Writing Wales
Writing Wales:
Welsh Historians and the Search for
Welsh Identity,
1970-1997.
Name: Lindsay Henderson
Degrees: BA (QUT)
: BA Honours (First Class) (QUT)
School: Humanities and Human Services
Centre: Centre for Social Change Research
Thesis: Submitted for a PhD
Year of Submission: 2007
i
Keywords
Wales
Identity
Britain
Welsh-English Relationship
Historiography
ii
Abstract
This thesis is a study of the way in which Wales and Welshness have been
depicted in Welsh general histories published in the period between 1970 and 1997.
National identity has been and remains a topical and controversial issue in Wales, due
to the complex and multiple nature of the identities that could be classified as
‘national’ identities. Correspondingly, the issue of identity, particularly national and regional identities, has been the subject of considerable study within Wales. These studies have provided considerable insight into the nature of Welsh identity but there
remain significant gaps in the overall research picture. This study focuses on one: the
way in which Welsh historiography has portrayed Wales and Welshness.
The very nature of Welsh history means that such a study must also involve
consideration of the impact of England and the relationship between Wales and
England on the historiographical depictions of Wales and Welshness. England, as the
dominant country in Britain and Wales’ neighbour, has played a major role in shaping
both the Welsh historical experience and Welsh identity, facts to which Welsh
historians must respond, particularly when writing general histories of their country.
This thesis, then, also examines the depiction of the Welsh-English relationship
within Welsh national historiography and the way this, in turn, impacted on the way
in which the historians portrayed Wales and Welshness.
These concepts are very significant for both Welsh historiography and the
wider study of Welsh identity. Historical studies, in providing the information for the
construction of historically based national identities, are heavily involved in the larger
issue of Welsh identity. This study aims to contribute to the research on Welsh identity through the analysis of this specific area of Welsh historiography. In doing iii
so, this thesis offers a new way of approaching the complicated and very real issues of understanding Wales, Welshness and the relationship between Wales and England. iv
Contents Keywords. i
Abstract. ii
Abbreviations. v
Statement of Ownership. vi
Acknowledgements. vii
Introduction. 1
Chapter One. Questioning Britain and the Boundaries of the 21 Welsh-English Relationship: 1970-1979.
Chapter Two. Arthur Herbert Dodd and Gwynfor Evans: 68 Historiographical Confidence.
Chapter Three. A Search for Wales and Welshness: the 1980s. 121
Chapter Four. Wynford Vaughan-Thomas and Gwyn A. Williams: 170 Historiography and the Search For Wales.
Chapter Five. Towards Wales or Europe? The 1990s. 229
Chapter Six. J. Graham Jones and John Davies: A New 278 Framework?
Conclusion. 335
Bibliography. 343
v
Abbreviations and Welsh Terms
Abbreviations
EC European Community
EEC European Economic Community
EU European Union
SNP Scottish Nationalist Party
Welsh Terms
Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg Welsh Language Society
Gwerin Peasantry/Welsh folk
Meibion Glyndwr Sons of Glyndwr (Nationalist supporters of
direct action)
Plaid Cymru Party of Wales
Tynged yr Iaith Fate of the Language (A radio broadcast by
Saunders Lewis)
Uchelwyr Aristocracy/upper class/nobles
Author’s Note
There appears to be some historical debate over the use of ‘ab’ or ‘ap’ in relation to
Llywelyn ab Iorwerth. This study follows John Davies’ use of ‘ab’. Owain Glyn
Dwr’s appellation records similar variations, and this study uses the above form. vi
Statement of Authorship
The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted for a degree or diploma at this or any other higher education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made. vii
Acknowledgements
When I began my PhD, I had no idea what I was getting into. Or rather, I
knew intellectually, but knowing and understanding are two very different things.
Despite the eventual shocked realisation of what a PhD involved, the almost four
years that I have spent researching, writing, and rewriting have been an incredibly
rewarding learning experience. So thank-you, Gary Ianziti and John Ainsworth, for your supervision, advice and guidance. I really appreciate all the work you have put
in to get my PhD and me to this point!
I also owe a huge vote of thanks to my family, who have supported me right
the way through. Thank-you, Mum and Martti, for everything and, most especially,
for always being around. Thanks, Hope, for all the dinners, movies and ice-creams –
wonderful stress relief! My grandparents and aunt cheerfully provided me with a
home and family away from home during my several trips to Wales for research and
conferences. Thanks, all. My trips over would have been considerably more difficult
without you!
My friends have also been fantastic and have definitely helped to keep me
grounded and sane. Your patience has been much appreciated. Thanks, Lisa,
Catherine, Merran and Alvin. 1
Introduction
Studies of Welsh identity indicate the centrality and influence of England and the complicated and multi-layered nature of identity within Wales. Welsh identity has, in this wide context, been approached from many angles: literature, Britain,
religion, industry, and experiential Welshness. Each approach has provided a position from which to explore the ways in which Welsh identity has been constructed, expressed and experienced. History – the study of the Welsh past – has facilitated this
examination. Over the last four decades, the field of Welsh history has been widely
explored, providing the groundwork for the examination of the construction of aspects
of Welsh identity over a considerable period of time. In the late 1990s, the way
history was used to depict images of Wales also became a topic of study. This shift
towards the analysis of the role of the Welsh historical tradition has played in the
construction of Welsh identity opened the door to a historiographical analysis of the
topic. Such an analysis would, when placed in the wider context of Welsh identity
studies, facilitate a deeper and wider understanding of the identity debate in Wales.
This thesis, then, is an effort to analyse the identity debate from the perspective of
historiography. In order to do so, this thesis argues that Welsh national history has
been built around the framework of the relationship between Wales and England, and
expresses the resultant conflict over what, precisely, can be considered to be the
identity of Wales and the Welsh people.
In order to examine this proposition, I selected, on the basis of three criteria,
six history books published between 1970 and 1997 and have analysed the way in
which all six portrayed Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-English relationship. To
look at the national situation, these books had to address national Welsh history. As 2
national histories address the widest time period available, they enabled me to trace
the historiographical depictions of the Welsh-English relationship, Wales and
Welshness throughout a variety of periods and events. It is, after all, to events over
the entire national history, from nation formation to the present day, to which theoreticians of national identity like Anthony D. Smith refer. According to Anthony
D. Smith, a connection with a shared past, a national history, is one of the essential
facets of national identity. This shared past can be accessed through myth, popular
history, or academic-based history: it is the shared past itself that is significant.1
History provides the outline of the nation: how it was formed, its significant events,
and the connections between the people and the geographical territory of a nation.2
This argument was more philosophically reinforced by Ross Poole in his book
Nation and Identity.3 National identity, including history had, according to Poole,
become a fundamental part of the way we articulate our self.4 History, through its
fundamental position in our understanding of our national identity, tied with our
national experience of the past to connect us with events that occurred before our life
time.5 Nation, national identity and history are, in this interpretation, inextricably
intertwined, and demand “…a moral involvement in our nation’s past and its
future…”6 History, then, not only facilitates national identity, community and a sense
of a shared past but influences the way the claimant of that national identity views the
future.
Benedict Anderson approached the argument from a slightly different
perspective, focusing on the production of a popularly available literature, of which
1 Anthony D. Smith (1991) National Identity. London: Penguin, pp.21-22. 2 Ibid., pp.22-23. 3 Ross Poole (1999) Nation and Identity. London: Routledge. 4 Ibid., p.69. 5 Ibid., pp.72-73. 6 Ibid., p.73. 3
historical works formed a part. Theoretically, Benedict Anderson argued that a nation
was an imagined community, made possible by the rise of a combination of print
culture and capitalism.7 Print culture facilitated the dominance of a unitary written
language within the nation, while capitalism fostered the desire to sell and possess.
This combination facilitated the spread within a group of people of an awareness of
their status as a nation, rather than simply as a region or locality. Popularly available
literature enabled those separated by distance to imagine the other’s life, to realise the
commonality they shared, and to feel a mutual sense of belonging to one nation.
Historiography, in its widest sense as written history, forms a significant part of this
literature, enabling those who read it to feel a connection with a shared past. National
history, then, provides a connection with a national past, facilitating the emergence of
a national identity.
For the present analysis to be fair and productive, it needed to involve books
that had a certain level of similarity. That is not to argue that the objects had to be
identical: such a requirement would be impossible to fulfil and would render any such comparison pointless. Given this, I decided to limit the books I would analyse according to the nature of the book, the time span covered, and the possession of a single author who was an active part of the Welsh intelligentsia. All three of these criteria also served other purposes. Firstly, in limiting my selection of books to those that were general histories of Wales rather than specialised academic monographs, I focused in on the history books most likely to be easily accessible to the general public in terms of physical access and content. National histories were written with the general public in mind and, unlike specialised academic monographs did not presume a pre-existing knowledge base on which to build their argument. The former
7 Benedict Anderson (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. London; New York: Verso, pp.37-40. 4
histories also tended to avoid extensive referencing and abstract historical arguments,
rendering the contents more accessible by those not possessing either a prior
knowledge of the history of Wales or much exposure to history as a discipline or field
of study. They were, therefore, more likely to contribute towards the construction of
the public perception of Wales, Welshness and the relationship between Wales and
England in Britain than the more specialised books. The second criterion was primarily aimed at enabling comparison, but only choosing books that covered the
same lengthy time period, from pre-Celtic times to the present day, also meant that I
could consider how the authors’ viewed several different major events and key
people, facilitating greater depth of analysis. The third criterion, the possession of a
single author, ensured the focus remained on national histories, excluding two history
series that, when taken as an entirety met the time span criteria but were too strongly
influenced by the multiplicity of their authors to be used as an analytical unit or to be
considered national histories. The second part of that criterion – being an active part of the Welsh intelligentsia – ensured that the images depicted in the books were actually relevant to the way the Welsh themselves viewed their country and identity, as opposed to the way someone from outside Wales might have seen these facets.
The period on which the study is focused and from which the history books
were selected was set between 1970 and 1997 for several reasons. The final three
decades of the twentieth century witnessed substantial changes in both Britain and in
Wales, changes that strongly influenced both popular and elite perceptions of nation, state and identity. To some extent, these changes began in the 1960s, but as far as I am aware, no books matching the above criteria were published in this decade. The
1960s, however, saw the gradual rise of output in the field of Welsh history as a result of the growth and expansion of British universities and by the 1970s this had spilled 5
over into the arena of popular history. Two general history books matching all of the criteria were published in this decade: hence, I decided to begin my study here. The
1970s also saw the lead up to the first devolution referendum, the build up to the fall
of the British post-war consensus, Britain’s entry into the European Union, and
various other events that would contribute towards moulding Wales into its modern
form. It could be argued that events of similar magnitude occurred in earlier decades
as well but the fact remains that the other decades did not produce general histories
that matched my criteria. It would have been possible to examine the books published
between 1900 and the 1950s but while such a study would have been highly
elucidating, it would not have been able to contribute as directly to understanding the
modern shape of Welsh historiography as a study commencing in the 1970s.
The end-date of 1997 held far more significance for Wales than the start date.
In 1997, the Welsh people voted the Welsh Assembly into existence, an action that
altered the framework of Wales quite significantly, if to a lesser extent than many
nationalists might have preferred. 1997, then, offered an obvious point at which to
end the study. The advent of devolution altered the political situation in Wales quite
substantially, and the two history books published in the years immediately following
the referendum were not written by Welsh historians. Jeremy Black, an English
historian, published his A New History of Wales in 20008 and Henry Weisser, an
American historian, published Wales: An Illustrated History in 2002 specifically for
Americans with Welsh ancestry. These two books indicated that Wales and Welsh
history were beginning to appear on an international stage. This fact is significant for
the international perception of the country and is also a reflection of the increased
validity of small nations and regional ethnic minorities on the world stage but is not
8 Jeremy Black (2000) A New History of Wales. Stroud: Sutton; Henry Weisser (2002) Wales: An Illustrated History. New York: Hippocrene Books Ltd. 6 contributive to a study of the Welsh historiographical depiction of Wales, Welshness and the relationship between Wales and England. Geraint H. Jenkins’ A Concise
History of Wales (2007)9 was the first national history to be published after the mid-
1990s. It might provide scope for a further research project considering changes towards Welsh identity within Welsh historiography after the 1997 ‘yes’ vote in the
Welsh devolution referendum. The present study is, however, set between the chronological boundaries of 1970 and 1997.
When the above criteria were applied in these time limits, six books matched all of the requirements. The six are as follows: Arthur Herbert Dodd’s A Short
History of Wales: Welsh Life and Customs from Prehistoric Times to the Present Day
(1972);10 Gwynfor Evans’ Land of My Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History
(1974);11 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas’ Wales: A History (1985);12 Gwyn A. Williams’
When was Wales? A History of the Welsh (1985);13 J. Graham Jones’ A Pocket Guide:
The History of Wales (1990);14 and John Davies’ A History of Wales (1993).15
Conveniently, two books were published in each decade, a chance occurrence that greatly facilitated the structure of the comparative analysis between the authors. Each book was also republished several times and all remain in print today, indicating their
9 Geraint H. Jenkins (2007) A Concise History of Wales. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10 Arthur Herbert Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales: Welsh Life and Customs from Prehistoric Times to the Present Day. Ruthin: John Jones Publishing Ltd. Originally published in 1972 by Batsford Press as Life in Wales. For ease of analysis, I will refer to it by its current title. Also published in 1977, 1990 & 1998. 11 Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of My Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History. Talybont: Y Lolfa. Originally published in Welsh in 1971 as Aros Mae. First published in English in 1974 and republished in 1984, 1992, 1993, 2000 and 2005. It is currently on its seventh reprint. 12 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History. London: Michael Joseph Ltd. Published in relation to the HTV series The Dragon Has Two Tongues: A History of the Welsh. 13 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When was Wales? A History of the Welsh. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd. Published in relation to the HTV series The Dragon Has Two Tongues: A History of the Welsh. 14 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales. Cardiff: University of Wales Press. Originally published in 1990 and republished in 1997 and 1998. 15 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales. London: Penguin. This book was first published in Welsh in 1990 as Hanes Cymru, and was republished in Welsh in 1992. It was published in English in 1993, and republished in 1994 and 2007. 7
contemporary and continued relevance to the Welsh who read history. Such a continued publication has also maximised the potential impact of each book’s interpretation of Wales, Welshness and the relationship between Wales and England on the popular Welsh perception of these factors. Books following other approaches to Welsh history were, of course, published during this period. However, the Welsh historians who took a more sceptical approach to Welsh identity and who, therefore, played a much smaller role in the nationalist tradition, did not choose to write general histories of Wales. Lacking such a popular vehicle, their views did not appear as consistently in the public arena.
Ultimately, the central point of this thesis is to demonstrate the centrality,
however unwitting, of the Welsh-English relationship to the framework of Welsh historiography and to a historiographically expressed Wales and Welshness. A considerable portion of the thesis is, therefore, devoted to this historiographical comparative analysis. Each section of Welsh history examined was placed in the context of the existing historiography and, for the 1980s and the 1990s, in the context of the books examined in the previous decades. This form of comparative analysis between the authors selected for each decade was chosen in order to facilitate the tracing of developments and changes in the way Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-
English relationship were depicted over the years between 1970 and 1997. It also provided the background against which the differences between the books themselves, and between the books and the wider historiography would be apparent.
In order to determine the extent to which the historiographical interpretations
of the Welsh-English relationship affected the portrayal of Wales and Welshness in
the history books, and the contrast between books within the decade and then across
the decades, I decided to focus on specific periods of Welsh history that included 8
events and/or people whose actions impacted the relationship between Wales and
England and that also allowed me access to the authors’ approaches to the concepts of
Wales and Welshness. There are many periods that match these criteria to some
extent, but five were particularly closely matched: the period in which Wales was
formed, the Welsh medieval and early modern Princes, the process of Union with
England, the growth of Nonconformity and industry, and the twentieth century. In
order to observe the level of change and continuity between decades, these five
periods were utilised throughout the three historiography chapters. Yet this analysis
would be without context if the wider situation was not also considered. All six of the
authors whose books were selected for examination within this thesis were active
members of the educated Welsh, a group frequently termed ‘intelligentsia.’ This term, while referring to a subset of the Welsh population with shared educational and participatory characteristics, does not imply unity. Differences of political opinion, of
linguistic ability – Welsh or English speaker – and regional identities all combined to
create a subsection of the population who were educated and vocal about issues
within Wales without being united. This Welsh intelligentsia are significant for this
study as they, in their vocalisation of their opinions and beliefs concerning the Welsh
situation in Wales, Britain, Europe and the wider world, created the intellectual
atmosphere within which each of the selected six historians worked. Given the nature
of this study, the analysis it contains will focus on the section of the Welsh
intelligentsia most actively involved in the English-language debate over Wales and
Welshness.
The Welsh intelligentsia expressed their considered views on Wales through a
variety of media, including journal articles. The Welsh journals that fielded this
debate hold a distinct advantage over media like newspapers, television and lectures 9
for those attempting to outline the debates of an earlier era. This is due to their
relative permanency in print, their collection into journals, their accessibility to a
national audience, and their facility for continued debate between contributors.
Correspondingly, the journal articles, when examined, provide considerable insight
into the issues that dominated the concerns of the Welsh intelligentsia in each decade
and the variety of responses to those concerns.
Three English-language journals offered the Welsh intelligentsia an arena for
this form of discussion. Indeed, all three were specifically founded to facilitate Welsh
sociological, political and cultural discussion. As such, these three journals, Planet,
Contemporary Wales and the New Welsh Review, formed the single most important vehicles for the debate about Welsh identity in English. Of these three, Planet was the only one existent in the 1970s, an indication that the structure of a national sociological critique was still developing in Wales. By the mid-1980s, however,
Contemporary Wales and the New Welsh Review were founded. Contemporary Wales commenced publication in 1987 with the stated intention of fielding research publications and debate within the field of social science in order to facilitate an interchange of views and greater depth of public discussion.16 The New Welsh
Review, first released in 1988, followed suit from a more literary perspective. This
new journal was, in fact, the reincarnation of an obsolete literary journal, The Anglo-
Welsh Review. Its 1988 version branched out to include socio-political concerns
while retaining a strong interest in language, literature and the culture related to both.
All three journals contained a number of debates over the relevant periods but one
debate dominated: the expression and boundaries of the relationship between England
and Wales. The dominance of this issue indicated the real centrality of the Welsh-
16 Graham Day & Gareth Rees (1987) “Editorial. Images of Contemporary Wales: Researching Social and Economic Change.” Contemporary Wales, Vol. 1, p.2. 10
English relationship for understanding Wales and Welshness and for grasping the
Welsh situation in general.
A smaller, more strongly nationalist section of this debate occurred in the
Welsh language in journals like Cof Cenedl, and Y Cymro, as well as in a variety of
pamphlets produced by Plaid Cymru. The latter usually included an English translation and, where relevant, this has been incorporated into the analysis. The
untranslated journal articles have, however, only been included through their
appearance in other English-language works. The inability of the majority of the
Welsh population to access these articles limited their impact on the public debate.
Such additional analysis could well be included in a further study.
The structure of my thesis has been designed to facilitate both the creation of
this context and the central historiographical analysis. The twenty-seven year period
has been divided into decades: the 1970s, the 1980s and the 1990s. Each decade is
dealt with over two chapters: the first covers the context and the second provides the
historiographical analysis. The division into decades emerged after research revealed
the presence of three periods in which the approach to the Welsh-English relationship
and, correspondingly, to Wales and Welshness changed substantially. These three
periods corresponded relatively neatly to the decades, with the first falling between
1970 and 1979, the second from 1979 to 1989, and the third from 1990 to 1997. The
boundaries between the second and third periods were noticeably blurred, unlike the
sharp division between the first and the second courtesy of the rejection of devolution
in the 1979 referendum. Such blurring is, actually, more the norm than the sharp
division in 1979, and the real presence of change over the 1980s and 1990s is strong
enough to make the use of the decade-divides a valid structure. 11
Each chapter is also internally divided, with the first chapter assessing the
major events in Britain, then the effect of these events on Wales and, finally, the
Welsh intelligentsia’s approach to the Welsh-English relationship in the context of the
events in both Britain and Wales. This final section is, essentially, composed of the
analysis of the journal articles published by the Welsh intelligentsia across three
journals, as well as a selection of political manifestoes and pamphlets, government
reports and similar publications. This final section is further divided into sections
according to the dominant fields of discussion evident in the journal articles that dealt
with some aspect of the relationship between Wales and England. Surprisingly, there
was a remarkable level of consistency of dominant fields over the three decades, with
issues like the economy, political identity, cultural identity, the Welsh language and
devolution featuring across the board. In fact, the fields were identical in the 1970s
and the 1980s: political identity and independence, cultural identity, the economic ties
between Wales and England in Britain and the potential for devolution.
There was, however, one additional field evident in the 1980s, centred on the
issue of historiography. This decade was marked by a tendency to question Wales
and Welshness – the aftermath of the rejection of devolution in 1979. Three Welsh
historians, R. Gerallt Jones, Dai Smith and Gwyn A. Williams,17 published articles
debating the direction, medium, content and functionality of Welsh historiography,
problematising the growing tendency to use history to create a neat and tidy Welsh
identity. These articles, while critical, did not lead to a major study of Welsh
historiography, however, and by 1990 this debate had disappeared from the discussion
17 R. Gerallt Jones (1985) “Mirror Images.” Planet, Vol. 51, pp.32-38; Dai Smith (1986) “Back to the Future.” Planet, Vol. 56, pp.14-25; Gwyn A. Williams (1988) “Are Welsh Historians Putting on the Style?” Planet, Vol. 68, pp.23-31. 12
fielded by the Welsh intelligentsia, although a variant remained present in the field of
Welsh historiography in the work of Neil Evans.18
In the 1990s, this interest in historiography was replaced by interest in Europe
and the European Union (EU) as a potential alternative to Britain as a framework for
Wales as a nation. The Welsh intelligentsia’s search for identity within their past was
only too quickly submerged by the lure of an EU with its potential to desensitise
many of the pressing questions of the 1980s over who and what, exactly, the Welsh
and Wales were. Europe and the EU came with less historical baggage –
Anglicisation, the Welsh language, English-language Welsh culture, conquest and colonialism could all be placed at a slight remove. John Osmond, in Welsh
Europeans, argued for the repositioning of both forms of Welshness within the
European framework.19 According to John Osmond, Europe – the European Union – provided a framework in which Wales and Welshness could breathe, a framework that accepted and respected a Welsh identity.20 The fields that were dominant in the
1990s were, however, very similar to the ones in the 1970s and 1980s, although the
circumstances of the 1980s and the 1990s had reshaped the focus within all except the
economic field. Political identity and independence were almost entirely centred on
the issue of devolution and the Welsh Assembly, while cultural and political identity
combined to produce significant interest in national identity. With these conceptual
changes, the four fields shifted to become: the economy of Wales, devolution and the
Welsh Assembly, Welsh national identity, and the Welsh language. There were, of
course, other views held within the widely disparate group of the Welsh intelligentsia,
18 Neil Evans (2004) “Where Men and Mountains Meet: Historians’ Explanations of the History of Wales, 1890-1970.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp.222-251; Neil Evans (2004) “The Changing Context of Welsh Historiography, 1890-2000.” In Helen Brocklehurst & Robert Phillips (eds) History, Nationhood and the Question of Britain. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp.20-32. 19 John Osmond (1995) Welsh Europeans. Bridgend: Seren Books. 20 Ibid.. p.14. 13
but these views failed to find platforms equivalent to these major English-language
journals. As a result, these alternative views did not have the same impact on the
public debate as the more nationally focussed issues identified above. An analysis of
the content of the three journals indicates that public debate on Wales and Welshness
consistently occurred within their pages.
With the first of each pair of chapters providing this wider context, the second
chapter of each decade provides the central historiographical analysis of the six
books. As previously mentioned, these three chapters analyse five periods within
Welsh history, focusing on the depictions of Wales, Welshness and the relationship
between Wales and England. The historiographical approaches of each of the six authors were placed in the context of the debates occurring among the wider Welsh
intelligentsia and also in the context of the wider Welsh historiography. This
comparative analysis between the authors, in providing both intellectual and historiographical context, enabled meaning to be given to the argument: the author’s depiction was only meaningful when differentiated from and positioned within both fields.
The theoretical background to this study is both rich and surprisingly sparse.
National identity – seen in this study as historiographical depictions of Wales and
Welshness – has been studied extensively in theoretical and practical terms, in and outside of Wales. These studies provide a fertile foundation for the examination of
Welsh identity. In historiographical terms, however, the field is much less populated, particularly within Wales. While historiography is emerging as a popular field, it is
still emerging in Wales, with the few studies available tending to be general surveys
spanning considerable periods of time in the short space dictated by the structure of
journal articles. 14
The relevant theoretical connections between national identity and national
history made by Benedict Anderson, Anthony D. Smith and Ross Poole have been
briefly discussed previously. In practical terms, these theories, whilst illustrating the
above connections, are of limited use when applied to Wales. All three theoreticians
envisaged the production of a single national identity supported by a single version of
a national history. The situation in Wales is, however, considerably more
complicated. R. Merfyn Jones, in his article “Beyond Identity? The Reconstruction
of the Welsh,” offered one of the more sophisticated analyses of Welsh identity,
arguing that Wales, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, possessed three national identities, all of which lost their foundations in the second half of the
twentieth century.21 Despite the complexities and confusion inherent in such a situation, authors have continued to analyse and discuss Welsh identity. Welsh national identity may not fit the theoretical boundaries but it undeniably exists.
Identity, national and regional, has been the target of considerable study in
Wales, due to its complexity and the continued relevance of the debate in a country heavily affected by Anglicisation and its near relationship with England. These studies range from broad, as with R. Merfyn Jones’, to narrow, as with Emyr
Humphreys’ The Taliesin Tradition,22 to the historical study in Dai Smith’s Wales: A
Question for History.23 When combined, these studies provide the broad background
for a historiographical depiction of Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-English relationship. None of these studies reveal a unified identity but, as argued by Dai
Smith, this need not be considered a negative. For Dai Smith, a Wales deeply aware
of its history would not need a unified identity or any “…totalising definitions of an
21 R. Merfyn Jones (1992) “Beyond Identity? The Reconstruction of the Welsh.” The Journal of British Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp.330-357. 22 Emyr Humphreys (1989) The Taliesin Tradition. Bridgend: Seren Books. 23 Dai Smith (1999) Wales: A Question for History. Bridgend: Seren Books. 15
essentialist kind.”24 A deep historical awareness of the “…relationships between
people, across generations and gender, between a landscape and a life, a past and a
present…”25 would provide a unity that allowed for a multiplicity of historically
based identities that were equally Welsh and together created a complete image of
Wales.
Over the course of his career, Raymond Williams, one of Wales’ foremost
writers, captured the lived experience of this complexity of identity in essays and
novels. In his essay “Welsh Culture,” written in 1975, Raymond Williams discussed the difficulty the Welsh people have found in creating an identity that was connected
to the past and the present yet could accommodate the reality of English conquest and
continued dominance. Many of the myths created by the Welsh – Celtic ancestry, the
Celtic temperament, natural radicals – expressed part of Welsh history but also
covered a loss.
It is just as often an unmitigated flow to prevent other things being said. And what
those other things are we hear more often among ourselves, an extraordinary sadness,
which is indeed not surprising, and at the edges, lately, an implacable bitterness, even
a soured cynicism, which can jerk into life – and this is what makes it hard to hear –
as a fantastic comic edge, or a wild self-deprecation, as a form of pride: a wall of
words, anyway, so that we do not have to look, steadily, and soberly, at all that has
happened to us.26
24 Ibid., p.25. 25 Ibid., pp.25-26. 26 Raymond Williams (2003) “Welsh Culture.” In Raymond Williams Who Speaks for Wales? Nation, Culture, Identity. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, p.9. 16
Conquest, Union and Anglicisation had resulted in a late twentieth century Wales
whose identity bore the distinct marks of a post-colonial culture.27
The presence of a cultural and identity debate between Welshness and the pressure of a dominant English culture was also present in Emyr Humphreys’ The
Taliesin Tradition, analysing the role of literature, particularly the Welsh poetic
tradition, in the survival of Welsh culture. Emyr Humphreys argued that the Welsh
language poetic tradition had been the means of creating and transmitting national
identity through its development and cultivation of myths, including those that
described a glorious Roman and pre-Roman past and that propagated the idea that a
Welsh leader would one day reclaim the island of Britain for the Welsh.28 The
structured and organised myth-making of the poets, with its social and political
significance, remained one of Wales’ most potent weapons for survival and provided
the means by which the Welsh could negotiate the conflict between an attachment to
Welsh society and national character and the hostility of British society towards
traditional Welshness.29 The Welsh language was an essential part of Emyr
Humphreys’ concept of Welshness, for that language, the language of Welsh poetry,
was the crystallisation of Welsh identity.30 “To cherish the language was no more than a necessary act of self-respect.”31
Yet Welsh industrial society, predominantly English-speaking by the early
twentieth century, could also provide a viable Welshness. Dai Smith, in Wales. A
Question for History,32 and his chapter “Wales Through the Looking Glass,”33
27 Ibid., p.9. 28 Emyr Humphreys (1989) The Taliesin Tradition. 29 Ibid., pp.227-228. 30 Ibid., p.233. 31 Ibid., p.134. 32 Dai Smith (1999) Wales. A Question for History. 33 Dai Smith (1994) Aneurin Bevan and the World of South Wales. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, pp.45-66. 17
depicted a vital, raw and yet sophisticated society that had produced an identity and
lived cultural experience that changed the face of Wales. He did not see the
dominance of the English language as implying a corresponding loss of Welshness or
isolation from a Welsh past. Welsh industrialisation merely altered the rural,
Nonconformist, traditional version of Welshness and, in fact, revitalised Welsh
cultural life and language but, in doing so, divided Welsh identity to the point where
“…any easy definition of people and country, let alone nation, became impossible.”34
For Dai Smith, industrial Wales under leaders like Labour MP Aneurin Bevan,
offered an alternative route should the bulk of the Welsh people choose to take it, to a
more active recreation of a Wales desired by the Welsh, rather than one imposed by
circumstance and defeat.35 The Welsh language, in this interpretation, no longer
provided the benchmark for Welsh identity.
Dai Smith also rejected another facet traditionally associated with Welshness;
Nonconformist Christianity. D. Densil Morgan, in contrast, argued that Welsh identity and Welsh Christianity had emerged together in the immediate post-Roman
Age of the Saints, entwining the concepts.36 The close association of Welshness with
Christianity continued into the 1920s and 1930s, with the connection between
Welshness and Nonconformity being intentionally reinforced in the final decades of
the nineteenth century by David Lloyd George, then an MP for the Caernarvon
Boroughs,37 and connecting with the nationalism of Plaid Cymru in the middle of the
twentieth century,38 with the Anglican Church in Wales shifting towards a closer
34 Ibid., p.66. 35 Dai Smith (1999) Wales. A Question for History, p.205. 36 D. Densil Morgan (2001) ‘The Essence of Welshness’?: Some Aspects of Christian Faith and National Identity in Wales, c.1900-2000.” In Robert Pope (ed) Religion and National Identity: Wales and Scotland c.1700-2000, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, p.139. 37 Ibid., p.143. 38 Ibid., pp.150-151. 18
identification with Welsh culture after Disestablishment.39 By the late twentieth
century, the form of association between Welshness and Christianity had shifted again
towards an emphasis on house fellowships and evangelical groups but the actual
association remained a vital facet of Welsh identity.40 The increasing validity of a
multiplicity of Welsh identities and expressions of religion merely provided new
challenges for a Christian Welsh identity within a nation that was increasingly being
united through infrastructure.41 “However the relationship between nation and
identity will be formulated in the years to come, the long history of Wales’s [sic]
Christian past will still provide inspiration and hope.”42
R. Merfyn Jones, in contrast, saw the dominance of an institutionally defined
Welshness as far more significant.43 The previous manifestations of Liberal, Labour
and Nationalist identities had, in requiring an emotional commitment to a cause, been as exclusive as they were significant in providing a certainty of identity. The decline of these identities and the concurrent growth of the Welsh institutions had resulted in the emergence of a non-ideological political institutionally-based identity, shaping the
Welsh as citizens rather than adherents to a cause. Despite this identity being more inclusive and matching European developments, he did not consider this empty version of Welsh identity to be either beneficial or positive for the Welsh as a people, and hardly a more positive move for the wider European community.44 “Wales has
acquired a proto-state, but who are the Welsh?”45
39 Ibid., pp.154-157. 40 Ibid., p.158. 41 Ibid., pp.158-159. 42 Ibid., p.160. 43 R. Merfyn Jones (1992) “Beyond Identity? The Reconstruction of the Welsh.” The Journal of British Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp.330-357. 44 Ibid., p.357. 45 Ibid., p.355. 19
Each of these depictions of Welsh identity was historically based yet reflective
of a variety of different experiences of Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-English
relationship. None questioned the existence of a Welsh identity despite the sheer
variety of identities, yet all acknowledged that the complexity created problems for
Welsh identity. A historiographical analysis of identity and the impact of the
relationship between Wales and England will, as a part of the examination of
Welshness, provide another perspective on the topic.
In all of these studies, history was present: indeed, many involved the
rethinking of historically grounded aspects of Welsh identity. In the late 1990s and
early 2000s, specifically historiographical studies began to emerge, although none
examined the depiction of identity or the Welsh-English relationship within Welsh
history. Neil Evans and Dai Smith both moved into this field, although Dai Smith’s
Wales: A Question For History could also fall under a few other categories, including
a straight examination of identity within industrial Wales. Neil Evans published two
articles, both addressing the way the approaches to Welsh history had altered over the
twentieth century. In “Where Men and Mountains Meet: Historians Explanations of
Wales, 1870-1970,” he traced the evolution of approaches to Welsh history, arguing
that geography and geology were used by Welsh historians to differentiate the Welsh
experience from that of the rest of Britain, albeit with increasing sophistication as the
century progressed and with greater theoretical refinement.46 He repeated and
extended this analysis in a later book chapter, arguing that Welsh historians had not,
in the later twentieth century, followed the trends apparent in British history including
46 Neil Evans (2004) “Where Men and Mountains Meet: Historians’ Explanations of the History of Wales, 1890-1970.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp.222-251. 20
that of post-modernism or those inspired by Thatcherism.47 The failure to follow
these trends was not problematic in and of itself, but the corresponding isolation of
Welsh historiography from the wider field was less than ideal. Neil Evans argued that
Welsh history would benefit from both a more unified national perspective and from
being placed in the wider context of Europe.48 Dai Smith’s book, in contrast, was
both a history of the industrial twentieth century in Wales and an analysis of the
meaning of this history for the people currently living in Wales, particularly in the old
industrial areas of Wales. In the second part of this duality, Dai Smith analysed the
basis for one version of Welsh identity, focusing on critiquing the historical
approaches taken to the industrial era and the aspects of this period that continued to
shape Wales and Welshness in 1999 when Wales: A Question for History was
published. This thesis takes the existing research a step further and, in one way, is an
active part of the debate. As indicated above, the issue of language is controversial in
Wales and this thesis, being written in English and based on sources published in the
English language, automatically takes a stance in this debate. Yet English is the
language of the majority of the Welsh population and in utilising English language
sources and histories, I have focused on the images of Wales, Welshness and the
Welsh-English relationship available to the bulk of the general population in Wales
for the construction of their understanding of Welsh identity.
In the light of this wider situation, this thesis argues that Welsh national
history books published between 1970 and 1997 were written around a framework of the relationship between Wales and England. This study contends that Wales and
Welshness were, correspondingly, shaped by the authors’ approaches to this
47 Neil Evans (2004) “The Changing Context of Welsh Historiography, 1890-2000.” In Helen Brocklehurst & Robert Phillips (eds) History, Nationhood and the Question of Britain. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp.20-32. 48 Ibid., pp.31-32. 21
relationship, resulting in the conveyance of an understanding of Wales and Welshness
that was unique to each book. In this sense, this thesis asserts that Welsh national
histories have played a contributing role in the emergence and expression of a multiplicity of Welsh identities. These identities were, however, also influenced by the wider context in which the histories were written, notably the British and Welsh situations and the debate among the wider Welsh intelligentsia. This study argues that the changing situation over the three decades influenced the gradual alteration in the framework on which Welsh national history was constructed, with the weakening of
Britain as an entity and the changing Welsh-English relationship introducing an element of Welshness and Europeanness to the historiographical framework.
22
Chapter One
Questioning Britain and the Boundaries of the Welsh-English
Relationship: 1970-1979.
For Wales, the 1970s was a decade of surprising optimism amid the growing
shambles of the wider British political and economic situation. As Britain moved into
Europe and further away from its prosperous imperial days, the Welsh intelligentsia
turned their eyes towards the possibility of the achievement of some level of Welsh independence, viewing the then-current relationship between England and Wales as less than entirely advantageous for the Welsh. This was the world in which Arthur Herbert
Dodd and Gwynfor Evans, the first of the six authors to be examined, published their histories of Wales, offering historical interpretations of the relationship between Wales and England and of Wales and Welshness themselves that contributed to the continual public shaping of these factors. Yet these images would have been irrelevant to the situation within Wales in this decade if they had not connected with the wider understanding and experience of these concepts.
The historical relationship between England and Wales had, since the Welsh
industrial revolution, been seen by the bulk of the Welsh people as viable and, indeed,
advantageous for the economic advancement and the material prosperity of the Welsh
people as individuals and as subjects of the British Crown, despite minority concerns
over the corresponding damage to Welsh identity and to Wales as a nation distinct from
England. This began to change in the interwar period as the economic advantages of
Union with England became less and less apparent. By the late 1960s, Plaid Cymru, the 23
nationalist Party of Wales, had begun to make inroads into the Welsh electorate,
culminating in the election victory of its President, Gwynfor Evans, in the Carmarthen
by-election in 1966, following a popular protest over the construction of the Tryweryn
dam. The vote was later acknowledged to be primarily a protest vote but still indicated
widening popular discontent with the Welsh economic and political position in Britain.1
Britain continued its post-war decline in the 1970s, through a series of events that also challenged the popularly accepted version of the relationship between Wales and
England, including British entry into the European Community (EC), Trade Union unrest, apparent political and economic incompetence, Northern Irish violence and unrest and the decline of post-war consensus politics.
The majority of these events emerged from the decline of the British Empire and
Imperial world power status. British identity had, in historical terms, been firmly linked to Empire and Imperial status,2 as was the structure of Britain itself, with the material and
economic benefits of Empire seen as ensuring the relatively contented presence of
Scotland and Wales in Britain throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.3
Britain was a political and economic global power and this prestige and material position
was shared – if not equally, at least, for the majority of the Scots and Welsh, then
satisfactorily – among the constituent nations of Britain.4 The expense of participating in
two world wars, the slowdown of the British economy and the steady growth of other
European and, in the later twentieth century, Asian economies began, however, to make
1 Kenneth O. Morgan (2002) Rebirth of a Nation: A History of Modern Wales. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.407. 2 Linda Colley (2003) Britons: Forging a Nation, 1707-1837. London: Pimlico. 3 Frank Welsh (2003) The Four Nations: A History of the United Kingdom. London: HarperCollins Publishers, pp.246-247. 4 Ibid., pp.246-247. 24
the maintenance of this Imperial and global position beyond the resources and budget of
the British government. By 1970, Britain had lost its Empire and had come to the
realisation that the Commonwealth could and would not provide a functional or
satisfactory alternative basis for British global power, economic prestige, identity and
political and structural stability.
The awareness of British decline had not, by 1970, seriously impacted on the
relationship between Wales and England in Britain but events in the 1970s began to alter
the Welsh intelligentsia’s perception of the benefits and necessity of the continuation of
the then-current shape of the Welsh-English relationship. Yet these events did not
seriously challenge the Welsh intelligentsia’s understanding of Wales and Welshness.
Their changing perception of the Welsh-English relationship was coloured by a high level
of idealism about the strength of a popular Welsh identity and the potential for the Welsh nation to head towards devolution and, for some, eventual independence. An imperially
based British identity had not, prior to the 1970s, been seriously undermined, either. It was partly, in fact, the destabilization of the Imperial British identity that facilitated the
Welsh intelligentsia’s challenge to the established relationship between England and
Wales.
Over the 1970s, Britain’s position in the international arena changed significantly.
In 1972, the British government succeeded in its third application to join the European
Community (EC), acknowledging its inability to prosper in isolation from the rest of
Europe. This acknowledgment was driven home by the economic difficulties that
plagued Britain and, indeed, Europe, throughout the 1970s, difficulties that were, in
Britain, exacerbated by serious Trade Union unrest and the distraction of the Northern 25
Irish Troubles. Successive governments failed to deal with these problems, initiating the
break away from the post-war political consensus that had dominated British politics
since 1945, and the rise of Scottish and Welsh nationalism. When combined, these
events provided the stimulus for the Welsh intelligentsia’s attitude towards Wales,
Welshness and the Welsh-English relationship over the 1970s.
In the 1950s when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was first proposed, the British Labour and Conservative Parties firmly rejected British participation in any project for European Unity as such involvement would prevent
Britain from fulfilling its world role.5 This attitude did not begin to change until after the
Suez Crisis of 1956 and the corresponding decline of Britain as a global and imperial
power. In 1959, the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, warned Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan that, in this context, the unexpected economic success of the European
Community posed a serious threat to the Anglo-American relationship, and to continued
British influence within the Commonwealth.6 It was from this background of decline
rather than from any real commitment to the ideals behind the European Community that
the first British applications for EC membership were tendered in 1961 and 1967.
Britain’s need for Community membership and declining individual power was further emphasised by a combination of events that occurred towards the end of the
1960s. A financial crisis in 1967 forced the devaluation of the pound which in turn pushed the British government to make huge cuts in military commitment and equipment,
5 A. Varsori (1998) “Is Britain Part of Europe? The Myth of British ‘Difference’” In C. Buffet & B. Heuser (eds.) Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations. Oxford: Berghahn Books, p.145: Winston S. Churchill (1974) Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches 1897-1963 Vol. VIII 1950-1963, James, R.R. (ed.), New York: Chelsea House Publishers, p.8025. 6 L.J. Butler (1993) “Winds of Change: Britain, Europe and the Commonwealth, 1959-61.” In B. Brivati & H. Jones (eds.) From Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and Europe Since 1945. London: Leicester University Press, p.159. 26
withdrawing from Aden, Singapore and Malaysia.7 Increasingly, Britain also discovered
that it could have little practical effect on problems within the Commonwealth, as
illustrated by the failure to alter the situation in Southern Rhodesia under Ian Smith.8
Empire and world power status had shaped Britain’s response to the international
situation for over a century. The 1960s saw the beginning of the end of the viability of
such an attitude, a change that would become increasingly apparent in the 1970s
atmosphere of British decline.
The British governments were not alone in finding the shift from an imperial and
global power difficult to comprehend in the 1960s and 1970s. The British intelligentsia,
active participants in the construction of the British imperial and global identity, shared the governments’ attitude, something that was particularly evident in their positions
regarding the EC. In 1972, Kenneth Younger argued in an article in the journal
International Affairs that EC membership would provide “…Britain with a more solid
base than it has recently had from which to exert an influence upon world affairs.”9
Younger was not envisaging a situation in which Britain contributed its power and prestige to the European Community which then acted as a concerted union in international affairs. Rather, he was referring to the ways in which Britain could
independently use the power and prestige bestowed on Britain by participation in the EC.
There is a distinct sense in which Younger believed that all the EC countries wanted to get their viewpoint and agenda across: this being the most reasonable point of the then-
7 Malcolm Pearce & Geoffrey Stewart (1992) British Political History. London: Routledge, p.637. 8 Kenneth O. Morgan (2001) Britain Since 1945: The People’s Peace, pp.470-473. 9 Kenneth Younger (1972) “Britain in Europe: The Impact on Foreign Policy.” International Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 4, p.591. 27
potential renegotiation of the British entry conditions.10 In the case of Britain, this
consisted of boosting Britain’s failing position on the world stage, regaining influence in
the USA,11 and continuing the old imperial responsibilities in the Third World. Joseph
Frankel, publishing an article on the EC in the journal in 1974, was less inclined to see
the EC as an alternate way of retaining a semi-independent role in global affairs but he,
too, did not approach the EC with any acknowledgement of its founding ideals.12
Britain’s loss of status and declining economic position – from its post-war command of
20% of world trade to a low of 6% in the early 1970s13 - had, instead, refined its
understanding of its resource-dictated limitations and gained a clearer perception on the
need to pursue national interests above those of a wider organisation, i.e. the Empire.14
In this context, the EC, as opposed to a commitment to the Commonwealth, was seen as
best for Britain – and British concern for the Commonwealth countries was one of the
major stumbling blocks for British entry into the EC. The European organisation was not
expected to limit or impact on the British trade arena outside of Europe; the USA, the oil-
producing Middle East, Latin America, Japan, Canada, and Australia.15 The British
attitude towards the EC may have been gradually changing but it was, in the 1970s, still
far from evidencing a real commitment to Europe and the ideals behind the European
Community.
Essentially, Britain’s reasons for entry into the EC were very different from those
of the majority of European nations. The political, constitutional and ‘sovereignty’
10 Ibid., p.582. 11 Ibid., pp.582-583. 12 Joseph Frankel (1974) “Britain’s Changing Role.” International Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp577-580 13 Ibid., p.580. 14 Ibid., pp.577-578. 15 Ibid., p.582. 28
experiences in Britain were very different from those of Europe, and the British failed to
understand the European approach and mindset. “Europe was seen as a last resort, a final
resting place for a country which had run out of options.”16 Ultimately, the real issue was reversing Britain’s decline in world power and economic status and, in the 1960s and early 1970s, the Labour Party could argue that closer ties with the Commonwealth could also remedy this situation.17 While this route had declined in validity by the late 1970s, the underlying tension over the best way to remedy British decline remained, particularly in light of the continuation of Britain’s economic problems after its accession to the EC.
Hence, Andy Mullen and Brian Burkitt have argued that in Harold Wilson’s 1975 referendum on British membership in the EC, the Wilson government was forced to utilise propaganda to convince the public of the benefits of EC membership.18 The
European idealism of an ever-closer union and the painful reality behind this goal was not
part of either the British experience or the British government’s reasons for joining the
EC and could not, therefore, be used to convince the public of the need for European
Unity.19
There were, of course, some pragmatic and very valid reasons for Britain’s
concern with retaining its influence in both America and Europe. The Cold War was still
very much present in the 1970s and, therefore, the USA’s continued presence in Europe
equally required.20 The USA was increasingly replacing Britain in the Middle East and,
16 V. Bogdanor (2005) “Footfalls Echoing in the Memory. Britain and Europe: the Historical Perspective.” International Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4, p.693. 17 J. Tomlinson (2003) “The Decline of the Empire and the Economic ‘Decline’ of Britain.” Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp.209-216. 18 Andy Mullen & Brian Burkitt (2005) “Spinning Europe: Pro-European Union Propaganda Campaigns in Britain, 1962-1975.” The Political Quarterly, pp.100-113. 19 Ibid., pp.100-113. 20 Sean Greenwood (2000) Britain and the Cold War 1945-91. London: MacMillan Press Ltd, pp.174-180. 29
in turn, expected Britain to foster its influence in Europe.21 Britain was dependent on the
USA for its nuclear technology and, therefore, defence, particularly significant in the
Cold War atmosphere of the time. In many ways, Britain was caught between two versions of itself: one that was, ultimately, limited in scope to a power of the second rank and tied, of necessity, to Europe, and a second one that was still following the habitual thought patterns of a global power responsible for the well-being of a far-flung Empire.
British decline was, however, also manifested in ways that were not primarily
related to foreign policy. During the 1970s, Britain struggled economically, experiencing
a continuation of the Trade Union action of the 1960s, a rapid rise in inflation, and the
continued contraction of the British industrial base. The decade was ushered in by the
USA’s abandonment of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. In the
following year, Britain also left the system, floating the pound against other currencies
and, in the process, “…belatedly bringing to an inglorious end sterling’s ancient and
burdensome role as an international ‘reserve’ currency.”22 This combined with the
successive devaluations of the pound in the 1960s and British entry into the EC in 1973
to render the Sterling Bloc an unnecessary burden. Yet the loss of another facet of
Britain’s global and imperial role could only contribute to the atmosphere of decline, and
to the decline of international confidence in the pound sterling.
Unfortunately, Britain’s basic economic difficulties were exacerbated by the
global economic slowdown of the 1970s, and the development of what came to be termed
‘stagflation’, in which wages ceased to advance despite the steady rise of inflation.
Economic slowdown, stagflation and Middle Eastern oil crises resulted in rising
21 Ibid., pp.174-180. 22 Tony Judt (2005) Post War. London: William Heineman, p.454. 30
unemployment across Europe – these issues affected the majority of countries in Western
Europe as well as Britain. By 1975, British inflation had reached 27%23 and by the end
of the decade, unemployment had risen from 3.6% to 9%.24 It was not until 1976,
however, that it became clear that the post-war trends of strong economic growth and low
unemployment were over.25
From this context, the trade union protests were broadly understandable. The late
1960s had seen a series of serious strikes in Britain, and these continued into the 1970s as
the trade unions attempted to ensure the continuation of the post-war rise of wages and
working conditions. Economic slowdown and inflation undermined profits, however,
and altered the power balance between unions and employers. The result was a series of
confrontations between unions and the government, with one of the most dramatic falling
in the winter of 1973 and 1974, in which an oil crisis coincided with industrial unrest, resulting in an energy shortage that reduced Britain to a three day week and a strange twilight existence.26 The governments of Edward Heath, Harold Wilson and James
Callaghan made various efforts to bring this situation under control, with only minor
success. Ultimately, both the Heath and Callaghan governments were forced to the polls
by union militancy and unrest: in the winter of 1978-9, Ford motor workers, lorry drivers
and tanker drivers demanded pay rises and 1.5 million public services workers embarked
on six weeks of strikes, during which garbage remained uncollected, schools closed and
graves remained undug.27
23 Arthur Marwick (1990) British Society Since 1945. London: Allen Lane, pp.185-186. 24 Tony Judt (2006) Post War, pp.456-457. 25 Arthur Marwick (1990) British Society Since 1945, p.185. 26 Malcolm Pearce & Geoffrey Stewart (1992) British Political History, p.496. 27 Ibid., pp.504-505. 31
Possibly most humiliating of all, however, was the financial result of the falling
value of the pound sterling and the corresponding loss of international confidence in the
pound.
The British national accounts were by now chronically in deficit – so much so that by
December 1976 there appeared a serious risk of a national debt default and the
International Monetary Fund was called in to bail Britain out.28
Britain was offered a loan of ₤3900 million, with conditions that included further
government expenditure cuts of ₤3000 million.29 This situation, the economic problems and the trade union militancy manifested in a very unsettled economic atmosphere in
Britain in the 1970s, something that only accentuated the concerns at political and
intellectual levels over British decline.
Tony Judt argued that it was, ultimately, this situation that triggered the British
break away from the consensus politics that had dominated the scene since 1945. Jim
Callaghan and his Chancellor of the Exchequer embarked, in the wake of the IMF loan
and the rising trade union militancy
…on a restructuring program that acknowledged the inevitability of a certain level of
unemployment; reduced social transfer payments and labour costs by protecting skilled
workers while permitting the emergence of a disfavoured periphery of unprotected, non-
28 Tony Judt (2006) Post War: A History of Europe Since 1945, p.458. 29Malcolm Pearce & Geoffrey Stewart (1992) British Political History, p.501. 32
unionized part-time employees; and set out to control and reduce inflation and
government spending even at the price of economic hardship and slower growth.”30
Callaghan’s policy failed, with its main result being the Winter of Discontent. His attempt would not be the last: Margaret Thatcher would openly follow his precedent after her election in 1979.
Economic issues were not the only domestic political concerns of the 1970s.
Increasingly, Northern Ireland became a source of serious political problems, in both its
Unionist and Republican manifestations. Through the 1960s, Civil Rights marches in
Ulster had been attacked by Protestant mobs, and the situation climaxed when, in early
1972, the Royal Ulster Constabulary lost control of the situation and was replaced by
British Army divisions.
On ‘Bloody Sunday’, 30 January 1972, a banned march was fired upon by British
paratroopers in Derry, and thirteen unarmed civilians were shot dead. The descent into
terror and counter-terror had begun.31
Terrorist organisations emerged on both sides of the Irish divide: the IRA, the Continuity
IRA, the Real IRA, the Irish Liberation Army; the Ulster Defence Association, otherwise known as the Ulster Freedom Fighters, the Loyalist Volunteer Force and the Ulster
Volunteer Force.32 Yet the seeds of peaceful compromise were never particularly far from the scene, as illustrated by the steady presence of the SDLP, an anti-sectarian, anti-
30 Tony Judt (2006) Post War, p.539. 31Malcolm Pearce & Geoffrey Stewart (1992) British Political History. London: Routledge, p.771. 32Ibid., p.771. 33
terrorist party.33 Nonetheless, for Britain, the central issue in the conflict remained
unsolved – no British government in the 1970s came close to bringing the violent
situation in Northern Ireland under control. Indeed, after 1974, they appeared unable to prevent IRA violence on English soil.
There were many complex reasons for the governments’ failures to deal
effectively with both the trade union problems and the violence in Northern Ireland, not
the least of which was their unwillingness or inability to take the drastic steps required to
remedy both situations.34 Nonetheless, for this thesis, the point is more the atmosphere
these situations created, particularly when combined with the concerns about Britain’s
role in the world. All together, a situation began to emerge in which the concepts of
Britain and Britishness were increasingly open to question, in terms of content and of
value both in England and, more significantly for Britain, in Scotland and Wales.
The relative decline of Britain in the international sphere, the domestic economic
problems and apparent ineffectualness of all the governments in Britain over the decade
began to challenge the basis of the Welsh and Scottish acceptance of their respective
unions with England. The Empire had been perceived by many in both countries as
beneficial. The Scots had actively participated in the administration and development of
the overseas Empire and the Welsh had dominated the international coal market for a
significant period of time. Nationalists tended to view these circumstances rather less
positively but for the majority of the people of Scotland and Wales, the experience of
Empire had definitely had its benefits. As Britain declined economically and politically,
however, the benefits of remaining in a union with England became far less obvious. By
33 Ibid., p.771. 34 Tony Judt (2005) Post War, pp.538-539 & pp.466-469. 34
the end of the 1970s, the EC had begun serious development of its policies for the regions of its constituent members, offering a potential alternative structure within which small
nations like Wales and Scotland could prosper. The Republic of Ireland was, in fact,
offering an encouraging example to both Scotland and Wales: EC funding was enabling it slowly but steadily to develop its economy from primarily agricultural to a high
technology economy able to compete on a global scale.35 Under Dafydd Wigley, Plaid
Cymru responded to this European trend, refocusing the Party’s nationalist commitment
as “…full national status in Europe.”36
The Welsh and Scottish intelligentsia were not, however, the only intelligentsias
debating the continued validity of the established British identity. Jim Tomlinson has argued that
While the debate on decline focused on the perceived failure in economic performance,
especially growth, that failure led to critiques of British society that went much wider
than strictly economic issues.37
This wider debate was linked to that of imperial decline by “…the belief that Britain had
lost its sense of ‘purpose’.”38 As mentioned earlier, the EC was seen as a solution to this,
as was an intensified link with the Commonwealth. Another, quite different solution was
also beginning to emerge among the less politically affiliated members of the British
intelligentsia, with British historians slowly coming to the realisation that the form of
35 Charles Townshend (1999) Ireland: the Twentieth Century. London: Oxford University Press. 36 Laura McAllister (2001) Plaid Cymru: The Emergence of a Political Party. Bridgend: Seren, p.142. 37 J. Tomlinson (2003)’The Decline of the Empire and the Economic ‘Decline’ of Britain.’ Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 14, No. 3, p.203. 38 Ibid., p.203. 35
history – and, therefore, of understanding Britain – and identity that expanded England
and Britain across Empire and Commonwealth was no longer feasible: “…what had
given unity, purpose and coherence to British history had faded away.”39 The 1970s was,
according to Keith Robbins, the first decade in which the British intelligentsia grasped
that there was a real need to reconsider British history and identity.40
The questioning of Britain by the British intelligentsia and the growing
atmosphere of decline among the same group essentially meant that the Welsh
intelligentsia were living and working in a world in which many of their preconceptions
about their state and state identity were being challenged, either through actual events or
by theoretical analysis. This atmosphere manifested in Wales in several ways: through a
growth of support and interest in Plaid Cymru and the Welsh language, a change in
Welsh voting patterns and a wider interest among the community in all things Welsh.
Support for the national parties of both Wales and Scotland had begun to grow in the
1960s but it was not until the 1970s that Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party
(SNP) gained enough popularity to begin to make themselves felt at Westminster. In
1974, the SNP returned eleven members to Parliament and Plaid Cymru succeeded in
sending three members to Westminster.41 Yet the two parties were the recipients of very
different responses both within their home countries and on the international stage. The
real nationalist base of the SNP has been acknowledged, as was its still current ability to
place significant pressure on parliament.42 Plaid Cymru and the Welsh nationalist
39 Keith Robbins (1990) “National Identity and History: Past, Present and Future.” History, Vol. 75, Iss. 258, p.376. 40 Ibid., p.376. 41 Kenneth O. Morgan (1981) Rebirth of a Nation: A History of Modern Wales, pp.396-397; Kenneth O. Morgan (2001) Britain Since 1945: The People’s Peace, pp.368-369. 42 Tony Judt (2005) Post War, pp.705-706. 36
movement were and still are more easily dismissed – as was their nineteenth century
ancestor Cymru Fydd (Young Wales). Westminster and even the Welsh themselves had
not been inclined in the nineteenth or for most of the twentieth century to take their
nationalist movements seriously.
This Welsh expression of political and cultural nationalism remained relatively
muted, despite government fears that it might not. The brief appearance of the Welsh
Freedom Fighters in the late 1960s and their prominence during the 1969 investiture of
Prince Charles associated nationalism with violence and terrorism in the minds of the
general public and the government, an association that was further confirmed by the
rising violence in Northern Ireland.43 This association discouraged the real interest of
both government and the Welsh general public in Welsh nationalism. Towards the end of
the 1960s, the government attempted, through the Crowther Commission, to grasp the
reasons for the re-emergence of Welsh nationalism and its potential for violence.44 This latter concern was, however, dismissed in a study by the Institute for the Study of
Conflict, when D.L. Price argued that the emergence of a violent separatist movement in
Wales was unlikely although, given the correct circumstances, such a situation could arise.45 The question over the need to take Welsh nationalism seriously or not appeared
to be further answered for the government by the resounding rejection of devolution in
1979.
The Welsh intelligentsia, however, took a rather different approach to the issues
of Wales, Welshness and nationalism. In many ways, the devolution ‘no’ vote confirmed
43 Kenneth O. Morgan (2001) Rebirth of a Nation: A History of Modern Wales, pp.383-385. 44 Patricia Elton Mayo (1971) “Constitutional Background of Separatist Movements.” Planet, Vol. 7, pp.29-31. 45 D.L. Price (1971) “Wars of National Liberation.” Planet, Vol. 7, pp.13-19. 37
that the Welsh growth of nationalism and interest in cultural, political and national identity was primarily defined by the Welsh intelligentsia, a disparate group consisting of academics from a range of disciplines, media-people, politicians from a range of political ideologies and even interested, university-trained individuals not exercising an academic profession. This group, albeit not a solid, cohesive or nationalist group, were, as members of the level of society most inclined to discuss, question and challenge political, economic and social issues on the public stage, the logical candidates to begin the questioning about Wales, Welshness and the relationship between Wales and England.
Their interest in this questioning was fostered by the political and economic scenario of the 1970s and this combination pushed the issue of Welsh national identity further onto the political stage than might have occurred in more affluent times. Few of the Welsh intelligentsia were in a position to advance the Welsh cause within Britain, as most were based in Welsh institutions with only a few Plaid Cymru MPs at Westminster. Despite this, the mere presence of interest within Wales facilitated Plaid Cymru’s and Labour’s advancement of devolution at Westminster in the mid-1970s. The presence and activity of Cymdeithas yr Iaith indicated the presence of some grassroots interest in the Welsh situation but it also revealed the limits of the wider public’s interest in the Welsh intelligentsia’s agenda. The Welsh public felt some empathy for Cymdeithas’ efforts to reinstall Welsh as a legal language, but the methods – such as painting over English- language road signs – were disliked for the resultant inconvenience.46
If Plaid Cymru and Cymdeithas yr Iaith did not gain much from a rethinking of the Welsh-English relationship that was primarily limited to the Welsh intelligentsia in the 1970s, or from a public growth of interest in nationalism, their strength was fostered
46 Kenneth O. Morgan (1981) Rebirth of a Nation: A History of Modern Wales, pp.383-384. 38
by the cultural and grass-roots political shift away from consensus politics over the
decade. In many ways, this shift was the result of the success of consensus politics in
these earlier decades. Between them, the Labour and Conservative parties had achieved a
significant proportion of the reforms promised, building a welfare, consumer society that,
prior to the 1970s, had low unemployment, low inflation, and relatively good economic
growth. With these issues removed from the public’s attention, single issue politics began to emerge in the political arena. Minority groups such as women and homosexuals appeared, youth issues grew with the fall of the voting age to 18, immigrants found themselves excluded from mainstream politics and, correspondingly, found political expression outside the boundaries of the mainline parties. For many of these groups,
“…the price of modernity, at least to its main beneficiaries, was starting to look rather high; the ‘lost world’ of their parents and grandparents rather appealing.”47 Policies
began to replace party allegiances as the focus of political activity, resulting in increased
popular action – as with Cymdeithas yr Iaith - and the emergence of single issue political
parties, such as the Greens.
By the 1970s, then, the post-war consensus that was, in many ways, as social as it
was political, had unravelled to the point that there was considerably more space within
Welsh society for issues like the protection of the Welsh language to develop and grow.
Similarly, the emerging political and cultural space allowed Plaid Cymru to gain votes,
votes that while not entirely protest votes as is generally meant by the term, were more a reflection of the concern felt by the Welsh people over Welsh issues than a genuine expression of what is generally meant by nationalism. Issues like the investiture of
47 For a more elaborate summary of the shift towards single issue politics, please see: Tony Judt (2006) Post War, p.485. 39
Prince Charles in 1969 and the development of the Tryweryn Reservoir in the mid 1960s
for the exportation of water to England at the expense of the local community left a reasonable proportion of the Welsh population feeling ignored by the government at
Westminster.48 Essentially, in the 1970s, there was political and cultural space for a new
generation, unable to remember World War Two or the events before it, to focus on the
issues that were of concern to them and, in Wales, this included the state of the Welsh
language and culture.
Politically speaking, however, the Welsh people did not follow the Welsh
intelligentsia into questioning Britain and the relationship between Wales and England.
Despite a real level of interest in the traditional Welsh culture and language and a small
swing to Plaid Cymru, the majority of the Welsh people continued to vote Labour,
Conservative or Liberal. Given the history of the Welsh people, however, this political
voting pattern did not necessarily imply that the Welsh general public were Anglicised.
Welsh political expression had been bound to that of England since the Edwardian
Conquest in the 13th century. The intervening 700 years had served to deepen those ties,
and there is ample evidence that the Liberal and Labour parties had become a living part
of a Welsh political identity. It is, then, feasible that in the 1970s, many of the Welsh
people who voted Labour or Liberal were voting Welsh – just not the Welsh nationalism
of Plaid Cymru. Wales and Welshness were not, for the general public in the Wales of
the 1970s, items of significant concern: they just were.
Yet Kenneth O. Morgan, one of the foremost political historians of Wales, has
argued that despite the high level of continuity in voting patterns, the Welsh political
attitude was strongly influenced by the events that were occurring on the British stage
48 Kenneth O. Morgan (2002) Rebirth of a Nation: A History of Modern Wales, pp.381-382. 40
during the 1970s.49 Labour and Conservative ineffectiveness at remedying the rising
unemployment and inflation, as well as the steadily worsening industrial relations,
triggered economic dissatisfaction within Wales, increasing support for Plaid Cymru.50
Labour’s narrow majority resulted in their inclusion of devolution on the political agenda in an effort to gain Welsh and Scottish support, bringing to public attention an issue that had, until then, been primarily limited to the Welsh intelligentsia and nationalists.51 The
Labour need for SNP and Plaid Cymru support had earlier led to the Labour establishment of a Welsh Secretary for State and of the Welsh Office.52 Generally – and
despite continuing difficulties in the Welsh economy, with the slow and only partially
successful modernisation of industrial Wales and the decline of rural Wales – the Welsh
people accepted the government figures of 1971, arguing that Wales benefited from
economic membership in Britain.53 Plaid Cymru’s argument to the reverse was
unprovable and, given the economic situation, deemed unacceptable in the 1979
devolution referendum.54 Kenneth O. Morgan cast the Welsh economy of the 1970s into
perspective, arguing that despite its poor comparative performance with the south-east of
England, the Midlands of other EC countries, when Welsh progress was measured with
that of the Wales of the 1930s the huge advance was evident.55 This was the source of the general atmosphere of optimism and confidence, despite concerns over the ‘branch’
49 Kenneth O. Morgan (1981) Rebirth of a Nation: A History of Modern Wales. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.338. 50 Ibid., p.338. 51 Ibid., p.338. 52 Frank Welsh (2003) The Four Nations: A History of the United Kingdom. London: HarperCollins Publishers, pp.389-390. 53 Kenneth O. Morgan (1981) Rebirth of a Nation: A History of Modern Wales. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.338. 54 Ibid., pp.338-339. 55 Ibid., pp.338-339. 41
nature of much of Welsh industrial modernisation.56 It was also the source of the continued Welsh support for membership in Britain, particularly in the border areas
composing British Wales. This economic optimism and the concerns raised during the
Winter of Discontent were enough to negate the real interest in the Welsh language and
culture fostered by the increasing public awareness of the dangerous decline of the
former.57 The Winter of Discontent, concern over the potential loss of financial aid from
Westminster and over the creation of yet another tier of local government, and the increasingly evident divide between industrial and rural Wales resulted in huge majorities voting against devolution.58 As Kenneth O. Morgan argued: “However powerful their
sense of cultural and historical identity, the Welsh were, in political and economic terms, strictly unionist.”59
The Welsh popular attachment to Britain identified by Kenneth O. Morgan was,
however, far more practical than ideological. Beneath this pragmatism, the Welsh
intelligentsia were actively participating in the questioning of Britain and Britishness that
was occurring across the border at both political and intelligentsia levels. By far the
majority of the Welsh intelligentsia were committed to Wales and Welsh culture and
identity and a significant section of this group tended to assume that these concepts
primarily referred to traditional Wales and Welshness. Few Welsh intellectuals professed
to a British Welsh identity, with the majority claiming either a Welsh-Wales or a Y Fro
Gymraeg identity.60 Given this, the criticism apparent – particularly in the main source
56 Ibid., pp.336-339. 57 Ibid., pp.397-405. 58 Ibid., pp.404-405. 59 Ibid., p.405. 60 K.O. Morgan was one of the few members of the Welsh intelligentsia who came close to claiming a British Welsh identity. 42
material, the journal articles – was strongly focused on examining the continued
applicability and relevance of the then-existent expression of the relationship between
Wales and England. The Welsh intelligentsia publishing in the journal Planet, the primary 1970s journal discussing wider events in Wales, mainly focused on four aspects of the Welsh-English relationship: political identity and independence, cultural identity, the economic ties between Wales and England in Britain, and the potential for devolution. All four of these fields related to the events of the 1970s. The decline of the political and economic prowess of Britain facilitated the Welsh intelligentsia’s examination of the political and economic relationship between the two countries, including the potential role of devolution in reconfiguring those relationships. Cultural identity was more specific to the Welsh experience of the 1960s and 1970s, emerging from the intelligentsia’s realisation of the real dangers facing the Welsh language and traditional Welsh language culture, as highlighted by Saunders Lewis in his “Tynged yr
Iaith”61 radio broadcast in 1962. The British-wide challenge to Britain and Britishness
provided the Welsh intelligentsia with the space to examine this version of Welsh culture and identity. Indeed, it could be argued that Saunders Lewis’ speech also helped to
trigger the intelligentsia’s re-examination of the political and economic relationship
between Wales and England, particularly devolution.
Political identity and independence – the first field addressed by the Welsh
intelligentsia – has been, historically, a major issue in Wales, a side-effect of living next
door to England. Technically, Wales never achieved political unification and cannot,
therefore be awarded the controversial title of nation-state. More importantly, lack of
61 Kenneth O. Morgan (2002) Rebirth of a Nation: A History of Modern Wales, pp.382-383. “Tynged yr Iaith” means “The Fate of the Language.” 43
political unification indicated lack of a unified political identity, confirmed by the
preponderance of pre-Edwardian Conquest internecine warfare. In this pre-Conquest
period, Welsh political identity was predominantly local, offered to the traditional, small
kingdoms or princedoms. When attempts were made to unify Wales under Llywelyn ab
Iorwerth and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, they failed – at least, in part, because of the strength
of those local ties. It is evident, however, that the Welsh of this pre-13th century era did
possess a sense of Welsh cultural similarity and external difference: they knew they were
not English and their name for their people – Cymry – and country – Cymru – meant
kindred. This non-political sense of identity, in many ways, a cultural identity, has
proven particularly important in allowing Wales to retain its sense of self and sense of
difference since the Edwardian Conquest.
After the Edwardian Conquest, Welsh political identity began its slow process of
Anglicisation, a process that gained speed after the Acts of Union under Henry VIII and
the steady imposition of the Church of England, triggering the decline of the Welsh expressions of Christianity. By the sixteenth century, little sense of Wales as a discrete
political unit remained, with the majority of Welsh gentry and nobles gradually rejecting
the Welsh language, Welsh literature and traditional Welsh culture in favour of the
English equivalents that facilitated political, economic and social survival and prosperity.
This process has been well illustrated in Welsh language novels, including Marion
Eames’ Y Stafell Dfirgel, which describes the experience and isolation of the Welsh
Quakers.62 It is worth emphasising that the processes of Anglicisation and the
corresponding exclusion of Welsh expressions of identity are still in action today: they
are the result of a gradual accumulation of choices and actions on those choices, rarely a
62 Marion Eames (1969) Y Stafell Dfirgel. Llandybie: Llyfrau’r Dryw. 44
deliberate abandonment of identity. Regardless, the outcome has been close affiliation with first England and then England in Britain.
This political association with England was further illustrated by the events of the
19th and 20th centuries. When the Welsh people began to gain the vote in the 19th century
electoral reforms, they tended to vote Liberal: a British party, albeit one more relevant to
non-gentry voters such as the Liberal Party had connected itself with the issues, culture
and Nonconformity relevant to the Welsh people. By the 20th century inter-war period,
this vote had segued with events and the decline of Chapel attendance towards the Labour
Party, where it stayed until 1979. Welsh political alternatives were largely ignored.
Cymru Fydd (Wales To Be or, in some translations, Young Wales) failed over the
disunity between the northern Welsh-speaking heartlands and the English-speaking
industrial south, and Plaid Cymru was primarily limited to the Welsh speaking
heartlands. These latter two did, however, indicate the existence of a sense of Welsh
nationalist political identity, however much it may have been subsumed by the majority
who supported British parties, thereby accepting the Union with England in Britain.
Such a brief outline of political identity in Wales leaves out a world of detail – the
intense socialism of the industrial areas, the Liberalism of the Welsh heartlands, Owain
Glyn Dwr’s rebellion. This detail will be addressed, where appropriate, in the following
chapter. Here, what is important is the broad tendency of the Welsh people to be content with a British political identity, as opposed to a purely Welsh one.
Independence is a similar story. Wales was technically independent prior to the
Edwardian Conquest, although it had experienced Celtic, Roman and Norman occupation
prior to the 13th century. Yet even this independence was marred by the homage paid to 45
neighbouring Saxon Kings from at least the time of Hywel Dda in the 10th century. This, while a political necessity, indicates the problematic nature of proclaiming pre-Conquest
Wales fully independent. It also begs the question of whether any kingdom, including the most powerful can ever truly claim independence: all must co-exist with others in a way that casts doubt on the idea of true political independence. Nevertheless, any semblance of Welsh political independence was lost with the Edwardian Conquest, and Wales was legally and politically absorbed into England under the terms of Henry VIII’s Acts of
Union.
In the 19th and 20th centuries, minority interest was shown in regaining some level of political independence, usually in the form of Home Rule or a devolved body within the larger auspices of Britain. Both Cymru Fydd and Plaid Cymru have been advocates for such a development and it formed an essential part of Plaid Cymru’s political programme although neither were taken all that seriously by either Westminster or the
Welsh people prior to the rise in support for Plaid Cymru in the 1970s. Interest was also shown at a less advanced level, with popular Welsh demands for legislation to cater for specifically Welsh needs, including the Sunday Opening Act and the Disestablishment
Act. There was also the gradual development at Westminster of political Welsh bodies such as a Welsh Office and a Secretary of State for Wales. These bodies did not indicate possession of political independence or a distinct political identity or a desire for such entities, but did demonstrate some elite awareness in Britain of the political difference between Wales and England even within the framework of Britain.
The Welsh intelligentsia approached this field of political identity and independence from two main perspectives: they considered Welsh political development 46
from within the context of British and European trends, and they attempted to outline
ways forward for Welsh political development. Both types of articles show considerable
awareness of events outside of Wales and, in many cases, outside of Britain. This is, at
least in part, because of the journal in which these articles were all published. Planet was
intentionally internationalist and mildly nationalist in outlook, and its articles naturally
followed suit. It also reflects, however, the way in which the governments of the 1970s
approached the topic of Welsh political nationalism, indicating a general academic
tendency to place Welsh nationalism within an international context.
The government’s and external research centres’ concerns differed noticeably
from those inside Wales, however. Two such studies published in 1971 by the Institute
for the Study of Conflict63 and the government’s Crowther Commission64 indicated that
the central concern of these bodies was to understand the origins of the Welsh nationalist
movement and its potential for violence. Both tied the origins back to the relationship
between Wales and England in Britain, with the centralised nature of British
government,65 featuring resentment from being governed from Westminster, a frustration
born from a feeling of inferiority, the Welsh desire for economic independence and a real
desire for complete autonomy for the practice and evolution of the Welsh language.66
Both studies concluded that violence along the lines observed in Ulster and Cyprus, with
the Catalans and the Croatians was unlikely but that the situation remained problematic.67
In many ways, both these studies were more commentaries on the British situation than
63 D.L. Price (1971) “Wars of National Liberation.” Planet, Vol. 7, pp.13-19. 64 Patricia Elton Mayo (1971) “Constitutional Background of Separatist Movements.” Planet, Vol. 7, pp.29-31. 65 Ibid., pp.29-31. 66 D.L. Price (1971) “Wars of National Liberation.” Planet, Vol. 7, pp.16-18. 67Ibid., pp.13-15. 47
the Welsh: Patricia Elton Mayo, in her analysis of the report released by the Crowther
Commission, argued that Welsh nationalism was symptomatic of a wider reaction against
a form of government based on an ethos unsuitable for the nature of the United Kingdom,
preferring a more federal governmental structure.68
This governmental and British focus emerged from the wider British situation and
the experience of the violence associated with Irish nationalism and trade unionism.
British decline and the atmosphere of questioning towards Britain and Britishness
combined with the fear of the spread of violent unrest to open a door for the discussion of
the most effective form of government for Britain. In other words, for the British
government, Welsh political nationalism was seen as part of a bigger picture and was not
really addressed as a specifically Welsh issue. This was definitely not the case among the
Welsh intelligentsia themselves. For this group, Welsh political nationalism and identity
were intricately related to both Wales as a specific country and to Britain as the current
expression of Welsh state identity. Violence and terrorism were not issues that attracted
a significant amount of attention from the Welsh intelligentsia. Indeed, the journal
articles indicated a very low tolerance of any form of illegality stronger than basic civil
disobedience.
Several of the journal articles do indicate that the disparate Welsh intelligentsia,
as with their English relations, were aware of the relationship between the shakiness of
Britain and Britishness and the growth of popular and elite interest in a Welsh political identity and some level of independence. Three slightly different but complementary
approaches were visible in Planet. One, of which Ioan Williams is an example,
68 Patricia Elton Mayo (1971) “Constitutional Background of Separatist Movements.” Planet, Vol. 7, pp.29-31. 48
considered Welsh political developments in the light of the changes within Britain since
World War One (WW1).69 According to Ioan Williams, the decline of the Liberal Party in the post-war era occurred concurrently with the decline of the Welsh willingness to work within a British framework.70 Both, in turn, were symptomatic of a gradual change in the Welsh attitude towards Britain and their role in the state. By the 1970s, this process had reached the point where the Welsh re-acknowledgement of their traditions based on a classical – rather than an English or British – past had become embodied in the concern over the language and in the emergent belief that Wales deserved a separate political expression.71
Tom Nairn, in 1976, continued the trend of approaching Welsh nationalism from within the broader context of the British situation, providing an example of what would become a familiar approach to Britain in the ensuing decades. The continued unity of
Britain became a topic of substantial interest in the later 1970s, both within and without
Wales, particularly after the publication of Nairn’s book, The Break-up of Britain.72
Strictly speaking, Tom Nairn was not a member of the Welsh intelligentsia but his work impacted so strongly on some sections of the Welsh intelligentsia and their perceptions of
Britain that his publication in Planet is of real relevance to this analysis.73 He argued that
Wales, having advanced from being a non-historic and under-developed nation with its identity based purely on culture to possessing a specifically Welsh political identity, was able to provide an example for those nations, including Scotland, which had not yet
69 Ioan Williams (1974) “One Blood, yet Twain.” Planet, Vol. 24, No. 5, pp.21-30. 70 Ibid., pp.21-30. 71 Ibid., pp.21-30. 72 Tom Nairn (1977) The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neonationalism. London: NLB. 73 Tom Nairn (1976) “Scotland and Wales: Notes on Nationalist Pre-history.” Planet, Vol 34, pp.1-11. 49
achieved such a balance.74 This argument indicated two significant beliefs – one, that
despite the Welsh lack of an official Welsh government, Wales had, since the start of the
20th century, developed enough in terms of institutions and political expression to possess
a specifically Welsh political identity. Secondly, while the outcome of this development
could not be foreseen, one possible result would be a substantial change in the then-
current system of Unions and government that bound the nations of Britain together.
Wales itself would play a large role in this process for, according to Nairn, the Welsh
achievement - if it continued to develop – would provide an example to those nations,
including Scotland, who had yet to achieve a balance between political and cultural
identities.75
Raymond Williams dealt quite thoroughly with the third approach to the
relationship between the shakiness of Britain and Britishness and the growth of interest in
a Welsh political identity and some level of independence. He advocated the proactive
change of the form of government and of the rethinking of the ideological basis of the
nation-state to facilitate the emergence of a Welsh political identity that was not defined
by non-Welsh standards.76 In arguing this, Raymond Williams made explicit a point that,
again, would become very prevalent over the ensuing decades. As has been seen, several
of the Welsh intelligentsia had, in the 1970s, argued that the then-current shape of the
relationship between England and Wales was problematic for the healthy development of
Welsh political identity and independence, implying that the state of these factors left
something to be desired. Raymond Williams was far more explicit, arguing outright that
74 Ibid., pp.1-11. 75 Ibid., pp.1-11. 76 Raymond Williams (2003) Who Speaks for Wales? Nation, Culture and Identity. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, pp.186-203. 50
Welsh political identity and, therefore, potential for independence was shaped and, in
many ways, defined by Wales’ historical relationship with England in Britain. The shape
of this relationship needed to be addressed for Welsh political identity to fully develop.
This approach was picked up by several other members of the Welsh intelligentsia
who offered more specific critiques on the aspects of the English-Welsh relationship that were perceived as debilitating for Welsh political identity. Two of these people focused
on the colonial nature of the relationship, indicating yet another trend that was prevalent
in the 1970s, in the era of final decolonisation. From this perspective, Wales was,
essentially, the first English colony and the current economic relationship between the two was still colonial in shape. Brian Davies argued that this colonial relationship was responsible for the disassociation of economic history from Welsh history which, in turn, created a divide between Welsh nationalism and the Welsh working class who possessed
the disassociated history.77 Correspondingly, the nationalist challenge to the colonial
relationship between Wales and England was less effective because the Welsh working
class movements – and, essentially, the grass-roots population – were historically
positioned against traditional Wales and Welshness.78
Not all of the Welsh intelligentsia agreed with this form of solution to the colonial
predicament, however. There was another group writing, a group whose approach to the
situation would become more dominant in the 1980s and 1990s. Brian Davies’ work
was, for all intents and purposes, an argument for the creation of a Welsh history and
identity that included all the Welsh experiences, with the identity formed being based on
Welsh history. This second group of writers, however, was more concerned about
77 Brian Davies (1977) “Towards a New Synthesis.” Planet, Vol. 37, No. 8, pp.56-59. 78 Ibid., pp.56-59. 51
accepting diversity in a manner that would be conducive to Welsh development and freedom from the Welsh-English colonial relationship. One example, Bobi Jones, agreed with the diagnosis of a colonial relationship but argued that the central problem lay deeper than economic disassociation.79 The Welsh had developed an inferiority complex
towards their language and culture, a complex that had been expressed through the silent acceptance of English dominance in culture and politics.80 He argued that the socialist
idea of equality between Welsh and English languages and cultures was, because of this
complex, impractical, recommending instead the national individuality position: this
involved the rejection of external cultural dominance and the acceptance of pluralism and
diversity within one nation.81
It is evident from these examples that the Welsh intelligentsia of the 1970s and
those who participated in this discussion were primarily concerned with the limitations
imposed on Wales by the political dominance of England. There was general agreement that this situation needed to be changed, and a general sense that it needed to be done
soon. At some levels, there was also awareness that the Welsh interest in the potential for political separation at some level from England was part of the British experience –
Welsh political identity in the 1970s was both shaping and being shaped by Britain. Yet for the Welsh intelligentsia, the Welsh movement away from then-current political
understanding of Wales and Britain was a process that had been slowly occurring over
the last century. None of the journal articles examined considered the possibility that
despite the changes in the British situation and in the relationship between Wales and
England, Wales was not, in fact, moving automatically towards regaining its political
79 Bobi Jones (1978) “I’m Your Boy” Planet, Vol. 42, pp.3-5. 80 Ibid., pp.3-5. 81 Ibid., pp.3-5. 52
identity as a devolved country. The ‘no’ vote in the 1979 devolution referendum, in which the Welsh people rejected this form of progress, came as a serious shock for many among the Welsh intelligentsia.82 Indeed, the analysis of the reasons for the unexpected
rejection of devolution is still ongoing.83
Cultural identity, the second field focused on by the Welsh intelligentsia in the
1970s was, in Wales, far more political than might have been immediately apparent to those outside the country. This politicisation began with the debate over political identity and the acknowledged divide between some of the political identities found in Wales and a Welsh cultural identity. In any national context, the presence of such a divide would be significant: for Wales and Welshness, it held considerable implications. First among these was that political and cultural identities did not, necessarily, have to belong to the same national group. For example, it would be possible to be politically aligned with
Labour and Britain (as opposed to Labour and Wales) and yet still identify culturally with
Wales rather than Britain or England. This further implied a divided national identity, in which political nationalism did not necessarily correlate with cultural nationalism. The atmosphere of political questioning and the internal concerns over the state of the Welsh language and traditional Welsh culture combined to open another arena of debate over the nature and position of both aspects in relation to the relationship between Wales and
England.
The practical result of this separation of political and cultural aspects of identity
was neatly summarised in an analysis of a Public Policy Pamphlet released in 1982.
82 See Chapter Three. A Search for Wales and Welshness: The 1980s, pp.141-170. 83 Andrew Edwards & Duncan Tanner (2006) “Defining or Dividing the Nation? Opinion Polls, Welsh Identity and Devolution, 1966-1979.” Contemporary Wales, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp.54-71. 53
Throughout the analysis it is clear that Welsh society and politics is shot through with
‘Welsh’ values and sentiments: these are ubiquitous but elusive. They appear to be
significant in affecting outlook and behaviour mainly where sentiment is sharpened by
the language. Welsh sentiment is not in itself a neutral medium but it is a comparatively
passive medium. It is open to activation or impregnation by cultural and economic
discontents. The former has led to Plaid Cymru voting, the latter to Labour voting. In
Wales, the Labour Party has been the recent beneficiary of Welsh sentiment.
The analysis has uncovered a significant gap between identity and language, and between
low and high cultural attachment. Welsh identity is widespread but falls short of
nationalism in the strict sense. Even among the most intensely Welsh there is no
consistent strong commitment to Plaid Cymru to devolution or to self-government. The
Welsh people are also caught up in British perspectives and, reasonably enough, see
Britain as the arena in which their fate will be decided. As Glanmor Williams has
written, Welshness had been ‘judged …to be largely irrelevant to the most serious social
and political issues of the twentieth century’. (19). ‘A realist’, looking to the present and
future, may accept Britishness as a necessary complement to a Welsh identity; but a
‘romantic’, looking into the past, sees no virtue in a system which so fundamentally
compromises the integrity of Wales.84
As the 1979 rejection of devolution only too clearly revealed, these attitudes had been prevalent among the Welsh people throughout the 1970s. The Welsh intelligentsia’s examination of the Welsh-English relationship and majority interest in devolution were not significant issues in popular Wales.
84 Dennis Balsom, Peter Madgwick & Dennis Van Mechelen (1982) The Political Consequences of Welsh Identity. University of Strathclyde, Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, p.24. 54
Yet for the Welsh people as well as the intelligentsia, then, Wales and Welshness did not come with an easy definition. The divide between cultural and political identity was lived as well as theoretical, as was a divide within cultural identity in Wales, between those whose identity fell within the realms of traditional Welsh culture and those whose identity and culture were solely or predominantly expressed through the English language. It is also clear that, for the Welsh people, the debate of the 1970s was not limited to the value of Britain and Britishness. It began to encompass the questioning of the value of the then traditional definition of cultural Wales and Welsh identity – a direction not then of real interest to the section of the Welsh intelligentsia active in the journals. This public planning policy pamphlet further indicated that the Welsh intelligentsia were not working on the same wave-length as the Welsh people in their discussions over the limitation of Welshness according to language either. The survey behind the Public Policy Pamphlet indicated that, for the people of Wales, cultural
Welshness was considered compatible with the English language, that this form of identity was considered as valid as a traditional cultural identity, and that the majority were happy to accept the reality of the Welsh relationship with England in Britain. It also questioned other conclusions reached by Cymdeithas yr Iaith, Plaid Cymru and its
President, Gwynfor Evans, in depicting the Welsh language as firmly linked to a passionate identification with a Wales linguistically and/or politically devolved from
England – “…despite the force of cultural tradition, the language is no longer the basis of
Welsh national identity. …this implies a reduction of political commitment in Welsh national sentiment…”85 The concerns of the Welsh people and those of the still disparate
Welsh intelligentsia were significantly – and, in 1979, very tellingly – different.
85 Ibid., p.25. 55
Statistical evidence confirmed the dominance of this pragmatic approach to a
cultural Welsh identity among the people of Wales and further demonstrated the impact
of the Welsh-English relationship on the formation of Welsh cultural identity. The 1982
Public Policy Pamphlet contained a graph detailing the interpenetration of language and
identity based on the Gallup Poll of the summer of 1979.86 What this data indicated was
that of the respondents who claimed a Welsh identity – 57% - over half spoke only
English – 34% of the total number of respondents.87 The data also indicated that Welsh
language and Welsh identity were not necessarily linked with 5% of the respondents
claiming a non-Welsh identity (usually British) despite being able to speak Welsh.88
However, the intelligentsia’s concern over the language and a corresponding Welsh identity or British identity was somewhat justified, with 42% of the respondents claiming an identity other than Welsh – generally a British-Welsh identity.89
The connection between the language and identity had entered the public arena in
1962 as a result of Saunders Lewis’ radio lecture, ‘Tynged yr Iaith’ (‘The Fate of the
Language’), which highlighted the problems threatening the survival of the Welsh
language and called for action to rejuvenate this aspect of Welshness.90 As a result of
this speech, Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymreig (The Welsh Language Society) was set up in
the same year, both to facilitate language growth and to gain official recognition, usage
and protection of Welsh91. Cymdeithas yr Iaith embarked on a programme of civil
disobedience, including painting over English language road signs, effectively shifting
86 Ibid., p.2, Figure 1. 87 Ibid., p.2, Figure 1. 88 Ibid., p.2, Figure 1. 89 Ibid., p.2, Figure 1. 90 Raymond Williams (2003) Who Speaks for Wales? Nation, Culture and Identity, p.221. 91 Ibid., p.221. 56
awareness of the debate firmly into the public arena. In 1964, the first South Wales
Welsh-medium high school was opened, Ysgol Gyfun Rhydfelen, facilitating the growth
of the language in a traditionally English-speaking area. Despite these efforts, however,
the 1971 census indicated that only 21% of the population above the age of three were
able to speak Welsh – an improvement on the 1961 situation but still an unhealthily small
percentage.92
The debate among the Welsh intelligentsia was stimulated by the small but growing section of the public who were concerned by the state of the Welsh language and culture in the 1970s. There were several factors about the intelligentsia’s approach to this
topic of cultural identity that were immediately apparent. The first of these was the
centrality of the debate over the use of the English and Welsh languages within Wales
and the relative positions and status of the two languages. The second was the
acknowledgement of the antagonistic relationship between the two language cultures and,
by the end of the decade an increased interest in breaking the deadlock between the two
linguistic expressions of Welshness. Both factors were present throughout the journal
articles, as was a clear lack of agreement among the Welsh intelligentsia over the basis
for a modern, undivided Welsh cultural identity. A third factor, however, was the
apparent lack of awareness on the behalf of the Welsh intelligentsia of the fact that the
majority of the Welsh population approached the issue of cultural identity and language
from a very different perspective. Again, the popular rejection of the more traditional
forms of Welsh identity in the 1979 devolution referendum would come as a major shock for much of the Welsh intelligentsia.
92 Denis Balsom, Peter Madgwick & Denis Van Mechelen (1982) The Political Consequences of Welsh Identity. University of Strathclyde, Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, p.1. 57
The lack of a common experiential ground for the construction of a Welsh
identity was, as with the issue of political identity and independence, based firmly in
Welsh history. English was – and is - essentially the language of the dominant nation, of
the conquerors, but economic participation in Britain required – and still does – the
ability to speak and work in English. Access to the English language also opened up a
huge popular cultural arena not available to those who chose to function only within the
Welsh language world. Correspondingly, the central question for the Welsh intelligentsia
was whether or not it was possible for the English language to express a Welsh identity or
whether this ability was limited to the Welsh language and, therefore, to those able to
speak it. The status of the Welsh language, particularly in terms of its position against
English, was also central to this question.
The first factor noticeable in the journal articles, the centrality of the language
issue to cultural identity, was indicated by the inability of the Welsh intelligentsia to
discuss Welsh literature without consideration being given to the language in which the
literature was written. Plaid Cymru and Cymdeithas yr Iaith represented one approach to
this issue. Both groups effectively denied the validity of an English-speaking Welsh culture, relegating Welsh literature written in English to England and regional English culture. Cymdeithas yr Iaith was able to propose, in all seriousness, the official linguistic
division of Wales, complete with separate institutions and linguistic employment policies.93 This model was intended to protect the Welsh language from the influx of
English, and to allow English speakers space to develop a Welsh English-language
culture without the pressure to choose between their mother tongue (English) and their
93 Ned Thomas (1972) “Socialism and the Two-Wales Model.” Planet, Vol 14, pp.3-9. 58
stated identity (Welsh).94 Clearly implied was the assumption that there was no developed Welsh English-language culture and that the traditional Welsh identity was only available to those able to speak Welsh. This traditional identity needed to be protected from the ravages of English, an approach that was evidence of the antagonism between those committed to the two expressions of Wales.
This hostility was emphasised by others among the intelligentsia, in ways that both challenged and supported the argument that the Welsh language was central to
Welsh cultural identity. Only one of the challenges, however, indicated the attitude that the Welsh language was not so important for Welsh identity and unity. This perspective, represented by Roger Tanner, emerged in response to Cymdeithas yr Iaith’s proposal to divide Wales linguistically. He argued that such a division would weaken the Welsh ability to withstand English cultural pressure. In contrast, he argued that a focus on other features of a Welsh identity would foster unity in Wales as well as a national identity, enabling Wales to withstand the advances of English culture.95 Some among the Welsh intelligentsia, however, were not willing to deny the importance of the Welsh language to cultural identity, arguing instead that both versions of Welsh culture deserved equal respect.96 Where this did not happen – and Robert Nisbet offered the example of the disrespect shown by Welsh-speakers attending the Eisteddfod in Haverfordwest towards the area’s dominant English-language Welsh culture – resentment, dislike and division were the result.97 Cultural antagonism and division were also deepened by the reverse – by the lack of empathy offered towards Welsh-language learners by native Welsh-
94 Ibid., pp.3-9. 95 Roger Tanner (1973) “National Identity and the One-Wales Model.” Planet, Vol. 17, pp.31-34. 96 Robert Nisbet (1972) “After the Eisteddfod.” Planet, Vol 14. pp.10-12. 97 Ibid., pp.10-12. 59
speakers.98 In this interpretation, J.P. Brown confirmed the importance of the Welsh language to Welsh cultural identity but critiqued the methods in place for fostering its growth.
Raymond Williams provided an example of another approach to the topic, one that was only beginning to appear in the later 1970s and one that was inclusive of both languages. This perspective was not spelt out in Who Speaks for Wales? Nation, Culture
and Identity (2003) but was, nonetheless, quite clearly presented in two of the essays it
contains – “The Welsh Industrial Novel” (1979) and “The Welsh Trilogy and The
Volunteers” (1979). These two essays presented Welsh literature of both languages as
emergent from the Welsh experience and the language used was a part of this
experience.99 Raymond Williams also indicated that Welsh nationalists did not
automatically have to reject Anglo-Welsh literature and acknowledged the Welshness of
both story and expression.100 English-language literature could be just as nationalist as
that written in Welsh, as the spate of anti-investiture writing in the early 1970s illustrated.
It was at this point that Raymond Williams offered a new element into the mix,
one that contributed towards an explanation of the inclusiveness of his understanding of
cultural identity in Wales. Raymond Williams considered his own writing to be
European Welsh,101 one of the few indications that the Welsh intelligentsia were
beginning to alter their thinking according to the presence of the EC. This European
element was relatively unexplored in relation to Welsh identity in the 1970s, and the
98 J.P. Brown (1971) “Welcoming the Welsh Learner.” Planet, Vol. 7, pp.39-41. 99 Raymond Williams (2003) Who Speaks for Wales? Nation, Culture and Identity, pp.99-100. 100 Ibid., p.136. 101 Ibid.. 60
concepts behind this perspective seem to have been relatively slow in catching on in
Wales.
With the exception of Raymond Williams, the Welsh intelligentsia appeared to limit their critique of the Welsh-English relationship to its cultural manifestations within
Wales. This manifestation was plainly considered problematic for the development of a united Welsh culture and identity, and the discussion clearly portrayed a keen awareness of the threat offered by the English language to Wales and Welshness. Raymond
Williams, however, lifted the argument into a new level by problematising the umbrella state of Britain. This, in turn, implicitly problematised the Welsh-English relationship in
Britain by arguing that the two expressions of a Welsh cultural identity could not co-exist while the colonial baggage of conquest and dominance remained embodied in Britain.
Despite the uniqueness of his approach, Raymond Williams was not the only
member of the Welsh intelligentsia to place the blame for the Welsh cultural division on
England’s doorstep. For a proportion of the Welsh intelligentsia, the English language
gained its initial dominance in Wales through the emergence of a Welsh inferiority
complex that was as cultural as it was post-colonial and political.102 Two examples of
this argument can be found in the writings of Bobi Jones and Tecwyn Lloyd. Both
authors argued that this inferiority complex was historically based, although both
identified different trigger events – the Acts of Union and the 1847 Education Report respectively.103 Both events, regardless of their separation in time, involved the displacement of the Welsh language, first from law and government and then from education. Such a displacement implied a lower status which, once accepted by the
102 Bobi Jones (1978) “I’m Your Boy.” Planet, Vol. 42, pp.3-5. 103 Ibid., pp2-20; Bobi Jones (1974) ‘The Roots of Welsh Inferiority,’ Planet, Vol 22, pp53-72; Tecwyn Lloyd (1976) “Wales – see England.” Planet, Vol. 34, pp.36-47. 61
Welsh people, resulted in a loss of national confidence and the inclination to accept their
inferiority in other areas of life, facilitating Anglicisation and a personal sense of
incompleteness.104 For these members of the Welsh intelligentsia, the solution to the
division in Welsh cultural identity lay in understanding the way in which the Welsh
inferiority complex had emerged and how it had shaped the Welsh people’s attitude
towards their culture and identity. Essentially, they were challenging the then-current
expression of the Welsh-English relationship in Britain and Wales’ position within the
state of Britain itself. Raymond Williams was, however, one of the few among the Welsh
intelligentsia to demonstrate an understanding of the perspective of the Welsh people
concerning the Welsh and English languages and their roles in identity construction.
The economic aspect of the relationship between England and Wales, the third
field addressed by the intelligentsia in the 1970s, did not, at the start of the 1970s, hold
the particular significance it had gained by the end of the decade or, certainly, by the end
of the Thatcher period. Britain’s economic situation during the 1970s has already been
broadly outlined, as has that of Wales. The decade was difficult, particularly in
comparison with the 1950s and 1960s but it was, at least in part, concern over British
decline that cast the biggest shadow across the economic scene. It is, however, important
to realise that the significance of the economic developments of the early 1970s – the
entry into the EC, the floating of the pound sterling, the gradual rise of inflation etc – was not fully grasped until the second half of the decade. Thus, the Welsh economic position could seem strong enough for independence in the early 1970s and still receive a popular and resounding rejection at the 1979 devolution referendum.
104 Bobi Jones (1974) “The Roots of Welsh Inferiority.” Planet, Vol. 22, pp53-72; Bobi Jones (1978) “I’m Your Boy.” Planet, Vol. 42, pp2-20; Tecwyn Lloyd (1976) “Wales – see England.” Planet, Vol. 34, pp.36- 47. 62
As previously mentioned, it is argued now, well after the fact, that the 1960s and
1970s rise of Welsh nationalism was, in fact, based on economic dissatisfaction. Little
discussion of this economic dissatisfaction was evident until 1979, although Plaid Cymru was clear in their election manifestos that they believed the Welsh economy was being mishandled by Labour and Conservative governments.105 Nonetheless, the Welsh
intelligentsia subjected the nature of the economic relationship between Wales and
England to some serious debate throughout the decade.
Unsurprisingly, the focus of the debate over the economic relationship was on the
colonial nature of the Welsh economy. This debate was very closely connected to the one over the colonial nature of the Welsh-English political relationship, and many of the
Welsh intelligentsia who contributed to one, contributed to both. The theory of the
internal colony, discussed earlier, found an immediate home with Plaid Cymru and with
those attempting to inter-relate class and nationalist struggles. Brian Davies argued that the political problems emerging from the colonial relationship had in fact had an economic basis with capitalism and imperialism demanding the assimilation of Wales into Britain to ensure a stable economic base for expansion.106 Similarly, the concepts
behind the political notion of an underdeveloped nation also had an economic basis. In
this interpretation, the Welsh intelligentsia argued that England had, essentially,
dominated Wales politically and economically, resulting in the Welsh failure to develop
the foundations for self-sustaining economic development.107 Yet again, the dominance
of England was identified as a problem for Welsh development, and the structure of
105 Plaid Cymru (1966/7-1970) Action for Wales: Manifesto for the General Election. Bangor: Elwyn Roberts 106 Brian Davies (1977) “Towards a New Synthesis.” Planet, Vol. 37, No. 8, pp.54-59. 107 Graham Day (1978) ‘Underdeveloped Wales,’ Planet, Vol. 45, No. 6, pp.104-107. 63
Britain, built to foster the economic prowess of an Empire centred on England, was
increasingly being seen as, as best, semi-functional in the modern world.
Plaid Cymru, under Gwynfor Evans, offered a solution to the problems that had
emerged from this unequal relationship. Plaid Cymru manifestos for the 1970s tended to emphasise the problematic English control over the Welsh economy.108 Plaid Cymru
were committed to the rebuilding and maintenance of industrial Wales, but in a way that
fostered traditional Welsh culture and positioned Welsh economic development under
Welsh control. Wales would remain economically competitive but without continuing to
suffer what Plaid Cymru perceived as the intentional economic, cultural and political
damage inflicted on Wales by England through their external industrialization of the
country. According to Plaid Cymru, some level of economic self-management was
feasible, as Wales was already economically self-supporting. Yet neither Gwynfor Evans
nor Plaid Cymru advocated for total economic independence, preferring the retention of
Britain as a free trade zone with interdependent economies. This reflected both Gwynfor
Evans’s and Plaid Cymru’s careful avoidance of demands for independence, preferring
the limited Home Rule option. This preference indicated the retention of Celtic Welsh
ties to the concept of Britain despite their dislike of identity compromise, and also
indicated their pragmatic understanding of the need for Wales to function in an
international economy. Unsurprisingly, Plaid Cymru was unenthusiastic about Britain’s
entry into the EC, feeling that the negotiated terms were not particularly favourable to the
Welsh, and that the organisation itself was not necessarily the best solution for the Welsh
economic problems. Under Gwynfor Evans, Plaid Cymru argued for the renegotiation of
terms for the Welsh entry, as a body separate from England, into the EC in order to
108 Plaid Cymru (c. 1966/7-1970) Action for Wales. General Election Manifesto. Bangor: Elwyn Roberts. 64
prevent the dominance of English issues stunting Welsh growth and activity within and
through the European organisation. Again, the nature of the British relationship and
structure was identified as the primary issue, rather than the mere existence of such a
relationship.
John Lovering, however, explicitly refuted these arguments, particularly those
made by Plaid Cymru under and through Gwynfor Evans.109 He questioned the basic
concepts of exploitation and the intentional misuse of Welsh economic resources, arguing
that the situation was far more complex that the theory of the internal colony allowed, and that modern capitalist core-periphery relations rarely involved intentional abuse.110
He also challenged Plaid Cymru’s assertion that Wales was economically self-sufficient,
arguing the reverse and demonstrating the inflow of resources from the centralised state
in England through the public sector into Wales.111 He essentially emphasised the economic dependence of Wales on England and Britain, particularly in terms of future growth through the attraction of industries and businesses to Wales.
Much of the resentment of the Welsh economic ties to England found in Plaid
Cymru’s approach to the issue was, ultimately, historical. They were protesting against a
tie enforced through conquest and involuntary union – essentially, the nature of the
relationship between Wales and England rather than the relationship itself. John
Lovering’s approach was far more practical, reflecting the reality of 700 years of steadily
growing economic integration and, as was demonstrated by the rejection of devolution in
1979, shared by a substantial majority of the Welsh population. As with political and
109 John Lovering (1978) “The Theory of the Internal Colony.” Planet, Vol. 45/6, pp.89-96; John Lovering (1978) “The Theory of the “Internal Colony” and the Political Economy of Wales.” Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp.55-67. 110 John Lovering (1978) “The Theory of the Internal Colony.” Planet, Vol. 45/6, p.94. 111 Ibid., p.95. 65
cultural identities, the situation in economic terms was quite complex and connected with
the general atmosphere of doubt about the nature of Britain and Britishness. Yet as with the previous two themes, those among the Welsh intelligentsia who challenged the economic relationship between Wales and England were a decade ahead of the Welsh population.
Given this situation, the final theme of devolution could hardly fail to be equally
complex or the subject of serious debate. The situation was initially complicated by the
manner in which devolution advanced to the political agenda of the Labour Party. It was,
in part, in response to the growth of Welsh political nationalism and to the real concern
over the centralisation of government in Britain. Partly, however, it was the result of political necessity. Labour was returned to power with a very small majority and needed the support of the SNP MPs. Devolution was, basically, the price for this support and if offered to Scotland, had to be offered to Wales as well. Many of the Welsh Labour MPs, however, were considerably less than enthusiastic about devolution, as were a large minority of English Labour MPs. Plaid Cymru was effectively left to run the devolution campaign in Wales, despite their lukewarm response to the limited devolution on offer.
For example, Neil Kinnock of the Labour Party argued that Wales was a natural part of
Britain – a stance shared by the Conservative Party – despite his Party’s official support of devolution.112 One essential point here is that the 1970s devolution proposal came
from above: it was not a popular expression of nationalism or of interest in any form of
political independence.
The debate about devolution was equally complex among the Welsh
intelligentsia. Two articles by Ned Thomas indicate that the debate was anything but
112 Kenneth O. Morgan (2002) Rebirth of a Nation: A History of Wales, pp.398-399. 66
superficial, stretching to ask questions about the nature of Wales and Welshness, and the role of Britain in the world of the 1970s. Ned Thomas acknowledged the controversial nature of Welshness and was, correspondingly, concerned about the construction of devolution on nationalist grounds.113 His argument was, rather, that devolution should be
brought in on economic and administrative grounds, facilitating better Welsh
functionality within the EC, itself better suited to dealing with the increasingly globalised
world economy than Britain.114 Yet this latter idea was not always seen as a solid reason
for devolution. Enoch Powell, in a radio interview with BBC Wales’ Vincent Kane
argued that because devolution was, in reality, a purely administrative structure, the price at which it came – the deconstruction of Britain – was far too high.115 Plaid Cymru, in
contrast, did not consider devolution to offer enough freedom from the constrictive and involuntary union with England in Britain.
The content of these debates over devolution did little to reassure the general
public in Wales that devolution would be beneficial, particularly in the light of the
economic difficulties affecting all of Europe in the wake of the 1970s oil crises. For the
Welsh intelligentsia, the issue at the heart of the devolution debate was the nature of the
relationship between Wales and England, its structure and its manner of expression
within Wales. Politically, culturally and economically, the Welsh intelligentsia argued
that England’s dominance crippled Welsh development – and in the atmosphere of the
1970s, devolution was, for many, the solution to the problem. Few among the Welsh
intelligentsia expressed any doubt that Wales would be able to function as a devolved
113 Ned Thomas (1979) “Two Cheers for Devolution?” Planet, Vol. 47, pp.2-3. 114 Ned Thomas (1976) “Behind the Devolution.” Planet, Vol. 35, pp.1-2. 115 Vincent Kane & Enoch Powell. (1974) “Devolution and Self-determination.” Planet, Vol. 24/25, pp.39- 46. 67
nation. Few among the Welsh intelligentsia expected the depth of the Welsh people’s
rejection of devolution in 1979. The arguments for devolution had not met the Welsh
people where they were at, unlike the success of the arguments against devolution in
touching on the fears of the Welsh populace of the domination of one or another group in
Wales, of an ineffective, expensive and democratically unsound addition to the tiers of
government, and of the Welsh inability to prosper economically in a devolved state.
The Welsh intelligentsia were, in the 1970s, participating in the British-wide
questioning of Britain and Britishness, albeit from a very Welsh perspective. This
questioning clearly emerged from the Welsh experiences of the 1960s and 1970s and
focused on the rethinking of the structure and expression of the relationship between
Wales and England in Wales. Yet what was also clear was that the Welsh general
population was not actively participating in this questioning. The English-Welsh
relationship was not, for the majority of the Welsh people, a highly controversial topic.
This would change in the 1980s, but it would take the experience of Thatcherism and the intelligentsia’s rethinking of Wales and Welshness as well as the Welsh-English relationship to bring the two Welsh groups closer together.
It was in this atmosphere of the late 1960s and the 1970s that A.H. Dodd and
Gwynfor Evans116 wrote and published their books, and it was the world of 1970s Wales
into which they released their images of Wales and Welshness and their understanding of
the nature of the relationship between Wales and England. Historiography plays a part in
the construction of national identity, if only through the communication of images to the
116 A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales; Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of My Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History. 68
general public. Where, then, did the histories written by A.H. Dodd and Gwynfor Evans belong in the debates of the decade? 69
Chapter Two
Arthur Herbert Dodd and Gwynfor Evans: Historiographical
Confidence.
Arthur Dodd’s and Gwynfor Evans’ histories1 demonstrated their membership in the Welsh intelligentsia’s discussion about the Welsh-English relationship throughout the 1970s. The huge differences between the two authors’ approaches to the same history only serves to indicate the disparate opinions held by those classified as Welsh intelligentsia. What is particularly interesting about both books is the extent to which the history has been shaped by the 1970s understanding of the relationship between Wales and England in Britain. Such influence is significant as it indicates one of the underlying structures of Welsh historiography and, in turn, casts light on the depth of the influence of Welsh historical experience on shaping the images of
Wales and Welshness that were acceptable to the Welsh people in the 1970s.
Arthur Dodd’s A Short History of Wales and Gwynfor Evans’ Land of My
Fathers were published in 1972 and 1974 respectively. Correspondingly, both histories captured attitudes towards the Welsh-English relationship and Wales and
Welshness that were current in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Given that both books were republished several times over the decade, it can be argued that they also contributed to the discussion that continued after the publication of the two books, even if their influence would only have been felt within the circles of those interested in Welsh history. This influence would still have been significant, as it has been
1 Arthur Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales. Ruthin, North Wales: John Jones Publishing Limited. This book was first published in 1972 by Batsford as Life in Wales. Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of My Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History. Talybont: Y Lolfa. This book was published in Welsh under the title Aros Mae in 1970. 70
books like these that, throughout the 20th century, have shaped the public’s understanding of the Welsh historical experience outside of lived memory.2
The two books are as different as their authors and, as such, provide a vivid demonstration of the impact of the author’s beliefs and experiences upon their work.
The first and most obvious difference between the two books is that of size. Dodd’s
history is brief, a mere 165 pages, where Gwynfor Evans’ utilizes 453 pages to cover
the same span of time. Inevitably, this length difference is expressed in the detail in
which the history is covered and it also reflects the intention of the authors in writing
the books and the audience for which the books were produced. A Short History of
Wales was written as an introduction to Welsh history for those who wished to learn
more either about their own history or that of the country in which they were visitors.3
Land of My Fathers, in contrast, was written with a very different motivation.
Gwynfor Evans’ “Introduction” to his history book reveals his celebratory approach to Welsh history,4 something he himself confirmed in his autobiography For the Sake
of Wales.5 Welsh history was, for Gwynfor Evans, intimately tied to his
understanding of Welsh national identity: no Welsh person could truly be sure of their
national identity without knowing their history from a Welsh rather than an English
perspective.6 This latter point is significant. Gwynfor Evans’ history was, essentially, written to provide the Welsh people with roots in Wales as opposed to
Britain and, through confirming their identity, to decrease what he perceived as the ineffectiveness of Wales as a nation apart from England and the servility of the Welsh
2 Benedict Anderson discussed the role literature and literacy played in the creation of an imagined community (the nation) in Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. 3 Arthur Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales. John Jones Publishing Ltd: Ruthin, Foreword. 4 Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of my Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History. Talybont: Y Lolfa, pp.13- 14. 5 Gwynfor Evans (1996) For the Sake of Wales. Welsh Academic Press, pp.200-201. 6 Ibid., pp.200-201. 71
towards both England and Britain.7 Land of My Fathers was a political history – it
contained what Gwynfor Evans acknowledged to be an element of propaganda.8
The fact that the book was first written and published in Welsh indicated the centrality of the language to Gwynfor Evans’ understanding of both history and national identity. Gwynfor Evans was not brought up in a Welsh-speaking home but learnt the language in his teens, already convinced of the value and importance of the language and its literature to Welsh identity and experience9 as was illustrated in his later life by his efforts to secure a Welsh language television channel.10 “Where the
Welsh language is alive the seams of our tradition yield great treasure.”11 Land of My
Fathers was not published in English until 1974, a translation that was neither undertaken nor initiated by Gwynfor Evans, although done with his full approval.12
The differing styles of the two books clearly reflect their authors’ careers as
well as their personal beliefs about Welsh history. Arthur Dodd, although retired at
the time of writing, had been a professional university based historian at the
University of Wales, Bangor, from 1922 to 1958.13 As such, his approach to history
reflected his professional training and expertise as an analytical researcher, allowing
him to construct an overview of Welsh history that was of a professional standard
even outside his own preferred areas of research.14 Gwynfor Evans, in contrast, was
a politician, a Welsh nationalist and, at the time of the writing and publication of
Land of My Fathers, the President of Plaid Cymru since 1945 and its first MP. His history reflected his vocation, for while it utilised substantial quantities of scholarly
7 Ibid., pp.200-201. 8 Ibid., p.200. 9 Ibid., pp.23-32. 10 Ibid., pp.93-108. 11 Ibid., p.93. 12 Gwynfor Evans took advantage of this opportunity to add a further thirty pages of corrections and additions to the original text. Gwynfor Evans (1996) For the Sake of Wales, p.204. 13 Arthur Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales. John Jones Publishing Ltd: Ruthin, Foreword. 14 Arthur Dodd wrote one of the seminal books on North Welsh industrial development; he also published extensively in English and Welsh history. 72
research, his interpretation of the facts it contained was frequently at variance with
the original interpretations. Almost unvaryingly, Gwynfor Evans’ interpretations reflected his political ideology and nationalist fervour, resulting in rather dubious historiography.
The difference between the two men and their books does raise some
questions about the validity in comparing the approaches evident within the books.
In a straight comparison this might very well present intractable difficulties. I am not, however, intending to embark on such a project but will focus instead on the different understandings of the Welsh-English relationship and the corresponding images of
Wales and Welshness found within the two histories. Despite the differences, both books were published as histories and entered the public domain as such. Given this, the images contained within the two books are equally relevant and cast light on two of the historiographical approaches taken to Welsh history in the 1970s. Indeed, it is their variations that make the central point more significant: the history in both books has been shaped around the Welsh experience of the relationship between Wales and
England in – where appropriate - Britain.
The centrality of this relationship is evident throughout both books but is
particularly clear in five periods within Welsh history: the period in which Wales was
formed, the Welsh medieval and early modern Princes, the process of union with
England, the growth of Nonconformity and industry, and the 20th century. In this
decade, the final period receives a more cursory and personal treatment than in the
1980s and 1990s. Of course, other periods of Welsh history could have been chosen:
I do not, for example, specifically address the Civil Wars. As discussed in the
Introduction, the above five themes were not only consistent with the areas of history
theoretically identified as significant for a historically based national identity but also 73
remain relevant for modern Wales. The idea of the Celtic basis to Wales remains part
of the Welsh myths of national formation, the Welsh Princes continue to be remembered as heroes and to have pubs named after them, the union with England is still a controversial point, and Nonconformity, industry and the events of the twentieth century immediately shape current Welsh identity. This relevance makes their portrayal within Welsh historiography particularly significant as the general public would have been most likely to grasp the images conveyed by periods that seemed connected to their personal experience of Wales.
The first of these periods covers the lengthy section of time over which Wales
emerged as a nation and a people distinct from that of England and conscious of this distinction. This period in time is immensely significant within any national history as it defines the foundations on which the modern nation and, therefore, the history of that modern nation are built.15 Furthermore, it is from this period that national myths
of origin emerge: every nation possesses these, some more historically based than
others, and Wales was, in the 1970s – and still is – no different. Historiography
shapes these popular myths and plays a correspondingly large role in providing the
foundations for a national identity, for the way in which a nation is understood at the
most basic level.16
Arthur Dodd portrayed a Wales that was formed and shaped by the same
broad experiences that occurred throughout Europe. Throughout Britain, settlers
arrived in waves from Europe, bringing their skills and knowledge to update those of
each previous group.17 This society remained tribal and territorial until the Roman occupation which resulted in the Romanisation of the Celtic aristocracy, effectively reorganising the upper levels of the Celtic tribes into Romano-Britons. Romanisation
15 See Anthony D. Smith (1991) National Identity. 16 Ibid.. 17 For this paragraph, see A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, pp.1-17. 74
spread throughout the Celtic tribes in what is now Wales during the sixth century
through the influence of the Irish church, whose missionaries re-Christianized Wales
after the Roman withdrawal although the latter point was of some historical
contention during the 1960s.18
It is Dodd’s emphasis on the role of international forces that is significant
here. Wales, from the start of its history has belonged to an international community
and has benefited enormously from the shared cultural, social, political and
technological developments. These experiences gradually moulded loosely affiliated
tribes into a distinct entity, noticeably different from its Teutonic neighbours. By the
ninth century AD, Cymru and the Cymry had become, respectively, a distinct nation
and a distinct people.19 The identity of the Cymry, however, was never presented as
purely Celtic-Welsh. According to Dodd’s interpretation of this early period of
history, Welsh identity was, from the beginning, shaped by the experiences of those who claimed that identity.
The Wales that emerged in this depiction of prehistoric and ancient Wales
offered some interesting images of the Welsh-English relationship. First and
foremost was the clear belief that neither identity, as mentioned above, was a given
and, correspondingly, that there was nothing inevitable about the emergence of either
nation. Events and reactions to events – the arrival of the Celtic peoples, the Romans, and the Saxons and the reactions of the people within the modern boundaries of these
two countries – resulted in the emergence of Wales and England. Yet it was also
significant that Dodd did not present Welsh history as a continuous process. The
Welsh tribes were not unified, for example, in the pre-Roman period, indicating the
18 P.A. Wilson (1966) “Romano-British and Welsh Christianity: Continuity or Discontinuity? Part One.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp.5-21; P.A. Wilson (1966) “Romano-British and Welsh Christianity: Continuity or Discontinuity? Part Two.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.103- 120. 19 A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, p.19. 75
non-existence of Wales as opposed to Britain.20 Similarly, Dodd depicted breaks in
the flow of Welsh history. Christianity came with the Romans and also largely left
with them, being reintroduced over the following century by the Irish missionaries,21 an argument that negated the Nonconformist insistence on their modern replication of a truly Welsh Christianity.22 Essential parts of a traditional Welsh identity were, in
this way, portrayed as historical developments – significant in a modern sense but not
necessarily definitive of a Welsh identity.
The people who would become the Welsh were, in this process, positioned
against the settlers moving into what would become England with “…the Britons of
the western highlands… [becoming]…conscious of themselves as the sole heirs of the
Romano-British civilization.”23 Dodd viewed the Teutonic settlers in what would
become England as intruders, barbarians, who were culturally less sophisticated and
civilized than the Romano-Britons in what would become Wales.24 Dodd did not
position England against Wales, however, focusing instead on the significance of the
different backgrounds of the peoples. It was the Romano-Britons, not the Celts or the
Welsh who reacted to the inflow of Teutonic settlers but it was apparent, nonetheless,
that Wales and England emerged from different heritages and were correspondingly,
historically separate. Wales may have been influenced by events in what would
become England but Dodd made it clear, from the start of his history, that Wales and
England were separate entities with separate historical experiences.
Gwynfor Evans’ approach to this period was startlingly different. From the
beginning of his history, his focus was on the people of Wales, on their culture and
20 Ibid., pp.7-8. 21 Ibid., pp.14-16. 22 D. Densil Morgan (2001) ‘The Essence of Welshness’?: Some Aspects of Christian Faith and National Identity in Wales, c.1900-2000.” In Robert Pope (ed) Religion and National Identity: Wales and Scotland c.1700-2000, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, pp.139-162. 23 A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales. John Jones Publishing Ltd: Ruthin, pp.17-18. 24 Ibid., p.17. 76
their characteristics. The pre-Roman era Celtic tribes were not, then, portrayed as
disparate Britonnic tribes but Celtic tribal groupings who were sophisticated and largely self-contained and, while separate bodies, were conscious of their cultural
uniformity.25 This sense of identity resulted in a vigorous defence of both land and
freedom against Roman incursions. The eventual Celtic defeat resulted in the
Romanisation and Christianisation of the tribes, but in a fashion that merely deepened
and enriched Welsh culture. The Romans left behind a thoroughly Romanised Wales
that gradually spread this Romano-British Christian civilization throughout the Celtic
world, an important argument given the nineteenth and twentieth century
Nonconformist claims to be the modern expression of this innately Celtic and Welsh
Christianity.
Such a depiction offered a Wales that existed as an identifiable country from a
very early stage in history. It may not have claimed its current name, but the basic
identity of the people in what is now Wales was already identifiable. The
characteristics Gwynfor Evans attributed to these Celtic Welsh tribes were also
revealing. Education and religion appeared central to their society, the people were
gifted in language, literature and poetry, and women were well regarded and
correspondingly well educated.26 These depicted characteristics were Celtic, shared
by all the Celts across Europe: the Welsh tribes were a part of an international culture
and civilization that were well regarded even by the Romans.27 Yet Gwynfor Evans
also identified another characteristic that was not so complementary – the
“instability”28 of the Welsh. He quoted Giraldus Cambrensis: “It is a nation which is
called back from an intention or action already begun with the same ease as it is sent
25 For this paragraph, see Gwynfor Evans (1992) Land of My Fathers, pp.15-41. 26 Ibid., pp.15-17. 27Ibid., p.15. 28 Ibid., p.17. 77
to undertake any adventure,”29 presenting these characteristics, positive and negative
as both historical and modern. Gwynfor Evans was, essentially, providing the
historical origins of many of the characteristics stereotypically associated with the
modern Welsh people.
If people are to be connected to their roots, they must be able to perceive
similarities between their historical ancestors and themselves. Here, Gwynfor Evans
made it possible to trace both positive and negative aspects of the Welsh identity back
to the origins of the nation. Nation and identity were portrayed as organic and
interconnected.30 Even one of the basic modern problems was historically based; the
general failure of the Welsh to take the nationalist hard route despite its long-term benefits for identity and culture. For Gwynfor Evans, this was manifested in 1970 by the steady process of Anglicisation for the immediate benefit of higher paid jobs and material prosperity, a materialism of which he was highly critical, particularly when it came at the cost of the unrenewable resource of nation and national identity.31
Yet, despite his pointed remarks about “instability” Gwynfor Evans also
argued that the Welsh were capable of being passionate about their freedom and their
country. The Romans found it extremely difficult to conquer Wales not only because
of the geological and nomadic structure of Welsh society but also because the Welsh
possessed the “… tight society of a community that valued its independence highly,
and had the spirit to defend it to the end.”32 When that conquest did occur, Roman
and Welsh society combined advantageously, in stark contrast with Gwynfor Evans’
later description of the destructive nature of the Welsh-English culture merge.33
29Ibid., p.18. 30 Laura McAllister (2001) Plaid Cymru: The Emergence of a Political Party. Bridgend: Seren, p.67. 31 Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of My Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History. Talybont: Lolfa, pp.66- 67. 32 Ibid., p.23. 33 Ibid., pp.32 & 41. 78
The first part of this argument was, however, not entirely in accordance with
the interpretations found in other historical texts. There was and remains a general
historical consensus that the tribes initially resisted Roman occupation but with
varying levels of enthusiasm and success. What Gwynfor Evans did not
acknowledge, however, was the lack of continued resistance. R.G. Livens and F.A.
Patterson both argued that, after circa 100 AD, Welsh resistance decreased to the
point where Roman troops could be redistributed elsewhere in Britain.34
Throughout this interpretation of pre-Roman and Roman Welsh history,
Gwynfor Evans consistently positioned Wales against England. Wales was, from an
early stage, a distinct country, and was alone among the countries and peoples of
Western Europe in preserving their Romano-Celtic culture from the onslaught of
barbarian migration.35 Dodd portrayed a country in disarray in the wake of the
Roman withdrawal. Gwynfor Evans, however, depicted this period as one of
independence, in which Welsh culture flourished and shared in the vibrancy of the
neighbouring Irish development and the Welsh form of government emerged.36
England was the country in cultural and spiritual disarray, from which experience it
would emerge as the opposite to Wales – culturally poor but with strong imperial
tendencies.
Gwynfor Evans’ historical interpretation of the emergence of the Welsh nation
provided the basis for the rest of his history of Wales and for his historical depictions
of both England and Wales. In this setting, Wales was emerging as a culturally and
34 F.A. Patterson (1974/5) “Roman Wales and the Votadini.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 7, pp.213- 222. (Based at Michigan State University): R.G. Livens (1974/5) “The Roman Army in Wales.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 7, pp.88-89. 35 Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of my Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History. Talybont: Lolfa, p.42. 36 Ibid., pp.47-48, 56-57. This interpretation would become more common in the 1990s when historians began to pay attention to the Kings and Princes who were less involved with England. For instance: Benjamin T. Hudson (1990/1) “The Destruction of Gruffudd ap Llewelyn.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 15, pp.331-350; David E. Thornton (1996/7) “Maredudd ab Owain (d. 999): The Most Famous King of the Welsh.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 18, pp.567-591. 79 politically sophisticated and independent country, clearly separated from England and flourishing best in this position, a stance replicated throughout Plaid Cymru’s political material.37 England, however, was undergoing different experiences that forced it away from the process of development found in Wales, down a route from which it would emerge as an imperial nation – in Gwynfor Evans’ depiction, an imperial predator.
Despite the differences between Dodd’s and Gwynfor Evans’ images of the formation of the Welsh nation and their understanding of the origins of the Welsh-
English relationship, there are some similarities between the two. First and most obviously, Wales and England were separate countries, developing along different lines due to different experiences. Secondly, Celtic culture was international and the
Celts in the geographical area of Wales were participants in an international world.
Thirdly, to some extent, both authors acknowledged the role of events in shaping identity. This similarity is, however, only partial, as for Dodd, identity was constructed while, for Gwynfor Evans, experience impacted upon an identity that emerged from the nation – “…the basic organic form of society.”38
This difference, like most of the differences between the two histories, is highly significant and relates to the divergence over the issue of continuity of history and identity in Wales. For Dodd, identity was not prescriptive or definitive, while for
Gwynfor Evans, for Welsh identity to be Welsh it had to fit within certain boundaries that came into existence with Wales itself. Dodd’s view was far more flexible than
Gwynfor Evans’ and given the realities of the situation in the 1970s, such flexibility would have proven to be far more relevant to a significant proportion of the Welsh people.
37 Plaid Cymru (1966/7-1970) Action for Wales: Manifesto for the General Election. Bangor: Elwyn Roberts. 38 Laura McAllister (2001) Plaid Cymru: The Emergence of a Political Party. Bridgend: Seren, p.65. 80
Neither interpretation, however, emerged from an ideological vacuum. Both
historical interpretations were based on scholarly research although the selection of
sources inevitably reflected the professional historical skills of the author. Gwynfor
Evans’ approach to many aspects of the Celtic and Roman periods was noticeably
similar to that of O.M. Edwards.39 In the latter’s work, the Celtic tribes in Wales
fought for the Brythonic unity of Britain as well as for themselves, suggesting some
level of cultural connection and inter-tribal politics beyond the purely territorial. This was again apparent in relation to the issue of the continuity or discontinuity of
Christianity after the Roman withdrawal from Britain, with Gwynfor Evans’ argument
for the continuous development of Christianity finding a place in O.M. Edwards’
Wales and being supported by more modern interpretations.40 It would appear, however, that this latter issue was open to some debate in the 1960s with academic historians arguing the point in both directions based on archaeological as well as written evidence.41 Dodd’s interpretation of the Celtic and Roman periods did not
appear to rely nearly so heavily on classical historical texts, showing instead a
preference for arguments also found within emergent archaeological papers and books
published in the mid to late 1960s.42 Where their histories touched on historical
39 O.M. Edwards (1925) Wales. (2nd edition) London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd, p.41. 40 Ibid., pp.24 & 28: P.A. Wilson (1966) “Romano-British and Welsh Christianity: Continuity or Discontinuity? Part 1.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp.5-21; P.A. Wilson (1966) “Romano- British and Welsh Christianity: Continuity or Discontinuity? Part 2.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.103-120. 41 L. Alcock (1965) “Wales in the Fifth to Seventh Centuries A.D.: Archaeological Evidence.” In I.Ll. Foster & Glyn Daniel (eds) Prehistoric and Early Wales. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; P.A. Wilson (1966) “Romano-British and Welsh Christianity: Continuity or Discontinuity? Part 1.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp.5-21; P.A. Wilson (1966) “Romano-British and Welsh Christianity: Continuity or Discontinuity? Part 2.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.103-120. 42 I.A. Richmond (1965) “Roman Wales.” In I.Ll. Foster & Glyn Daniel (eds) Prehistoric and Early Wales. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; F.A. Patterson (1974/5) “Roman Wales and the Votadini,” Welsh History Review, Vol 7, pp.213-222; R.G. Livens (1974/5) “The Roman Army in Wales, A.D. 120-220.” Welsh History Review, Vol 7, pp.88-95; L. Alcock (1965) “Wales in the Fifth to Seventh Centuries A.D.: Archaeological Evidence.” In I.Ll. Foster & Glyn Daniel (eds) Prehistoric and Early Wales. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 81
controversy, Dodd and Gwynfor Evans selected the interpretation that fitted best with
their overall argument: legitimate, but very revealing of the goals of their books.
As previously mentioned, the situation in the 1970s also had a noticeable
impact on the specific interpretations found in Dodd’s and Gwynfor Evans’ histories.
The impact on Dodd’s work was, for this particular period of history, not overly
obvious. His flexibility over the content of early Welsh culture and his acknowledgement of the constructed nature of identity did, however, indicate an awareness of the reality of the situation concerning cultural identity in Wales in the
1970s with the fading of many aspects considered traditionally Welsh – the language and Nonconformity for example. If identity was not constructed by a group of people
in response to events, then the more extreme nationalists were right and Wales was
dying with the decline of traditional Welsh culture. Dodd’s internationalism was also
very 1960s and 1970s, echoing the growing awareness of the Welsh intelligentsia and
Plaid Cymru of the historical and current significance of Europe – as opposed to the
EC – for Wales.43 Gwynfor Evans’ history was another story altogether. His
interpretation had been vividly shaped by Plaid Cymru’s understanding of Wales and
Welshness and of the relationship between Wales and England. He provided
traditional Welshness with a historical foundation and a place in the Welsh myths of
origin, and provided the foundations for the antagonistic relationship that would develop between Wales and England. Plaid Cymru’s argument for Welsh independence was also given historical reality, with Gwynfor Evans arguing that
Wales flourished and “…its life opened into flower”44 in the centuries immediately
after the Roman withdrawal from Wales.
43 Raymond Williams (2003) Who Speaks for Wales? Nation, Culture and Identity. Cardiff: University of Wales Press; Laura McAllister (2001) Plaid Cymru: The Emergence of a Political Party, p.145. 44 Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of my Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History. Talybont: Lolfa, p.48. 82
There is ample evidence for the claim that Gwynfor Evans’ construction of the
Wales of the pre-Roman and Roman period was tied very closely to the politics of
Plaid Cymru. Gwynfor Evans, as the President of the party in the 1960s and 1970s,
shaped a significant proportion of Plaid policy, and wrote many of its pamphlets addressing Welsh history. His glorification of the Age of the Saints was repeated in a lecture he gave in 197345 and his argument for the validity and reality of the federal
state that emerged during this period in Wales was clearly the basis for Plaid’s vision
of an independent Wales.46 Indeed, the Plaid Cymru Commission, in 1981, stated
that knowledge of Welsh history was essential for fostering Welsh identity47 which,
given the attitude present in the history sponsored by Plaid Cymru and its members,
was a very revealing statement. The Welsh identity that emerged in this early period
was an essential part of Plaid Cymru’s ideology, as was the history of Wales as an
independent nation, both prior to and after the Roman occupation.
The second period of history that is quite revealing of the authors’
understanding of Wales and Welshness and the relationship between Wales and
England is that of the age of the Princes. It was in this period that Welsh political
identity was formed and independence lost to Edward I. Correspondingly, this period
also plays a major role in understanding the historical basis of modern Welsh political
identity and the political relationship between Wales and England in Britain in the
1970s. Given this, it is not surprising that there were considerable similarities
between the discussion over Welsh political identity and independence that was
taking place in the 1970s and the historical depiction of these factors in the two
history books.
45 Gwynfor Evans (1973) Nonviolent Nationalism. The Fellowship of Reconciliation. 46 Report of the Plaid Cymru Commission (1981) Plaid Cymru, p.13. 47 Ibid., p.11. 83
Both Dodd and Gwynfor Evans identified four Welsh Princes who were
historically significant – Hywel Dda, Llywelyn ab Iorwerth, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd
and Owain Glyn Dwr. All four Princes ruled over a significant proportion of Wales
in the late medieval and early modern period and were involved in attempting to
define the boundaries between Wales and England. These boundaries were not
purely physical demarcations of territory, however. The four Welsh Princes were
also concerned with limiting English political influence within Wales and ensuring that Wales had enough space to develop into an independent nation, albeit one that
acknowledged the political realities of living next to a powerful country. Dodd’s and
Gwynfor Evans’ depictions of these four Princes and their actions in the above
directions were very different but both remained focused on defining the historical
relationship between Wales and England.
Dodd’s preference for an international interpretation of Welsh history and for
an identity constructed in response to events has already been noted, and both were
further evidenced in his depiction of this period of Welsh history. Wales was
portrayed, from its emergence as an identifiable country, as developing more or less in time and through mutual exchange with its closest neighbours.48 In the early
period of its existence – Hywel Dda’s Wales of the 10th century – Wales was
developing politically in time with its Celtic brethren in Scotland, Ireland and
Brittany, and was also engaged in close cultural and religious discourse with these
countries. Similarly, the Viking incursions provided at least some of the stimuli
required for increased internal cohesion of Wales. In this depiction of Hywel Dda’s
48 For this paragraph, see A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, pp.16-21. 84
world, Dodd shifted away from J.E. Lloyd’s tendency to focus on Hywel Dda’s supposed Anglophilia, leaning towards the emerging emphasis on political realism.49
Welsh political identity further developed and coalesced in response to the
Norman invasion and the rule of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd.50
The Norman invasion altered the existing political identities in Wales as the Welsh leaders in the conquered borderlands lost considerable status and power, effectively ceasing to belong to an independent Wales. Yet Norman influence facilitated the attempts of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd to unify the free heartlands of Wales allowing the emergence of the concept of Wales as a separate state by the thirteenth century.
The implication in this interpretation was that the Norman state-structure was perceived by at least some of the Welsh gentry and their leaders as superior to that then-used by the Welsh tribes. Wales and Welsh identity were shaped by contact with outside forces in both positive and negative ways. For Dodd, the factor that removed independence and altered political identity in the borderlands – the Normans
– was also the factor that strengthened the independence of the rest of Wales by providing an example of more modern forms of societal structure and government.
Contact with the Normans was, therefore, both divisive and an aid towards unification, as were individual Welsh reactions to the situation. In these reactions,
Dodd saw the commencement of the modern divisions between the different understandings of Wales and Welshness. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, some
Welsh cooperated with Norman neighbours, some fought for a united Wales, and
49 J.E. Lloyd (1948) A History of Wales: From the Earliest Times to the Edwardian Conquest. Longmans: New York; London; Toronto, pp.335-337: His argument was dismissed by D.P. Kirby (1976/7) “Hywel Dda: Anglophil?” Welsh History Review, Vol. 8, pp.1-13. 50 For this paragraph, see A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, pp.21-22 & pp.30-31. 85
others preferred local kingdom loyalties.51 Glyn Roberts supported this mixture of
reactions, arguing that “…political realism implied association as well as enmity…”52
and that even the actions of the Princes of Gwynedd illustrated their ability to adapt to the situation in which they found themselves.53 The myriad of different attitudes
towards and experiences of the Norman presence in England and in the Welsh
Marches, then, began the process by which several different understandings of Wales
and Welshness would emerge, particularly in terms of political identity.
All of these reactions were, according to Dodd, intimately connected with the
world in which the Princes, their supporters and their opponents were living. He was
careful not to attribute nationalism or other modern motivations to the actions and
reactions of the Welsh people from this period. The emergence of and popular
support received by Owain Glyn Dwr was also portrayed as a product of his time,
with his rebellion against Henry IV in the fifteenth century occurring in reaction to a
combination of the general misery of the masses across Europe, the political, social and economic disruption after the Black Death, and the oppressive racial laws enacted in the Settlement of Edward I after his defeat of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd.54 This
combination of internal and external factors was manifested in the land dispute that
triggered the rebellion and the social, economic and political factors that ensured mass sympathy with Glyn Dwr’s goals and methods, an interpretation that was based on both the classic study in J.E. Lloyd’s history and the more recent examination of
Glyn Dwr by Glanmor Williams. According to these historians, the Welsh rebelled from a combination of personal and national motivations: there were economic and
51 A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, pp.22-29. 52 Glyn Roberts (1960/63) “Wales and England: Antipathy and Sympathy 1282-1485.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 1, p.378. 53 Ibid., p.379. 54 A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, pp.42-45. 86
social reasons but there was also prophetic tradition in which the Welsh would no
longer be a conquered people.55
Wales and Welshness were, in Dodd’s depiction, a place and identity that
have been shaped and constructed in both positive and negative ways by the events
that had influenced the country and the people. This was especially significant for this period, as the Norman conquest of first the borderlands and then the Principality of Wales has traditionally been seen by Plaid Cymru as a largely negative event for
Wales and the Welsh people.56 Dodd’s argument clearly demonstrated that the
Norman influence was not entirely negative and, in fact, contributed to the
development of a Welsh political and cultural identity. It was a formative part of the
modern Welsh world, positives and negatives included.
The Welsh-English relationship appeared in this scenario quite clearly, and in
a way that illustrated both the centrality of the issue for Welsh history and the
connection between the construction of Dodd’s account and the then-modern concerns
over the structure and development of Welsh political identity. Modern Welsh
intelligentsia were, in the 1970s, quite concerned with the dominance of England and
the inability of the Welsh to develop politically.57 Plaid Cymru took this argument
one step further, arguing that the non-Welsh political parties (Labour, Liberal and
Conservative) were incapable of defending and propagating ‘real’ Welsh culture and
identity.58
55 David Williams, (1977) A History of Modern Wales. London: John Murray, p.16; Glanmor Williams (1993) Owain Glyndwr. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, p.24. This book was first published in 1966. 56 Gwynfor Evans (1988/9) “The 1536 Act of Incorporation and the Welsh Language.” Planet, Vol. 68, pp.54-58; Glanmor Williams (1988/9) “The Act of Incorporation and the Welsh Language.” Planet, Vol 72, pp.48-53. 57 See Chapter One. Questioning Britain and the Boundaries of the Welsh-English Relationship: 1970- 1979, pp.43-68. 58 Plaid Cymru (1966/7-1970) Action for Wales: Manifesto for the General Election. Bangor: Elwyn Roberts. 87
There were also distinct similarities between Dodd’s depiction of the Welsh-
English relationship and the Welsh internal situation and these factors in the 1970s.
The Welsh-Norman relationship involved, from the start, an acknowledgment of
English dominance in Britain. It also acknowledged the need for the Welsh Princes to
maintain a balance in this relationship that would recognise English superiority whilst
assuring the English acknowledgment of Welsh independence. The internal situation
– the lack of unity over the direction of Welsh political development - facilitated
enough discord to encourage cooperation with the English state under the Normans.
In the 1960s and 1970s Plaid Cymru were effectively trying to regain this political balance. Despite their efforts, however, the variety of responses to the situation from
the Welsh people, political parties and intelligentsia ensured the continued close
association of England and Wales in the devolution referendum of 1979.59 For Dodd,
as for the Welsh intelligentsia of the 1970s, the basic problem was not the existence of
the relationship between Wales and England but its expression and imbalance.
Dodd argued that Welsh political independence declined gradually during the
period between the death of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd and the ascension of the Tudor
dynasty.60 The Welsh heartlands were conquered by Edward I after the death of
Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, effectively terminating Welsh political independence. Legal
discrimination and economic sanctions resulted in the slow but steady process of
Anglicisation, eroding Welsh political identity to the point where the Welsh gentry
willingly participated in the English government. Dodd indicated that, by the time of
Owain Glyn Dwr, this situation had progressed to a point where most of the Welsh
people actively involved in politics were less than certain about their political identity
and were in fact, relatively comfortable with participation in and representation by an
59 See Chapter One. Questioning Britain and the Boundaries of the Welsh-English Relationship: 1970- 1979, pp.43-68. 60 For this paragraph, see A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, pp33-49. 88
English government. Interdependence slid into assimilation as the centuries passed
but such an occurrence was not intentional on either Welsh or Norman side: it was
merely the product of circumstances.
Gwynfor Evans approached this period in history from a perspective that was
most striking for its difference from the approach utilised by Dodd and, again, for its intense nationalist affiliations. This latter tendency was noted by Glanmor Williams in the 1980s, who argued in reference to an article published on the Acts of Union – an article that echoed the approach taken in Land of My Fathers –
…it is his politics rather than his history which kindles the fires of his emotion – though I
doubt whether he would be willing to separate the two! Intense political convictions usually
evoke an interpretation of history in accordance with them.61
Unsurprisingly, then, Gwynfor Evans’ approach to Wales and Welshness and the
Welsh-English relationship in this period was very similar to the ideological
argument offered by Plaid Cymru in the 1970s.
The Wales of the Princes was, according to Gwynfor Evans, a self-sufficient nation in terms of its political and cultural development. While it did interact with countries outside its borders, this interaction – particularly the interaction with
Norman England – did not definitively shape Welsh identity or the Welsh political
expression. Gwynfor Evans portrayed this nation’s identity as whole and complete
prior to the death of Prince Llywelyn ap Gruffudd in the 13th century.62 Such a
complete, Cymryic Welsh identity was the Welsh birth-right: an approach that
explains Gwynfor Evans’ outright condemnation of all the historical circumstances
61 Glanmor Williams (1988/9) “The Act of Incorporation and the Welsh Language.” Planet, Vol 72, pp.52- 53. 62 Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of My Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History, p.162. 89
that resulted in the 1970s division between political and cultural identity. It was the
Welsh possession of a sure political identity that facilitated the Welsh resistance to
Norman-English incursions.
Correspondingly, Gwynfor Evans’ historical retelling of the events
surrounding the reigns of the four Princes was substantially different from that of
Dodd. Hywel Dda brought Wales onto a legal par with England through the
development of codified Welsh law.63 When Hywel Dda died, he left a unified
country with its own territory, language, church, institutions, history, traditions and
legal system. Wales was, effectively, the full equal of England in all areas except
wealth and military strength despite Welsh development occurring along lines other
than those followed by England. One aspect of this argument was, in fact, repeated in
more scholarly circles in 1977. Professor Dafydd Jenkins argued that the Law of
Hywel was indeed quite sophisticated and that its replacement with the Anglo-
Norman legal system was far from inevitable.64 Where Gwynfor Evans’ depiction of
Hywel Dda differed from all contemporary accounts was in his attribution of
nationalism to Hywel Dda, as well in his depiction of Hywel Dda as the sole
contributor to the laws attributed to him.65 These differences were, however, essential for Gwynfor Evans’ nationalistic depiction of Welsh history and the attribution of the
bulk of the law-making to Hywel Dda bore distinct similarities to J.E. Lloyd’s
interpretation66 - although Gwynfor Evans avoided agreeing with Lloyd’s earlier
emphasis on Hywel Dda’s close relationship with Wessex.67
63 For this paragraph, see Ibid., pp.141-147. 64 Dafydd Jenkins (1977) “The Significance of the Law of Hywel.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.61-62. 65 Dodd’s portrayal of Welsh law as having multiple sources was more accepted. 66 J.E. Lloyd (1948) A History of Wales: From the Earliest Times to the Edwardian Conquest, Vol. Two, pp.338-343. 67 Ibid., pp.335-337. 90
Gwynfor Evans’ depiction of Hywel Dda was echoed in his portrayal of the
two Llywelyns.68 Gwynfor Evans portrayed all three men as selfless leaders
attempting to create a unified, civilized Welsh nation based on a confederation of
states. Unlike Dodd’s version, these attempts were not primarily triggered by
Norman influence. Gwynfor Evans placed his emphasis on the Welsh nature of the
political developments, stating that the synthesis between Welsh and Norman cultures
simply deepened and developed rather than altered the Welsh expression both
politically and culturally. Llywelyn ab Iorwerth’s actions were, in particular, not a
huge development from previous political structures. Wales had been tending in the
direction of a confederation from the time of Hywel Dda at the latest, and had long
since discarded all vestiges of tribal structure in favour of a hierarchical structure.
Wales was, thus, portrayed as culturally and politically sophisticated, developing in a
pattern unlike that of England, a pattern purely Welsh. Similarly, Gwynfor Evans
acknowledged the social, economic and political conditions that Dodd identified as
the triggers of Glyn Dwr’s rebellion, but argued that by themselves these conditions
would have resulted only in the mild disturbances felt elsewhere.69 Welsh patriotism
had been offended by the growth of English imperialism, resulting in popular support
for the man who fought to free his country from English oppression.70
Sections of this argument were based in then-current interpretations but
Gwynfor Evans’ insistence on the totally Welsh origin and nature of the political
developments and his arguments against the presence of internecine warfare owed
much to his political affiliations and his belief in the organic nature of nations. Yet
there was a current theory that Wales had, by the time of the Princes, long since lost
68 For the summary of Gwynfor Evans’ historiographical portrayal of Llywelyn ab Iowerth and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, see Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of My Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History, pp.208-235. 69 Ibid., p.254. 70 Ibid.. 91
its tribal nature; a move that, according to G.R.J. Jones of the University of Leeds, occurred in the Roman era.71 Historical consensus also agreed that whilst the social,
economic and political situation after the Black Death provided the stimulus for Glyn
Dwr’s revolt, it was the specifically Welsh situation that resulted in the national uprising.72 Gwynfor Evans, however, did not follow this general consensus. He chose instead to emphasise the significance of patriotism and nationalism in Glyn
Dwr’s actions. This was, again, the result of his political beliefs colouring his historiography. In his autobiography, Gwynfor Evans celebrated the modern day
Glyn Dwrs: those who, through patriotic action, were jailed for Wales, including his daughter and son-in-law.73
Gwynfor Evans’ assumption of the existence of patriotism and its primary role
in this rebellion and in the actions of the earlier heroes clearly delineated the
characteristics he considers heroic. Patriotism was, obviously, a leading feature, depicted as passionate, self-sacrificial love of country and people. Glyn Dwr’s rebellion may have been triggered by more material developments but his true motivation was patriotism – something also true for the modern Welsh heroes.
This depiction of the Welsh medieval heroes offered a very different understanding of Wales and Welshness from that proffered by Dodd. All four of
Gwynfor Evans’ heroes were personally motivated by patriotism – the emphasis was
on the individual and the individual’s loyalty and choices. All four attempted to
further Wales’ progress down its historic path of development into an independent,
decentralised nation possessed of its own culture and forms of government. These
71 G.R.J. Jones (1960-2) “The Tribal System in Wales: A Re-assessment in the Light of Settlement Studies.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 1, pp.130-132. 72 David Williams, (1977) A History of Modern Wales. London: John Murray, p.16; Glanmor Williams (1993) Owain Glyndwr. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, p.24. 73 Gwynfor Evans (1996) For the Sake of Wales, pp.196-198. Gwynfor Evans was, however, a pacifist and would never have supported a similarly violent uprising within Wales. All his modern day Glyn Dwrs functioned pacifically. 92
heroes were national heroes and portrayed a history of struggle against a stronger,
intolerant and imperialistic neighbour. Modern Welshness, then, involved a similar
commitment to Wales and its culture, a passionate identification and self-sacrificial
commitment, accompanied by a strong sense of difference, of not being English. This
form of Welshness was strongly conveyed by Plaid Cymru’s literature in the 1960s
and 1970s and in Gwynfor Evans’ own autobiography as well as in his history.74
This is the point at which some of Gwynfor Evans’ political convictions
intruded very obviously into his interpretation of Welsh history. Gwynfor Evans
described England and English culture as intentionally imperial, insidious and destructive, clearly implying English intent to destroy Welsh political independence and culture.75 Given this, he considered the recurrent English victories against
militarily weaker Wales as tragedies for Wales as a nation, for the Welsh people and
for the Welsh culture. Such a condemnation of English intent in a historical sense
extended to condemn English behaviour in the present. The whole relationship
between England and Wales, based on this historical precedent, was innately wrong
and so, by inference, was any Welsh identity constructed around accommodation of
the English presence. This interpretation has some serious implications, given
Gwynfor Evans’ stated intention that he was writing Land of My Fathers to facilitate
the growth and reconnection with Wales, the Welsh past and Welsh national identity.
Not only was his condemnation of England historically inaccurate, it condemned the
identity that emerged from the dominant presence of England, positioning it against a
traditional and ‘real’ Welsh identity. This division was, in the 1970s, of serious
concern to the Welsh intelligentsia as well as to Plaid Cymru, but it was not until the
74 Plaid Cymru’s literature: Ibid., pp.196-198. 75 Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of My Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History, p.215, p.239, p.255 & p.295. There are almost constant references to these English attributes throughout Land of My Fathers. 93
shock in 1979 of the popular rejection of devolution and the resulting questioning of
the borders of Wales and Welshness the 1980s that this issue began to be resolved.
Some of the factual variations between the interpretations offered by Dodd
and Gwynfor Evans can be explained by a different source base but these variations,
while significant, did not cloud the centrality of the emergent Welsh-English
relationship to both interpretations of this period. Interpretations following the lines
set out by Dodd did dominate the historiographical field in the 1970s, as was
evidenced by a survey of the journal articles published on Hywel Dda during the
1970s.76 Gwynfor Evans’ depiction was far more similar to that of J.E. Lloyd’s focus on codification of Welsh law,77 although his conviction of the strength of the Welsh
political identity was purely Plaid Cymru. Indeed, the one real similarity between the
two interpretations was that both Dodd and Gwynfor Evans portrayed Wales as a country in and of its own right. And this similarity was more apparent than real.
The intense differences in the portrayal of Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-
English relationship are best captured by the motivations assigned to the four Welsh
Princes by Dodd and Gwynfor Evans. Gwynfor Evans was clearly providing examples of appropriate nationalism, in spirit if not actual violence. The level of
sacrifice was applauded and contrasted sadly with the absence of such spirit in the
1970s.78 There was no doubt that this interpretation provided Wales with heroes who
exemplified the best of Welsh culture and character, and that they were intended to
act as an inspiration and encouragement to modern nationalists. Arthur Dodd also
76 J. Goronwy Edwards (1973) “The Laws of Hywel Dda.” In A.J. Roderick (ed) Wales Through the Ages: From the Earliest Times to 1485. Vol 1. Llandybie: Christopher Davies (Publishers) Ltd; D.P. Kirby (1976/7) “Hywel Dda: Anglophil?” Welsh History Review, Vol. 8, pp.1-13; Dafydd Jenkins (1977) “The Significance of the Law of Hywel.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.54-76. 77 J.E. Lloyd (1948) A History of Wales: From the Earliest Times to the Edwardian Conquest, Vol. Two, pp.338-343. 78 Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of My Fathers, p.254 & pp.290-291. 94
provided heroes, although of a different calibre. These men were less passionate and
more political, statesmen rather than early members of Plaid Cymru. Yet they too exemplified leadership within a cause, the modernisation of Welsh society and
politics. Both provided guidelines for modern Wales, although in significantly
different directions and, therefore, offered another basis for national identity.
There were clear connections between both Dodd and Gwynfor Evans’ work
and the debate occurring in the 1970s over Welsh political identity and independence.
As with the previous period, these connections were most evident between Gwynfor
Evans’ work and the ideology of Plaid Cymru. Plaid Cymru’s election manifestos clearly argued that they were the only party able to protect Wales and Welshness: the
British parties – Labour, Liberals and Conservatives – could not offer such action because they were not Welsh.79 Britain and Britishness were not, according to Plaid
Cymru, at all compatible with Wales and Welshness, and one way that this
incompatibility was to be taught to the Welsh people was through the medium of
history.80 England was alien, the Welsh ‘other’: this understanding of the
relationship between Wales and England was common to both Gwynfor Evans’ work
and Plaid Cymru’s political ideology.
The fact that this approach to Wales, Welshness and the relationship between
Wales and England was limited to a minority of Welsh people in the 1970s was,
however, acknowledged by Plaid Cymru.81 Dodd’s depiction of a relationship that
was both beneficial and negative for Wales and Welshness, particularly the
development of Welsh political identity, was far more common in the 1970s. This
was illustrated by the number of Welsh people who were comfortable with joint
79 Plaid Cymru (c. 1966/7-1970) Action for Wales. General Election Manifesto. Bangor: Elwyn Roberts 80 Report of the Plaid Cymru Commission (1981) Plaid Cymru, pp.10-11. 81 Ibid., p.10. 95
Welsh-British identities or, indeed, with a dominant British identity, and by the fact
that Plaid Cymru remained a minority party. Yet Dodd’s work also reflected a trend
that was emerging in the 1960s and came more to the fore in the 1970s prior to the
1979 devolution referendum. This trend was the awareness that the dominance of
England was not healthy for Welsh political development. Dodd clearly illustrated
this in his depiction of the four Welsh Princes as men who attempted - and failed – to
ensure that the balance of political power between England and Wales was suitable
for the development of Wales apart from England. In many ways, the devolution
debate of the 1970s centred on the same concern: reshaping the balance of political
power between the two countries in Britain.
The third historical period that will be addressed in this chapter carries on
from that of the age of the Welsh princes. Llywelyn ap Gruffudd’s defeat at the hands of Edward I ushered in a new period in Welsh history, and one that impacted hugely on the Wales that would emerge in the modern world. After 1282, the heartland of Wales was held directly by the English King as a Principality and was increasingly incorporated into English forms and means of government. This process was formalised by Henry VIII’s Acts of Union in the 15th century. Inevitably, such
close contact with England also impacted on Wales outside the political sphere, shaping the development of Welsh culture and the position of the Welsh language.
Any historiographical interpretation of this period will be overflowing with images of
Wales, Welshness and the relationship between Wales and England, and Dodd’s and
Gwynfor Evans’ histories were no exception. The Union with England, regardless of interpretation, clearly presented a major challenge to Welsh political identity and, perhaps less blatantly, to Welsh cultural identity. How this challenge was addressed 96
defines, in many ways, a considerable portion of the foundations of both the modern
Welsh identity and perception of Wales itself.
Dodd characterised the Edwardian Settlement as “…harsh, but not vindictive,”82 arguing that the majority of the nobles and gentry speedily came to
terms with the English Crown. This decision to begin the process of what became
Anglicisation did not, however, automatically result in the abandonment of Welsh
culture. Despite participating in the English government, the Welsh gentry continued
to support the language and culture, and retained their sense of national pride.83 In
fact, Dodd dubbed the Welsh motivation for participation in the Wars of the Roses as
imperialism – an attempt to reclaim Britain for the Welsh through the Tudor
dynasty.84 Correspondingly, the Welsh people willingly accepted the official union of
Wales with England under Henry VIII, seeing it as both a Welsh triumph and of pragmatic – materialistic – importance.85
This interpretation of the union process echoed what is colloquially known as the Welsh case of schizophrenia, although a more accurate medical analogy might be that of some form of personality disorder. As a result of the Acts of Union, the Welsh gentry became proudly British, accepting the Tudors’ Welsh blood as fulfilment of the bardic prophecy that the Cymry would once more rule Britain. Yet the gentry initially remained Welsh as well, particularly culturally, resulting in the creation of dual and not always logically compatible identities. In many ways, Dodd was echoing the modern identity conflict and doing so in a way that presented the conflict as a choice resulting from circumstances outside individual control – social and economic forces. The Welsh people in the 13th and the 20th centuries were forced to
82 A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, p.33. 83 Ibid., p.38. 84 Ibid., p.52. 85 Ibid., pp.56-57. 97
balance original and adopted identities in a way that broadly avoided points of conflict and allowed for the creation of a functional identity within the society in which they lived. For the Welsh people in both periods, this meant seeking a functional balance between a Cymryic, traditional Welsh identity and the demands of close association with England. This interpretation built on the interaction Dodd outlined in the previous section. The experience of living in close quarters with the
English, particularly given the power imbalance implied by the presence of the
English in Wales as conquerors, increased what Glyn Roberts referred to as “The tendency to compromise with the new system, indeed, to co-operate with it…”86
In depicting the process of Union in this manner, Dodd shifted a substantial
proportion of the blame for the decline of traditional Welsh culture and political
expression from the Anglicising gentry. Dodd clearly empathised with the situation
and choices of those Welsh leaders, describing in his Epilogue a modern Wales that
still required a choice between nationalism and “…bread and butter questions.”87 He
thereby strengthened his depiction of identity as a many-faceted construct in which
external influence can play a formative role, and directly connected the modern
identity predicament with its historical precursor. Wales and Welshness were and are
shaped by the experiences of the Welsh people including their response to external
influences, and the relationship with England was that of a dominant country to its
weaker neighbour.
Gwynfor Evans, unsurprisingly, did not offer such an empathic interpretation
of the assimilation process. He made it plain that he considered the Conquest and
Union disastrous and the reaction of the gentry to the Tudors a betrayal unmitigated
86 Glyn Roberts (1960-63) “Wales and England: Antipathy and Sympathy.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 1, p.383. 87 A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, p.164. 98
by circumstances.88 The Edwardian loss of the Welsh government and officials left
Welsh culture vulnerable but unlike Dodd, Gwynfor Evans argued that the gentry
frequently protested against the Settlement terms. This rebellion triggered Welsh
participation in the Wars of the Roses in which the Welsh people fought, rather
ironically, for the restoration of their freedom.89 In many ways, Gwynfor Evans
considered this participation misguided as well as ironic: the Welsh gentry failed to understand the nature of the English and their motivations. Because of this, the
Tudor victory became, for the Welsh, a pyrrhic victory that, through the later Acts of
Union, nearly cost the Welsh people their culture, civilization and national identity.
In one sense, Gwynfor Evans was telling the other side of the story here.
Dodd recorded one effect of the post-Conquest Welsh-English relationship: Gwynfor
Evans recorded the actions of those who did not respond to the situation from a
perspective of political realism. According to Glyn Roberts, Glyn Dwr’s rebellion
sowed racial hatred that echoed vividly in the poetry of the fifteenth century.90
Similarly, for this section of Welsh society, Welsh participation in the Wars of the
Roses was stimulated by prophecies of a saviour-to-be and the belief that Henry
Tudor’s Welsh ancestry would incline him more favourably towards Wales.91
Gwynfor Evans acknowledged this action and motivation but portrayed it as seriously
misguided.
Gwynfor Evans continued his criticism of the Welsh gentry who anglicised
during the Tudor period. They were contrasted with the earlier Welsh princes and
rebels against English presence and rule, and Gwynfor Evans argued that it was the
newly emergent servility and self-aggrandizement that facilitated the gradual decline
88 Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of My Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History, pp.294-302. 89 For the rest of this paragraph, see Ibid., pp.277-282. 90 Ibid., p.394. 91 Ibid., pp.395-396. 99 of the Welsh language and culture. Such a portrayal clearly outlined the expected behaviour for modern Welsh leaders and provided a means of identifying those who, by limiting their Welshness “...to sentimentality and gain...”92 failed to match
Gwynfor Evans’ criteria for Welshness, criteria that clearly excluded the English- speaking Welsh who had accepted the demands of the world in which they lived.
Gwynfor Evans did not, however, condemn the English for their actions, displaying his respect for the imperialistic success of the English, and his disgust over the Welsh people’s distinct lack of success and poor resistance to English blandishments.93 This attitude was consistent with Plaid Cymru’s ideology whilst under the leadership of
Gwynfor Evans. Both the pamphlet propaganda and Gwynfor Evans’ autobiography illustrated the level of commitment Party and leader required for Welsh identity.
Welsh identity did not depend on blood or birth but on an active participation in
Welsh traditional culture and language. “For us…anyone can choose to be Welsh as long as they are prepared to take the consequences.”94 Neither Plaid Cymru nor
Gwynfor Evans accepted identity compromise, not even for the sake of compromise with political reality.
Both Dodd’s and Gwynfor Evans’ interpretations reflected different aspects of
Welsh society, then and now, and different ways of dealing with the pressures of the modern world. It could also be argued that the variations reflected different priorities for daily life. Dodd expected people to want to achieve the best life possible within national and moral boundaries and, therefore, saw compromise and accommodation as inevitable aspects of life. Gwynfor Evans, in contrast, expected people to be willing to sacrifice aspects of this world if, by that sacrifice, they could protect Welsh
92 Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of My Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History. Talybont: Y Lolfa, p.290. 93 Ibid., p.283. 94 Gwynfor Evans (1996) For the Sake of Wales, p.191. 100
identity. Both authors were equally empathetic towards the group they singled out
but, by this process, failed to fully understand the motivations behind the other.
The political difference between Dodd’s and Gwynfor Evans’ approaches to
the process of union was immediately apparent. In Dodd’s version, England was a powerful, slightly over-bearing but not ill-intentioned neighbour, while in Gwynfor
Evans’ account, England was a predator, intentionally attempting to destroy all that made Wales Welsh. Their corresponding attitudes towards the people of Wales were, for the 1970s, equally political. Dodd saw the Welsh dilemma of the 1970s as historically based but part of life, albeit a part that needed to be kept under control so
as not to allow all of Welsh culture to disappear. Gwynfor Evans, in contrast, saw any amount of Anglicisation in any circumstances as a betrayal of Wales and also as a choice that each Welsh person made in full awareness of the consequences for their country and culture.
Dodd’s acknowledgment of both the positives and negatives of the process of
union and, in particular, the Acts of Union, had far more in common with the available source base than did the interpretation found in Land of My Fathers. Owen
M. Edwards regarded the Settlement of Edward I and the Tudor Acts of Union as largely positive, with political and legal gains being seen as outweighing the losses.
Indeed, he went as far as arguing that the Welsh Tudors laid “…the foundations of the modern greatness of the British people.”95 Dodd did not go quite this far, but
followed the 1960s trend of attempting to understand the reasons behind both the
union and Anglicisation. Glyn Roberts and W. Ogden Williams both absolved
England of intentional cultural destruction, with Roberts arguing that the gentry’s
cooperation with England began in early Norman times and only gradually – and
95 O.M. Edwards (1925) Wales. (2nd edition) London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd, p.301. 101
generally unintentionally – resulted in Anglicisation.96 Indeed, W. Ogden Williams
argued that if the process of assimilation had not occurred as it did but had followed
either Scottish or Irish patterns, the cultural damage would have been significantly worse.97 As it was, Henry VII could offer his Welsh subjects freedom from
oppressive laws on a purely financial and administrative basis, without real concern
of fostering a threat to his rule.98 Dodd’s denial of English genocidal tendencies
towards the Welsh was also part of the standard historiographical tradition in Wales.
David Williams, author of one of the seminal texts on Welsh history, was primarily concerned to place the Acts of Union and their acceptance by the Welsh gentry in the context of both monarchical reform throughout Europe and the removal of the legal penalisations against being Welsh that had been enacted in the wake of Glyn Dwr’s
rebellion.99
Gwynfor Evans did, however, consider his interpretation to be a solid
historical argument, as did Plaid Cymru, both of whom plainly argued for the
intentional abuse and mismanagement of Wales by England and the failure of the
majority of the Welsh people to act to prevent this damage. Where Dodd was
empathic in a purely practical sense, Gwynfor Evans offered a similar understanding
to those whose culture and language were damaged in a way that could not be
remedied by access to Westminster and legal, professional and economic equality.
This approach was indicative of a very different understanding of Wales, Welsh
identity and the relationship between Wales and England, in which the Welsh
language and traditional culture were valued beyond the more mundane legalities and
96 Glyn Roberts (1960-63) “Wales and England: Antipathy and Sympathy 1282-1485.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 1, pp.375-396. 97 W. Ogden Williams (1964/5) “The Survival of the Welsh Language After the Union of England and Wales.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 2, pp.67-93. 98 J. Beverley Smith (1966) “Crown and Community in the Principality of North Wales in the Reign of Henry Tudor.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.145-171. 99 David Williams (1950) A History of Modern Wales. London: John Murray. 102
economics. Plaid Cymru, of which Gwynfor Evans was then President, was proof
that this attitude existed in the wider Welsh community, particularly in light of
Gwynfor Evans’s return to Westminster as a Plaid Cymru MP.
There are many clear parallels between both historical interpretations of the
period and the concern in the 1970s over the division in Welsh identity, the decline of
the Welsh language, and the political inequality between Wales and England. Given
the gradual change from a fairly complete approval of Welsh incorporation in
political England evident at the start of the 20th century to the slightly more critical
and international approach evident in the 1960s and 1970s, it would appear that
changing perceptions of Britain also impacted on the historiographical versions. The
nature of the Union with Britain became more open to debate as Britain’s global role
and economic status declined in the post-world war era. British association with and
eventual entry to the EC also offered the Welsh intelligentsia insight into other ways
of organising state and economic relations, ways that appeared to come without some
of the more detrimental aspects of the Union with England in Britain.
Where the process of the Union between Wales and England was particularly revealing of attitudes towards the Welsh-English relationship, the fourth theme, covering the development of Nonconformity and industry in Wales, focuses more on
Dodd’s and Gwynfor Evans’ understanding of Welsh identity within this relationship.
Both Nonconformity and industry became foundation stones of the late 19th century
and early 20th century Welsh identities and were, in the 1970s, significant because of
their declining role in the Welsh world. This decline was not limited to Wales,
occurring throughout the Western world as church attendance declined and heavy
industry was replaced by more technology and service intensive industries. Indeed,
by the 1970s, the decline that had commenced in the first few decades of the 103 twentieth century had progressed to the point that the identity connected to
Nonconformity and industry would be resoundly rejected in 1979, much to the shock of the bulk of the Welsh intelligentsia and Plaid Cymru. Prior to 1979, the issues remained contentious as it involved a politically and socially sensitive area – that of the preservation of Welsh culture and concerns over Anglicisation.
It is possible to see these concerns in the discussion occurring among the
Welsh intelligentsia of the 1970s and in Plaid Cymru’s documents from the decade.100 Nonconformity and industry did not, in and of themselves, feature all that noticeably in these discussions, but concern over the culture of which these facets were a part was very evident. The decline of the Welsh language, the division between Welsh and English-speakers, the debate over whether language defined
Welsh literature, the Welsh inferiority complex; all these issues were a fundamental part of a wider debate on Welsh culture, a culture of which Nonconformity and heavy industry were stereotypical parts.
Nonconformity emerged in Wales during the Interregnum, although it did not really develop into the prevailing religious form in the country until the mid-18th century, when a European-wide religious revival found its Welsh expression in the emergence of Methodism. During the 19th century, Welsh Nonconformity became part of the national identity. To be Welsh was to be Nonconformist, Welsh-speaking and Liberal-voting. Correspondingly, the attitudes taken by Dodd and Gwynfor
Evans illustrated their understanding of the origin of these components, their role in the Welsh identity of the 18th and 19th centuries, and their place in Wales and Welsh identity in the 1970s.
100 See Chapter One. Questioning Britain and the Boundaries of the Welsh-English Relationship: 1970-1979, pp. 52-64. 104
Dodd argued that Nonconformity in Wales was not particularly successful
during the Interregnum or the immediate Restoration period, with the majority of the
Welsh people being content to conform to the Established Church.101 Indeed, the first major religious movement in Wales emerged out of the Anglican Church in the
form of the Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge (SPCK) which, in
turn, spawned Griffith Jones’ Circulating Schools. The SPCK and the Circulating
Schools had the combined effect of increasing Welsh literacy and of fostering an
interest in religion through their use of religious writings to teach students to read and
write. Griffith Jones’ use of itinerant preaching, while disliked by the Welsh
authorities, also fostered the spread of the new religious enthusiasm, resulting in
several converts who were considered the founding fathers of Welsh Methodism:
Daniel Rowland, Howel Harris and William Williams. This combination of literacy
through the medium of religion meant that the Welsh people learnt to express
themselves through Christian concepts. Given the centrality of literature and literacy
to the ability of a people to imagine their nation,102 it is of little wonder that the form
of Christianity most accessible to the general population, Nonconformity, became so
entangled in the Welsh concept of Wales and national identity. Dodd’s history
demonstrated his awareness of the importance of Nonconformity to Welsh identity103
but, as with the earlier historical periods, placed this further development of Welsh
firmly into an international as well as a national context.
For Dodd, Welsh Nonconformity developed and became a part of Welsh
identity in the context of a period of European-wide interest in religion. For example,
this was expressed among the educated Welsh in London and Wales through an
101 For this paragraph, see A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, pp.96-102. 102 Benedict Anderson (1991) Imagined Communities, pp.37-40. 103 A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, p.145. 105
active concern over the poor state of spiritual education and participation in Wales.104
A substantial proportion of the Welsh population were incapable of accessing what theological material was available, either because it was written in English or because they were illiterate. As with many of the earlier political developments in Wales,
Dodd placed Welsh religious development within the wider context, leaving the reader aware that Welsh culture developed in the direction it did because of the circumstances in which the Welsh people found themselves in the 18th century.
This approach remained constant in Dodd’s discussion of the development of
Nonconformity into the dominant religious affiliation in Wales. The panic
surrounding the Napoleonic Wars pushed the Methodists into declaring themselves
Nonconformists in order to gain official recognition and protection, taking advantage
of the wider British political developments that had resulted in the proclamation of
the Toleration Act.105 The revival of the Anglican Church and its return to ritualism
pushed the Methodists towards the older Nonconformist groups, as did the slow but
steady growth of Catholic adherents with the rise of Irish immigration.106 By the
middle of the 19th century, Nonconformity had shaped Welsh education and culture,
forming one of the three ways Dodd had identified as expressing Wales and
Welshness.107 This approach avoided mention of the negative aspects of
Nonconformity pointed out by David Williams, who argued that Nonconformity
“…changed the tone of the nation both for the better and for the worse.”108 Dodd
presented this shift in denominational affiliation as natural, allowing for the validity
of multiple expressions of Wales and Welshness, something that would have seemed
familiar if slightly controversial to his Welsh audience. For Dodd, this cultural
104 Ibid., pp.87-103. 105 Ibid., p.135. 106 Ibid., pp.136-138. 107 Ibid., p.102. 108 David Williams (1977) A History of Modern Wales, p.156. 106
change was simply the result of the middle-class dominance of Nonconformity, and
the steady change of cultural norms over the 19th century, a change that occurred
across Europe. W.R. Lambert of the Delegacy of Local Examinations, Oxford,
agreed with Dodd that it was the middle-class leadership of the Chapels that created the cultural change. Yet he, unlike Dodd, linked this with the early twentieth century affiliation between the emergent Labour Party and a working-class disillusioned with the requirements and failings of middle-class Nonconformity.109
Dodd, in his A Short History of Wales, focused instead on portraying this
period as one in which three distinct patterns of Wales and Welshness emerged.
These religious developments were, according to Dodd, occurring in a society that
was also undergoing major changes in its economic structure, particularly in the 19th century.110 As with the growth of Nonconformity, industrial expansion was triggered
by events external to Wales, initially in response to the external demands of overseas
wars.111 Investment and organisation were, however, English rather than Welsh in origin,112 a depiction that occurred in the majority of Welsh historiography on this
era. G.M. Holmes, however, placed this into context, noting that while immigration
and English capital played a significant role in the expansion of Welsh industry, local
Welsh entrepreneurs were active and important participants.113 This difference has a
major impact on the way in which the reader perceives Welsh culture. According to
Dodd, as industry developed, so did the transportation infrastructure that supported it,
allowing social and cultural life to expand and develop.114 Dodd described these
109 W.R. Lambert (1976) “Some Working-Class Attitudes Towards Organized Religion in Nineteenth- Century Wales.” Llafur, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp.12-13. 110 A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, p.102. 111 Ibid., p.108. 112 Ibid., p.103. 113 G.M. Holmes (1976) “The South Wales Coal Industry 1850-1914.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.187-192. Here the major difference appears to be who exactly is considered to be Welsh. Do the Anglicised gentry count as Welsh or English? 114 A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, pp.121-129. 107
changes as emerging logically and progressively, resulting in both the emergence of
an urban working and middle class, and in a political awakening due to the combining
of the religious/humanist/education movement with industrial conditions.115 By the
start of the nineteenth century, Wales possessed a distinct working class and, as of
about 1830, a basic but conscious working class movement.116 Yet this distinctly
Welsh society had, again, been formed in response to an external stimulus, one that
had an increasingly Anglicising effect on Welsh industrial culture as the nineteenth
century turned towards the twentieth.
Dodd continued this trend of positioning Welsh development opposite external
and increasingly, British stimuli. He argued that over the course of the nineteenth
century, this working class consciousness merged with Nonconformity to create an
atmosphere of political and cultural radicalism, allowing the infusion of politics into
what had been primarily a cultural identity.117 Two main events, both external in
origin, triggered this merge: generally, the Britain wide push for education, for
increased literacy, and for religious conformity, and specifically, the 1847 Blue Book
Reports on the state of Welsh education. These reports, through their criticism of the
low standards of literacy in Wales and of the immorality that supposedly emerged
from Nonconformist beliefs, stimulated an indignant politicised identity expressed through calls for Disestablishment and Home Rule: class and religion unified. The
reports also stimulated the desire for English language education. Wynford Davies confirmed this argument later in the decade, pointing out that the bulk of the Welsh
working and middle-classes saw English language education, as provided by the new
curriculum that emerged in the later nineteenth century, as beneficial for their and
115 Ibid., pp.131-132. 116 Ibid., p.131. 117 For this paragraph, see Ibid., pp.144-6 & 150. 108
their children’s material advancement.118 Welsh was the language of the Chapel, not of the material and industrial world.119 Dodd was, then, part of the historiographical
group that identified these events as one of the origins of the divided Welsh identity
apparent in the 1970s. The Welsh people reacted indignantly to the Blue Books’
attack on their morality, religion and language, but at some level, the inferiority of the
Welsh language and its role in limiting Welsh participation in the modern world was
actually accepted. This understanding of the historical basis of the cultural Welsh
inferiority complex was current in the 1970s, appearing in a couple of articles in
Planet.120
Dodd’s identification of a Welsh, politically conscious working class in pre-
industrial Wales was also worthy of attention, as it – when combined with the developments around the Blue Books – illustrated the spread of Welsh divided identity from the gentry, present since the Edwardian Conquest, to the general
population. Yet for the first time, the Welsh people were full participants in their
world. Their working class culture was both international and Welsh, connected to
the pre-industrial Welsh culture and to the rapid western economic expansion, and the
growing use of English facilitated political participation at a popular level.121 The
Welsh people were passionately Welsh, as illustrated by the demand for
Disestablishment, but were also fervent about entering into the success of the English
speaking world, in a manner not dissimilar to the Tudor gentry.122 Dodd seemed to
be implying that this division of identity was inescapable should a Welsh person
118 Wynford Davies (1979/80) “The Curriculum of the County Intermediate Schools: Some Antecedent Considerations.” National Library of Wales Journal, Vol. 21, pp.95-98. This new curriculum was intended to provide an education suitable for the late nineteenth century. 119 Ibid., p.98. 120 Bobi Jones (1974) ‘The Roots of Welsh Inferiority,’ Planet, Vol 22, pp.53-72; Tecwyn Lloyd (1976) “Wales – see England.” Planet, Vol. 34, pp.36-47. 121 A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, pp.147-159. 122 Ibid., pp.150-151. 109 choose to act as a full citizen of Britain, or even of an international Wales. Such action required an ability to move fluently between two worlds, or the creation of an identity that facilitated concurrent existence in the two worlds.
Dodd, then, considered Nonconformity and industrialisation to have occurred in response to external events and in a manner that shaped the emergence of the
Wales of the 1970s. There were many correlations between his understanding of the relevance of Nonconformity and industrialisation to Welsh culture and society and the issues that were apparent in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The decline of traditional culture, the gradual loss of the definitive Welsh industries, the decline of the Chapels, the Welsh inferiority complex, the presence or otherwise of a Welsh political identity123 – this section of Dodd’s history positioned these aspects in reference to
Wales and Welshness, emphasising both the constructed nature of the actual manifestations of Welshness in society and the vitality of the culture and people.
Gwynfor Evans’ approach towards both Nonconformity and industry was quite different from that of Dodd. Where Dodd emphasised the external stimulus,
Gwynfor Evans focused on the internal situation, as was vividly displayed in his portrayal of Welsh Nonconformity. He broke with Dodd over the depiction of the relationship between Welsh identity, traditional culture and Nonconformity, arguing that the Nonconformists of all denominations were the upholders and preservers of the
Welsh cultural traditions of literacy, education, the production of literature and an innate focus on the spiritual.124 Griffith Jones was presented as a hero, as were all the
Welsh Anglicans and Methodists who fostered Welsh language education.125 In
Gwynfor Evans’ words:
123 See Chapter One. Questioning Britain and the Boundaries of the Welsh-English Relationship: 1970-1979, pp42-68. 124 Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of My Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History, pp.322-323. 125 Ibid., p.326. 110
Despite the malice of the government and the neglect it suffered at the hands of a
rather contemptible gentry, Welsh civilisation had been saved, by dint of work that
was just as important as the feats of the Princes.126
This interpretation was, like much of Gwynfor Evans’ work, a mixture of standard
historiography and his own ideology. David Williams, one of Wales’ pre-eminent
historians, also presented Griffith Jones’ efforts as being of great significance. Here,
however, David Williams was referring to Griffith Jones’ primary goal of saving
souls and his method which resulted in increased literacy in the Welsh language.127
David Williams did not attribute either patriotism or a desire to save Welsh culture to
any aspect of Nonconformity. The efforts of the Nonconformists were, unlike in
Land of My Fathers, positioned firmly in the world in which they occurred. Gwynfor
Evans’ interpretation also differed from that of Dodd although not so much from
David Williams’128 in arguing that Welsh Nonconformity emerged from within the
Welsh culture and tradition, rather than being stimulated by events external to the
Welsh tradition and even to Wales itself, confirming the idea of a link between Welsh
identity and Nonconformity. Indeed, Gwynfor Evans compared the revival initiated
by Daniel Rowland, Howel Harris and William Williams to the period he identified as
the Welsh golden age – the period after the Roman withdrawal during which Welsh culture, including Welsh Christianity, flourished and the nation’s identity was untarnishedly Welsh.129
126 Ibid., p.329. 127 David Williams (1977) A History of Modern Wales, p.147. 128 David Williams argued that “Although Methodism in Wales was but one aspect of a general religious revival, it was a spontaneous movement.” Ibid., p.148. 129 Ibid., p.333. 111
Gwynfor Evans thoroughly tangled Welsh Nonconformity with Welsh identity
in his historiographical explanation of the period, a move attributable to his personal
affiliation with Nonconformity.130 It was, according to a Plaid Cymru historian,
Laura McAllister, his Christian faith that led him to emphasise the spiritual and communal above the material.131 His history demonstrated that he saw a similar
belief active among the Welsh Nonconformists of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. As with the Golden Era of the Princes, Gwynfor Evans attributed a
patriotic motive to the Welsh who accepted the material discrimination attached to
Nonconformity. This patriotic motive was expressed through a commitment to the
Welsh language above material advancement, an interest in Welsh literature, hymns
and verse and real Welsh spiritual development.132
This positioning built on Gwynfor Evans’ earlier positioning of Celtic
Christianity as a vital aspect of Welsh identity. Christianity was, for Gwynfor Evans, part of what made the country Wales and, according to Laura McAllister’s analysis,
“Nonmaterial values like co-operation and freedom were the ‘natural’ principles upon which Welsh society should rest, for they were rooted in Wales’ Christian past.”133
Gwynfor Evans’ historiography illustrated this belief: he clearly considered a
commitment to Welsh culture to involve spiritual depth and, if necessary, material
sacrifice. The Nonconformists initially conformed to this expectation, giving Welsh
culture new life and aiding the growth and development of Wales and Welshness.
This ceased when the Welsh people became side-tracked by the material prosperity
promised by full cooperation with the economic machine of England and the British
Empire. Welsh culture would be betrayed by the Welsh people.
130 Laura McAllister (2001) Plaid Cymru: The Emergence of a Political Party, p.68. 131 Ibid., p.68. 132 Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of My Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History, pp.330-331. 133 Laura McAllister (2001) Plaid Cymru: The Emergence of a Political Party, p.68. 112
As can be gathered from this latter point, Gwynfor Evans’ approach to the industrialisation of Wales was not nearly as enthusiastic as his consideration of the growth of Nonconformity. His approach to Welsh industrialisation was, however, consistent with that of Plaid Cymru in the 1970s, condemning not so much industrialisation as the circumstances in which it occurred.134 Industry and economic growth were considered by both Gwynfor Evans and Plaid Cymru as essential for the advancement of the Welsh nation. The Welsh experience of industrialisation to the
1970s was, in contrast, considered problematic in that it had been effectively controlled by England, with Welsh resources being used to build and maintain
England and the British Empire rather than Wales as a nation.135 This basic attitude went a long way towards explaining the condemnation Gwynfor Evans displayed towards the Welsh gentry, the majority of whom were, by this period, thoroughly
Anglicised and had provided considerable financial support for early industrial development, along with English capitalists. This English exploitation of what
Gwynfor Evans presented as the first English colony was aided by the Welsh middle class who were determined to advance in the material world and accepted the subservient position of Wales in Britain on these grounds. This exploitation was economic and physical, but had equally damaging effects on language and culture.
The British state made no effort to protect either aspect from the spread of the English language through industrialisation and the corresponding demand for the English medium education needed to participate in and gain from this industrial world. From this period on, Gwynfor Evans argued that the Welsh people demonstrated their death wish for their original culture and identity,136 welcoming English language education
134 For this paragraph, see Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of My Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History, pp.348-349 & pp.388-393. 135 Ibid., pp.388-393 136 Ibid., p.395. 113
as the path to success and their willing acceptance of English culture as the price for
this pathway to success.
In taking this attitude, Gwynfor Evans did not really address the rise of the
Welsh politicised working class or the functional purpose of the divided Welsh identity. Instead, he focused on the aspects of the traditional Welsh culture that
remained visible in industrial Wales, arguing that not even English-triggered
industrialisation and Welsh materialism were enough to totally destroy Welsh culture.
In fact, he did not mention industrial development prior to Chartism and the Rebecca
Riots in the mid-19th century.137 The nineteenth century was, instead, portrayed as
absorbed in literature and religion. The Welsh people were clustered into tightly knit
communities that were only incidentally industrial and remained possessed of a rich
intellectual culture despite the failure of the upper levels of Welsh society to provide
cultural leadership.138 Yet this depiction failed to foreshadow the depth of awareness
of the complexity and uniqueness of Welsh industrial society that would be expressed later in the decade by Gwyn A. Williams.139 This description, did, however,
correspond exactly with Plaid Cymru’s argument that Welsh controlled industry
would be compatible with the maintenance and continued growth of a Welsh culture
founded in the original identity of Wales.
By emphasising culture over industry and in condemning the choice of
English language education, Gwynfor Evans indicted the historical and contemporary
identity of the majority of the Welsh population in the 1970s. Yet this interpretation
offered strong support for a minority group who, in that decade, continued to identify
with Celtic Welsh culture and society. Gwynfor Evans did not define the boundaries
between those aligning themselves with traditional and non-traditional Welsh culture
137 Ibid., p.348. 138 Ibid., pp.339-338. 139 Gwyn A. Williams (1978) The Merthyr Rising. London: Croom Helm. 114 by employment or locality, however, but by the choice of affiliation. His belief in the voluntary nature of identity was indicated by his focus on the Celtic aspects of Welsh culture within the industrial communities, echoing again Plaid Cymru’s stance on the matter.140 Gwynfor Evans’ unwillingness to allow the separation of cultural and political identities within Wales was further illustrated by his limitation of full Welsh identity to those who were involved in the nineteenth century movement towards self- government and the creation of a radical Welsh political party based on a program of education, Disestablishment and land reform. This approach was substantially different from that of Dodd, who accepted the separation of political and cultural identities. It did, however, allow some room for the redemption of the Welsh of the industrial communities. Gwynfor Evans, in focusing on the strand of pure Cymryic
Welshness, indicated that the choice of identity remained open even to those who had spent their life choosing Britain and material success over Wales and true Cymryic
Welshness.141
Both interpretations revealed quite different understandings of Wales and
Welshness. Dodd was presenting a country and identity shaped although not defined by external events, while Gwynfor Evans argued that Welsh identity must always be grounded in the original and traditional one. Each interpretation also indicated a different relationship with England in Britain. For Dodd, the relationship was both positive and negative: the negative aspects were not deliberately inflicted by England, but result from short-sightedness and the failure of the Welsh language and culture to make the transition into the industrial world. For Gwynfor Evans, any English or
British impact on the growth and development of Welsh culture was negative.
Hence, the growth of Nonconformity, apparently emerging from Welsh traditions,
140 Gwynfor Evans (1996) For the Sake of Wales: 2000 Years of Welsh History, p.191. 141 Gwynfor Evans embodied his understanding of a commitment to Wales, working as a tomato farmer in order to have the time to work for Plaid Cymru rather than build a career as a lawyer. 115
was positive, but industrialisation, coming from a purely external source and fostering
materialism at the expense of Wales and Welshness was negative.
Historiographically and conceptually, both interpretations of Wales and
Welshness and the relationship between England and Britain were grounded in the
late 1960s and early 1970s. One of the most obvious indicators of this was the less
than celebratory attitude taken towards industrialisation by both Dodd and Gwynfor
Evans. O.M. Edwards, author of the main books published on the industrial period
prior to the 1950s presented a picture of a prosperous nation possessed of a clear
cultural identity, satisfied with local government and with a bright industrial and
economic future to which to look forward.142 This outlook had altered noticeably by
1950, when David Williams argued that Welsh industrialisation occurred as the result
of the English need for more resources.143 Dodd’s interpretation followed suit: with two of the main researchers of industrial Wales arguing from this perspective, the
1960s and 1970s examination of the English motivations for Welsh industrialisation
became noticeably more cynical. Gwynfryn Richards agreed that Nonconformity,
specifically Methodism, connected with the revivals in education and literature to
reshape Welsh culture drastically.144 The later industrial revolution, external in
impetus, failed to foster national development145 and the decreased isolation and increased mobility combined with this to encourage the spread of the English language.146 By 1815, the Welsh workers had become sufficiently politically aware
142 O.M. Edwards (1925) Wales. (2nd edition) London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd; O.M. Edwards (1906) A Short History of Wales. London: T.Fisher Unwin Ltd. 143 David Williams (1950) A History of Modern Wales. London: John Murray. 144 Gwynfryn Richards (1979/80) “The Diocese of Bangor During the Rise of Welsh Methodism.” National Library of Wales Journal, Vol 21, pp.179-224. 145 David W. Howell (1974/5) “The Impact of Railways on Agricultural Development in Nineteenth Century Wales.” Welsh History Review, Vol 7, pp.40-62; Leonard S. Higgins (1977/8) “The Brogden Pioneers of the Early Industrial Development in Mid-Glamorgan.” National Library of Wales Journal, Vol. 20, pp.240-252. 146 G.J. Lewis (1979/80) “The Geography of Cultural Transition: The Welsh Borderland 1750-1850.” National Library of Wales Journal, Vol. 21, pp.131-144. 116
to begin reform movements that triggered general unrest, although this lacked any
ideological backing.147
There was, however, another stream evident in the academic literature that
was not represented by either Dodd or Gwynfor Evans, in which the impact of
England on Wales was considered primarily positive. B.L. Davies argued that the
Blue Books of 1847 had a primarily positive influence on education,148 despite other
historiographical trends and the intelligentsia’s debate of the 1970s identifying this
government report as contributory to both the decline of the Welsh language and the
Welsh inferiority complex. Similarly, neither Dodd nor Gwynfor Evans discussed in depth the rural industrialisation in the 18th and 19th centuries, something that reflected
both the lack of research into the field prior to the 1970s and the dominance in the
1970s of the industrial south in terms of both Welsh identity and the relationship
between Wales and England.
The final theme to be discussed in this Chapter is that of the twentieth century.
Neither author deals with this period with the depth given to earlier times, due in part
to the recent nature of the events and in part to the difficulty noted by Dodd in
discerning the trend of twentieth century Wales.149 Yet the impact on Wales of the rapid changes that defined the twentieth century makes these brief historical interpretations important, as they contribute further insight into their authors’ historiographical understandings of Wales, Welshness and the relationship between
Wales and England in Britain.
Dodd passed rapidly over the major events in the first half of the century –
WW1, WW2 and the Great Depression - indicating their role in the emergence of
147 David A. Wagner (1974/5) “Welsh Politics and Parliamentary Reform, 1780-1832.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 7, pp.427-449. 148 B.L. Davies (1973/4) “British Schools in South Wales.” National Library of Wales Journal, Vol. 18, pp.383-396. 149 A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, p.159. 117
post-war pressure groups and political activity,150 a development that, according to
Tony Judt, occurred throughout Europe in the 1960s and 1970s.151 These were,
primarily, international events and movements that combined with the Welsh situation
to result in a public expression of, if not nationalism, certainly patriotism, expressing
concern about the state of the Welsh language and the legal basis of Welsh
nationhood. As a result, Urdd Gobaith Cymru (Welsh League of Youth) and Y Blaid
Genedlaethol Cymru (the Welsh National Party) grew, and Welsh institutions
appeared and flourished.152 Dodd, however, did not conclude on an entirely positive
note, expressing concern about the potential for the historic character of Welsh life to
withstand the global changes being ushered in by the cosmopolitan television
culture.153 In line with his statement that the theme of the twentieth century remained
hard to discern even in the 1960s and 1970s, Dodd did not provide much
interpretation of these events.
This brief summary of 20th century Wales indicated Dodd’s belief that Welsh
identity had survived and that the alterations to its original structure over the centuries
had not detracted significantly from its essential Welshness. Welsh Wales offered an
active Welsh identity. Dodd, did, however, emphasise the importance of the historic
foundations of this identity. This, along with active participation in the Welsh
language and Welsh politics by at least some of the claimants of a Welsh identity, was
essential for the retention of Welshness. Here, Dodd’s definition of Welsh identity
specifically included those who were Welsh-speakers, while continuing to acknowledge the Welshness of those limited to English.
150 Ibid., pp.164-165. 151 Tony Judt (2005) Post War. London: William Heineman, pp.347-503. 152 A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, pp.161-165. 153 Ibid., p.165. 118
Dodd was, through this inclusion, offering a key to his understanding of Welsh identity. To belong to Wales, a person needed to be a part of Welsh society. In the
Wales Dodd saw, shaped and altered by international social and economic forces, this participation may have required the acceptance of a divided identity. This division of identity did not, however, equate to the discarding of all historical Welsh connections, as was illustrated by his concern over the impact of Anglo-American culture on the historic foundations of Welsh identity.
His approach to the relationship between Wales and England emerged from this concept of balance and compromise. Dodd did not advocate compromise to the point of the loss of a separate Wales and Welshness, but rather acknowledged the reality of living next door to a more powerful country. As with the debate among the
Welsh intelligentsia of the 1970s, Dodd was aware of the detrimental consequences when the balance between Wales and England moved too far towards England, but he did not consider all English influence to be negative, or the negative consequences to be intentional.
Gwynfor Evans, however, continued to see the relationship with England in
Britain and the resultant divided identity as a problem, in the sense that Welsh people should have, regardless of cost, chosen an entirely Cymryic Welsh identity. He condemned the rising Britishness of the twentieth century, arguing that from Lloyd
George on, Welsh politics were predominantly expressed through British parties in a
British context, the main exception being that of Plaid Cymru.154 The state centralization and technological advances that Dodd attributed to international trends were condemned, not in and of themselves, but because they were directed by an
154 Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of My Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History, pp.140-142. 119
English government and culture and therefore undermined the non-state protected
Welsh language and culture.155
Although Gwynfor Evans did not consider these developments as positive, he
argued that a Cymryic Welsh identity had survived and was demonstrated by the
modern heroes, the 1970s equivalent of the Glyn Dwr rebels.156 His depiction of
these young nationalists undertaking peaceful activism in defence of Welsh language
and culture was close to celebratory. Such a depiction revealed again the political passion behind his historical surface and his own beliefs concerning the active expression of Welsh identity. Gwynfor Evans clearly indicated the appropriate behaviour of those who would claim a Welsh identity in the 1970s through this celebration of the young nationalists and his condemnation of the average Welshman
whose primary aim was self-aggrandizement through Anglicisation.
Gwynfor Evans concluded his book with a blatant call for active nationalism:
For the day is coming when Wales and Scotland, Ireland and England will arise out
of the ashes of Great Britain to associate in harmony with each other in a partnership
of free and equal nations.157
This conclusion displayed the political motivation behind his history, and provided a
definitive version of Welsh identity that refused to accept any form of compromise
with Britain or England. The Welsh who made this compromise betrayed their nation. Gwynfor Evans’ opinion of the relationship between England and Wales, as
manifested in the 20th century – including the point in time in which he wrote and
published Land of My Fathers – was entirely negative.
155 Ibid., pp.433-445. 156 For this paragraph, see Ibid., pp.443-452. 157 Ibid., pp.452. 120
Dodd and Gwynfor Evans approached Welsh history from very different
perspectives and, correspondingly, offered very different understandings of Wales,
Welshness and the relationship between Wales and England in Britain despite both
being actively connected to wider Welsh historiography. Dodd was, essentially,
arguing that these factors had been shaped by the reactions of the people in Wales to
external events. Welshness and the Welsh-English relationship were not defined by
these external events but, according to Dodd, there was no absolutely definitive
understanding of Welsh identity. This perspective accorded closely with the debate
occurring in the 1970s over the boundaries between the political, cultural and
economic relationship between the two countries. Very few articles considered
viewed the relationship as entirely negative, none as entirely beneficial, and most
were concerned over the danger inherent in the then-current power imbalance
between England and Wales.
Gwynfor Evans, in contrast, depicted a Wales, Welshness and Welsh-English
relationship that echoed the political stance of Plaid Cymru. Welsh identity, in this interpretation, emerged from a definitive Welsh foundational identity. All external influences were judged according to whether they strengthened or weakened the identity that developed from this foundation. Correspondingly, Gwynfor Evans considered the Welsh-English relationship to be entirely negative because the power imbalance between the two meant that Wales could not ensure the continuity of its traditional culture.
It is evident from this analysis that the two books by Dodd and Gwynfor
Evans were heavily influenced by the 1970s understanding of the relationship
between Wales and England. Both also offered fascinating insight into the versions
of Wales and Welshness that corresponded with the different understandings of the 121 relationship between the two countries. The implications of this for the modern debate over Britain and Britishness and for Welsh history are huge, as the centrality of the Welsh-English relationship to Welsh historiography implies that until this power imbalance is addressed, the Welsh position in these fields will be uncertain.
The centrality of this issue to Welsh history became even more apparent in the
1980s, after the rejection of devolution in 1979. Yet again, the events of the decade as seen through the discussion carried on by the Welsh intelligentsia were vividly apparent in the historiography of the period. If anything, the extent to which 1979 shaped both Gwyn A. Williams’ and Wynford Vaughan-Thomas’ histories158 is indicative of the real necessity of addressing the focus of Welsh history on the
English actions and attitude towards Wales and Welshness, and the Welsh position in relation to England in Britain.
158 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd; Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History. London: Michael Joseph Ltd. 122
Chapter Three
A Search For Wales and Welshness: The 1980s.
In many ways, the 1980s saw the continuation of some of the trends evident in
the 1970s and the apparent reversal of others. Under Margaret Thatcher, the consensus politics that had dominated Britain since 1945 finally departed, being replaced by an ideological program that would effectively alter the shape of British society. Britain’s relationships with the EC and the USA would also continue to be redefined, yet, in this case, the redefining appeared more as a surface reversal of the
1970s attempts to come to terms with Britain’s changed role in the world. Despite
Thatcher’s attempts to retain Britain’s prominence in the global sphere, however, the economic and political realities could not be entirely masked by Thatcherism and the
USA-UK special relationship. The British intelligentsia in the 1980s continued to
define and redefine Britain and Britishness.
Wales, of course, experienced this decade from a slightly different perspective
from that of England, particularly the south-east of England. As in the 1970s, there
were resemblances between the Welsh experience and that of areas of England
outside the south-east corner. For instance, the industrial south of Wales and north of
England shared the impact of mine closures and unemployment. The Welsh possession of nationhood, however, ensured that the Welsh experience of Thatcherism and the 1980s was distinctive and was primarily responsible for the return of devolution to the Welsh and British political agendas. This latter fact is a clear indication that, despite Thatcher’s determination to hold Britain in a prominent global position, the Welsh intelligentsia were still reacting to Britain’s decline in a way that 123
directly questioned the continued viability of Britain and of the Welsh-English
relationship as it existed throughout the 1980s.
The events in Britain in the 1980s very much centred around the personality
and policies of Margaret Thatcher, and the fact of British economic and international
political decline. Thatcher and the Conservative party were voted into office and
government in the 1979 election following the devolution referendum. This election
has received considerable interest over the ensuing two and a half decades, partly
because of the policy program on which the Conservatives won the election, partly
because of the Conservative swing in Labour strongholds – including south Wales –
but mostly because of Thatcher herself. Thatcher’s personality dominated her
political program, a fact evident in the later use of the name ‘Thatcherism’. It was,
ultimately, this style that was rejected, rather than her policies. Indeed, Tony Judt
argued that Thatcher’s main achievement was to create a new consensus politics
broadly acceded to by both the Conservatives under Thatcher’s successor, John
Major, and his successor, Labour’s Tony Blair.1
Thatcherism, as a political program, was centred on the attempt to reverse
British decline, both economically and in international political influence. As a
politician during the 1970s, Thatcher had witnessed the failure of consensus politics
to resolve Britain’s economic and trade union problems and, correspondingly, had
rejected its central facets of a large public sector and welfare state, high taxation, an
interventionist government, and high respect for trade unions.2 Thatcherism was,
instead, based on the unshackling of the free market. The policies intended to achieve this goal developed over her long decade as Prime Minister but, in 1979, were evident in her election promises to control inflation, to scale down the public sector through
1 Tony Judt (2005) Post War, p.547. 2 Geoffrey Smith (1986) “The British Scene.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64. No. 5, p.924. 124
privatisation, to cut direct tax rates, and to focus taxation on consumption rather than
investment.3 These policies represented a significant shift in the economic theory that
had guided consensus politics, a shift away from increasing demand to increasing
supply.4 The Keynesian demand based economy was one of the earliest victims of
Thatcherism.
It is, however, the manifestations of these policies that are of significance
here. Technically, Thatcherism was beneficial to the British economy overall.
Inflation was brought under control and, despite an oil crisis in 1979-80 and an international recession in 1981-82, a substantial increase in real GDP positioned
Britain as the fastest growing economy in Europe between 1982 and 1985.5 These
developments were undoubtedly positive but need to be qualified. British inflation
remained higher than that of its major competitors and its growth rates were tarnished
by the lowly position from which they started.6 Much of Thatcherism was, in fact,
quite similar in style, with the positive achievements being balanced by a less
celebratory perspective.
As mentioned above, privatisation formed a major facet of Thatcher’s policies.
The floating of British Telecom in 1984 permanently altered the boundaries between
the private and the public sector,7 and by the late 1980s, over twelve state companies
were predominantly in the hands of private owners, including British Aerospace and
the Jaguar automobile company.8 Privatisation of these companies was intended to
increase share ownership within the British public and, correspondingly, increase their
3 Dimitri N. Balatsos (1985) “The British Disease – Is the Thatcher Prescription Working?” ABA Journal: The Lawyer’s Magazine, London ’85 Special Feature, p.140. 4 Ibid., p.140. 5 Ibid., p.140. 6 Geoffrey Smith (1986) “The British Scene.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 5, pp.929-930. 7 Peter Hennessy (1991) “The Last Retreat of Fame: Mrs Thatcher as History.” The Modern Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 4, p.495. 8 Geoffrey Smith (1986) “The British Scene.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 5, p.930. 125 interest in creating profitable companies and a strong economy.9 The success or otherwise of this program appears to have been unclear in the 1980s, and later analyses have been distinctly mixed in their response. The British economy may well have become more efficient and competitive but privatisation also resulted in the neglect of public spaces and the remaining public sector, and disasters like the rapid and avoidable deterioration of the rail service.10
It would appear from the summaries available of the Thatcher era, that
Thatcherism, as an economic program, had both positive and negative effects on
Britain as a state. Thatcherism did succeed in halting Britain’s steady economic decline, but at the expense of British society and community.11 Privatisation, inflation control measures, an oil crisis and an international recession ensured that one price of increased economic efficiency would be visible quite early in Thatcher’s tenure as Prime Minister: rising unemployment.12 Industries and companies that were not both competitive and profitable were encouraged to close and many of those made redundant failed to re-enter the work force. This particular social cost, long-term unemployment, was particularly visible in the industrial north of England and the south of Wales. Both regions were heavily dependent on mining for local employment, and many of the newly unemployed miners failed to re-enter employment.
Long-term unemployment inevitably carries with it serious social costs, some of which appear innately contradictory to the economic goals of Thatcherism.
Malcolm Pearce and Geoffrey Stewart argued that long-term welfare-dependency had been documented as leading to depression, poor self-esteem, and alcohol and drug
9 Ibid., p.931. 10 Tony Judt (2005) Post War, pp.543-544. 11 Ibid., pp.543-544. 12 Ibid., pp.543-544. 126
abuse as well as youth delinquency.13 In economic terms, it was also problematic, as potentially productive people were permanently removed from the labour market in a
manner that decreased the economic potential of the community and of future
generations within that community.14 As the 1980s progressed and the effects of
welfare-dependency and long term unemployment became increasingly evident, the
people and intelligentsia outside of the south-east corner became increasingly concerned about the priorities of Thatcherism, as illustrated by the issues that dominated the discussions among the Welsh intelligentsia and the steady rise of popular interest in Welsh devolution.
The social effects of privatisation were not entirely negative, however. One
facet of Thatcher’s policies was to encourage council house tenants to purchase their
property at discount prices. This policy was remarkably successful, resulting in an
overall decline in the absolute numbers renting council housing.15 Generally
speaking, this public enthusiasm for participation in Thatcher’s property and share
owning society could be found throughout Britain in the 1980s, wherever the British people had the money to participate. In this sense, the British people accepted and supported the change in economic direction.
It is doubtful that there was a wide-spread outcry over Thatcher’s eventual
success in bringing the Trade Unions under control. Two governments had fallen in
the 1970s for their inability to achieve this. Thatcher’s success may have created a
certain level of unease and real dislike at some levels, but her ability to curb the
inflationary wage demands of the unions appears to have been broadly accepted as
necessary if the decline of the British economy was to be reversed. Thatcher’s
Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982 combined with rising unemployment to shift the
13 Malcolm Pearce and Geoffrey Stewart (2002) British Political History 1867-2001, p.523. 14 Ibid., p.253. 15 Ibid., p.525. 127
power equation in the direction of the employer.16 A successive Act was passed in
1984, further limiting the trade unions who were already suffering from the economic
policies of the Conservative government.17 Thatcher’s decision to close uneconomic
coal mines was in keeping with her broader economic policy and was taken only after
the government had prepared for the inevitable clash with mining’s powerful union.
Pearce and Stewart argued, however, that the miners’ strike, lasting 362 days and
involving considerable economic privation, physical violence between picketers and
police and the shattering of communities as men were forced to return to work
through economic necessity was not solely about the threatened mine closures.18
Rather, it was centred on the legislative limitations imposed by the Conservative
government – essentially, the strike was about who held the upper hand in the
economy; the unions or the government.19
In this case, as with the year long print-workers’ strike at News International,
Wapping in 1986, the government won. The miners were forced to return to work
and “…from 1984 to 1987 the number of colliery workers fell from 181, 000 to 108,
000 and the number of NCB [National Coal Board] works fell from 234 to 143 with
42 pits being closed.”20 Thatcher did indeed succeed in making the mines more
efficient and competitive with the tons of coal per man shift rising from 2.59 to 3.96
by 1987.21 Union power appeared broken, partly by the Conservative government’s
tactic and partly by unpropititious economic conditions. The nature of the conflict
16 Ibid., p.524. 17 Christine F. Collette & Keith Laybourn (2003) (eds) Modern Britain Since 1979. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, pp.69-70. 18 Malcolm Pearce and Geoffrey Stewart (2002) British Political History 1867-2001, p.530. 19 Ibid., pp.529-531; Kenneth O. Morgan (2001) Britain Since 1945: The People’s Peace, pp.472-475. 20 Malcolm Pearce and Geoffrey Stewart (2002) British Political History 1867-2001, p.531. 21 Ibid., p.531. 128
contributed to the nature of the defeat, with the British trade union movement remaining caught in “…myopic shambles…”22 until the mid 1990s.
It is obvious from this outline of domestic events in Britain in the 1980s that
some fundamental assumptions about society and community were under threat.
Privatisation, house and share ownership, the dismantling of union power and the
increasing privatisation and consumer choice approach to education, health and even local councils were all centred on the concept of the individual. Society, as a real
concept, was not considered, a point on which many of the critics of the Thatcher era
focused. Thatcher herself has frequently been quoted as stating that society did not
exist – only the individual existed.23 The international economic situation ensured
that this approach would, at least in the economic sphere, be successful.
Globalisation, increasingly prominent in the 1980s, ignored nations: the boundaries of
society and community were and continue to be irrelevant to this economic approach.
Thatcherism, then, essentially undermined society and community in Britain in the
1980s, something that was to have an unexpected effect in Wales.
As discussed previously, the concept of Britain as an identity and a
community was already under serious debate in the 1970s. Many of the ties that had
bound the nations of Britain together were dissolving or had dissolved – the
Commonwealth, the Empire, Britain’s global role. Despite this, however, and despite
the growth of political and popular interest in alternative national identities,
economic, political and community concerns had resulted in the Welsh rejection of
devolution. The Conservative attack on society, however, and apparent lack of
interest in the national and community interests of Scotland and Wales increasingly
alienated both countries. By the late 1980s, devolution was back on the agenda in
22 John Stirling (2005) “There’s a New World Somewhere: The Rediscovery of Trade Unionism.” Capital and Class, Iss. 87, p.43. 23 Tony Judt (2005) Post War, p.543. 129
both Scotland and Wales, with the then-current form of Britain being seen as an
economic and political liability. Unlike the 1970s, the devolution that reappeared
under Thatcher had grass-roots support and appealed across a range of political and
social divisions: a direct response to the lived experience of Thatcher and
Thatcherism.
This effect of Thatcherism is particularly ironic, given Thatcher’s foreign policy aims. As already implied, Margaret Thatcher evinced a slightly different attitude towards foreign policy than that evident in the 1970s under Heath, Wilson and
Callaghan. Edward Heath’s Euro-focus was anomalous for the period, but both
Wilson and Callaghan remained aware of the pressing reasons for Britain’s membership in the European Community. Wilson’s relationship with the EC was definitely not as good as that of Heath, courtesy of his insistence on renegotiating
Britain’s terms of entry into the Community and the referendum held on the continuation of British membership. His reasons for membership were more focused on retaining Britain’s influence in global affairs, but his approach was never as aggressive as that of Thatcher. The story was similar with the Anglo-American
relationship. Heath, unusually for a post-WW2 British Prime Minister, did not
actively cultivate a particularly close relationship with the USA, preferring to
concentrate on Europe. The two Labour Prime Ministers returned the American
relationship to its 1960s position, focusing particularly in maintaining their influence in American decisions concerning Europe, the Cold War and nuclear armaments.
Thatcher, however, shifted the Anglo-American relationship to one of prime
importance, something felt and disliked especially in France.
This rebalancing of foreign relations under Thatcher can be explained in
numerous ways, one of which also featured quite prominently in the 1970s. Margaret 130
Thatcher’s foreign policy was motivated by much the same goals as her domestic
policy: to halt and reverse British decline. Where, in the 1970s, this need to
reposition Britain in a global sense had pushed the state into Europe, Thatcher’s
attempts to halt the decline pushed Britain away from Europe, towards America. It
was also expressed through acts reminiscent of the British Empire, as evidenced by
the Falklands War in 1982. Admittedly, the Argentinean invasion of British territory
required response, but avenues other than that of war were open. Thatcher’s more
violent response did, however, illustrate several of her goals. Firstly, it demonstrated
that Britain was quite capable of single-handedly running and winning a military
campaign, something that had been questionable since the Suez fiasco in the 1950s.24
Secondly, the success and the action helped to restore British confidence and national
feeling, weakened by the shadows of British decline.25 Thirdly and correspondingly,
it effectively increased Thatcher’s popular support despite an economic recession and
rising unemployment.26
P. Sharpe has argued that the central change Thatcher made to British foreign
policy was that she acted to ensure British interests rather than those of some wider
global order, such as the Commonwealth or the Empire.27 British foreign policy was
tangential to her intentions to rebuild Britain and the British economy.28 From this
perspective, Thatcher’s willingness to engage in open confrontation with Argentina over the Falklands was logical, quite despite the admitted fact that any British government would have had to respond in some fashion. Sharpe argued that
Thatcher’s focus on the Anglo-American relationship emerged from the same basis.
Thatcher fostered a relationship that met specific British interests and requirements,
24 Kenneth O. Morgan (2001) Britain Since 1945: The People’s Peace, pp.460-461. 25 Ibid., pp.460-461. 26 Ibid., pp.460-461. 27 P. Sharpe (1991) “Thatcher’s Wholly British Foreign Policy.” Orbis, Vol. 35, Iss. 3, p.396. 28 Ibid., p.397. 131
rather than trying to reinforce what Sharpe termed Britain’s more altruistic global role.29 The ideological similarities between Thatcherism and Reaganism, as well as
the real friendship that existed between the two leaders, made this form of Anglo-
American relationship relatively easy to maintain, and Thatcher’s willingness to part ways with America when American interests clashed with those of Britain ensured the popularity of her Atlanticist approach with the British electorate.30
Thatcher’s approach of putting British interests before all else did not,
however, function so well in terms of Britain’s relationship with the European
Community. Britain has, historically, been ambivalent about its membership of
‘Europe’ and was, until the realities of economic and political decline manifested in
the 1960s, far from enthusiastic about participation in the EC or any other European
body with federal tendencies. Their war-time and post-war experiences also ensured
that British motivations for entry into the EC would be far less idealistic and, in
general, based on considerably different premises than those of the continental
European countries. All members entered in order to gain, but Britain’s idea of gain
was not that of the battered nations of the original six – France, Germany, the Benelux
countries and Italy. This difference was vividly evident under Thatcher, with efforts
to reshape the financial arrangements of the EC, notably CAP (Common Agricultural
Policy) and Britain’s net contribution to the financial arrangements in the EC. It was
also evident in her opposition to Italian and German attempts to get the process of
closer European union back on track.31
Essentially, Britain under Thatcher was progressing down an ideologically and
economically different path from that of the other members of the EC, and Thatcher’s
policy of British interests first set Britain on a collision course with Europe. This was
29 Ibid., p.399. 30 Ibid., p.399. 31 Ibid., p.402. 132
evident in the above negotiations, in the negotiations for the Single European Act, in
Britain’s opt-out from sections of the SEA, and in Britain’s attitude towards the
proposed single European currency. Britain, under Thatcher, tried to shape the EC
towards a non-federal design, something not appreciated by the other members.
Neither was Thatcher’s style of negotiating much appreciated, with her attitude being
perceived as aggressive, abrasive and uncompromising.
There is evidence that indicates Thatcher’s attitude towards Europe received a
reasonable level of popular support from an electorate who were the least European-
feeling of all the EC countries with the possible exception of Denmark. Thatcher’s
government was returned twice, the tabloids generally supported her actions and
attitude in terms of the EC and the USA, and the Liberal Party – the only genuinely
pro-EC party in the 1980s – failed to win a substantial number of seats at either
national or, more significantly, EC elections.32 Furthermore, the British debate on the
EC remained focused on the issue of British membership until 1985, a full 12 years after official entry into the community.33 Clearly, the British people and politicians
were far from committed to a program of European unification.
This position was reinforced by the general enthusiasm for Anglo-American
relations, and Thatcher’s program of reversing British decline. One facet of her
propaganda used to facilitate the reversal of the general attitude of decline was her use
of the values and traditions of imperial Britain, as evidenced in the Falklands War.34
It was this approach that won Thatcher her greatest support, plainly indicating that the
British people were still being shaped by their history and by the images of Britain and Britishness created by that history. Other, more factual economic influences were
32 Alan Butt Philip (1993) “Europeans First and Last: British Liberals and the European Community.” The Political Quarterly, pp.447-461. 33 Ibid., p.461. 34 Kenneth O. Morgan (2001) Britain Since 1945: The People’s Peace, pp.460-461. 133
also involved in fostering this new attitude. London, specialising in international
banking and investment, was not centred on the EC, but rather on a London-New
York-Tokyo axis.35 This form of trade - banking and investment – did, according to
DeAnne Julius, hold considerable future potential for Britain, and should not be
restricted by a foreign policy or general public who limited trade to mercantilist
exchange.36 DeAnne Julius did not explicitly condemn British membership in the EC
nor did she in any way imply that British membership in the EC was inappropriate,
but the implication was clear. The EC did not hold or define the balance of British
foreign policy or economic interests. The nature of both meant that Britain had and
needed to maintain and develop commitments outside Europe, commitments that
should not suffer due to British membership in the EC.
Thatcher’s departure from Downing Street in 1990 was, however, indicative
that this attitude towards Europe began to alter towards the end of the decade. Pearce
and Stewart argued that, by the 1987 election, Thatcher’s Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, had effectively abandoned the economic basis of
monetarism – money supply – and had chosen instead to shadow the Deutschmark,
effectively entering Britain into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism despite
Thatcher’s active rejection of such participation.37 Lawson’s move won increasing
support from within Thatcher’s government, resulting in a clash that increased tension
within the Conservative Party. This tension triggered the resignation of two Cabinet
Ministers, Nigel Lawson himself and Geoffrey Howe.38 These resignations combined
with the incredibly unpopular Poll Tax to force Thatcher from power. Significantly,
however, the central issue behind Thatcher’s resignation was the EC and the belief
35 DeAnne Julius (1987) “Britain’s Changing International Interests: Economic Influences on Foreign Policy Priorities.” International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 3, p.392. 36 Ibid., p.393. 37 Malcolm Pearce and Geoffrey Stewart (2002) British Political History 1867-2001, pp.538-539. 38 Ibid., pp.538-539. 134
within her government that full participation in the Community would be hugely beneficial to the British economy.39
How much of this political change in direction was the result of the 1987 stock
market crash, the resultant overheating of the British economy and corresponding rise
in inflation is, as yet, unknown. At the time of her resignation, however, Thatcher
was presiding over an economy in which inflation was at almost the same underlying
rate as in 1979, and was starting down “…its steepest and longest decline into recession in the modern era.”40 Undoubtedly, the apparent failure of Thatcher’s
monetarist policies had something to do with the rejection of her corresponding
foreign policy. The underlying theme, it would appear, remained constant: British
decline needed to be halted. If monetarism failed, the EC might succeed. Hence one
of John Major’s policy claims: to place Britain at the heart of Europe.
It is worth noting that Thatcherism did not, ultimately, shift Britain away from
one major trend that had developed in the 1970s. The concepts of Britain and
Britishness were still being examined, as was plainly evidenced by the publication of
Linda Colley’s book, Britons: The Forging of a Nation.41 British decline was a
central issue right through the 1980s and the public response to the Falklands War
indicated the continuing hold of the old concepts of Imperial Britain. This attitude, in
turn, contributed towards the unpopularity of the EC and the ambivalence towards
Britain as a part of Europe at all. Nonetheless, the realities of the world had, by the
end of the 1980s, dinted this image just a little bit more and Britain moved forward
with the EC, despite maintaining close ties with the USA.
As mentioned earlier, Thatcherism also impacted quite heavily on British
society. This, however, was not the only influence shaping and changing the social
39 Ibid., pp.538-539. 40 Malcolm Pearce and Geoffrey Stewart (2002) British Political History 1867-2001, p.539. 41 Linda Colley (2003) Britons: The Forging of a Nation, 1707-1837. London: Pimlico. 135
and cultural world of Britain. Globalisation also altered the cultural boundaries of
nations, increasingly so as the electronic advances behind globalisation became readily available to the general public. Radio and movies had been contributing to this process since the 1920s and television had accelerated the process in the post war period. By the 1980s, these three facets of cultural life were well-established, and
clothing and food trends had spread across nations in a process commonly known as
Americanisation. International travel and communication became steadily easier,
encouraging people “…to define themselves – at the level of enacting their identities
and of self-consciously positioning their lives – in transnational or nonnational, as
opposed to conventionally national, systems of meaning.”42 Geoff Eley further
argued that this process altered slightly during the 1980s, taking on a distinctly
European as opposed to American slant.43
One way in which this process began to take on a particularly European look
was through the political acceptance, encouragement and use of popular culture.
Until the 1980s, popular or mass culture was not highly regarded, with ‘high’ culture
remaining the politically correct expression throughout European society. This
altered across Europe in the 1980s, including in Thatcherite Britain. Advertising and
feminist discourse were just two of the areas that began to take popular culture
seriously, altering the dynamics within European – including British – society.44
Thatcherism successfully picked up on this growing attention to popular culture,
playing to popular needs and wants. This, in turn, meant that popular culture was able
to challenge grant-maintained high culture, riding on the Thatcherite ideology of
market forces. Only the culture that related to the desires and understandings of the
42 Geoff Eley (1992) “Culture, Britain and Europe.” The Journal of British Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, p.393. 43 Ibid., p.393. 44 Ibid., pp.399-401. 136 bulk of the population would naturally achieve financial viability and it was this culture that should be considered the true culture.45
This is a new construction of the mass culture/high culture opposition, in which the
signs have been changed: a highly moralized conception of improvement and
enlightenment has given way to the celebration of the ordinary and the healthy
instincts of the average person, in often crass disregard for older values of
sophistication and refinement. To a great extent this has been borne by a powerful
backlash against the values of the 1960s and the break-down of moral order these
allegedly produced, with enormous animus against the twin perpetrators of
permissive liberals and radical extremists. In cultural politics, aside from the
dismantlement of support for experimentation and diversity in the arts through attacks
on local government, the Arts Council, and the BBC, there have been perhaps three
key symptoms: the remarkable attack on the British universities during the 1980s,
which devalued intellectual work (in the sciences as much as in the social sciences
and the arts), disorganized an existing institutional complex (small and socially
restrictive by European and North American standards, but well functioning in its
own terms), and gutted its talent; the triumph of tabloid journalism and the
transformation of the press; and the resurgence of aggressive and inward-looking
British patriotism in the wake of the Falklands/Malvinas War. Together with other
developments of the 1980s – notably, the attack on trade unions and the narrowing of
civil liberties – these histories have broken an older ideal of citizenship.46
Geoff Eley was noticeably less than complimentary about these changes but, then, relatively few of the British intelligentsia have been particularly complimentary.
On a popular level, these changes did not appear overly disturbing but at a community
45 Ibid., pp.399-402. 46 Ibid., pp.402-403. 137
level, complaints did arise over the impact of the changes. This was evident in Tony
Judt’s statement that while Thatcher was economically beneficial for Britain, she was
socially destructive.47 According to Judt, the emphasis on the private market and her
negation of society effectively devalued the public arena and public spaces, and the
general public gradually absorbed and accepted this attitude.
…late-Thatcherite Britain began to take on some of the more unappealing
characteristics of the American model that the Iron lady so admired…Public spaces
fell into neglect, petty crime and delinquency rose in line with the growing share of
the population caught in permanent poverty.48
Wales, as a part of Britain, experienced all the developments and changes that
affected the state during the 1980s. As stated before, however, the Welsh experience
of the 1980s did differ slightly because of its position as a nation separate from
England. One of the major factors that influenced the Welsh political experience of
the 1980s was the rejection of devolution in 1979. As discussed in the first chapter,
this rejection occurred for logical reasons but its impact went far deeper than these
reasons might imply. In the early 1980s, there was considerable concern among the
Welsh intelligentsia, media and public that Wales was becoming little more than a
region of England.49 This concern was increased by the Conservative swing in Wales
and the growing realisation of the difficulties facing the practical survival of the
Welsh language.50 Even the shape of Welsh society seemed to change with the final
separation from Nonconformist and industrial traditions. Welsh chapel attendance
47 Tony Judt (2006) Post War, p.543. 48 Ibid., pp.543-544. 49 Peter Madgwick (1986) “Radical Wales Lost to Moderation?” Planet, Vol. 59, pp.37-39. 50 Colin H. Williams (1985) “Public Gain and Private Grief: The Ambiguous Nature of Contemporary Welsh.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.27-48; Wynford Bellin (1989) “Ethnicity and Welsh Bilingual Education.” Contemporary Wales, Vol. 3, pp.95-96. 138
was no greater than the British average, and Thatcher’s economic policies saw the rapid closure of most of the remaining coal mines with serious and negative effects on the communities around those mines.
The 1980s, particularly towards the end of the decade, also saw the Welsh
move towards Europe. Plaid Cymru’s political manifestos became steadily more
positive about Welsh participation in Europe, particularly as the opportunities to
participate at a regional rather than a state level grew, a move facilitated by the pro-
European stance taken by Dafydd Wigley and Dafydd Elis Thomas, Plaid Cymru’s
Presidents during the 1980s.51 Nonetheless, Plaid Cymru continued to perceive a
need not apparent to the majority of the Welsh people to renegotiate the terms of entry
in order to acknowledge and protect the Welsh nation and national interests.52 This does, however, reveal a development that was to become increasingly prominent in this decade. In the 1980s, Plaid Cymru realised that the EC could act as a vehicle through which to ensure the acknowledgement of Wales as a nation, equal with all other nations on the European and world scene. Correspondingly, Plaid Cymru was a
member of the European Free Alliance, a group of small nations and regions working
together for self-protection, preferring intelligent cooperation to increased
centralisation.53 It is highly likely that the Irish example was part of the reason
behind Plaid Cymru’s growing enthusiasm for Europe. As a member of the EC,
Ireland had taken strategic advantage of the funding and markets available and had, in
many ways, rebuilt its economy with noted success.
Despite Plaid Cymru’s arguments, the majority of the Welsh population continued to vote Labour, Liberal and Conservative, evidencing the retention of popular ties to Britain. Thatcherism appeared to have had far more impact on the
51 Laura McAllister (2001) Plaid Cymru: The Emergence of a Political Party, pp.72-83. 52 Plaid Cymru (1984) European Election Manifesto, p.4. 53 Ibid., p.6. 139
public perception of the benefits of Britain than Plaid Cymru had ever had. The
Welsh experience of Thatcherism was undoubtedly dominated by economic privatisation, most visibly manifested by the closure of many of the remaining coal
mines, the resulting structural unemployment and Thatcher’s penchant for
centralisation. The neglect of society and democratic representation inherent in these
elements of Thatcherism deepened the relative unpopularity of Thatcher and the
Conservative Party and began to push Wales and the Welsh people back towards
devolution.
Wales, as with the Conservative Party, rejected Thatcherism by the end of the
decade. Unlike England, however, and particularly the south-east corner, the
Conservative Party did not achieve a majority of seats or votes in Wales in the 1980s.
This political difference is important if the experience of Wales and Welshness is to
be understood. Despite the increased number of seats gained by Welsh
Conservatives, the Welsh people never actively endorsed the Conservative program.
This is not to deny their willing and active participation in certain events in the 1980s,
including the flash of patriotic Britishness surrounding the Falklands War, and the more beneficial economic aspects of Thatcherism. There was, however, a growing feeling among the Welsh intelligentsia that these benefits were coming at too high a cost.54
Wales also shared the growth of popular culture, both in terms of the
European/American global culture and the rise of a popular Welsh culture fostered by
organisations like Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg. This was particularly visible with
the rise of interest in the Welsh language in the latter half of the 1980s, the growth of
54 Kenneth D. George and Lynn Mainwaring (1987) “The Welsh Economy in the 1980s.” Contemporary Wales, Vol. 1, p.36; Victoria Wass & Lynn Mainwaring (1989) “Economic and Social Consequences of Rationalization in the South Wales Coal Industry.” Contemporary Wales, Vol. 3, pp.161-185. 140
Welsh language education55 and a rapid rise in interest in Welsh heritage.56 An
interest in heritage was a UK-wide development, but the heritage that developed in
Wales did not stress Wales’ British antecedents but its Celtic ancestry and its later
Welsh expression. Heritage is, of course, not history in the strict sense of the word,
but the growth of interest in it indicated the corresponding rise of public awareness of
Welsh history as distinct from English or British history. The myths generated by
heritage also offer one route to understanding how a nation perceives itself, but such
an analysis must occur elsewhere.
As in the 1970s, the Welsh intelligentsia did not focus on every aspect of the
1980s, but a quick scan of the journals fielding the majority of the intellectual debate
in the 1980s reveals some major differences from the earlier decade. Two new
journals emerged on the scene in the 1980s, considerably widening the arena in which
debate on Wales and Welsh society could occur. These two journals, Contemporary
Wales and the New Welsh Review, in company with Planet, the longer running
internationalist Welsh journal, contained the majority of social, political and
economic discussion, with the historical journals of Llafur and the Honourable
Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions providing occasional contributions.
Despite the differences in the events and general situation of the 1980s, the areas of the Welsh-English relationship that were the focus of discussion in the 1970s remained topical in the 1980s. Such continuity indicates the immense significance of these topics for Wales and Welsh identity, and also implies that these same areas were typically those most threatened by close political, cultural and economic association with England in Britain. The 1980s did, however, see one addition to this discussion that is highly significant for this analysis: an attempt to grasp the way in which Wales
55 Wynford Bellin (1989) “Ethnicity and Welsh Bilingual Education.” Contemporary Wales, Vol. 3, pp.77-97. 56 Joseph P. Clancy (1985) “Museum Piece.” New Welsh Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.65-66. 141
was being presented in popular and media based historiography. Almost inevitably,
given the tone of the decade, this examination occurred within the context of the
questioning of what Wales and Welshness actually meant – as always, a questioning
that occurred in the shadow of England and Britain. Despite the remaining four
themes being consistent with the 1970s, however, the tone of the debate did alter
noticeably, reflecting the events of the decade. The five fields that will be examined
in this chapter are, then, the economic ties between Wales and England in Britain,
political identity and independence, the potential for devolution, cultural identity, and
historiography.
The first field, the economic ties between Wales and England in Britain,
illustrates the depth of the change of approach by the Welsh intelligentsia. In the
1970s, the focus was on the colonial nature of the relationship, and on the long-term
impediment this presented to the full development of Welsh economic potential. By
the 1980s, Thatcherism was taking its toll on the Welsh economy and economic
identity, and this practical and negative experience of British control over the Welsh economy triggered a debate over the continued viability of the British economic policies in Wales. For the first time, this concern began to move beyond the ranks of the Welsh intelligentsia into the general population, courtesy of the social impact of economic rationalisation. One of the main reasons for the popular rejection of devolution in 1979 - the economic benefit of full union with England - was being seriously questioned. The growing prominence of the EC in the economic sphere further facilitated this debate.
The second and third fields of discussion were, in many ways, two faces of the
same coin and both emerged from the shock of the 1979 rejection of devolution. The
impact of this referendum was painfully evident in the articles addressing politics in 142
the first two thirds of the 1980s. After 1979, the debate shifted away from a search
for a separate political identity towards the issues of political assimilation into
England, and of achieving a workable balance between Welsh and British parts of the
political party identities and manifestations. Towards the end of the decade, however,
another facet emerged in the debate; devolution. This devolution debate was quite
different from that of the earlier decade, reflecting the experiences of both the popular
rejection of devolution and Thatcherism, and openly questioning the value of the
then-current relationship between Wales and England in Britain.
Language continued to form the central facet of the fourth field of cultural identity. Unlike the previous decade, however, in the 1980s this debate moved beyond arguing over the boundaries of Welsh identity into efforts to understand and expand those boundaries. Essentially, the Welsh intelligentsia made a concerted effort to grasp the importance of the Welsh language to the Welsh identity in a much broader sense than occurred in the 1970s.
The final theme is, in many ways, a continuation of the debate over cultural
identity. Historiography, particularly the expression and function of Welsh history,
became a topic of debate, indicating an awareness of the importance of history to
identity. The two historians analysed in this decade, Wynford Vaughan-Thomas and
Gwyn A. Williams positioned themselves within this arena simply by writing their histories. This issue, although dealt with last, is of particular significance for any analysis of the expression of Wales and Welshness in historiography, as it took the form of a debate over the appropriate methods for the portrayal of these aspects in history. In many ways, this debate was an extension of that occurring concurrently in
England over ‘England’ and ‘Britain’ – the new British history. 143
The first field to be examined is that of the economic developments in Wales
in the 1980s. In the 1970s, this debate occurred primarily in the context of the
relationship between Wales and England. By the 1980s this focus had altered, with
researchers tending to consider Wales in its own right, as a country and economy
apart from England. The combination of Conservative policies towards the economy
and, implicitly, on the shape of Welsh society, and the underlying Conservative policy
of rebuilding the competitiveness of the Welsh and, more generally, the British
economies encouraged the Welsh intelligentsia to rethink the nature of the economic
ties between the two countries.57 This was highly significant given the centrality of
the economic ties to the popular support for the union between England and Wales.
There is considerable evidence within the journal articles of the 1980s that the
Welsh intelligentsia approached the issue of the Welsh economy from a very different
perspective from that of Thatcher’s Conservative government. Under Thatcher,
economic competitiveness within a free market was the order of the day – implying
no protection for industries or infrastructure that failed to meet profitability criteria.
In Wales, however, the journal articles indicated a far deeper concern over the social
side of the economy and a far greater awareness of the social costs of economic
restructuring. It was evident that the Welsh intellectuals of the 1980s saw the
development of public infrastructure as part and parcel of creating an economically
competitive society. With Thatcherism, infrastructure was supposed to emerge out of
a competitive economy. By 1987, concern was expressed by Kenneth D. George and
Lynn Mainwaring from the Department of Economics, University College Cardiff, over the failure of Thatcherism to achieve the economic rejuvenation promised in the
Conservative manifestoes of 1979 and 1985. They argued that, ultimately, this failure
57 Conservative Party (1983) Conservative Manifesto for Wales. Cardiff: Conservative Central Office for Wales, pp.1-2; Conservative Party (1987) Conservative Manifesto for Wales. Cardiff: Conservative Central Office for Wales, pp.1-7. 144
had occurred because of the governments’ failure to treat the infrastructural causes of
the Welsh industrial decline rather than its symptoms.58 Yet the infrastructure
developments identified as necessary by George and Mainwaring were precisely those
unlikely to have occurred under Thatcher, such as the extension of modern
communication systems and the up-dating of housing and schools, as they fell into the
field of public development. For these economics researchers, Thatcherism’s attitude
of privatisation and economic rationalism at the expense of manufacturing was not the
answer for Wales.
A similar dislike of the approach taken by Thatcher was evident in three
articles addressing the closure of the coal mines, particularly those published in the
wake of the 1984/5 miners’ strike. All three articles moved beyond the economics of the situation to the effects on society and community, moving into a domain not acknowledged by Thatcherism or, indeed, by Thatcher herself. Under Thatcher, the free market, competitiveness and hence, profitability were the yardsticks by which all economic ventures would rise or fall. Victoria Wass and Lynn Mainwaring demonstrated one Welsh reaction to this when they argued quite strongly that the coal mines should not be closed on a purely economic basis but should take into account the potential for the re-employment of those made redundant and, in general, the cost to the individual, the society and the community of potential long-term structural unemployment.59 The Thatcher government appeared to give little consideration to
these factors in south Wales, resulting in the creation of more and deeper problems
that economically uncompetitive coal mines.
58 Kenneth D. George and Lynn Mainwaring (1987) “The Welsh Economy in the 1980s.” Contemporary Wales, Vol. 1, p.36. 59 Victoria Wass & Lynn Mainwaring (1989) “Economic and Social Consequences of Rationalization in the South Wales Coal Industry.” Contemporary Wales, Vol. 3, pp.161-185. 145
Some of the social cost was publicised by Marilyn Thomas,60 and Hywel
Francis and Gareth Rees61 in 1991 and 1989. The late dates of these two articles are
significant as it indicates the realisation of the passing of a way of life. This change
was significant given the centrality of mining to the stereotypical Welsh identity and,
furthermore, because the coal mines had effectively tied Wales into the economy of
Imperial Britain and the Empire. Both articles reinforced the attitude evident in Wass
and Mainwaring’s article, stressing the importance of community and arguing that the
damage inflicted on the people involved needed to be taken into consideration.
Neither argued against the assessment of the mines as uncompetitive, but emphasised
the loss of purpose, the uncertainty, the inability to see a future for themselves62 and
the pain involved in witnessing the end of a century-old community and way of life.63
The concept of an economic Wales in flux was also evident in articles that
addressed other areas of the Welsh economy. Rural Wales had been on the receiving
end of considerable in-migration, altering the population demographic and, therefore,
the economic characteristics of the area. Graham Day hastened to point out that this
experience was shared with the majority of rural Britain, albeit without the Welsh
pressures of language and culture and could not, given the 1960s rural population and
economic decline, be classified as an entirely negative thing.64 Nonetheless, his
concern echoed that of the above researchers, arguing that the emphasis on the free
market was releasing forces that were virtually uncontrollable.65 Research into the
effects on in-migration into rural Wales was needed to enable policy makers to
60 Marilyn Thomas (1991) “Colliery Closure and the Miner’s Experience of Redundancy.” Contemporary Wales, Vol. 4, pp.45-66. 61 Hywel Francis and Gareth Rees (1989) “No Surrender in the Valleys: The 1984-85 Miners’ Strike in South Wales.” Llafur, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp.41-71. 62 Ibid., pp.41-71. 63 Marilyn Thomas (1991) “Colliery Closure and the Miner’s Experience of Redundancy.” Contemporary Wales, Vol. 4, pp.45-66. 64 Graham Day (1989) “A Million on the Move? Population Change and Rural Wales.” Contemporary Wales, Vol. 3, p.155. 65 Ibid., pp.157-158. 146
respond effectively to the problems that would inevitably arise.66 Yet again, it would
appear that Day was rejecting Thatcherism’s avoidance of the subject of community
and, furthermore, of the hands-off approach of privatisation and the rolling-back of
state interference in socio-economic change.
All of these authors focused on two aspects of Thatcherism: the neglect of
society and community, and free market capitalism. Both aspects were found wanting
but, unlike the 1970s, it was the policies and not Britain that were seen as
problematic. This development is particularly noticeable as all authors focus on
Wales alone, rather than on the economic balance between Wales and England in
Britain. The experiences of 1979, of Thatcherism, of globalisation and the EC appear
to have combined to increase the self-confidence of the Welsh intelligentsia in their
approach to the issue of the economy. British policies, as embodied by Thatcherism,
could be rejected on a purely Welsh basis, the Welsh economy could be considered
without that of England or Britain coming into the equation, and the Welsh community could viably be considered as important as its economy. This confidence was different from the attitude of the 1970s and was also quite different from the actual content of the 1980s articles. There can be no doubt that the Welsh economy of the 1980s was far from healthy or flourishing in structure or appearance, in industry, tourism, services, or agriculture. But by the end of the 1980s, these problems appear as Welsh problems, governed from Westminster. A subtle difference, but a difference nonetheless. It is, however, critical to not overlook the intense awareness of the social cost of the economic ideologies of the 1980s. This awareness was dramatically changing one of the underpinnings of the Welsh-English relationship, particularly as seen in its British manifestation.
66 Ibid.. 147
The Welsh-English relationship was also being re-evaluated in the field of
political identity and independence, the second field to be examined. This field
attracted considerable attention in Planet between 1985 and 1989, primarily in
response to the dramatic shift in voting patterns evident in Wales in the 1979 and
1983 elections. In 1983, for the second election in a row, a Conservative swing
occurred in Wales, reflecting the startling realignment that had occurred within Welsh
politics in 1979. Welsh voters appeared to be rejecting the radical identity of Wales first expressed through affiliation with the Liberal Party and, since WW2, with the
Labour Party. The new Welsh voting pattern appeared similar to that of England, shifting for the first time into real three-party politics. Coming on the heels of the rejection of devolution – and the implicit rejection of Welsh nationalism and traditional identity – this shift towards the voting pattern of England suggested a dramatic upheaval within Welsh politics and political identity, almost a final confirmation of the disappearance of a distinctive Welsh political expression. This, in turn, impacted on the intelligentsia’s perception of Welsh identity and the political relationship between England and Wales.
Planet evidently considered this development to be of some importance, as it
fielded a succession of articles between 1985 and 1988 on Welsh politics. One theme was particularly evident in the majority of these articles: an attempt to understand the changes occurring in Welsh political expression. Naturally, these attempts were based on the foundations of what was perceived as normal – a different voting pattern from that of England, the belief that the Conservative Party was an English party, the lack of racist politics in Wales, and the association of Plaid Cymru with a Welsh- speaking, traditional Welsh identity. These assumptions held some foundation in historical fact but for this study, the reality of the change is less significant than the 148
perception of it. In the 1980s, the Welsh intelligentsia were faced with substantial
alterations in political behaviour and this, given the more general situation, was a
challenge that demanded examination.
Ultimately, the need to respond on an intellectual level to this challenge
altered the level at which the Welsh intelligentsia were concerned about the impact of
England in Britain on the political identity and development of Wales. In the 1970s,
the focus had been on the limitations imposed on Welsh political development by
Britain, and had evidenced a belief that the Welsh were slowly but steadily moving
towards some level of self-government. In the 1980s, this latter belief in particular
had been badly dinted by the rejection of devolution in 1979 and by the Welsh swing
towards the Conservatives in the following general elections. Correspondingly, the
Welsh people who participated in the political discussion of the 1980s were far more
interested in attempting to understand the reasons behind these changes and what
these changes meant for a Welsh political identity of any sort.
One dominant explanation forwarded – in several forms – by the Welsh
intelligentsia was that the swing in the Welsh voting pattern reflected societal changes
in Wales and across Britain. The conclusions reached by the different forms of this
explanation, however, implied quite different understandings of Welsh political
identity in the 1980s. Gareth Rees argued that Welsh political expression had altered
in response to the Thatcherite democratic deficit.67 Not only were the issues that had dominated the 1970s no longer relevant – devolution, Welsh administration – but
Thatcherism had pushed the people away from electoralism into direct action, as was demonstrated by the 1984/5 miners’ strike, on-going at the time of publication.68
Labour’s seeming inability to offer a viable alternative to the economics and politics
67 Gareth Rees (1985) “A New Politics?” Planet, Vol. 53, pp.13-17. 68 Ibid., p.13. 149 of Thatcherism meant, in turn, that the Welsh concern for social issues would manifest through these direct action groups rather than in a radical vote.69 From this perspective, the changes, while of concern for electoral democracy, did not imply the loss of Welsh political expression so much as the emergence of an alternative vision of Welsh society.70 Britain no longer offered the means by which the Welsh people could express their political concerns and opinions.
Others among the Welsh intellectuals, however, saw this reshaping of the
Welsh political image away from radical politics in accordance with the economic and political developments of the late 1970s and early 1980s as evidence that Wales was sliding deeper into political assimilation with England. Peter Madgwick argued that the popular move away from electoral politics to direct action protest groups was evident across Britain, and that Welsh participation in this process illustrated the continuation of the historical process of political assimilation into Britain.71 This did not necessarily imply the termination of any Welsh political expression but confirmed the position of Welsh cultural and political identity as a “sturdy dwarf”72 who must exist beneath the dominant British culture and would prove unable to grow beyond that position.73 In this view, the Welsh shift to the right was indicative of the ever- increasing British hegemony.
This form of political assimilation into Britain was of real concern to the
Welsh intelligentsia in the 1980s. The decline of a distinctive Welsh political tradition and the spread of the extreme right National Front Party into Wales indicated the growing similarities between the concerns of the Welsh and the English people,
69 Ibid., pp.13-17. 70 Ibid., pp.17. 71 Peter Madgwick (1986) “Radical Wales Lost to Moderation?” Planet, Vol. 59, pp.37-39. 72 Ibid., p.39. 73 Ibid., pp.37-39. 150
concerns such as migration and unemployment.74 These concerns were, increasingly,
expressed through the same means.75 Welsh concerns were no longer expressed in a
distinctively Welsh fashion.
By the mid-1980s, the presence of a supported if not dominant right wing
party in Wales was also receiving serious consideration. In 1985/6, Geraint Morgan
published an article entitled “How Welsh are the Welsh Conservatives?” Prior to the
1980s, such a question would, at the least, have seemed entirely irrelevant in a society
dominated by Labour and renowned for its rejection of the Anglicised branch of the
Conservative party. By the mid-1980s, after two Conservative election swings in
Wales, the situation could not have seemed so clear cut. Geraint Morgan’s analysis,
however, added another perspective to the debate over the state of Welsh politics. He
argued that even a Party as unsympathetic towards Wales and the Welsh situation as
the Conservatives had, on occasion, passed positive legislation, supporting both the
Welsh language and the existence of the Welsh Home Office. 76 Occasionally, the
Conservatives had more accurately reflected Welsh opinion than the Labour and
Liberal Parties and Plaid Cymru, as evidenced by Conservative opposition to devolution in 1979 in favour of a stronger Home Office.77
Perhaps the fairest judgement one can pass is that, while they have not been lacking
in achievement, they suffer from a basic lack of sympathy with Welsh aspirations
which all too often turns into arrogant disregard. Until they cure themselves of this
besetting sin their future in Wales will remain bleak.78
74 Grahame Davies (1987) “National Front Cymru.” Planet, Vol 65, pp.109-111. 75 Ibid., pp.109-111. 76 Geraint Morgan (1985/6) “How Welsh are the Welsh Conservatives?” Planet, Vol. 54, p.61 & p.64. 77 Ibid., p.63. 78 Ibid., p.64. 151
Yet, significantly, the question had been asked and the line drawn between
achievement and an understanding of who and what the Welsh were. This step
indicated a growing openness to the consideration of the validity of Welsh identities
outside the traditional, and a more conscious appreciation of what it really meant to be
practically as well as traditionally Welsh.
This questioning of the traditional positions of Welsh political parties also
extended to Plaid Cymru. Of all the political parties in Wales, Plaid Cymru had
received the most direct blow from the rejection of devolution and, apparently, of the
Wales and Welshness they had supported in 1979. In the early 1980s, Plaid Cymru, under the leadership of Dafydd Wigley and later under that of Dafydd Elis Thomas, attempted to come to terms with the apparent reality of Wales in the 1980s.79 Yet this
repositioning was not uncontroversial, as evidenced by the concerns of Ned Thomas.
He argued that Plaid Cymru’s attempt to represent the Welsh nation as it was rather
than as it should be had pushed the Welsh language onto a backburner, undermining
Plaid Cymru’s ability to defend the Welsh language and the integrity of the Welsh
language heartlands.80 In this approach to Welsh politics, Wales could only be truly
represented by a party that was more than sympathetic to Welsh aspirations or alive to
the realities of Welsh life and culture in the 1980s. A Welsh political party and, therefore, a Welsh political identity had to be traditionally Welsh, rejecting any form
of Anglicisation and, inherently, the then-current relationship between Wales and
England in Britain. Without this base, Ned Thomas argued that Plaid Cymru would
be inhibited from building a nation able to distinguish itself from England, Anglo-
Welsh culture not necessarily being well enough defined or strong enough to
79 Laura McAllister (2001) Plaid Cymru: The Emergence of a Political Party, pp.72-83. 80 Ned Thomas (1988) “Can Plaid Cymru Survive Until 1994?” Planet, Vol. 70, pp.3-10. 152
withstand pressure from English or Anglo-American cultures.81 Any form of cultural,
linguistic or political assimilation with England or Britain should not be courted in
exchange for votes.
It is evident that the Welsh intelligentsia in the 1980s did not subscribe to any one definition of Welsh politics or Welsh political identity. Despite this lack of
agreement, the depth of concern expressed by the Welsh intelligentsia over the form
and shape of political culture in the 1980s was evidence of the impact of the events of
the decade and of the rejection of devolution in 1979. The Welsh intelligentsia were
encouraged into questioning the structure and shape and, indeed, the continued
existence of a Welsh expression of political identity by the changes to the political
situation in Wales, in the position of traditional Welsh culture and language, and to
the structure and shape of Welsh society. This form of questioning inevitably
challenged the political givens in Wales in a manner that opened the political structure
of Wales and of Wales in Britain to debate.
The third theme of devolution was one of the ways in which this debate was
expressed. Devolution came under the intelligentsia’s examination in two ways in the
1980s: firstly, in an attempt to understand why devolution had been rejected and to
grasp what had been rejected in 1979, and secondly, in an effort to grasp the reasons
behind the re-emergence of a newly shaped devolution in the later 1980s. This, as
with the debate over the political identity and expression of Wales, was part of the
Welsh intelligentsia’s refiguring of the basic shape of Wales in light of the challenges
presented by the rejection of devolution in 1979 and the changes of the 1980s.
Indeed, in reference to the latter point, the journal articles make it very clear that, as
far as the Welsh intelligentsia were concerned, this process of questioning and of the
81 Ibid., pp.6-8. 153
re-emergence of devolution was occurring within the context and stimulus of
Thatcherism. There is another noticeable difference between this discussion and that
of the 1970s: the boundaries around the debate were clearer. In all the journal
articles, the authors stated frankly that devolution and not independence was at issue –
devolution was an alteration to the structure of government, not the prelude to the
dissolution of Britain. Few 1970s pro-devolutionists argued that devolution would
lead to the dissolution of Britain but, to the public, the line between devolution and
independence was not clear. By the 1980s, the intelligentsia’s approach to the topic
was far less likely to engender confusion.
Attempts to understand and evaluate the meaning behind the no vote
commenced almost as soon as the votes were counted. Inevitably, this evaluation
extended to Welsh nationalism and national identity and, in turn, became an effort to
see the future potential of the Welsh attempts to retain their distinctiveness in the face of a culturally, economically and politically dominant neighbour. Charlotte H. Aull took this approach in her analysis, arguing that Welsh nationalism, including support for Plaid Cymru, had originally developed in response to the encroachment of state bureaucracy on local government and the economy.82 Much of Welsh nationalism was based on the goal of getting increased economic control at local government level and this expression of nationalism should not have been seriously affected by the rejection of a very weak Welsh Assembly. What had been rejected was the potential legitimation of the political existence of Wales.83 In this context, the overall issue of
Welsh devolution remained alive: only one form of devolution had been rejected in
1979.
82 Charlotte H. Aull (1980) “Nationalism after the Referendum.” Planet, Vol. 49/50, pp.64-70. 83 Ibid., pp.64-70. 154
Here, Aull differentiated between expressions of nationalism in a way not evident in the 1970s, when the focus was primarily on political acknowledgment through devolution. It is impossible to tell without considerably more analysis exactly how much of this way of looking at nationalism was the effect of the 1979 referendum, and how much had always been present in company with the cultural and linguistic nationalism linked to Plaid Cymru. Plaid Cymru’s election manifestos indicated awareness even in the 1970s of the importance of devolution for the Welsh economy as well as identity and culture. It would appear, however, that the rejection of devolution triggered, in the 1980s, the emergence of ‘practical’ devolution as more important and desirable than cultural and linguistic separation. Thatcher’s economic impact clearly played a significant role in this development, as was illustrated by both the journal articles dealing with the economy of Wales and the increasing focus of
Plaid Cymru on the state of the Welsh economy.
This practical approach, as opposed to a passionate ethnically-based nationalism, also began, in the late 1980s, to dominate the Welsh intelligentsia’s understanding of the reasons behind the 1979 rejection of devolution. Such a development was not, of course, immediate, but by 1988/9, Hefin Williams was able to argue that the lead-up to the 1979 referendum had encouraged the rejection of devolution.84 Firstly, the political proposal for devolution had not emerged from a grass-roots demand for increased local control and did not carry the support of many
Welsh MPs or local government officers.85 Secondly, no one political party entirely supported the Labour proposal and, correspondingly, the ‘no’ campaign received better funding and organisation.86 Finally the arguments mustered against devolution
– the dissolution of Britain, the inability of Wales to be economically self-sufficient,
84 Hefin Williams (1988/9) “Talking About the Referendum.” Planet, Vol. 72, pp.71-80. 85 Ibid., pp.71-75. 86 Ibid., pp.75-79. 155
the threatened dominance of Welsh-language speakers – all touched points that were
sensitive, either historically or given current circumstances.87 Again, Hefin Williams
argued that 1970s version of the economic argument identified by Aull was the point
on which the ‘no’ campaign succeeded.88 It was the change in Welsh circumstances
that allowed the economic relationship between Wales and England in Britain to be so
drastically re-evaluated in the later 1980s.
One concern and argument was very obviously missing from both the above
arguments: cultural identity. It was neither offered as a reason for devolution nor
considered to be made questionable or threatened by the rejection of the Welsh
Assembly. Cultural identity was central to Plaid Cymru in the 1970s, but by the
1980s, Plaid Cymru too had shifted away from cultural identity as a foundation for
devolution – a pragmatic but realistic decision albeit one that, as seen in the
discussion of the previous theme, was not without controversy. There can be no
doubt, however, that the political and emotional confusion surrounding the issue of
cultural and linguistic identity in the 1979 referendum encouraged the intelligentsia’s orientation away from radical readjustments of the Welsh position in Britain, with devolution becoming more an economic adjustment to an existent relationship.
It appeared to take about eight years for the Welsh intelligentsia to begin the
rebound from the rejection of devolution but by the end of the 1980s, sincere interest in some form of devolution was clearly apparent. By 1987, John Osmond was arguing that devolution was creeping back onto the official agenda, banished until then due to its decisive nature.89 This step was, yet again, considered to be the result
of Thatcherism and Thatcher’s own preference for government centralisation. Local
government was finding its responsibilities and finances shrinking, bringing to
87 Ibid., pp.71-80. 88 Ibid., p.80. 89 John Osmond (1987) “Dreaded Devolution…Back on the Agenda.” Planet, Vol. 65, pp.116-117. 156
question their continued functionality. This situation – precisely the feared result of
devolution – pushed the local councillors towards devolution in an effort to prevent
the disappearance of their reasons for being and the potentially negative effect this
would have on the local communities. Similarly Welsh officials were becoming
increasingly concerned about the non-representative nature of the infamous Welsh
qangos.90
Yet not all of the Welsh intelligentsia considered these effects of Thatcherism
entirely negative, due to the constructive way in which the Welsh people reacted to
them. Some of the increase in Welsh confidence has already been noted in the field
of the economy. By 1988, it was also visible in the political sphere, albeit at the point where the two meet. The intelligentsia’s economic approach to devolution and the
growing realisation that the Welsh were not actually economically reliant on Britain,
particularly in terms of government hand-outs, had triggered a rejuvenation of interest in constitutional politics in Wales.91
One could be forgiven for assuming that a consequence of the 1979 Referendum
might have been an end to the expansion of new national institutions and the Welsh
Office. In fact the reverse has occurred…in an attempt to promote the industrial
regeneration of the country.92
While Thatcherism fostered political centralisation, encouraging a renewed interest in
devolution, Emyr W. Williams argued that Thatcherite economic decentralisation developed Welsh state machinery and Welsh self-confidence in their ability to guide
90 Ibid., pp.116-117. 91 Emyr W. Williams (1988) “The State Without the People.” Planet, Vol. 69, p.19. 92 Ibid., p.20. 157
and develop their own economy.93 Essentially, the Conservative Party had, through the combined effects of these two factors, propagated “…an ideology of Welsh
success” and had encouraged the popular realisation that “…an interventionist Welsh state can accomplish more for them than a dependence inherent in a centralist British
Labourism.”94 Thatcherism, then, played a major role in the return of devolution to
the Welsh political agenda in the late 1980s, ironic, given Thatcher’s aversion to that
form of government and her attachment to a semi-Imperial version of Britain. Her
politics and economics forced the Welsh intelligentsia and Welsh people to reconsider
the viability of the structure of Britain.
The fourth theme of cultural identity continued the 1980s trend of questioning
the basis, structure and continued viability of that identity. As already mentioned, the
rejection of devolution in 1979 was seen by many of the Welsh intelligentsia as a
rejection of traditional Welsh cultural identity. The 1980s, therefore, witnessed
considerable effort by the intelligentsia to grasp what Welsh cultural identity was and
the relationship of language to this identity. In the 1970s, the issue of language had
dominated the debate, primarily focusing on the status and meaning of the two
languages for Wales, and for the Welsh-English relationship. A certain level of
conflict was evident in the articles from the 1970s in the form of a fear about the
inferiority of Welsh-language society and culture, and the semi-denial of the validity
of English-language Welsh culture. In the 1980s, this situation changed noticeably.
One of the most evident developments was the growing acceptance among the
Welsh intelligentsia of the validity of the English-language Welsh culture and the real
Welshness of its literary expressions. In 1988, The New Welsh Review published a
trio of articles by Peter MacDonald Smith on English-language Welsh literature,
93 Ibid., p.22. 94 Ibid., p.23. 158
illustrating this process.95 Peter MacDonald Smith addressed the heart of the
contention over the nature of English-language Welsh culture, its antecedents. In the
1970s, the underlying assumption was that because English-language Welsh culture utilized the English language, its cultural base was also English. This, in turn,
alienated English-language Welsh culture from Welsh traditions, history and identity.
Peter MacDonald Smith argued, however, that this was not the case. Instead, he argued that the English-language Welsh periodicals in the post-war period contributed towards giving Welsh writers working in English “…a sense of cohesion…” and invested “…their work with the cachet of a tradition.”96 The Welshness of the
authors, at first predominantly poets, shaped the way they read and wrote.97 This
Welshness was further expressed through the sense of connection with and
responsibility to the Welsh language traditions as displayed by the continuing interest
towards this literature in the journals.98 “…the tradition…has been a bulwark in re- enfranchising the other four-fifths of Wales’ people through that most Welsh of all
media, poetry.”99
Peter MacDonald Smith took this argument one step further, and stated that
the English-language Welsh culture’s commitment to the Welsh language positioned
it squarely within the culturally nationalist arena.100 Undoubtedly the English- language Welsh tradition, as expressed through its journals, generally tended to place
95 Peter MacDonald Smith (1988) “The Making of the Anglo-Welsh Tradition (1).” New Welsh Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.61-64; (1988) “A Tale of Two Literatures: The Periodicals and the Anglo- Welsh Tradition (2).” New Welsh Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp.68-70; (1988) “Poetry, Politics and the Use of English: The Periodicals and the Anglo-Welsh Tradition (3).” New Welsh Review, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp.63-67. 96 Peter MacDonald Smith (1988) “The Making of the Anglo-Welsh Tradition (1).” New Welsh Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, p.61. 97 Ibid., p.62. 98 Peter MacDonald Smith (1988) “A Tale of Two Literatures: The Periodicals and the Anglo-Welsh Tradition (2).” New Welsh Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp.68-70. 99 Peter MacDonald Smith (1988) “The Making of the Anglo-Welsh Tradition (1).” New Welsh Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, p.64. 100 Peter MacDonald Smith (1988) “Poetry, Politics and the Use of English: The Periodicals and the Anglo-Welsh Tradition (3).” New Welsh Review, Vol. 1, No. 3, p.64. 159
poetry – in both languages – above politics, but their commitment to Welsh culture
was very real. This commitment may have seemed insignificant given its undoubted
effect of legitimising the expression of Welsh culture in English rather than in
Welsh101 but in Wales, such a commitment was actually highly significant. At this point, Peter MacDonald Smith advanced to include the English-language Welsh tradition in the essence of Welsh identity up until the 1980s – the Welsh literary tradition.102
The political avant-garde in Wales in the last half-century has been nationalist: in
their various ways, with varying degrees of commitment, determination, idealism,
ingenuity and (let it be said) guilt, the Anglo-Welsh magazines have reflected that
trend, and played an honourable part in it.103
This approach to the issues of language and literature was quite revealing. It
appeared that the 1979 rejection of devolution, when that devolution was argued on
cultural as well as political grounds, in an economically unpropititious situation had,
oddly enough, lifted some of the contention and heat from the issue of Welsh cultural
identity. The apparent rejection of Plaid Cymru’s version of Welshness had forced
the Welsh intelligentsia across all political affiliations to become more open to
acknowledging the value and reality of other expressions of a Welsh identity. In the
1980s, this surfaced in the journal articles as a re-examination of the boundaries of
cultural identity in Wales. In Peter MacDonald Smith’s articles, Welsh identity was
widened to include the Anglo-Welsh tradition.
101 Peter MacDonald Smith (1988) “The Making of the Anglo-Welsh Tradition (1).” New Welsh Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, p.64. 102 Peter MacDonald Smith (1988) “Poetry, Politics and the Use of English: The Periodicals and the Anglo-Welsh Tradition (3).” New Welsh Review, Vol. 1, No. 3, p.67. 103 Ibid., p.67. 160
This process involved the growing realisation of the ridiculousness of some of the vaunted definitions of Welsh identity, illustrative of the 1980s abandonment of old stereotypes, at least in part. It is also illustrative of the traditional centrality of the
Welsh language to Welsh identity. G.O. Jones identified two questions that he termed particularly nonsensical:
…are the Welsh people who do not speak Welsh ‘truly’ Welsh [and] are
Welsh writers who write in English and choose their own themes Anglo-
Welsh even if they do not write about Wales, or ‘truly’ Anglo-Welsh if they
do not write about the ‘colonial predicament’ of Wales?104
Either question, when approached from a practical sense was ridiculous. Why deny
Welshness to four-fifths of the population, or impose limits on literature not found anywhere else?
G.O. Jones’ argument also illustrated some of the problems inherent in nationalist debate over Welsh identity and also rendered logically problematic the exclusivity of such an identity. This logical deficiency was not a new discovery but was, by the 1980s, being recognised more widely – hence the gradual relocation of the boundaries of cultural identity among the Welsh intelligentsia and even among Plaid
Cymru. G.O. Jones quoted historians Dai Smith and Glyn Jones in support of his argument: “But what is a nation… [it] is…an ‘imagined community’. However, people do not necessarily imagine the same community,”105 and “To me, anyone can be a Welshman who chooses to be so and is prepared to take the consequences.”106
Welshness was, by these definitions, freed from a definitive definition of any sort,
104 G.O. Jones (1988) “Wales, Welsh…” New Welsh Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, p.60. 105 Dai Smith quoted in G.O. Jones (1988) “Wales, Welsh…” New Welsh Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, p.59. 106 Glyn Jones quoted in Ibid., p.59. 161
while remaining firmly within the boundaries of what was recognisably Welsh. The
artificial limitations imposed by traditional Welshness and also by the positioning of
Wales as opposite to every aspect of England, English culture and Britishness were
increasingly being challenged.
Yet this shift was far from absolute, and the value and importance of the
Welsh language to Wales and to any form of Welsh identity remained a central
concept throughout the decade. This was evidenced by the republication in 1980 of
an article originally given as a lecture in 1967. J.R. Jones argued that the Welsh people needed to alter their perspective on the Welsh language, moving beyond seeing it as a purely functional tool, to understanding it as a form of consciousness.107
If language could be considered this way, as a means of thought, of understanding, as a process of shaping attitudes – all emergent from an experienced history – a door would potentially open to allow non-Welsh speakers to connect with the language and with the full history of Wales.108 Such a connection would reduce the divide between
English and Welsh speakers, contributing towards the growth of a unified cultural
identity, an identity that could supersede the contentious linguistic divide while
remaining vitally connected to the Welsh language.109
The continued centrality of the Welsh language to the concerns of the Welsh
intelligentsia was further illustrated by the interest in the state of the Welsh language.
By the mid-1980s, the bulk of intelligentsia interest had shifted from the pure
statistical position of the Welsh language to the possibility of facilitating its growth as
a functional community and work-place language. In 1985, Colin H. Williams argued
that the increasing number of Welsh medium schools and institutions was widening
the language’s cultural applicability, but for it to extend throughout Welsh society, the
107 J.R Jones (1980) “Need the Language Divide Us?” Planet, Vol. 49/50, p.30. 108 Ibid., p.29. 109 Ibid., p.26. 162
language needed to be used in the economic and public world as well.110 By 1989,
Wynford Bellin was able to argue that this had occurred to a large enough extent to
provide learners with some utilitarian value, although there remained plenty of room
for further development.111 This shift in focus was, in part, a reflection of the success
in halting the real decline of the Welsh language, particularly among the younger
generations. It is highly likely that this increased vitality also contributed to the
decrease in heat in debates about Welsh culture and language: the increased security
of the language was reflected in the increased openness towards English-speaking
Welsh identities.
This process of cultural re-evaluation was not, however, limited to the Welsh
culture. Efforts were also being made by the Welsh intelligentsia to position the
Wales that emerged from this questioning in the context of England and Britain,
redefining their relationship with their neighbours in the process. John Osmond
neatly illustrated this process, arguing that England was, in reality, as divided
internally as Wales.112 Given the dominance of England in Britain and the role of
England in dictating, in many ways, the shape and boundaries of Welsh identity, even if only in opposition, this acknowledgement of similarity in situation was quite significant. England, it would appear, was no longer considered quite as superior in
internal structure and organisation and this was reflected in the visible increase in
national rather than nationalistic self-confidence among the Welsh intelligentsia.
In an interesting twist, this questioning of the pre-1980s understanding of
Wales and Welshness extended into the field of historiography, focusing on the way
in which written and televised history were produced. This fifth and final theme is
110 Colin H. Williams (1985) “Public Gain and Private Grief: The Ambiguous Nature of Contemporary Welsh.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.27-48. 111 Wynford Bellin (1989) “Ethnicity and Welsh Bilingual Education.” Contemporary Wales, Vol. 3, pp.95-96. 112 John Osmond (1987) “Trying to Understand England.” Planet, Vol. 64, pp.3-7. 163
extremely interesting, not only because it evidences an awareness among the Welsh
intelligentsia of the role of history in shaping culture and identity, but because both
the history books to be analysed in the following chapter and one of the authors of the
books featured quite noticeably in this debate. Indeed, the article, written by Gwyn A.
Williams, author of When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh,113 offered fascinating
insight into his approach to Welsh history.
Both the authors to be examined in the following chapter, Gwyn A. Williams
and Wynford Vaughan-Thomas, based their books on a television series released in
the early 1980s. This HTV series, broadcast on Channel Four, was jointly presented by both authors with the intention of demonstrating the variety of interpretations of
Welsh history available and was entitled – with poignant symbolism – The Dragon
Has Two Tongues. BBC Wales also produced and broadcast a history series, Wales!
Wales? by Dai Smith, released slightly earlier and consisting of six programs rather
than the thirteen of The Dragon Has Two Tongues. Televised Welsh history was,
from this outline, quite prominent in the 1980s, and it is very feasible that this
growing publicisation through a highly accessible medium facilitated the growing
awareness of a shared, non-exclusive version of Wales and Welshness that was
becoming increasingly apparent in the work of the Welsh intelligentsia. Yet this use
of television to communicate Welsh history was not without criticism.
Some of these concerns were identified by R. Gerallt Jones in 1985, in an
article that focused on the problems inherent in communicating history through
television.114 Both programs were – as is essential for television – constructed to
entertain as well as to inform and both BBC and HTV elected to do this by allowing
the historians to present their views on history, rather than offering a more balanced
113 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh. 114 R. Gerallt Jones (1985) “Mirror Images.” Planet, Vol. 51, pp.32-38. 164
perspective on events. Wales! Wales? by Dai Smith achieved this by focusing on
modern and, primarily, industrial Wales, while in The Dragon Has Two Tongues,
Vaughan-Thomas and Gwyn A. Williams presented a dialogue of opposing views of
the entirety of Welsh history. While R. Gerallt Jones did note the viability of both
approaches, he argued that the views presented offered the audience an imbalanced
version of history.115 In the case of the latter program, a significant proportion of this
imbalance lay in the two presenters themselves.
The difficulty was that a stylised historical argument was taking place between a
highly articulate professional historian who was enunciating, with some force, a
Marxist interpretation of Welsh history [Gwyn A. Williams], explaining it as a
gradually unfolding, largely predetermined tapestry of events, and a media-man with
amateur historical interests who seemed to be called upon to represent a vaguely
liberal, traditionalist viewpoint [Wynford Vaughan-Thomas].116
Television in and of itself can also be problematic for a thoroughly acceptable
transmission of history. R Gerallt Jones argued that television was, as a medium,
more concerned with impact than any notion of truth, “…historical or
contemporary…”117 Source depiction was also weak with television, in its
entertainment mode, focusing on telling the viewer what to think rather than
demanding active consideration from the viewer.118 Furthermore, many of the images used to accompany the spoken word were problematic in terms of association, being
115 Ibid., pp.32-38. 116 Ibid., p.35. 117 Ibid., p.35. 118 Ibid., pp.35-36. 165 only vaguely related to the topic at hand.119 In a decade of questioning, these television programs did not quite reach the standard.
Television was not the only aspect of Welsh historiography being analysed in this decade. Dai Smith argued against a history based on the Myth of Wales, and for comparative histories that focused on the real experiences of the people of Wales.120
His critique was quite stinging at points, condemning Jan Morris’ The Matter of
Wales121 as:
…full of meaning but empty of significance. Its result is solipsism in the guise of
sympathy. Confronted by the fissiparous social history of any one people, it seeks to
impose unity by magical incantation designed to uncover the essence of national
being.122
These versions of Welsh history emerged out of:
…too ready an acceptance of a general synthesis for Welsh history and, on the other,
a wilful dismissiveness of an actual history which certain concepts of national
identity cannot, by their nature, accommodate.123
Dai Smith argued that this myth was incompatible with reality, and until Welsh history reflected this reality in connection with broader concepts, such as sport or working class experience, Welsh history would be unable to move out of isolation or
119 Ibid., pp.36-37. 120 Dai Smith (1986) “Back to the Future.” Planet, Vol 56, pp.14-25. 121 Jan Morris (1984) The Matter of Wales. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 122 Dai Smith (1986) “Back to the Future.” Planet, Vol 56, pp.16-17. 123 Ibid., p.16. 166
to reconnect with either the Welsh people or the wider world.124 Gwyn A. Williams’
When Was Wales? was mentioned as a good and useful general history, but also as the
ground from which this new interpretation could be built.125 In the atmosphere of the
1980s, even Welsh history was expected to move with the times.
That this was only one perspective on the state of Welsh history was
illustrated by Gwyn A. Williams’ article “Are Welsh Historians Putting on the
Style?”126 This article not only debated Welsh historiography, but cast considerable light on the mental framework behind When Was Wales? His first concern was that the Welsh people were asking history to do something it could not do. “It cannot
bring you The Word and The Light. It cannot bring you The Truth. It can bring you
only the Question Mark.”127 History could not define identity, could not create
identity: it was history, not definition. Such misunderstanding of the ‘meaning’ of
history and the modern abandonment of old identity orthodoxies has combined to
produce confusion. “In place of light, we bring darkness and endless argument.”128
Correspondingly, when Gwyn A. Williams wrote When Was Wales?, he based
it on two broad ideas and two beliefs. The ideas: the history of the people of Wales
was one of “…discontinuity, rupture and crisis…” in which the only constant had
been the “…perversely persistent adherence to an idea of Wales,” and: that Wales,
like history itself, was always ‘now’, was always contemporary.129 His two beliefs: the necessity of a non-rational commitment to the notion of a historical Wales; and the
124 Ibid., pp.14-25. 125 Ibid., p.19. 126 G.A. Williams (1988) Are Welsh Historians Putting on the Style? Planet, Vol. 68, pp.23-31. 127 Ibid., p.28. 128 Ibid., p.28. 129 Ibid., p.29. 167 belief that no man could be totally free.130 If one identity was rejected, another was instantly chosen – total freedom was an illusion.
Such a set of ideas and beliefs offered another approach to Welsh history, one that challenged the concept of a traditional Wales and Welshness – very much in line with the general attitude of the Welsh intelligentsia throughout the 1980s. Dai Smith and Gwyn A. Williams argued that using history to search for and/or discover a definite if as yet unknown identity was pointless and a misuse of history. Identity as witnessed in history was not a singular, set concept, but an organic structure that changed and developed with circumstances and the reactions and actions of the Welsh people themselves. Dai Smith argued that the attempt to turn this into a definitive, long-term identity isolated Welsh history from real experience, from the changing nature of identity and, therefore, from the Welsh people.
A poem, published in the New Welsh Review in 1987, quite neatly expressed the argument that Gwyn A. Williams and Dai Smith, as historians, were trying to convey.
Museum Piece
It is like walking through an elegy.
The rhythms of the paths in shade and sunlight
String visitors along a facile stroll
Through bakehouse, farmhouse, schoolhouse, tannery,
Smith and gorse-mill, cruck-barn, kiln and chapel,
To eighteenth century gardens and the castle.
130 Ibid., p.30. 168
Everything’s authentic here, and as unreal
As china bridges in a home aquarium.
The buildings float within a reservoir
Of antiseptic memories, detached
From a community to serve. Nothing
Is fed here but the sweet tooth of nostalgia
By currents in a well-baked funeral cake
(Commemoration that pays loving tribute
And comforts that the past is safely dead),
And foreign appetites for passing through
A mummy neatly wrapped. Slate quarries in Ffestiniog,
Coal pits in the Valleys, and soon perhaps Port Talbot’s
Steel Works – will all Wales be saintfaganized
To pump our tourist dollars through Welsh veins
And keep a Welsh heart going in the ICU
Of a picturesque folk park? A nice place
To visit, but you wouldn’t care to live there.
After a day’s diversion on these paths
It helps to recall a cowshed’s healthy stench
On a working farm near Brecon, the racket
Of a noonday crowd in Carmarthen market,
169
And the babbling Welsh of a two-year old in Cardiff
To her uncomprehending grandfather’s welcoming ears.
It is too easy to write elegies in Wales.131
Joseph P. Clancy’s poem encapsulated the dangers of the heritage fetish existent in the 1980s – precisely the same danger of building firm historical boundaries around identity. He also addressed another danger inherent in this process, one also noted by R. Gerallt Jenkins in televised history: a focus on entertainment rather than reality, and a problematic use of images to convey historical concepts. This was, essentially, the creation of a history that had been sanitised to fit unalarmingly into a public display of identity. Yet again, history was being asked to do something it could not: to provide people with easy answers.
Even in the area of historiography, Wales, Welshness and the position of these two concepts in relation to England in Britain was being questioned and challenged.
Historians and intellectuals alike were arguing for the lack of a definitive, historically evident Welsh identity, and against the existence of easy ‘them and us’ answers that could define Wales against England, or even Wales by itself. Both Gwyn A.
Williams and Wynford Vaughan-Thomas, as historians writing in the middle of this debate and, indeed, contributing to the debate, were actively involved with the questioning and redefining of Wales and Welshness and the position of Wales in
Britain that occurred in the 1980s.
It is this theme of questioning that ties all five of the fields together in the
1980s. The political, economic and social circumstances of the decade combined with the specifically Welsh experience of the rejection of devolution in 1979 to create an atmosphere in which the Welsh intelligentsia were able to push the accepted
131 Joseph P. Clancy (1985) “Museum Piece.” New Welsh Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.65-66. 170
boundaries on the economic, political and cultural understandings of Wales and
Welshness, and on the Welsh position in Britain, particularly in relation to England.
Both the experience of Thatcherism and the intelligentsia’s response to the rejection of devolution also facilitated the growth of self-confidence among the intelligentsia – confidence in the Welsh ability to understand themselves, to differentiate themselves from England if not from Britain without resorting to nationalism, and to open themselves to a variety of expressions of political and cultural Welshness.
These changes created an atmosphere among the Welsh intelligentsia quite
unlike that of the 1970s. Given this – and particularly in light of the spread of
questioning into the field of historiography – the general history books published in
the decade are particularly important. These books formed one of the means by
which the general public could be made aware of the new trends evident among the
Welsh intelligentsia. Yet the question arises – did Gwyn A. Williams’ and Vaughan-
Thomas’132 histories reflect the changing atmosphere in Wales? If so, how did this
affect the influence of Welsh-English relationship in Britain on the histories? How did this relate to the broader debate over Britain and Britishness, particularly in light of the emergent Thatcherite consensus?
132 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh; Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History. 171
Chapter Four
Wynford Vaughan-Thomas and Gwyn A. Williams: Historiography
and the Search for Wales.
Wynford Vaughan-Thomas’ and Gwyn A. Williams’ books1 were both published in 1985, right at the heart of the 1980s. In simple terms of time, this centrality within the decade implies that both authors were well aware of many of the changes that were occurring in Wales as a result of Thatcherism. Indeed, both were active participants in the debate over the position of Wales, Welshness and the relationship between England and Wales in the light of the 1980s. This positioning and participation should imply that both authors would have been influenced by the changing perspectives on these areas but, however, a brief scan of Vaughan-Thomas’ book reveals that this is not the case. Gwyn A. Williams’ book, in contrast, was heavily influenced by the rejection of devolution, the events of the 1980s and the discussion among the intelligentsia, in which he played a major part. The way in which these two books present Wales is, then, quite revealing of two different ways in which the historical relationship between Wales and England in Britain can be cast, and the different ways in which the authors’ understanding of this relationship can affect the history they produce.
The different views offered by the two authors were particularly significant for the decade due to their televised publication in the HTV series, The Dragon Has Two
Tongues. This program would, almost inevitably, have reached a wider audience than a standard history book, publicising Vaughan-Thomas’ and Gwyn A. Williams’
1 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History. London: Michael Joseph Ltd; Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd. 172
understandings of Welsh history. It is, correspondingly, important to grasp what these
two men were saying about Wales, Welshness and the Welsh relationship with
England in Britain as these views were widely available, in a historical context, to the
general public in the 1980s.
As with Dodd and Gwynfor Evans, Vaughan-Thomas and Gwyn A. Williams
worked in very different fields and approached history from similarly differing
perspectives. Vaughan-Thomas worked primarily in media and was, essentially, an
amateur historian who identified his own historiographical approach as somewhat old- fashioned, preferring to focus on the people rather than on an ideology.2 This
historiographical approach combined with his belief in the need to write history with
compassion and understanding to produce a history of Wales that was, indeed, focussed on the people. It was also considerably more optimistic, definitive and upbeat about Wales and Welshness and the Welsh position in Britain than was standard for the 1980s. This approach and interpretation can be explained by his stated motivation for writing the book - to accompany the television series.3
Television, while able to reach a broad audience, only offered transitory information.
“The printed page can fix it [Welsh history] in memory and act as a springboard for a wider exploration of the subject.”4 Welsh people wanted this fixed information and
its guidance as part of a growing public desire to understand the past, present and
future of their culture, politics, society and identity. Vaughan-Thomas’ personal
belief in the importance of a historical and historiographical confidence in Wales and
Welshness was reflected in the presentation of a history of survival, offering this optimism as a guide to the Welsh people. This approach was, however, controversial among Welsh historians and the Welsh intelligentsia, with Martin John somewhat
2 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, p.15 3 Ibid., p.14. 4 Ibid., p.14. 173
scathingly referring to Vaughan-Thomas as “…a typically puffed up specimen of the
Welsh establishment.”5
Gwyn Alf Williams was, in contrast, anything but an establishment figure,
with the reputation of being “…the most passionate and controversial Welsh historian
of modern times…”6 He had earned this reputation through his commitment to Welsh
history in a period when that subject was considered of small importance7 and
through his readiness to challenge the established interpretations of historical events,
periods and people.8 In many of his publications, this challenge was based in his
affiliation with the left of politics and his rejection of what Geraint H. Jenkins termed
“…the bland Lib-Labism (or what he [Gwyn A. Williams] used to call ‘Welsh
Whiggery’) which characterized historical discourse and writing in Wales.”9 This
political inclination was apparent in When Was Wales? - particularly in the final
chapters dealing with the industrialisation of Wales.
By the 1980s, however, Gwyn A. Williams’ affiliation with socialist discourse
had been coloured by the 1979 devolution referendum and the Conservative
landslides that occurred in the two following elections. In 1983 after the second
sound Labour defeat at the polls, he joined Plaid Cymru,10 adding further depth to the
intellectual basis from which he approached Welsh history. Martin John, in the
Socialist Review’s obituary for Gwyn A. Williams, described the historian as Marxist,
socialist and nationalist,11 a combination that, in When Was Wales, appeared oddly
complimentary.
5 Martin John (1995) “Gwyn A. Williams.” Socialist Review, Issue 192, p.1. 6 Geraint H. Jenkins (1996) The People’s Historian: Professor Gwyn A. Williams. Aberystwyth: University of Wales Centre for Advanced Welsh and Celtic Studies, p.1. 7 Ibid., p.5. 8 Geraint H. Jenkins argued that this characteristic was illustrated by Gwyn A. Williams’ revision of Iolo Morganwg. Ibid., p.14. 9 Ibid., p.15. 10 Ibid., p.10. 11 Martin John (1995) “Gwyn A. Williams.” Socialist Review, Issue 192, p.1. 174
These personal affiliations and characteristics combined with his academic
training, experience and research interests to create a history of Wales that was
considerably more complex than that found in either book examined in the 1970s or in
that of Wynford Vaughan-Thomas. The book’s title – When was Wales? – was
indicative of the searching nature of the book. Gwyn A. Williams examined each
period of Welsh history to determine the presence or absence of the concepts of Wales
and Welshness, and to outline what defined these two concepts. His conclusion
revealed the reason for this search; the ‘no’ vote in the 1979 devolution referendum
appeared to reject the traditional definitions of these concepts of Wales and
Welshness. His concern over the potential undermining of Wales and Welshness
created a perceptible level of pain in his retelling of Welsh history indicating that, in
many ways, this search was personal as well as professional. Geraint H. Jenkins noted that this lack of detached objectivity from the history he was writing was, in fact, a standard element of Gwyn A. Williams’ work. When Was Wales? was also a
record of Gwyn A. Williams’ response to the events of the late 1970s and early 1980s
– particularly the rejection of devolution in 1979, the rising tide of Europhobia and
the enthusiastic response to Thatcherism.12
His contempt for his own people for shrugging off their Welshness and their
radicalism ‘like a shabby old moleskin jacket’ was boundless and…he began to move
beyond his academic role as a historian by becoming a passionate political
polemicist.13
12 Geraint H. Jenkins (1996) The People’s Historian: Professor Gwyn A. Williams. Aberystwyth: University of Wales Centre for Advanced Welsh and Celtic Studies, p .9. 13 Ibid., p.9. 175
The history recorded in When Was Wales? was a demand for its Welsh readers to pause in the British rush into Thatcherism and to consider what identity they wanted
themselves and their country to possess in both the present and the future, always in the light of their history.
Despite their differences, however, there was one major conceptual similarity
between Vaughan-Thomas’ and Gwyn A. Williams’ books. Both authors accorded
with the 1980s tendency to consider Wales as intact apart from England but neither
rejected the continuation of the relationship between Wales and Britain. In fact, both
authors assumed that Wales belonged in modern Britain, meaning the unions of
Scotland, England and Wales, given the historic, economic and political situation,
although neither rejected some form of governmental and/or economic devolution.
This basic acceptance of the existence of political, administrative and economic ties
was quite different from the approach taken to the Welsh-English relationship in the
1970s. The actual presence and form of the union relationship appeared far less
relevant than grasping what Wales and Welshness actually were as a nation and an
identity. Such a change was undoubtedly circumstantial, reflecting the trauma
experienced by the Welsh intelligentsia after the rejection of devolution in 1979, a
trauma exacerbated by the effects of Thatcherism on Welsh society and culture.
The basic perception of the function and nature of Britain and the Welsh-
English union also appeared to undergo a significant change in the 1980s histories. In
both histories, but most vividly in Gwyn A. Williams’ book, Britain was no longer primarily seen as England’s vehicle for economic or imperial domination but as an economic and political vehicle to facilitate the survival of its constituent parts in an
international politico-economic world. In many ways, the strengthening of Welsh
self-confidence visible in the writings of the Welsh intelligentsia in the 1980s was 176
apparent in Vaughan-Thomas’ and Gwyn A. Williams’ histories as a tendency to
focus on the issue of Wales and Welshness in a way that implied the need for the
Welsh, not the English or the British, to figure this out for themselves. There was a
distinct sense in which the 1980s, both historiographically and intellectually, were a
stepping stone between a Wales that was still largely defined by its relationship with
England in Britain, and a Wales that was moving to define itself.
These historiographical developments were, of course, not this blatantly
apparent in the two books but they were present and quite clearly so, particularly in
the periods which dealt most closely with the relationship between Wales and
England in, where appropriate, Britain. As with the books by Dodd and Gwynfor
Evans, the focus of my discussion will be on the different understandings of the
Welsh-English relationship and the corresponding images of Wales and Welshness
found within Vaughan-Thomas’ and Gwyn A. Williams’ approaches to five periods of
Welsh history in which the Welsh-English relationship was a major factor: the period
in which Wales was formed, the Welsh medieval and early modern Princes, the
process of union with England, the growth of Nonconformity and industry, and the
20th century. The continuity established by analysing the same periods as in Chapter
One is important, as it facilitates a clearer understanding of the historiographical
changes between the 1970s and the 1980s.
In both the 1980s histories, the first period to be analysed, the formation of
Wales, set the scene for the themes that ran through each book. For both Vaughan-
Thomas and Gwyn A. Williams, Wales emerged as a nation in its own right in the post-Roman period, the period in which Wales was differentiated from the rest of 177
Britain by the advancing Saxon occupation.14 In purely historiographical terms, the
basic accounts of the emergence of Wales as an identifiable country did not differ
hugely between the two books. They did, however, differ quite substantially in
approach to Wales, Welshness and the emergent relationship between Wales and
England. Vaughan-Thomas approached the period from a perspective that was
superficially story-like. His approach was, in reality, far more scientific in its
approach to history, firmly dismantling the myths that every country has about its
origins. His motive behind this dismantling, however, was not purely historical but, as with Gwynfor Evans’ history, aided in the construction of a Wales to which the general populace of the 1980s could connect.15 It is at this point in Vaughan-Thomas’
history that the charges against him of being establishment and a Whig historian take
on relevance. Where Gwynfor Evans was attempting to foster the growth of a
historically based national identity and nationalism, Wynford Vaughan-Thomas was
attempting to create a sense of continuity between the past and a present that was
marked by Welsh achievement.
This process was evident in the way in which Vaughan-Thomas approached
the pre-Celtic and Celtic people whose experiences and existence began the process of
the formation of a recognisably Welsh nation. Where Dodd focused on the tribal,
European and international aspects of those early people and Gwynfor Evans on their
culture and Welshness, Vaughan-Thomas focused first on the aspects of the pre-Celtic
era that remained visible. These included the discovery of the Red Lady, a ochre-
stained skeleton in 1824, the impact of the original agriculturalists on the face of the
Welsh land, and the many megaliths, barrows and standing stones scattered across the
14 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, p.68; Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? p.45. 15 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, pp.13-16. 178
Welsh landscape.16 He did not, like Gwynfor Evans, attempt to connect the people
then and now. Rather, he used the familiarity of the modern Welsh landscape to
begin to construct the progression of history from the pre-Celtic days to modern
Wales. These were a people who worked with the land and built societies and
communities in ways not dissimilar to modern man, participated in an international
culture and economy and who had built the foundations of the world in which that
modern man lived.17 This approach to pre-Celtic Wales was quite different, not only
from that of Dodd and Gwynfor Evans, but also from the seminal histories of J.E.
Lloyd and O.M. Edwards whose focus was more on the people themselves.18
Vaughan-Thomas’ more archaeological focus was heavily pictorial, creating verbal images, reinforced by photographs, of the world as it would have been, still European and non-national but vividly descriptive rather than analytical.
Vaughan-Thomas continued his construction of an approachable and
touchable Wales into the Celtic era, challenging two specific myths about Celtic
Welsh society: the Celtic ancestry of the Welsh and the modern, sanitised images of
the Druids. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Invasion thesis remained a valid
explanation of the arrival of the Celts in Britain, as evidenced by Dodd’s description
of a “…warlike people…able to overrun the country…”19 Gwynfor Evans’ approach
was similar, albeit more political being compared with the English/Norman conquest
and domination of Wales.20 Vaughan-Thomas argued, however, that by the 1980s
this Invasion thesis and the treatment of the Celts as a distinctive and solid group was
no longer valid, a fact that brought the Welsh-speaking Welsh people’s claims to a
16 Ibid., pp.20-28. 17 Ibid., pp.20-28. 18 J.E. Lloyd (1948) A History of Wales, Vol 1, pp.1-25: O.M. Edwards (1925) Wales, pp.2-13. O.M. Edwards, however, did attempt to use the geological structure of Wales to connect the Welsh past with its present. 19 A.H. Dodd ( 2003) A Short History of Wales, p.7. 20 Gwynfor Evans (1992) Land of My Fathers, pp.21-22. 179
Celtic identity and ancestry under question.21 He argued that the Celts, being
numerically inferior, could not have invaded Wales – or Britain – in a large wave,
physically eliminating the original people of Britain.22 Just like the English, the Celts
had the power and prestige necessary to culturally dominate the original inhabitants
through the spread of their language.23 This comparison with England is very significant if Vaughan-Thomas’ understanding of Wales and Welshness and the
Welsh-English relationship is to be grasped. The original formation of the traditional
Welsh culture – and Vaughan-Thomas explicitly positioned his argument against the
modern expression of a Celtic Welsh culture24 - was created in much the same way
that Anglo-Welsh culture was created. This comparison was remarkably similar to,
albeit without the nationalistic agenda, of that evident in Land of My Fathers.25
Vaughan-Thomas was, essentially, demythologising traditional Welsh culture and
validating the process by which Anglo-Welsh culture would emerge, a theme that
appeared throughout the book. Welsh-speaking culture, whilst being older, was not
superior to Anglo-Welsh culture in origin.
The section of his book addressing the druids continued his demythologisation
of the Celts. Not only did the Celts disseminate their culture in ways similar to the
English, they kept slaves26 and while the druids may have been educated and culturally sophisticated, they actively participated in religious human sacrifices.27
Vaughan-Thomas made it clear that the druids were a part of Celtic culture, alien as some aspects may have appeared to the modern Welsh.28 Yet the way in which he
21 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, p.29. 22 Ibid., p.29 & p.32. 23 Ibid., p.32. 24 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, p.29. 25 Gwynfor Evans (1992) Land of My Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History, pp.21-22. 26 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, p.32. 27 Ibid., p.37. 28 Ibid., pp.36-38. 180
portrayed this, both in writing and pictorially, rendered the Celt less an ideal and more
a real part of Welsh history, by allowing all the versions of Welsh identity access to
this part of their past. Druids, in Vaughan-Thomas’ history, no longer belonged to
Iolo Morganwg, the Eisteddfod or Welsh-speaking Wales. They were Celtic priests
and an active part of the culture that had dominated Wales at an early stage of its
history.29
One feature of Wales and Welshness that is already emerging quite strongly in
Vaughan-Thomas’ history is the permeability of both to external cultural, economic
and political influences. The culture that originally existed in the geographical area
that would eventually become Wales was European, and was heavily influenced
through contact with the Celts and, slightly later, the Romans. At all times, this early
culture was tribal rather than national, and European rather than Welsh or even
British.30
Roman contact formed the second stage of the formation of the Welsh nation,
introducing social structures, cultural influences and architectural designs that would
form a part of the Wales that would emerge in the Dark Ages [sic], after the Roman
withdrawal from Britain.31 Both the Celts and the Romans contributed to the
cultural shape of the Wales that would emerge in the post-Roman period, with the
Roman influence particularly strong in the south-east of the geographical area of
Wales.32 Here, Vaughan-Thomas’ argument was very much in line with that evident
in then current historiography, portraying the Welsh tribes as disparate groups who
resisted the Roman invasion but gradually conceded defeat. This argument was,
29 Ibid., pp.36-38. 30 Ibid., pp.38-42. 31 Ibid., pp.41-44. 32 Ibid., p.42. 181 according to Vaughan-Thomas, based on that of Professor Michael G. Jarrett, a specialist in the Roman period.33
Vaughan-Thomas’ depiction of this period post-withdrawal was one of heroism and sainthood, focusing on the warriors of the Arthur era fighting against the
Saxon invaders, and on the Age of Saints.34 It is at this point in his book that
Vaughan-Thomas’ preference for people-focused history comes to the fore, with the warriors and saints being discussed as people rather than as events or the product of ideological movements. Yet neither warrior nor saint was presented as a legend, with
Vaughan-Thomas carefully displaying both the historical basis and the later usage of the legends surrounding the hero.
Vaughan-Thomas’ approaches to Christianity and Arthur were illustrative of this point. Christianity simply replaced the Druidic religion. The Welsh possessed no natural affinity to Christianity, an argument that was also evident in Dodd’s approach to the topic.35 Vaughan-Thomas, however, did not elect to portray post-Roman
Christianity as either continuous or discontinuous, arguing that it was probably both, continuous in the towns and discontinuous in the more remote areas.36 “Christianity may have survived in some quarters in the south-east, but it may also have been
‘refreshed’ by influences entering Wales through the western sea-ways.”37
Christianity, like the Celts and the Romans, was one of the external influences that shaped Welsh culture. This argument was, in the 1980s, becoming increasingly
33 Ibid., pp.40-42: Wendy Davies (1982) Wales in the Early Middle Ages. Leicester: Leicester University Press; Michael G. Jarrett (1969) (ed) The Roman Frontier in Wales. Cardiff: University of Wales Press. This book was originally written by V.E. Nash-Williams and later revised by Jarrett; R.G. Livens (1974/5) “The Roman Army in Wales.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 7, pp.88-89; F.A. Patterson (1974/5) “Roman Wales and the Votadini.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 7, pp.213-222. 34 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, pp.50-64. 35 A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, pp.14-15. 36 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, pp.58-59. 37 Ibid., p.59. 182 accepted, with Wendy Davies presenting a similar situation in Wales in the Early
Middle Ages, albeit with greater detail and sophistication.38
The demythologising of Welsh heroes like Magnus Maximus (Macsen
Wledig) and Arthur, however, went a little further. Vaughan-Thomas presented both these men as based in some historical fact, but argued that their legendary heroic status as Welsh saviours reflected:
…the desperate need of the Welsh for a hero…Welshmen needed continual
reassurance that someone would appear in the future who would reverse the
tide of present defeat. Arthur was only the first in a long line of heroes –
from Owain Glyn Dwr and Henry VII on to David Lloyd George – who
would minister to this deep need in the Welsh psyche.39
The condescension in this statement revealed a rejection of certain aspects of traditional Welsh culture. All of the aforementioned leaders played significant roles in Welsh history and legend. Unlike Vaughan-Thomas, the other historians who demythologised these leaders acknowledged their continued significance for both
Welsh historiography and the Welsh historical tradition.40
Nevertheless, Vaughan-Thomas argued that Wales was born out of this period of military and religious passion41 and the Wales and Welshness that are visible in
Vaughan-Thomas’ work are heavily touched by this passion. Vaughan-Thomas may
38 Wendy Davies (1982) Wales in the Early Middle Ages, pp.169-171. 39 Ibid., p.54. 40 G.R. Elton (1985) “King Henry VII” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.131- 46; Michael G. Jarrett (1983) “Magnus Maximus and the End of Roman Britain.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, p.35; Emyr Wyn Jones (1979-80) “Wales and Bosworth Field – Selective Historiography?” National Library of Wales Journal, Vol. 21, pp.43-75; J. Beverley Smith (1966) “Crown and Community in the Principality of North Wales in the Reign of Henry Tudor.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.145-171; Gruffydd Aled Williams (1986) “The Bardic Road to Bosworth: A Welsh View of Henry Tudor.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.7- 32. 41 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, p.50. 183
have demythologised aspects of the Welsh past but his historical account, in focusing
on the people rather than on a theme within the period, reflected the passion and
commitment of the Welsh defence of their culture, land and religion against the Saxon
invaders in a way that linked all five factors into a Welsh identity that was at once
distinctly Welsh and permeable to external influences. It was a Welshness that was
positioned opposite the emergence of Saxon England. For Vaughan-Thomas, this
opposition was frequently based on what the Welsh perceived as the English
attitudinal problem. Vaughan-Thomas argued that, in the case of the Celtic Church, it
was the attitude of the Roman emissary, Augustine, which prevented cooperation – he
demanded Celtic submission to the superior Roman Church.42
Gwyn A. Williams’ treatment of this period in with the Welsh nation was
formed served a very different purpose from that of Vaughan-Thomas. Vaughan-
Thomas was attempting to create a history that was both factual and real. It was a
history that allowed the Welsh people to connect to their past and that displayed the
continuity between the past and the present. When Was Wales? in contrast, was thematically organised, searching for the answer to the question in the title. The impact of such a thematic and questioning approach was immediately evident in the structure of the book. Gwyn A. Williams entitled his first chapter dealing with pre-
Celtic and Celtic Wales “Prologue to History”, and argued that “Wales is impossible.
A country called Wales exists only because the Welsh invented it. The Welsh exist only because they invented themselves.”43 Pre-historic Wales was, then, not Wales
because the Welsh people had not had the chance to become Welsh and to define their
block of land as Wales. “There was no such place as ‘Wales.’ How could there
42 Ibid., p.64. 43 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? p.2. 184 be?”44 Roman Wales received slightly more attention, but Gwyn A. Williams also defined this tribal society as not Welsh. None of the other authors examined took this approach to Welsh history, but it dominated the Welsh intelligentsia’s discussion throughout the 1980s, albeit in a slightly different form. Gwyn A. Williams echoed the Welsh intelligentsia in questioning the boundaries of Wales and Welshness, a process that resulted in a historical interpretation that was considerably more flexible than that of Vaughan-Thomas yet still revealed the author’s basic groundwork for
Wales and Welshness.
The tribes in pre-Celtic Wales were European and, more importantly for Gwyn
A. Williams, British.45 Celtic Wales combined these two identities, with Gaul and
Britain functioning more or less as one in a complex, alien society shaped by the landscape, possessed of strange gods and religious practices and finding cultural expression through magnificent art, stonework and metal work. It was not until the
Romans arrived that these disparate but culturally affiliated tribes in the geographical area of Wales began to form a coherent and identifiable people, but this people were not Welsh. “Whatever these peoples were, going into Rome, they came out of it
Britons.”46
Gwyn A. Williams’ Wales and Welshness were, then, truly constructed concepts, the products of the experiences of the people mediated by the constant shape of the landscape. His factual portrayal of the Celts and the Druids was similar to that of Vaughan-Thomas. Both were up-to-date with the advances in Celtic historiography and equally disinclined to view the Druids from a Romantic perspective. Gwyn A. Williams, however, relegated this pre-Roman period to pre-
Welsh history. It was the history, not of Wales, but of what happened in the
44 Ibid., p.2. 45 For this paragraph, see Ibid., pp.7-11. 46 Ibid., p.11. 185
geographical area that would become Wales. It was this shift in designation that, for
Gwyn A. Williams, gave the Roman presence in Wales its significance. The tribal
experience of the Roman occupation introduced physical structure to the landscape in
the form of roads, major towns and industries: indeed the kingdoms that were to
emerge in Wales were headed by those descended from Romano-British notables and
the chroniclers of these kingdoms constructed histories and pedigrees that tied both
kingdom and ruler to the Roman period.47 These kingdoms, based on a semi-tribal,
part-Celtic, part-Roman culture were correspondingly fragile, forming and dissolving
until, in the Middle Ages, the traditional four kingdoms emerged, “…persisting but changing their form as often as Gwydion himself.”48
Here, Gwyn A. Williams’ history diverged in emphasis from those of J.E.
Lloyd, O.M. Edwards, Dodd, Gwynfor Evans and Vaughan-Thomas and from those
of the medieval specialists, Wendy Davies and R.R. Davies.49 According to Gwyn A.
Williams, the significance of this period was not so much what actually happened, but
what chronicle and legend claimed had happened.50 He used the example of Magnus
Maximus, a Hispanic Roman soldier serving in Britain who attempted to become the
Roman Emperor. Welsh legend portrays Magnus Maximus as Macsen Wledig, the
man who handed power back to the Welsh-Britonnic nobles, brought a Welsh warrior-hero, Cunedda, to Gwynedd, and essentially became the name to which all
Welsh dynasties attempted to tie themselves. These legends emerged in the 9th
century and provided the basis for the construction of an identity and an identifiable country.
47 Ibid., p.15 & p.28. 48 Ibid., p.32. 49 Wendy Davies (1982) Wales in the Early Middle Ages; R.R. Davies (1991) The Age of Conquest. Oxford: Oxford University Press. R.R. Davies’ book was first published in 1987 as Conquest, Coexistence and Change: Wales 1063-1415. 50 For Gwyn A. Williams’ summary of Magnus Maximus, see Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? pp.19-20. 186
…[Wales] emerged then out of the ruins of an independent British state which
Roman-Britons created and of whose creation Macsen Wledig had been a herald.
The Welsh, like most of the peoples and nations of Western Europe, struggled
painfully to birth as bastard children of the late Roman Empire.51
Wales was created, not only through experience but through the memory and the
legends associated with that experience. Fact was fact, but the meaning people gave to that history was equally important. This concept was not entirely alien to Welsh historiography, however. Professor Michael G. Jarrett, in an article also about
Magnus Maximus, noted that his presence in the Welsh genealogies and the
Mabinogion was part of the history of the period in time in which those items were created.52
For Gwyn A. Williams, the facts of history were less relevant than the
experience of that history, an approach that reflected his refusal to aspire to
“…detached objectivity…”53 and his belief that myth played a significant role in explaining this experience.54 This focus on the experience of history was clearly illustrated by his approach to the Saxon presence in what would become England and to the Celtic Church. The Welsh kingdoms were defined in part by their opposition to
Saxon conquest, and the Celtic Church was shaped by its refusal to proselytise among the invaders and by its stubborn refusal to bow to the Roman Church.55 This
argument was reiterated by Glanmor Williams in 1991 when he argued that
Christianity became one of the features of identity that differentiated the Celts from
51 Ibid., p.20-21. 52 Michael G. Jarrett (1983) “Magnus Maximus and the End of Roman Britain,” p.35. 53 Geraint H. Jenkins (1996) The People’s Historian: Professor Gwyn A. Williams, p.15. 54 Ibid., p.9. 55 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? p.44. 187
the Saxons.56 Indeed, this Church was central to the Wales that emerged in the 9th
century – but for Gwyn A. Williams, it was a Church and a nation that were born
almost incomplete, forced out of the Briton to which they belonged by the Saxon
invaders.57
In a valley right under Snowdon, near Beddgelert, a dramatic, rocky outcrop
dominates all passage through. Here, in these dark ages, rose a typical hilltop fort-
settlement, the nucleus of some little king of the bro…It called itself Dinas Emrys
(the fortress of Emrys). To later generations, what Emrys could this be but that other
Emrys, Emrys Wledig, Emrys the Emperor, Ambrosius Aurelianus? Here it had
been, then, that magic lake in which the Red Dragon of the Britons and the White
Dragon of the Saxons had fought for dominion over the island of Britain.
The Welsh, as a people, were born disinherited.58
This offered a very clear understanding of the nature of the emergent Welsh
nation’s relationship with Saxon England. This relationship was defined by antagonism because the Saxon invaders had effectively stolen a large portion of
Britain, and the remaining section regarded these Saxons as invaders, as aliens, as not part of the Cymry, the kindred. It is worth noting, however, that the corollary to this is that Wales was a part of Britain, a Britain that was more than a legal construction.
The Welsh experience began in Britain and continued to involve the other nations that emerged within the wider island. Such an approach to the position of Wales in Britain was distinctly reminiscent of the attitude prevalent among the Welsh intellectuals of the 1980s.
56 Glanmor Williams (1991) The Welsh and their Religion: Historical Essays. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, p.3. 57 Ibid., pp.42-45. 58 Ibid., p.45. 188
In the second period under consideration, the age of the late medieval and early modern Princes of Wales, Vaughan-Thomas’ and Gwyn A, Williams’ approaches to these Princes and, therefore, their portrayal of Wales, Welshness and
the relationship between England and Wales were both substantially different from
those evident in Dodd’s and Gwynfor Evans’ histories. Where Dodd presented
Princes who were gradually forced by circumstances into a closer relationship with
England, and Gwynfor Evans presented Welsh heroes fighting against the imperialism
of the English, both of the 1980s authors focused on the way the Welsh Princes
attempted to create a balance between Wales and England that would have provided
the space for the development of Wales as a nation and a state. Welsh independence
was far less of an issue in the 1980s than the creation of a balance that would protect
and preserve Welsh culture and political traditions while acknowledging the reality of
English political and military dominance. This newer focus reflected the 1980s
search for the boundaries of Wales and Welshness and the Welsh intelligentsia’s
efforts to rediscover where Wales began and England stopped.59 Vaughan-Thomas
and Gwyn A. Williams, however, expressed this need to balance pragmatism and
patriotism in very different ways.
Vaughan-Thomas’ depiction of Hywel Dda, Llywelyn ab Iorwerth, Llywelyn
ap Gruffudd and Owain Glyn Dwr continued his effort to make Welsh history
approachable, touchable and connected to the present. All four of the Welsh Princes
were presented as talented political leaders who played major roles in the formation of
Wales as a nation and in the creation of a Welsh political identity. It is immediately
noticeable, however, that the significance allocated by Vaughan-Thomas to this
construction was different from that apparent in the 1970s. The mark of success for
59 See Chapter Three. A Search for Wales and Welshness: the 1980s. 189
these Princes was not the retention of Welsh independence, but the ability to retain a
balance in political life that kept the English out of Wales. This interpretation was
not, however, novel. Welsh historians researching this period had begun to approach
the Welsh Princes from a similar perspective.60
For Vaughan-Thomas, Wales began the process towards becoming a unified
kingdom in the time of Hywel Dda who, essentially, completed the transition between
the Celtic Britain of the Saxon era and the emergence of an entity recognisable as
Wales.61 Hywel Dda, as one of the first Welsh kings to possess many of the
traditional markers of Kingship – a unified country with the exceptions of the south-
east kingdoms of Morganwg and Gwent, his own coinage and a codified law – was
also the first to establish the form of relationship between Wales and England that
would endure for centuries. Vaughan-Thomas was, here, essentially arguing that
from the moment Wales emerged as an identifiable nation, it was tied into a
relationship with England necessitated by English supremacy in Britain. Henry Loyn,
of Westfield College, London, agreed that Hywel Dda did indeed manage to create a
successful political balance within the Welsh relationship with England. This
relationship developed to the point where it was feasible that the English King,
Athelstan, possibly supervised Hywel Dda’s Wales whilst the Welsh King went on a
pilgrimage to Rome.62 Both Loyn63 and Vaughan-Thomas64 explicitly disavowed
any charges of Anglophilia on the behalf of Hywel Dda but, in the 1980s, there
appeared to have been a return to one aspect of J.E. Lloyd’s approach to the Welsh
60 Henry Loyn (1980-1) “Wales and England in the Tenth Century: The Context of the Athelstan Charters.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 10, pp.283-301. 61 For Vaughan-Thomas’ depiction of Hywel Dda, see Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, pp.74-76. 62 Henry Loyn (1980-1) “Wales and England in the Tenth Century: The Context of Athelstan Charters.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 10, p.299. 63 Ibid., pp.300-301. 64 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, p.75. 190
King. It was the English example that triggered Hywel Dda’s codification of the
Welsh laws.65
Historically speaking, Vaughan-Thomas’ depiction of the next three Princes, the two Llywelyns and Owain Glyn Dwr, was not substantially different from that of
Dodd. Both positioned the modernisation of Welsh government and administration in the context of similar moves in France and England and noted the controversial nature of the changes to Welsh political traditions.66 At this point, Vaughan-Thomas’
depiction of the two Llywelyns took a slightly different route from that of Dodd,
reflecting the substitution of concern over political independence with the effort to
define the nature of the balance between Wales and England. Vaughan-Thomas
portrayed Llywelyn ab Iorwerth as playing a major role in defining this relationship
between Wales and England.67 His skill in politics was primarily used to achieve this
protective balance, hence his alliances with the Marcher Barons of Wales and his
marriage to King John I’s illegitimate daughter.68 This interpretation bore distinct
similarity to those of O.M. Edwards and J.E. Lloyd, both of whom argued that
Llywelyn ab Iorworth employed considerable statesmanship as well as military
prowess in order to preserve Welsh independence.69 The focus between the
interpretations was, however, slightly different. The early twentieth century
historians focused on the success of maintaining Welsh independence where
Vaughan-Thomas concentrated on the ability to balance the unavoidable relationship
between Wales and England. These two approaches began to merge towards the end
65 Ibid., p.75; Henry Loyn (1980-1) “Wales and England in the Tenth Century: The Context of Athelstan Charters,” Welsh History Review, Vol. 10, p.300. 66 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, p.103. 67 Ibid., pp.105-107. 68 Ibid., p.106. 69 O.M. Edwards (1925) Wales, pp143-151; J.E. Lloyd (1948) A History of Wales, Vol 2, p.623. 191
of the decade, with Glanmor Williams presenting a Prince who attempted to do both
in a struggle that was essentially about power and overlordship in feudal clothes.70
It was, for Vaughan-Thomas in the 1980s, this ability to balance the needs of
Wales against the requirements of having England as a neighbour that defined the
success or failure of the Welsh Princes. Hywel Dda and Llywelyn ab Iorwerth were
depicted as consummate politicians, managing for most of their careers to hold Wales
in a position that kept England placated while ensuring the survival of Wales as a
political and cultural entity. Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, however, was portrayed as too
inflexible to continue his grandfather’s work in defining the nature of the homage to
be paid to the English King.71 Vaughan-Thomas noted that the nature of Edward I’s
demand for homage probably played a role in this failure, but the contrast between the
two remained significant. Llywelyn ab Iorwerth was able to compromise while
remaining patriotic; he was pragmatic and creative. His grandson lacked his abilities
in these areas, despite being as talented militarily. The significant difference between
the two was the ability – or lack of – to negotiate a balance in the relationship
between England and Wales. Again, Vaughan-Thomas’ dismissal of the second
Llywelyn bore much similarity to that of J.E. Lloyd. By the 1980s, however, a new
interpretation had begun to gain ground.72 Vaughan-Thomas’ interpretation was
almost directly contradicted by this alternate vision, in which Llywelyn ap Gruffudd
was presented as a skilled statesman who worked to strengthen Wales politically – as
a nation and as the neighbour of a strong England.73 Dr David Stephenson had
argued in an article published about eighteen months earlier that even Llywelyn ap
70 R.R. Davies (1991) The Age of Conquest, p.294. 71 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, p.110. 72 Llinos Beverley Smith (1984/5) “Llywelyn ap Gruffudd and the Welsh Historical Consciousness.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 12, p.23. Beverley Smith argued that this interpretation was first broached by J.G. Edwards in 1940 in J.G. Edwards (ed) Littere Wallie. Cardiff, especially pp.xxxvi-xlvi. 73 Ibid., p.23. 192
Gruffudd’s final military defeat had been misinterpreted by later historians. He
argued that the Treaty of Montgomery that had ended the previous conflict was more a truce than a declaration of peace.74 Llywelyn ap Gruffudd’s final uprising was final
only in hindsight. It was, at the time, simply a continuation of the old struggle
between Wales and England75 rather than the failure more common in the
historiography of the 1970s and 1980s. By the early 1990s, this rehabilitation was combining with the earlier critiques. For R.R. Davies, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd was a consummate politician who was perhaps slightly too forceful and single-minded in the pursuit of his goals but who was also caught in a position where a collision with
England over the nature of the Welsh-English relationship would be very difficult to avoid.76
Owain Glyn Dwr epitomised, for Vaughan-Thomas, this all important ability
to balance patriotism and pragmatism. By the start of the 15th century, this balance
had become the norm for the Welsh gentry and aristocracy.77 This section of the
Welsh population had benefited hugely from participation in the English
administration of the Principality after its conquest by Edward I, but many still
retained memories of independence.78 As such, Glyn Dwr was depicted as a
miniature of the upper levels of Welsh society: educated in England, a landowner,
closely connected with the rising gentry class but also possessed of royal blood, and
sure of Welsh equality with the English.79
Vaughan-Thomas accepted the standard historiographical argument
concerning the outbreak of the popular rebellion under Glyn Dwr – the Black Death,
74 David Stephenson (1983) “Llywelyn ap Gruffudd and the Struggle for the Principality of Wales, 1258-1282.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, p.43. 75 Ibid., p.47. 76 R.R. Davies (1991) The Age of Conquest, pp.317-330. 77 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, p.119. 78 Ibid., p.122. 79 Ibid., pp.123-124. 193
poor harvests, etc - but argued that the rebellion itself was primarily a Welsh
demonstration of their refusal to allow pragmatism to damage Wales and Welshness.
For Vaughan-Thomas, English actions in Wales triggered the rebellion.80 The word
change in defining the motivation behind the rebellion might seem minor, but it
implied an alteration in the understanding of Wales and Welshness in the 1980s. For
Dodd, the motivating factors behind the rebellion were self-interest and assimilation,
tempered by national feeling, while Gwynfor Evans saw nationalism, heroism and
betrayal. These characteristics implied the presence and loss of a political identity
that was independent. Vaughan-Thomas, in contrast, allowed the reader to understand
the developments behind not the growth of nationalism evident through the 1960s and
early 1970s, but the rejection of devolution in 1979. Glyn Dwr’s rebellion was
primarily about negotiating the details of the Welsh-English relationship in Britain.
This depiction was also flashy and fiery: an excellent story, but showing little
reflection of the historical analysis that had occurred over the previous twenty years
and certainly foreshadowed none of the advances made in the 1990s.81 The Owain
Glyn Dwr that emerged from the pre-1985 analyses was less of a national hero
attempting to right every wrong in Wales and more a member of the landed gentry
resentful of English imposition on his rights and aware that the general Welsh
resentment of similar impositions would ensure him support in an uprising.82
Vaughan-Thomas instead preferred to retain some of the romance, arguing that the
real significance of Glyn Dwr’s uprising was his success in rekindling “…the flame of
80 Ibid., pp.122-123. 81 For Vaughan-Thomas’ full description of Glyn Dwr’s uprising, see Ibid., pp.122-129; R.R. Davies (1991) The Age of Conquest, pp.317-330; R.R. Davies (1995) The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dwr. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Elissa R. Henken (1996) National Redeemer: Owain Glyn Dwr in Welsh Tradition. Cardiff: Cardiff University Press; Glanmor Williams (1993) Owain Glyndwr (first published 1966). 82 R. Ian Jack (1964/5) “Owain Glyn Dwr and the Lordship of Ruthin.” The Welsh History Review, Vol. 2, pp.303-322. 194
their [Welsh] nationality.”83 He restored some balance to the relationship between
Wales and England.
This attitude was very definitely present in the journal articles of the 1980s,
particularly in those dealing with the social effects of Thatcher’s economic policies
and the concerns over the increasing political centralisation. The necessity of Britain
was accepted, but damage to Wales was not – a mix of pragmatism and patriotism. It
appears that it was also this need to balance the Welsh-English relationship that,
towards the middle of the decade, reintroduced the issue of devolution to the political
agenda. Independence was not the issue, balance was, and this 1980s approach to the
relationship between Wales and England in Britain was very evident in Vaughan-
Thomas’ historiography. The self-confidence about the validity of Wales and
Welshness apparent in the 1980s was also apparent in Vaughan-Thomas’ work. His
perception of the need for balance between England and Wales was, however, defined
by the purpose behind this balance – the protection of Welsh culture and traditions
within Britain.
Gwyn A. Williams’ approach to these Welsh Princes was totally different
from those in any of the books considered thus far but, in an interesting twist, part of
his underlying motivation was not. Unlike the previous three authors, Gwyn A.
Williams focused more on the conceptual creation of Wales – the creation of what
people thought Wales was – and on continuing with his examination of the myths
behind the history. For Gwyn A. Williams, the process of nation creating really
coalesced under Hywel Dda, with the emergence of myths about the foundation of the
Welsh nation.84 These myths did not reflect the practical political reality of the dominance of England in the English-Welsh relationship but instead centred on the
83 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, p.131. 84 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? pp.56-57. 195
loss of Britain to the Saxons and resulted in the creation of a Wales based on the
concept of disinheritance from their rightful geographical world.85 In reality, Gwyn
A. Williams argued that “Wales, as a political entity, comes into existence as a junior
partner in a Britain run by England.”86 Wales was never fully independent and was,
from the beginning, unable to reconcile the imaginative and pragmatic aspects of identity. Gwyn A. Williams further argued that the Welsh failure to establish political independence had, in the light of the foundation myths in which the Welsh were forced to retreat into the geographical location of Wales by those who would become the English, resulted in “…a self-questioning suspicion that the Welsh people, as opposed to individuals among them, inherently lack political capacity.”87 Myths of
what might or should have been ignored the political and military reality, creating a
part of the modern Welsh inferiority complex. Gwyn A. Williams was arguing that
Wales and Welshness had been innately problematic since their conception. This
focus on the role of myth in the creation of Welsh identity became increasingly
popular in the 1980s and 1990s. Emyr Humphries, among others, argued that Welsh
poetry had transmitted a certain idea of Wales and Welshness from the time of the
Celts well into the modern era.88
For Gwyn A. Williams, Llywelyn ab Iorwerth and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd
epitomised the logical conclusion of this clash between myth and political reality. He
did not offer them as heroes to be emulated and admired but rather presented them as
ambitious, ruthless, politically and militarily astute men who attempted to unify and
modernise Wales against the wishes of many of the Welsh Princes and Lords,
85 Ibid., pp.56-58. 86 Ibid., p.58, italics in original. 87 Ibid., p.60. 88 Emyr Humphreys (1989) The Taliesin Tradition. Bridgend: Seren Books. 196
particularly those from outside Gwynedd.89 According to Gwyn A. Williams, the
defeat of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd did not equate to the failure of Wales to emerge as a
nation in its own right.90 Instead, he argued that the collapse of the “Wales of the
Princes”,91 based on the foundation myths, had to occur before Wales could become a
nation in its own right, a nation that chose Owain Glyn Dwr to be its Prince, this latter
interpretation being quite different from that current in the 1980s.92
Gwyn A. Williams departed even further from Vaughan-Thomas’ – and Dodd
and Gwynfor Evans’ – interpretations of these heroes with his interpretation of Owain
Glyn Dwr. Glyn Dwr, according to Gwyn A. Williams, did not attempt to recreate a
Welsh nation along the lines of the two Llywelyns, but attempted to create a modern
“nationes” merely cloaked in the “…mythical history and redemptive policy of the
Welsh.”93 The rebellion occurred because the Welsh gentry had been denied full
equality before the law and equality of participation in the society and government of
Wales as a Principality of England.94
Owain Glyn Dwr, unlike the two Llywelyns, was portrayed as a hero, which
offered some interesting insights into Gwyn A. Williams’ understanding of Wales.
Unlike the tendency of the 1970s authors to base heroism on the fight to create an
independent and unified Wales, Gwyn A. Williams was arguing that true heroism was
to fight for full and popular Welsh participation and equality in Britain. His emphasis
on the popular nature of the rebellion indicates why Gwyn A. Williams considered
this rebellion so significant. Glyn Dwr was the only Welsh Prince to ever attract
popular support and was also the only Welsh Prince who was never betrayed by his
89 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh, pp.78-85. 90 Ibid., pp.85-86. 91 Ibid., p.85. 92 Ibid., pp.85-88. 93 Ibid., p.88. 94 Ibid.. 197
people.95 To a true socialist, such a popular rebellion would be of much more
importance for the formation of a nation (composed of the masses) than any similar
effort led by a member of royalty. In its way, this definition of Welshness was as
radical as Gwynfor Evans’ nationalist definition; both demanded that the people of
Wales fight for their country and identity, and both displayed specific ideas of the
approved ideology behind their demands. Glyn Dwr’s failure to achieve equality with
Britain was also a popular failure and it confirmed the emergent political inferiority
complex, helping to create the divided Welsh identity: “For the Welsh mind is still
haunted by its lightning-flash vision of a people that was free.”96 Freedom, in this context, appeared to be equity within Britain as chosen by the Welsh people, and the opportunity to be oneself without being born into an identity crisis.
Gwyn A. Williams’ rejection of the two Llywelyns in favour of Glyn Dwr was
not entirely a historically based decision. He was frequently recorded as arguing
“…that too much of Welsh history had been written with the Welsh left out.”97
Geraint H. Jenkins argued that by this he meant the non-Welsh-speaking working
class98 but it could equally be argued that, in the Age of the Princes, it meant interest
in the popular rebellion rather than in the top-down changes imposed by Welsh
royalty. It only after the Princes had left the stage that the Welsh people – the focus
of any good socialist or Marxist – got the opportunity to shape their nation. A similar
concern was evident among the Welsh intelligentsia of the 1980s with their rejection
of the top-down imposition of Thatcherism onto the values of community chosen by
the Welsh people. Some of this attitude was also evident among the wider
historiography of this period although none put the case in quite this way. Henry
95 Ibid., p.88 & p.109. 96 Ibid., p.113. 97 Geraint H. Jenkins (1996) The People’s Historian: Professor Gwyn A. Williams, p.7. 98 Ibid.. 198
Loyn, David Stephenson and Llinos Beverley Smith began revision of and demanded
more research into Hywel Dda and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, although none brought
quite the same socialist perspective to their research and analysis of either Welsh
leader.99
Vaughan-Thomas’ and Gwyn A. Williams’ understanding of the nature of the
relationship between Wales and England was made very clear in the third period in
which the process of union between the two countries was presented very much as a
natural progression of events. This approach clearly built on the attitudes evident in
both authors’ interpretations of the Welsh Princes and was particularly significant
within Gwyn A. Williams’ history. He argued that it was this period that provided the
foundations for the modern Welsh identity and, indeed, for the modern British
identity.100 Vaughan-Thomas’ interpretation was less explicitly definitive in terms of
identity but his belief in the inevitableness of close Welsh ties to England given the
circumstances was plain.
Indeed, it was this belief that dominated Vaughan-Thomas’ section on the
process of union between England and Wales. All of the major events that occurred
within this process were placed firmly into context, historiographically negating any
accusations of cultural betrayal on the behalf of those who adapted to the realities of
English rule. Vaughan-Thomas began this process with Llywelyn ap Gruffudd’s
failure to retain the balance between England and Wales. The Welsh accepted
Edward I’s rule only gradually, with the traditional Welsh aristocracy fielding several
99 Henry Loyn (1980/1) “Wales and England in the Tenth Century: The Context of the Athelstan Charters.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 10, pp.283-301; David Stephenson (1983) “Llywelyn ap Gruffydd and the Struggle for the Principality of Wales, 1258-1282.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.36-47; Llinos Beverley Smith (1984/5) “Llywelyn ap Gruffydd and the Welsh Historical Consciousness.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 12, pp.4-23; R.R. Davies (1978) Lordship and Society in the March of Wales, 1282-1400. Oxford: Clarendon Press; J.E. Lloyd (1931) Owen Glendower: Owen Glyn Dwr. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Glanmor Williams (1966) Owen Glendower. London: Oxford University Press. 100 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? pp.114-139. 199 rebellions that predominantly contributed to the elimination of their class.101 Yet
Vaughan-Thomas hastened to add that these rebellions were not patriotic or nationalist movements in defence of a conquered nation-state. They were, instead, motivated by more local and personal concerns, natural in the Wales of the time.102
Wales was not a nation-state in the 13th century and Vaughan-Thomas was careful to hold this fact at the centre of his argument. It was this fact that also explained the motivations behind those of the Welsh upper classes who quickly affiliated themselves with Edward I’s administration of Wales, the uchelwyr. Such affiliation did not automatically mean Anglicisation, but was simply the Welsh response to the realities of the situation.103 This depiction of the earliest stages of the process of union accorded with that of Glyn Roberts104 and was not dissimilar from that of
Dodd. Glyn Roberts argued that the passing of time convinced more and more of the gentry to cooperate with Edward I,105 a process that created the Welsh official class.106
This process continued until the Tudor era. Vaughan-Thomas argued that it was actually through this process that the Welsh truly became a separate people, secure in their knowledge of their difference from the English.107 This may sound contradictory but is actually a logical conclusion given Vaughan-Thomas’ conviction about the importance of Britain and the naturalness of some form of relationship between Wales and the rest of the countries that are in Britain. Exposure to direct
English rule culminated in Owain Glyn Dwr’s rebellion, in which the Welsh people
101 Ibid., p.117. 102 Ibid., p.118. 103 Ibid., p.119. 104 Glyn Roberts (1960-3) “Wales and England: Antipathy and Sympathy 1282-1485.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 1, p.390. 105 Ibid., p.390. 106 Ibid., p.384. 107 For this argument, see Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, p.131. 200
rejected their status of second class citizens, a rejection borne from and confirming
the Welsh knowledge “…that they were a separate people – even when the law bound
them ever closer to England. Modern Wales, it is claimed, really begins in 1400.”108
Wales, then, emerged as a modern nation whilst ruled from England, and the modern
Welsh identity was a product of the Welsh experience of this relationship. This modern Welsh identity included a fuller realisation that Wales could possess a national political identity as well as a cultural one, despite the concept after the
Edwardian Conquest. Dr Ceridwen Lloyd Morgan argued that this emergent realisation was also apparent in the poetry of the fifteenth century: the very failure of
Glyn Dwr’s uprising facilitated the growth of a national Welsh identity.109
For Vaughan-Thomas, this situation remained constant under the Tudors. He
explicitly argued against the theory that the official Acts of Union under Henry VIII
were entirely negative and the cause of the identity problems in modern Welsh society.110 Instead, Vaughan-Thomas portrayed this final stage of the process of union between the two countries as the product of international politics, the lawless state of Wales, and Henry VIII’s need to consolidate his home base during the unstable period of religious reformation. Both England and Wales underwent the same process of legislative and administrative modernisation and, indeed, the Welsh people benefited from the removal of the penal laws against them as a people.111 To
some extent, this interpretation was solidly based in historiography. There was a
general consensus among Welsh historians of the Tudor period that the Welsh gentry
received Tudor legislation willingly, as illustrated by J. Beverley Smith’s analysis of
108 Ibid., p.131. 109 Ceridwen Lloyd Morgan (1985) “Prophecy and Welsh Nationhood in the Fifteenth Century.” Hinourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, p.23. 110 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, p.144. 111 Ibid., pp.144-151. 201
the charters granted to North Wales by Henry VII and Henry VIII.112 Vaughan-
Thomas did not, however, pay much accord to the myths and poetry that fostered
Welsh support of and cooperation with the Tudors, thereby failing to discuss a facet of Welsh culture that was politically significant.113
Vaughan-Thomas thus retained the balance between patriotism and
pragmatism. Pragmatism dictated the acceptance of the Tudor program of
modernisation both politically and religiously, while patriotism, lacking the militancy
of nationalism, failed to see the damage to Welsh culture that could be inflicted by the
Acts of Union. It saw only the advantages inherent in participation in the government
and economy of England. This interpretation indicated his belief that some level of
Anglicisation was inevitable after Llywelyn ap Gruffudd’s failure to hold the English
cultural and political presence at a safe but realistic distance. Yet this Anglicisation
was firmly presented as unintentional on both Welsh and English sides. It was merely
a reaction to circumstance and was entirely understandable when placed in its
historical context. Such an interpretation served two purposes. Firstly, it validated
the origins of the Anglo-Welsh culture that would slowly emerge over the following
centuries. Vaughan-Thomas did not present those who pragmatically worked with the
reality of English rule as any less Welsh for their actions or as intentionally betraying their culture or nation. Secondly, it outlined Vaughan-Thomas’ belief that some form of relationship between Wales and England was inevitable given their proximity to each other and the superior strength of England. This relationship was not, in this period, intentionally destructive: the damage to Welsh culture was unforeseen by either side. Here, however, the wider historical analysis was not so conclusive.
112 J. Beverley Smith (1966) “Crown and Community in the Principality of North Wales in the Reign of Henry Tudor.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, p.171. 113 David Rees (1997) The Son of Prophecy: Henry Tudor’s Road to Bosworth. Ruthin: John Jones Publishing Ltd. First published in 1985 by Black Raven Press. 202
Whilst the nationalist argument embodied by Gwynfor Evans in Land of My Fathers
was unhelpfully biased, other research has noted that English political necessity failed
to leave room for the free development of Welshness, requiring instead at least outward conformity to the standards in religion, language, culture and education set by the Tudors.114
This interpretation was, as pointed out by one of Vaughan-Thomas’ critics, a
very establishment view. In the circumstances of the early 1980s, many of its
implications would have seemed out of place. The Welsh intelligentsia had accepted
the reality of the Welsh relationship with England and were more concerned to
understand the nature of Wales and Welshness – and it is here that the establishment
nature of Vaughan-Thomas’ approach became particularly apparent. There was a
certain passivity about Vaughan-Thomas’ approach to Welsh history, a
historiographical comfortableness that explained the past of an accepted present and
allowed modern people to understand the history behind their world. As their journal
articles made clear, the Welsh intelligentsia did not share Vaughan-Thomas’ passivity in any sense. Their questioning may have altered their focus from the 1970s but any search for understanding about the shape and meaning of an identity inevitably results in challenges to the accepted shape of that identity and the world to which it belongs.
In this sense, Vaughan-Thomas’ understanding of the nature of the relationship
between Wales and Welshness was, while definitely existent in Welsh society and
historiography, out of sync with the bulk of the Welsh intelligentsia.
Gwyn A. Williams’ portrayal of the process of union, however, was highly
sympathetic towards the questioning style dominant among the Welsh intelligentsia
during the 1980s. Historically speaking, Gwyn A. Williams’ factual version of events
114 Peter R. Roberts (1989) “The Welsh Language, English Law and Tudor Legislation.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.19-75. 203
did not differ substantially from that of Vaughan-Thomas but the tone in which he
discussed those events implied a drastically different understanding of the short and
long term consequences of both events and the Welsh responses to those events. This
period clearly was not Gwyn A. Williams’ favourite and his tone was slightly scathing
as he discussed the final period of the process of union under the Tudors: scathing
towards the attitudes of the English and the Welsh.
Gwyn A. Williams’ portrayal of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd and Owain Glyn Dwr
provided the first outline of his approach to the process of union. He was clearly not
opposed to the existence of some sort of relationship between Wales and England and,
indeed, considered this a part of having a stronger neighbour. Nonetheless, in
identifying Owain Glyn Dwr as the true Welsh Prince, he lodged an objection to the
form of Welsh-English relationship that was to develop under the Tudors. The ideal
Wales, for Gwyn A. Williams, was one that was independent but also content with its
borders, aware of the reality of England, and devoid of the myths that demanded a
return to the original Britain of the Celts and Kings.115 Tudor Wales was a long way
from this ideal – being based on the very prophecy of a return to a Welsh Britain that
he had rejected in the Age of the Princes – and Gwyn A. Williams was not overly
complimentary about some of the adaptations that occurred within Welsh society.116
His attitude towards others was, however, rather more complex.
Gwyn A. Williams agreed that the majority of the Welshmen gladly accepted
the equality offered under the Acts of Union, equality that was offered by Henry VIII
as part of a wider program of political reform and modernisation. For Gwyn A.
Williams, however, the problem lay less in the intentions behind the Acts than in the methods used by both Henry VII and Henry VIII to bring the Welsh onside. Both
115 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh, p.88. 116 Ibid., pp.114-121. 204
Tudor monarchs utilised the myths of Arthur, with his foretold return to reclaim
Britain for the Welsh, and their own rather diluted Welsh ancestry to gain Welsh loyalty and cooperation in a process referred to by Gwyn A. Williams as “play- acting.”117
…it worked. England opened up like the rose it now bore as its badge, and the Welsh
poured in. The old order hung on back home in Wales and, in the boroughs, made a
last stand against the incoming tide.118
But under Henry VIII’s Acts of Union, those clinging to pre-Tudor Welsh culture were fighting a losing battle as the Welsh language was effectively banished from official life into the kitchen.119 The process of union, then, began the destruction of
Welsh culture and the Welsh people, blinded by the myths of Arthur and the benefits of the repeal of the penal laws, participated enthusiastically.
The union went through in jubilation and many a sour-faced burgess found himself
cheerfully thumped around the head to the cry that Welshmen were now as free as
Englishmen. Arthur had returned, perhaps a little earlier than expected, and was
reinventing his cantref of Britain with a squirearchy for his warband.120
These myths were not presented as particularly beneficial for Wales but it is at this point that Gwyn A. Williams’ attitude towards Britain as an entity became more complex. He presented a Wales that played a major role in the creation of the British identity that enabled that state to survive in Counter-Reformation Europe and to build
117 Ibid., p.117. 118 Ibid.. 119 For Gwyn A. Williams’ analysis of the early period of Union, see Ibid., pp.114-131. 120 Ibid., p.121. 205
an Empire against the might of Spain.121 The Union essentially facilitated the invention of Britain with Welsh mythology providing the traditions necessary for the creation of “that new and imperial British identity by which the state lived.”122 One
fascinating example is the use of the legend of Madoc and his discovery of America
to bolster English claims to the north of the continent against those of Spain.
In this new Britain and its British Empire, the Welsh could recover a respectable and
central identity, the English discover a new and useful one, under those Tudors who
were the Return of Arthur.123
Welsh myths misled the Welsh but did succeed in creating Britain, a Britain in which
the Welsh were to play an important role into the 20th century.
This attitude to Welsh mythology within Welsh history was not restricted to
Gwyn A. Williams. Indeed, his critical approach to the Tudor monarchs was echoed
by G.R. Elton who argued that Henry Tudor’s Welsh loyalties were dubious and that
the Welsh nobles were more concerned about backing the victor of the Wars of Roses
than establishing a Welsh monarchical dynasty.124 Arthur, in turn, was used by Henry
VII to establish his credentials as a British, not a Welsh monarch.125 The arguments
concerning Welsh mythology could, however, go both ways. Gruffydd Aled
Williams criticised both Gwyn A. Williams’ condemnation of Henry VII’s role in
bardic tradition as “play acting”, and Gwynfor Evans’ argument that Henry VII used
his Welshness only for personal gain.126 Yet Gruffydd Aled Williams’ argument
121 Ibid., p.122. 122 Ibid., p.123, author’s italics. 123 Ibid., p.125, author’s italics. 124 G.R.Elton (1985) “King Henry VII.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, p.144. 125 Ibid., p.143. 126 Gruffydd Aled Williams (1986) “The Bardic Road to Bosworth: A Welsh View of Henry Tudor.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, p.30. 206 agreed with Gwyn A. Williams’ interpretation of the centrality of this mythology to
Welsh life. The variety of opinion on the beneficial nature or otherwise of the Welsh mythological and poetic tradition indicated that this aspect of Welsh culture was, in the 1980s and 1990s, a topic of some debate.
Gwyn A. Williams’ message about Wales and Welshness was clear: where the
Welsh did not find one identity and expression of nationhood they found another.
Wales and Welshness were what the Welsh people wished them to be. During the process of union, the Welsh people elected to build Britain and to accept the nature of the Welsh-English relationship under the Tudors. In doing so, Gwyn A. Williams argued that they missed an opportunity to attempt to become truly Welsh but also that historical circumstances made such an achievement unlikely. One facet of his portrayal of Britain as an entity was, however, clear – in the long term, its basis in
Welsh myth limited Welsh political development and undermined Welsh culture.
Gwyn A. Williams’ depiction of this period and of the intentions of the
English in initiating the Acts of Union also cast light on one of the debates that was still current in Welsh society in the 1980s. One of the fundamental tenets of Plaid
Cymru under Gwynfor Evans and, therefore, a central argument in his Land of My
Fathers, was the reality of the English design to destroy Welsh political and cultural identity through progressive union with England. Towards the end of the 1980s,
Gwynfor Evans repeated the arguments found in Land of My Fathers, arguing that the
Acts of Union and the corresponding relationship between Wales and England were problematic due to its genocidal basis.127 Glanmor Williams, a leading Welsh historian, replied to the article, challenging the linkage between Welsh nationalism and the rejection of the Acts of Union on the grounds of its intended cultural
127 Gwynfor Evans (1988) “The 1536 Act of Incorporation and the Welsh Language.” Planet, Vol. 68, pp.54-58. 207
genocide.128 In historiographical terms, this rejection of an extremist view was hardly
surprising, but the tone of Glanmor Williams’ reply indicated an interesting polarisation within the Welsh understanding of nationalism.
To some extent, this polarisation has been present in all expressions of Welsh
nationalism but in the 1980s, the tendency to favour a less anti-English version
became far more prominent. As Glanmor Williams explained;
It seems to me to be perfectly possible to be an ardent and committed supporter of the
nationalist cause without at the same time having to accept what appear to me to be
its, at times, distorted historical interpretations.129
Gwyn A. Williams’ interpretation of the process of union was a part of this
redefining of what it meant to be a Welsh nationalist as well as participating in the
1980s search for what it meant to be Welsh.
Unlike the 1970s, the fourth theme of religious and industrial developments
continued to reveal the attitudes of the historians under analysis towards Britain and
the relationship between Wales and England, as well as how the two men understood
the constituent elements of Welshness. In many ways, this particular period of Welsh
history was most revealing of the 1980s authors’ attitudes towards the modern Welsh-
English-British relationship and of the impact of the Welsh intelligentsia’s debate
over Wales and Welshness within the context of Britain. Central to this difference
was an apparent change in attitude towards both Britain itself and the significance of
religion, if not of industry, to Welsh identity.
128 Glanmor Williams (1988/9) “The Act of Incorporation and the Welsh Language.” Planet, Vol. 72, pp.48-53. 129 Ibid., p.53. 208
For Vaughan-Thomas, Nonconformity was primarily significant because of its
role in the modernisation of Welsh culture. Christianity itself was not portrayed as
particularly central to Welsh identity prior to the 18th and 19th centuries, with
Vaughan-Thomas arguing that the Welsh gentry accepted the Reformation with the
same ease with which they had accepted the Acts of Union: “Men will defend so
lightly what they so lightly hold.”130 The Anglicised nature of the post-Reformation
Established Church in Wales ensured the continuation of the lack of popular interest
in this form of spirituality.131 The Methodist Revival of the 18th century, however,
altered this situation quite drastically, capturing the hearts of the Welsh people and
creating a new popular culture to replace the decaying bardic traditions.132
Vaughan-Thomas essentially tied the rise of Nonconformity to the cultural and industrial changes that were occurring concurrently. He argued that all three
eventually combined to create what would become both the modern and the
stereotypical faces of Wales – with a Nonconformist history, an industrial and
Anglicised south and a divided people.133 Methodism, the primary expression of
Welsh Nonconformity in the 18th century, emerged from the basis planted in the
Interregnum, by the Anglican SPCK and by Griffith Jones’ Circulating Schools.134 It
became the force that educated and democratised the Welsh people and offered one
solution to the gap left by the dissolution of bardic culture. Through this process,
however, Vaughan-Thomas argued that Nonconformity changed the face of Welsh
culture, dragging “Merrie Wales…into a grimmer, more serious Future.”135
130 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, p.147. 131 Ibid., pp.181-183 & p.188. 132 For Wynford Vaughan-Thomas’ description of the establishment of Methodism in Wales, see Ibid., pp.184-189. 133 Ibid., p.184. 134 Ibid., pp.184-185. 135 Ibid., p.184. 209
This approach to Welsh Christianity and Nonconformity was a topic of some
controversy within the major Welsh history books. Dodd, little inclined to foster
myths about the necessity of Christianity for Welsh identity, still acknowledged that
the Welsh transition from Catholicism to Anglicanism to Nonconformity was gradual
and the effect of circumstance and experience. It was not the result of “…religious
indifference…”136 David Williams, however, offered an argument very similar to that
of Vaughan-Thomas. David Williams argued that the Welsh people moved easily
from one denomination to another “…because their religious life had decayed. For it
has been truly said that men will abandon so lightly only what they lightly hold.”137
His analysis of Nonconformity was also incredibly similar to that of Vaughan-
Thomas, as was Dodd’s, creating an impression of some historiographical continuity concerning the later popular religious revivals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.138 The historical controversy, however, lay in Vaughan-Thomas’ denial of
the significance of Christianity for Welshness. While David Williams clearly wrote
from a similar perspective, Glanmor Williams argued that Christianity had been an
essential facet of Welshness since the emergence of that identity.139 The Reformation
had been accepted through patriotism to both the Tudors and to Wales, because of its
use of the Welsh language and through its intentional association with the Welsh myths concerning the Welsh position as a chosen people loyal to their God.140 Yet
again, Welsh poetry and its new manifestations of hymns and spiritual verse, helped
to spread the new attachment to Christianity. Methodism was, in fact, the Welsh
expression of the spiritual hunger that was a part of Welsh society at that time.141
136 A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, p.63. 137 David Williams (1977) A History of Modern Wales, p.61. 138 Ibid., pp.139-157: A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, pp.97-102 & pp.133-138. 139 Glanmor Williams (1991) The Welsh and their Religion: Historical Essays, p.14. 140 Ibid., pp.39-42. 141 Ibid., pp.51-64. 210
Vaughan-Thomas did, however, follow the general consensus in arguing that
this future was no less Welsh. The increasing disassociation of the Welsh people from Welsh traditional culture during this period was depicted as part of a European- wide Humanist development that significantly altered the location of referential cultural standards across Europe. Nonconformity was simply the popular Welsh expression of this movement. For those more inclined towards intellectual culture, modernisation involved reconnecting with the Celtic Welsh past, creating traditions that would once more allow popular participation in traditional Welsh culture.142 Of the two Welsh expressions of the European-wide movement away from local peasant cultures, Nonconformity was to have the most pronounced effect on Welsh culture, contributing towards the stereotypical image of Wales,
…the Wales of Nonconformist chapels, powerful preachers carried away by the
‘hwyl’, of pubs shut on Sundays, of miners’ choirs, of fiery politicians denouncing
the Establishment and of continually victorious rugby teams.143
This impact was reiterated by Glanmor Williams, who argued that the values and
ideals of Methodism became those of the respectable Welsh, resulting in the societal
focus on the maintenance of outward respectability.144
It was industry, however, that completed the Welsh movement towards
modernity. And for Vaughan-Thomas, it was clearly industry that revealed Welsh
potential in Britain – an interpretation that did not allow for any of the 1970s or 1980s
concerns over the nature of Welsh industrialisation. This was expressed most
obviously in the emotive detail – or lack of – used to describe working class
142 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, pp.184-196. 143Ibid., p.184. 144 Glanmor Williams (1991) The Welsh and their Religion: Historical Essays, pp.65-66. 211
conditions and the motivations behind the Chartists, the Rebeccas, and the Scotch
Cattle.145 Vaughan-Thomas traced the three protest movements back to unrest over
general conditions within a rapidly changing society. The participants were labelled
“rebels” and the impression was given that they were fighting against the “new
standards”146 that were emerging in society. Wales and the Welsh were not willing to
fully embrace these new and modern standards until the middle of the 19th century
when the 1847 Blue Book reports on the state of education in Wales shocked the
Welsh into rebuilding the structure of and the concepts behind Welsh education.147
No mention was made of the negative effects of those reports on Welsh culture:
instead, they contributed to the creation of a prosperous and respectable Wales.
This approach was evident throughout Vaughan-Thomas’ portrayal of the
industrial era. He described the Edwardian era as filled with a sense of security and a
“buoyant hope for a prosperous future”.148 Little space was given to the other side of
industrial Wales with only brief mentions being made of the danger of the coal mines,
disputes between miners and owners, and the general level of poverty prevalent
throughout the coal fields.149 Most attention was given to the religious revivals, the
emergence of Nonconformist politics, Welsh nationalism, the “coal rush”,150 Lloyd
George and Cymru Fydd, an interpretation of the period that lacked Gwyn A.
Williams’ deep understanding of the nature and being of the industrial societies that
emerged in south Wales.151
For Vaughan-Thomas, eighteenth and nineteenth century Wales was, in this
depiction, finally beginning to accept the new standards of modern society.
145 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, pp.204-218. 146 Ibid., p.223. 147 Ibid., pp.219-223. 148 Ibid., p.244. 149 Ibid., pp.232-244. 150 Ibid., p.232. 151 Please see: Gwyn A. Williams (1978) The Merthyr Rising. London: Croom Helm. 212
Welshness was not lost but was expressed through ways appropriate to the time and
place - Nonconformity, Lloyd George and the Welsh nationalism/patriotism of Cymru
Fydd, the nationalist party of the day. Vaughan-Thomas saw this process as positive,
as Wales becoming an advanced, modern society fully participant in Britain and the
British economy. This interpretation differed quite substantially from those offered
by Dodd and Gwynfor Evans. Dodd saw Anglicisation as inevitable given the social
and economic forces, while Gwynfor Evans condemned the industrial era and the
Blue Books for their role in the Anglicisation of Wales. Certainly, the Welsh intelligentsia of the 1980s had identified structural problems grounded in this era – the divided Welsh identity, the rapid rise of Anglicisation, the Anglo-focus of the emerging Welsh industrial economy – which Vaughan-Thomas, while aware of their existence, did not choose to focus on.
Such an interpretation reflected Vaughan-Thomas’ establishment tendencies
and his attitude towards Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-English relationship in
Britain. The Welsh actions in affiliating themselves with Methodism and industrial
Britain were practical, given the circumstances in which the Welsh found themselves,
and industrialisation was, in the 19th century, quite beneficial for Wales. England did
not exploit Wales in any sense, nor were the emerging problems with the Welsh
identity related to English actions. Welsh contact with England in Britain did, in fact,
facilitate Welsh development and modernisation.
Similar historical interpretations of this period were current in the 1980s.
Working class, industrialists and gentry alike were approached from their position
within the British economy, and this context provided the foundations for the
explanations of productivity and entrepreneurial investment and success towards the 213
close of the 19th century.152 Frank Llewellyn-Jones took this new conceptual
approach a step further, arguing that it was important for the Welsh youth of the
1980s to be aware of their technological history, both in terms of pride in British
Welsh achievements and for inspiration for the future.153 Welsh industrial history
should not only be accepted, but was something of which to be proud: quite a
dramatic statement given the condition of Welsh industry and industrial society in the
1980s. There was, however, one major differentiating factor between Vaughan-
Thomas’ interpretation and those of the above historians – Vaughan-Thomas’ neglect
of the negative side of industrialisation. The lack of perspective makes Vaughan-
Thomas’ history more celebratory than not – aimed at allowing a comfortable
connection with a comfortable past rather than challenging accepted ideas whether of
identity or history. Whig history indeed.
Gwyn A. Williams’ interpretation of the religious developments was both
similar and very different to that of Vaughan-Thomas. The similarities lay in
historical fact. Gwyn A. Williams also argued that Nonconformity combined with
Humanism to create a new popular Welsh culture and that the alienation of the Welsh
from the predominantly English-language culture of the Established Church and the
earlier Anglican missionary movements facilitated the emergence of popular
Nonconformity in Wales.154 Wales was not alone in moving away from traditional
culture – Gwyn A. Williams also argued that the shift was European in nature. The
differences between the two approaches lay in the authors’ understanding of the way
152 William J. Hausman and Barry T. Hirsch (1982) “Wages, Leisure and Productivity in South Wales Coal Mining, 1874-1914: An Economic Approach.” Llafur, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp.58-66: Rhodri Walters (1983) “Wages, Leisure and Productivity in South Wales Coal-mining, 1874-1914: A different “Economic Approach”.” Llafur, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp.59-65: G.W. Roderick (1987) “South Wales Industrialists and the Theory of Gentrification: 1770-1914.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.65-84: Michael Asteris (1986/7) “The Rise and Decline of South Wales Coal Exports, 1870-1930.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 13, pp.24-43. 153 Frank Llewellyn-Jones (1983) “Wales and the Origins of the Railway Revolution.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.115-131. 154 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh, pp.128-172. 214
these changes impacted on Wales and Welshness. Gwyn A. Williams did not present
a gradual slide from a traditional to a Humanist/Methodist culture but rather described
a battle in which both sides fought for dominance: the bards to retain their traditional structure, content and position, and the Humanists to modernise bardic society in line with the developments occurring throughout Europe.155
The failure of the Humanists to convert the bards resulted in the decline of traditional culture and in gentry patronage of that culture, as it became increasingly out-dated and irrelevant in a modernising society.156 Welsh, being linked to bardic culture, also failed to make the transition into the new intellectual and artistic fields, and was gradually limited to oral, popular and religious expressions.157 Humanism did, however, play a major role in the retention of Welsh as a living language, as it was Humanists who translated the Bible into vernacular Welsh.158 These
developments were portrayed as British, the natural result of Welsh participation in
Britain, and as the simple failure of the bards to release their hold on myth and to
participate in the modernisation of Welsh culture. Philip Jenkins, recommended by
Gwyn A. Williams for further reading, supported this interpretation. He argued that
Europe was, in the 18th century, strongly influenced by Anglomania, resulting in the
adoption of “the same social fashions… [of]…English polite culture.”159 Wales could
not be expected to stand outside this European-wide trend.
In this account, Humanist Methodism replaced traditional Welsh culture,
effectively supplanting the older version of Welshness and, therefore, the older
understanding of Wales. This change in culture was confirmed by Nonconformities’
155 Ibid., pp.128-131. 156 Ibid.. 157 Ibid., pp.130-131. 158 Ibid., p.131. Glanmor Williams also takes this approach in The Welsh and their Religion: Historical Essays, Chapters Five and Six. 159 Philip Jenkins (1983) The Making of a Ruling Class: The Glamorgan Gentry 1640-1790. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 215
interest in education. By the end of the 18th century, the majority of Welsh adults
were literate, but in a way that encouraged expression and self-definition “…in the
language, imagery and concepts of the Bible and of Protestant sectarianism.”160
Humanism, the Welsh language and Nonconformity were converging to create a
distinct Dissenting culture that stretched from Wales to the colonies of America.
This new culture may have replaced the traditional version of Welshness but
Gwyn A. Williams did not consider it to be any less Welsh. He did, however, identify
several problems that were embodied in its construction. Firstly, it embodied an
identity that became the stereotype for Wales and Welshness.161 This identity failed
to allow for several realities of life, including the Welsh relationship with Britain, and
those in Welsh society who did not identify with any of the Nonconformist groups.162
Secondly, Dissenting culture also appeared to stop at the old east-west frontier in
Wales.163 Gwyn A. Williams argued that Dissent, when combined with the radical
ideas of the London Welsh and the process of industrialisation, uncovered and
reconfirmed the old frontier between the Marches and the Principality of the Norman
era.164 This division was not accommodated in the stereotypical identity of the 19th
century, despite it being a major factor in Welsh life.
Gwyn A. Williams’ approach to Nonconformity addressed one issue that was
quite prominent in the intelligentsia’s discussion in the 1980s – Welsh identity. Gwyn
A. Williams offered one answer to the question as to of what Wales and Welshness
consisted, an answer based on the theme on which his book was built: the people in
Wales create and recreate Wales and Welshness. By arguing that Nonconformist
Wales was itself a creation, Gwyn A. Williams shifted the locus of the argument away
160 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? The History of the Welsh, p.155. 161 Ibid., p.180. 162 Ibid., pp.151-167 & p.207. 163 Ibid., p.151. 164 Ibid., pp.159-167. 216
from concern over the loss of one form of Wales and Welshness to focus on the
constant process of recreation of a Welsh identity. The bulk of the Welsh
intelligentsia may not have opted for precisely this solution but their increased
willingness to consider English-speaking Welsh culture as a valid form of Welshness
was basically another way of accepting and dealing with popular rejection of
devolution and traditional Welsh identity in 1979. In this sense, Gwyn A. Williams’
book was very much a product of the 1980s and also of the de-Christianisation of
modern Britain: his depiction excluded religion from the core of any Welsh identity.
Gwyn A. Williams really drove this theme home in his consideration of
industrial Wales. He focused heavily on the experiences and community of the
working class and the role of this working class in creating the stereotyped industrial
identity that was still attached to Wales in the 1980s.165 Despite his clear sympathy with the working class experience, the point of his interpretation was not so much the actual historical experience as the historical way in which the problems inherent in a modern Welsh identity were created.166
Gwyn A. Williams portrayed a society that, at the start of the industrial period,
was, essentially, on the border of civilization. As a specialist in the industrial history
of Merthyr,167 Gwyn A. Williams was well positioned to comment on structure and
society of these frontier towns and painted a stark picture of the realities of industrial
life, one equally vividly depicted in Ieuan Gwynedd Jones’ article entitled “Merthyr
Tydfil: The Politics of Survival.”168 Unlike Vaughan-Thomas, Gwyn A. Williams and Ieuan Gwynedd Jones saw the people – the masses – of Wales as the centre point of history as opposed to the great people and leaders of society. It was in this world
165 For Gwyn A. Williams’ consideration of the rise of industrial Wales, see Ibid., pp.176-219. 166 Ibid., p.181. 167 Gwyn A. Williams (1978) The Merthyr Rising. London: Croom Helm. 168 Ieuan Gwynedd Jones (1976) “Merthyr Tydfil: The Politics of Survival.” Llafur, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp.18-31. 217
of the masses that Chapel culture began to merge with traditional rural Welsh culture
to create a distinct industrial Welsh culture. The Chartists, the Scotch Cattle and the
Rebecca Rioters were expressions of the passions and values of this society, not futile
rebellions against new standards.169 David Williams, as the leading authority on the
Rebecca Riots in the 1980s, confirmed this interpretation, as he argued that the rioters
were protesters against injustice, representative of the values of their compatriots.170
There was, then, in the 1980s field of history, an increased tendency to consider
Welsh culture as it would have appeared to those involved in its creation and expression although there were still those, like Vaughan-Thomas who preferred to emphasise the success of individuals and the country over the experience of those living and working in industrial Wales.
The arrival of industry in Wales also allowed the creation, in south Wales, of
Nonconformist, Welsh-speaking trade centres, facilitating the emergence of a sense of
Wales as a nation and as an imperial economy.171 This Welsh nation differed from
the pre-industrial sense of Welshness through its ties to an imperial Britain and a
British economy. In this context, Welsh culture began to break with its Celtic past to
become “essentially an English and largely middle-class-cum-populist culture translated and transmuted”.172 It was from this Wales that the first Welsh politicians
began to emerge.
Gwyn A. Williams, however, described the formation of this modern Welsh
nation in order to illustrate the emergence of the problems associated with Welsh
identity.173 Nonconformity continued to dominate this identity despite its transmutation into Liberalism and nationalism in Cymru Fydd, and its eventual
169 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh, pp.183-197. 170 David Williams (1977) A History of Modern Wales, pp.206-212. 171 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh, pp.182-213. 172 Ibid., p.210. 173 Ibid., p.207 & p.233. 218
replacement by socialism in the form of the Labour Party.174 Jon Parry presented a
similar argument: Socialism and the Labour Party emerged from the Welsh
experiences and were a new way of relating to their world.175 This identity, however,
would also decline after 1979.176 For Gwyn A. Williams, cultural identity had been
defined by the gwerin, the rural middle class, despite the realities of industrial
working class and middle class culture.177 Wales and Welshness, in this industrial
incarnation, had been created on an identity time bomb in the form of a
Nonconformist, Liberal, Welsh-speaking identity that only briefly matched reality.178
This Wales had more or less ceased to exist by 1900 and was totally destroyed by the experiences of WW1 and the Great Depression.179 Yet the stereotype of Welshness
remained the touchstone of Welsh identity up until the 1980s, an argument that
revealed again his belief that the majority of Welsh historiography failed to do justice
to the English-speaking working-class of industrial Wales. Vaughan-Thomas did not
share this view. Indeed, he, Dodd, Jon Parry and David Williams included the Labour
Party in their depiction of Welshness despite their histories being somewhat less
socialist. Gwyn A. Williams was not the only Welsh author, however, to argue that
the shape of Welsh industrial society and its uniqueness within Wales would be
problematic for the future understanding and description of a unitary Wales. Dai
Smith, in “Wales Through the Looking Glass,” argued that the dramatic differences
and experiences of industrial and rural Wales effectively prevented the formation of a
174 Ibid., pp.233-241. 175 Jon Parry (1986) “Trade Unionists and early Socialism in South Wales.” Llafur, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp.43-54. 176 Ibid., pp.43-54. 177 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh, pp.234-241. 178 Ibid., pp.234-241. 179 Ibid., pp.239-240. 219 unitary Welsh identity in the twentieth century, or of the construction of an “…easy definition of people and country, let alone nation…”180
In many ways, Gwyn A. Williams used his history to trace these two forms of
Welsh identity, the mythical, Celtic, self-contained Welshness once expressed by the bards, and the practical, British, international Welshness that defined the reality of
Wales. It was presence of the former in every incarnation of Wales and Welshness that triggered problems in the Welsh identity. Indeed, Gwyn A. Williams argued that it was the sheer out-datedness of the stereotypical version of Wales and Welshness that resulted in the 1979 and 1980s general rejection of the traditional interpretation of
Wales and Welsh society.181 The 1980s search for Wales and Welshness was the direct result of this popular rejection. In this way, Gwyn A. Williams provided a historical explanation for the intelligentsia’s position in the 1980s: their questioning and searching was inevitable given the basis from which the Welsh people had, until that point, insisted on constructing their identity. Many of the particular issues under intellectual discussion in the 1980s emerged from this basic identity problem – Anglo-
Welsh culture, the Welsh language, the relationship between Wales and England in
Britain, the shape of Welsh historiography. According to Gwyn A. Williams, the
Welsh of the 1980s were dealing with issues that had been planted by the Welsh themselves two hundred years before. This conclusion was supported by Bobi
Jones182 and Tecwyn Lloyd,183 albeit for different reasons, who argued that the Welsh inferiority complex over their identity and culture had begun with, respectively, the
Acts of Union and the Blue Book Reports. Three different causes for one problem but
180 Dai Smith (1994) Aneurin Bevan and the World of South Wales. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, pp.45-66. 181 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh, pp.252-260 & pp.287-295. 182 Bobi Jones (1978) “I’m Your Boy.” Planet, Vol. 42, pp.2-10; Bobi Jones (1974) “The Roots of Welsh Inferiority.” Planet, Vol 22, pp.53-72. 183 Tecwyn Lloyd (1976) “Wales – see England.” Planet, Vol 34, pp.36-47. 220
an indication that Gwyn A. Williams was not alone in either his concern or his efforts to analyse the problem from a historical perspective.
The conclusions reached by Vaughan-Thomas and Gwyn A. Williams were
quite disparate and the difference remained very evident in the final period to be
examined, the twentieth century. The variation in focus between the two authors was
displayed by the aspects of the twentieth century with which they are most concerned
and by the way they discussed some of the central features of the century. Wales,
Welshness and the relationship between Wales and England in Britain were, in this
final period, presented in a way that explains why Wales was where it was in 1985.
Both Vaughan-Thomas and Gwyn A. Williams spent considerably more time
on the twentieth century than either Dodd or Gwynfor Evans did but this difference
can be partly explained by the variation in purposes between the decades. Dodd and
Gwynfor Evans were writing at the start of the 1970s, in a period in which Welsh
Home Rule seemed very possible and the worst of the economic problems of the
1970s had not yet hit. By 1985, this situation was very different. Devolution had
been rejected by the Welsh people; the Welsh economy had suffered through
stagflation and was currently being dismantled by Margaret Thatcher and her
economic ideologies. In the 1970s, the difficulties of the twentieth century seemed to
be normal problems, present in every age. By the 1980s, these problems were
threatening the existence of Wales and Welshness, and broader concerns were
challenging the existence of Britain as a state, an economy and an identity.
It is clear that, for Vaughan-Thomas, the Welsh heyday ended with WW1 and
the end of the heady optimism of the Edwardian era in which the Welsh coal mines brought the country to the world’s economic attention.184 The experiences of two
184 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, p.245. 221
World Wars and the Great Depression shattered this confidence and effectively
destroyed the old Welsh identity based on Nonconformity,185 an analysis confirmed
by David Williams.186 But to every challenge, Wales had an answer, and it was this that demonstrated the heart of Vaughan-Thomas grasp of Wales and Welshness for
the twentieth century. He identified three main men who defined the Welsh century:
Lloyd George, Saunders Lewis and Gwynfor Evans.187 All three were involved at
some point in their careers in Welsh nationalist movements and all three responded to
the threats against Welsh culture and society during the times in which they were
active. Vaughan-Thomas’ use of these three men to illustrate the century was
consistent with his preferred historiographical approach: his portrayal of these three
men also indicated his preferred approach to Britain. Of the three, only Lloyd
George, as the Prime Minister of Britain, was the presented as a hero and as such not
for advancing the case of Welsh Home Rule but for advancing the “…general
awareness of Wales in Britain and the world.”188 In a foreword to Pat Molloy’s book
on the Rebecca Riots, Vaughan-Thomas defined Lloyd George as a hero and a rebel,
challenging the Establishment189 as a Welsh nationalist during his time in Cymru
Fydd, simply as a Welshman challenging the position of the Welsh and of Wales as a
country, and as a man attempting to create a more compassionate society. This
interpretation of Lloyd George avoided the ambiguity that surrounded his move from
Welsh to British politics, culminating in his election as Prime Minister. As J. Graham
Jones noted, by the 1920s, Lloyd George’s interest in “…the national rights of Wales
185 Ibid., pp.245-253. 186 David Williams (1977) A History of Modern Wales, pp.296-300. 187 For Wynford Vaughan-Thomas’ depiction of these three men, see Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, pp.245-260. 188 Ibid., p.247. 189 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1983) “Foreword.” In Pat Molloy, And they blessed Rebecca: An account of the Welsh Toll-gate Riots 1839-1844. Llandysul: Gomer Press, p.ix. 222
clearly now came very low on his list of priorities as perhaps befitted a politician who
was daily becoming more remote from his Welsh roots.”190
Saunders Lewis and Gwynfor Evans, whilst not portrayed in such glowing
terms as Lloyd George, were identified as significant for their roles in defending some
aspect of Welsh culture. Vaughan-Thomas clearly considered these actions to be
vitally important for Wales and Welshness, illustrating that despite his Establishment
attitude, he was a Welsh patriot. Saunders Lewis was deeply involved in both the establishment of Plaid Cymru and in the 1960s revival of the Welsh language through his radio broadcast “Tynged yr Iaith”.191 Gwynfor Evans brought Wales as a nation
firmly back into the British political arena with his success at the 1966 Carmarthen
By-election.192 In both cases, these men are credited with contributing towards the
survival of Wales and Welsh culture within Britain. Vaughan-Thomas did not focus
on their actions as demonstrations of a Welsh desire for independence but rather as
part of a Welsh battle to remain visible and functional within Britain. There was,
however, a definite note of dismissal present in historical analysis towards both men.
Saunders Lewis’ efforts in helping to found Plaid Cymru were depicted as significant
for Wales but out-of-sync with a world on the edge of the Great Depression and a
second World War.193 Vaughan-Thomas branded his role in helping to revive the
Welsh language as far more important,194 indicating his own priorities – the retention
of the Welsh cultural difference rather than any more nationalistic agenda. Gwynfor
Evans’ political success was similarly qualified with the popular rejection of Plaid
190 J. Graham Jones (1988) “Early Campaigns to Secure a Secretary of State for Wales, 1890-1939.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, p.166. 191 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, pp.250-256. 192 Ibid., pp.258-260. 193 Ibid., pp.250-252. 194 Ibid., p.256. 223
Cymru’s ideals in 1979 decreasing the value of their achievements.195 This dismissive approach was not shared by many Welsh historians who acknowledged the significance of both men despite the difficulties experienced by both within the context of Plaid Cymru.196
Ultimately, Vaughan-Thomas’ depiction of this century was optimistic.
Despite the problems attached to the decline of Welsh industry, the traumatic experiences of the World Wars and the Great Depression, and the fear associated with the steady decline of the Welsh language and its culture, leaders emerged from among the Welsh people who fought to ensure that Wales, as a country and as an identity, would survive within Britain. Vaughan-Thomas was not overly concerned with the rejection of devolution, illustrating the centrality of Britain to his understanding of
Wales and Welshness.197 His final two paragraphs captured the swinging optimism, surety and confidence in Wales and Welshness within a British environment that underlay not only his depiction of the 20th century but his whole history of Wales.
All through its troubled story, Wales has shown its strange power of survival. Even
in dark eclipse, it has retained the secret power of revitalising itself, to add its own
exciting note to the concert of Britain. In a world of insidious and spreading
standardisation, this is surely the heart of the matter, the justification for the survival
of Wales in its Welshness, it language and its culture.
195 Ibid., pp.258-259. 196 J. Graham Jones (1981/2) “ Forming Plaid Cymru: Laying the Foundations, 1923-26.” National Library of Wales Journal, Vol. 22, pp.427-459 & (1989) “Socialism, Devolution and a Secretary of State for Wales, 1940-64.” Honorable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.135-159; Ian McAllister (1981) “The Labour Party in Wales: the Dynamics of One-Partyism.” Llafur, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.79-89; Alwyn Roberts (1989) “Some Political Implications of S4C.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.211-228; Colin H. Williams (1985) “Public Gain and Private Grief: The Ambiguous Nature of Contemporary Welsh.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.27-48. 197 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, pp.260-261. 224
In the end the historian must yield to temptation, forsake his strict discipline and risk
looking boldly towards the future. For has not Wales drawn much of its strength for
survival, not only on myth and legend but on prophecy. The defiant words of that
brave Welshman of Pencader reach us from the distant twelfth century, when he
confronted the formidable Henry II, King of England, with this ringing prediction of
the future of Wales, come what may. His words are now engraved on stone in
Pencader:
Nor do I think that any other nation than this of Wales…shall, on the day of severe
examination before the Supreme Judge, answer for this corner of the earth.198
Vaughan-Thomas’ Wales and Welshness was bilingual and united by its shared history and by a commitment to ensuring a Welsh future. Britain was the wider field in which this nation and people had to function, both through historical ties and practical choice. There is no doubt that Vaughan-Thomas was aware of the soul-searching that was occurring in Wales in the aftermath of the devolution referendum or of the concerns over the damage done to Welsh culture by the experience of the twentieth century. But his response to this awareness was significantly different from the majority of the Welsh intelligentsia in the 1980s and his confidence about the existence of a Welsh identity was expressed quite differently.
Welsh history was a steady progression to which the Welsh people could connect, could see the real validity of who they were. For the Welsh intelligentsia of the
1980s, Welshness was real but the boundaries were undefined by either history or modern experience.
198 Ibid., p.261. 225
Gwyn A. Williams’ understanding of Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-
English relationship in the twentieth century was considerably closer to that of the
Welsh intelligentsia. The titles of the chapters in which he addressed this century
were very revealing of the concern with which he viewed the effects of the century on
Wales and Welshness: “The Dismantling of Wales”, “Cataclysm and Community”
and “Travail’s Acre.”199 The twentieth century witnessed the dismemberment of the
old identity of Wales but, unlike other in other eras, no clear incarnation of Wales and
Welshness rose to take its place.
Gwyn A. Williams portrayed a Wales that entered the Great Depression fully
committed to the Labour Party, with an equal commitment to the trade unions and
with a strong leaning towards socialism, particularly in the south-east.200 North
Wales displayed right-wing nationalist tendencies, embodied in Plaid Cymru.201 By
the 1980s, however, Wales had totally altered its industrial and social structure,
changed political affiliations to a multiple party pattern similar to that of England, and
developed a new, semi-English identity.202 This change was accompanied by the
deepening of the north-south divide, particularly evident in the growth of the language
issue, resulting in both the exclusion and self-exclusion of English monoglots from a
Welsh identity.203 The bulk of the Welsh historians publishing in the The Welsh
History Review, Llafur, the National Library of Wales Journal, and the Honourable
Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions appeared to view the twentieth century from a
similar perspective, with considerable interest being displayed in the trade unions and
strikes, the political parties in Wales, the language, and Welsh political representation
199 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh, Chapters 11, 12 & 13. 200 Ibid., pp.261-266. 201 Ibid., pp.289-296. 202 Ibid., pp.296-303. 203 Ibid., pp.292-293. 226
at Westminster204 – areas that were also of interest for the broader Welsh
intelligentsia of the 1980s.
In this context, Gwyn A. Williams saw the 1979 devolution referendum as more than a vote about the form of government or even the position of Wales in
Britain.205 Despite Plaid Cymru’s distance from the Labour proposal for devolution,
the campaign had come to be associated with them, and the ‘no’ vote not only rejected
Plaid Cymru but the Wales and the Welshness it claimed to represent, a view shared by the Welsh intelligentsia of the 1980s.206 The identity time bomb sown in the industrial era had exploded, and Nonconformist, radical/Liberal, Welsh-speaking
Wales was rejected. Later national and EEC elections confirmed this rejection.207
Even Plaid Cymru abandoned its grasp on this old stereotypical identity, moving to the left of politics and primarily concentrating on the language issue.208
The two poems with which G.A. Williams concluded confirm his concern that
a cultural vacuum had replaced the old definition of Welshness, leaving nothing but
the idea of Britain – the myth he rejected during the Age of the Princes. William
Butler Yeats provided the first of the two poems, offering a reflection on how the
misuse of Welsh history and mythology in pursuit of the Celtic ideal had made it
204 Martin Barclay (1978) “The Slaves of the Lamp – The Aberdare Miners’ Strike 1910.” Llafur, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp.24-42; Trevor Boyns (1989) “Of Machines and Men in the 1920s.” Llafur, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp.30-40; J. Graham Jones (1981/2) “ Forming Plaid Cymru: Laying the Foundations, 1923-26.” National Library of Wales Journal, Vol. 22, pp.427-459 & (1989) “Socialism, Devolution and a Secretary of State for Wales, 1940-64.” Honorable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.135- 159; Ian McAllister (1981) “The Labour Party in Wales: the Dynamics of One-Partyism.” Llafur, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.79-89; Alwyn Roberts (1989) “Some Political Implications of S4C.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.211-228; Peter Stead (1973) “The Welsh Working Class.” Llafur, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp.42-54; Colin H. Williams (1985) “Public Gain and Private Grief: The Ambiguous Nature of Contemporary Welsh.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.27-48; M.G. Woodhouse (1978) “Mines for the Nation or Mines for the Miners? Alternative Perspectives on Industrial Democracy, 1919-1921.” Llafur, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp.92-109. 205 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh, pp.295-303. 206 Ibid., pp.295-303. 207 Ibid., p.296 & pp.302-303. 208 Ibid., p.302. 227 irrelevant for and, therefore, eventually discarded by the Welsh people209. The final poem, “The Welsh Hill Country” by R.S. Thomas210, reflected on the growing hollowness of Welsh culture, society and identity.
Central to his final chapter was Gwyn A. Williams’ personal doubt that the
Welsh would remake themselves yet again.
Wales has always been now. The Welsh as a people have lived by making and
remaking themselves in generation after generation, usually against the odds, usually
within a British context. Wales is an artefact which the Welsh produce. If they want
to. It requires an act of choice. Today, it looks as though that choice will be more
difficult than ever before. There are roads out towards survival as a people, but they
are long and hard and demand sacrifice and are at present unthinkable to most of the
Welsh…in these days without precedent and without promise, I must confess that I
often succumb to what Aneurin Bevan once called, in capital letters, The Invasion of
Doubt…One thing I am sure of. Some kind of human society, though God knows
what kind, will no doubt go on occupying these two western peninsulas of Britain,
but that people, who are my people and no mean people, who have for a millennium
and a half lived in them as a Welsh people, are now nothing but a naked people under
an acid rain.211
Gwyn A. Williams’ conclusion could not be more different from that of Vaughan-
Thomas. Gwyn A. Williams’ reflected the 1980s uncertainty over the boundaries and futures of Welshness, if not their confidence in the existence and continued existence of Wales and Welshness. For this historian of Wales, nothing – including the nature of the relationship between Wales and England in Britain – was certain.
209 Ibid., pp.304-305. 210 Ibid., p.306. 211 Ibid., pp.304-305. 228
It is worth noting that none of the other Welsh historians addressing issues within the twentieth century shared Gwyn A. Williams’ doubts. Welsh historians made significant efforts to grasp the nature of Welsh politics and society as witnessed in the twentieth century. They essentially provided a historical version of the intelligentsia’s concerns with the closures of the coal mines, the restructuring of
Welsh society and the political changes within Welsh identity.212 It is, therefore, evident that Gwyn A. Williams was not alone in his questioning approach to the decade but the nature of Gwyn A. Williams’ book and his disavowal of objective, detached history allowed him to venture further into the realms of soul-searching than facilitated by pure history.
For both authors, England and Britain remained central features in Welsh history and central actors in shaping Wales and Welshness. Vaughan-Thomas and
Gwyn A. Williams saw this influence differently – and differently from the way Dodd and Gwynfor Evans viewed it – and it is clear that these differences were, in turn, influenced by the author’s own beliefs and perspectives. Both Vaughan-Thomas and
Gwyn A. Williams have, in essence, provided historiographical responses to the main issues of the 1980s – who were the Welsh, how was a Welsh identity to be defined, and what road the Welsh should take. There is one significant difference between, in particular, Gwyn A. Williams’ book and the general approach evident in the work of the Welsh intelligentsia of the 1980s. The Welsh intelligentsia were moving away from a Wales and Welshness defined by England or by a relationship with Britain.
212 J. Graham Jones (1982/3) “Wales and the ‘New Socialism’, 1926-1929.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 11, pp.173-199; Chris Williams (1987) ““An Able Administrator of Capitalism”? The Labour Party in the Rhondda, 1917-1921.” Llafur, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp.20-33; Hywel Francis & Kim Howells (1982) “The Politics of Coal in South Wales 1945-48.” Llafur, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp.74-85; Trevor Boyns (1989) “Of Machines and Men in the 1920s.” Llafur, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp.30-40; J. Graham Jones (1981/2) “Forming Plaid Cymru.” National Library of Wales Journal, Vol. 22, pp.427-459; Alwyn Roberts (1989) “Some Political Implications of S4C.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.211-228. 229
Gwyn A. Williams’ conclusion hinted at such possibility, but his history argued that
the Welsh had always chosen to include England and Britain in their calculations and
that this would probably continue past 1985, although his historical analysis indicated
his concern over the mythical basis of this relationship. Vaughan-Thomas did not
really consider any other option. So long as Welshness was preserved, and Wales
remained prominent on the British and international scene, he did not appear to see
any problems with the role of England and Britain in defining Welsh identity.
Certainly, neither history followed the path emerging among the Welsh intelligentsia in the 1980s, of letting a Welsh identity define the relationship between Wales and
England in Britain. One does have to wonder whether it would actually be possible to
approach Welsh history from this perspective or whether the dominance of England in
Welsh history would make such an approach unfeasible.
Regardless, there are some very different tendencies evident in the history of
the 1980s when compared to Dodd’s and Gwynfor Evans’ works in the 1970s. It is
evident that these differences emerged from the events occurring in Wales and from
the intellectual response to the situation in which Wales found itself in the 1980s. The
1979 devolution referendum acted as a break between two ways of understanding
Wales and Welshness and the 1980s were a decade of searching and questioning:
would the 1990s reveal any answers to the questions of the 1980s? 230
Chapter Five
Towards Wales or Europe? The 1990s.
During the 1990s, the relationship between Wales and England in Britain
continued to evolve, as did the understanding of this relationship evident in the journal
articles written by the Welsh intelligentsia. In terms of foreign relations, Britain’s
experience of the 1990s was dominated by the first Gulf War, the USA and the EU.
Domestically, the economy, governmental structure and the growth of nationalism in
Scotland, Wales and England impacted quite substantially on Welsh and British attitudes
towards both Britain and Wales. This was particularly evident within the field of British
history. It was during the 1990s that the New British History concept really caught on
and the historiographical idea of the connection between history and identity was more
publicly acknowledged. For Britain, these events and situations continued the challenge
towards the validity of Britain as a state, an economy and an identity. Essentially, the
British government was still attempting to come to terms with the realities of the British global situation, and the British people were not necessarily pleased by the actions taken in the process.
Unlike the previous two decades, the Welsh reaction to these 1990s events was
actually not entirely dissimilar to that of the people of England: both peoples began to
attempt to rebuild an identity that was not imperially British. The Welsh, of course, had a
definite advantage in this procedure as they had a cultural and identity base from which
to work. In the 1990s, the Welsh intelligentsia began to find an answer to the questions
that had shaped their discussion in the 1980s. Thatcherism continued to play a major role 231
in pushing the Welsh intelligentsia away from England and towards an expression of
Wales that was more self-confident and far less defensive. This combined with the
European Union’s increasing emphasis on regionalism to further facilitate changes in the
Welsh attitude towards Britain, Wales and Welshness. John Major’s government, still structured along the lines defined by Thatcherism, was unenthusiastic about the EU and regionalism and this, along with growing concern over the government’s lack of transparency, continuing economic problems and globalisation, heightened Welsh disillusionment with the then-current British governmental structure. It was apparent that this disillusionment was, indeed, Welsh, and not just a sentiment confined to the Welsh intelligentsia. Throughout the 1990s, the work of the intelligentsia indicated that they were tending to argue that Wales needed to define its own priorities and, at least to some extent, be able to act upon those priorities. Welsh intelligentsia had argued this before – the 1970s were a case in point – and had failed to carry the Welsh public with them. By
1997, however, there would be one pointed demonstration of the Welsh public’s dissatisfaction with the state of government and society in Britain, a demonstration that also indicated a rise in Welsh self-confidence. One aspect of Tony Blair and Labour’s election campaign was Scottish and Welsh devolution. The Scots were to be offered a legislative parliament, the Welsh an executive assembly. Unlike that of 1979, the 1997 devolution referendum received a resounding ‘yes’ vote in Scotland, and a weaker ‘yes’ vote in Wales. This, more than anything else, illustrated the depth of the changes that had occurred in Wales over the intervening 18 years. The depth of public commitment to
Wales as an entity in and of itself remains questionable in the 21st century – the depth of public commitment to any governmental body is, arguably, questionable except in cases 232
of revolution. Nonetheless, somewhere in the 1990s, Britain and Wales changed enough
to facilitate a popular endorsement of Welsh devolution.
The European Union was, undoubtedly, one of the dominant influences
throughout the 1990s, both in Wales and in Britain. John Major’s government retained
Thatcher’s distinctly less than enthusiastic attitude about full British participation in the
EU: at least, in a European Union headed towards increased integration and sacrifice of
national sovereignty. This attitude was expensive in terms of political credibility with the
general public, not the least because British public opinion towards the EU was beginning
to shift from scepticism into a genuine interest in the economic potential of the
institution.1 Major’s failure to remedy the British doldrums simply enhanced popular discontent with both Conservative economic and EU policies.
One area in which this change of popular attitude towards the EU was particularly
evident was the trade union movement. During the 1990s, a much weaker post-Thatcher
British Trade Union Congress became increasingly pro-EU, shifting away from the anti-
EU stance that had been evident between 1960 and 1989.2 Both attitudes, pre and post
1990, were rational, in that they responded to the British Trade Union Congresses’
perception of the economic situation in which Britain found itself.3 By the 1990s,
globalization had drastically altered the way in which the British economy functioned.
Under Thatcherism, the official response had been to shift from a national, protected economic base to that of a free market, focusing on increasing competitiveness and, therefore, profit and the international success of the British economy. Conservative
1 Kenneth O. Morgan (2001) Britain Since 1945: The People’s Peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.509-522. 2 Gerard Strange (2002) “British Trade Unions and European Union Integration in the 1990s: Politics versus Political Economy.” Political Studies, Vol. 50, p.332. 3 Ibid., p.334. 233
policy thus shifted Britain away from the “coordinated market policies” of Europe towards the American model of “uncoordinated, liberal market economies.”4 In Britain, the shift towards the free market economy was a far from popular move among the
British people as it had emerged from government policy rather than business or grass- roots motivation and its effects on the working class were resented by the British Trade
Union Congress.5
Given the lack of popular support for Thatcher’s policies and rising concern throughout Britain over their social effects, it is not surprising that not all British organisations simply accepted the new economic ideology and structure. Globalisation remained an economic fact, but solutions other than that of the Conservative Party were proffered. The Trade Union Congresses’ shift towards the EU was one example. This change in attitude was, according to Gerard Strange, a rational response to globalisation, to the decline of the nation-state and to the emergence of the EU as an alternative political economy.6 The first two factors had contributed to the growing inability of the
British government to ensure full employment or to manage the domestic economy successfully.7 The EU in contrast, offered the Trade Union Congress a way to address their concerns, particularly given the development of the Maastricht Treaty and the increased possibility of Congress interaction directly with the EU.8
This attitude towards Europe was drastically different from that expressed by
John Major’s Conservative government, courtesy of the strong and very visible Euro-
4 James E. Cronin (2000) “Convergence by Conviction: Politics and Economics in the Emergence of the ‘Anglo-American Model.’” Journal of Social History, Vol. 33, No. 4, p.12. 5 Ibid., p.10. 6 Gerard Strange (2002) “British Trade Unions and European Union Integration in the 1990s: Politics versus Political Economy.” Political Studies, Vol. 50, p.334. 7 Ibid., p.335. 8 Ibid., p.337. 234
sceptic wing of the Conservative Party. Technically, John Major had promised to bring
Britain to a position at the heart of Europe but lack of progress in fulfilling this promise
disillusioned not only portions of British society, but also the other members of the
European Union.9 By the end of the decade, this disillusionment had reached the point
where The Guardian could issue a warning that, should Britain ever decide to become a cooperative and committed member of the EU, they might find their fellow members less than enthusiastic about their presence.10 As it was, Britain’s economic problems
combined with its uncooperative attitude to reduce their influence within the EU,
resulting in the popular feeling that the Conservative government was unable to
effectively defend British interests within the body.
The comment in The Guardian was, again, indicative of the awareness of the
British intelligentsia and press of the promise of the EU, and of the paralysis of the government in drawing Britain towards this alternative economic structure, one that appeared to come with a lower social cost whilst continuing to defend British interests within the institution. It was the social cost aspect, however, that appeared to motivate most of the intelligentsia’s concerns over both Thatcherism/monetarism and the EU. The world economy may have impacted substantially on both national economy and on the ability of national governments to control their domestic economies, but there was considerable dissatisfaction in Britain during the 1990s over Major’s – and Thatcher’s – attempts to deal with this economic and political reality and their ideological lack of
interest in the social consequences of monetarism and free market economics.
9 Andreas Musolff (2004) “The Heart of the European Body Politic. British and German Perspectives on Europe’s Central Organ.” Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, Vol. 25, No. 5 & 6, p.448. 10 Ibid., p.448. 235
There were two significant EU-related events that illustrated the overall nature of the relationship between Britain under Major and the EU, neither of which cast a particularly pleasant light on John Major or the Conservatives as Prime Minister, party or government. Britain had, after much debate, formally signed the Treaty of Maastricht in
February 1992, with official opt-outs from plans for a single currency and from the Social
Chapter. In and of itself, accession to this Treaty was required for Britain to remain a part of the European Union. As such, Major’s signature could be seen as an achievement in bringing Britain further into Europe and into a more integrated European Union.
Thatcher’s Euro-sceptics were, however, still very much present in the Conservative
Party, hence the necessity of the opt-outs from the two Treaty areas perceived as the largest affronts on British sovereignty and tradition. These Tory Europhobes were not satisfied with the negotiated opt-outs, resulting in the steady growth of public dissension within the Conservative Party.11 Such discord seriously hampered Major’s ability to deal with the EU throughout the remainder of his time in office, resulting in the retention of
Britain’s less than stellar reputation among the other constituent nations in the EU.
Major and the Conservative government also lost standing within Britain, due to the highly visible nature of the Eurosceptic wing, Cabinet dissention and the eventual formation of the anti-European Referendum Party by Sir James Goldsmith just prior to the 1997 election.12 These pre-election antics merely served to confirm the growing public opinion of Conservative economic and political ineptitude.
Relations with both the EU and the British public were further undermined in
1992, when Britain was forced to leave the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) during a
11 Ian Cawood (2004) Britain in the Twentieth Century. London: Routledge, p.371. 12 Ibid.. 236
difficult period for the European currency market. Major had taken Britain into the ERM
in an attempt to facilitate the control of inflation, part of the basic reason behind the
policies of Thatcherism.13 A recession in 1992, rising inflation rates, Italy’s forced
withdrawal from the ERM and a corresponding run on the pound made it impossible for
the British government to retain the price set on the pound in the system.14 British
politicians blamed Germany in the form of the Bundesbank and the ERM system itself
for this humiliating withdrawal.15 Their efforts to shift the blame and the outpouring of
anti-EU sentiment by the Conservative Party or the Tory Press could not, however,
prevent the government’s loss of face16 or the further damage done to the Conservative
government’s reputation for financial competence.17
By 1997, there was a distinct feeling both in Britain among the more pro-
European sections of the public and on the continent that Britain’s lack of cooperation
with the advances being made by the EU, particularly in terms of the Social Chapter and
the proposed monetary union, was not only potentially problematic for the EU but also for Britain. With the end of the Cold War, the countries of Europe, both west and east, had to reorient themselves quickly from the USA-USSR duopoly politically and economically.18 The USA no longer needed such close relations with the western
European bloc, including Britain.19 The first Gulf War, erupting in 1990, hid this reality
at first, but British intellectuals were well aware of the potential impact of this significant
13 William D. Rubenstein (2003) Twentieth Century Britain: A Political History. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.337-338. 14 Ibid.. 15 Alan Booth (2001) The British Economy in the Twentieth Century. Basingstoke: Palgrave, p.82. 16 William D. Rubenstein (2003) Twentieth Century Britain: A Political History. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p.338. 17 Ian Cawood (2004) Britain in the Twentieth Century. London: Routledge, p.370. 18 Will Hutton (1992) “Britain in a Cold Climate: the Economic Aims of Foreign Policy in the 1990s.” International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 4, pp.619-632. 19 Ibid., pp.622-623. 237
alteration of the political world map on Britain. Will Hutton warned in 1992 that, with the decline of international tension and enforced cooperation, national interests would re- emerge, creating an atmosphere in which Thatcherism, with its emphasis on the free market over national protection would be far less economically advantageous for Britain than the Conservatives argued.20 Indeed, the resultant weakening of the domestic industrial base through the failure or sale of those industries considered uncompetitive in favour of the development of the London based finance economy was increasingly becoming an issue of considerable concern among the British intelligentsia. Europe and the EU offered a potential route by which Britain could rebuild its industry and retain a powerful role within both Europe and the world – still a major governmental concern in the 1990s.
The continuing problems with the British economy also contributed to the public’s declining faith in the Conservative Government’s financial competence and to the growing dissatisfaction with the Conservative Government in general. Globalisation and monetarism were proving to be detrimental for society. This reinforced the 1980s conclusion in Wales that monetarism was, by itself, problematic for the continued existence of community in general and for the continued existence of the social welfare side of the economy in particular. As the free market became increasingly dominant, the public sector was steadily absorbed by the private, resulting in previously non-market areas being treated as commodities.21 Thatcher had basically altered the rules under which society had functioned since WW2. Service sectors from railways to hospitals to
20 Ibid., pp.627-632. 21 Hilary Wainwright (2004) “Reclaiming ‘The Public’ through the People.” The Political Quarterly, Vol. 75, No.1, pp.141-156. 238
education were expected to become competitive industries, functioning successfully in
the private sector.
Compulsory competitive tendering, subcontracting of ancillary services, the breaking up
of services into parts that can be sold as a price, the demoralizing and fragmenting
transferral of workforces accustomed to providing a public service into companies
requiring them to work for profit – all of these processes eroded the foundations of the
social democratic state, which had been by definition a body of non-market institutions
intended to meet social needs according to democratic principles of organisation and
resource allocation.22
Monetarism altered the rules of the game which, in turn, led to the decline of the welfare
economy that had existed since WW2. This decline had serious and negative impacts on
the social structure of Britain, far beyond the devastating problems unleashed by the
simple closure of industries. By 1997, Britain led Western Europe in terms of poverty,
with relatively weak income and child support.23 British intellectuals were, as illustrated
by their journal articles, in no doubt that these problems were structural in origin, directly
related to the shape of the economy and to government policy.24 Thatcherism and
monetarism as embodied by John Major were significant causes of British societal and
economic decline.
Specific complaints tended to focus on the treatment meted out to noncompetitive
industries and the lack of Conservative interest in the social consequences of industrial
22 Ibid., p.146. 23 Steve Illiffe (1997) “Review of Britain Divided: The Growth of Social Exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s by Alan Walker & Carol Walker.” British Medical Journal, Vol. 315, p.437. 24 Ibid., p.437. 239
closures. This issue was very big in the 1980s in Wales and, by the 1990s, had spread
into England. John Major’s government continued Thatcher’s trend of seeing the
development of competitive industries as more important than the social costs of closure
and downsizing, and more important than securing long-term domestic fuel supplies and
industries.25 Existing industrial structures facilitating an integrated industry, notably in
the field of energy, were ignored rather than developed, and divided according to
function, effectively unravelling an entire national industry to rebuild it according to free
market imperatives.26 Unfortunately for monetarism and the British economy, these
actions almost inevitably resulted in the sale of sections of British companies to foreign
buyers, effectively destroying a national industry.
This was the central concern behind these more specific complaints: the sense that
the long term British interests were being traded for short-term economic benefits.
Industrial restructuring may well have resulted in more efficient companies – although
privatisation, in general, had precisely the opposite effect - but these industries were no
longer domestic property. Domestic resources – including people – were being ignored,
resulting in high levels of unemployment.27 Increasingly, through the 1990s, the British
intellectuals began to consider this attitude problematic.
As well as this, by the late 1990s, concern was emerging over the non-
transparency of the British government. Much of this concern was triggered by the BSE
crisis and the repeated denials by the government of any risk of human cross contagion.28
25 David Sadler (2001) “The Political Economy and Regional Implications of Energy Policy in Britain in the 1990s.” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol. 19, pp.5-6. 26 Ibid., p.5. 27 Steve Illiffe (1997) “Review of Britain Divided: The Growth of Social Exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s by Alan Walker & Carol Walker.” British Medical Journal, Vol. 315, p.437. 28 Haroon Ashraf (2000) “BSE Inquiry Uncovers ‘A Peculiarly British Disaster.’” The Lancet, Vol. 356, pp.1579-1580. 240
Indeed, the BSE crisis itself was seen by social critics as the result of free market and
profit mentalities, through the relaxing of standards on intensive farming.29 By the end
of the decade, the public was left in no doubt that the government had intentionally
withheld information about the possibility of cross-species contagion despite receiving
repeated warnings from British scientists.30 British beef was banned by the EU and the
British public lost confidence in beef, lamb, chicken and pork production, as problems
became apparent across the board. This further dinted the British economy and public
confidence in the Conservative government.31 This situation was not helped, and neither
were British-EU relations, by Major’s announcement of non-cooperation with the EU ban
and investigation. After all, with no risk of cross-species contamination being admitted, there was no reason for the ban or the investigation.32
When combined, this mixture of intelligentsia and public discontent seriously
undermined the credibility of the Conservative government of the 1990s. This was not
all that was being undermined, however. In both Scotland and Wales nationalism was
becoming far more credible, and similar debates were emerging in England itself,
centring on the need to rediscover an English as opposed to British identity. More than
Thatcherism was being questioned and rejected in the Britain of the 1990s.
Unsurprisingly, Wales and Welshness made very few appearances in the mainstream
British journals, but the British intelligentsia’s attitudes towards Scotland and Ireland
clearly demonstrated the increasing seriousness with which their claims to a national
identity and to some level of independence were taken. By 1994, the Scottish Nationalist
29 Ibid., p.1579. 30 Ibid., p.1580. 31 Ian Cawood (2004) Britain in the Twentieth Century, p.370. 32 Ibid.. 241
Party (SNP) was being acknowledged as more than a protest party or a new social
movement. It was, rather, a party aimed at independence and supported by Scots who
believed that Scotland’s economic performance would improve with independence.33
SNP voters also tended to identify as Scottish, not British – again, an acceptance of the
validity of an identity other than that of Britain or England.34
The Conservative government’s attitude towards Irish and Northern Irish claims
also became more realistic. John Major’s negotiated Downing St Declaration of
December 1993 was based on the concept that the political destiny of Northern Ireland should be based on the choice of both Ireland and Northern Ireland, and should include the possibility of reunification.35 Irish identity was thereby acknowledged and validated,
as was the right for the constituent nations of Britain - most notably Scotland and Wales -
to choose their own primary identity. In reality, these developments were probably the
result of a combination of factors, including the simple political pressure imposed by the
people of Scotland and Wales. This pressure manifested particularly through the growing
influence of nationalist parties and groups such as Plaid Cymru and Cymdeithas yr Iaith –
influence that emerged from the very real questioning of the 1980s and the equally real
dissatisfaction with the Britain of the 1990s. The people of Scotland and Wales had
alternatives to Britain and were, in the 1990s, starting to take these alternatives more
seriously.
There can be no doubt, however, that there was a growing tendency among the
British intelligentsia to consider identity as constructed and chosen, rather than as a
33 Jack Brand, James Mitchell & Paula Surridge (1994) “Social Constituency and Ideological Profile: Scottish Nationalism in the 1990s.” Political Studies, Vol. XLII, pp.622-623 & p.627. 34 Ibid., p.624. 35 Ian Cawood (2004) Britain in the Twentieth Century, p.374. 242
given. Part of this acknowledgment involved the consideration of the role that history
played in the construction of identity. Racial identity was increasingly being viewed as constructed through history, as was Britain itself. By 1990, this constructed nature of
Britain, in terms of both nation and identity was increasingly being acknowledged:36 an acknowledgment that contributed towards the legitimisation of nationalist sentiment in all constituent nations but also re-legitimised an overarching British identity. This process was reflected in the historical world through the production of the New British History,37
a reaction to the events that were shaping Britain in the late twentieth century. In this
sense, the events and issues that dominated the years between 1972 and 1997 are inseparable from the historiography of the period. The close relationship between the
politico-economic scene and the emergent New British History is just one example of this
connection.
Numerous periods and events had, by 1997, been selected as seminal in the
process of the construction of Britain and British identity, but there were at least three
aspects that attracted a general consensus with regard to their significance. These three
were the possession of world power status, possession of the Empire, and being a
Protestant, island nation. In 1992, Linda Colley’s book Britons: The Forging of a Nation,
argued strongly for the role of all three in facilitating the creation of a British identity to
which the subjects of Britain could relate.38 By 1998, Edwin Jones was continuing the
argument, albeit from a different perspective – Catholic Welsh.39 Essentially, however,
36 Linda Colley (1992) Britons: The Forging of a Nation, 1707-1837; Linda Colley (1992) “Britishness and Otherness: An Argument.” The Journal of British Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp.309-329. 37 An ideal example of the New British History is The Four Nations: A History of the United Kingdom, by Frank Welsh. This was not published until 2002, but is an advanced specimen of the new approach to British history. 38 Linda Colley (1992) Britons: The Forging of a Nation, 1707-1837. 39 Edwin Jones (1998) The English Nation: The Great Myth. Thrupp, Stroud: Sutton Publishing. 243
Britain was, in all the arguments, constructed against Europe, against Catholicism and in
the light of British political and economic success on a global scale.
Yet by 1990, all of these formative aspects of a historical Britain had if not
entirely disappeared, been seriously undermined. The inability of the Thatcher and
Major governments to manage the domestic economy successfully in the face of
increased globalisation and the decreased effectiveness of the nation-state reinforced this
fact. Membership in the EU further demonstrated the drastic changes occurring within
Britain as a result of these realities. Britain was no longer an Imperial power, and did not
possess an Empire or world power status despite continued attempts to punch above its
weight. Membership in the EU limited the effectiveness of an identity constructed
against the Catholic ‘other’ – suddenly, Britain was a part of, rather than positioned against, that ‘other’. It was the acknowledgement of all these changes, both practical and ideological that was behind the intelligentsia’s gradual reworking of both Britain as it was understood, and behind the policies of the Conservative government. Both were acknowledgements that the world had changed and efforts to deal with the reality of that change. The rise of nationalism in Scotland and Wales was also an expression of this acknowledgement.
Correspondingly, the 1990s saw historical examinations, not merely of where
British identity had come from, but of why it was failing. In 1992, Linda Colley argued
that Britain and Britishness were valid identities claimed by a substantial proportion of
the British population, and had broadly been accepted as such for hundreds of years.40 In this active sense, Britain and Britishness remained valid and useful concepts, particularly
40 Linda Colley (1992) “Britishness and Otherness: An Argument.” Journal of British Studies, Vol. 31, pp.314-16. 244
in the world of historiography. However, the loss of the creating factors behind this
overarching British identity was allowing the re-emergence of Scottish, Welsh and
English identities and nationalisms.41 The external 'other', a Catholic Europe, had been
removed through decreased interest in religion and through British membership in the
EU, allowing the return of an increased sensitivity to internal differences in Britain,
facilitating the expression of separate national identities.42
Another interpretation was offered by David McCrone in 1997, this one rather
more political. He argued that Britain had been created as an imperial overstate that had subjects, not citizens.43 As such, the constituent countries were afforded “…a fairly high
degree of limited autonomy…”44 allowing Britishness to sit “…lightly on top of the
constituent nations as a kind of state identity…”45 This concept was significant.
McCrone was arguing that Britain became a state that had only minimal interaction with
its subjects, was, in essence, a “nightwatchman state”.46 Twentieth century warfare,
however, changed this, triggering a radical alteration in the level of state intervention in
society, seen through the “…mobilisation of manpower and the organisation of
production” by the state.47 This combined with the loss of the creating factors behind
‘Britain’ to reveal both the difficulty of transforming this umbrella identity into a primary identity, and the unsuitability of a nightwatchman state to the demands of the late twentieth century.48 In turn, the problems that emerged from these revelations resulted in
41 Ibid., p.328. 42 Ibid.. 43 David McCrone (1997) “Unmasking Britannia: The Rise and Fall of British National Identity.” Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 3, No. 4, p.585. 44 Ibid., p.583. 45 Ibid., p.584. 46 Ibid., p.585. 47 Ibid., p.590. 48 Ibid., pp.592-593 & p.595. 245
both the re-emergence of the national identities that had continued to exist beneath that of
Britain, and the rejection of the attempt to make British identity the dominant and
primary personal identity.49
This return to a non-British expression of identity was first visible in the rise of
Scottish and Welsh nationalism from 1960 on, but by the 1990s, had branched into a
search for England and Englishness. This primarily found expression in the attempt to
separate Britain and England, and a re-founding of England in history.50 Britain and
British identity were, then, in the 1990s being increasingly readjusted to cope with the concepts and identities attached to England, Wales and Scotland.
It has also been suggested that this gradual refocus on the constituent nations of
Britain was the effect of the process of decolonisation, but the argument was, by 2004, still incomplete.51 Decolonisation has long been toyed with in terms of Scotland and
Wales, particularly in the internal colony theory used to describe the economic and
political peripheral position of both Scotland and Wales in Britain. Again, this theory
was quite controversial but did contribute to the reconsideration of Britain and its
constituent nations in the 1990s.
Wales was, of course, very much a part of this Britain but, in many ways, was
becoming far less inclined to adhere to a state structure with which the Welsh
intellectuals, Plaid Cymru and a significant proportion of the Welsh population were less than happy. This rise in active dissatisfaction with the then-current form of Britain was the result of the Welsh experience of the events that shaped Britain in both the 1980s and
49 Ibid., pp.593-595. 50 Jeremy Black (1998) “An English Identity?” History Today, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp.5-7. 51 Stephen Howe (2003) “Internal Decolonization? British Politics Since Thatcher as Post-Colonial Trauma.” Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp.286-304. 246
the 1990s. Thatcherism had begun the slide away from Britain in the 1980s but John
Major’s continuation of the majority of Thatcher’s policies ensured that Welsh dissatisfaction and, correspondingly, national and patriotic sentiment continued to grow.
In political and structural terms, Wales changed quite substantially during the
1980s and 1990s. Thatcherism as practiced by both Thatcher’s and John Major’s
Conservative governments may have involved political centralisation but their policy of
economic decentralisation – out of state into private hands – resulted in the steady
development of unelected administrative bodies within Wales, colloquially known as
quangos. Similarly, the Welsh Home Office grew as political centralisation increased,
increasing the responsibility of the Welsh Secretary for State in a way that facilitated the
institutional definition of Wales as a country apart from England. There were, however, considerable concerns within Wales over the non-elected composition of the quangos
(Quasi Autonomous National Government Organisations). This concern, combined with the decreasing powers allocated to the local councils encouraged the growth of the intelligentsia’s and the general public’s interest in official forms of devolution.
Economic concerns also contributed to the growth of interest in devolution in
Wales. Welsh economic experiences occurred within the British framework.
Globalisation, the EU and BSE were all significant factors in shaping the Welsh economy
in the 1990s and, correspondingly, the Welsh attitude towards the economic relationship between Wales and England in Britain. The 1980s had, broadly speaking, been both good and bad for the Welsh economy, good in that Thatcher, through her expectation that
Wales be economically competitive, encouraged the rejection of the idea that Wales was reliant on some level of financial support from Westminster. Thatcher’s policies of 247
monetarism and economic competitiveness did, however, as discussed in Chapter Four, impact negatively on the existent structure of the Welsh economy, particularly on the remainder of the Welsh heavy industry. For the Welsh, the implications of this callous
disregard for Welsh industrial traditions and for the communities reliant on those
industries for work contributed to the economic disillusionment with Britain that had
been slowly developing since the 1960s. By the 1990s, continued Welsh high
unemployment levels, the lowest rate of qualified school leavers in Britain, low pay levels comparative to the south-east of England, and the dominance of secondary factories ensured not only real concern about the Welsh and British economies from the
Welsh intelligentsia but also from the Welsh people. The people’s concerns in particular were illustrated by the steady return of Labour, Liberal or Plaid Cymru MPs to
Westminster, the rising interest in the EU as an economic alternative, and the growth of popular interest and participation in Welsh language and culture.
Poor British economic performance was definitely one of the primary motivating
factors behind the rapid increase in Welsh business and local governmental interest in the
European Union in the late 1980s and 1990s. The Irish example clearly demonstrated the benefits that were potentially available to a small member state, particularly one whose economy was in a state of disrepair. Ireland had, through EU membership, been able to develop its economy from primarily agricultural to one of high tech industries, significantly lower its unemployment rate and raise its GNP. The British framework was, by the 1990s, clearly unable to foster this sort of development in Wales and the Welsh businesses and local governments were steadily becoming more actively involved in attempting to position Wales more advantageously within the European Union. The 248
Welsh Office, for example, fostered closer relations with Baden-Wurttemburg in
Germany,52 another small, highly industrialised and economically successful region.
Wales in Europe, intended to foster international investment in Wales, also continued to
grow after its birth in 1986 at the instigation of the Welsh Counties Committee and the
Welsh Development Agency.53 Welsh involvement in Europe as a region and
international investment in Wales were both facilitated by the rapid development of
communications technology during the decade, rendering Welsh hopes for a ‘Wales in
Europe’ far more realistic, at least in economic terms. “Aberystwyth is now closer to the
European centre than Porthmadog was when its slates re-roofed Hamburg in 1842.”54
In 1992, Britain signed the Treaty of Maastricht, signifying British entry into the
new European Common Market. Britain’s opt-out of the Social Charter, however, was
not well received by the Welsh Trade Unions, by Plaid Cymru or the Welsh Labour
Party, all of whom vocally demanded British accession to that aspect of the Treaty. On
the Welsh part, this action must be seen as a reaction to the Thatcherite disregard for
society and community. British policy had failed to provide for the social economy and
Europe was offering an alternative.
When combined, these social and economic factors fostered the growth of regionalism in Wales, something that was facilitated by another aspect of the Treaty of
Maastricht, one that Britain as a state was not happy about. Maastricht, in utilising the
policy of subsidiarity between Brussels and the administrative centres of its member
states opened the door to intra-national demands for the extension of the policy between
52 Alwyn Roberts (1992) Wales and Europe: 1992. Darlith Ben Bowen Lecture, North Wales Arts Association, Sept 25. 53 Christopher Harvie (1995) Europe and the Welsh Nation. Welsh Political Archive Lecture 4 Nov 1994. The National Library of Wales: Aberystwyth. 54 Ibid., p.21. 249
regions and state centres. Furthermore, the emergent Council of the Regions increased national pressure to recognise the internal regions possessed by the majority of member states. Both factors were highly relevant within the British situation and both Wales and
Scotland began putting pressure on Westminster to not only offer them increasing political and economic recognition but also to participate in Europe in a more productive manner.
Within Wales, both Plaid Cymru and local government expressed considerable
interest in the Council of the Regions, at least in part as a way of protecting not just the
Welsh economy but also Welsh identity. In the Council of the Regions and the principle
of subsidiarity, Plaid Cymru saw the potential for the development of a decentralised
Europe “…that values the diversity of its people and its cultures.”55 Thatcherism as
embodied by both Thatcher and Major demonstrably did not, particularly when those
people and cultures were embodied in community. Plaid Cymru had never accepted the
structure of Britain as it was between 1970 and 1997 but during the 1990s moved to
considering the EU as an alternative framework in which to build Wales and Welshness.
Britain was not entirely rejected but was, in a sense, marginalised. Europe, through its
interest in regionalism and subsidiarity caught Welsh attention, and became the potential
yardstick by which to measure normality. Both decentralisation and bilingualism could
become normal rather than alien, facilitating the growth of Welsh political and cultural
identity. British centralism and monolingualism were increasingly considered to be out
of date and ineffective in the modern world.
55 Plaid Cymru (1994) Making Europe Work for Wales. Plaid Cymru: The party of Wales in Europe Manifesto. 250
That these sentiments were, to some extent, shared by the general public in Wales was demonstrated clearly in the different reaction to the prospect of devolution. To begin with, the Welsh ‘yes’ campaign was conducted along a very different premise than that of the 1970s: the issues that dominated were democracy, globalisation and the EU, with devolution portrayed as being of benefit to Britain rather than as essential for the protection of Wales and Welshness. In this sense, the devolution campaign built on and emerged from the other events of the decade and from the basis laid by Thatcherism in the 1980s.
In many ways, the later decade was, effectively, an extension of the 1980s, with devolution and increased involvement in the EU the general public’s answers to the questions that had emerged during the 1980s. Similarly, the Welsh and British rejection of the Conservative Party in the May 1997 elections and the election of a Labour government on the basis of election promises that included British ascension to the Social
Chapter and devolution referendums in both Scotland and Wales indicated the parallel experiences of Wales and Britain during this decade. The Welsh experience was, it would appear, primarily distinguished by their possession of an identity outside that of
Britain and their return to this identity in the face of disillusionment with Britain.
The Welsh intelligentsia lived and worked in this Wales and, as in the previous two decades, their work encapsulated a more intense version of the attitudes among the general population. A quick scan through the journals quickly reveals one very significant change from the 1980s, particularly evident after 1992. Few of the Welsh intelligentsia continue the questioning of the boundaries of Wales and Welshness with the intensity evident in the 1980s. Most begin to consider the EU as a viable answer to the 251
uncertainties aroused by the rejection of devolution in 1979. Yet the question remains:
what did this imply for the Welsh intelligentsia’s understanding of Wales, Welshness and
the relationship between Britain and Wales?
Part of an answer to this question is suggested by the changes that occurred within
the way in which the Welsh intelligentsia addressed the fields of political identity, cultural identity, the economy and devolution. A certain amount of development was evident between the 1970s and the 1980s, with these four fields being strongly influenced by the rejection of devolution in 1979 and the corresponding attitude of questioning and challenge towards the traditional boundaries around Wales and Welshness. In this process, the Welsh intelligentsia also began to express far more self-confidence about their abilities to define Wales and Welshness and, indeed, in the unquestionable existence of Wales as an entity and Welshness as an identity. This and the lack of a predefinition of either concept ushered intellectual Wales out of the 1980s and into the 1990s. Unlike
1979, the 1980s were not sharply divided by a traumatic event: in many ways, the 1990s were, as mentioned earlier, a continuation of the processes begun in 1979.
By the 1990s, the Welsh intelligentsia had begun to move from challenging the
boundaries of Wales, Welshness and the relationship between Wales and England in
Britain to suggesting alternatives. This is most immediately visible in the way in which
the four fields were perceived by the intelligentsia. Technically, all four remained
existent but the focal issues within the fields altered dramatically with one notable
exception. Political identity almost entirely centred on the issue of devolution, and
cultural identity and language separated entirely into the different fields of language and
national identity. Thatcherism and the social neglect of monetarism remained, however, 252
central to the field of the Welsh economy. Here, the difference lay in the more prominent
appearance of the EU in relation to Welsh economic issues, something that was only just
beginning to emerge in the 1980s. Given these changes, the fields to be analysed must
also alter slightly if the intelligentsia’s understanding of where Wales stood in relation to
Britain, to England and to its own nationhood and identity is to be grasped.
Historiography also remained on the scene, albeit in a far less prominent manner outside of the field of history itself: it was not an issue of great debate among the Welsh intelligentsia in general. Correspondingly, the four fields to be analysed in this chapter are: the economy of Wales, devolution and the Welsh Assembly, Welsh national identity and the Welsh language.
By 1990, the Welsh economy, the first field to be analysed, had experienced a
decade of Thatcherism and a substantial proportion of the Welsh intelligentsia’s journal
articles were concentrated on the corresponding construction of the Welsh economy in
economic, socio-economic and politico-economic terms. This division of the economic
issue into three main areas was new. In many ways, the experience of the 1980s
appeared to have triggered the increasing sophistication of economic discussion among
the intelligentsia. Certainly, there was far more debate evident than in previous decades,
in which there was a general consensus over the problematic state of the Welsh economy,
even if the reasons given for this state could vary quite differently according to the
author’s understanding of the English/British role in the situation.
Thatcherite dismantling of the traditional Welsh industries of coal and steel had,
by 1990, largely been completed but the resultant changes in both the Welsh economic
and social structures were not. The Welsh intelligentsia continued to express 253
considerable concern about the short and long term effects of Thatcherism on Wales,
arguing that government efforts to restructure the Welsh economy in order to increase
both profitability, competitiveness and, correspondingly, to increase permanent
employment had failed. Community based, skilled mining jobs had been replaced with
low skilled or unskilled factory employment that failed to address the basic problem that
had haunted the Welsh economy since industrialisation, its narrow industrial base. Such
an economic structure failed to allow the Welsh to move forward with the rest of Europe
in creating a highly skilled, technologically advanced workforce.
Two reasons for this failure surfaced regularly in the journal articles written by
the Welsh intelligentsia – the incorrect structure and use of government and EU funding
and the nature of the internal employee pool. Tod Rutherford followed this line of
argument, stating that while Wales had received a proportionately higher amount of
funding than England and Wales, most of this had gone into the construction of low-
wage, low-skilled factory employment.56 The incentives offered by all British post-war governments had failed to attract higher-skilled research and development jobs, a fact that did not alter under Thatcher or John Major.57 Furthermore, Rutherford argued that many of the jobs created during the late 1980s and early 1990s were not, in fact, available
to the unemployed miners, due to the perception that they were not flexible enough to
adapt to the different structures of factory employment.58 Correspondingly, while Welsh
unemployment levels had dropped substantially by the start of the 1990s, male
56 Tod Rutherford (1991) “Industrial Restructuring, Local Labour Markets and Social Change: The Transformation of South Wales.” Contemporary Wales, Vol. 4, pp.9-44. 57 Ibid., pp.18-19. 58 Ibid., p.21. 254
unemployment in ex-mining towns like Aberdare remained at 19% compared to the 7%
for female unemployment.59
The ready presence of a labour pool in Wales and the steady disintegration of the
values and communities that had existed around the mines further complicated the
situation. Lack of other employment options provided the factories and service sector
with a surplus of available labour which, in turn, lowered the pressure on employers to
provide job training.60 Furthermore, many of those employed were relatively content
with low skilled jobs due to the disintegration of the coal and steel emphasis on education
and training both in job-skills and academically.61 Essentially, those firms arriving in
Wales were presented with few incentives from either government or local population to
shift away from providing low-waged, low-skilled employment.62
Many of the Welsh intelligentsia considered that these changes in industrial
Wales were at least partly responsible for an emergent socio-economic trend, one that
was not actually limited to Wales. The actual disintegration of society and community under Thatcher had been established in the 1980s and by the 1990s the results of this
disintegration were becoming apparent in the increasing polarisation of Welsh society.
Jonathan Morris and Barry Wilkinson captured the essence of this argument, stating that the widening gap between the rich and the poor and the ghettoisation of the more successful Welsh from the unemployed underclass firmly banished the already problematic concept of Wales as a classless nation.63 In this way, what had been a
59 Ibid., p.27. 60 Ibid., pp.31-39. 61 Ibid.. 62 Ibid., pp.39-40. 63 Jonathan Morris & Barry Wilkinson (1995) “Poverty and Prosperity in Wales: Polarization and Los Anglicisation.” Contemporary Wales, Vol. 8, pp.29-45. 255
distinctively Welsh society was increasingly coming to represent the America – more
specifically, Los Angeles – so admired by the Thatcherites. This, according to the Welsh intelligentsia, was not a positive development and the visible effects in Wales were
“…indictments of a specific set of social and economic policies pursued in the 1980s.”64
Rurally, Thatcherism was having a similar effect. As with industry, the Welsh
intelligentsia were well aware of the issues of agricultural decline, in-migration and the
corresponding cultural imbalance. By the 1990s, however, the primary concern evident
in the work of the intelligentsia was the rising marginalisation of those in rural
communities as privatisation and community decline isolated small towns and villages
from mainstream society.65 This, in effect, tied in closely with the concerns given voice
by Tod Rutherford: ghettoisation and marginalisation were not dissimilar. The Welsh
intelligentsia were, in the 1990s, strongly disturbed by the nature of then-contemporary society and of the effect this society was having on the people who made up Wales.
This process of increasing marginalisation and the destruction of Welsh
community was, however, under some debate among the Welsh intelligentsia. Kevin
Morgan, Professor of Regional Development at the University of Wales, Cardiff, pointed
out that there had been some very real improvement in the Welsh economy despite the
continued existence of equally real problems.66 In an article that directly challenged one
written by John Lovering, Professor of Urban Development and Governance at the same
64 Ibid., p.44. 65 Paul Cloke, Mark Goodwin & Paul Milbourne (1995) “There’s So Many Strangers in the Village Now: Marginalization and Change in 1990s Welsh Rural Life-Styles.” Contemporary Wales, Vol.8, pp.47-73. 66 Kevin Morgan (1996) “State of the Welsh Economy.” Planet, Vol. 117, pp.94-96. 256
university,67 Kevin Morgan argued that one very significant and positive change had occurred within the way in which the Welsh economy was viewed.
It is here, in the political and cultural mindset in Wales, where some of the biggest
changes have occurred in recent years. We are no longer looking to London for all the
solutions, but asking what more we in Wales can do to help ourselves…68
This change was not built on an unravelling Welsh society. According to Gareth Rees, also from the University of Wales in Cardiff, it was built on a society that had, despite the damage inflicted by Thatcherism, managed to retain its Labour affiliation and anti-Tory tendencies, its inclination towards corporatism and genuine lack of interest in the
“…individualism which is held to be the cornerstone of Thatcherite values…”69 John
Lovering, in contrast, presented the other side of the debate, arguing that these more positive views of the Welsh economy were myths that merely served to divert attention from the persistence of the Welsh economic problems and the failure of market-oriented economics.70
John Lovering offered, as a solution, the Welsh return to what he termed the
“…troublesome politics of economic purpose and distribution.”71 Kevin Morgan, in contrast, focused on devolution and the EU. Devolution would allow the Welsh to move forward proactively, while the EU offered the chance to learn “…best practice from the
67 John Lovering (1996) “New Myths of the Welsh Economy.” Planet, Vol. 116, pp.6-16. 68 Kevin Morgan (1996) “State of the Welsh Economy.” Planet, Vol. 117, p.95. 69 Gareth Rees (1990) “Restructuring Britain.” Planet, Vol. 83, pp.40-41, quote on p.41. 70 John Lovering (1996) “New Myths of the Welsh Economy.” Planet, Vol. 116, pp.6-16. 71 Ibid., p.16. 257
most innovative regions, and applying those needs to Welsh needs and circumstances.”72
In a shift away from then-recent Welsh economic trends, it appeared to be Kevin
Morgan’s solution that attracted the most attention among the Welsh intelligentsia.
Considerable interest was displayed towards both devolution and the EU as methods by which Wales could regain some control of its economic future, limit the further impact of
Thatcherite policies and move back onto the international economic stage.
Welsh institutions and local government had, since the 1970s, become progressively more involved with the EU in an effort to take advantage of the political and economic benefits proffered by the larger institution. According to Duncan Mitchell, such activity required, by the 1990s, a matching level of Welsh independence of action – essentially, the ability to independently defend Welsh interests at a European level.73
The Welsh voice would not be heard and EU developments would not consider Welsh needs, cultural and economic, unless devolution recognised the historic and modern distinctiveness of Wales.74 The EU was not only offering an alternative to the economic
function of the state of Britain but was, it would appear, encouraging the Welsh
intelligentsia to speed their return to unconditional support for devolution. The EU
offered a more appealing economic, political and cultural package than the still-
Thatcherite Britain of John Major.
Several trends that were appearing in the 1980s remained visible in the
intelligentsia’s discussion of the Welsh economic situation during the 1990s. Britain and,
therefore, the Welsh position in that state, were rendered increasingly problematic by the
72 Kevin Morgan (1996) “State of the Welsh Economy.” Planet, Vol. 117, p.95. 73 Duncan Mitchell (1992) “Wales and the Political Impact of ‘1992’.” Contemporary Wales, Vol. 5, pp.7- 22. 74 Ibid., pp.13-22. 258
economic and social consequences of the Conservative Party’s policy program. Major’s
increased tactfulness did little to alleviate the resultant disillusionment with Britain as an
economic state. The 1980s expression of increased confidence in the Welsh ability to
solve Welsh economic problems had, by the 1990s, metamorphosed into a focus on the
EU as the framework within which the Welsh could work to solve their economic
problems. This, of course, represented the continued alteration of the way in which the
Welsh intelligentsia viewed Wales, Welshness and the Welsh relationship with England in Britain. Increased self-confidence in the former and disillusionment with the latter were seriously altering the intellectual boundaries of Wales.
Devolution, the second field, was one of the main changes that emerged out of the
changes of the 1980s and continued to develop until 1997. The debate among the Welsh intelligentsia was, however, considerably more sophisticated than in the 1980s – or the
1970s – with the field being approached from several angles, three of which were
political, cultural and sceptical. All three illustrated the developments that were
occurring in the intelligentsia’s understanding of Wales, Welshness and the relationship
between Wales and England in Britain. There was, in the 1990s, a substantial increase in
the emphasis placed by those in the pro-devolution camp on the political benefits of devolution for both Wales and England. Unlike the 1970s, this emphasis did not focus on the national right of Wales to develop its political identity but rather on the need to update Britain’s democratic structure, particularly in light of the demands of globalisation
and the EU. Economic arguments were, in essence, incorporated into the less volatile
field of the structure of British politics. In many ways, this was also true for the pro- 259
devolution camp’s cultural arguments and for those who warned of the potential failure
of devolution if the Welsh public could not be brought on side.
The shift in focus within the pro-devolution camp reflected the changes that had occurred within both Britain and Wales over the 18 years between the two devolution referendums. Britain’s continued economic problems and declining world power status, particularly in light of the political rebalancing with the end of the Cold War, had further undermined the hold of Britain over its constituent nations. The EU, in offering an alternative route to economic development and some level of global influence, definitely attracted both Wales and Scotland, particularly with the Irish example of what could be achieved with full access to and control over EU funds. Wales was in a very different position in the 1990s than in the 1970s. Culture and identity remained issues but the pro- devolution camp had learned to couch their arguments in language that reflected the dominant concerns of the Welsh people and, indeed, a substantial proportion of those in
England and Scotland.
These changes were very evident in the journal articles written by the Welsh
intelligentsia on the potential and need for devolution in Wales. Labour’s return to
devolution at the start of the 1990s triggered a dramatic increase in the scope of the
debate that had begun to reappear towards the end of the 1980s. Most of the 1980s
debate had focused on the need for devolution to address the negative consequences of
Thatcherism and this remained true in the 1990s. Conservative lack of interest in
facilitating Welsh participation in the EU’s new Council of the Regions and the general
outrage over their proposed local council reforms had contributed to a steady rise of
public support for devolution in Wales. By 1992, 60 % of those polled indicated support 260
for the concept.75 Ioan Bowen Rees epitomised this argument in his article “Devolution:
Wales Cannot Wait.”76 The Conservative Party, according to Rees, stood against
everything that defined Wales and Welshness politically and culturally, most notably
community values, compassion and democracy.77 The Welsh could not afford to wait
until the opposition parties eventually dislodged the Conservatives from power.78
Devolution, based on popular demand, would not only protect Wales and Welshness from
Conservative degradation but would allow Wales to move forward in its own way as a total nation, something that was becoming increasingly necessary for the Welsh to take advantage of its European connections.79
Welsh disillusionment with the Conservative government was also evident in the
positioning of some of the journal articles in Planet. Rees’ article and another by Dave
Adamson were placed in the section of the journal entitled “Matters Arising…” that dealt
with issues that were active in the Welsh community. In this sense, the intelligentsia’s
devolution debate was not purely academic. The Welsh people were actively dissatisfied
with the policies of the Conservative government and were, according to Dave Adamson,
increasingly aware of the “…creaking legitimacy of the Union itself.”80 Britishness and
Englishness were being questioned and challenged as well as Welshness and through this
process, devolution began to shift from being a peripheral concern about national identity
to one about democracy and the then-current unrepresentative nature of the British state
structure. This situation had, according to Tom Ellis, been brought about by the failure of
75 Robin Reeves (1991/2) “A Welsh Assembly.” Planet, Vol. 90, p.117. 76 Ioan Bowen Rees (1992) “Devolution: Wales Cannot Wait.” Planet, Vol. 94, pp.3-7. 77 Ibid., p.3. 78 Ibid.. 79 Ibid., pp.3-5. 80 Dave Adamson (1995/6) “Devolution: It All Comes Round Again and Again.” Planet, Vol. 114, p.122. 261
the British state structure to keep pace with the changes that had occurred since WW2 in the international economy – globalisation and the EU – and the corresponding impact on the way the British people thought about their state, countries and identities.81
Devolution was, correspondingly, a far more legitimate issue in the eyes of the general
public in Wales and throughout Britain than it had been in the 1970s or even in the 1980s.
Concern over the impact of the Conservative government on Wales and the increasing
self-confidence in Wales and Welshness began, in the later decade, to spread from the
intelligentsia to the people of Wales as a direct result of their experience of the 1980s and
1990s.
The lack of cultural argument was painfully evident in most of the intelligentsia’s
articles dealing with devolution. Where it was addressed, it was mentioned almost as a
passing point that, while contributory to the overall argument, was more of a basic
justification for devolution than a pressing reason. For Ioan Bowen Rees, Welsh culture
was what made Tory rule so problematic in Wales, contributing to the clash of values that
triggered Welsh disillusionment with Britain.82 The steady revival of interest in Welsh
culture among the people of Wales, especially in the industrialised south, served a similar
purpose for Dave Adamson.83 Yet neither author politicised this existent Welsh culture
or sense of Welsh identity and, indeed, Dave Adamson noted that the revival of Welsh
identity and culture was primarily expressed through cross-class interest in Welsh
language education, linguistic viability and Welsh identity.84 Welsh identity and culture
81 Tom Ellis (1995/6) “The British Case for a Welsh Parliament.” Planet, Vol. 114, pp.12-15; Tom Ellis (1996) “The British Case for a Welsh Parliament – 2.” Planet, Vol. 15, pp.80-83. 82 Ioan Bowen Rees (1992) “Devolution: Wales Cannot Wait.” Planet, Vol. 94, pp.3-5. 83 Dave Adamson (1995/6) “Devolution: It All Comes Round Again and Again.” Planet, Vol. 114, pp.119- 123. 84 Ibid., p.119. 262
were, then, the foundations on which the 1990s devolution campaign was built but they
were not, at least for the Welsh intelligentsia, the actual motivating issues for pushing for
a Welsh Assembly.
Not all the Welsh intelligentsia shared the relatively high level of optimism
evident in the above articles. The rejection of devolution in 1979 had, as was made very
evident by the questioning among the Welsh intelligentsia in the 1980s, been extremely
traumatic for those inclined towards intellectual consideration of the meaning behind and
the future of Wales and Welshness. To some extent, this trauma was evident in all the
articles addressing devolution, particularly in the general avoidance of issues connected to cultural identity and the propagation of Welsh political identity through some form of
Welsh Assembly. Some of the Welsh intelligentsia’s journal articles revealed deeper
scars, however, expressed in a real scepticism towards the Labour Party’s intentions, and
the depth of Welsh popular interest in devolution. John Osmond and Alys Thomas
captured the concerns towards the commitment of the Labour Party to devolution quite
neatly.85 In 1990, John Osmond expressed concern about the continued indecisiveness of
the Labour Party over whether Wales was a nation in its own right or simply a region of
England.86 Such indecisiveness meant a corresponding level of indeterminacy about the
form of devolution to be offered to Wales. Neil Kinnock’s suggestion of three regional
assemblies in Wales was an offer that indicated the continued existence of serious
differences of opinion between the Welsh pro-devolution group and the Party most likely
to offer some form of Welsh self-government. Alys Thomas, six years later, expressed
concern over the potential pressure from England concerning Labour’s plans to include
85 John Osmond (1990) “Anaesthetising Nationalism?” Planet, Vol. 81, pp.109-111; Alys Thomas (1996) “Labour, Devolution and the “English Backlash”” Planet. Vol. 119, pp.51-56. 86 John Osmond (1990) “Anaesthetising Nationalism?” Planet, Vol. 81, pp.109-111. 263
the English in their general plans for devolution, pressure that might test Labour’s
commitment to Scottish and Welsh devolution to the limit.87 The Welsh intelligentsia had clearly learnt from their previous experience in which Labour, after proposing devolution, effectively abandoned the campaign as the result of intense internal division over the issue itself. In many ways, Labour was no longer seen as the Party that would act for Welsh interests, even those of the working classes.
The outright rejection of a Welsh Assembly in 1979 despite prior indications of
popular interest also contributed to the atmosphere of scepticism and warning evident in
some of the journal articles. Labour, in offering devolution to Scotland and Wales, did not offer the two countries identical forms of government, with the proposed Welsh
Assembly lacking the legislative powers of the proposed Scottish Parliament. A lack of
legislative powers did not appear to seriously concern the Welsh population, a fact that
was commented on with some perturbation by the Welsh intelligentsia. For John Barnie,
the Welsh apathy was both a reflection of the lack of self-confidence among the Welsh
people about their country and identity and the cause of the weaker form of government
offered to the Welsh.88 Barnie argued that the Labour proposal had, essentially, been achieved by Scottish pressure. Should the Welsh refuse a Welsh Assembly this time around and Scotland accept the proposal, there would be “…no robust Celtic neighbour from whom to hitch a political ride, and it will be hard to deny the English perception of
us as a political and cultural backwater.”89
Not all the Welsh intelligentsia had the confidence that the Welsh would be able
to win the devolution battle – or that the general population of Wales actually wanted to
87 Alys Thomas (1996) “Labour, Devolution and the “English Backlash”” Planet, Vol. 119, pp.51-56. 88 John Barnie (1997) “For “Wales” See Wales” Planet. Vol 124, p.4. 89 Ibid., p.4. 264
win the battle. Denis Balsom, in contrasting the Welsh and Scottish situations, noted the real lack of steadfast popular support for devolution in Wales, a difference he linked to the Scottish tendency to view Britain as a treaty-based Union rather than as a unitary state.90 Within Wales, only the middle class intelligentsia had been convinced of the real
need for devolution, a situation that ensured the Welsh ability to advance down the track
of self-government would be considerably slower than that of the Scots.91 “For Scotland
the question is no longer if, but when. In Wales, no such sense of inevitability can yet be
presumed. Evolution not revolution is in the air.”92
In and of itself, little appears to have altered in the way the Welsh intelligentsia
viewed the relationship between Wales and England. The changes lay, rather, in the
increased proactivity of the intelligentsia’s arguments and in their increased interest in the
attitudes of the Welsh people. For the Welsh intelligentsia, the relationship between
England and Wales in Britain was economically and politically problematic. Devolution, in facilitating Welsh freedom to develop ties with the EU, limiting Conservative inflicted damage to the Welsh economy and Welsh society and modernising the state structure of
Britain, was the most feasible adjustment to this relationship. The increased proactivity of the Welsh intelligentsia’s journal articles was a further reflection of their steady growth of self-confidence in Wales and Welshness and in the ability of the Welsh to function independently as well as within Britain in the contexts of Europe and the wider world. The developments of the 1980s had continued into the 1990s in a way that began to shape not only the world of the Welsh intelligentsia but the people of Wales and, indeed, the people of Scotland and England as well.
90 Denis Balsom (1995) “The Devolution Debate.” Planet, Vol. 110, pp.113-114. 91 Ibid., p.114. 92 Ibid.. 265
A similar form of progression from the 1980s to the 1990s was evident in the
third field to be considered, national identity. In the 1980s, the Welsh intelligentsia had begun to move away from defining Welsh identity through language and culture to a
more inclusive definition based on intention, loyalty, location and experience. In the
1990s, this more inclusive version of Welshness found several forms of expression. The
variety of ways of defining Welshness did, however, indicate one very real continuity in
the issues of Welsh identity. There was – and still is – no one way to define who was
Welsh and who was not, or even to agree conclusively what Wales itself consisted of.
Still, the continuation of this debate, albeit within wider boundaries, was very revealing
of the importance and continued viability of Wales and Welshness in the 1990s, and also
of the points considered essential by the Welsh intelligentsia for the construction of a
Welsh identity.
The shift away from language and traditional culture as the basis of Welshness changed the way the Welsh intelligentsia perceived Welsh identity. In the 1970s, Welsh identity had been considered primarily cultural, with political identity being somewhat disassociated from its cultural relative. With the apparent rejection of both in 1979, the
nature of the cultural basis of Welshness was questioned and, by the 1990s, this
questioning combined with the experiences of the Welsh intelligentsia to facilitate the
growth of interest in a national identity that unified the political and cultural aspects.
Many of the intelligentsia who published articles on Welsh national identity openly
connected this development with the impact of Thatcherism and the opportunities
available to Wales in the EU. Essentially, the Welsh intelligentsia’s approach to Welsh
identity was altering as Wales outgrew the then-current state structure of Britain. 266
A national identity involved both the identity of the people within the nation and
the identity of the nation itself. This latter aspect had, until the 1990s, more or less been
limited to the Three Wales model and its relatives – models in which Wales was divided
according to depth of Anglicisation or, alternatively, the level of retention of traditional
Welsh culture and language. In the 1990s, however, two new ways of considering the
broad identity of Wales as a nation emerged, focusing on the boundaries of Welsh
community and of Welsh nationalism. The concept of community was highly significant
within the national context as it defined the criteria through which individual identity
was, in turn, defined. When, for example, the Welsh community was defined by the level
of Anglicisation, the markers for individual Welsh identity included the ability to speak
Welsh, awareness of Welsh history, Nonconformity, Liberal or Plaid Cymru affiliation
and knowledge of traditional Welsh culture. In 1992, John Borland, Ralph Fevre and
David Denney offered an alternative model of Welsh community from which to work.93
They identified four different understandings of Wales within the country: the open
community as defined by Plaid Cymru, a culturally closed community, a secular
culturally closed community and a racially closed community.94 Plaid Cymru had begun the move towards the idea of an open community after the 1979 devolution referendum, insisting that all who were committed to Wales and its culture and lived inside the Welsh borders could claim a Welsh identity.95 Their pre-1979 version of Wales still existed,
however, in the concept of a culturally closed community, in which Wales was defined
by language, politics, religion and nationalism (Welsh-speaking, Liberal,
93 John Borland, Ralph Fevre & David Denney (1992) “Nationalism and Community in North Wales.” The Sociological Review, pp.49-72. 94 Ibid., pp.54-66. 95 Ibid., pp.55-60. 267
Nonconformist).96 The secular version of this formed the third way of defining Wales,
through community and language.97 Probably the most exclusive version was the final one – the racially closed community which was limited to those who possessed the spirit of Wales, the eneidfaeth, the possession of which would be incredibly hard to prove.98
According to David Denney, the different ways of understanding Wales resulted
in different forms of patriotism and nationalism, further complicating a single understanding of the boundaries of the Welsh nation.99 At the start of the 1990s, there
were three main groups of nationalists in Wales; Meibion Glyndwr, Cymdeithas yr Iaith
Gymraeg and Plaid Cymru. All three were based on different understandings of the
boundaries of Wales. Meibion Glyndwr were racial separatists, Cymdeithas yr Iaith
Gymraeg were socio-linguists and Plaid Cymru, as mentioned above, were cultural
pluralists. All that united the three was a conviction that the Welsh community was
distinctively Welsh and a determination to stand firmly apart from the privatisation and
market-based policies of Thatcherism.100
Neither article offered a solution to the multiple understandings of Wales as a
nation but the shift away from the terminology of Anglicisation was very significant.
The authors of the articles have all identified ways of defining Wales that, while
acknowledging the impact of the English language and English culture within Wales, do
not necessarily exclude the Welsh adaptations of these things from within a Welsh nation.
Their definitions were correspondingly far less defensive than those found in the Three
96 Ibid., pp.60-62. 97 Ibid., p.63 98 Ibid., pp.64-66. 99 David Denney (1991) “The Social Construction of Nationalism: Racism and Conflict in Wales.” Contemporary Wales, Vol. 4, pp.149-166. 100 Ibid.. 268
Wales Model and its relatives, and echoed the 1990s tendency to look for ways in which
Wales could be defined without placing it inside an English or British framework.
The 1990s understanding of the identity of the people of Wales also began this
shift away from the English/British framework. As a result of the questioning approach
of the Welsh intelligentsia in the 1980s new ways of defining Welshness emerged,
including experiential, locational and institutional. These new definitions not only
avoided the exclusiveness of the pre-1979 traditional understanding but, as with the ways
of defining the national identity of Wales as a nation, avoided terminology that directly
opposed Welsh identity to Anglicisation. Most of the Welsh intelligentsia’s journal
articles that followed this new trend directly linked these new definitions with the Welsh
experience of the 1980s and 1990s, particularly the growth of Welsh institutions and the
EU.
During the 1980s, the Welsh intelligentsia increasingly acknowledged that
English-speaking Welsh culture was a valid expression of Welsh identity. In the early
1990s this idea developed into the experiential approach to the construction of a Welsh national identity, echoing the growing trend across Britain to consider all national identities as constructed rather than given. An experiential approach, as embodied in an article by Eleri Carrog, gave further validity to the English-speaking Welsh identity, arguing that it was simply another way of experiencing Wales and Welshness.101 In the
north of Wales, Welshness was defined by the ability to speak the Welsh language as
101 Eleri Carrog (1991/2) “The Fragmented Image.” New Welsh Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp.15-18. 269
those who could not were usually from England.102 In the south, Welsh-accented English
was just as much a marker of Welsh identity as the Welsh language was in the north.103
Ioan Bowen Rees took this experiential basis for Welsh identity a step further, grounding it more firmly as a way to approach a Welsh national identity.104 He argued
that the Welsh experience consisted of a number of basic commonalities. Every Welsh
person experienced the mountains, the landscape, the Welsh local and national
community, Welsh culture and the Welsh language, despite a huge number of variations
in the actual form of experience.105 All of these aspects were interdependent, giving value and meaning to each other whilst also combining together to create a distinctive identity that should not be sacrificed to the demands of capitalism embodied by either
Britain or the EU. Here, Ioan Bowen Rees introduced a new concept into the debate over
Welsh identity, arguing that this experiential identity could provide the foundation for
Welsh actions in the wider world as opposed to letting the wider world place artificial limitations around Wales and Welshness.106 Wales and the Welsh people would,
therefore, learn who they were and interact with Britain and the EU on that basis.
The same concept was evident in an article by Professor Emrys Jones, based on
his 1993 Llandaff Lecture given to the Old Students’ Association of Aberystwyth.107 In
this article, Emrys Jones argued that Welsh identity had been shaped by the Welsh
tendency and that of the English to consider Wales as being on the periphery of a centre
102 Ibid., pp.15-18. 103 Ibid.. 104 Ioan Bowen Rees (1994) “Landscape and Identity.” New Welsh Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp.17-26. 105 Ibid., pp.17-26. 106 Ibid.. 107 Emrys Jones (1995) “Where is Wales?” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, New Series, Vol. 1, pp.123-34. 270
founded on London.108 While this definition of locational identity relegated Wales to
increasing marginalisation, especially as England itself slid further into global
insignificance in the 1990s, Emrys Jones pointed out that location could be differently defined, focusing instead on Wales as “…that place which is the cradle of a unique culture.”109 This definition of location brought Welsh identity back within Welsh
borders, again rejecting a definition based on England. The Welsh people would not be
able to regain self-respect or a sense of well-being unless this re-centring of Welsh
identity took place. “This will not happen until that notorious encyclopedia entry is
changed from ‘For Wales see England’ to ‘For Wales see Cymru.’”110
The changes that occurred within Wales in the 1980s and the corresponding discrediting of the old images attached to Welsh identity – Liberalism, Nonconformity,
Labour affiliation, and radical nationalist – resulted in the emergence of another way of redefining Wales and Welshness. R. Merfyn Jones argued that the discrediting of ideology and the undermining of traditional Welsh culture had been accompanied by the growth of unified, centralised state institutions.111 Beginning with the creation of the federal University of Wales in 1896, and the increasing institutional separation of Wales and England in the second half of the 20th century, an institutional identity was created
that was predominantly unattached to any one of the earlier ideological forms of
identity.112 According to R. Merfyn Jones, a similar process had been steadily occurring
across Europe: ideological national identity was decreasing in favour of political
108 Ibid., pp.125-126. 109 Ibid., p.134. 110 Ibid.. 111 R. Merfyn Jones (1992) “Beyond Identity? The Reconstruction of the Welsh.” The Journal of British Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp.330-357. 112 Ibid., pp.352-355. 271
institutional based identity. In both cases, Welsh and European, the people of the
relevant countries became citizens, rather than “…a people with a distinct, shared, and
immutable identity.”113
The tone of R. Merfyn Jones’ article indicated that he did not consider the total
loss of ideology to be entirely a positive development. Institutions may have been
offering a way to create a Welsh identity that was unified and located inside Wales but
such an identity was depicted as colourless and passionless, somehow less vivid than
earlier Welsh experiences of their disunified identities.
Consequently, the achievement of this autonomy has not served to galvanize, or redefine,
the Welsh identity to any marked degree: Wales has acquired a proto-state, but who are
the Welsh?114
Yet this sense of disillusionment with passionate identity was very much a part of the more general disillusionment concerning national identity in Britain in the 1990s.
Britain’s continuing economic problems and falling influence within Europe created an atmosphere in which doubt over the relevance of distinctive national identities to the modern world could flourish. R. Merfyn Jones’ article did, in many ways, capture a deeper truth of the decade: Britain seemed increasingly irrelevant as an identity, as did all national identities of the old school, particularly in light of the end of ideologically charged Cold War.
113 Ibid., p.357. 114 Ibid., p.355. 272
In all three new forms of defining Welsh identity, England and Britain were
excluded from playing a primary role, something that, while emerging from the
questioning of the 1980s, was very much a result of the experiences of the 1990s. Britain was steadily being replaced by the EU as the framework in which Wales was most likely to flourish, and the way in which this was occurring challenged the very relevance and functionality of the British state. A Welsh-based understanding of Welsh identity was one way in which the Welsh intelligentsia took part in challenging Britain as an identity and as an umbrella state. The intelligentsia’s confidence in Wales and Welshness as separate, distinctive and functional concepts was also evident although this was qualified by the equally evident concern over the potential loss of a passionate and culturally distinctive identity in R. Merfyn Jones’ article. Still, for the majority of the Welsh
intelligentsia, an institutional identity was not the only option. Variations of a cultural
basis of identity – experiential and locational – were still available to the Welsh people.
National identity was a choice. In line with Gwyn A. Williams’ message, Wales and
Welshness would be as the Welsh people chose to define those concepts.
In the 1970s and the 1980s, the issue of language formed a major part of the field
of cultural identity. This situation had changed by the 1990s but language itself remained a prominent point of discussion among the Welsh intelligentsia, indicating its continued significance for a Welsh identity and, indeed, for an understanding of the Wales that was beginning to emerge in the late 1990s. The Welsh language had become problematic as a result of the decline of those able to speak the language – a decline that technically began with the Acts of Union under Henry VIII. Modern popular interest had been stimulated by Saunders Lewis’ speech in the 1970s, Tynged yr Iaith, in which he outlined the value 273
and precarious position of the Welsh language. From this point on, the Welsh language slowly began to regain ground and this defused a significant portion of the tension over
the existence and Welshness of the alternative English-language Welsh culture. These
changes were evident in the 1980s and had progressed further by 1997, contributing to the new perspectives from which Welsh national identity was being approached.
In terms of the Welsh language, two trends were becoming evident in the 1990s
that help to explain why Welsh-speakers appeared to be more secure in their identity.
One trend was the absolute increase in the number of Welsh speakers aged between three
and fifteen shown in the 1991 census, indicating that the school education program
implemented to facilitate the growth of the Welsh language was working.115 Similarly,
the absolute decline of Welsh speakers across all age groups had fallen from the 1961-71
low of 17.3% and the rather better 1971-1981 figure of 6.3% to 1.4%.116 Welsh was no
longer in immediate danger of following Cornish into extinction. Also, while the Welsh
language heartland did show a decline in both Welsh speakers and Welsh literacy levels,
both had increased in the English-speaking areas of south Wales and the borderlands.117
This combined to blunt the edge of the previously sharp language divide between the
three areas of Wales, decreasing the depth of alienation between the different cultural
identities.118 David Blackaby and Stephen Drinkwater’s analysis of the same census
presented the second trend. Welsh language speakers tended to do better in the
employment stakes in Wales, revealing the official attitude had skewed more towards the
115 John Aitchison & Harold Carter (1993) “The Welsh Language in 1991 – A Broken Heartland and a New Beginning?” Planet, Vol. 97, pp.5-9. 116 Ibid., p.4. 117 Ibid., p.5. 118 Ibid., pp.5-10. 274
active preservation and protection of the Welsh language.119 This was, again, a move that contributed to defuse the tension over both the Welsh language and its English-
Welsh counterpart.
The gradual and even as yet incomplete recovery of the Welsh language facilitated the continued rehabilitation of the south Wales English-language culture and its literature. English-language Welsh literature had, in the 1980s, been acknowledged to be one expression of Welsh literature. In the 1990s, the Welsh intelligentsia began to argue that English-language literature did not necessary have to be blatantly Welsh to be
Welsh literature, provided it was written by a Welsh writer. In other words, the dominant themes of searching for a lost language or of ties to the traditional Welsh culture were no longer compulsory. Diane Davies followed this line of argument, pointing out that in other nations, a book belonged to the national literature if it was written by someone from that country.120 For English-language Welsh literature to remain relevant it, too, would have to respond to the changes of the 1980s and 1990s and move beyond the increasingly outdated although not irrelevant (merely differently expressed) concerns of Anglicisation and the traditional Welsh culture and language.
The Welsh intelligentsia also continued to address the issue of English-language
Welsh communities and to acknowledge the validity of their expression of Welsh community and identity. This trend was evident in the reconsideration of the foundations of national identity, with many of the Welsh intelligentsia including the experiences of the English-language Welsh communities in their proposals for alternative identity foundations. In the early 1990s, this acknowledgement became more explicitly directed
119 David Blackaby & Stephen Drinkwater (1997) “Welsh-Speakers and the Labour Market.” Contemporary Wales, Vol. 9, pp.158-169. 120 Diane Davies (1997) “Anglo-Welshness: the Semantics of Hyphenation.” Europa, No. 3, pp.1-6. 275
at the communities themselves and at their experiences as opposed to the role they played
in the construction of national identity. Dai Smith, in an article about Aneurin Bevan,
celebrated the distinctive features of this part of Welsh society, depicting a vibrant, deep
community tied to socialist roots and, like Bevan, not willing to be limited by stereotypes
or marginalised to the borders of Wales.121 English-speaking or not, South Wales was a
vital and living part of the Welsh nation. Some of the linguistic divides in Wales were, in
the 1990s, being dismantled – albeit slowly and imperfectly. Nonetheless, the trend
among the Welsh intelligentsia to include the English-language communities and cultures
of Wales into the Welsh nation and identity continued the challenge issued to the
boundaries of Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-English relationship in Britain in the
1980s.
By the 1990s, the Welsh public was also becoming more involved in demanding
the acknowledgment of the existence of a distinctive English-language Welsh culture,
particularly in the field of television. During the 1970s, sufficient pressure had been
brought to bear in the British government by Plaid Cymru and Cymdeithas yr Iaith and a
Welsh language television channel, S4C, had been created. In the early 1990s, the Welsh
intelligentsia registered an increasing demand among English-speaking Welsh people for
an improvement in the quality of English-language Welsh television programs and, in
turn, added a call for the modernisation of the images of Wales that dominated the
television programs. According to John Osmond, English-language television producers
needed to recognise the Welsh status as a nation and to approach its broadcasting
121 Dai Smith (1991) “Speaking the Word: the Tongue of South Wales.” New Welsh Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp.31-43. 276
requirements from that perspective.122 Welsh-language television had taken this
approach and, while it had taken S4C to find a distinctive voice, its success offered a
model that could be followed by its English-language sibling.123 A national, high quality
English-language television station and/or programs could, according to Kevin Williams, play a significant role in the Welsh response to the developments of the 1980s and 1990s that had so seriously challenged the traditional understandings of Wales and
Welshness.124
The media here should be using new forms and formats to explore how individuals and
groups in Wales can be brought together in the face of these changes. It is important that
the media should represent progressive images of “Welshness” which could provide a
basis to mobilise people for political action. Traditional images celebrating a dead past
will simply render Wales invisible.125
The Welsh media had an important role to play in the reconstruction of Wales and
Welshness and in the redefinition of the Welsh-English relationship within the context of
Britain. Out-dated approaches were steadily becoming more irrelevant and the Welsh
intelligentsia of the 1990s were arguing that to retain a position of some influence within
the wider world of Britain and Europe, Wales had to acknowledge its present and, while
retaining an identity founded in its history, develop in Europe and Britain as a modern
nation.
122 John Osmond (1990) “Choosing Channels.” Planet, Vol. 80, p.115. 123 Ibid., p.118. 124 Kevin Williams (1993) “Misrepresenting Wales Today.” Planet, Vol. 100, pp.40-43. 125 Ibid., p.43. 277
This was, essentially, the underlying message in all four of the fields considered
in this decade. The questioning of the 1980s had evolved into a more proactive challenge
to the political status quo as a result of increasing dissatisfaction with the political and
economic structure of Britain. Undoubtedly, the events of the 1990s played a significant
contributory role to the dissatisfaction with Britain and the political relationship between
England and Wales in Britain, as it did in Scotland and, indeed, in England itself. Right
across the country, the validity of Britain in a changing world was up for debate. In the
Wales of the 1990s, the EU and devolution appeared to have been more convincing than
the Thatcherism of the Major government, the economic problems of the 1990s and the
continued trauma of the British-EU relationship.
The Welsh intelligentsia’s approach to the EU is worthy of further note. It would
appear that the EU was a large motivating factor behind the direction in which the Welsh
intelligentsia pushed their challenge to Britain and Britishness. Economically, the EU
attracted the Welsh intelligentsia for the opportunities it offered to facilitate and fund
Welsh economic development, as illustrated by Ireland. Devolution, it would appear, was primarily attractive for the advantages it would offer Wales within the EU and within
Britain – economic advancement and defence against economically and socially damaging Thatcherite policies. In and of itself, such developments were not negative but they do raise one question, a question that is reinforced by the persistent appearance of the EU in the debates over the Welsh language and the construction of Welsh identity.
That question: was the British framework around which Wales and Welshness had been constructed simply being exchanged for a European framework? None of the journal articles of the 1990s can answer this question. Indeed, Wales of the early 21st century has 278
not yet answered this question. Nonetheless, the advancement of the Welsh intelligentsia’s challenge to Britain and to the role of England and Britain in defining
Wales and Welshness was noticeable and public endorsement of this challenge evident in the 1997 devolution referendum in which the Welsh people voted for a Welsh Assembly.
How would this be reflected in the history books of the 1990s? 279
Chapter Six
J. Graham Jones and John Davies: A New Framework?
J. Graham Jones’ and John Davies’ history books1 were both first released in 1990, although the English language translation of John Davies’ A History of Wales was not
published until 1993. Their initial publication at the start of the decade did, however,
mean that the response to the Welsh intelligentsia’s turn towards a new identity
framework in Europe was not as evident in J. Graham Jones’ and John Davies’ books
as could be expected from the changes in perspective evident in the New British
History or the Welsh intelligentsia’s attitudes in the 1990s. Yet the approaches
towards Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-English relationship evident in the books
clearly positioned them in the early stages of the 1990s efforts to provide answers to the questions of the previous decade. The popularity of both books also ensured their republication over the 1990s, ensuring that the images contained in the histories would remain present throughout the decade.
The images of Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-English relationship differed
quite substantially between J. Graham Jones’ and John Davies’ histories indicating the
continued lack of consensus within Wales over the definition of these concepts.
These differences were quite substantially exacerbated by the drastically different
natures of the two history books. J. Graham Jones’ A Pocket Guide: The History of
Wales was written with the intention of simply outlining the main themes in Welsh
history.2 The book, part of the Pocket Guide series, was a brief 170 page summary,
and J. Graham Jones acknowledged in his Preface that the necessary brevity of the
1 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales. Cardiff: University of Wales Press: John Davies (1994) A History of Wales. London: Penguin. 2 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, p.vii. 280
book prevented him from considering many aspects of Welsh history and limited him
to brief considerations of many other sections of the Welsh past. This was a book
intended for an audience who knew little or nothing about Welsh history and wanted a
simple, straightforward over-view of the topic. Dodd’s A Short History of Wales, at
165 pages, was equally brief and was published with much the same intention in
mind. John Davies’ book, in contrast, was the most substantial of all six books considered between 1970 and 1997, covering 686 pages, excluding the index, and was originally commissioned by Penguin Books for its Pelican series of national histories.
The length and depth of the book, however, resulted in its publication under the Allen
Lane imprint for, as John Davies noted in the preface to the Welsh edition, he had
“…seized the opportunity to write a lengthy volume spanning the whole course of the history of Wales and the Welsh.”3 This, then, was a book intended for those
interested in Welsh history at a reasonable depth and who would potentially be
motivated to follow that interest further.
Unlike the previous decades, both J. Graham Jones and John Davies were
professional historians, actively involved in historical research. John Davies was,
when A History of Wales was published in Welsh, employed as an historical
researcher and lecturer at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth.4 By 1993 and the
publication of the English edition, he had left Aberystwyth for Cardiff, and was
becoming progressively more involved in the history productions of BBC Wales and
in the writing of BBC Wales’ commissioned history.5 His professional historical
background was very evident in A History of Wales, with the book receiving
considerable respect within the history profession in Wales. Gwyn A. Williams’
review, sparkling with his standard provocative wit, argued that Hanes Cymru (A
3 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales. Penguin Books: London, p.ix. 4 Ibid., p.i. 5 Ibid.. 281
History of Wales) “…distils and synthesises the best and most recent of scholarship”6 avoiding the trap of writing “Welsh history with the Welsh left out.”7 His lack of bias
was also noted – “He ignores not our languages and their cultures, but the mountains
of coral-growth of prejudices which has encrusted them.”8 John Davies approach to
Welsh history was balanced and “…sympathetically judicious.”9
Despite this seemingly glowing review, John Davies’ book was not held up as
the epitome of Welsh historiography. One side effect of offering a balanced view is
that the proponents of a particular school will disagree with that interpretation. Gwyn
A. Williams also criticised the failure of John Davies to consider Wales from an
external perspective, finding the history a little too rooted in Welsh soil.10 This
argument undoubtedly emerged from Gwyn A. Williams’ open affiliation with the
more international perspective of socialism and his preference for non-objective
history. Nevertheless, John Davies’ ability to produce a book so accepted by the
historical profession was a definite reflection of his training and position within that
community, and of his awareness both of the broad swathe of Welsh historiography,
and of the events occurring within the Welsh community. No book could be so
broadly accepted without it reflecting quite accurately the accepted rendition of
Wales, Welshness and Britain. Its very depth and complexity, however, would have
rendered it a difficult, if not inaccessible, tome to those without any historical
knowledge or training.
J. Graham Jones, also an historian was, in contrast, an archivist, rather than a
university based historian. At the time of publication, J. Graham Jones was employed
6 Gwyn A. Williams (1990) “With the History Left In.” Planet, Vol. 82, p.3. 7 Ibid., p.3. 8 Ibid., p.8. 9 Ibid., p.6. 10 Ibid., p.7. 282
in the Department of Manuscripts and Records at the National Library of Wales.11
Despite this difference in professional career, he had published a substantial number
of journal articles within the field of Welsh history prior to A Pocket Guide: The
History of Wales. His book, probably because of its nature and brevity, did not attract nearly as much academic interest as John Davies’. Its repeat publications in 1991,
1992, 1993, 1995 and 1997 did, however, indicate its success with the general public, if only through its steady sale to libraries and schools. John Davies’ history, again
due its more complex nature, was released only three times prior to 1997, still a good
record for a history book.
There was one other major stylistic difference between the two books, one that
John Davies implied impacted the form of history in his book.12 His A History of
Wales was first released in 1990 in Welsh. He translated it into English for the 1993
release which then reprinted in 1994. A direct translation from Welsh to English was,
according to John Davies, not necessarily usual, as he himself noted that he
considered rewriting the book for an English-speaking Welsh audience but did not do
so due to the growing demand by that audience for access to the type of history
available to Welsh-speakers.13 J. Graham Jones’ book was, in contrast, published purely for an English-speaking audience. None of these differences, however, prevent
the continuation of the analysis begun in Chapters Two and Four. Correspondingly,
the five periods of history in which the Welsh-English relationship was a major factor
and in which both Wales and the Welsh identity were shaped remain: the period in
which Wales was formed, the Welsh medieval and early modern Princes, the process
of union with England, the growth of Nonconformity and industry, and the 20th
11 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, p.vii. 12 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales, pp.xiii. 13 Ibid.. 283 century. As with the previous two chapters, this level of continuity facilitates the analysis of the changes in interpretation between the decades.
In the first period to be examined, J. Graham Jones and John Davies continued the debate over the exact point in time in which Wales became identifiable as a distinct entity. The nature of their two history books played a significant role in the difference evident between the two, as J. Graham Jones’ interpretation of each period was, of necessity, far more simplistic than that of John Davies. This simplicity was very evident in J. Graham Jones’ depiction of the formation of the Welsh nation, particularly in his division of the emergence of Welsh culture and the emergence of the nation, placing the first in the time of the Celts and the second in the standard post-Roman period.14
The approach taken by J. Graham Jones was significant as it based Welsh identity in the understanding of Wales and Welshness that had been firmly challenged by the Welsh intelligentsia in the wake of the 1979 devolution referendum.
According to J. Graham Jones, the pre-Celtic peoples in the geographic area of Wales shared a European culture and possessed the technical skills that were being slowly developed across the continent.15 If anything, those prehistoric people in Wales were slow to develop being at the edge of settled lands. A sophisticated, artistically advanced culture first appeared with the arrival of the Celts and the technical, artistic and agricultural skills they brought with them provided the foundations for a culture that could be identified as Welsh. Modern traditional Welsh culture had been associated with the Celtic people since Iolo Morganwg and the 19th century revival of interest in the Celtic inhabitants of Wales. J. Graham Jones’ interpretation of the
Celtic period did not explicitly base modern Welsh identity in a similar mythical
14 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, p.4 & p.7. 15 For J. Graham Jones’ consideration of the Celts, see Ibid., pp.4-6. 284
background, but the implication was plain, particularly given the popular belief that the Welsh people and culture were essentially Celtic.
With the exception of his association of Welsh culture with the Celts, the
majority of J. Graham Jones’ depiction of the Celtic period was standard. Few
historiographical advances had been made in relation to Welsh prehistory since the
revision of the invasion thesis, and the Welsh history journals evidenced a decline of
interest in the study of Celtic civilization in Wales. The pre-Celtic and Celtic people
were, for J. Graham Jones, of European origin and culture, were tribal and non-
national. This description matched with the facts evident in the histories of Dodd,
Vaughan-Thomas and Gwyn A. Williams, as well as the major articles and books on
the subject.16 Yet the very simplicity of his analysis disguised one major drawback.
All four of the authors analysed to this point made their stance on issues like the arrival of the Celts quite clear: J. Graham Jones did not. He merely stated that “…the first Celts reached the south coasts of Britain.”17 The resultant interpretation of this
statement would depend entirely on the readers’ prior knowledge of the nature of the
spread of Celtic culture through Britain and the geographic area of Wales: invasion or
cultural dominance. This, as with his more explicit linkage of the Celts and Welsh
culture could have, depending on the readers’ prior knowledge, reinforced out-of-date
historical interpretations and myths.
J. Graham Jones’ connection between Celtic culture and modern Welsh
culture was further reinforced by his interpretation of the Roman period. According
to J. Graham Jones, the Roman occupation did not substantially alter the Celtic
composition of Welsh culture with Roman Wales remaining a frontier zone. Such an
interpretation contradicted the research of the 1980s, in which it was argued that much
16 A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, pp.1-8; Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History, pp.19-35; Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh, pp.1-11. 17 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, p.4. 285
of Wales was, in fact, pacified and that the Romans made a substantial contribution to
Welsh culture.18 The way in which J. Graham Jones positioned the Roman presence
on top of an established Celtic civilization implied not only the prior establishment of
culture but also identity, a depiction quite different from the standard historiography
of the Roman period.19 For J. Graham Jones, Roman legacy was limited to superficial
alterations – new technology, agricultural developments, and Latin words for new
concepts.20 Welsh culture had defined prior to contact with the Romans and, unlike
the portrayals in Dodd’s, Vaughan-Thomas’ and Gwyn A. Williams’ work, did not
change and develop according to the experiences of the Welsh people. This depiction
of Welshness, whilst bearing a superficial similarity to that of Gwynfor Evans, was
out-of-sync with both the questioning attitude of the 1980s and the 1990s acknowledgement that culture and identity were constructs and, as such, always in formation.
The basic situation in which J. Graham Jones identified the emergence of
Wales as a nation was, however, consistent with that of Dodd, Gwyn A. Williams and
Vaughan-Thomas. J. Graham Jones implied, although did not explicitly state, that this early Celtic culture was present across Britain until the advance of the “barbarian peoples”21 in the post-Roman period. Wales was, due to this historical event, isolated
from the rest of Britain and from constructive relations with Ireland.22 It was during
this post-Roman period that Wales was defined as a geographical entity.23 All four of
the 1970s and 1980s authors, however, acknowledged the post-Roman impact on the
18 Wendy Davies (1982) Wales in the Early Middle Ages. Leicester: Leicester University Press; R.G. Livens (1974/5) “The Roman Army in Wales.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 7, pp.88-95; F.A. Patterson (1974/5) “Roman Wales and the Votadini.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 7, pp.213-222. 19 V.E. Nash-Williams (1969) The Roman Frontier in Wales. Second edition revised by Michael G. Jarrett. Cardiff: University of Wales Press. 20 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, p.6. 21 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, p.7. 22 Ibid., p.7 & p.12. 23 Ibid., p.7. 286
Welsh culture that shaped this post-Roman nation. For J. Graham Jones, the Saxons,
Irish and Picts merely threatened an established culture without substantially impacting on it.24 Welsh Celtic culture survived these threats relatively unchanged, defined more by its Celtic and Christian inheritance than by the experiences of the
fifth to tenth centuries AD.25 Christianity, in particular, was a feature of Celtic
Europe and J. Graham Jones opted for the same mixed input explanation as that of
Vaughan-Thomas, Wendy Davies and Glanmor Williams.26
J. Graham Jones also utilised traditional Welsh myths of origin to help explain
the emergence of the small kingdoms within Wales.27 He did make it clear that these
myths were traditions rather than historical fact but the lack of critical analysis of the
myths leaves the reader with the impression that at least some aspects of the story of
Cunedda Wledig and his sons as the founders of Gwynedd and many of the other
Welsh kingdoms were, in fact, based on entirely historically verifiable events. The
1974 return to many of the original names for the Welsh counties, names that coincided with those belonging to the medieval Welsh kingdoms, would have presented a reader unfamiliar with Welsh history with an obvious connection with the past of the country and its myths of foundation. Yet again, J. Graham Jones’ approach to Welsh mythology was very simplistic and lacked the sophistication evident in Gwyn A. Williams’ book.28 The reader’s interpretation would, once again,
depend on their previous knowledge of the subject at hand.
J. Graham Jones’ Welsh nation emerged from the experiences of the Celtic
people, creating a country that was very distinct from the English nation that was
24 Ibid., pp.7-13. 25 Ibid.. 26 Wendy Davies (1982) Wales in the Early Middle Ages; Glanmor Williams (1991) The Welsh and their Religion: Historical Essays. 27 For J. Graham Jones’ consideration of Cunedda Wledig, see J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, pp.7-8. 28 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh, pp.36-37. 287
slowly forming across its border and the communication between the two was more
often antagonistic than not. Internecine rivalries between the Welsh Kings in the 9th
and early 10th centuries were all that prevented the Welsh from forming a unitary
kingdom as distinctive as that of the English under Alfred the Great (d.899), Edward
the Elder (d.924) and Athelstan (d.939).29 Wales, unlike England, failed to fulfil its
early promise as a nation. The combined pressures of this internecine rivalry and the
Saxon presence in Mercia pushed the Welsh Kings into offering allegiance to Alfred
the Great, “…an allegiance which was ultimately expressed in terms of homage and
fealty,”30 an interpretation that lacked the depth evident in other research of the period.31 J. Graham Jones did not present this emergent relationship between Wales
and England in a particularly positive light but did clearly state that the relationship
was entered into voluntarily by the Welsh Kings.32 Such a statement must have
echoed familiarly with the Welsh people who voluntarily chose to remain in
administrative Union with England in 1979 and faced the consequences in the 1980s.
The Welsh nation and culture were, then, essentially formed by the tenth century with
Wales being a Celtic nation pushed by necessity into a voluntary relationship with
England. Here, J. Graham Jones’ interpretation lacked the European perspective
evident in Dodd’s, Vaughan-Thomas and Gwyn A. Williams histories in which
England was presented as abnormally advanced for the period. It was this and its
strength rather than Welsh failure that defined the early relationship between Wales and England. It was here, however, that another aspect of J. Graham Jones’ history became evident. Possibly because of the necessary brevity and simplicity of his
29 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, pp.13-14. He portrayed this internecine rivalry as significant despite an earlier disclaimer that the kingdoms of Wales developed peacefully and diplomatically. See Ibid., p.13. 30 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, p.14. 31 Wendy Davies (1982) Wales in the Early Middle Ages. Leicester: Leicester University Press. 32 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, p.13. 288
history, J. Graham Jones fell into the trap of historical inevitability, with one event
leading directly to the next.33
John Davies’ portrayal of Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-English
relationship in this period was substantially different from that of J. Graham Jones.
Wales as a nation and Welshness as a culture were in a constant process of formation
and reformation, distinct and real entities but far from fixed constructs. John Davies
saw early Wales as existing on the fringes of prehistoric European civilization,
relegated to this position by climate and distance.34 Wales shared in the European
progression through civilizations, moving slowly through Neolithic, Bronze and Iron
Age cultures, albeit at a pace reflecting the Welsh position at the edge of Europe.35
Celtic culture, when it arrived, was primarily European, not Welsh, in culture and
context.36 Wales was shaped, through the prehistoric era, by cultural and
technological imperatives fundamentally common across Europe. Yet in Wales, these
imperatives were themselves shaped by Welsh geography and geology – by distance, location and terrain – to provide an experience and, therefore, a history that was uniquely Welsh.37 This interpretation has echoes of the 1990s intelligentsia’s
tendency to focus on the experiential formation of Wales and Welshness, as well as a
clear relationship to O.M. Edwards’ emphasis on the defining nature of the Welsh
landscape on Welsh experience.38 John Davies’ emphasis on the role of Welsh terrain
in defining both the Welsh experience and culture was, however, far more prominent
33 This tendency was not present in his journal articles published prior to his A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales. See J. Graham Jones (1981/2) “Wales and the New Liberalism, 1926-1929.” National Library of Wales Journal, Vol. 22, pp.321-352; (1981/2) “Forming Plaid Cymru: Laying the Foundations, 1923-26.” National Library of Wales Journal, Vol. 22, pp.427-459; (1982/3) “Wales and the New Socialism, 1926-1929.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 11, pp.173-199; (1992/3) “The Liberal Party and Wales, 1945-79.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 16, pp.326-355; (1997) “Rift and Conflict Within the Labour Party in the 1950s: Letters from Aneurin Bevan.” Llafur, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp.31-40. 34 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales, pp.1-22. 35 Ibid., pp.1-22. 36 Ibid., pp.21-25. 37 Ibid., p.3. 38 O.M. Edwards (1925) Wales, pp.1-10. 289
in his historiography than in any of the other five historians examined. John Davies
was the only one to reincorporate the Welsh landscape as a formative feature of Wales
and Welshness. When Welsh historiography is taken as a whole – at least, from 1870
to 1997 – it is the lack, however, rather than the presence of this interpretation that
should be remarkable. Neil Evans argued that this sense of the fundamental
importance of geology and geography to Wales and Welshness was the unifying facet
of Welsh historiography between 1870 and 1970.39 From 1970 on, however, other
issues dominated English-language Welsh historiography until John Davies’ Welsh-
language history was translated into English. In all other ways, however, John
Davies’ depiction of pre-historic Wales conformed to the standard historiography
about the period.
Wales as a nation emerged slowly and unpredictably in response to the post-
Roman experience and the desire of the medieval Kings and Princes to find their
dynastic line in the heroic past. For John Davies, Wales was not only constructed by the experiences of the people within the geographical boundaries of Wales but by the
imagination and desires of the Welsh people themselves. His inclusion of this latter aspect was reminiscent of Gwyn A. Williams’ belief in the importance of mythology for understanding the period in which the myths were created. This approach, emphasising the tribal nature of Roman Wales, the confusion and power vacuum in the wake of the Roman withdrawal from Wales and the difficulty of working with the manuscripts in which the stories of Cunedda and his sons were found due to their tendency to blur fact and myth together,40 created an atmosphere of uncertainty. So
much was known about the emergence of the Welsh nation but the rest could not be
determined. What John Davies did create, however, were vivid images of a medieval
39 Neil Evans (2004) “When Men and Mountains Meet: Historians Explanations of the History of Wales, 1890-1970,” Welsh History Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp.222-251. 40 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales, pp.27-29 & pp.42-49 290
world that was defined by a civilization and shaped by experiences that would provide
the foundations from which both Wales and Welshness would grow. The changes
that would occur through external and internal influences over the following centuries
would, however, render the modern expression of Wales and Welshness quite foreign
to those of the post-Roman era.41 Here, John Davies’ history evidenced a trend that
had begun in the 1980s, of placing Welsh events and people firmly in the context of
their time. This trend culminated in the studies of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd and Owain
Glyn Dwr that approached these two leaders from a Welsh perspective, avoiding the
use of an English, British or even European framework.42
John Davies’ approach to Celtic Christianity and the Celtic Church provided
an example of this process. He argued that Christianity in Wales did not primarily emerge from either Rome or via the western sea-ways, but was the product of a variety of influences that united in south-east Wales.43 Two of these influences were
Rome and the western sea-ways, but others included the situation that occurred with
the collapse of the Roman Empire, the presence of the pagan Saxons, and the later
conflict between Wales and Canterbury.44 The Celtic Church that emerged from this combination of influences was not, in fact, as distinctive and original as popular history would claim, being instead the Welsh expression of a European Church – and was very definitely not proto-Protestant. The lack of Papal authority or of uniformity of ritual and organisation were, rather than particular features of an early Welsh
Church, common across the Christian sphere.45 The myth of a distinctive and unique
Celtic Church was just that – a myth, an interpretation that would become standard by
41 For the analysis that created this image, see Ibid., pp.44-79. 42 See R.R. Davies (1995) The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dwr: J. Beverley Smith (2000) Llywelyn ap Gruffudd: Prince of Wales. First published in 1998. 43 Ibid., pp.72-73. 44 Ibid., pp.73-79. 45 Ibid., p.72. 291
2007.46 Here, again, was apparent the pattern begun by Gwyn A. Williams in the
1980s of a European culture moulded to be Welsh through experience but this
interpretation was also based on the steady development of a Welsh Christian
tradition found in Vaughan-Thomas’ and Dodd’s histories. In John Davies’ hands,
however, the overall effect was not so much to question when Wales and Welshness
actually existed or to follow the continuous development of Welsh Christianity but to
trace the history of the civilizations that, over time and through countless experiences,
formed the Wales and Welshness of the 1990s.
It was these same experiences that formed the early relationship between the
people in what would become Wales and the Saxons who would form England. John
Davies joined J. Graham Jones - and indeed the four authors from the 1970s and
1980s – in depicting this relationship as antagonistic, naturally so due to the invasive
nature of the Saxon presence. Wales was, correspondingly, born by force and in
isolation. Saxon conquests defined the geographical entity and the Welsh experience
of Christianity, and this combined with the Welsh withdrawal into “…sterile
isolationism…” to separate them from the Latin culture of Europe.47
The nation of Wales was conceived on the death-bed of the Roman Empire; it was
born in the excitement of the ‘Age of Saints’ but its infancy was meagre and lonely.48
The Welsh-English relationship was very far from perfect from the start.
The approaches taken by both authors to the Welsh-English relationship were
developed further in the second period of the medieval and early modern Welsh
46 Geraint H. Jenkins (2007) A Concise History of Wales. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.49. 47 Ibid., p.79. This interpretation was also supported by Glanmor Williams (1991) The Welsh and their Religion: Historical Essays, p.3. 48 Ibid., p.79. 292
Princes. Without a doubt, this period of history was highly significant for Wales as it
was during these six centuries that Wales began to move towards unification under a
single monarch, and it was also the period in which the nature of the Welsh-English
relationship was to be defined. In discussing these events, both authors positioned
Wales against England, emphasising the external position of the country that was so
influential on Welsh political development. Such an emphasis distinctly reflected the
attitude that began to emerge in the late 1980s and developed further in the 1990s: an attitude that argued that Wales and England were separate bodies and that the Union
between them was artificial and open to alteration in suitable circumstances.
Inevitably, this basic approach also holds considerable implications for the authors’
approaches to the concepts of Wales and Welshness.
As in the previous examinations of this period, only four of the Welsh Princes
have been selected – Hywel Dda, Llywelyn ab Iorwerth, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd and
Owain Glyn Dwr. Both J. Graham Jones and John Davies discussed other significant
Welsh Princes as well, but for consistency’s sake, only the four that have been
covered by all six authors will be addressed. These four have, arguably, been seen
throughout Welsh historiography as among the most significant in defining the nature
of the Welsh-English relationship and, correspondingly, are highly revealing of the
author’s attitude towards the Welsh-English relationship. During the 1980s and
1990s, all four received considerable attention in the Welsh History Review, the
Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions and in scholarly monographs,
indicating their significance for Welsh historiography.49
J. Graham Jones’ tendency to portray Welsh history as progressive became clearly evident in this second period of Welsh history. The simplicity of his
49 R.R. Davies (1995) The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dwr; J. Beverley Smith (2000) Llywelyn ap Gruffudd: Prince of Wales. 293
argument, however, continued to hold the interpretation of his work open to the
influence of the readers’ prior knowledge. He did not actually place Wales and Welsh
events in the context of European developments but his positioning of the Normans as
the catalysts for Welsh developments under these four kings and princes implied that
Wales was, in this period, progressing down the same lines as all European proto-
nations, with one set of events simply leading to the next. Wales and Welshness and
the relationship with England were not fundamentally altered by this process, they
were simply refined and reformed according to circumstance.50
Hywel Dda received the most attention in J. Graham Jones’ history due to his
role in the codification of Welsh laws. Essentially, J. Graham Jones’ treatment of
Hywel Dda revealed the features he identified as significant within these leaders of
Welsh society.51 Through marriage and conquest, Hywel Dda united the majority of
Wales and, through a further application of his diplomatic and military skills was able to ensure Welsh security from both English and Viking incursions for most of his
reign.52 Yet although J. Graham Jones emphasised the real skills of Hywel Dda and indeed of several of the pre-Norman Welsh Kings, he also argued that the over- preponderance of these skills among the Welsh leaders ultimately prevented the permanent unification of Wales under one dynastic family. He quoted a comment by
Gerald of Wales: “They obstinately and proudly refuse to submit to one ruler.”53 This
situation ensured unity would be temporary, and resulted in the Welsh
acknowledgement of the English monarch as Over-king.54 J. Graham Jones’
description did not, however, acknowledge the dominance of local and regional
loyalties over national as emphasised by R.R. Davies among others. Indeed,
50 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, pp.13-31. 51 Ibid., p.14. 52 Ibid.. 53 Ibid., p.16. 54 Ibid., pp.12-16. 294
according to R.R. Davies, these local and regional loyalties were natural and normal for Welsh society rather than a potential failure of political development.55 J. Graham
Jones had, by the time he reached Hywel Dda, already indicated his belief in the
voluntary nature of the early Welsh allegiance to the Kings of England. It may also
have been perceived as necessary given the pressures of the times but it was not, at
this stage, enacted by English force. The four pre-Norman Welsh Kings who unified
the majority of Wales under their rule all offered some level of allegiance to the
English Kings, but despite their best efforts, none were able to create a unitary
kingdom that would survive their deaths. The research that emerged immediately
after J. Graham Jones’ A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, however, served to
further emphasise the disadvantages to such a simple rendition. In 1992/3, N.J.
Higham developed the 1980s ideas of the factual nature of overkingship in Wales,
shifting it from simply the side-effect of having a much stronger neighbour to the
normal pattern of affairs throughout Europe.56 Overkingship ensured some level of
political and military stability between tribes57 and was essential to the structure of
medieval society. Welsh historiography was moving away from the explanation in J.
Graham Jones’ history.
The Welsh refusal to accept a single dynastic monarchy continued into the
Norman era, particularly during the reigns of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth and Llywelyn ap
Gruffudd. J. Graham Jones continued to focus on their military and political achievements but did so in a way that emphasised the near-inevitableness of the
Welsh move towards feudalism. The Norman presence in the Marches exposed the
Welsh rulers of the Principality of Wales to the new feudal society that had been
55 R. R. Davies (1987) The Age of Conquest, p.14. 56 N.J. Higham (1992/3) “Medieval ‘Overkingship’ in Wales: The Earliest Evidence.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 16, pp.145-159. 57 Ibid., p.148. 295
developing in Europe.58 Most of the Welsh Princes during the Norman period
attempted to combined traditional patterns of kingship with the newer influences,
hence the actions of both the Llywelyns in attempting to create a full Welsh feudal
Kingdom with the recognition of the Norman-English King.59 This process altered
the structure of Welsh society from a tribal base and “…strengthened the sense of
individual proprietorship and underlined the link between the state and the
individual.”60 This process was not original or innovative, however, and did not
fundamentally change the Welsh culture or the Welsh nation. J. Graham Jones
effectively argued that Welsh exposure to Norman political and societal advances
began to push the Welsh towards the more modern societal advances. His argument,
while supported by several research papers, failed to represent the growing trend of
placing the Welsh rulers firmly in their own context and without negative comparison
with the English/Norman rulers.61
The Wales of the Llywelyns was, however, presented as culturally distinct
from England. J. Graham Jones’ basic interpretation agreed with that of Dodd: it was
the failure of the Norman Princes to negotiate the Welsh-English relationship
successfully that resulted in the end of Welsh independence. J. Graham Jones, however, also presented this eventual Conquest as leading straight from the earlier failure to establish a unified Welsh nation capable of withstanding the English might.62 Interestingly, of all six authors, J. Graham Jones was the only one who did
not offer a distinct opinion of the Edwardian Conquest. The reader was simply
58 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, p.20. 59 Ibid.. 60 Ibid., p.29. 61 R.R. Davies (1995) The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dwr; J. Beverley Smith (2000) Llywelyn ap Gruffudd: Prince of Wales; Llinos Beverley Smith (1984/5) “Llywelyn ap Gruffudd and the Welsh Historical Consciousness.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 12, pp.1-28; David Stephenson (1983) “Llywelyn ap Gruffudd and the Struggle for the Principality of Wales, 1258-1282.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.36-47. 62 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, pp.17-31. 296
presented with the historical fact: “From this time on, Wales was to be an integral, if
troublesome, part of the realm of England.”63 The progression through Welsh history to the first official formation of the incorporation of Wales into English administration happened due to the almost inevitable progression of events, a perspective on history
that was not common in the 1980s or the 1990s.
Owain Glyn Dwr’s rebellion received much the same treatment. J. Graham
Jones placed the rebellion within the context of the Edwardian Conquest, the arbitrariness of direct monarchical rule and the effects of the European-wide Black
Death.64 Glyn Dwr’s rebellion was a response to the combination of these situations.
In this interpretation, it appeared that this rebellion, “…the last sustained protest by
the native Welsh against the experience of conquest more than a century earlier,”65
was part of the Welsh adaptation to the new involuntary relationship between Wales
and England. It was, albeit, one that was not necessarily entirely negative, being the
simple result of circumstance. This depiction was standard if somewhat more
colourless than the depictions in the monographs from the previous two decades.66
There were some similarities between J. Graham Jones’ and John Davies’
interpretations of the period of the Welsh medieval Princes and Kings. Both authors
acknowledged that it was the Norman influence that began to feudalise Welsh society
and both focus on the military and political abilities of the Welsh leaders. Yet John
Davies interpreted these facts quite differently, reflecting his perception of medieval
Welsh society as vibrant and distinctive – complete in and of itself – rather than
simply part of the process of arriving in modern day Wales. He depicted all three of
the pre-Conquest Welsh Princes and Kings as warrior Kings, with their motivations
63 Ibid., p.31. 64 Ibid., pp.32-42. 65 Ibid., p.43. 66 Glanmor Williams (1993) Owain Glyndwr. Cardiff: University of Wales; Elissa R. Henken (1996) National Redeemer: Owain Glyndwr in Welsh Tradition. Cardiff: University of Wales Press. 297
and actions firmly based in the context of this society. They were not intentionally
national leaders or as leaders based in a society that was intentionally moving towards
modernity.67 This approach was not evident in any of the other five books – a significant fact given the resultant creation of the image of a series of Welsh kings following a European trend of territorial consolidation leading towards the construction of nation-states. Hywel Dda’s actions in unifying Wales, for instance,
expressed the military and political ruthlessness required by a King to gain and retain
territory68 rather than the more nationalistic role accorded him in Gwynfor Evans’ book or the specifically modernising role apparent in J. Graham Jones’ history.
Hywel Dda’s success in this matter was probably, according to John Davies, one of the primary reasons for his efforts to codify Welsh law.69 His grasp of the political
and military realities of his world was also likely to have been his motivation for
adhering to an allegiance to England, the local power that during Hywel’s reign
“…extinguished the Brythonic kingdom of Cornwall…”70 and could, potentially,
have done the same to Wales, despite the heated criticism from the heroic poets of his
world.71 This interpretation, placing Hywel Dda firmly in the world in which he
lived, echoed that very trend in the 1980s articles.72
Llywelyn ab Iorwerth and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd were also presented in the
context of the world in which they lived. John Davies argued that the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Marches forced the Welsh Princes to accommodate the new feudal realities in order to ensure the survival of their
67 For John Davies’ approach to all of these leaders, please see: John Davies (1994) A History of Wales, pp.80-203. 68 Ibid., p.87. 69 Ibid., p.94. 70 Ibid.. 71 Ibid., p.95. 72 Henry Loyn (1980-1) “Wales and England in the Tenth Century: The Context of the Athelstan Charters.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 10, pp.283-301. 298
territories.73 Norman Marcher Lords, as a condition of their existence, had to claim
and hold land and the retention of this territory involved the spread of Norman values
and political structures, a process that was facilitated by their growing influence over
the Church in Wales.74 Both Llywelyns responded to this political and military
reality, attempting to consolidate and develop the political, military and societal
structure of Wales and to define the relationship between Wales and Norman England
as well as between the Principality of Wales and the March sections under Norman
control. The downfall of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd and Edward I’s Conquest of Wales
were placed in this context. They were the result of a series of unexpected events
within the juggling of the development of Wales and the establishment of the Welsh-
English relationship that derailed the embryonic state of Wales. For John Davies, this
embryonic state, under Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, had needed only time to become as
firmly established as that of Norman England.75
This approach to the two Llywelyns, while firmly grounded in the
historiography of the 1980s,76 became increasingly common in the 1990s. The clear
borders and boundaries generally implied by the terms Marches and Principality were
under debate, with Kevin Mann arguing that the term ‘Marches of Wales,’ when used
in reference to a specific geographic area, did not occur in Welsh sources until
1196.77 Neither were the relationships between Welsh and Norman clearly defined,
particularly in what would become the Marches of south-east Wales during the reigns
73 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales, pp.128-161. 74 Ibid., p.104 & pp.110-112. 75 Ibid., p.153. This argument was, according to John Davies, based on that of Goronwy Edwards. 76 Llinos Beverley Smith (1984/5) “Llywelyn ap Gruffudd and the Welsh Historical Consciousness.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 12, pp.1-28; David Stephenson (1983) “Llywelyn ap Gruffudd and the Struggle for the Principality of Wales, 1258-1282.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.36-47. 77 Kevin Mann (1996/7) “The March of Wales: A Question of Terminology.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 18, p.10. 299
of William I and William II.78 W.J. McCann, in turn, argued that the Welsh leaders in
the eleventh and twelfth centuries did not consider the Normans to be outside the
normal pattern of warfare. They were simply treated as an extension of the violent relationship between Wales and England rather than as the start of a different type of military and political relationship.79
A concerted effort was being made in the 1990s to consider the situation from
the perspective of those involved, a process of which John Davies was very much a
part. Wales was, in Welsh historiography, becoming less confined by the Welsh-
English relationship. This shift was further evident in the increased historiographical interest in the Welsh Kings and Princes who were less involved with England or the perceived modification of Welsh society, such Maredudd ab Owain.80 It was also
beneficial for the research into the more prominent Welsh Princes. J. Beverley Smith,
for instance, was able to argue that Llywelyn ap Gruffudd’s homage to King Henry III
was, in fact, beneficial as it gained the first royal recognition of the status of the
Prince of Wales and the corresponding royal acknowledgement of the unity of a large
part of the country under one ruler.81 Maredudd ab Owain, far more involved with
Ireland than England, and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, demonstrated the historiographical
connection to the intelligentsia’s debate in the 1990s. Here, too, England was ceasing
to be the centre-point, with the wider Europe and, in some cases, Wales itself, slowly
becoming the new reference point for Wales and Welshness. John Davies began to
78 A.G. Williams (1992/3) “Norman Lordship in South-East Wales During the Reign of William I.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 16, pp.445-466. 79 W.J. McCann (1991) “The Welsh View of the Normans in the 11th and 12th Centuries.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.66-67. 80 David E. Thornton (1996/7) “Maredudd ab Owain (d. 999): The Most Famous King of the Welsh.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 18, pp.567-591. Also see Benjamin T. Hudson (1990/1) “The Destruction of Gruffudd ap Llywelyn.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 15, pp.331-350. 81 J. Beverley Smith (2000) Llywelyn ap Gruffudd: Prince of Wales, pp.1-2. 300
head in this direction. J. Graham Jones’ history, however, remained focused on
England.
Unexpected or not, Edward I’s conquest of Wales was not, according to John
Davies, beneficial to the continued formation of the Welsh-English/Norman
relationship as it resulted in the political subjugation of the Welsh.
Henceforth, the fate of the Welsh in every part of their country would be to live under
a political system in which they and their characteristics would have only a
subordinate role, a fact which would be a central element in their experience until this
very day and hour.82
The Welsh freedom to define themselves within their history was lost and what John
Davies considered to be the basic problem with the modern Welsh-English
relationship – the lack of a Welsh ability to develop an identity without reference to a
dominant England – was cemented.
For John Davies, it was this loss of freedom rather than the technical loss of
Wales as a separate nation that triggered the rebellion under Owain Glyn Dwr. John
Davies described a Wales that, in the late 15th century, was a colony of England in
which Welsh culture – epitomised by the poet Dafydd ap Gwilym – battled for
survival against the reality of the loss of political independence, poverty, harvest
failures and plague.83 Glyn Dwr’s rebellion emerged from this complex situation and
was an expression of Welshness, of the culture and identity that gave it form and of the antagonistic relationship between the conquered and the conqueror. John Davies’ description foreshadowed R.R. Davies’ argument that Glyn Dwr’s revolt was, in fact,
82 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales, p.161. 83 Ibid., pp.185-201. 301
“…a frontal challenge to the structures of lay and ecclesiastical power in Wales.”84
For John Davies, it was inevitable that this situation, as with the pre-Conquest Welsh-
Norman relationship, would strongly influence Welshness and the impact of England
on that identity.85
The impact of the differences between J. Graham Jones’ and John Davies’
interpretations of the relationship between Wales and England on their histories
became very apparent in the third period addressing the process of union between
England and Wales. J. Graham Jones acknowledged for the first time that Wales and
Welshness were gradually altered by a Welsh experience, the process of union. But
the book’s descriptive rather than analytical approach results in the reader’s impression that between the Conquest and the Acts of Union under Henry VIII
England and Wales gradually reconciled, allowing the Welsh full access into the political, economic and social life of England.86 John Davies, however, focused on
problematising the alienation of Welshness implied in this reconciliation process.
Wales was allowed entry into England but was not allowed to retain or continue to
independently develop its own full culture and identity.
As with the previous two periods, J. Graham Jones presented the process of
union as the near-inevitable result of a progression of historical occurrences. One early step in this process was the Welsh acknowledgement of an English Over-king, another being the gradual adoption of feudalism and, hence, of the cultural and social mores of the Norman world. J. Graham Jones, in the post-Conquest period, focused on the Welsh ambiguity towards the process of union and the increased English presence in Wales.87 He implicitly tied this sense of ambiguity, however, to the
84 R.R. Davies (1995) The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dwr, p.64. 85 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales, pp.203-209. 86 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, p.48. 87 Ibid., pp.36-39 & p.44. 302
modern Welsh experience. Each event was portrayed as leading to the next, allowing
this sense of ambiguity to remain present into his consideration of the twentieth
century, with J. Graham Jones’ history effectively explaining how modern Wales was
created.
This connection was particularly evident in two aspects of J. Graham Jones’
approach to the process of union: in the Welsh resentment of Conquest and in their
desire to participate in the benefits available to those cooperating with the conquerors.88 Inevitably, the imposition of Union with England through military
conquest resulted in real resentment towards the legal, political, economic and
demographic manifestations of this process. J. Graham Jones’ depiction of Wales in the pre-Tudor period of union was quite straightforward. English legislation altered the structure of Welsh society in a way that was both rejected and accepted by the
Welsh, creating the atmosphere of ambiguity that survived into the time of writing.
Welsh rejection of the process of union was based on the structure of the English presence, “…designed to keep vigorously alive the spirit of conquest and of racial cleavage and superiority.”89 Edwardian castles were the physical manifestation of this subjugation, displaying the quasi-imperial character of the English presence in
Wales. Welsh resentment of this situation and of their inability to fully participate in the wealth of the English within the borders of Wales triggered the many rebellions between the Edwardian Conquest and Owain Glyn Dwr. J. Graham Jones’ depiction of the Welsh-English relationship of this period was reminiscent of the experiences of the Welsh people of the 1990s who were also experiencing changes under
Thatcherism that drastically altered the shape and functioning of Welsh society,
88 For J. Graham Jones’ analysis of the immediate post-Conquest period, on which this summary is based, see Ibid., pp.33-37. 89 Ibid., p.36. 303
industry and community. In both periods, the benefits of participation were tangible,
but the impact on the existent Wales something to be resented.
The Welsh accepted the legislation and changes, however, for their offered
opportunities for personal advancement.90 Welshmen held positions in both official
and military life, and Welsh nobles began to build substantial estates.91 Thus, Wales
and Welshness also altered voluntarily, simply through the acceptance of the reality of
the Edwardian Conquest. Such acceptance would, again, have featured in the Wales
of both the 1980s and 1990s for, in many ways, it was precisely this acceptance that
was being challenged by the Welsh intelligentsia of both decades. Significantly, J.
Graham Jones presented this Welsh ambiguity towards the process of union as the
source of the Welsh rebellions: “Thus rebellions in fourteenth century Wales were
rooted in personal protest, social unrest, racial tension and popular prophecy.”92 Yet
after Owain Glyn Dwr, the rebellions ceased.93 Tudor action made it possible for the
Welsh to achieve without independence.94 Life had to go on, and the Welsh worked out how to live in post-Conquest Wales.
The basic facts underlying this description bear distinct similarity to the analysis of the period in David Williams’ A History of Modern Wales.95 David
Williams’ summary of this period was precisely that, a summary, and J. Graham
Jones’ included extra details but it could stand as the basis for his interpretation, as
could that of O.M. Edwards.96 Yet again, however, the simplicity of the
interpretation problematised it, with the period being portrayed as a neat progression
from resentment to acceptance, with the Welsh experience serving more as a
90 Ibid., pp.32-37. 91 Ibid.. 92 Ibid., p.39. 93 Ibid., pp.36-39. 94 Ibid.. 95 David Williams (1977) A History of Modern Wales. London: John Murray, pp.12-20. 96 O.M. Edwards (1925) Wales. London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd, pp.195-329. 304
stepping-stone to Wales of the early 1990s than as the experience of the people who lived through it.
J. Graham Jones’ depiction of the Tudor Acts of Union further elaborated his
understanding of the nature of the relationship between Wales and England. Henry
VII had failed to remedy the lawlessness and disorder prevalent in Wales during his
reign,97 resulting in Henry VIII’s major overhaul of the administrative structure of
both the Welsh Principality and the Marches in “…the culmination of a drive to
extend the authority of the English Crown over Wales.”98 The Welsh gentry,
commercial classes, lawyers and intelligentsia accepted this legislation for the active
changes they introduced into Welsh life: full legal equality, decrease of lawlessness,
and increased economic opportunities.99 Welsh assimilation into England was the
product of circumstances but also the choice of the Welsh people. He did not,
however, address the issue of mythology, depicting instead a choice made purely from
necessity rather than hope.100 Yet J. Graham Jones did not portray this willing
acceptance of the reality of the English presence and dominance as decreasing
Welshness but rather as one way by which the Welsh could achieve a prosperous,
civilized life. Wales did not drastically change: one set of events led neatly to the
next as part of the path to modern Wales.
Except for this latter section, J. Graham Jones’ interpretation of the Tudor
period was standard, although it failed to acknowledge the historiography that argued
that Henry VII’s actions emerged from his need to secure his Kingdom partly due to
the European trend of nation-consolidation and partly to ensure his Kingdom
97 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, p.47. 98 Ibid., p.48. 99 Ibid., p.50. 100 See David Rees (1997) The Son of Prophecy: Henry Tudor’s Road to Bosworth. 305
remained secure during his religious changes.101 His choice to focus on the benefits
of the Acts of Union provided a simple explanation for the Welsh adaptation to the situation, one that was – in a rather more complex fashion – noted by the other five authors as contributory to the process of Anglicisation. J. Graham Jones, however, did not exclude the Anglicised gentry from Welshness, indicating that the 1980s and
1990s gradual admittance of English-speaking Welsh culture to real Welshness had impacted on his history.
As with J. Graham Jones, John Davies presented the Welsh attitude towards
the English presence in Wales and towards English monarchical rule as ambiguous
and for many of the same basic reasons.
…the Conquest and the adversity which followed served to strengthen their [the
Welsh] self-awareness. That self-awareness was expressed in a series of anti-English
revolts but it was also expressed in delight in the achievements of those Welshmen
who served the English Crown and pride in the Welsh connections of the King
himself. This ambiguity in the attitude of the Welsh towards England, the complex
interweaving of sympathy and antipathy which developed in the centuries after the
Conquest, would be characteristic of many Welsh patriots to the present day.102
The Welsh acquiesced with the Conquest for the benefits it provided and for the achievements made available to the Welsh people but resented the English presence for its superiority and the changes forced on Welsh society. J. Gwynfor Jones and
Ceridwen Lloyd Morgan both presented arguments that supported this conclusion,
noting the ambiguity in the Welsh response towards the English: the retention of the
101 Peter R. Roberts (1989) “The Welsh language, English Law and Tudor Legislation.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.19-75. 102 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales, p.163. 306
myths and legends of Britain and freedom, the resentment of external domination, and
the practical adaptation to the situation.103
Unlike J. Graham Jones’ book, however, John Davies’ primary concern in this
era was the problematic nature of the emergent relationship between Wales and
England rather than the simple historical progression of events. The Welsh gentry
gradually accepted the political, economic and legal changes of the years after the
Conquest, with each change building upon the last, gradually altering what it meant to be Welsh, bringing it closer to the English norm and undermining Welsh confidence in their pre-Conquest identity.104 He thus created an interpretation reminiscent of
Tecwyn Lloyd’s and Bobi Jones’ historical placing of the emergence of the Welsh
inferiority complex.105 Language alone initially withstood this reshaping of
Welshness, becoming - because of this – the touchstone of Welsh identity in the years after the official Tudor Acts of Union,106 a concept again present in the
intelligentsia’s debates across the three decades, albeit somewhat controversially.
Tudor legislation enhanced the process of change, although John Davies was careful
to note, in accordance with the standard historiography, that Henry VII and Henry
VIII’s motivation for their legislative changes was political and neither nationalistic
nor malicious.107 The resultant changes to Wales and Welshness were,
correspondingly, Welsh changes made necessary by circumstance. According to John
Davies the reshaped Welshness was, while strongly coloured by the English presence
103 J. Gwynfor Jones (1978/9) “The Welsh Poets and their Patrons, c. 1550-1640.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 9, pp.245-277; Ceridwen Lloyd Morgan (1985) “Prophecy and Welsh Nationhood in the Fifteenth Century.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.9-26. 104 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales, pp.162-194. 105 Tecwyn Lloyd (1976) “Wales – see England.” Planet, Vol. 34, pp.36-47; Bobi Jones (1974) ‘The Roots of Welsh Inferiority,’ Planet, Vol 22, pp.53-72; Bobi Jones (1978) “I’m Your Boy,” Planet, Vol. 42, pp.2-10. 106 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales, pp.239-258. 107 Ibid., pp.225-231. 307
not automatically less Welsh.108 Here, John Davies made a differentiation that was
not as apparent in historiography prior to the 1990s. He acknowledged the validity of
a slightly Anglicised Welshness and the gulf between that form of Welsh identity and
the rejection of the Welsh past in favour of a future defined by English values and
culture. Indeed, the continued existence of Welshness was the result of the Welsh
reaction to the challenges of modernity in the form of the imperial English presence.
All this suggests that the Welsh of the Tudor age had a dynamic spirit and an urge for
modernization which differentiated them from some of the other peripheral peoples in
Europe, their fellow Celts above all, perhaps.109
John Davies, whilst acknowledging the survival of Wales and Welshness, positioned this firmly against the near-total rejection of these concepts evident in some of the reactions of the Welsh leading classes as the centuries progressed. The subjection of Wales – or the dominance of England – remained problematic as such subjection inherently involved the loss of Welsh freedom to define and shape their own identity. This interpretation, as with J. Graham Jones’, clearly related to the world in which John Davies was based. Thatcherism in the 1980s and 1990s was threatening to force the Welsh to abandon further their freedom to shape their identity.
The Welsh intelligentsia were, consequently, challenging the dominant position of
England for precisely the same reasons as John Davies was problematising English dominance in the Tudor period – the Welsh inability to define their future and, more significantly, their inability to define their country and identity.
108 Ibid., pp.249-276. 109 Ibid., p.258. 308
What is noticeable in both J. Graham Jones’ and John Davies’ histories was the absence of bemoaning of the long-term consequences of the process of Union, indicative that the locus of debate had, by the 1990s, shifted. Both authors acknowledged the occurrence of Anglicisation as the result of the process of union but neither addressed the issue explicitly. When these descriptions are compared with those of earlier decades, the debate over the process of Union appeared to have lost a lot of its fire. Neither the process of Union nor Anglicisation were positioned as definitively positive or negative occurrences, and neither were selected aspects of either process singled out for such treatment. John Davies briefly acknowledged the modern concern over the long-term impact of the process of Union110 but J. Graham
Jones did not include any similar comment. Neither questioned the Welshness of the gentry despite their open acknowledgement of the changes occurring in Welsh culture and society. The history of this period was written from a much less personal perspective. Such an approach was facilitated by the intellectual shift from the destruction of Welsh culture, or a perceived need for Britain, to the problematising of the modern relationship – irrespective of that relationship in the past – between Wales and England. Part of the problematisation of the modern Welsh-English relationship involved the political and intellectual shift to viewing Welsh identity as a choice as well as a birthright, as seen in the political stance of Plaid Cymru in the 1990s and the intelligentsia’s shift towards Europe as the framework for Welsh identity.111 For John
Davies, Wales itself simply was – it was the land: the process by which the land shaped people and events was the process by which Welshness was created. J.
Graham Jones did not advance this far in his history but the influence of this shift was evident in John Davies’ A History of Wales. This shift was also evident in the wider
110 Ibid., p.238. 111 See Chapter Five. Towards Wales or Europe? The 1990s. 309
historiography of the process of union published in the 1980s and 1990s. The
reconsideration of the role of myth, poets, and prophecy moved the argument towards
an attempt to see the situation from the perspective of those involved,112 indicating
that the nationalist approach evident in Gwynfor Evans’ history113 was as problematic
as the simplistic approach in J. Graham Jones’ A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales.
Wales, Welshness and the relationship between Wales and England continued
in their historical progress through the fourth period examined; the religious and industrial developments in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. All four authors from the 1970s and 1980s identified the religious and industrial
developments that occurred during these centuries as central to the emergence of two
facets of identity that, by the early twentieth century, were stereotypically associated
with Wales. J. Graham Jones and John Davies approached these three centuries and
the rise of Welsh Nonconformity and industrialisation from very different
perspectives, casting quite different lights on the centrality of Nonconformity and
industry to Welsh identity.
J. Graham Jones’ approach to Nonconformity in Wales was similar to his
approach towards the Celts in that it appeared to reinforce stereotype and myth.
Nonconformity emerged from the failings of the Anglican Church as a Church from
the time of its conception, with its alien nature hindering its advance in Wales.114 He portrayed Methodism, in contrast, as “…the full coming of age of the Protestant
112 G.R. Elton (1985) “King Henry VII.” Honorable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.131- 145; J. Gwynfor Jones (1978/9) “The Welsh Poets and their Patrons, c. 1550-1640.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 9, pp.245-277; Ceridwen Lloyd Morgan (1985) “Prophecy and Welsh Nationhood in the Fifteenth Century.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.9-26; Gruffydd Aled Williams (1986) “The Bardic Road to Bosworth: A Welsh View of Henry Tudor.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.7-32. 113 Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of My Fathers. Glanmor Williams argued that Gwynfor Evans’ nationalism meant his portrayal of the process of Union was unfairly biased with little consideration being give to the view point of those who lived through the process. See Glanmor Williams (1988/9) “The Act of Incorporation and the Welsh Language.” Planet, Vol 72, pp.48-53. 114 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, p.77. 310
Reformation in Wales…”115 implying that it was through and in Nonconformity that
the Welsh people were able to fully access and express their Christian heritage. His
analysis bore distinct resemblance to Glanmor Williams’ argument that Methodism was the Welsh expression of the spiritual hunger of the Reformation period.116 For J.
Graham Jones, Methodism reinvigorated a sickly Welsh culture and church, benefits
that outweighed its negative emphasis on moral seriousness, and political quiescence
and non-involvement.117 Furthermore, J. Graham Jones, in choosing not to discuss
the English connections of Welsh Nonconformity, gave the impression that for once
Wales was not following in English footsteps. Nonconformity was, essentially, a
Welsh development, the Welsh culmination of the Welsh experience of the
Reformation,118 a portrayal similar to David Williams’, Dodd’s and Gwyn A.
Williams’ approaches to Methodism.119
This perspective was developed further in the 1980s and 1990s with Gwynfryn
Richards120 and Roger L. Brown121 examining how Methodism and Griffith Jones’ circulating schools were, in fact, Welsh developments and considering their roles in revitalising Welsh Christianity. Neither of these authors ignored the external triggers but the focus was, increasingly on the Welsh expression of the movements. As in the previous periods, however, the simplicity of J. Graham Jones’ explanation contained its own problems. The implication of inevitability in the progression from
Anglicanism to Methodism was of the most obvious – as well as a lack of
115 Ibid., p.82. 116 Glanmor Williams (1991) The Welsh and their Religion: Historical Essays, pp.51-53. 117 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, pp.86-87. 118 Ibid., pp.82-87. 119 David Williams (1977) A History of Modern Wales, pp.139-157; A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of Wales, pp.96-102 & pp.133-138; Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh, pp.154-158 & pp.205-208. 120 Gwynfryn Richards (1979/80) “The Diocese of Bangor During the Rise of Welsh Methodism.” National Library of Wales Journal, Vol. 21, pp.179-220. 121 Roger L. Brown (1997/8) “Spiritual Nurseries: Griffith Jones and the Circulating Schools.” National Library of Wales Journal, Vol 30, pp.27-49. 311
differentiation between Nonconformity and Methodism. Methodism, in this way,
became an essential part of the Welsh experience, with little mention made of the
Welsh people who never participated and only a very brief acknowledgement of those
whose primary interest was the contemporary cultural revival.122
For J. Graham Jones, Nonconformity was more significant than the literary
and cultural developments led by those like the poet and self-styled bard Iolo
Morganwg. He did, however, briefly discuss the literary renaissance, noting its
interest in poetry, history and the more Romantic re-establishment of the Eisteddfod
as well as several London societies for the promulgation of Welsh literature.123 He
made no attempt to position these developments in relation to the concurrent rise of
Nonconformity, giving the impression that there was little conflict or correspondence between the two.124 To some extent, J. Graham Jones was aware of this lack – in his
introduction he mourned the little space available for the consideration of Welsh
literature.125
He did, however, briefly address the mergence of Nonconformity with the
developing European humanism. He argued that this mergence provided the Welsh
with their initial exposure to the radical ideas that were developing in Europe
concerning democracy and political reform;126 two further characteristics that became
stereotypically attached to the Welsh. J. Graham Jones argued that in the 19th century,
the combination of humanist Nonconformity and the new “…articulate, politically
122 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, pp.87-88. Gwyn A. Williams was the first of the authors examined to note that the history of those who did not participate in Nonconformism and especially those who were not Christian have dropped out of Welsh history. See Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh, pp.207. 123 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, pp.87-88. 124 J. Graham Jones avoided the interweaving of the religious and cultural revivals. An example of this research is Isaac Thomas (1993/4) “The Contribution of Two Welshmen to the English Bible.” National Library of Wales Journal, Vol. 28, pp.107-126. 125 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, p.vii. 126 Ibid., pp.91-95. 312
conscious working class…”127 merged to create another very Welsh alliance, radical
Liberalism.128 His description of this process enhanced the impression that these
events simply brought to the fore essential Welsh characteristics. Democracy and
certain forms of political participation (those that facilitated democracy rather than
nationalist political development) were as essential to Welshness as Nonconformity
and were, indeed, basically inseparable.129 The mergence of the two was, in this
portrayal, the path to a distinctly Welsh popular political identity. Again, J. Graham
Jones did not tie this development to the concurrent cultural revival despite its links to
humanism. The Welsh path to modernity was primarily through Nonconformity and
Liberalism. In radical, Liberal Nonconformity, the Welsh people came into their
inheritance. Wales and Welshness became mass concepts for the first time in Welsh
history,130 an argument that was technically not inaccurate if modern definitions of national identity and nation were used. The inevitableness of this progression and the brevity of the description did, however, necessitate the exclusion of other expressions
of Wales and Welshness. Correspondingly, J. Graham Jones’ analysis failed to
include the widening of the borders of Wales and Welshness occurring among the
Welsh intelligentsia in the 1980s and 1990s in response to the 1979 rejection of the
Wales that emerged from Nonconformity and Liberalism.
To some extent, J. Graham Jones followed Dodd, Vaughan-Thomas and Gwyn
A. Williams in portraying Welsh industrial development as triggered externally, at
least in the initial stages in Wales. Welsh industrial development did not occur prior
to English intervention and the provision of capital and expertise.131 Again, he
127 Ibid., p.95. 128 Ibid., p.129. 129 For J. Graham Jones’ full analysis of this process, see Ibid., pp.95-129. 130 For the first time, the Welsh people were able to actively direct and participate in religious and economic life, creating a culture that was their own. See Ibid., pp.116-135. 131 Ibid., p.102. 313
followed the standard depiction in arguing that only after this externally based start
were the Welsh able to continue agricultural and industrial development, although their success in continuing this process was made evident by the steady growth of the
export-based coal industry.132 For J. Graham Jones, it was, in fact, this industry that
facilitated the growth of a Welsh political consciousness, entirely working-class and
based on “…a new awareness of a seemingly inevitable antagonism between master
and man…”133 Both Chartism and the Rebecca Riots were expressions of this
working-class consciousness.134 Yet despite the emergence of a Welsh identity from
the industrial and political developments, J. Graham Jones essentially portrayed the
Welsh industrial revolution as British; English in origin and only then Welsh,
something that was evident in the British affiliations of industrial Wales.
By this stage of J. Graham Jones’ depiction of 19th century Wales, rural Wales
had been entirely subsumed by the industrial history, creating an impression of Wales
and Welshness that was defined by the industrial experience, again necessitated by
word space but as exclusionary as his focus on Nonconformity. This impression was
strengthened by the linkage of the development of national consciousness to
industrial, radical Liberal Nonconformity.135 It was a sense of Wales and Welshness,
however, which was very much secondary, if essential, to the industrial identity that
emerged. Traditional Welshness was relegated to rural Wales, with the slightly rising
interest in Welsh literature and language being perceived as limited to intellectual
circles136 until the 1880s. At this point in time, a sudden resurgence of Welsh
language writing and publishing occurred in both Chapel and Eisteddfod, creating
both a popular and an institutional Welsh culture. “This cultural vitality gave a new
132 Ibid., p.104. 133 Ibid., p.109. 134 Ibid., pp.109-112. 135 Ibid., pp.125-127. 136 Ibid., pp.125-126. 314 lease of life to the Nonconformist chapels, culminating in a famous revival in 1904, and the new status to the national eisteddfod…”137 Aberystwyth University College was founded, as were a national museum and a national library, fostering the growth of serious study of Welsh literature and history, published in Welsh periodicals.138
But Cymru Fydd’s failure to gain support for Home Rule and the reality of Lloyd
George’s British rather than Welsh ambitions illustrated the limits of this national revival.139
The Welsh renaissance was, first and foremost, cultural, literary and educational,
rather than separatist. The Welsh sought equality and recognition within the British
system of government, not exclusion from it.140
There is little to object to in this depiction – J. Graham Jones conveyed the burst of religious and cultural enthusiasm well but again, when it is placed in the light of the earlier parts of his history, it contributed to his neat progression of history to the
Wales of the 1990s. The Welsh, then and in 1990, chose to remain in Britain and to express their culture from within those bounds. Here, J. Graham Jones’ interpretation bore considerable similarity with that of Vaughan-Thomas, with the 1979 devolution referendum result depicted as a continuation of the choices historically made by the
Welsh people. The relationship between Wales and England was almost inevitable.
When this depiction is positioned in the context of the intellectual debate of the
1990s, it is evident that J. Graham Jones’ interpretation was too simplistic. His depiction was historically accurate, but it was not the whole story and leaves the
137 Ibid., p.133. 138 Ibid., pp.133-134. 139 Ibid., pp.134-135. 140 Ibid., p.135. 315
reader with the impression of a one-dimensional Wales, and one that may not resonate
at all with their or their familial experience of Wales and Welshness. A question
arises. J. Graham Jones history book may well provide a reader with a basic grasp of
Welsh history but do the problems with the forced historiographical brevity,
particularly in terms of Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-English relationship,
outweigh its benefits?
In terms of interpretation, John Davies’ positioning of Nonconformity in
relation to Welsh identity could not be more different from that of J. Graham Jones.
As in the three earlier periods, John Davies focused on analysing the events to reveal not only what factually happened but also to reveal how those events would have appeared to the participants. For John Davies, Nonconformity was not the culmination of the Protestant Reformation but a major and disturbing cultural development.141 Indeed, he pointed out the Welsh intellectuals of the time feared the
loss of Welsh culture and identity.142 Lewis Morris, one of the Morris group
responsible for the concurrent revival of the then-traditional Welsh culture,
“…believed that the culture of Wales faced extinction if the people continued to ‘get
drunk on religion.’”143 John Davies made no attempt to hide the similarity of this
situation to that prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s, when the culture spawned by
Methodism was finally vanishing.
Indeed, Welshness was so redefined as to raise doubts that those who did not cherish
the chapel culture could be considered heirs to the true traditions of Wales. This was
141 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales, p.313. 142 Ibid.. 143 Ibid.. 316
a highly ironic development, for in the eighteenth century the defenders of those
traditions saw Methodism as a threat.144
In this depiction, identity did not exist within fixed boundaries but was, instead,
formed by the interaction between events and the Welsh situation; it was the result of
the Welsh people’s actions and choices.
In correspondence with these wider boundaries around Welsh identity, John
Davies followed a newer trend in Welsh historiography145 in not displacing the Welsh
gentry from Welsh culture with the popular shift away from Anglicanism into
Nonconformity.146 All three forms of Welshness current during the rise of
Nonconformity – Nonconformity itself, the Morris’ brothers’ attempts to revive bardic and literary Welsh culture, and the gentry’s more Anglicised expression of
Welshness – were attempts to adapt and recreate a Wales and a Welsh identity that were relevant and responsive to the world of the late 18th century. This 18th century
Wales was experiencing a fundamental debility of identity, with the Anglicised gentry
serving as scapegoats for the wider community. “Out of enfeeblement came renewal,
not through the restoration of the old but rather through creating new traditions.”147
Welsh national culture, like that of England and France, was consciously created
during this period as in others: it was not organic.148 For John Davies, Welsh
Nonconformity was a part of this conscious creation of an identity that would function
in the society of the time. It was Welsh, it expressed the experiences of the Welsh
people and it was based in the roots of Welsh culture, but it was not a definitive
144 Ibid., p.313. 145 Philip Jenkins (1987/8) “The Glamorgan Gentry in 1677.” National Library of Wales Journal, Vol. 25, pp.53-70; Gareth Williams (1988) “How’s the Tenors in Dowlais? Hegemony, Harmony and Popular Culture in England and Wales 1600-1900.” Llafur, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp.70-80. 146 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales, p.301. 147 Ibid., p.302. 148 Ibid., pp.302-303. 317
Welsh identity. This approach owed a considerable amount to the questioning
approach towards identity evident during the 1980s and the gradual widening of the
boundaries of identity that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s in the wake of the decline
of Nonconformity in Wales. Events had, by 1990, amply demonstrated that
Nonconformity was not, in fact, essential for Welshness. As the Welsh intelligentsia’s shift towards Europe demonstrated, by 1990 Welsh identity was in the process of collecting new boundaries.
Welsh culture itself was also a target of increased research interest in the
1990s. In 1988, prior to the publication of either book, Gareth Williams asked
whether or not it was, in fact, possible to ever have “…a traditional popular culture
since, like society itself, it is always changing.”149 National and regional cultures
certainly existed but, as Hywel Francis illustrated, even the most vital and vivid
experienced constant change and development.150 John Davies’ interpretation, unlike that of J. Graham Jones, built on this approach to culture, emphasising its permeability and changeability as well as its foundations in Welsh experience. The debates of the 1980s and 1990s over the nature of Welsh culture had clearly impacted on this aspect of Welsh historiography.
Throughout his book, John Davies consistently portrayed the Welsh people as proactive – Nonconformity was an active response, as was the process of industrialisation. John Davies, in a manner similar to that of Gwyn A. Williams, portrayed an industrial revolution in which the Welsh people themselves were major actors. This similarity was intentional: John Davies openly based part of his
149 Gareth Williams (1988) “How’s the Tenors in Dowlais? Hegemony, Harmony and Popular Culture in England and Wales 1600-1900.” Llafur, Vol. 5, No. 1, p.73. 150 Hywel Francis (1994) “Language, Culture and Learning: The Experience of a Valley Community.” Llafur, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp.85-96. 318
consideration of industrial Wales on Gwyn A. Williams’ work.151 Hence, England
was depicted more as a catalyst than the driver of Welsh industrialisation – as
providing the stimulus for Welsh international growth, a role the English were to play
across the globe.152 It was Welsh entrepreneurial skills that facilitated the full development of Welsh industry, as seen in the later growth of the coal and steel
industries and, particularly, in the copper industry under Thomas Williams, a solicitor
from Llanidan.153 Yet the fact that John Davies, in the 1990s, felt the need to stress
Welsh possession of entrepreneurial skills and industrial ability was revealing,
illustrating the persistence of the stereotype of Welsh inability in these areas.
Historical arguments against this stereotype had been around since the 1960s and
1970s, and were elaborated on in the 1980s and 1990s, with Frank Llewellyn Jones
entitling an article “Two Centuries of Innovation in Welsh Industry,” yet it still persisted.154
John Davies, in attacking this stereotype, did not argue that the industrial
developments did not alter both the physical form of Wales and what the Welsh
people thought about themselves and their country. In fact, for him the depth and
extent of these changes fully justified the term ‘revolution’.155 As with all
revolutionary change, the process was not fully under Welsh – or any - control.156 It
was, however, the response of the Welsh people to the technological advances that
facilitated the development of a new culture based on Nonconformity and working
151 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales, p.327. 152 Ibid., pp.324-325. 153 Ibid., pp.324-326. 154 Michael Asteris (1986/7) “The Rise and Decline of South Wales Coal Exports, 1870-1930.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 13, pp.24-43; Chris Evans (1994) “Iron Puddling: The Quest for a New Technology in Eighteenth-Century Industry.” Llafur, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp.44-57; Frank Llewelyn-Jones (1983) “Wales and the Origins of the Railway Revolution.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.115-131; (1997) “Two Centuries of Innovation in Welsh Industry.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, Vol. 3, pp.86-102. 155 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales, p.323. 156 Ibid., p.320. 319 class unity. The circumstances of Wales, in turn, pitted this Welshness against the
Established Church and the Anglicised landowners and industrialists.157 John Davies depicted a people who gradually developed through the industrial experience from the raw protests of the Scotch Cattle to possessing the skills and political involvement necessary to organise their Chapels and the more planned protest of the Chartists and the Rebeccas.158
This depiction of eighteenth and nineteenth century Wales did not entirely rest on that of Gwyn A. Williams, however. John Davies did not separate industrial from rural Wales, or separate industrial society and culture from either Nonconformity or
‘traditional’ culture. Wales of the 19th century developed as a country despite some of the negative impacts of industrialisation – for example, the construction of the railways with their focus on Welsh-English access hindered national unity while raising national consciousness. The early industrial revolution shaped the growth of
Welsh agriculture, with the growing political awareness of the period facilitating rural protest against tolls and enclosures.159 Welsh traditional culture survived industrialisation, with the Eisteddfods, Welsh choral singing and “…literature-loving parsons…”160 ensuring its continued presence in both industrial and rural communities.161
This argument revealed a difference between John Davies’ understanding of
‘politically awake’ and that generally current in the 1980s and early 1990s. David W.
Howell argued that farm labourers did not become politically awake prior to WW1
157 Ibid., pp.318-379. 158 Ibid.. 159 Ibid., pp.355-356. 160 Ibid., p.386. 161 Ibid., pp.385-387. 320
when they began to act as a unionised entity.162 John Davies, however, had a wider
definition of politicisation that allowed action that was less labour and socialist
oriented. He avoided, in other words, antedating the Labour movement in Wales and
did so in a way that illustrated the constructed nature of the Welsh Labour identity.
His approach did appear in the wider historical community, with D.J.V. Jones arguing
that the Welsh farmers were politicised according to a different form of law, hence the
forms of action apparent in the Rebecca Riots.163 Michael Roberts had, in 1989, also
argued that the lack of a specifically Welsh working-class structure did not mean the
lack of the presence of a complex labour structure and complex relationships within
that structure.164 John Davies’ portrayal of a people who became politically aware
and active in the socialist sense over time and through experience was a part of this
wider historiographical debate.
In many ways, the transition between the world in which this older societal
law was dominant and that in which unionisation was the evidence of political
awareness, defined John Davies’ interpretation of the second half of the 19th century.
John Davies argued that this latter period was shaped by a rapid modernisation of
thought and understanding “…as mysticism yielded to rationalism,”165 a process
encouraged in turn by the growing “…hypersensitivity of the leaders of Welsh to the
criticism of the English.”166 This process was triggered by the 1847 Blue Book
Reports on Education and was manifested in the emergence of the battle for Welsh rights on a Nonconformist rather than Welsh basis.167 The transition between
162 David W. Howell (1992/3) “Labour Organization Among Agricultural Workers in Wales, 1872- 1921.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 16, pp.63-92. 163 D.J.V. Jones (1990) “Rebecca, Crime and Policing: A Turning-Point in Nineteenth-Century Attitudes.” Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion Transactions, pp.99-116. 164 Michael Roberts (1989) “Another Letter from a Far Country: The Pre-History of Labour, or the History of Work in Preindustrial Wales.” Llafur, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp.93-106. 165 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales, p.399. 166 Ibid., p.392. 167 Ibid., pp.391-392. 321
mysticism and rationalism was, however, occurring throughout Britain: Welsh hypersensitivity to English criticism simply made the Welsh situation more complex.
John Davies argued that this alteration of political consciousness was accompanied by two specific developments, both of which positioned A History of
Wales within the 1980s and 1990s debate over the definition of Wales and Welshness.
Technological developments such as rail transportation and the growth of institutions that acknowledged Wales as a nation facilitated a rise in the popular awareness of
Wales as more than a locality.168 This consciousness was, however, increasingly
being expressed through the English language, due to the Chapel monopoly on Welsh
language culture.169 English became “…the medium for expressing what could not be
expressed in Welsh.”170 It was this latter English-language Welshness that became
linked with socialism and unionism and, by 1901, had begun to develop an English-
language Welsh culture inextricably linked to Welsh modernity.171
The complexity of the language situation had attracted a considerable amount
of historiographical debate in the 1980s and the 1990s. Whilst John Davies’ argument
that industrialisation contributed towards the growth of the English language in Wales
received support, so did the reverse argument – that industrialisation helped to protect
the Welsh language.172 According to Brinley Thomas, industrial culture did not
trigger the decline of the Welsh language: he laid that charge at the feet of the global
economic collapse in the interwar period.173 John Davies’ preference for the
association of industrialisation with the English language was not, however, critical
168 Ibid., pp.398-399. 169 Ibid., pp.417-421. 170 Ibid., p.421. 171 Ibid., pp.498-499. 172 Brinley Thomas (1986/7) “A Cauldron of Rebirth: Population and the Welsh Language in the Nineteenth Century.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 13, pp.418-437. 173 Ibid., p.437. 322
but was, instead, a legitimisation of the English-language Welsh culture. It emerged from a Welsh reaction to events within Wales.
The differences evident between J. Graham Jones’ history and that of John
Davies’ continue into the final period to be examined, the twentieth century. J.
Graham Jones’ pattern of depicting one event leading on to the next came under some
stress in the final chapters, particularly post-WW2 when Britain began to be more
openly challenged as a result of its steady economic and global decline. The different attitude displayed by the two authors to the final decades covered by their books was also revealing. John Davies was far more comfortable with the questioning occurring in the 1980s and the new options being investigated by the end of the decade and in the 1990s than J. Graham Jones who brushed lightly over the depth of the search for
Wales and Welshness and the challenges offered to the then-current expression of the
Welsh-English relationship in Britain.
As with the previous periods, J. Graham Jones’ historical facts were generally
accurate. It was, again, the simplicity of his account that limited Wales and
Welshness to specific experiences. The Labour Party and Plaid Genedlaethol Cymru
both emerged from the disillusionment of WWI, which acted as a catalyst for trends
that had been developing prior to the war.174 Yet this argument failed to indicate the
presence of some historical controversy over the role of WWI, particularly in relation
to the Labour Party. Deian Hopkin argued that the structure needed for the political
advance of Labour was in place by 1914, and the shift in attitude towards Labour was
well under way by the outbreak of war in 1914.175 Despite the fact that Deian
Hopkin’s article was published after the release of J. Graham Jones’ book, it was a
longer running controversy and there is, indeed, evidence that J. Graham Jones was
174 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: the History of Wales, pp.135-143. 175 Deian Hopkin (1994) “The Rise of Labour in Wales 1890-1914.” Llafur, Vol. 6, No. 3, p.137. 323
aware of the debate and the complexity of the situation. Two articles he published in the early 1980s demonstrated his awareness of the complexity and depth of the issues surrounding the decline of the Liberal Party and the gradual climb to dominance of
Labour, with the Great Depression and issues internal to the Liberal Party playing major roles.176 In a following article a decade later, he demonstrated his awareness of
the continuing complexity of the Welsh political situation post-WW2,177 something
not conveyed in A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales. This debate expanded further
in the 1990s, with the Welsh intelligentsia analysing the Conservative Party’s
Welshness178 and Stephen M. Cullen discussing the presence of a fascist party in
Glamorgan between 1932 to 1940.179
J. Graham Jones’ depiction of Plaid Cymru shared these difficulties. Welsh
nationalism emerged from the same sense of post-WW1 disillusionment, shaped by
the perception of a small group of intellectuals that the Liberal and Labour Parties had
failed to act on the behalf of Wales over the previous few decades, industrially as well as politically.180 This perception of failure, accompanied by the decline of
Nonconformity and the Welsh language, triggered the formation of Plaid
Genedlaethol Cymru in August 1925, “…a fiercely autonomous, nationalist political
party, which sought, first and foremost, to defend the Welsh language…”181 Again, an article published by J. Graham Jones himself indicated that he must have been aware of the simplicity of his argument although he maintained in his article the
176 J. Graham Jones (1981/2) “Wales and the New Liberalism, 1926-1929.” National Library of Wales Journal, Vol. 22, pp.321-352; (1982/3) “Wales and the New Socialism, 1926-1929.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 11, pp.173-199. 177 J. Graham Jones (1992/3) “The Liberal Party and Wales, 1945-79.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 16, pp.326-355. 178 Geraint Morgan (1985/6) “How Welsh are the Welsh Conservatives?” Planet, Vol. 54, pp.60-64. 179 Stephen M. Cullen (1994/5) “Another Nationalism: The British Union of Fascists in Glamorgan, 1932-40.” Welsh History Review, Vol. 17, pp.101-114. 180 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, pp.138-139. 181 Ibid., p.139. 324
significance of the role of WWI as a catalyst for the formation of the Party.182
Nonetheless, the reasons offered in his article, including a wider awareness of world events among the Welsh people, the realisation that small nations were in fact viable and the principles established in the Peace of Versailles183 were not even implied in
his book, again over-simplifying the situation.
This simplicity was again apparent in his treatment of the Great Depression.
Here, J. Graham Jones reinforced the myth of the centrality of an industrial Wales to
Welsh identity. He focused primarily on technical industry and the agricultural
industry, depicting the deprivation and unemployment of the period, and the communal solidarity created by the shared experience.184 J. Graham Jones also
emphasised the poor governmental response, tying this to the growth of support for
Labour in Wales, due to the huge efforts of the local Labour councils who “…fought
unflinchingly against the harshest enactments of the National Government.”185 Thus,
Wales reacted against National Governmental neglect to become strongly Labour. It
was a logical explanation and yet one that isolated the Welsh experience of the Great
Depression from that in England and elsewhere in Britain and that, furthermore,
limited the Welsh experience to one of industrial deprivation. J. Graham Jones also
failed to note the complexity behind the Welsh shift towards Labour, including the
impact of Ramsay MacDonald’s defection from Labour to the National Government.
Again, the simplicity of the historiography implied that, given the experience of the
Depression years, loyalty to Wales meant loyalty to Labour, further limiting the
definition of Welsh identity and defining the nature of the Welsh-English relationship
as one of mutual obligation. Despite its simplicity, this depiction of the Great
182 J. Graham Jones (1981/2) “Forming Plaid Cymru: Laying the Foundations, 1923-26.” National Library of Wales Journal, Vol. 22, p.427. 183 Ibid., pp.427-428. 184 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, pp.141-142. 185 Ibid., p.143. 325
Depression was more viable than that of Wynford Vaughan-Thomas, demonstrating
none of the latter’s Establishment tendencies. Neither was J. Graham Jones alone
among the other authors for failing to consider the rural experience or that of those
who did not experience the deprivation of the period. In this period, Wales and
Welshness were largely defined by the experience of the majority, despite the
availability of wider interpretations in the research from prior decades.
J. Graham Jones’ depiction of the congenital problems of Welsh industry
further illustrated that, despite the generality and superficiality of much of A Pocket
Guide: The History of Wales, he was aware not only of the wider historiographical
debate but also of the discussion among the Welsh intelligentsia concerning the state
of the Welsh economy and Welsh industry. According to J. Graham Jones, post-
WW2 nationalisation, while welcomed by the miners, did not address any of the
underlying problems of the Welsh economic and industrial structure.186 Bill Jones,
Brian Roberts and Chris Williams’ article in 1996 presented the miners’ desire for
nationalisation as a more personal desire – it was intended to facilitate economic
security and to confirm the status and position of miners in relation to other workers
and to the nation.187 Similarly, for J. Graham Jones, government encouragement of industrial growth in Wales left the basic problems untouched and largely ignored any
sense of Wales as a unit. Welsh industry remained intensely vulnerable to
international markets, merely switching from a Welsh-based export industry to
providing homes for secondary factories.188 This view was strongly present in the
Welsh intelligentsia’s debate in both the 1980s and the 1990s in relation to both the
post-war situation and that of later decades.
186 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, pp.146-147. 187 Bill Jones, Brian Roberts & Chris Williams (1996) “Going from Darkness to the Light: South Wales Miners’ Attitudes Towards Nationalisation.” Llafur, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp.101-102. 188 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales, p.147. 326
From this point on, J. Graham Jones broadly failed to offer any real analysis
of events, choosing instead to simply detail the main political occurrences in Wales
between 1950 and 1980. Presumably, this was related to the relative recency of the
events but it did have the disadvantage of failing to offer any explanation to make
sense of difficult and unexpected events. Thus Plaid Cymru’s “…dramatic and
unexpected…”189 victory in July 1966 at the Carmarthen by-election remained
dramatic and unexpected, as was its influence on the resurgence of nationalism from
then into the 1970s.190 As with this, the Conservative voting achievements in the
1980s were unexamined. Little explanation was offered for the 1984/5 miners’ strike or for the return of devolution to the political agenda in the late 1980s.191 This leaves
the reader with the distinct impression of dramatic and rapid change that was in the
process of repositioning Welsh boundaries in terms of identity: a process that was
incomplete with the final product correspondingly indeterminate. It also leaves the reader with the sense that the Welsh-English identity was being upturned in a way that had no historical antecedent. Certainly, the neat progression from one event to another was broken. For the first time, J. Graham Jones presented Welsh culture and
language as under serious threat, although he balanced this condition with an
acknowledgement of the increasing stability of and interest in the Welsh language in
education and in the wider community.192
Despite this threat, J. Graham Jones presented a Welsh culture that remained
viable – it was threatened but not fatally damaged by the gradual encroachment of the
English language.193 Here, again, J. Graham Jones’ work showed the influence of the
debate occurring throughout the 1980s and early 1990s over the status of the Welsh
189 Ibid., p.152. 190 Ibid., pp.152-153. 191 Ibid., pp.152-155. 192 Ibid., pp.160-161. 193 Ibid., pp.156-161. 327
and English-language cultures. J. Graham Jones did not depict English as essentially
destructive of Welsh culture, noting the “…emergence of a new school of Anglo-
Welsh writers, writing in English but with their roots firmly in Wales.”194 Novels and
journals in English were portrayed as equally capable of expressing Welshness as the
Welsh language versions.195 J. Graham Jones indicated, however, that by the 1980s
the Welshness of the Anglo-Welsh writers was less pronounced being “…less
noticeably affected by a specifically Welsh literary tradition or the influence of Welsh
history.”196 Yet he also argued that Welshness remained a valid cultural identity, with
a steady growth in interest – and education – in the Welsh language, mostly accredited to the actions of Cymdeithas yr Iaith and the emergence of a Welsh middle class “…prepared to challenge the inferior status accorded to the Welsh language.”197
Here, his inclusion of Anglo-Welsh culture, while narrowly based, was evidence of
the widening of the boundaries of cultural identity evident among the Welsh
intelligentsia over the 1980s and 1990s. Yet his insistence on the continued viability
of a more traditional Welsh culture reflected only part of the story. Yes, general
interest in the Welsh language, in the Welsh past and in a Welsh identity were
growing as Britishness became increasingly irrelevant, but he did not acknowledge
the differences between this identity and the one that was present in Wales at the start
of the 20th century. Again, his general history of Wales failed to match the awareness
of the wider situation evident in his journal articles.
John Davies’ acknowledged the rapid changes that shaped 20th century Wales.
Yet because of his tendency to see Wales itself as a constant and Welshness as formed by the reaction and experience of events within the geology and geography of Wales,
194 Ibid., p.159. 195 Ibid., pp.157-160. 196 Ibid., p.160. 197 Ibid., p.161. 328
these changes were not seen as innately destructive of Welshness but rather part of the
reoccurring reshaping of that identity, a concept reminiscent of Gwyn A. Williams.
This process was also used, far more obviously than in the earlier sections of the
book, to explain the changing definitions of Wales and Welshness over the 20th
century. Thus, the shift from a Liberal to a Labour affiliation was the result of the
circumstances created by WW1, including the damage inflicted to Liberal principles
by the war itself and by Lloyd George’s adoption of the policy of War Socialism.198
Political realities and the Depression of the Interwar years heightened popular disillusionment with Lloyd George and the Liberal Party, particularly when promised reforms failed to materialise and governmental corruption hit newspapers.199 Yet
John Davies argued that this growing duality in politics did not alter the existence of a
uniquely Welsh dimension of politics, with ethnic factors effecting Labour loyalty,
allowing the expression of political Welshness through a non-nationalist means. It
was not until Labour achieved near-total political domination in the 1960s that Welsh
nationalism was able to regain separate popular political expression,200 an argument
that Ian McAllister had forwarded in 1981.201
There was one difference between John Davies A History of Wales and the
histories of the other five authors that emerged from his consideration of this aspect of
Welsh history. His portrayal of twentieth century Wales consistently depicted the
essentially multi-faceted nature of twentieth century Wales, validating the many
different experiences of Wales and Welshness. Gwyn A. Williams, while
approaching these events from a very left-wing stance, focused entirely on the
industrial experience of these events. A.H. Dodd briefly considered rural Wales but
198 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales, p.521. 199 Ibid., pp.528-596. 200 Ibid., p.664. 201 Ian McAllister (1981) “The Labour Party in Wales: The Dynamics of One-Partyism.” Llafur, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.79-89. 329
his coverage of the twentieth century was brief in the extreme. John Davies, in
contrast, covered the industrial experience of the Great Depression, but also presented
rural deprivation, the relative wealth of teachers, the rapid progress of social reform,
and the growth in education and the media as other, equally valid experiences of
Wales.202 Similarly, the protests over the closure of coal mines and the destruction of
the mining communities was addressed but “…but if there were alternative
employment available locally, it would seem that the miners of Wales turned their
backs on the pits without regret…”203 Post WW2 demands also altered Welsh
agricultural and rural life but these changes, industrial and rural, included a general
increased material prosperity, witnessed by the rising ownership of television sets and motor cars, the National Health Service and increased public investment into the
Welsh economy.204
John Davies did agree with the standard theme evident in the five other books
of a drastic identity shift in post-WW2 Wales. Despite the greater depth of his
analysis, there were definite similarities between his approach to the Welsh language
and culture and that of J. Graham Jones although the latter author did not consider the
role of the Chapels in the altering of Welsh linguistic identity. For John Davies, the
decline of the Chapels created a new phenomenon, “…a Welsh people, wholly
conscious of their Welshness, who were professed non-believers.”205 An
accompanying decline of the Welsh language removed this feature as an essential
material proof of identity as well, despite its continuing centrality to the concepts of
Wales and Welshness.206 Despite these alterations, Welshness remained strong in
202 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales, pp.559-598. 203 Ibid., p.627. 204 Ibid., pp.629-635. 205 Ibid., pp.642-643. 206 For John Davies’ analysis of the situation of the Welsh language, Welsh television, Welsh-language literature and English-language Welsh literature, see Ibid., pp.644-661. 330
Welsh society, with Cymdeithas yr Iaith extending its attention to television in the
1970s, and a concurrent release of government funding for Welsh language publication. Anglo-Welsh literature also flourished, with communication between it and its Welsh-language brethren gradually increasing – as did the study of Welsh history, in both languages.
In the 1970s, the standard explanation for the increased prominence of
devolution in the late 1960s and early 1970s was political: Plaid Cymru received
protest votes, boosting its importance to a shaky Labour Party who needed its support.
John Davies’ approach was quite different, focusing on these political factors, but also on the rise of Plaid Cymru as a valid popular party, concerns over the democratic deficit in Wales, and the vulnerability of these sentiments to more pressing economic and social concerns.207 In this context, the ‘no’ vote was not a rejection of devolution
or of Welshness. It was the result of a combination of factors, including bad timing and a popular dislike of the version of devolution on offer. This approach clearly revealed the influence of the 1980s debates on John Davies’ historiography and clearly positioned him as a forerunner of the 1990s approach taken to the 1979 rejection of devolution. Much of his argument about the alterations to Welsh identity, the development of Welsh nationalism, and devolution appeared to have been shaped by these debates. John Davies’ quotation of John Osmond supports this conclusion, with Osmond arguing that such an assembly would have “…hindered attempts to create a more radical consensus in favour of self-government…”208 Similarly, too
much was made of the Conservative resurgence in Wales: “…all that happened in
1979 was that their proportion of seats was, for once, broadly similar to their
207 Ibid., pp.670-675 208 Ibid., p.678 331
proportion of votes.”209 The Conservative face of Wales and Welshness was publicly
revealed, an approach that broadened the boundaries of Welshness in line with
Geraint Morgan’s article on the Welshness of the Conservative Party.210
John Davies made no attempt to play down the actions of the Conservative
government after 1979, however, or the confusion among Welsh nationalists. Welsh
mines were closed, leaving only 4000 miners in south Wales by the end of the 1980s,
triggering high unemployment, the dissolution of mining communities and the 1984/5
strike.211 Indeed, he portrayed a Wales and Welshness that were, during this decade,
uncertain of what and who they were, uncertain of their future and even of their
continued existence. John Davies’ concluding two pages captured his belief
concerning these challenges to Wales and Welshness, acknowledging the dismantling
of many of the factors that had defined these concepts in the 19th and 20th centuries.212
Yet his retelling of Welsh history makes it clear that these factors were situational rather than essential expressions of Welshness. His conclusion confirmed this:
Yet the prediction that Wales and its attributes are coming to an end is by no means
new…the Welsh survived all the crises of their history, remaking their nation time
and time again. As Wales seems to experience recurrent death and rebirth, it would
almost seem as if the history of the nation is an endless journey back and fore
between the mortuary and the delivery room. Those who proclaim its funeral are
singularly unwise, for tenacity is the hallmark of this ancient nation.213
209 Ibid., p.679 210 Geraint Morgan (1985/6) “How Welsh are the Welsh Conservatives?” Planet, Vol. 54, pp.60-64. 211 John Davies (1994) A History of Wales, pp.683-684. 212 Ibid., pp.685-686. 213 Ibid., p.686. 332
In John Davies’ eyes, Wales, as a full nation, was yet to be, but it would be. This was made possible by his historically demonstrated belief that Wales – its people – experienced and reacted to events, thus creating Welshness. Similarly, the relationship between Wales and England was open to change – still voluntary, still both positive and negative, still filled with ambiguity and ambivalence and never fixed.
Welshness and the Welsh-English relationship were, for John Davies, created
and defined by the way the Welsh people experienced and reacted to events. In this,
the constant was Wales itself, the shaping and defining factors of land and location –
geology and geography. In focusing on the issue of language, the identity debate had
gone off track. Both language cultures were depicted as valid reactions to events and,
therefore, both were equally Welsh. This period gave birth to what would become a
stereotypical Welsh identity, but this identity – both industrial and rural – excluded a
significant proportion of Wales and Welsh experience.214 It was this misplaced debate and the problematic relationship between Wales and England that was the real problem.
Consequently, it has been claimed that, in the twentieth century, there is no such thing
as a common Welsh experience and that attempts to write the recent history of Wales
are no more than exercises in metaphysics. Yet, to this day, a consciousness of
Welshness, whether it is given expression through the Welsh language or the English,
is a living reality to a host of people throughout Wales. During the twentieth century,
national characteristics have found expression through an increasing variety of
movements and institutions, and the concept of the territorial integrity of Wales is
stronger today than it ever has been before. The writing of the history of any country
214 Ibid., pp.499-500. 333
is to some extent a metaphysical act, but the fact that there exists the will to undertake
the task indicates that it is a substantive act also.215
John Davies’ history was clearly influenced by the debates that occurred
among the Welsh intelligentsia in the 1980s and was positioned within the continuation of the debate in the 1990s. The traditional boundaries of Wales and
Welshness were being challenged, as was the relationship between Wales and
England. John Davies’ A History of Wales revealed the weakening hold of England
on Welsh historiography and the emergence of the historiographical rejection of
Britain as a functional framework for Wales because it was not able to best facilitate
Welsh development, albeit in more economic patterns than cultural. Wales and
Welshness were, for John Davies, shaped by experiences and experienced multiple incarnations, ideas that were very much part of the 1980s and 1990s. His concern over the loss of Welsh freedom to define themselves after the Conquest was even more so. Certainly, John Davies – and, indeed, J. Graham Jones – portrayed the relationship between England and Wales as based on an artificial union that was, by the time of Edward I, involuntary on the Welsh side.
J. Graham Jones’ history was far too simplistic in its depiction of Wales,
Welshness and the relationship between Wales and England to fit comfortably into the
changes occurring in the 1980s and 1990s. Yet, when his other work is taken into
consideration, it is apparent that J. Graham Jones was, in fact, active within the
historiographical developments. Consequently, the narrowness of his portrayal of
Wales and Welshness, in particular, appears to be a reflection of the nature of the
book as opposed to his own beliefs. He did, nonetheless, manage to reinforce several
of the historical myths behind stereotypical Welshness: the Celtic cultural basis, the
215 Ibid., p.500. 334
connections between Celtic Christianity, Nonconformity and Welsh identity and the
centrality of industry to identity, for instance. This was, undoubtedly, related to his
desire to produce a basic guide to the history of Wales but A.H. Dodd managed, in A
Short History of Wales to avoid falling into the trap of historical inevitability. J.
Graham Jones’ history still sold well, indicating that despite the intelligentsia’s swing
towards Europe and towards a newly defined Welsh identity, the earlier concepts and
ideas still resonated with a substantial proportion of the Welsh people.
John Davies’ book also sold well, and given his more challenging and
questioning approach to Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-English relationship, a reasonable number of the Welsh people must have been leaning towards the changes apparent in both the book and the wider writings of the Welsh intelligentsia. Wales was, in the 1990s, still divided between traditional images and the newer visions of
Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-English relationship. For John Davies and the
Welsh intelligentsia, these visions involved Europe and – for the latter – the EU; a new framework for Welsh identity and new boundaries around that identity. There is, however, one question that neither author nor the Welsh intelligentsia of the 1980s and 1990s asked: why do the Welsh need an external framework for their identity?
Participation in the external world and EU membership may be unavoidable, but is
Wales not a strong enough framework for Welsh identity and, indeed, for Welsh historiography? Certainly, the one general national history published after the conclusion of this study, Geraint H. Jenkins A Concise History of Wales,216 did not
follow John Davies’ move away from a framework based on the Welsh-English
relationship. Yet a collection of essays published in 1999 did attempt to follow this path, building on the reality of the EU-granted respectability of small, devolved
216 Geraint H. Jenkins (2007) A Concise History of Wales. 335
nations and regions and the new Welsh experience of devolution.217 It remains to be seen whether John Davies’ shift will be developed further in Welsh historiography in the early twenty-first century.
217 Gareth Elwyn Jones (1999) “The People’s Nation.” In Gareth Elwyn Jones & Dai Smith (eds) The People of Wales, BBC Radio Wales: A Millennium History. Llandysul: Gomer Press, pp.1-9. 336
Conclusion
The study of Welsh identity has been well established in Wales and, as a
research field, has been approached from many perspectives including literature, religion, experiential Welshness and history. The conclusions reached in this thesis contribute towards providing an understanding of the nature, shape and boundaries of identity within Wales and the role of the Welsh-English relationship in forming these
Welsh identities. As this study has demonstrated, history has played a greater role in the issue of identity than previous studies have allowed. Certainly, the historical tracing of the emergence and development of Welsh identities has provided invaluable knowledge within all the research approaches mentioned above. Yet this study has revealed another way in which history contributes to the identity debate within Wales. Historiography itself, through its depiction of Wales, Welshness and the Welsh-English relationship, has provided guidance for both understanding and approaching these concepts in the modern world. As this study has demonstrated, national histories of Wales have also expressed one of the central problems of Welsh identity – the dominance of England through the relationship between the two countries.
Each of the six books examined in this thesis depicted a clear image of Wales
and Welshness. Four of the six books offered images that were strongly influenced
by concepts of Wales and Welshness that already existed within Welsh society.
Gwynfor Evans’ Land of My Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History1 embodied his
nationalist identity, locating Wales and Welshness firmly in traditional, Welsh-
speaking, radical, Nonconformist and highly patriotic terms. This version of
1 Gwynfor Evans (1993) Land of My Fathers: 2000 Years of Welsh History. 337
Welshness was not compatible with either version of Wales and Welshness found in
Wynford Vaughan-Thomas’2 or Gwyn A. Williams’ histories.3 Vaughan-Thomas, in writing from an establishment perspective, presented a Wales that was, through history and experience, part of modern Britain. Welsh progress to that point was to be celebrated and Welshness was simply the identity that had emerged from these historical experiences. Anglicisation, while challenging for Wales, simply was.
Gwyn A. Williams, in contrast, offered a strongly socialist approach to the issues of nation and identity. Wales and Welshness could only be created by the Welsh people
– with a distinct focus on the working class – and they had not, by 1985, achieved this goal. John Davies’ approach, in the 1990s, was different again, offering an identity and expression of Wales that belonged to Y Fro Gymraeg, the Welsh-speaking heartland of Wales, but without the nationalistic fervour of Gwynfor Evans. All four identities would have resonated with different sections of the Welsh population – nationalist, establishment, those from the industrial south-east, and those from the heartlands of Wales – as, indeed, the healthy sales and reprints of all four books confirms.
The remaining two books by A.H. Dodd4 and J. Graham Jones5 offered identities that were not as colourful or as strongly reflected, although they too were part of Welsh society. For Dodd, Welsh identity was primarily one of citizenship.
Those who lived in Wales and were part of Welsh civic and organisational life were
Welsh, from Hywel Dda’s codification of the Welsh laws, participation in
Nonconformist traditions, to the twentieth century development of Welsh institutions.
Such civic development would eventually lead to independence and a nation that was
2 Wynford Vaughan-Thomas (1985) Wales: A History. 3 Gwyn A. Williams (1985) When Was Wales? A History of the Welsh. 4 A.H. Dodd (2003) A Short History of the Welsh. 5 J. Graham Jones (1997) A Pocket Guide: The History of Wales. 338
based on Welsh culture but was not structurally defined by it. J. Graham Jones’
depiction was far simpler. One event in Welsh history led to another: modern Wales
and its identity were as history had defined them and tied them to Britain.
In all six understandings of Wales and Welshness, the impact of England
played a significant role. With the exception of John Davies, these authors of Welsh
national history primarily depicted Wales as passive, as having historically required
England as a conveyor of developments from the Norman era to modern industrial
Wales. John Davies, in contrast, moved more towards offering a depiction of two
very different cultures having to co-exist. Wales, as the weaker of the two nations,
had to adapt to the English presence, but this adaptation was initiated by the Welsh in
an effort to survive, first as an independent nation and then to simply to survive as
best as possible. Welsh identity in John Davies’ depiction was, however, still shaped
by the Welsh-English relationship. It was created in opposition to England; less
passive but still unable to withstand English pressure over the long term.
Certainly, some aspects of the dominance of England in Welsh history cannot be denied. England, in all its expressions from the Saxon to the modern day, has been politically, militarily and economically stronger than Wales. It has, therefore, had a
significant impact on Welsh life, culture and development. The relationship between the six national histories that have been analysed and the wider context of events in
Britain and Wales, and the Welsh intelligentsia’s debate does indicate, however, that
the use of the Welsh-English relationship as a framework for Welsh national histories
and identities over the period examined was partly defined by the then-current
attitudes towards England. The debate among the Welsh intelligentsia in the 1970s
reflected the weakening of Britain through its questioning of the nature and boundaries of the relationship between Wales and England, particularly within the 339
context of Britain. The 1970s Welsh intelligentsia argued for the need for increased
Welsh control over government and economy to facilitate full political, economic and
cultural development. Both A.H. Dodd’s and Gwynfor Evans’ histories reflected aspects of this debate, with A.H. Dodd seeing the historical advance of Wales as
leading to some level of increased self-government and Gwynfor Evans seeing full
self-government, if not necessarily full independence, as necessary for the continued
survival of Wales. Both histories, in being shaped by these issues, reflected the
dominance in the 1970s of the Welsh-English relationship in reference to the
development of Wales as a country and the Welsh as a people.
A similar trend was visible in the 1980s. The Welsh intelligentsia of this
decade had been seriously affected by the rejection of devolution in 1979 and focused
on the questioning and redefining of the boundaries of Wales and Welshness. The
popular Welsh choice to remain fully in the Union with England brought the issue of
Welsh identity into sharp relief: did it still exist and, if so, within what boundaries?
Again, the Welsh-English relationship was highly prominent in this discussion and,
correspondingly, in Gwyn A. Williams’ historical search for when Wales and
Welshness had really existed. Vaughan-Thomas’ decision to accept the Welsh
position within the Union with England in Britain was also a response to the popular
Welsh choice and brought the Welsh-English relationship well to the fore in his
history.
By the 1990s, however, this questioning had, with the continued decline of
Britain as a global political and economic world power and the gradual rise of the EU as a political and economic success in an increasingly globalised world, begun to shift its focus towards finding answers in Wales and Europe rather than in Britain. This situation combined with the questioning of the 1980s to shift the focus off Welsh 340
identity as defined by England to Welsh identity firmly positioned within Wales. The boundaries of Welshness widened to include English-language Welsh culture, with
the possibility of the EU as a future framework for Welsh identity contributing to the
slow desensitisation of this form of Welshness. John Davies’ A History of Wales
reflected the early part of this Welsh, rather than English framework. Similarly, the
EU featured more in his chapters dealing with the late twentieth century than either of
the books published in the mid-1980s. J. Graham Jones’ history, however, did not
reflect this paradigm shift, indicating that a total move away from using a Welsh-
English framework in considering Wales, Welshness and Welsh history would be a
slow process. It was, however, increasingly apparent in the wider historiography,
indicating the reality of the trend.6
The question of the relationship between Wales and England, however,
retained its vitality in the 21st century, with the publication of Geraint H. Jenkins’ A
History of Wales.7 The continued use of this framework for Welsh historiography,
despite the existence of two alternative frameworks – those of Wales itself and of
Europe – indicates the significance of this relationship for the broader study of Wales
and Welsh identity. It is evident from the examination of these six historians and their
history books that the Welsh-English relationship was considerably more than the
political, legal, cultural and economic understandings and boundaries between the two
countries. It had become and remains a fundamental aspect of the majority of
historiographical approaches to Wales and Welshness. Indeed, it would appear from
the wider literature on Welsh identity that the Welsh-English relationship has become
part of a fundamental approach to that area of research.
6 Two examples are R.R. Davies (1995) The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dwr and J. Beverley Smith (2000) Llywelyn ap Gruffudd: Prince of Wales. 7 Geraint H. Jenkins (2007) A Concise History of Wales. 341
The history books examined in this thesis also revealed another reality of the
Welsh historical experience, one that innately problematises the use of the Welsh-
English relationship to define Wales and Welshness. All six books made it very clear
that the Welsh identities that they conveyed emerged from Welsh experiences and
from a cultural and linguistic base very different from that of England. Because of
this difference, the use of the Welsh-English relationship as the essential marker for
Welshness – to be Welsh is not to be English – is not the best defining factor for that identity. It is likely to be the case, but places an uncomfortable emphasis on difference and of comparative value in which Welshness frequently suffers, rather than on the emergence of a Welsh identity and a Wales from the historical experience of a culture, society and people. An alternative approach, as in John Davies’ A
History of Wales, facilitates the depiction of a Wales and Welshness that are given full credit for the reality of what they are. A comparison with the country and identity of England reveals only the remaining Welsh inferiority complex.
Such a comparison also problematises the reality of the multiplicity of
identities and understandings of Wales that emerged from the variety of historical
experiences of Wales. As Raymond Williams argued in an essay published in 1971, nobody speaks for Wales.8 The six history books examined in this thesis indicate,
through their largely valid historical grounding of the Wales and Welshnesses
proffered, the near inevitability of such complexity. England, according to the
traditional, British and Imperial understanding of its identity, has not been portrayed
as sharing this complexity, regardless of the increasingly studied reality of this
situation. Yet the Welsh-English relationship, based on the traditional understanding
of a unitary England and placing the value of Wales and Welshness in opposition to
8 Raymond Williams (2003) “Who Speaks for Wales.” In Raymond Williams Who Speaks for Wales? Nation, Culture, Identity, p.3. 342
that of England, makes the multiplicity of Welsh identities an issue. If Wales,
Welshness and, indeed, Welsh history were not approached from this perspective of the Welsh-English relationship, this multitude of understandings of Wales and
Welshness might not be problematic. A historical and modern confidence in Wales and Welshness – a Welsh framework – could contain a variety of identities. Dai
Smith’s argument that a Wales deeply aware of its history would not require a single, unified identity but could express itself through several,9 accords with the concept of
confidence in Wales and Welshness. All six of the history books examined indicated
that this confidence cannot be found in the employment of the Welsh-English
relationship as a framework for Welsh historiography, or ideas of Wales and
Welshness.
Welsh historiography, in this sense, offers a unique insight into the impact of
the Welsh-English relationship on the concepts of Wales and Welshness. This historiographical analysis allowed access into the active employment of this framework. At the same time, the historical nature of the study placed the reality of
the Welsh-English relationship firmly in the light of the Welsh historical experiences.
This facilitated a deeper understanding of the reasons for the dominance of that
relationship, of the way it affected the depiction of Wales and Welshness in a variety
of situations, of the conceptual impact of a continued comparison between Welsh and
English development and of the way Welsh general history had been shaped by the
unexamined dominance of this relationship. John Davies’ employment of a
framework more strongly based in Wales and Welshness indicated the fact that the
Welsh-English relationship was not the only approach available to Welsh history.
And as this study has shown, it emphasises the question of both the necessity and
9 Dai Smith (1999) Wales: A Question for History, pp.25-26. 343
value of the use of the Welsh-English relationship as a conceptual framework for
Wales, Welshness and Welsh historiography. A new commonality for Welsh
historiography could be a Welsh framework. Certainly, the Welsh-English one was
problematic, and Welsh historians have shown little interest in repositioning
themselves within Britain in accordance with the New British History. The
intelligentsia’s development of the concepts of Wales and Welshness over the twenty-
seven year period from 1970 to 1997 simply did not fit into the framework of a
closely unified Britain and a New British History that still allocated little space to the
Welsh experience.10
10 Neil Evans (2004) “The Changing Context of Welsh Historiography, 1890-2000.” In Helen Brocklehurst & Robert Phillips (eds) History, Nationhood and the Question of Britain, pp.20-32. 344
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