Matteo Ilardo FOKUS | 9/2019 Conflict Analysis: The Second Libyan Civil war – and how to avoid a third one Introduction problems for a long-lasting stability. In monopoly of violence, the most compel- order to re-build the profoundly fractured ling problem in Libya is the extremely Since the fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libyan society, the first step is to reach a volatile security environment. The two 2011, the stabilization expected for the permanent truce between the two blocs competing political authorities both rely post-conflict transition in Libya has not in order to achieve a sufficient stability to upon different power arrangements to been achieved yet. On the contrary, the disarm and demobilize the several armed encounter their security needs, but none country is now divided into two main groups active in the country and therefore of them has firm control over each actor political centers of power and has been allow the formation of a national unity within their security complexes. Therefore, sinking into an endemic civil war ever government. This conflict analysis precisely neither in Tripoli nor in the East, there is since. Eight years after the revolution, aims to address these very last points. anything that could possibly be construed Libya remains in a chaotic state, home to as a stable, legitimate security authority.3 armed groups, terrorists, and criminal net- Conflict’s Causes works. After the expiration of the Libyan On a different level, the Libyan conflict Political Agreement (LPA) in December The deep-rooted tensions within Libyan is, to a large extent, a conflict for oil.4 2017, any effort to find a political com- society, substantially deriving from the The resource accounts for 82% of Libyan promise between Tripoli and Tobruk have unequal distribution of power and wealth, export earnings and 60% of the GDP.5 It been constantly undermined both by the date back to the birth of the post-colonial is self-evident why the control of the oil political fragmentation on the ground and state but re-emerged only in 2011 with industry lies at the heart of the quest for by detrimental foreign proxies. Moreo- the removal of Qaddafi after 42 years of power and legitimacy between East and ver, a solution for the East-West division authoritarian regime. More proximate West.6 Not for nothing, with the split of seems now even further out of reach with vulnerabilities, on the other hand, have the national institutions between the tensions reaching their peak in 2014 and crippled the post-revolution political Tripoli and the Tobruk-al-Bayda’s authori- have been deteriorating since. Following system since its earliest days until when, ties, the NOC, the Libyan state-owned oil the recent offensive on Tripoli launched at the beginning of 2014, rising tensions company, also got split into two parallel on April 4 by forces from the country’s between increa singly polarized factions institutions respectively based in Tripoli East and coming only 10 days ahead of a eventually resulted into widespread out- and Benghazi, with the former operating UN-sponsored peace conference that was breaks of violence across the country.1 The under international recognition and the supposed to finally break through the po- Libyan conflict is ultimately driven by the latter exporting the crude illicitly.7 While litical gridlock and schedule new general desire for power and resources rather than keeping on calling for the dissolution of its elections, the long-hoped-for stabilization competing ideologies. counterpart in Benghazi, the Tripoli-based of the country remains a long way off. Still, NOC has recently suspended operations with the possibility of a third full-scale Proximate Drivers of Violence at the country’s largest oil field due to civil war in less than ten years becoming an “unlawful” closure of a pipeline valve increasingly likely, a solution to the conflict The most obvious reason behind the linking the El Sharara oilfield to the port is needed now more than ever. ongoing crisis is the absence of a strong of Zawiya, on the Mediterranean coast.8 central authority that could fill the vacuum Albeit in control of the El Sharara oil field, The ultimate scope of this conflict analysis of power left by the Qaddafi regime and Haftar’s forces do not exercise full control is therefore to propose recommendations the consequential political fragmentation. of its pipeline’s route which runs partially for a swift interruption of violence and Since the 2011 overthrow of the regime, through territories held by militias allied to set the stage for the creation of those no political faction has ever enjoyed with the Tripoli government.9 This shows, sine qua non conditions for a national sufficient support to rule the country and on the one hand, the fragility of the Libyan reconciliation and stabilization process. In an overabundance of actors have con- oil production – at its lowest levels in the other words, following a comprehensive sequently crowded the national political last five months – and, on the other hand, analysis of the conflict, the most proximate landscape due to a total lack of political how the ability to control or disrupt it causes of the conflict will be specifically consensus.2 This situation resulted in con- plays a pivotal role in the conflict.10 addressed to find a near-term solution for flict in 2014 and is now the main reason the achievement of a functional “negative for the ongoing political stalemate. As an Finally, all the above is compounded by peace”, leaving future analyses the onerous immediate consequence of the absence detrimental foreign proxies. As pinpointed task of addressing more deeply rooted of a central government with the resulting by the human rights activist and former 1 Conflict Analysis: The Second Libyan Civil war FOKUS | 9/2019 Vice-Chairman of the National Transitional illicit trafficking and smuggling of migrants centers of power compete for power, Council of Libya during the 2011 revo- are a constant occurrence in Libya. As the legitimacy, and everything that goes along lution, Abdul Hafiz Ghoga, “there will be war economy intensifies, the chances of with it, above all, the control over finan- no peace and stability in Libya unless the restoring a national central governance cial institutions and resources. The main international community reaches consen- drastically diminish, since armed groups political actors are therefore split between sus.” Mr. Ghoga touched the heart of the and local militias are among the major the capital Tripoli, the western strong- issue here as competing interests from beneficiaries of these illegal lucrative hold, and the eastern bloc of Torbuk and various global and regional powers have networks.14 Criminal and terrorist orga- al-Bayda. Originally, the competing centers significantly crippled the efforts of the UN nizations are the biggest spoilers of the of power were three, with Tripoli having to find a political compromise between Tri- conflict. The two, present in both the GNA a second claimant, the Government of poli and Tobruk, with the former suppor- and LNA-controlled territories and enabled National Salvation (GNS). Headed by Pri- ted, among the others, by Qatar, Turkey, to sustain themselves by the remunera- me Minister Khalifa al-Ghawi until March Italy, and the United States and the latter tive incentives offered by the Libyan war 2016, the GNS is today no longer in control mainly backed by Egypt, United Arab Emi- economy, represent a serious impediment of any relevant institution.16 The quest for rates (UAE), France, and Russia.11 Among to peace as short-term gains get priori- legitimacy is therefore a two-horse race them, France, Italy, Egypt, the UAE, and the tized at the group level over wider national between the UN-backed government in United States have called in a recently is- stability and security. Tripoli and the parliament in Tobruk. sued rare joint statement for an immediate The politico-administrative structure in end of hostilities around Tripoli warning On top of the above, and partially due to Tripoli is the outcome of the fragile-born how “terrorist groups” are exploiting the both the absence of government and the UN-brokered agreement, the LPA. Since country’s security vacuum and “there can presence of lucrative networks, the insta- March 2016 the capital has been officially be no military solution in Libya”.12 Still, the bility in Libya has awakened ancient tribal governed by two institutions deriving disunity so far exposed at the international feuds throughout the country. This is the their legitimacy from the agreement, level is far from being replaced by a more case, for instance, in Tripolitania between the Presidential Council (PC) and the robust international approach to resolving the Zintan and the Wershefana’s Tribes, in Government of National Accord (GNA), the conflict as seeking a simple cease-fire Fezzan between the Tuaregs and the Te- holding respectively the supervisory and is likely to merely give Haftar and the GNA- bus, and in Cyrenaica where the Awaqeer, executive powers of the country. The two aligned forces the opportunity to rearm, Magharbeh and Obaidat tribes have been are both headed by Fayez al-Sarraj, who’s reorganize, and re-entrench themselves on growing resentful towards the Haftar’s leadership is weak and constantly crippled offensive positions. leadership.15 Further complicating this situ- by the necessity to lean on a complex of ation, historical rivalries are also inflamed several different security actors to exert Resulting Sources of Instability by the aforementioned opportunities of- control over the capital.17 Still, the control fered by the war economy, especially with of Tripoli gives Al-Sarraj and his GNA a con- There are several destabilizing elements regard to the smuggling business that has siderable advantage, namely the control contributing to further complicate the pre- been benefitting some groups over others, over strategic infrastructure such as ports carious situation on the ground.