prescription antimalarial drugs and protecting yourself against mosquito bites (see below). Most travelers to malaria risk areas in this region should take chloroquine to prevent malaria. A limited risk for malaria exists in certain parts of Algeria, Egypt (El Faiyum area only), Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Western Sahara, and Morocco. There is no risk for travelers visiting the major tourist areas in North Africa, including Nile cruises. For more detailed information about the risk in specific locations, see Malaria in North Africa (http://www.cdc.gov/travel/regionalmalaria/nafrica.htm).

A certificate of yellow fever vaccination may required for entry into certain of these countries if you are coming from a country in tropical South America or sub-Saharan Africa. (There is no risk for yellow fever in North Africa.) For detailed information, see Comprehensive Yellow Fever Vaccination Requirements

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(http://www.cdc.gov/travel/yelfever.htm).

Dengue, filariasis, leishmaniasis, and onchocerciasis are diseases carried by insects that also occur in this region. Protecting yourself against insect bites (see below) will help to prevent these diseases.

Schistosomiasis, a parasitic infection, is found in fresh water in the region, including the Nile River. Do not swim in fresh water (except in well-chlorinated swimming pools) in these countries. (For more information, please see the Swimming Precautions on the Making Travel Safe page at URL http://www.cdc.gov/travel/safety.htm.)

Because motor vehicle crashes are a leading cause of injury among travelers, walk and drive defensively. Avoid nighttime travel if possible and always use seat belts.

CDC Recommends the Following Vaccines (as Appropriate for Age):

See your doctor at least 4-6 weeks before your trip to allow time for shots to take effect.

• Hepatitis A or immune globulin (IG). • Hepatitis B if you might be exposed to blood (for example, health-care workers), have sexual contact with the local population, stay longer than 6 months in the region, or be exposed through medical treatment. • Rabies, if you might be exposed to wild or domestic animals through your work or recreation. • Typhoid, particularly if you are visiting developing countries in this region. • As needed, booster doses for tetanus-diphtheria, measles, and a one-time dose of polio vaccine for adults. Hepatitis B vaccine is now recommended for all infants and for children ages 11-12 years who did not complete the series as infants.

To Stay Healthy, Do:

• Wash hands often with soap and water. • Drink only bottled or boiled water, or carbonated (bubbly) drinks in cans or bottles. Avoid tap water, fountain drinks, and ice cubes. If this is not possible, make water safer by BOTH filtering through an "absolute 1-micron or less" filter AND adding iodine tablets to the filtered water. "Absolute 1-micron filters" are found in camping/outdoor supply stores. • Eat only thoroughly cooked food or fruits and vegetables you have peeled yourself. Remember: boil it, cook it, peel it, or forget it. • If you will be visiting an area where there is risk for malaria, take your malaria prevention medication before, during, and after travel, as directed. (See your doctor for a prescription.)

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• Protect yourself from insects by remaining in well-screened areas, using repellents (applied sparingly at 4-hour intervals) and permethrin-impregnated mosquito nets, and wearing long-sleeved shirts and long pants from dusk through dawn. • To prevent fungal and parasitic infections, keep feet clean and dry, and do not go barefoot. • Always use latex condoms to reduce the risk of HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases.

To Avoid Getting Sick:

• Don't eat food purchased from street vendors. • Don't drink beverages with ice. • Don't eat dairy products unless you know they have been pasteurized. • Don't share needles with anyone. • Don't handle animals (especially monkeys, dogs, and cats), to avoid bites and serious diseases (including rabies and plague). (For more information, please see the Animal- Associated Hazards on the Making Travel Safe page.) Don't swim in fresh water, including the Nile. Salt water is usually safer. (For more information, please see the Swimming Precautions on the Making Travel Safe page.)

\What You Need To Bring with You:

• Long-sleeved shirt and long pants to wear while outside whenever possible, to prevent illnesses carried by insects (e.g., malaria, dengue, filariasis, leishmaniasis, and onchocerciasis). • Insect repellent containing DEET (diethylmethyltoluamide), in 30%-35% strength for adults and 6%-10% for children. Unless you are staying in air-conditioned or well-screened housing, purchase a bed net impregnated with the insecticide permethrin. (Bed nets can be purchased in camping or military supply stores.) • Over-the-counter antidiarrheal medicine to take if you have diarrhea. • Iodine tablets and water filters to purify water if bottled water is not available. See Do's above for more detailed information about water filters. • Sunblock, sunglasses, hat. • Prescription medications: make sure you have enough to last during your trip, as well as a copy of the prescription(s).

After You Return Home:

If you have visited an area where there is risk for malaria, continue taking your malaria medication weekly for 4 weeks after you leave the area.

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If you become ill after your trip-even as long as a year after you return-tell your doctor where you have traveled.

For More Information:

Ask your doctor or check the CDC web sites for more information about how to protect yourself against diseases that occur in North Africa, such as:

For information about diseases-

Carried by Insects Dengue, Malaria, Plague

Carried in Food or Water Cholera, Escherichia coli, diarrhea, Hepatitis A, Schistosomiasis, Typhoid Fever

Person-to-Person Contact Hepatitis B, HIV/AIDS

For more information about these and other diseases, please check the Diseases (http://www.cdc.gov/travel/diseases.htm) section and the Health Topics A-Z (http://www.cdc.gov/health/diseases.htm).

Note:

Libya is located in the North Africa health region.

Sources:

The Center for Disease Control Destinations Website: http://www.cdc.gov/travel/indianrg.htm

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Chapter 6 Environmental Overview

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Environmental Issues

General Overview:

Very little environmental information about Libya is readily available.

Current Issues:

-deforestation in the tropical rain forest -soil erosion -loss of biodiversity

Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Mtc):

14.7

Country Rank (GHG output):

71st

Natural Hazards:

-dust-laden harmattan winds blow from the Sahara

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Environmental Policy

Regulation and Jurisdiction:

The regulation and protection of the environment in Libya is under the jurisdiction of the following:

Secretariat for Agrarian Reform and Land Reclamation

Major Non-Governmental Organizations:

N/A

International Environmental Accords:

Party to:

Biodiversity Climate Change Desertification Endangered Species Hazardous Wastes Marine Dumping Nuclear Test Ban Ozone Layer Protection

Signed but not ratified:

Law of the Sea

Kyoto Protocol Status (year ratified):

Libya is not a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol

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Greenhouse Gas Ranking

GHG Emissions Rankings

Country Country Rank

1 United States

2 China

4 Russia

5 Japan

6 India

7 Germany

8 United Kingdom

9 Canada

10 Korea, South

11 Italy

12 Mexico

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13 France

14 South Africa

15 Iran

16 Indonesia

17 Australia

18 Spain

19 Brazil

20 Saudi Arabia

21 Ukraine

22 Poland

23 Taiwan

24 Turkey

25 Thailand

26 Netherlands

27 Kazakhstan

28 Malaysia

29 Egypt

30 Venezuela

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31 Argentina

32 Uzbekistan

33 Czech Republic

34 Belgium

35 Pakistan

36 Romania

37 Greece

38 United Arab Emirates

39 Algeria

40 Nigeria

41 Austria

42 Iraq

43 Finland

44 Philippines

45 Vietnam

46 Korea, North

47 Israel

48 Portugal

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49 Colombia

50 Belarus

51 Kuwait

52 Hungary

53 Chile

54 Denmark

55 Serbia & Montenegro

56 Sweden

57 Syria

58 Libya

59 Bulgaria

60 Singapore

61 Switzerland

62 Ireland

63 Turkmenistan

64 Slovakia

65 Bangladesh

66 Morocco

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67 New Zealand

68 Oman

69 Qatar

70 Azerbaijan

71 Norway

72 Peru

73 Cuba

74 Ecuador

75 Trinidad & Tobago

76 Croatia

77 Tunisia

78 Dominican Republic

79 Lebanon

80 Estonia

81 Yemen

82 Jordan

83 Slovenia

84 Bahrain

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85 Angola

86 Bosnia & Herzegovina

87 Lithuania

88 Sri Lanka

89 Zimbabwe

90 Bolivia

91 Jamaica

92 Guatemala

93 Luxembourg

94 Myanmar

95 Sudan

96 Kenya

97 Macedonia

98 Mongolia

99 Ghana

100 Cyprus

101 Moldova

102 Latvia

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103 El Salvador

104 Brunei

105 Honduras

106 Cameroon

107 Panama

108 Costa Rica

109 Cote d'Ivoire

110 Kyrgyzstan

111 Tajikistan

112 Ethiopia

113 Senegal

114 Uruguay

115 Gabon

116 Albania

117 Nicaragua

118 Botswana

119 Paraguay

120 Tanzania

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121 Georgia

122 Armenia

123 Congo, RC

124 Mauritius

125 Nepal

126 Mauritius

127 Nepal

128 Mauritania

129 Malta

130 Papua New Guinea

131 Zambia

132 Suriname

133 Iceland

134 Togo

135 Benin

136 Uganda

137 Bahamas

138 Haiti

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139 Congo, DRC

140 Guyana

141 Mozambique

142 Guinea

143 Equatorial Guinea

144 Laos

145 Barbados

146 Niger

147 Fiji

148 Burkina Faso

149 Malawi

150 Swaziland

151 Belize

152 Afghanistan

153 Sierra Leone

154 Eritrea

155 Rwanda

156 Mali

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157 Seychelles

158 Cambodia

159 Liberia

160 Bhutan

161 Maldives

162 Antigua & Barbuda

163 Djibouti

164 Saint Lucia

165 Gambia

166 Guinea-Bissau

167 Central African Republic

168 Palau

169 Burundi

170 Grenada

171 Lesotho

172 Saint Vincent & the Grenadines

173 Solomon Islands

174 Samoa

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175 Cape Verde

176 Nauru

177 Dominica

178 Saint Kitts & Nevis

179 Chad

180 Tonga

181 Sao Tome & Principe

182 Comoros

183 Vanuatu

185 Kiribati

Not Ranked Andorra

Not Ranked East Timor

Not Ranked Holy See

Not Ranked Hong Kong

Not Ranked Liechtenstein

Not Ranked Marshall Islands

Not Ranked Micronesia

Not Ranked Monaco

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Not Ranked San Marino

Not Ranked Somalia

Not Ranked Tuvalu

* European Union is ranked 3rd Cook Islands are ranked 184th Niue is ranked 186th

Global Environmental Snapshot

Introduction

The countries of the world face many environmental challenges in common. Nevertheless, the nature and intensity of problem vary from region to region, as do various countries' respective capacities, in terms of affluence and infrastructure, to remediate threats to environmental quality.

Consciousness of perils affecting the global environment came to the fore in the last third or so of the 20th century has continued to intensify well into the new millennium. According to the United Nations Environment Programme, considerable environmental progress has been made at the level of institutional developments, international cooperation accords, and public participation. Approximately two-dozen international environmental protection accords with global implications have been promulgated since the late 1970s under auspices of the United Nations and other international organizations, together with many additional regional agreements. Attempts to address and rectify environmental problems take the form of legal frameworks, economic instruments, environmentally sound technologies and cleaner production processes as well as conservation efforts. Environmental impact assessments have increasingly been applied across the globe.

Environmental degradation affects the quality, or aesthetics, of human life, but it also displays potential to undermine conditions necessary for the sustainability of human life. Attitudes toward the importance of environmental protection measures reflect ambivalence derived from this bifurcation. On one hand, steps such as cleaning up pollution, dedicating parkland, and suchlike, are seen as embellishments undertaken by wealthy societies already assured they can successfully perform those functions deemed, ostensibly, more essential-for instance, public health and

Libya Review 2016 Page 375 of 437 pages Libya education, employment and economic development. On the other hand, in poorer countries, activities causing environmental damage-for instance the land degradation effects of unregulated logging, slash-and-burn agriculture, overgrazing, and mining-can seem justified insofar as such activities provide incomes and livelihoods.

Rapid rates of resource depletion are associated with poverty and high population growth, themselves correlated, whereas consumption per capita is much higher in the most developed countries, despite these nations' recent progress in energy efficiency and conservation. It is impossible to sequester the global environmental challenge from related economic, social and political challenges.

First-tier industrialized countries have recently achieved measurable decreases in environmental pollution and the rate of resource depletion, a success not matched in middle income and developing countries. It is believed that the discrepancy is due to the fact that industrialized countries have more developed infrastructures to accommodate changes in environmental policy, to apply environmental technologies, and to invest in public education. The advanced industrialized countries incur relatively lower costs in alleviating environmental problems, in comparison to developing countries, since in the former even extensive environmental programs represent a rather minuscule percentage of total expenditures. Conversely, budget constraints, lagged provision of basic services to the population, and other factors such as debt service and militarization may preclude institution of minimal environmental protection measures in the poorest countries.

A synopsis for the current situation facing each region of the world follows:

Regional Synopsis: Africa

The African continent, the world's second-largest landmass, encompasses many of the world's least developed countries. By global standards, urbanization is comparatively low but rising at a rapid rate. More heavily industrialized areas at the northern and southern ends of the continent experience the major share of industrial pollution. In other regions the most serious environmental problems typically stem from inefficient subsistence farming methods and other forms of land degradation, which have affected an increasingly extensive area under pressure of a widely impoverished, fast-growing population. Africa's distribution of natural resources is very uneven. It is the continent at greatest risk of desertification, especially in the Sahel region at the edge of the Sahara but also in other dry-range areas. Yet at the same time, Africa also harbors some of the earth's richest and most diverse biological zones.

Key Points:

Up to half a billion hectares of African land are moderately to severely degraded, an occurrence

Libya Review 2016 Page 376 of 437 pages Libya reflecting short-fallow shifting cultivation and overgrazing as well as a climatic pattern of recurrent droughts.

Soil degradation is severe along the expanse directly south of the Sahara, from the west to the east coasts. Parts of southern Africa, central-eastern Africa, and the neighboring island of Madagascar suffer from serious soil degradation as well.

Africa contains about 17 percent of the world's forest cover, concentrated in the tropical belt of the continent. Many of the forests, however, are severely depleted, with an estimated 70 percent showing some degree of degradation.

Population growth has resulted in continuing loss of arable land, as inefficient subsistence farming techniques affect increasingly extensive areas. Efforts to implement settled, sustainable agriculture have met with some recent success, but much further progress in this direction is needed. Especially in previously uninhabited forestlands, concern over deforestation is intensifying.

By contrast, the African savanna remains the richest grassland in the world, supporting a substantial concentration of animal and plant life. Wildlife parks are sub-Saharan Africa's greatest tourist attraction, and with proper management-giving local people a stake in conservation and controlling the pace of development-could greatly enhance African economies.

Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of northern, southern and eastern Africa are currently threatened, while the biological diversity in Mauritania and Madagascar is even further compromised with over 20 percent of the mammal species in these two countries currently under threat.

With marine catch trends increasing from 500,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 3,000,000 metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life, should this trend continue unabated.

Water resource vulnerability is a major concern in northeastern Africa, and a moderate concern across the rest of the continent. An exception is central Africa, which has plentiful water supplies.

Many Africans lack adequate access to resources, not just (if at all) because the resources are unevenly distributed geographically, but also through institutional failures such as faulty land tenure systems or political upheaval. The quality of Africa's natural resources, despite their spotty distribution, is in fact extraordinarily rich. The infrastructure needed to protect and benefit from this natural legacy, however, is largely lacking.

Regional Synopsis: Asia and the Pacific

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Asia-earth's largest landmass-and the many large and nearly innumerable small islands lying off its Pacific shore display extraordinarily contrasting landscapes, levels of development, and degrees of environmental stress. In the classification used here, the world's smallest continent, Australia, is also included in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Asia-Pacific region is home to 9 of the world's 14 largest urban areas, and as energy use for utilities, industry and transport increases in developing economies, urban centers are subject to worsening air quality. Intense population density in places such as Bangladesh or Hong Kong is the quintessential image many people have of Asia, yet vast desert areas such as the Gobi and the world's highest mountain range, the Himalayas, span the continent as well. Forested areas in Southeast Asia and the islands of Indonesia and the Philippines were historically prized for their tropical hardwood, but in many places this resource is now severely depleted. Low-lying small island states are extremely vulnerable to the effects of global warming, both rising sea levels and an anticipated increase in cyclones.

Key Points:

Asian timber reserves are forecast to be depleted in the next 40 years. Loss of natural forest is irreversible in some areas, but plantation programs to restore tree cover may ameliorate a portion of the resulting land degradation.

Increased usage of fossil fuels in China and other parts of southern Asia is projected to result in a marked increase in emissions, especially in regard to carbon dioxide. The increased usage of energy has led to a marked upsurge in air pollution across the region.

Acidification is an emerging problem regionally, with sulfur dioxide emissions expected to triple by 2010 if the current growth rate is sustained. China, Thailand, India, and Korea seem to be suffering from particularly high rates of acid deposition. By contrast, Asia's most highly developed economy, Japan, has effected substantial improvements in its environmental indicators.

Water pollution in the Pacific is an urgent concern since up to 70 percent of the water discharged into the region's waters receives no treatment. Additionally, the disposal of solid wastes, in like manner, poses a major threat in a region with many areas of high population density.

The Asia-Pacific region is the largest expanse of the world's land that is adversely affected by soil degradation.

The region around Australia reportedly suffers the largest degree of ozone depletion.

The microstates of the Pacific suffer land loss due to global warming, and the consequent rise in

Libya Review 2016 Page 378 of 437 pages Libya the levels of ocean waters. A high-emissions scenario and anthropogenic climate impact at the upper end of the currently predicted range would probably force complete evacuation of the lowest-elevation islands sometime in this century.

The species-rich reefs surrounding Southeast Asia are highly vulnerable to the deleterious effects of coastal development, land-based pollution, over-fishing and exploitative fishing methods, as well as marine pollution from oil spills and other activities.

With marine catch trends increasing from 5,000,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 20,000,000 metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life, should this trend continue unabated.

Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of China and south-east Asia are currently threatened, while the biological diversity in India, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia and parts of Malaysia is even further compromised with over 20 percent of the mammal species in these countries currently under threat.

Water resource vulnerability is a serious concern in areas surrounding the Indian subcontinent.

Regional Synopsis: Central Asia

The Central Asian republics, formerly in the Soviet Union, experience a range of environmental problems as the result of poorly executed agricultural, industrial, and nuclear programs during the Soviet era. Relatively low population densities are the norm, especially since upon the breakup of the U.S.S.R. many ethnic Russians migrated back to European Russia. In this largely semi-arid region, drought, water shortages, and soil salinization pose major challenges.

Key Points:

The use of agricultural pesticides, such as DDT and other chemicals, has contributed to the contamination of soil and groundwater throughout the region.

Land and soil degradation, and in particular, increased salinization, is mostly attributable to faulty irrigation practices.

Significant desertification is also a problem in the region.

Air pollution is prevalent, mostly due to use of low octane automobile fuel.

Industrial pollution of the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea, as a result of industrial effluents as well as

Libya Review 2016 Page 379 of 437 pages Libya mining and metal production, presents a challenge to the countries bordering these bodies of water.

One of the most severe environmental problems in the region is attributable to the several billion tons of hazardous materials stored in landfills across Central Asia.

Uzbekistan's particular problem involves the contraction of the Aral Sea, which has decreased in size by a third, as a consequence of river diversions and poor irrigation practices. The effect has been the near-total biological destruction of that body of water.

Kazakhstan, as a consequence of being the heartland of the former Soviet Union's nuclear program, has incurred a high of cancerous malignancies, biogenetic abnormalities and radioactive contamination.

While part of the Soviet Union, the republics in the region experienced very high levels of greenhouse gas emissions, as a consequence of rapid industrialization using cheap but dirty energy sources, especially coal.

By contrast, however, there have recently been substantial reductions in the level of greenhouse gas emissions, especially those attributable to coal burning, with further decreases anticipated over the next decade. These changes are partially due to the use of cleaner energy technologies, such as natural gas, augmented by governmental commitment to improving environmental standards.

Regional Synopsis: Europe

Western Europe underwent dramatic transformation of its landscape, virtually eliminating large- scale natural areas, during an era of rapid industrialization, which intensified upon its recovery from World War II. In Eastern Europe and European Russia, intensive land development has been less prevalent, so that some native forests and other natural areas remain. Air and water pollution from use of dirty fuels and industrial effluents, however, are more serious environmental problems in Eastern than in Western Europe, though recent trends show improvement in many indicators. Acid rain has inflicted heavy environmental damage across much of Europe, particularly on forests. Europe and North America are the only regions in which water usage for industry exceeds that for agriculture, although in Mediterranean nations agriculture is the largest water consumer.

Key Points:

Europe contributes 36 percent of the world's chlorofluorocarbon emissions, 30 percent of carbon dioxide emissions, and 25 percent of sulfur dioxide emissions.

Sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions are the cause of 30 to 50 percent of Central and Eastern

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Europe's deforestation.

Acid rain has been an environmental concern for decades and continues to be a challenge in parts of Western Europe.

Overexploitation of up to 60 percent of Europe's groundwater presents a problem in industrial and urban areas.

Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of western Europe, Eastern Europe and Russia are currently threatened, while the biological diversity on the Iberian Peninsula is even further compromised with over 40 percent of the mammal species in this region currently under threat. As a result, there has been a 10 percent increase in protected areas of Europe.

A major environmental issue for Europe involves the depletion of various already endangered or threatened species, and most significantly, the decline of fish stocks. Some estimates suggest that up to 50 percent of the continent's fish species may be considered endangered species. Coastal fisheries have been over-harvested, resulting in catch limits or moratoriums on many commercially important fish species.

Fortunately, in the last few years, these policies have started to yield measurable results with decreasing trends in marine fish catch.

Recently, most European countries have adopted cleaner production technologies, and alternative methods of waste disposal, including recycling.

The countries of Eastern Europe have made air quality a major environmental priority. This is exemplified by the Russian Federation's addition to the 1995 "Berlin Mandate" (transnational legislation based on resolutions of the Rio Earth Summit) compelling nations to promote "carbon sinks" to absorb greenhouse gases.

On a relative basis, when compared with the degree of industrial emissions emitted by many Eastern European countries until the late 1980s, there has been some marked increase in air quality in the region, as obsolete plants are closed and a transition to cleaner fuels and more efficient energy use takes place.

Regional Synopsis: The Middle and Near East

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Quite possibly, the Middle East will exemplify the adage that, as the 20th century was a century fixated on oil, the 21st century will be devoted to critical decisions about water. Many (though far from all) nations in the Middle East rank among those countries with the largest oil and gas reserves, but water resources are relatively scarce throughout this predominantly dry region. Effects of global warming may cause moderately high elevation areas that now typically receive winter "snowpack" to experience mainly rain instead, which would further constrain dry-season water availability. The antiquities and religious shrines of the region render it a great magnet for tourism, which entails considerable economic growth potential but also intensifies stresses on the environment.

Key Points:

Water resource vulnerability is a serious concern across the entire region. The increased usage of, and further demand for water, has exacerbated long-standing water scarcity in the region. For instance, river diversions and industrial salt works have caused the Dead Sea to shrink by one-third from its original surface area, with further declines expected.

The oil industry in the region contributes to water pollution in the Persian Gulf, as a result of oil spills, which have averaged 1.2 million barrels of oil spilt per year (some sources suggest that this figure is understated). The consequences are severe because even after oil spills have been cleaned up, environmental damage to the food webs and ecosystems of marine life will persist for a prolonged period.

The region's coastal zone is considered one of the most fragile and endangered ecosystems of the world. Land reclamation, shoreline construction, discharge of industrial effluents, and tourism (such as diving in the Red Sea) contribute to widespread coastal damage.

Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of the Middle East are currently threatened.

Since the 1980s, 11 percent of the region's natural forest has been depleted.

Regional Synopsis: Latin America and the Caribbean

The Latin American and Caribbean region is characterized by exceedingly diverse landforms that have generally seen high rates of population growth and economic development in recent decades. The percentage of inhabitants residing in urban areas is quite high at 73.4 percent; the region includes the megacities of Mexico City, Sao Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. The region also includes the world's second-highest mountain range, the Andes; significant expanses of desert and grassland; the

Libya Review 2016 Page 382 of 437 pages Libya coral reefs of the Caribbean Sea; and the world's largest contiguous tropical forest in the Amazon basin. Threats to the latter from subsistence and commercial farming, mineral exploitation and timbering are well publicized. Nevertheless, of eight countries worldwide that still retain at least 70 percent of their original forest cover, six are in Latin America. The region accounts for nearly half (48.3 percent) of the world's greenhouse gas emissions derived from land clearing, but as yet a comparatively minuscule share (4.3 percent) of such gases from industrial sources.

Key Points:

Although Latin America is one of the most biologically diverse regions of the world, this biodiversity is highly threatened, as exemplified by the projected extinction of up to 100,000 species in the next few decades. Much of this loss will be concentrated in the Amazon area, although the western coastline of South America will also suffer significant depletion of biological diversity. The inventory of rainforest species with potentially useful commercial or medical applications is incomplete, but presumed to include significant numbers of such species that may become extinct before they are discovered and identified.

Up to 50 percent of the region's grazing land has lost its soil fertility as a result of soil erosion, salinization, alkalinization and overgrazing.

The Caribbean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean have all been contaminated by agricultural wastes, which are discharged into streams that flow into these major waters. Water pollution derived from phosphorous, nitrates and pesticides adversely affects fish stocks, contributes to oxygen depletion and fosters overgrowth of aquatic vegetation. Marine life will continue to be severely compromised as a result of these conditions.

Due to industrial development in the region, many beaches of eastern Latin America and the Caribbean suffer from tar deposits.

Most cities in the region lack adequate sewage treatment facilities, and rapid migration of the rural poor into the cities is widening the gap between current infrastructure capacity and the much greater level needed to provide satisfactory basic services.

The rainforest region of the Amazon Basin suffers from dangerously high levels of deforestation, which may be a significant contributory factor to global warming or "the greenhouse effect." In the late 1990s and into the new millennium, the rate of deforestation was around 20 million acres of rainforest being destroyed annually.

Deforestation on the steep rainforest slopes of Caribbean islands contributes to soil erosion and landslides, both of which then result in heavy sedimentation of nearby river systems. When these sedimented rivers drain into the sea and coral reefs, they poison the coral tissues, which are vital to

Libya Review 2016 Page 383 of 437 pages Libya the maintenance of the reef ecosystem. The result is marine degradation and nutrient depletion. Jamaica's coral reefs have never quite recovered from the effects of marine degradation.

The Southern Cone of Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) suffers the effects of greatly increased ultraviolet-B radiation, as a consequence of more intense ozone depletion in the southern hemisphere.

Water resource vulnerability is an increasingly major concern in the northwestern portion of South America.

Regional Synopsis: North America

North American nations, in particular the United States and Canada, rank among the world's most highly developed industrial economies-a fact which has generated significant pollution problems, but also financial resources and skills that have enabled many problems to be corrected. Although efforts to promote energy efficiency, recycling, and suchlike have helped ease strains on the environment in a part of the world where per capita consumption levels are high, sprawling land development patterns and recent preferences many households have demonstrated for larger vehicles have offset these advances.

Meanwhile, a large portion of North America's original forest cover has been lost, though in many cases replaced by productive second-growth woodland. In recent years, attitudes toward best use of the region's remaining natural or scenic areas seem to be shifting toward recreation and preservation and away from resource extraction. With increasing attention on the energy scarcity in the United States, however, there is speculation that this shift may be short-lived. Indeed, the energy shortage on the west coast of the United States and associated calls for energy exploration, indicate a possible retrenchment toward resource extraction. At the same time, however, it has also served to highlight the need for energy conservation as well as alternative energy sources.

Despite generally successful anti-pollution efforts, various parts of the region continue to suffer significant air, water and land degradation from industrial, vehicular, and agricultural emissions and runoff. Mexico, as a middle-income country, displays environmental problems characteristic of a developing economy, including forest depletion, pollution from inefficient industrial processes and dirty fuels, and lack of sufficient waste-treatment infrastructure.

Key Points:

Because of significantly greater motor vehicle usage in the United States (U.S.) than in the rest of the world, the U.S. contribution of urban air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, especially carbon dioxide, is disproportionately high in relation to its population.

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Acid rain is an enduring issue of contention in the northeastern part of the United States, on the border with Canada.

Mexico's urban areas suffer extreme air pollution from carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and other toxic air pollutants. Emissions controls on vehicles are in their infancy, compared to analogous regulations in the U.S.

The cities of Mexico, including those on the U.S. border, also discharge large quantities of untreated or poorly treated sewage, though officials are currently planning infrastructure upgrades.

Deforestation is noteworthy in various regions of the U.S., especially along the northwest coastline. Old growth forests have been largely removed, but in the northeastern and upper midwestern sections of the United States, evidence suggests that the current extent of tree cover probably surpasses the figure for the beginning of the 20th century.

Extreme weather conditions in the last few years have resulted in a high level of soil erosion along the north coast of California; in addition, the coastline itself has shifted substantially due to soil erosion and concomitant landslides.

Agricultural pollution-including nitrate contamination of well water, nutrient runoff to waterways, and pesticide exposure-is significant in various areas. Noteworthy among affected places are California's Central Valley, extensive stretches of the Midwest, and land in the Chesapeake Bay watershed.

Inland waterways, especially around the Great Lakes, have substantially improved their water quality, due to concentrated efforts at reducing water pollution by governmental, commercial and community representatives. Strict curbs on industrial effluents and near-universal implementation of sewage treatment are the chief factors responsible for this improvement.

A major environmental issue for Canada and the United States involves the depletion of various already endangered or threatened species, and most significantly, the decline of fish stocks. Coastal fisheries have been over-harvested, resulting in catch limits or moratoriums on many commercially important fish species. In the last few years, these policies have started to yield measurable results with decreasing trends in marine fish catch.

Due to the decay of neighboring ecosystems in Central America and the Caribbean, the sea surrounding Florida has become increasingly sedimented, contributing to marine degradation, nutrient depletion of the ecosystem, depletion of fish stocks, and diseases to coral species in particular.

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Polar Regions

Key Points:

The significant rise in sea level, amounting 10 to 25 centimeters in the last 100 years, is due to the melting of the Arctic ice sheets, and is attributed to global warming.

The Antarctic suffers from a significant ozone hole, first detected in 1976. By 1985, a British scientific team reported a 40 percent decrease in usual regeneration rates of the ozone. Because a sustained increase in the amount of ultraviolet-B radiation would have adverse consequences upon all planetary life, recent environmental measures have been put into effect, aimed at reversing ozone depletion. These measures are projected to garner significant results by 2050.

Due to air and ocean currents, the Arctic is a sink for toxic releases originally discharged thousands of miles away. Arctic wildlife and Canada's Inuit population have higher bodily levels of contaminants such as PCB and dioxin than those found in people and animals in much of the rest of the world.

Global Environmental Concepts

1. Global Warming and Greenhouse Gases

The Greenhouse Effect:

In the early 19th century, the French physicist, Jean Fourier, contended that the earth's atmosphere functions in much the same way as the glass of a greenhouse, thus describing what is now understood as the "greenhouse effect." Put simply, the "greenhouse effect" confines some of the sun's energy to the earth, preserving some of the planet's warmth, rather than allowing it to flow back into space. In so doing, all kinds of life forms can flourish on earth. Thus, the "greenhouse effect" is necessary to sustain and preserve life forms and ecosystems on earth.

In the late 19th century, a Swedish chemist, Svante Arrhenius, noticed that human activities, such as the burning of coal and other fossil fuels for heat, and the removal of forested lands for urban development, led to higher concentrations of greenhouse gases, like carbon dioxide and methane, in

Libya Review 2016 Page 386 of 437 pages Libya the atmosphere. This increase in the levels of greenhouse gases was believed to advance the "greenhouse effect" exponentially, and might be related to the trend in global warming.

In the wake of the Industrial Revolution, after industrial development took place on a large scale and the total human population burgeoned simultaneously with industrialization, the resulting increase in greenhouse gas emissions could, many scientists believe, be significant enough to have some bearing on climate. Indeed, many studies in recent years support the idea that there is a linkage between human activities and global warming, although there is less consensus on the extent to which this linkage may be relevant to environmental concerns.

That said, some scientists have argued that temperature fluctuations have existed throughout the evolution of the planet. Indeed, Dr. S. Fred Singer, the president of the Science and Environment Policy Project has noted that 3,000-year-old geological records of ocean sediment reveal changes in the surface temperature of the ocean. Hence, it is possible that climate variability is merely a normal fact of the planet's evolution. Yet even skeptics as to anthropogenic factors concur that any substantial changes in global temperatures would likely have an effect upon the earth's ecosystems, as well as the life forms that inhabit them.

The Relationship Between Global Warming and Greenhouse Gases:

A large number of climatologists believe that the increase in atmospheric concentrations of "greenhouse gas emissions," mostly a consequence of human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels, are contributing to global warming. The cause notwithstanding, the planet has reportedly warmed 0.3°C to 0.6°C over the last century. Indeed, each year during the 1990s was one of the very warmest in the 20th century, with the mean surface temperature for 1999 being the fifth warmest on record since 1880.

In early 2000, a panel of atmospheric scientists for the National Research Council concluded in a report that global warming was, indeed, a reality. While the panel, headed by Chairman John Wallace, a professor of atmospheric sciences at the University of Washington, stated that it remained unclear whether human activities have contributed to the earth's increasing temperatures, it was apparent that global warming exists.

In 2001, following a request for further study by the incoming Bush administration in the United States, the National Academy of Sciences again confirmed that global warming had been in existence for the last 20 years. The study also projected an increase in temperature between 2.5 degrees and 10.4 degrees Fahrenheit by the year 2100. Furthermore, the study found the leading cause of global warming to be emissions of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels, and it noted that greenhouse gas accumulations in the earth's atmosphere was a result of human activities.

Within the scientific community, the controversy regarding has centered on the difference between

Libya Review 2016 Page 387 of 437 pages Libya surface air and upper air temperatures. Information collected since 1979 suggests that while the earth's surface temperature has increased by about a degree in the past century, the atmospheric temperature five miles above the earth's surface has indicated very little increase. Nevertheless, the panel stated that this discrepancy in temperature between surface and upper air does not invalidate the conclusion that global warming is taking place. Further, the panel noted that natural events, such as volcanic eruptions, can decrease the temperature in the upper atmosphere.

The major consequences of global warming potentially include the melting of the polar ice caps, which, in turn, contribute to the rise in sea levels. Many islands across the globe have already experienced a measurable loss of land as a result. Because global warming may increase the rate of evaporation, increased precipitation, in the form of stronger and more frequent storm systems, is another potential outcome. Other consequences of global warming may include the introduction and proliferation of new infectious diseases, loss of arable land (referred to as "desertification"), destructive changes to existing ecosystems, loss of biodiversity and the isolation of species, and concomitant adverse changes in the quality of human life.

International Policy Development in Regard to Global Warming:

Regardless of what the precise nature of the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming may be, it seems that there is some degree of a connection between the phenomena. Any substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and global warming trends will likely involve systematic changes in industrial operations, the use of advanced energy sources and technologies, as well as global cooperation in implementing and regulating these transformations.

In this regard, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) stipulated the following objectives:

1. To stabilize "greenhouse gas" concentrations within the atmosphere, in such a manner that would preclude hazardous anthropogenic intervention into the existing biosphere and ecosystems of the world. This stabilization process would facilitate the natural adaptation of ecosystems to changes in climate.

2. To ensure and enable sustainable development and food production on a global scale.

*** See section on "International Environmental Agreements and Associations" for information related to international policies related to limiting greenhouse gases and controlling climate change emanating from historic summits at Kyoto, Copenhagen, Doha, and Paris. ***

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2. Air Pollution

Long before global warming reared its head as a significant issue, those concerned about the environment and public health noted the deleterious effects of human-initiated combustion upon the atmosphere. Killer smogs from coal burning triggered acute health emergencies in London and other places. At a lower level of intensity motor vehicle, power plant, and industrial emissions impaired long-range visibility and probably had some chronic adverse consequences on the respiratory systems of persons breathing such air.

In time, scientists began associating the sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides released from coal burning with significant acid deposition in the atmosphere, eventually falling as "acid rain." This phenomenon has severely degraded forestlands, especially in Europe and a few parts of the United States. It has also impaired some aquatic ecosystems and eaten away the surface of some human artifacts, such as marble monuments. Scrubber technology and conversion to cleaner fuels have enabled the level of industrial production to remain at least constant while significantly reducing acid deposition. Technologies aimed at cleaning the air and curtailing acid rain, soot, and smog may, nonetheless, boomerang as the perils of global warming become increasingly serious. In brief, these particulates act as sort of a sun shade -- comparable to the effect of volcanic eruptions on the upper atmosphere whereby periods of active volcanism correlate with temporarily cooler weather conditions. Thus, while the carbon dioxide releases that are an inevitable byproduct of combustion continue, by scrubbing the atmosphere of pollutants, an industrial society opens itself to greater insolation (penetration of the sun's rays and consequent heating), and consequently, it is likely to experience a correspondingly greater rise in ambient temperatures.

The health benefits of removing the sources of acid rain and smog are indisputable, and no one would recommend a return to previous conditions. Nevertheless, the problematic climatic effects of continually increasing emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases pose a major global environmental challenge, not as yet addressed adequately.

3. Ozone Depletion

The stratospheric ozone layer functions to prevent ultraviolet radiation from reaching the earth. Normally, stratospheric ozone is systematically disintegrated and regenerated through natural photochemical processes. The stratospheric ozone layer, however, has been depleted unnaturally as a result of anthropogenic (man-made) chemicals, most especially chlorine and bromide compounds such as chloroflorocarbons (CFCs), halons, and various industrial chemicals in the form of solvents, refrigerants, foaming agents, aerosol propellants, fire retardants, and fumigants. Ozone depletion is of concern because it permits a greater degree of ultraviolet-B radiation to reach the earth, which then increases the incidences of cancerous malignancies, cataracts, and human immune deficiencies. In addition, even in small doses, ozone depletion affects the ecosystem by

Libya Review 2016 Page 389 of 437 pages Libya disturbing food chains, agriculture, fisheries and other forms of biological diversity.

Transnational policies enacted to respond to the dangers of ozone depletion include the 1985 Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The Montreal Protocol was subsequently amended in London in 1990, Copenhagen in 1992 and Vienna in 1995. By 1996, 155 countries had ratified the Montreal Protocol, which sets out a time schedule for the reduction (and eventual elimination) of ozone depleting substances (OPS), and bans exports and imports of ODS from and to non- participant countries.

In general, the Protocol stipulates that developed countries must eliminate halon consumption by 1994 and CFC consumption by 1996, while developing countries must eliminate these substances by 2010. Consumption of methyl bromide, which is used as a fumigant, was to be frozen at the 1995 in developed countries, and fully eliminated in 2010, while developing countries are to freeze consumption by 2002, based on average 1995-1998 consumption levels. Methyl chloroform is to be phased out by 2005. Under the Montreal Protocol, most ODS will be completely eliminated from use by 2010.

4. Land Degradation

In recent decades, land degradation in more arid regions of the world has become a serious concern. The problem, manifest as both "desertification" and "devegetation," is caused primarily by climate variability and human activities, such as "deforestation," excessive cultivation, overgrazing, and other forms of land resource exploitation. It is also exacerbated by inadequate irrigation practices. Although the effects of droughts on drylands have been temporary in the past, today, the productivity and sustainability of these lands have been severely compromised for the long term. Indeed, in every region of the world, land degradation has become an acute issue.

Desertification and Devegetation:

"Desertification" is a process of land degradation causing the soil to deteriorate, thus losing its nutrients and fertility, and eventually resulting in the loss of vegetation, known as "devegetation." As aforementioned, "desertification" and "devegetation" are caused by human activities, yet human beings are also the greatest casualties. Because these forms of land degradation affect the ability of the soil to produce crops, they concomitantly contribute to poverty. As population increases and demographic concentrations shift, the extent of land subject to stresses by those seeking to wrest subsistence from it has inexorably risen.

In response, the United Nations has formed the Convention to Combat Desertification-aimed at

Libya Review 2016 Page 390 of 437 pages Libya implementing programs to address the underlying causes of desertification, as well as measures to prevent and minimize its effects. Of particular significance is the formulation of policies on transboundary resources, such as areas around lakes and rivers. At a broader level, the Convention has established a Conference of Parties (COP), which includes all ratifying governments, for directing and advancing international action.

To ensure more efficacious use of funding, the Convention intends to reconfigure international aid to utilize a consultative and coordinated approach in the disbursement and expenditure of donor funds. In this way, local communities that are affected by desertification will be active participants in the solution-generation process. In-depth community education projects are envisioned as part of this new international aid program, and private donor financing is encouraged. Meanwhile, as new technologies are developed to deal with the problem of desertification, they need to be distributed for application across the world. Hence, the Convention calls for international cooperation in scientific research in this regard.

Desertification is a problem of sustainable development. It is directly connected to human challenges such as poverty, social and economic well-being and environmental protection as well. Broader environmental issues, such as climate change, biological diversity, and freshwater supplies, are indirectly related, so any effort to resolve this environmental challenge must entail coordinated research efforts and joint action.

Deforestation:

Deforestation is not a recent phenomenon. For centuries, human beings have cut down trees to clear space for land cultivation, or in order to use the wood for fuel. Over the last 200 years, and most especially after World War II, deforestation increased because the logging industry became a globally profitable endeavor, and so the clearing of forested areas was accelerated for the purposes of industrial development. In the long term, this intensified level of deforestation is considered problematic because the forest is unable to regenerate itself quickly. The deforestation that has occurred in tropical rainforests is seen as an especially serious concern, due to the perceived adverse effects of this process upon the entire global ecosystem.

The most immediate consequence of deforestation is soil degradation. Soil, which is necessary for the growth of vegetation, can be a fragile and vital property. Organically, an extensive evolution process must take place before soil can produce vegetation, yet at the same time, the effects of natural elements, such as wind and rain, can easily and quickly degrade this resource. This phenomenon is known as soil erosion. In addition, natural elements like wind and rain reduce the amount of fertile soil on the ground, making soil scarcity a genuine problem. When fertile topsoil that already exists is removed from the landscape in the process of deforestation, soil scarcity is further exacerbated. Equally significant is the fact that once land has been cleared so that the

Libya Review 2016 Page 391 of 437 pages Libya topsoil can be cultivated for crop production, not only are the nutrient reserves in the soil depleted, thus producing crops of inferior quality, but the soil structure itself becomes stressed and deteriorates further.

Another direct result of deforestation is flooding. When forests are cleared, removing the cover of vegetation, and rainfall occurs, the flow of water increases across the surface of land. When extensive water runoff takes place, the frequency and intensity of flooding increases. Other adverse effects of deforestation include the loss of wildlife and biodiversity within the ecosystem that supports such life forms.

At a broader level, tropical rainforests play a vital role in maintaining the global environmental system. Specifically, destruction of tropical rainforests affects the carbon dioxide cycle. When forests are destroyed by burning (or rotting), carbon dioxide is released into the air, thus contributing to an intensified "greenhouse effect." The increase in greenhouse gas emissions like carbon dioxide is a major contributor to global warming, according to many environmental scientists. Indeed, trees themselves absorb carbon dioxide in the process of photosynthesis, so their loss also reduces the absorption of greenhouse gases.

Tropical rainforest destruction also adversely affects the nitrogen cycle. Nitrogen is a key nutrient for both plants and animals. Plants derive nitrogen from soil, while animals obtain it via nitrogen- enriched vegetation. This element is essential for the formation of amino acids, and thereby for proteins and biochemicals that all living things need for metabolism and growth. In the nitrogen cycle, vegetation acquires these essential proteins and biochemicals, and then cyclically returns them to the atmosphere and global ecosystem. Accordingly, when tropical rainforest ecosystems are compromised, not only is vegetation removed; the atmosphere is also affected and climates are altered. At a more immediate level, the biodiversity within tropical rainforests, including wildlife and insect species and a wealth of plant varieties, is depleted. Loss of rare plants is of particular concern because certain species as yet unknown and unused could likely yield many practical benefits, for instance as medicines.

As a result of the many challenges associated with deforestation, many environmental groups and agencies have argued for government policies on the sustainable development of forests by governments across the globe. While many countries have instituted national policies and programs aimed at reducing deforestation, and substantial research has been advanced in regard to sustainable and regenerative forestry development, there has been very little progress on an international level. Generally speaking, most tropical rainforests are located in developing and less developed countries, where economic growth is often dependent upon the exploitation of tropical rainforests. Timber resources as well as wildlife hunting tend to be particularly lucrative arenas.

In places such as the Amazon, where deforestation takes place for the construction of energy plants aimed at industrialization and economic development, there is an exacerbated effect on the

Libya Review 2016 Page 392 of 437 pages Libya environment. After forests are cleared in order to construct such projects, massive flooding usually ensues. The remaining trees then rot and decay in the wake of the flooding. As the trees deteriorate, their biochemical makeup becomes more acidic, producing poisonous substances such as hydrogen sulphide and methane gases. Acidified water subsequently corrodes the mechanical equipment and operations of the plants, which are already clogged by rotting wood after the floodwaters rise.

Deforestation generally arises from an economically plausible short-term motivation, but nonetheless poses a serious global concern because the effects go beyond national boundaries. The United Nations has established the World Commission on Forest and Sustainable Development. This body's task is to determine the optimal means of dealing with the issue of deforestation, without unduly affecting normal economic development, while emphasizing the global significance of protecting tropical forest ecosystems.

5. Water Resources

For all terrestrial fauna, including humans, water is the most immediate necessity to sustain life. As the population has increased and altered an ever-greater portion of the landscape from its natural condition, demand on water resources has intensified, especially with the development of industrialization and large-scale irrigation. The supply of freshwater is inherently limited, and moreover distributed unevenly across the earth's landmasses. Moreover, not just demand for freshwater but activities certain to degrade it are becoming more pervasive. By contrast, the oceans form a sort of "last wilderness," still little explored and in large part not seriously affected by human activity. However, coastal environments - the biologically richest part of the marine ecosystem-are experiencing major depletion due to human encroachment and over-exploitation.

Freshwater:

In various regions, for instance the Colorado River in the western United States, current withdrawals of river water for irrigation, domestic, and industrial use consume the entire streamflow so that almost no water flows into the sea at the river's mouth. Yet development is ongoing in many such places, implying continually rising demand for water. In some areas reliant on groundwater, aquifers are being depleted at a markedly faster rate than they are being replenished. An example is the San Joaquin Valley in California, where decades of high water withdrawals for agriculture have caused land subsidence of ten meters or more in some spots. Naturally, the uncertainty of future water supplies is particularly acute in arid and semi-arid regions. Speculation that the phenomenon of global warming will alter geographic and seasonal rainfall patterns adds further uncertainty.

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Water conservation measures have great potential to alleviate supply shortages. Some city water systems are so old and beset with leaking pipes that they lose as much water as they meter. Broad- scale irrigation could be replaced by drip-type irrigation, actually enhancing the sustainability of agriculture. In many areas where heavy irrigation has been used for decades, the result is deposition of salts and other chemicals in the soil such that the land becomes unproductive for farming and must be abandoned.

Farming is a major source of water pollution. Whereas restrictions on industrial effluents and other "point sources" are relatively easy to implement, comparable measures to reform hydraulic practices at farms and other "nonpoint sources" pose a significantly knottier challenge. Farm- caused water pollution takes the following main forms:

- Nitrate pollution found in wells in intensive farming areas as a consequence of heavy fertilizer use is a threat to human health. The most serious danger is to infants, who by ingesting high-nitrate water can contract methemoglobinemia, sometimes called "blue baby syndrome," a potentially fatal condition.

- Fertilizer runoff into rivers and lakes imparts unwanted nutrients that cause algae growth and eventual loss of oxygen in the body of water, degrading its ability to support fish and other desirable aquatic life.

- Toxic agricultural chemicals - insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides - are detectable in some aquifers and waterways.

In general, it is much easier to get a pollutant into water than to retrieve it out. Gasoline additives, dry cleaning chemicals, other industrial toxins, and in a few areas radionucleides have all been found in water sources intended for human use. The complexity and long time scale of subterranean hydrological movements essentially assures that pollutants already deposited in aquifers will continue to turn up for decades to come. Sophisticated water treatment processes are available, albeit expensive, to reclaim degraded water and render it fit for human consumption. Yet source protection is unquestionably a more desirable alternative.

In much of the developing world, and even some low-income rural enclaves of the developed world, the population lacks ready access to safe water. Surface water and shallow groundwater supplies are susceptible to contamination from untreated wastewater and failing septic tanks, as well as chemical hazards. The occurrence of waterborne disease is almost certainly greatly underreported.

Marine Resources:

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Coastal areas have always been desirable places for human habitation, and population pressure on them continues to increase. Many types of water degradation that affect lakes and rivers also affect coastal zones: industrial effluents, untreated or partially treated sewage, nutrient load from agriculture figure prominently in both cases. Prospects for more extreme storms as a result of global warming, as well as the pervasiveness of poorly planned development in many coastal areas, forebode that catastrophic hurricanes and landslides may increase in frequency in the future. Ongoing rise in sea levels will force remedial measures and in some cases abandonment of currently valuable coastal property.

Fisheries over much of the globe have been overharvested, and immediate conservation measures are required to preserve stocks of many species. Many governments subsidized factory-scale fishing fleets in the 1970s and 1980s, and the resultant catch increase evidently surpassed a sustainable level. It is uncertain how much of the current decline in fish stocks stems from overharvesting and how much from environmental pollution. The deep ocean remains relatively unaffected by human activity, but continental shelves near coastlines are frequently seriously polluted, and these close-to-shore areas are the major biological nurseries for food fish and the smaller organisms they feed on.

6. Environmental Toxins

Toxic chemical pollution exploded on the public consciousness with disclosure of spectacularly polluted industrial areas such as Love Canal near Buffalo, New York. There is no question that pollutants such as organophosphates or radionucleides can be highly deleterious to health, but evidence to date suggests that seriously affected areas are a localized rather than universal problem.

While some explore the possibilities for a lifestyle that fully eschews use of modern industrial chemicals, the most prevalent remediative approach is to focus on more judicious use. The most efficient chemical plants are now able to contain nearly all toxic byproducts of their production processes within the premises, minimizing the release of such substances into the environment. Techniques such as Integrated Pest Management (IPM) dictate limited rather than broadcast use of pesticides: application only when needed using the safest available chemical, supplemented as much as possible with nontoxic controls.

While heightened public awareness and growing technical sophistication suggest a hopeful outlook on limiting the damage from manmade environmental toxins, one must grant that previous incidents of their misuse and mishandling have already caused environmental damage that will have to be dealt with for many years to come. In the case of the most hazardous radioactive substances, the time scale for successful remediation actually extends beyond that of the recorded history of civilization. Moreover, in this era of high population density and rapid economic growth, quotidian activities such as the transport of chemicals will occasionally, seemingly inevitably result in

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7. "Islandization" and Biodiversity

With increased awareness regarding the adverse effects of unregulated hunting and habitat depletion upon wildlife species and other aspects of biodiversity, large-scale efforts across the globe have been initiated to reduce and even reverse this trend.

In every region of the world, many species of wildlife and areas of biodiversity have been saved from extinction. Nationally, many countries have adopted policies aimed at preservation and conservation of species, and one of the most tangible measures has been the proliferation of protected habitats. Such habitats exist in the form of wildlife reserves, marine life reserves, and other such areas where biodiversity can be protected from external encroachment and exploitation.

Despite these advances in wildlife and biodiversity protection, further and perhaps more intractable challenges linger. Designated reserves, while intended to prevent further species decline, exist as closed territories, fragmented from other such enclaves and disconnected from the larger ecosystem. This environmental scenario is referred to as "islandization." Habitat reserves often serve as oversized zoos or game farms, with landscapes and wildlife that have effectively been "tamed" to suit. Meanwhile, the larger surrounding ecosystem continues to be seriously degraded and transformed, while within the islandized habitat, species that are the focus of conservation efforts may not have sufficient range and may not be able to maintain healthy genetic variability.

As a consequence, many conservationists and preservationists have demanded that substantially larger portions of land be withheld as habitat reserves, and a network of biological corridors to connect continental reserves be established. While such efforts to combat islandization have considerable support in the United States, how precisely such a program would be instituted, especially across national boundaries, remains a matter of debate. International conservationists and preservationists say without a network of reserves a massive loss of biodiversity will result.

The concept of islandization illustrates why conservation and preservation of wildlife and biodiversity must consider and adopt new, broader strategies. In the past, conservation and preservation efforts have been aimed at specific species, such as the spotted owl and grizzly bear in North America, the Bengal tiger in Southeast Asia, the panda in China, elephants in Africa. Instead, the new approach is to simultaneously protect many and varied species that inhabit the same ecosystem. This method, referred to as "bio-regional conservation," may more efficaciously generate longer-term and more far-reaching results precisely because it is aimed at preserving entire ecosystems, and all the living things within.

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More About Biodiversity Issues:

This section is directly taken from the United Nations Environmental Program: "Biodiversity Assessment"

The Global Biodiversity Assessment, completed by 1500 scientists under the auspices of United Nations Environmental Program in 1995, updated what is known (or unknown) about global biological diversity at the ecosystem, species and genetic levels. The assessment was uncertain of the total number of species on Earth within an order of magnitude. Of its working figure of 13 million species, only 13 percent are scientifically described. Ecological community diversity is also poorly known, as is its relationship to biological diversity, and genetic diversity has been studied for only a small number of species. The effects of human activities on biodiversity have increased so greatly that the rate of species extinctions is rising to hundreds or thousands of times the background level. These losses are driven by increasing demands on species and their habitats, and by the failure of current market systems to value biodiversity adequately. The Assessment calls for urgent action to reverse these trends.

There has been a new recognition of the importance of protecting marine and aquatic biodiversity. The first quantitative estimates of species losses due to growing coral reef destruction predict that almost 200,000 species, or one in five presently contributing to coral reef biodiversity, could die out in the next 40 years if human pressures on reefs continue to increase.

Since Rio, many countries have improved their understanding of the status and importance of their biodiversity, particularly through biodiversity country studies such as those prepared under the auspices of UNEP/GEF. The United Kingdom identified 1250 species needing monitoring, of which 400 require action plans to ensure their survival. Protective measures for biodiversity, such as legislation to protect species, can prove effective. In the USA, almost 40 percent of the plants and animals protected under the Endangered Species Act are now stable or improving as a direct result of recovery efforts. Some African countries have joined efforts to protect threatened species through the 1994 Lusaka Agreement, and more highly migratory species are being protected by specialized cooperative agreements among range states under the Bonn Agreement.

There is an emerging realization that a major part of conservation of biological diversity must take place outside of protected areas and involve local communities. The extensive agricultural areas occupied by small farmers contain much biodiversity that is important for sustainable food production. Indigenous agricultural practices have been and continue to be important elements in the maintenance of biodiversity, but these are being displaced and lost. There is a new focus on the interrelationship between agrodiversity conservation and sustainable use and development practices in smallholder agriculture, with emphasis on use of farmers' knowledge and skills as a source of information for sustainable farming.

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Perhaps even more important than the loss of biodiversity is the transformation of global biogeochemical cycles, the reduction in the total world biomass, and the decrease in the biological productivity of the planet. While quantitative measurements are not available, the eventual economic and social consequences may be so significant that the issue requires further attention.

******

Specific sources used for this section:

Bendall, Roger. 1996. "Biodiversity: the follow up to Rio". The Globe 30:4-5, April 1996.

Global Environmental Change: Human and Policy Implications. 1995. Special issue on "People, Land Management and Environmental Change", Vol. 3, No. 4, September 1995.

Golubev, Genady N. (Moscow University) In litt. 29 June 1996.

Heywood, V.H. (ed.). 1995. Global Biodiversity Assessment. United Nations Environment Programme. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Heywood, V.H. 1996. "The Global Biodiversity Assessment". The Globe, 30:2-4, April 1996.

Reaka-Kudla, Marjorie. 1996. Paper presented at American Association for Advancement of Science, February 1996. Quoted in Pain, Stephanie. "Treasures lost in reef madness". New Scientist, 17 February 1996.

Uitto, Juha I., and Akiko Ono (eds). 1996. Population, Land Management and Environmental Change. The United Nations University, Tokyo.

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USFWS. 1994. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service report to Congress, cited in news release 21 July 1994.

Online resources used generally in the Environmental Overview:

Environmental Protection Agency Global Warming Site. URL: http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming

Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations: Forestry. URL: http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/sofo/en/

Global Warming Information Page. URL: http://globalwarming.org

United Nations Environmental Program. URL: http://www.unep.org/GEO/GEO_Products/Assessment_Reports/

United Nations Global Environmental Outlook. URL: http://www.unep.org/geo/geo4/media/

Note on Edition Dates:

The edition dates for textual resources are noted above because they were used to formulate the original content. We also have used online resources (cited above) to update coverage as needed.

Information Resources

For more information about environmental concepts, CountryWatch recommends the following resources:

The United Nations Environmental Program Network (with country profiles)

The United Nations Environment Program on Climate Change

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The United Nations Environmental Program on Waters and Oceans

The United Nations Environmental Program on Forestry: "Forests in Flux"

FAO "State of the World's Forests"

World Resources Institute.

Harvard University Center for Health and the Global Environment

The University of Wisconsin Center for Sustainability and the Global Environment http://sage.aos.wisc.edu/

International Environmental Agreements and Associations

International Policy Development in Regard to Global Warming:

Introduction

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In this regard, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) stipulated the following objectives:

2. To ensure and enable sustainable development and food production on a global scale.

Following are two discusssions regarding international policies on the environment, followed by listings of international accords.

Special Entry: The Kyoto Protocol

The UNFCCC was adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, and entered into force in 1994. Over 175 parties were official participants.

Meanwhile, however, many of the larger, more industrialized nations failed to reach the emissions' reduction targets, and many UNFCCC members agreed that the voluntary approach to reducing emissions had not been successful. As such, UNFCCC members reached a consensus that legally binding limits were necessitated, and agreed to discuss such a legal paradigm at a meeting in Kyoto, Japan in 1997. At that meeting, the UNFCCC forged the Kyoto Protocol. This concord is the first legally binding international agreement that places limits on emissions from industrialized countries. The major greenhouse gas emissions addressed in the Kyoto Protocol include carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride, and methane.

The provisions of the Kyoto Protocol stipulate that economically advanced nations must reduce their combined emissions of greenhouse gases, by approximately five percent from their 1990 levels, before the 2008-2010 deadline. Countries with the highest carbon dioxide emissions, such as the United States (U.S.), many of the European Union (EU) countries, and Japan, are to reduce emissions by a scale of 6 to 8 percent. All economically advanced nations must show "demonstrable progress" by 2005. In contrast, no binding limits or timetable have been set on developing countries. Presumably, this distinction is due to the fact that most developing countries - - with the obvious exceptions of India and China -- simply do not emit as many greenhouse gases as do more industrially advanced countries. Meanwhile, these countries are entrenched in the process of economic development.

Regardless of the aforementioned reasoning, there has been strong opposition against the asymmetrical treatment assigned to emissions limits among developed and developing countries.

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Although this distinction might be regarded as unfair in principle, associations such as the Alliance of Small Island States have been vocal in expressing how global warming -- a result of greenhouse gas emissions - has contributed to the rise in sea level, and thus deleteriously affected their very existence as island nation states. For this reason, some parties have suggested that economically advanced nations, upon returning to their 1990 levels, should be required to further reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by a deadline of 2005. In response, interested parties have observed that even if such reductions were undertaken by economically advanced nations, they would not be enough to completely control global warming. Indeed, a reduction in the rate of fossil fuel usage by developing nations would also be necessary to have substantial ameliorative effect on global warming. Indeed, a reduction in the rate of fossil fuel usage by developing nations would also be necessary to have substantial ameliorative effect on global warming.

As such, the Protocol established a "Clean Development Mechanism" which permits developed countries to invest in projects aimed at reducing emissions within developing countries in return for credit for the reductions. Ostensibly, the objective of this mechanism is to curtail emissions in developing countries without unduly penalizing them for their economic development. Under this model, the countries with more potential emissions credits could sell them to other signatories of the Kyoto Protocol, whose emissions are forecast to significantly rise in the next few years. Should this trading of emissions credits take place, it is estimated that the Kyoto Protocol's emissions targets could still be met.

In 1999, the International Energy Outlook projected that Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Newly Independent States, as well as parts of Asia, are all expected to show a marked decrease in their level of energy-related carbon emissions in 2010. Nations with the highest emissions, specifically, the U.S., the EU and Japan, are anticipated to reduce their emissions by up to 8 percent by 2012. By 2000, however, the emissions targets were not on schedule for achievement. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Energy estimates forecast that by 2010, there will be a 34 percent increase in carbon emissions from the 1990 levels, in the absence of major shifts in policy, economic growth, energy prices, and consumer trends. Despite this assessment in the U.S., international support for the Kyoto Protocol remained strong, especially among European countries and island states, who view the pact as one step in the direction away from reliance on fossil fuels and other sources of greenhouse gases.

In 2001, U.S. President, George W. Bush, rejected his country's participation in the Kyoto Protocol, saying that the costs imposed on the global economic system, and especially, on the US, overshadowed the benefits of the Protocol. He also cited the unfair burden on developed nations to reduce emissions, as another primary reasons for withdrawal from the international pact, as well as insufficient evidence regarding the science of global warming. Faced with impassioned international disapproval for his position, the U.S. president stated that his administration remained interested in dealing with the matter of global warming, but would endorse alternative measures to combat the problem, such as voluntary initiatives limiting emissions. Critics of Bush's position, however, have

Libya Review 2016 Page 402 of 437 pages Libya noted that it was the failure of voluntary initiatives to reduce emissions following the Rio Summit that led to the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol in the first place.

In the wake of the Bush administration's decision, many participant countries resigned themselves to the reality that the goals of the Kyoto Protocol might not be achieved without U.S. involvement. Nevertheless, in Bonn, Germany, in July 2001, the remaining participant countries struck a political compromise on some of the key issues and sticking points, and planned to move forward with the Protocol, irrespective of the absence of the U.S. The key compromise points included the provision for countries to offset their targets with carbon sinks (these are areas of forest and farmland which can absorb carbon through the process of photosynthesis). Another compromise point within the broader Bonn Agreement was the reduction of emissions cuts of six gases from over 5 percent to a more achievable 2 percent. A third key change was the provision of funding for less wealthy countries to adopt more progressive technologies.

In late October and early November 2001, the UNFCC's 7th Conference of the Parties met in Marrakesh, Morocco, to finalize the measures needed to make the Kyoto Protocol operational. Although the UNFCC projected that ratification of the Protocol would make it legally binding within a year, many critics noted that the process had fallen short of implementing significant changes in policy that would be necessary to actually stop or even slow climate change. They also maintained that the absence of U.S. participation effectively rendered the Protocol into being a political exercise without any substance, either in terms of transnational policy or in terms of environmental concerns.

The adoption of the compromises ensconced within the Bonn Agreement had been intended to make the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol more palatable to the U.S. In this regard, it failed to achieve its objective as the Bush administration continued to eschew participation in the international accord. Still, however, the Bonn Agreement did manage to render a number of other positive outcomes. Specifically, in 2002, key countries, such as Russia, Japan and Canada agreed to ratify the protocol, bringing the number of signatories to 178. The decision by key countries to ratify the protocol was regarded as "the kiss of life" by observers.

By 2005, on the eve of a climate change conference in London, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was hoping to deal with the problems of climate change beyond the provisions set forth in the Kyoto Protocol. Acknowledging that the Kyoto Protocol could not work in its current form, Blair wanted to open the discussion for a new climate change plan.

Blair said that although most of the world had signed on to Kyoto, the protocol could not meet any of its practical goals of cutting greenhouse gas emissions without the participation of the United States, the world's largest polluter. He also noted that any new agreement would have to include India and China -- significant producers of greenhouse gas emissions, but exempt from Kyoto

Libya Review 2016 Page 403 of 437 pages Libya because they have been classified as developing countries. Still, he said that progress on dealing with climate change had been stymied by "a reluctance to face up to reality and the practical action needed to tackle problem."

Blair also touted the "huge opportunities" in technology and pointed toward the possibilities offered by wind, solar and nuclear power, along with fuel cell technology, eco-friendly biofuels, and carbon capture and storage which could generate low carbon power. Blair also asserted that his government was committed to achieving its domestic goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 20 percent by 2010.

In the United States, President George W. Bush has said that global warming remained a debatable issue and despite conclusions reached by his own Environmental Protection Agency, he has not agreed with the conclusion that global warming and climate change are linked with human activities. Bush has also refused to ratify Kyoto on the basis of its economic costs.

Australia, an ally of the United States, has taken a similarly dim view of the Kyoto Protocol. Ahead of the November 2005 climate change meeting in Canada in which new goals for the protocol were to be discussed, Australia 's Environment Minister, Ian Campbell, said that negotiating new greenhouse gas emission levels for the Kyoto Protocol would be a waste of time. Campbell said, "There is a consensus that the caps, targets and timetables approach is flawed. If we spend the next five years arguing about that, we'll be fiddling and negotiating while Rome burns." Campbell, like the Bush administration, has also advocated a system of voluntary action in which industry takes up new technologies rather than as a result of compelling the reduction of emissions. But the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) has called on its government to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, to establish a system of emissions trading, and to set binding limits on emissions. Interestingly, although it did not sign on to Kyoto , Australia was expected to meet its emissions target by 2012 (an 8 percent increase in 1990 levels in keeping with the country's reliance on coal). But this success has nothing to do with new technologies and is due to state- based regulations on land clearing.

Note: The Kyoto Protocol calls for developed nations to cut greenhouse emissions by 5.2 percent of 1990 levels by 2012.

Special Entry: Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen (2009) --

In December 2009, the United Nations Climate Change Summit opened in the Danish capital of Copenhagen. The summit was scheduled to last from Dec. 7-18, 2009. Delegates from more than 190 countries were in attendance, and approximately 100 world leaders, including British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and United States President Barack Obama, were expected to participate. At issue was the matter of new reductions targets on greenhouse gas emissions by 2020.

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Despite earlier fears that little concurrence would come from the conference, effectively pushing significant actions forward to a 2010 conference in Mexico City, negotiators were now reporting that the talks were productive and several key countries, such as South Africa, had pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The two main issues that could still lead to cleavages were questions of agreement between the industrialized countries and the developing countries of the world, as well as the overall effectiveness of proposals in seriously addressing the perils of climate change.

On Dec. 9, 2009, four countries -- the United Kingdom, Australia, Mexico and Norway -- presented a document outlining ideas for raising and managing billions of dollars, which would be intended to help vulnerable countries dealing with the perils of climate change. Described as a "green fund," the concept could potentially help small island states at risk because of the rise in sea level. Bangladesh identified itself as a potential recipient of an assistance fund, noting that as a country plagued by devastating floods, it was particularly hard-hit by climate change. The "green fund" would fall under the rubric of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, for which developed countries have been committed to quantifying their emission reduction targets, and also to providing financial and technical support to developing countries.

The United Kingdom, Australia, Mexico and Norway also called for the creation of a new legal treaty that would replace the Kyoto Protocol. This new treaty, which could go into force in 2012, would focus largely on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. But Australia went even further in saying that the successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol, should be one with provisions covering all countries. Such a move would be a departure from the structure of the Kyoto Protocol, which contained emissions targets for industrialized countries due to the prevailing view that developed countries had a particular historic responsibility to be accountable for climate change. More recently, it has become apparent that substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions demanded by scientists would only come to pass with the participation also of significant developing nation states, such as China and India. Indeed, one of the most pressing critiques of the Kyoto Protocol was that it was a "paper tiger" that failed to address the impact of the actions of emerging economies like China and India, with its focus on the developed economies.

Now, in 2009, China -- as the world's biggest greenhouse gas emitter -- was responding this dubious distinction by vocalizing its criticism of the current scenario and foregrounding its new commitments. Ahead of the Copenhagen summit, China had announced it would reduce the intensity of its carbon emissions per unit of its GDP in 2020 by 40 to 45 percent against 2005 levels. With that new commitment at hand, China was now accusing the United States and the European Union of shirking their own responsibilities by setting weak targets for greenhouse gas emissions cuts. Senior Chinese negotiator, Su Wei, characterized the goals of the world's second largest greenhouse gas emitter -- the United States -- as "not notable," and the European Union's target as "not enough." Su Wei also took issue with Japan for setting implausible preconditions.

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On Dec. 11, 2009, China demanded that developed and wealthy countries in Copenhagen should help deliver a real agreement on climate change by delivering on their promises to reduce carbon emissions and provide financial support for developing countries to adapt to global warming. In so doing, China's Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei said his country was hoping that a "balanced outcome" would emerge from the discussions at the summit. Echoing the position of the Australian government, He Yafei spoke of a draft agreement as follows: "The final document we're going to adopt needs to be taking into account the needs and aspirations of all countries, particularly the most vulnerable ones."

China's Vice Foreign Minister emphasized the fact that climate change was "a matter of survival" for developing countries, and accordingly, such countries need wealthier and more developed countries to accentuate not only their pledges of emissions reduction targets, but also their financial commitments under the aforementioned United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. To that end, scientists and leaders of small island states in the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, have highlighted the existential threat posed by global warming and the concomitant rise in sea level.

China aside, attention was also on India -- another major player in the developing world and a country with an industrializing economy that was impacting the environment. At issue was the Indian government's decision to set a carbon intensity target, which would slow emissions growth by up to 25 percent by the 2020 deadline. This strong position was resisted by some elements in India, who argued that their country should not be taking such a strong position when developed wealthy countries were yet to show accountability for their previous commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The matter grew so heated that the members of the opposition stormed out of the parliament in protest as Indian Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh defended the policy. But the political pressure at home in India was leaving the Indian delegation in Copenhagen in a state of chaos as well. In fact, India's top environmental negotiator refused to travel to Copenhagen in protest of the government's newly-announced stance.

China and India were joined by Brazil and South Africa in the crafting of a draft document calling for a new global climate treaty to be completed by June 2010. Of concern has been the realization that there was insufficient time to find concurrence on a full legal treaty, which would leave countries only with a politically-binding text by the time the summit at Copenhagen closed. But Guyana's leader, President Bharrat Jagdeo, warned that the summit in Denmark would be classified as a failure unless a binding document was agreed upon instead of just political consensus. He urged his cohorts to act with purpose saying, "Never before have science, economics, geo-strategic self-interest and politics intersected in such a way on an issue that impacts everyone on the planet."

Likewise, Tuvalu demanded that legally binding agreements emerge from Copenhagen. Its proposal was supported by many of the vulnerable countries, from small island states and sub- Saharan Africa, all of whom warned of the catastrophic impact of climate change on their

Libya Review 2016 Page 406 of 437 pages Libya citizens. Tuvalu also called for more aggressive action, such as an amendment to the 1992 agreement, which would focus on sharp greenhouse gas emissions and the accepted rise in temperatures, due to the impact the rise in seas. The delegation from Kiribati joined the call by drawing attention to the fact that one village had to be abandoned due to waist-high water, and more such effects were likely to follow. Kiribati's Foreign Secretary, Tessie Lambourne, warned that the people of Kiribati could well be faced with no homeland in the future saying, "Nobody in this room would want to leave their homeland." But despite such impassioned pleas and irrespective of warnings from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that the rise in sea level from melting polar ice caps would deleteriously affect low-lying atolls such as such as Tuvalu and Kiribati in the Pacific, and the Maldives in the Indian Ocean, the oil-giant Saudi Arabia was able to block this move.

Meanwhile, within the developed countries, yet another power struggle was brewing. The European Union warned it would only agree to raise its target of 20 percent greenhouse gas emissions reductions to 30 percent if the United States demonstrated that it would do more to reduce its own emissions. It was unknown if such pressure would yield results. United States President Barack Obama offered a "provisional" 2020 target of 17 percent reductions, noting that he could not offer greater concessions at Copenhagen due to resistance within the United States Congress, which was already trying to pass a highly controversial "cap and trade" emissions legislation. However, should that emissions trading bill fail in the Senate, the United States Environment Protection Agency's declaration that greenhouse gases pose a danger to human health and the environment was expected to facilitate further regulations and limits on power plants and factories at the national level. These moves could potentially strengthen the Obama administration's offering at Copenhagen. As well, President Obama also signaled that he would be willing to consider the inclusion of international forestry credits.

Such moves indicated willingness by the Obama administration to play a more constructive role on the international environmental scene than its predecessor, the Bush administration. Indeed, ahead of his arrival at the Copenhagen summit, President Barack Obama's top environmental advisors promised to work on a substantial climate change agreement. To that end, United States Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Lisa Jackson said at a press conference, "We are seeking robust engagement with all of our partners around the world." But would this pro- engagement assertion yield actual results?

By Dec. 12, 2009, details related to a draft document prepared by Michael Zammit Cutajar, the head of the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action, were released at the Copenhagen climate conference. Included in the document were calls for countries to make major reductions in carbon emissions over the course of the next decade. According to the Washington Post, industrialized countries were called on to make cuts of between 25 percent and 40 percent below 1990 levels -- reductions that were far more draconian than the United States was likely to accept. As discussed above, President Obama had offered a provisional reduction target of 17

Libya Review 2016 Page 407 of 437 pages Libya percent. The wide gap between the released draft and the United States' actual stated position suggested there was much more negotiating in the offing if a binding agreement could be forged, despite the Obama administration's claims that it was seeking greater engagement on this issue.

In other developments, the aforementioned call for financial support of developing countries to deal with the perils of climate change was partly answered by the European Union on Dec. 11, 2009. The European bloc pledged an amount of 2.4 billion euros (US$3.5 billion) annually from 2010 to 2012. Environment Minister Andreas Carlgren of Sweden -- the country that holds the rotating presidency of the European Union at the time of the summit -- put his weight behind the notion of a "legally binding deal." Meanwhile, Yvo de Boer, a top United Nations climate change official, focused less on the essence of the agreement and more on tangible action and effects saying, "Copenhagen will only be a success if it delivers significant and immediate action that begins the day the conference ends."

The division between developed and developing countries in Copenhagen reached new heights on Dec. 14, 2009, when some of the poor and less developed countries launched a boycott at the summit. The move, which was spurred by African countries but backed by China and India, appeared to be geared toward redirecting attention and primary responsibility to the wealthier and more industrialized countries. The impasse was resolved after the wealthier and more industrialized countries offered assurances that they did not intend on shirking from their commitments to reducing greenhouse gases. As a result, the participating countries ceased the boycott.

Outside the actual summit, thousands of protestors had gathered to demand crucial global warming, leading to clashes between police and demonstrators elsewhere in the Danish capital city. There were reports of scattered violence across Copenhagen and more than 1,000 people were arrested.

Nevertheless, by the second week of the climate change summit, hopes of forging a strong deal were eroding as developed and developing nations remained deadlocked on sharing cuts in greenhouse gases, and particularly on the matters of financing and temperature goals. In a bid to shore up support for a new climate change, United States President Barack Obama joined other world leaders in Copenhagen. On Dec. 14, 2009, there was a standoff brewing between the United States and China. At issue was China's refusal to accept international monitoring of its expressed targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The United States argued that China's opposition to verification could be a deal-breaker.

By the close of the summit, the difficult process eventually resulted in some consensus being cultivated. A draft text called for $100 billion a year by 2020 to assist poor nations cope with climate change, while aiming to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius compared with pre- industrial levels. The deal also included specific targets for developed countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and called for reductions by developing countries as a share of their

Libya Review 2016 Page 408 of 437 pages Libya economies. Also included in the agreement was a mechanism to verify compliance. The details of the agreement were supported by President Barack Obama, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.

This draft would stand as an interim agreement, with a legally-binding international pact unlikely to materialize until 2010. In this way, the summit in Copenhagen failed to achieve its central objective, which was to negotiate a successor to the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions.

Editor's Note

In the background of these developments was the growing global consciousness related to global warming and climate change. Indeed, as the Copenhagen summit was ongoing, it was clear there was enormous concurrence on the significance of the stakes with an editorial on the matter of climate change being published in 56 newspapers in 45 countries. That editorial warned that without global action, climate change would "ravage our planet." Meanwhile, a global survey taken by Globescan showed that concern over global warming had exponentially increased from 1998 -- when only 20 percent of respondents believed it to be a serious problem -- to 64 percent in 2009. Such survey data, however, was generated ahead of the accusations by climate change skeptics that some climate scientists may have overstated the case for global warming, based on emails derived in an illicit manner from a British University.

Special Entry: Climate change talks in Doha in Qatar extend life of Kyoto Protocol (2012)

December 2012 saw climate talks ensue in the Qatari city of Doha as representatives from countries across the world gathered to discuss the fate of the Kyoto Protocol, which seeks to minimize greenhouse gas emissions. The summit yielded results with decisions made (1) to extend the Kyoto Protocol until 2020, and (2) for wealthier countries to compensate poorer countries for the losses and damage incurred as a result of climate change.

In regards to the second matter, Malia Talakai of Nauru, a leading negotiator for the Alliance of Small Island States, explained the necessity of the compensation package as follows: “We are trying to say that if you pollute you must help us.”

This measure was being dubbed the "Loss and Damage" mechanism, and was being linked with United States President Barack Obama's request for $60 billion from Congress to deal with the devastation caused by Hurricane Sandy months before. The sight of a hurricane bearing down on the northern Atlantic seaboard, along with the reality of the scope of reconstruction, appeared to have illustrated the economic costs of climate change -- not so much as a distant environmental issue -- but as a danger to the quotidian lives of people. Still, there was blame to be placed on the United States and European countries -- some of world's largest emitters -- for failing to do more

Libya Review 2016 Page 409 of 437 pages Libya to reduce emissions.

To that latter end, there was in fact little progress made on the central issue of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Had those emissions been reduced, there would have been less of a need to financially deal with the devastation caused by climate change. One interpretation was that the global community was accepting the fact that industrialization was contributing to global warming, which had deleterious effects on the polar ice caps and concomitantly on the rise of sea level, with devastating effects for small island nations. Thus, wealthier countries were willing to pay around $10 billion a year through 2020, effectively in "damages," to the poor countries that could be viewed as the "collateral damage" of industrial progress. But damages today could potentially be destruction tomorrow, leaving in place the existential challenges and burdens to be born by some of the world's smallest and least wealthy island countries.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the representative for the small island nation states at the Doha summit responded with ire, characterizing the lack of progress on reducing emissions as follows: "We see the package before us as deeply deficient in mitigation (carbon cuts) and finance. It's likely to lock us on the trajectory to a 3,4,5C rise in global temperatures, even though we agreed to keep the global average temperature rise of 1.5C to ensure survival of all islands. There is no new finance (for adapting to climate change and getting clean energy) -- only promises that something might materialize in the future. Those who are obstructive need to talk not about how their people will live, but whether our people will live."

Indeed, in most small island countries not just in the Pacific, but also the Caribbean and Indian Ocean, ecological concerns and the climate crisis have been dominant themes with dire life and death consequences looming in the background for their people. Small island nations in these region are already at risk from the rise of sea-level, tropical cyclones, floods. But their very livelihoods of fishing and subsistence farming were also at risk as a result of ecological and environmental changes. Increasingly high storm surges can wipe out entire villages and contaminate water supplies. Accordingly, the very existence of island nations, such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, are at severe risk of being obliterated from the map. Yet even with the existential threat of being wiped off the map in the offing, the international community has been either slow or restrictive in its efforts to deal with global warming, climate change, economic and ecological damage, as well as the emerging global challenge of environmental refugees.

A 2012 report from the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the Pacific Regional Environment Program underlined the concerns of small island nations and their people as it concluded that the livelihoods of approximately 10 million people in Pacific island communities were increasingly vulnerable to climate change. In fact, low-lying islands in that region would likely confront losses of up to 18 percent of gross domestic product due to climate change, according to the report. The report covers 21 countries and territories, including Fiji, Kiribati, Samoa and Tonga, and recommended environmental legislation intended to deal with the climate

Libya Review 2016 Page 410 of 437 pages Libya crisis facing the small island countries particularly. As noted by David Sheppard, the director general of the Pacific Regional Environment Program that co-sponsored this study: “The findings... emphasize the need more than ever to raise the bar through collective actions that address the region's environmental needs at all levels."

Regardless of the failures of the summit in Qatar (discussed above), the meeting did facilitate a process starting in 2015, which would bind both wealthy and poor countries together in the mission of forging a new binding treaty that would replace the Kyoto Protocol and tackle the central causes of climate change.

For more information on the threats faced in small island nations by climate change and the measures being undertaken to lobby for international action, please see the Alliance for Small Island States available online at the URL: http://aosis.org/

Special Report

COP 21 summit in Paris ends with historic agreement to tackle climate change; rare international consensus formed on environmental crisis facing the planet (2015) --

In mid-December 2015, the highly-anticipated United Nations climate conference of parties (COP) in Paris, France, ended with a historic agreement. In fact, it would very likely be understood as the most significant international agreement signed by all the recognized countries of the world since the Cold War. Accordingly, the Paris Agreement was being distinguished as the first multilateral pact that would compel all countries across the world to cut its carbon emissions -- one of the major causes of increasing greenhouse gas emissions, which contribute to global warming, and its deleterious effects ranging from the dangerous rise in sea level to catastrophic climate change.

The accord, which was dubbed to be the "Paris Agreement," was the work of rigorous diplomacy and fervent environmental advocacy, and it aimed to address the climate change crisis facing the planet. As many as 195 countries were represented in the negotiations that led to the landmark climate deal. Indeed, it was only after weeks of passionate debate that international concurrence was reached in addressing the environmental challenges confronting the world, with particular attention to moving beyond fossil fuels and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

The success of the COP 21 summit in Paris and the emergence of the landmark Paris Agreement was, to some extent, attributed to the efforts of France's Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius who presided over the negotiations. The French foreign minister's experience and credentials as a seasoned diplomat and respected statesman paid dividends. He skillfully guided the delegates from almost 200 countries and interest groups along the negotiations process, with ostensibly productive

Libya Review 2016 Page 411 of 437 pages Libya results and a reasonably robust deal to show for it.

On Dec. 12, 2015, French Foreign Minister Fabius officially adopted the agreement, declaring: "I now invite the COP to adopt the decision entitled Paris Agreement outlined in the document. Looking out to the room I see that the reaction is positive, I see no objections. The Paris agreement is adopted." Once Foreign Minister Fabius' gavel was struck, symbolically inaugurating the Paris Agreement into force, the COP delegate rushed to their feet with loud and bouyant cheers as well as thunderous applause.

In general, the Paris Agreement was being hailed as a victory for enviromental activists and a triumph for international diplomats, while at the same time being understood as simply an initial -- and imperfect -- move in the direction of a sustainable future. China's chief negotiator, Xie Zhenhua, issued this message, saying that while the accord was not ideal, it should "not prevent us from marching historical steps forward."

United States President Barack Obama lauded the deal as both "ambitious" and "historic," and the work of strenuous multilateral negotiations as he declared, "Together, we've shown what's possible when the world stands as one." The United States leader acknowledged that the accord was not "perfect," but he reminded the critics that it was "the best chance to save the one planet we have. "

Former United States Vice President Al Gore, one of the world's most well known environmental advocates, issued a lengthy statement on the accompishments ensconced in the Paris Agreement. He highlighted the fact that the Paris Agreement was a first step towards a future with a reduced carbon footprint on Planet Earth as he said, "The components of this agreement -- including a strong review mechanism to enhance existing commitments and a long-term goal to eliminate global-warming pollution this century -- are essential to unlocking the necessary investments in our future. No agreement is perfect, and this one must be strengthened over time, but groups across every sector of society will now begin to reduce dangerous carbon pollution through the framework of this agreement."

The central provisions of the Paris Agreement included the following items:

- Greenhouse gas emissions should peak as quickly as possible, with a move towards balancing energy sources, and ultimately the decrease of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century - Global temperature increase would be limited to 1.5 degrees Centigrade above pre-industrial levels and would be held "well below" the two degrees Centigrade threshold - Progress on these goals would be reviewed every five years beginning in 2020 with new greenhouse gas reduction targets issued every five years - $100 billion would be expended each year in climate finance for developing countries to move forward with green technologies, with further climate financing to be advanced in the years beyond

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It should be noted that there both legally binding and voluntary elements contained within the Paris Agreement. Specifically, the submission of an emissions reduction target and the regular review of that goal would be legally mandatory for all countries. Stated differently, there would be a system in place by which experts would be able to track the carbon-cutting progress of each country. At the same time, the specific targets to be set by countries would be determined at the discretion of the countries, and would not be binding. While there was some criticism over this non-binding element, the fact of the matter was that the imposition of emissions targets was believed to be a major factor in the failure of climate change talks in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 2009.

In 2015, the talks faced challenges as several countries, such as China and India, objected to conditions that would stymie economic and development. In order to avoid that kind of landmine, a system Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) was developed and formed the basis of the accord. As such, the Paris Agreement would, in fact, facilitate economic growth and development, as well as technological progress, but with the goal of long-term ecological sustainability based on low carbon sources. In fact, the agreement heralded as "the beginning of the end of the fossil fuel era." As noted by Nick Mabey, the head of the climate diplomacy organization E3G, said, "Paris means governments will go further and faster to tackle climate change than ever before. The transition to a low carbon economy is now unstoppable, ensuring the end of the fossil fuel age."

A particular sticking point in the agreement was the $100 billion earmarked for climate financing for developing countries to transition from traditional fossil fuels to green energy technologies and a low carbon future. In 2014, a report by the International Energy Agency indicated that the cost of that transition would actually be around $44 trillion by the mid-century -- an amount that would render the $100 billion being promised to be a drop in the proverbial bucket. However, the general expectation was that the Republican-controlled Senate in the United States, which would have to ratify the deal in that country, was not interested in contributing significant funds for the cause of climate change.

A key strength of the Paris Agreement was the ubiquitous application of measures to all countries. Of note was the frequently utilized concept of "flexibility" with regard to the Paris Agreement. Specifically, the varying capacities of the various countries in meeting their obligations would be anticipated and accorded flexibility. This aspect presented something of a departure from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which drew a sharp distinction between developed and developing countries, and mandated a different set of obligations for those categories of countries. Thus, under Kyoto, China and India were not held to the same standards as the United States and European countries. In the Paris Agreement, there would be commitments from all countries across the globe.

Another notable strength of the Paris Agreement was the fact that the countries of the world were

Libya Review 2016 Page 413 of 437 pages Libya finally able to reach consensus on the vital necessity to limit global temperature increases to 1.5 degrees Centrigrade. Ahead of the global consensus on the deal, and as controversy continued to surface over the targeted global temperature limits, the leaders of island countries were sounding the alarm about the melting of the Polar ice caps and the associated rise in seal level. Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga of Tuvalu issued this dismal reminder: “Tuvalu’s future … is already bleak and any further temperature increase will spell the total demise of Tuvalu. No leader in this room carries such a level of worry and responsibility. Just imagine you are in my shoes, what would you do?” It was thus something of a victory for environmental advocates that the countries of the world could find cnsensus on the lower number -- 1.5 degrees rather than 2 degrees.

A significant weak point with regard to the Paris deal was a "loss and damage" provision, which anticipates that even with all the new undertakings intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and move to a low carbon future, there would nonetheless be unavoidable climate change consequences. Those consequences ranged from the loss of arable land for farmers as well as soil erosion and contamination of potable water by sea water, to the decimation of territory in coastal zones and on small islands, due to the rise in sea level, with entire small island countries being rendered entirely uninhabitable. The reality was that peoples' homes across the world would be destroyed along with their way of life.

With that latter catastrophic effect being a clear and present danger for small island countries, the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) demanded that the developed world acknowledge its responsibility for this irreversible damage.. Despite the fact that greenhouse gas emissions and the ensuing plague of global warming was, indeed, the consequence of development in the West (the United States and Europe) and the large power house countries, such as Russia, China and India, there was no appetite by those countries to sign on to unlimited liability. Under the Paris Agreement, there was a call for research on insurance mechanisms that would address loss and damage issues, with recommendations to come in the future.

The call for research was being regarded as an evasion of sorts and constituted the weakest aspect of the Paris Agreement. Not surprisingly, a coalition of small island nations demanded a "Marshall Plan" for the Pacific. Borrowing the term "Marshall Plan" from the post-World War II reconstruction effort, the coalition of Pacific island nation, which included Kiribati, Tuvalu, Fiji, and the Marshall Islands, called for an initiative that would include investment in renewable energy and shoreline protection, cultural preservation, economic assistance for economies in transition, and a plan for migration and resettlement for these countries as they confront the catastrophic effects of the melting of the Polar ice caps and the concomitant rise in sea level. The precise contours of the initiative remained unknown, unspecified, and a mere exercise in theory at the time of writing. Yet such an initiative would, at some point, have to be addressed, given the realities of climate change and the slow motion calamity unfolding each day for low-lying island nations across the world.

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As noted by Vice President Greg Stone of Conservation International, who also functions as an adviser to the government of Kiribati, “Imagine living in a place where you know it’s going to go away someday, but you don’t know what day that wave’s going to come over and wash your home away." He added, “It’s a disaster we know is going to happen.” Meanwhile, the intervening years promised to be filled with hardship for small island nations, such as Kiribati. Stone explained, “For every inch of sea-level rise, these islands lose 10 feet of their freshwater table to saltwater intrusion,” Stone explained. “So it’s not just about the day the water finally goes over the island; it’s also about the day that there’s just not enough water left and everyone has to move off the island.” Presaging the future for island nations that could face submersion, Stone said, “If you look ahead 50 years, a country like Kiribati could become the first aqueous nation. possibility of migration. That is, they own this big patch of ocean, and they administer it from elsewhere.”

Foreign Minister Minister Tony Debrum of the Marshall Islands emerged as the champion advocating on behalf of small island nation states and a loose coalition of concerned countries from the Pacific to the Caribbean, but with support from the United States. He addressed the comprehensive concerns of small island nations regarding the weaknesses of the deal, while simultaneously making clear that the Paris Agreement signified hope for the countries most at risk. In a formal statement, Debrum declared: "We have made history today. Emissions targets are still way off track, but this agreement has the tools to ramp up ambition, and brings a spirit of hope that we can rise to this challenge. I can go back home to my people and say we now have a pathway to survival.” Debrum highlighted the imperatives of Pacific island nations, saying, “Our High Ambition Coalition was the lightning rod we needed to lift our sights and expectations for a strong agreement here in Paris. We were joined by countries representing more than half the world. We said loud and clear that a bare-bones, minimalist agreement would not fly. We instead demanded an agreement to mark a turning point in history, and the beginning of our journey to the post-carbon era.”

Debrum of the Marshall Islands espoused the quintessential synopsis of the accord and its effects for those most likely to be affected by climate change as he noted, “Climate change won’t stop overnight, and my country is not out of the firing line just yet, but today we all feel a little safer.”

Editor's Entry on Environmental Policy:

The low-lying Pacific island nations of the world, including Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, Fiji, among others, are vulnerable to the threats posed by global warming and cimate change, derived from carbon emissions, and resulting in the rise in sea level. Other island nations in the Caribbean, as well as poor countries with coastal zones, were also at particular risk of suffering the deleterious effects of climate change.

Political policy in these countries are often connected to ecological issues, which have over time

Libya Review 2016 Page 415 of 437 pages Libya morphed into an existential crisis of sorts. Indeed, ecological concerns and the climate crisis have also been dominant themes with life and death consequences for the people of island nations in the Pacific. Indeed, the very livelihoods of fishing and subsistence farming remain at risk as a result of ecological and environmental changes. Yet even so, these countries are threatened by increasingly high storm surges, which could wipe out entire villages and contaminate water supplies. Moreover, because these are low lying island nations, the sustained rise in sea level can potentially lead to the terrain of these countries being unihabitable at best, and submerged at worst. Stated in plain terms, these countries are at severe risk of being obliterated from the map and their plight illuminates the emerging global challenge of environmental refugees. In these manifold senses, climate change is the existential crisis of the contemporary era.

Since the time of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, there have been efforts aimed at extending the life of that agreement, with an eye on minimizing greenhouse gas emissions, and thus minimizing the effects of climate change. Those endeavors have largely ended in failure, as exemplified by the unsuccessful Copenhagen talks in 2009 and the fruitless Doha talks in 2012 respectively. The success of the COP 21 talks in France, with the adoption of the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015, was regarded as the first glimmer of hope. Not only did the Paris Agreement signify the triumph of international diplomacy and global consensus, but it also marked the start of the end of the fossil fuel era, with the path forward toward a low carbon future reliant on greener technologies. Most crucially, the Paris Agreement stood as the first significant response in recent times to the central challenge of climate change and its quotidian effects on the lives of real human beings across the world.

1. Major International Environmental Accords:

General Environmental Concerns

Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 1991.

Accords Regarding Atmosphere

Annex 16, vol. II (Environmental Protection: Aircraft Engine Emissions) to the 1044 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Montreal, 1981

Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), Geneva, 1079

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), New York, 1002

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Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 1985 including the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Depleted the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 1987

Accords Regarding Hazardous Substances

Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movements and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, Bamako, 1991

Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused during Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), Geneva, 1989

Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention), Basel, 1989

Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Helsinki, 1992

Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within the South Pacific Region (Waigani Convention), Waigani, 1995

European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), Geneva 1957

FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides, Rome, 1985

2. Major International Marine Accords:

Global Conventions

Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention 1972), London, 1972

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by Protocol of 1978 relation thereto (MARPOL 73/78), London, 1973 and 1978

International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 (1969 CLC), Brussels, 1969, 1976, and 1984

International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil

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Pollution Damage 1971 (1971 Fund Convention), Brussels, 1971

Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS), London 1996

International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Co-operation (OPRC), London, 1990

International Convention Relation to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (Intervention Convention), Brussels, 1969

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Montego Bay, 1982

Regional Conventions

Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (Oslo Convention), Oslo, 1972

Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based Sources (Paris Convention), Paris, 1974

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention), Paris, 1992

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (1974 Helsinki Convention), Helsinki 1974

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (1992 Helsinki Convention), Helsinki 1992

Conventions within the UNEP Regional Seas Programme

Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution, Bucharest, 1992

Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, Cartagena de Indias, 1983

Convention for the Protection, Management, and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region, Nairobi, 1985

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Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution, Kuwait, 1978

Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment and Coastal Region of the Mediterranean Sea (Barcelona Convention), Barcelona, 1976

Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, Jeddah, 1982

Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region, Noumea, 1986

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South-East Pacific, Lima, 1981

Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region, Abidjan, 1981

3. Major Conventions Regarding Living Resources:

Marine Living Resources

Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), Canberra, 1980

International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), Rio de Janeiro, 1966

International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), Washington, 1946

Nature Conservation and Terrestrial Living Resources

Antarctic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 1959

Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention), Paris, 1972

Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Nairobi, 1992

Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), Bonn, 1979

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Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Washington, D.C., 1973

Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention), Ramsar, 1971

Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD), Paris 1994

FAO International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Rome, 1983

International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1994 (ITTA, 1994), Geneva, 1994

Freshwater Resources

Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Helsinki, 1992

4. Major Conventions Regarding Nuclear Safety:

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Assistance Convention), Vienna, 1986

Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Notification Convention), Vienna, 1986

Convention on Nuclear Safety, Vienna, 1994

Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, 1963

5. Major Intergovernmental Organizations

Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)

European Union (EU): Environment

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

Global Environment Facility (GEF)

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International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

International Labour Organization (ILO)

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds)

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Environment Policy Committee (EPOC)

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)

United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

World Bank

World Food Programme (WFP)

World Health Organization (WHO)

World Meteorological Organization (WMO)

World Trade Organization (WTO)

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6. Major Non-Governmental Organizations

Atmosphere Action Network East Asia (AANEA)

Climate Action Network (CAN)

Consumers International (CI)

Earth Council

Earthwatch Institute

Environmental Liaison Centre International (ELCI)

European Environmental Bureau (EEB)

Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)

Friends of the Earth International (FoEI)

Greenpeace International

International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)

International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)

International Solar Energy Society (ISES)

IUCN-The World Conservation Union

Pesticide Action Network (PAN)

Sierra Club

Society for International Development (SID)

Third World Network (TWN)

Water Environment Federation (WEF)

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Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO)

World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)

World Federalist Movement (WFM)

World Resources Institute (WRI)

World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF)

7. Other Networking Instruments

Arab Network for Environment and Development (RAED)

Global Legislators for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE)

Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC)

United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service (UN-NGLS)

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Appendices

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Bibliography

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sources: Key Data

Altapedia. URL: http://www.atlapedia.com/online/country_index.htm

Ethnologue. URL: http://www.ethnologue.com

Geobase Global Statistics. URL: http://www.geoba.se

Infoplease: URL: http://www.infoplease.com

The Statesman's Year Book 2006. Barry Turner, ed. London: St. Martin's Press.

United States Department of State, Background Notes. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.htm

United States Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook. Washington, D.C.: Printing and Photography Group. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html

World Bank. URL: http://www.worldbank.org/

World Climate Data Online. URL: http://www.worldclimate.com

Methodology Note for Demographic Data:

The demographic numbers for cities and national populations listed in CountryWatch content are derived from the Geoba.se website, which analyzes data from the World Bank. The current demographic numbers displayed on the Countrywatch website are reflective of the latest available estimates.

The demographic information for language, ethnicity and religion listed in CountryWatch content is

Libya Review 2016 Page 425 of 437 pages Libya derived from a mix of sources including the Altapedia, Central Intelligence Agency Factbook, Infoplease, and State Department Background Notes.

Sources: Political Overview

Agence France Presse. URL: http://www.afp.com/en/

BBC International News. URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews)

Britannica Book of the Year. 1998-present. David Calhoun, ed. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.

Britannica Online URL :http://www.eb.com

Britannica Year in Review. URL: http://www.britannica.com/browse/year

Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/chiefs/index.html

Christian Science Monitor. URL: http://www.csmonitor.com/ (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews)

CNN International News. URL:http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/ (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews)

Current Leaders of Nations. 1997. Jennifer Mossman, ed. Detroit: Gale Research

The Economist Magazine. (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews)

The Economist Country Briefings. URL: http://www.economist.com/countries/

Eldis Country Profiles. URL: http://www.eldis.org/country/index.htm

Elections Around the World. URL: http://www.electionworld.org/

Election Resources. URL: http://electionresources.org/

Europa World Yearbook 1999. Vols. I & II. 1999. London: Europa Publications Ltd.

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Europe World Online. URL: http://www.europaworld.com/pub/

Financial Times. URL: http://www.financialtimes.com

Foreign Government Resources. URL: http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/foreign.html

Human Rights Watch. URL: http://www.hrw.org

IFES Election Guide. URL: http://www.electionguide.org

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. URL: http://www.idea.int/

International Who's Who 1997-1998, 61st Edition. 1997. London: Europa Publications Ltd.

Leadership Views, Chiefs of State Online. URL : http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/chiefs/index.html

Library of Congress Country Studies. URL: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html

New Encyclopedia Britannica. 1998. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc.

New York Times. URL: http://www.nytimes.com (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews)

Patterns of Global Terrorism. n.d. United States Department of State. Washington D.C.: United States Department of State Publications.

Political Handbook of the World. n.d. Arthur S. Banks, Thomas C. Muller, ed. Binghamton, New York: CSA Publications.

Political Reference Almanac Online. URL: http://www.polisci.com/almanac/nations.htm

Reuters News. URL: http://www.reuters.com/

Rulers. URL: http://rulers.org/

The Guardian Online. URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/ (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews)

The Statesman's Year-Book 2006. Barry Turner, ed. London: St. Martin's Press.

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United Nations Development Programme. URL: http://hdr.undp.org

United Nations Refugee Agency. URL: http://www.unhcr.org

United States Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook.Washington, D.C.: Printing and Photography Group. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html

United States Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) URL : http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_ac/reports_ac.html

United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. URL: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18245.htm

United States Department of State, Background Notes. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html

Virtual Library: International Relations Resources. URL: http://www.etown.edu/vl/countgen.html

World Bank: Governance Indicators. URL: http://info.worldbank.org/governance

-- See also list of News Wires services below, which are also used for research purposes. --

Note on Edition Dates:

The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original Country Reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above) contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.

Sources: Economic Overview

BP Statistical Review of World Energy. URL: http://www.bp.com/genericsection.do? categoryId=92&contentId=7005893

BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 1998. 1998 to present. Page 1.C. London: The British Petroleum Company.

International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services.

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International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 1998 to present. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services.

International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 1999 to present. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services.

International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, May 1999. 1999 to present. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services.

International Labour Office, World Employment Report, 1998-99. 1998 to present. Geneva: International Labour Office.

United Nations Statistical Division Online. URL: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm

United Nations Statistics Division, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (MBS On Line), November 1999 Edition. 1999 to present. New York: United Nations.

United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 43rd Issue. 1999. 1999 to present New York: United Nations.

United Nations, Food & Agricultural Organization, FAOSTAT Database. URL : http://apps.fao.org/ United Nations, Comtrade Data Base, http://comtrade.un.org/

United States Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs. URL:http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html

United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Database

United States Geological Service, Mineral Information

United States Department of State, Country Commercial Guides. Washington, D.C. United States of America. URL:http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/com_guides/index.html

The World Bank, Global Development Finance, Country Tables. 1999 to present. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators. 1999 to present. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

Yearbook of Tourism Statistics, World Tourism Organization. 1998 to present. Madrid: The World Tourism Organization.

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Note on Edition Dates:

The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original country reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above) contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.

Methodology Notes for Economic Data:

Estimates by CountryWatch.com of GDP in dollars in most countries are made by converting local currency GDP data from the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook to US dollars by market exchange rates estimated from the International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics and projected out by the CountryWatch Macroeconomic Forecast. Real GDP was estimated by deflating current dollar values by the US GDP Implicit Price Deflator.

Exceptions to this method were used for: • Bosnia-Herzegovina • Nauru • Cuba • Palau • Holy See • San Marino • Korea, North • Serbia & Montenegro • Liberia • Somalia • Liechtenstein • Tonga • Monaco • Tuvalu

In these cases, other data and/or estimates by CountryWatch.com were utilized.

Investment Overview

Corruption and Transparency Index. URL: http://www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/2001/cpi2001.html#cpi

Deloitte Tax Guides. URL: http://www.deloittetaxguides.com

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Trade Policy Reviews by the World Trade Organization . URL: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm#bycountry

United States Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs. URL: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html

United States Department of State, Background Notes. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html

United States Department of State, Country Commercial Guides. 1996-2006. Washington, D.C. United States of America. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/com_guides/index.html

World Bank: Doing Business. URL: http://www.doingbusiness.org

World Bank: Governance Indicators. URL: http://info.worldbank.org/governance

Social Overview

Borden, G.A., Conaway, W.A., Morrison, T. 1994. Kiss, Bow, or Shake Hands: How to do Business in Sixty Countries. Holbrook, Massachusetts, 1994.

Center for Disease Control. URL: http://www.cdc.gov

Eldis Country Profiles. URL: http://www.eldis.org/country/index.htm

Ethnologue. URL: http://www.ethnologue.com/

Government of Australia Department of Foreign Affiars and Trade. URL: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo

Government of Canada Foreign Affairs and International Trade. URL: http://www.voyage.gc.ca/consular_home-e.htm

Library of Congress Country Studies. URL: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html

Lonely Planet. URL: http://www.lonelyplanet.com/worldguide/

Steve Kropla's Online Help For World Travelers. URL: http://www.kropla.com/

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United Kingdom Ministry of Foreign and Commonwealth Office. URL: http://www.fco.gov.uk/

United Nations Human Development Report. URL: http://www.undp.org/hdro

UNICEF Statistical Database Online. URL: http://www.unicef.org/statis/atoz.html

United States Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook. 2001. Washington, D.C.: Printing and Photography Group. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html

United States Department of State, Background Notes. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html

United States Department of State, Commercial and Business Affairs: Travel Tips. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/cba_travel.html

United States Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs. URL: http://travel.state.gov/

World Health Organization. URL: http://www.who.int/home-page/

World News Connection, National Technical Information Service. Springfield, Virginia, USA.

Internet News Service, Xinhua News Agency (U.S.) Inc. Woodside, New York. URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/

Note on Edition Dates:

Methodology Notes for the HDI:

Since 1990, the United Nations Development Programme, in concert with organizations across the globe, has produced the Human Development Index (or HDI). According to the UNDP, the index measures average achievement in basic human development in one simple composite index, and produces from this index a ranking of countries. The HDI is a composite of three basic components of human development: longevity, knowledge and standard of living. Longevity is measured by life expectancy. Knowledge is measured by combination of adult literacy and mean

Libya Review 2016 Page 432 of 437 pages Libya years of schooling. Standard of living is measured by purchasing power, based on real GDP per capita (in constant US$) adjusted for differences in international living costs (or, purchasing power parity, PPP). While the index uses these social indicators to measure national performance with regard to human welfare and development, not all countries provide the same level of information for each component needed to compute the index; therefore, as in any composite indicator, the final index is predicated on projections, predictions and weighting schemes. The index is a static measure, and thus, an incomplete measure of human welfare. In fact, the UNDP says itself the concept of human development focuses on the ends rather than the means of development and progress, examining in this manner, the average condition of all people in a given country.

Specifically, the index is calculated by determining the maximum and minimum for each of the three components (as listed above) and then measuring where each country stands in relation to these scales-expressed as a value between 0 and 1. For example, the minimum adult literary rate is zero percent, the maximum is 100 percent, and the reading skills component of knowledge in the HDI for a country where the literacy rate is 75 percent would be 0.75. The scores of all indicators are then averaged into the overall index.

For a more extensive examination of human development, as well as the ranking tables for each participating country, please visit: http://www.undp.org

Note on History sections

In some CountryWatch Country Reviews, open source content from the State Department Background Notes and Country Guides have been used.

Environmental Overview

Environmental Profiles: A Global Guide to Projects and People. 1993. Linda Sobel Katz, Sarah Orrick, and Robert Honig. New York: Garland Publishing.

The Environment Encyclopedia and Directory, 2nd Edition. 1998. London: Europa.

Environmental Protection Agency Global Warming Site. URL: http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming

Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations: Forestry. URL: http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/sofo/en/

Global Warming Information Page. URL: http://globalwarming.org

Introduction to Global Environmental Issues, 2nd Edition. 1997. Kevin Pickering and Lewis Owen.

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London: Routledge.

Trends: Compendium of Data on Global Change. URL: http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/trends/emis/em_cont.htm

United Nations Environmental Program. URL: http://www.unep.org/GEO/GEO_Products/Assessment_Reports/

United Nations Global Environmental Outlook. URL: http://www.unep.org/geo/geo4/media/

United States Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs. URL: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html

World Climate Data Online. URL: http://www.worldclimate.com

World Directory of Country Environmental Studies. 1996. The World Resource Institute.

World Factbook. US Central Intelligence Agency. Washington, D.C.: Printing and Photography Group.

1998-1999 World Resources Guide to the Global Environment by the World Resources Institute. May, 1998.

1998/1999 Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development. 1998. London: Earthscan Publications.

Note on Edition Dates:

Other Sources:

General information has also been used in the compilation of this review, with the courtesy of governmental agencies from this country.

News Services:

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CANA Daily Bulletin. Caribbean Media Agency Ltd., St. Michael, Barbados.

Central and Eastern Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa.

Daily News, Panafrican News Agency. Dakar, Senegal.

PACNEWS, Pacific Islands Broadcasting Association. Suva, Fiji.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Washington D.C. USA.

Reuters News. Thomson Reuters. New York, New York. USA.

Southern Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa.

Voice of America, English Service. Washington D.C.

West Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Network for West Africa. 1998-1999

Note: Some or all these news services have been used to research various sections of this Country Review.

USING COUNTRYWATCH.COM AS AN ELECTRONIC SOURCE:

MLA STYLE OF CITATION

Commentary

For items in a "Works Cited" list, CountryWatch.com suggests that users follow recommended patterns forindentation given in the MLA Handbook, 4th edition.

Individual Works

Basic form, using an Internet protocol:

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Author/editor. Title of Print Version of Work. Edition statement (if given). Publication information (Place of publication: publisher, date), if given. Title of Electronic Work. Medium. Available Protocol (if applicable):Site/Path/File. Access date.

Examples:

Youngblood-Coleman, Denise. Country Review: France. 2003. Houston, Texas: CountryWatch Publications, 2003. Country Review:France. Online. Available URL: http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_country.asp?vCOUNTRY=61 October, 12, 2003. Note: This is the citation format used when the print version is not used in the reference.

Parts of Works

Basic form, using an Internet protocol:

Author/editor. "Part title." Title of Print Version of Work. Edition statement (if given). Publication information (Place of publication: publisher, date), if given. Title of Electronic Work. Medium. AvailableProtocol (if applicable): Site/Path/File. Access date.

Examples:

Youngblood-Coleman, Denise. "People." CountryWatch.com: France. 2003. Houston, Texas: CountryWatch Publications, 2003. CountryWatch.com: France. Online. Available URL : http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.asp? vCOUNTRY=61&SECTION=SOCIAL&TOPIC=CLPEO&TYPE=TEXT. October 12, 2003.

Note: This is the citation format used when the print version is not used in the reference.

For further source citation information, please email: [email protected] or [email protected].

Libya Review 2016 Page 436 of 437 pages CountryWatch

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