KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT

tidskrift Military history or the study of “War and Society”? The Swedish Staff and the last Russo-Swedish War, 1880–1936 (ca)

Av Gunnar Åselius

ABSTRACT Denna artikel diskuterar finska kriget i svensk officersutbildning före andra världskriget, med särskild hänsyn tagen till undervisningen vid Krigshögskolan (KHS) och den svenska generalstabens historieverk, Sveriges krig 1808–1809, som utkom i nio band mellan 1890 och 1922 och var typiskt för samtidens militärhistoria, inriktad på operativa förlopp och fältherrars beslutsfattande. Artikeln ägnar särskild uppmärksamhet åt dåvarande generalstabslöjtnanten Carl Bennedichs kritik av verket i en utredning 1915. Han efterlyste en bredare, samhällsinriktad typ av militärhistoria, delvis från moderna vetenskapliga synpunkter, men främst av inrikespolitiska, ideologiska skäl. Kort efter att generalstabsverket färdigställts framstod dock de militära lärdomarna från 1809 som föråldrade, och den internationella samtiden som viktigare än den nationella historien när det gällde att mobilisera stöd för försvaret.

raditionally, military history was a in their teaching and research seldom Tsubject which was taught at mili- rose above that of individual commanders tary colleges but nowhere else. In many making decisions in the battlefield, or that countries, most of the research was also of staffs planning for mobilization and done by professional officers without campaigns. Warfare beyond those aspects academic training, serving at the history which were under direct military control, section of their . Military col- where there were no practical lessons to leges are educational institutions which be drawn, were typically left out. Larger train officers for senior command. Gen­ issues which pertained to the political, eco- eral staffs are bureaucratic organisations nomic, social, technological and cultural which make plans and preparations for dimensions of war were often absent from war. Consequently, the level of analysis military history.1

1 Raschke, Martin: Der politisierender Generalstab. Die Friedrizianischen Kriege in der amtlichen deutschen Militärgeschichtsschreibung 1890-1914, Freiburg 1993.

3-2008 40 3-2008 KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT tidskrift Hans Delbrück (1848–1929) – a Ger- and really not a subject worthy of serious man history professor, reserve officer and scientific study. The University of Berlin veteran of the 1870 Franco-Prussian war did not make Delbrück professor of mili- who was equally disturbed by the scientific tary history, as he had wished, but gave him amateurism of general staff historians and a chair in international history.2 the military ignorance of civilian historians Only the experience of total war in – made a heroic effort to lay a scientific the twentieth century gradually changed foundation for military history. According the attitude to military history. When the to Delbrück, it was above all through field of military activity and preparations contextual critique – Sachkritik – that the expanded far beyond the horizons of modern military historian should remove the battlefield, the subject also grew and romantic myth-making and anachronistic soon came to include most aspects of the misinterpretation from the study of wars relationship between armed conflict and in the past. This, of course, required a thor­ society. This also meant that it gained some ough knowledge of military details – tac- academic respectability, especially when tics, strategy, weaponry and equipment, civilian historians began to realize the im- horses and logistics – but also thorough portance of war and military organizations knowledge of the historical context: pol­ in state formation processes. After 1945, itics, economy, culture, social conditions this broader definition of military history and geographical environment. All these – as a history of “war and society” – has factors were important to understand war- won general acceptance.3 fare. However, Delbrück’s critique of the This article discusses the interpretation Grosse Generalstab’s history section only of the 1808–09 Russo-Swedish war in the earned him bitter enemies in the German Swedish military establishment before military establishment. Nor did he find World War II, with an emphasis on the much support among academic historians,, period after 1880. We will examine how who were suspicious of his theoretical the war was taught at the Swedish staff approach and his ambitions to write mi- colleges, and what principles guided the litary history as a form of “total history”. writing of the influential official general To them, warfare was a technical activity staff history, Sveriges krig 1808–1809, which was best analyzed by professionals, which appeared in nine volumes between

2 Bucholz, Arden: Hans Delbrück & the German Establishment: War Images in Conflict, Iowa City, 1985; cf Raschke, Martin: Der politisierender Generalstab. Die Friedrizianischen Kriege in der amtlichen deutschen Militärgeschichtsschreibung 1890-1914, Freiburg 1993. 3 The role of military history in the training of officers is discussed in Böhme, Klaus R & Åselius, Gunnar (eds), Why Military History? Stockholm 2000.

3-2008 41 KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT

1890 and 1922. Although this was a period (topografiska kåren), which succeeded when the traditional, battlefield-narrative the Reconnaissance and Surveying Corps from the commander’s perspective was in 1831. Throughout the early half of the still in sway, we will see how a more nineteenth century, however, the military modern definition of military history was production of historical works remained nonetheless considered necessary, at least meagre. A proposal from the commander when the experience of 1808-09 was under of the Topographical Corps in 1851 to consideration. What may seem surprising organize a special military history section is the fact that the representative of this within the corps was rejected by the go- broader scientific approach within the ge- vernment. The following year, a group of neral staff was an officer, who otherwise young officers, who enjoyed royal protec- held arch-conservative, not to say reac- tion, began collecting documents relevant tionary, views on most political issues. It to ’s wars with the aim of publish­ will become clear why this was the case, ing them. In 1854, the first volume in a and why the 1808–1809 war suddenly series of three appeared in print.5 disappeared from the war college syllabus Until then, some 45 years after the Peace in the 1930s, in spite of the fact that Fin- in Fredrikshamn, Swedish literature on land played a far greater role in Swedish the 1808–09 war had been dominated by military planning in the inter-war period works written by war veterans, like Carl than before.4 Johan Holm and Gustav Montgomery.6 A systematic study of past wars had The first Swedish author to approach the been initiated in the already conflict from a historian’s perspective in 1805, when the Reconnaissance and was Julius Mankell (1828–1897), an army Surveying Corps (fältmätningskåren) was captain and a member of the working organized. This new unit had been united group mentioned above. In 1855, Mank­ with the military archives and entrusted the ell anonymously published a study on the task of collecting the sources and writing Swedish archipelago-fleet, how it had been the ’s wars. The same employed historically and how it should task was given to the Topographical Corps best be used in the future. Here, he also

4 Cf Turtola, Martti: Från Torne älv till Systerbäck: Hemligt försvarssamarbete mellan och Sverige, 1923 –1940, Stockholm 1987. 5 Arkiv till upplysning om svenska krigen och krigsinrättningarnas historia, Stockholm 1854; cf Broomé, Bertil: ”Krigshistoriska avdelningens förhistoria och verksamhet t o m 1917”, Aktuellt & Historiskt 1973, pp 173-176. 6 For research-overviews of the 1808-1809 war, see Hakala, Pertti: “Kriget 1808-1809 – forskningsläget ur finländsk synvinkel”, and Hårdstedt, Martin: ”Kriget 1808-09 och svensk militärhistorisk forskning”, Hårdstedt, Martin och Backman, Göran (eds): Krig kring kvarken. Kriget 1808-1809 och slaget vid Oravais i ny belysning, Oravais, Finland 1999.

3-2008 42 3-2008 KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT

analyzed the defence of Finland in 1808- teaching the Napoleonic Wars.9 09. Ten years later, Mankell under his own There was still no official history of the name published a volume on the strength 1808–09 War. In 1867, the staff college and composition of Sweden’s armed forces students were allowed to use Mankell’s from the late sixteenth century onwards, writings on the war as textbook-literature, accompanied with an account of Sweden’s although with certain restrictions.10 Only wars, including the 1808-09 conflict. with the creation of the Swedish general Finally, in 1870, he dedicated the second staff in 1873 and its military history sec- volume of his “notes on the history of the tion, the army established an organization Finnish army and the wars of Finland” to specialized in historical research. In 1882, the 1808-09 campaign. However, with ex- this section was invigorated under the ener- ception of some data on the Swedish order getic leadership of Major – later Major-Ge- of battle which Mankell had collected from neral – Gustaf Björlin. In a memorandum the military archives, his sources consisted written shortly after he took command of mostly of memoirs and contemporary com- the section, Björlin declared that within a muniqués from the army headquarters.7 few years, a complete account covering In 1818, a college for artillery and engine- all of Sweden’s wars in the past must er officers had been founded in Marieberg, have been prepared and elaborated within at the western outskirts of Stockholm. In the the general staff. Detailed knowledge of 1830s, this college also began to educate the nation’s military experience would staff officers, which meant giving courses be directly useful, according to Björlin, in military science and military history.8 The as Sweden’s neighbours would always war against Russia in 1808-09 was part of wage war in the same way, regardless of the syllabus, but took up only a minor por- how the art of war would develop in the tion of the twenty hours or so that were spent future. “Very true”, the chief of the General

7 Mankell, Julius: Studier öfver svenska skärgårds-flottans historia, krigssätt och användande vid Sveriges försvar, af en infanteriofficer, Stockholm 1855; Uppgifter rörande svenska krigsmagtens styrka, sam- mansättning och fördelning sedan slutet af femtonhundratalet jemte översigt av svenska krigshistoriens vigtigaste händelser under samma tid, Stockholm 1865; Anteckningar om Finska arméens och krigshistoria, särskildt med afseende på krigen emellan Sverige och Ryssland åren 1788–1790 samt 1808–1809 II, Stockholm 1870. 8 Sylvan, Per & Kuylenstierna, Oswald (eds): Minnesskrift med anledning av K Högre artilleriläroverkets och Krigshögskolans å Marieberg samt Artilleri- och Ingenjörhögskolans etthundraåriga tillvaro 1818- 1918, Stockholm 1918, p 17. 9 Memorandum to lectures, no date, J A Hazelius papers serie F fascikel 17 (”Anteckningar, föreläsningar m m i samband med Hazelius verksamhet som lärare vid Marieberg”) Nordiska museet, Stockholm. 10 Protocol Militärläroverksinspektionen, krigsundervisningskommissionen A, vol. 1 1866-1885 protocol 17, 14 November 1867, Military Archives, Stockholm.

3-2008 43 KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT

Staff, Colonel , commented in documents and copies of documents from the margin.11 archives in Sweden and abroad. Soon it Plans for a comprehensive study of the was decided that the project should not 1808-09 war against Russia were brought only cover the conflict with Russia, but forward the following year. In a memo- also Sweden’s wars against Denmark randum dated on 7 April 1884, Björlin and France in 1808-09. In 1909, when stated that the new chief of the general the fifth volume was under production, staff, Colonel von Vegesack, had decided it was finally decided that the length of that a work on this conflict should become the 1808-09 war was to comprise nine the first major project of the general staff’s volumes. When the project was concluded, military history section. Writing began in excerpts and working material took up October. According to Bertil Bromée’s more than 130 shelf-meters in the general 1973 study on the early development of staff archives.13 the Swedish general staff’s military history Although the reception of the 1808- section, the initiative to the 1808-09 project 09-work among academic historians was in reality originated with Björlin himself. generally positive, there were of course The year before he had published a popular also critical remarks. book on the subject, and had acquired tho- Volume 1 (1890) describes the diploma- rough knowledge of the Swedish and Fin- tic background to the conflict, and the state nish archival material. Further inspiration of Sweden’s armed forces in 1808. The may have come from Prussia, where the first part of the volume, which dealt with general staff had pub­lished major works a subject outside the professional expertise on the wars against France in 1813-1814 of the military, was later considered to be and 1870-1871, and was now turning its among the weakest portions in the entire attention to the wars of Frederick the Great. work.14 In addition, in 1877 the Austrian military Volume 2 (1895) covered the organisa- archives had begun publishing several tion of Russia’s and Denmark’s armed volumes on the campaigns of Prince Eugen forces, the war plans of the belligerents and of Savoy.12 operations in Finland from the February In the following years, the Swedish 1808 Russian invasion up to the surrender general staff collected a huge amount of of Sveaborg Fortress outside in

11 Broomé, B:”Krigshistoriska avdelningens förhistoria”, p 183. 12 Ibid, pp 187-188. 13 Ibid pp 188-192, Krigsarkivet, Beståndsöversikt del 2, Meddelanden från Krigsarkivet XI:2, Stockholm 1987, p 557. 14 Ibid p 195.

3-2008 44 3-2008 KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT

May. An appendix to volume 2, which Volume 3 (1902) covered the Swedish appeared six years later, contained further counteroffensive in Finland, which cul- details on tactics and logistics during the minated in July 1808, and also provided a winter months of the campaign. The other- survey of domestic conditions in Finland, wise positive reviewer in the Swedish his- tracing the roots of Finnish separatism and tory journal (Historisk tidskrift) – Agaton­ Russian intrigues back to the eighteenth Hammarskjöld – pointed out that since the century. In his review in the Finnish journal general staff historians had worked mainly (Finsk tidskrift), Schybergson criticized with materials from the Military Archives, that interpretation.17 without consulting all relevant documents Volume 4 (1905) focused on the southern in the National Archives, their description front against Denmark from February to of the Sweden’s war preparations became July 1808, when a Franco-Spanish army slanted and misleading. Had they studied was deployed on the Danish Isles to invade the Swedish ministry records, Hammars- southern Sweden, while volume 5 (1910) kjöld claimed, the authors would have dis- covered events on the Danish and Finnish covered that the government in Stockholm fronts until October 1808, including the did not passively await the Russian attack decisive Swedish defeat against the Rus- but tried to raise military preparedness in sians at the battle of Oravais on 14 Sep- time.15 Also, Lieutenant-General Casimir tember. In a review which appeared in the Ehrnrooth in the Finnish military journal Swedish history journal in 1905, following (Finsk militär tidskrift) found the harsh the publication of volume 4, Gothenburg judgement passed by the Swedish general Professor Ludvig Stavenow expressed his staff historians on Sveaborg’s comman- great appreciation of the thorough research dant, Vice-Admiral Carl Olof Cronstedt, behind the general staff work, the high unfair. However, Ehrnrooth’s views were standard of maps and the many interesting opposed by other Finnish officers and by data presented in the appendices. At the the Finnish historian Magnus Gottfrid same time, he pointed out how the lack of Schybergson.16 scientific training among the authors had

15 Hammarskjöld, A: ”Finska kriget 1808–1809”, Historisk tidskrift 1896, pp 2, 25–26. 16 Ehrnrooth, Casimir: ”Betraktelser med anledning av svenska generalstabens värk ”Sveriges krig 1808 och 1809”, Finsk militär tidskrift 1896, pp 116-131, 178-191, 241–262, 437-438; Ehrnrooth, Casimir: ”Svea- borgs öfvergång 1808. Haeretiska åsikter”, Finsk militär tidskrift 1897, pp 209-220; ”A”, ”Kommentarier”, ibid, pp 371-396; Schybergson, MA:”Med anledning av uppsatsen ’Sveaborgs öfvergång 1808. Haeretiska åsikter’, ibid, pp 423-428; ”Historiker”, I anledning av polemiken om Sveaborgs öfvergång”, ibid, pp 544- 550; ”A”, ”Replik”, p 550; ”Anmärkningar med anledning av ’Betraktelser med anledning av svenska generalstabens värk Sveriges krig 1808 och 1809”; ibid, pp 579-602, 642-667; ”Historiker”, ”Signaturen A. om Sveaborgs öfvergång”, ibid, pp. 633-636; ”Bemötande av signaturen **:s anmärkningar”, ibid, pp 667-674; ”A”, ”Slutord”, ibid, pp 713-714. 17 Op cit. p 197. Fotnot 11.

3-2008 45 KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT

resulted in a fragmented text overridden­ Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878.19 with details at the expense of general In addition, the events of 1808-09 were context and inner structure.18 also treated during the course in strategy. In After 1878 Swedish staff officers no 1894-97, students were given home assign- longer went to the same college as artillery ments in strategy with titles like ”Critical and engineer officers, but to a school of description of the defence plan for Finland their own, located in the centre of Stock- at the beginning of the century, and how holm – the War College (Krigshögskolan). it was applied by Klingspor (commander As could be expected, the Swedish general of the Swedish army in Finland)”,”Were staff’s huge research effort soon had an there in 1808, after the defeat at Oravais, impact on the teaching at the War Col- still a possibility for the Swedish army to lege. The 1808-09 project had produced a retake Finland?” or “The Swedish Army greater amount of texts in military science in Finland 1808”. The class of 1898-1900 than ever before in the Swedish lang­uage, spent 4 out of 115 hours of strategy lectures and it would have been a waste not to studying the operations of 1808. The more use this literature as teaching-material. recent Greek-Turkish war of 1897 was Moreover, many officers who had served covered in 6 hours.20 at the general staff’s military history sec- In the autumn of 1914, when Europe tion later took up positions as teachers at was experiencing its most disastrous war the War College, bringing their detailed since Napoleon, the Swedish general staff knowledge of this particular conflict with was still struggling to conclude its history them into the class-rooms. of Sweden’s most disastrous war. Volume In the war college-syllabus in military 6, which treated the campaign on the Nor- history for the junior course in the aca- wegian border until July 1808, was being demic year of 1905-1906, at least 14 out prepared for publication in the following of 180 hours of lectures were spent on year, while the work on volume 7 – which Sweden’s wars in 1808-09. This was only dealt with operations against Norway equalled by the amount of time spent on and Denmark until March 1809 – had Napoleon’s defeat in 1813 – which was proceeded quite far, although it would not Sweden’s last participation in European appear in print until 1919. In view of the great power politics – or the more recent ongoing war and the possibility of Swed-

18 Stavenow, Ludvig: ”Sveriges krig åren 1808–1809” Historisk tidskrift 1905, pp 57-58. 19 Sjögreen, C A: 15 May 1905, ”Förslag till program för läsåret 1905–1906”, ”Redogörelse för kursen 1904– 1905” KHS arkiv, liggare förteckningar, undervisningsjournaler, serie D, Military Archives, Stock- holm. 20 ”Redogörelse för lärokursen 1892–1894”; ”Redogörelse för lärokursen 1896–1898”; Hult, Ivar: ”förslag till program i strategi” 18 May 1898; KHS arkiv, liggare förteckningar, undervisningsjournaler, D, Military Archives, Stockholm.

3-2008 46 3-2008 KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT

en being dragged in, a special study was spending and that of the Conservative ordered by the chief of the general staff opposition was marginal. Therefore, the on what precautions should be taken with bitterness with which the political struggle regard to volume 8. In contrast to the other over defence was waged in Sweden around volumes in the series, this one would deal 1914 is hard to understand, unless related with defensive measures that had taken to the main ideological struggle at the time place on the territory of present Sweden in between Left and Right over democracy, 1808–09, and thus risked revealing infor- parliamentary rule and the constitutional mation which might still be sensitive. function of the monarch. Bennedich’s It so happened that the task of writing motives for participating in the overthrow that report was entrusted to Lieutenant – lat­ of the Liberal government must also be er Colonel – Carl Bennedich (1880-1939), interpreted within this broader context.21 who in November 1914 started his second In March 1915, Bennedich presented tour of service at the general staff’s section his memorandum on the planned volume of military history. Together with the Swed­ 8, beginning by listing the literature he ish explorer Sven Hedin, Bennedich, who had consulted on the period. Among the was well connected in court-circles, had in historians he had read were also Liberal February that same year secretly authored history professor Nils Edén, an expert on King Gustav V’s famous “Palace Court the 1809-constitution who a few years later Yard Speech” (borggårdstal). Addressing would lead the government of Liberals and 30,000 Swedish farmers who had gathered Social Democrats which would introduce in the court yard of the royal palace in general and equal suffrage in Sweden for Stockholm to protest against the defence men and women. Bennedich pointed out, policy of Sweden’s Liberal government, however, that he had only read Edén in or- the King on this occasion had publicly der “to get acquainted with the desires and expressed his support for the demonstra- needs of modern Swedish party politics tors, in defiance of constitutional practice, when it comes to coloring the truth about an act which a few days later forced the the events of 1809”.22 government to resign. To Bennedich, who was a fervent In reality, the difference between the admirer both of contemporary Imperial government’s proposed level of defence Germany and of Sweden’s eighteenth-

21 Bennedich’s political activities around 1914 are described in Jarl Torbacke, “Försvaret främst”. Tre studier till borggårdskrisens problematik, Stockholm 1983. 22 Bennedich,Carl, 5 March 1915: ”Vilka särskilda synpunkter böra göra sig gällande vid utarbetandet av Del VIII av ’Sveriges krig åren 1808-1809’ dels på grund av att denna del, i motsats till övriga delar av ifrågavarande arbete, behandlar försvarsåtgärder inom eget land, dels med hänsyn till verkets avslutning inom rimlig tid?” Sveriges krig 1808–1809, vol. 398, Military Archives, Stockholm.

3-2008 47 KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT

century Soldier-King Charles XII, the war founders of the Society of Carolean Studies of 1808-09 was a tragedy not only because (Karolinska förbundet) in 1910 – dedicated it had ended in humiliation and the loss to studying Swedish history in 1654–1718, of Finland. The defeat had also led to the when the dynasty of Charles XII had only successful military coup in Swedish ruled Sweden – and he was in constant history – the mutiny of the army stationed correspondence with some of the leading on the Norwegian border in March 1809 Swedish historians of his time. During – the end of royal absolutism and the adop- World War I, he served in the general tion of a new constitution (which would staff’s military history section and as a remain in function until 1974). While history teacher at the War College, while at Swedish liberals in the early twentieth the same time editing and writing most of century regarded the 1809 revolution as the general staff’s next monumental history the founding moment of modern Swedish work, a four-volume series on Charles XII. society, Bennedich saw it as a disgraceful Bennedich’s wish to portray the King as moment in history, when self-serving, one of the greatest generals of all times and un-patriotic bureaucrats had initiated the to “sell in” the notion of a special Swedish erosion of royal power and of national tactical tradition, focused on decisive ac- greatness. tion and much ahead of its time, made Although Bennedich could be described the Charles XII-work biased and in some as a romantic dreamer with little understan- respects even unreliable, but it must still ding for the century in which he lived, he be regarded as far superior to the 1808–09 was also a person of unusual intellectual general staff history. Bennedich’s work capacity. Among the many hundred of- contained detailed references to sources, ficers who applied to the War College in was written with considerable dramatic Stockholm in the 36 years preceding World talent in a clear and elegant prose, and War I, he was the only one ever to receive approached its subject from a conscious a “10” as grading on his entrance essay theoretical perspective.24 (Bennedich applied in 1908, when the gi- Against this background, it is no surprise ven subject was “Which were the gravest that Bennedich’s memorandum from 1915 disadvantages with the great power posi- contained a highly critical appreciation tion that Sweden upheld in the seventeenth of those volumes of the 1808-09 history century?”).23 which had hitherto appeared, and of the Bennedich had also been one of the research-work that had produced them.

23 KHS arkiv, Inträdesprov, serie F I, 1908, Military Archives, Stockholm. 24 Karl XII på slagfältet. Karolinsk slagordning sedd mot bakgrund av slagtaktikens utveckling från alla äldsta tider I–IV, Stockholm 1918-1919.

3-2008 48 3-2008 KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT

Bennedich’s criticism was in fact similar to itary history could not be written out of that which had been expressed by profes- context. He therefore demanded that the sional historians in Sweden and Finland proposed structure of the last two volumes since the 1890s.25 should be revised. According to the exis- In spite of Bennedich’s admiration for ting plan, volume 8 should deal with the the German military, he also shared Hans remaining operations on land and volume Delbrück’s critique of the history writing 9 with the remaining operations at sea. of the Prussian general staff. In his memo- It would be better, he said, to have both randum, Bennedich emphasized that the volumes describe land as well as naval writing of history must always be founded operations and draw a chronological line in a critical analysis of the available sour- between them in March 1809. On the do- ces, asserting that like any other academic mestic scene, at this point the overthrow institution the War College should “teach of King Gustavus IV Adolphus and the its students to form their own opinion on return to constitutional monarchy intro- the basis of their own research”. When duced a system of government related to it came to source-criticism, Bennedich (and paving the way for) that of modern believed, this would amount to nothing Sweden. From March 1809, the strategic less than giving the future staff officers situation was also that of modern Sweden, the same kind of training that civilian the Russians having conquered the Åland university students received at a history Islands and advancing across the northern seminar. Although one could argue that the border of Sweden proper.27 Swedish general staff should not aspire to Bennedich also pointed out the need for produce works in military history of the a thorough geographical description of the same quality as those of great powers like theatre of operations, something which had Germany and Austria with their superior been missing in the earlier volumes. Such a resources, scientific quality was not ne- description must contain data on economy cessarily a function of size, he said. The and agriculture, population density, the Danish general staff, Bennedich noticed, availability of horses and vehicles, com- had in recent years published no less than munications, shipping and ice conditions four volumes of high scientific standard in the Baltic region. The war must be anal­ on the Great Northern War, with no more yzed in its full geographical and societal officers than three active in the project, context, Bennedich believed, expressing none of them full-time. 26 views that would only later become aca- To Bennedich, it was obvious that mil­ demically fashionable, through the famous

25 Op cit pp 21-24, 27. Fotnot 22 26 Ibid pp 20-21, 26. 27 Ibid pp 9-11.

3-2008 49 KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT

French school of Annales-historians in the the European continent worth mobilizing inter-war period. Hopefully, Bennedich in the struggle against Napoleon. Sweden’s said, the material collected could also be will to resist the Russian invasion had of use later, when the general staff went on also been weakened by financial interests to write about Charles XII, who had fought inside the country who wanted to continue most of his wars in the same geographi- to trade with Russia and who therefore cal setting. Although giving publicity to were prepared to sacrifice the eastern part such information could prove harmful to of the realm for a quick peace. It would Sweden’s present defence, a thorough geo- therefore be valuable if the general staff graphic survey of the Baltic would still be history could explain the true nature of necessary for a correct analysis of events. British policy in 1808-09, as “in the present Even if only a few pages of such a survey situation there are certain delusions even at proved fit to print in the end, it would still very high levels regarding the interests of have served its purpose.28 foreign powers in Scandinavia”... “Already The influence of winter conditions in those days the ghost of ’neutrality’ hang on operations merited further research, over us”30 according to Bennedich, as did the role Bennedich’s remarks seem to have been of the archipelago-fleet. Bennedich also a direct comment to Swedish foreign pointed out that the Russian army had in policy in the winter of 1915, when the fact defeated the superior Swedish army in country was neutral in the ongoing world winter-time, although Russian equipment war, Britain and Russia openly aligned had been just as bad and Russian logisti- against Germany and influential groups cal support even weaker than that of the with whom Bennedich sympathized want- Swedes: “Are we better than in 1808, the ed Sweden to enter the war on Germany’s Russians are probably better too, at least side. The principal guardian of neutrality to the same degree.”29 in the Swedish government was Foreign Moreover, Bennedich found it neces- Minister Knut A. Wallenberg, who was sary to add a thorough investigation of also the head of Sweden’s leading financial Sweden’s relations to her ally in 1808–09, family. Many of the pro-German activists Great Britain. He claimed that the British saw Wallenberg’s care for Swedish neu- had dealt with the Russians behind Swe- trality merely as a way to protect his own den’s back throughout the conflict, as they economic interests. knew that Russia was the only power on It is likely that Bennedich viewed the

28 Ibid pp 5, 32–39. 29 Ibid, pp 57, 67, 69. 30 Ibid, pp 42, 62 (quotes), 63–64.

3-2008 50 3-2008 KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT

Wallenberg family as a modern example century-ambition of scientific impartial- of those forces which had brought the ity and instead write an account of the fatherland down during the Napoleonic “dangers and consequences of the self- Wars. Apart from a survey of the military delusions of a people, its bureaucracy geography in the Baltic, he urged that an ex- and its party bosses, and their negligence amination of Sweden’s domestic conditions towards their real, most basic duty.” Ben- in 1808-09 should be included in volume 8. nedich hoped that such an emphasis would Bennedich realized that it might seem inap- also make the revered 1809 constitution propriate that the general staff published a appear in a different light. The true lesson study on domestic politics but if the history of 1809 was that the ideals of the French work was to be concluded in a satisfactory revolution had eroded national conscious- way, all factors which had undermined na- ness and the sense of duty in officialdom, tional defence had to be investigated. As in which in turn had led to chaos in the gov- the case with the geographic survey, a full ernmental apparatus: “The Gallic phrase publication would not be necessary. The had confused the stern Germanic reason”.33 published account could well terminate with Clearly, Bennedich found it useful if the the new year of 1809, “when the shadow of general staff history could draw conclu- revolution approaches”.31 sions from Sweden’s catastrophic defeat in In earlier historiography, the king 1808–1809, which would also be useful in overthrown by the revolution in March the contemporary political debate on par- 1809, Gustavus IV Adolphus, had received liamentary rule and democracy, a debate most of the blame for Sweden’s defeat. to which Bennedich had made his most According to Bennedich, however, the important contribution in February 1914, King’s only fault was his reluctance to use as anonymous co-writer to King Gustav force against his subordinates to command V’s Palace Court Yard speech. the necessary obedience. The breakdown When volume 8 finally appeared in 1921, of army logistics and the mass-death of many of Bennedich’s recommendations Swedish militia conscripts during the war had in fact been implemented. The volume had in reality been caused by passive local covered operations on both land and sea officials.32 until March 1809, there was a short survey These important truths about 1808-1809 of military geography as well as some must be brought to light, according to thirty pages on domestic politics, albeit Bennedich. The general staff historians somewhat more moderate in tone than must therefore abandon their nineteenth Bennedich would have preferred.34 Volume

31 Ibid pp 6-7, 39, 40 (quote). 32 Ibid pp 41-47. 33 Ibid pp 72-73.

3-2008 51 KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT

9, which covered operations in Åland and posed to the proposal as the 1808-09 cam- Västerbotten and the end of hostilities in paign contained many “negative lessons” September, appeared the year after, and that they believed to be of great value to had been written at record-speed by one Swedish officers. The teacher in military single author.35 geography supported them, asserting that With this, the greatest research project his own teaching was much enriched if that the Swedish general staff would ever the students had studied the campaigns in undertake had been concluded, after more 1808-09 before.36 than thirty years. However, when the final Soon, however, the 1808–09 War disap- volumes appeared, the utility of this kind peared from the lectures. In 1926, the new of military history seemed less obvious curriculum at the War College spent half of than before. World War I had changed the the teaching hours in military history on the strategic geography in the Baltic, but above period after 1914. At the same time, a new all the conduct of war. In the age of tanks, subject was introduced, “Sweden’s strate- poison gas and aircraft, the relevance of gic conditions”, which aimed at describing military lessons from the Napoleonic Wars strategic, economic and infrastructural were called into question. conditions in the Baltic region. It could be And when new wars were to be added to argued that this new subject would add the the syllabus at the War College, old ones same dimension to the war college educa- had to be removed. Already in May 1918, tion that Bennedich had found missing the commandant of the college had sug- in the first seven volumes of the general gested at a faculty meeting that the 1808-09 staff history. However, this would not be War should be omitted, as too little time achieved through the study of events more would remain to general lectures on the than a hundred years ago, but by focusing Napoleonic Wars otherwise. During the on modern conditions. The new curriculum course in military geography, the students became operative in the academic year of would get the necessary acquaintance with 1926-27, and when next year’s syllabus in the Finnish theatre of operations anyway. military history was presented in the spring The teachers in military history, Bennedich of 1927, the 1808-09 War was gone.37 and his colleague Archibald Douglas, op- In the new course on Sweden’s strate-

34 Sveriges krig vol VIII, Stockholm 1921, pp 44-47, 220–254. 35 Sveriges krig vol IX, Stockholm 1922, cf Kleen, Willy: Ur skuggan av min dal, Stockholm 1954. 36 KHS faculty protocol 21 May 1918, KHS avd I, Exp lärarkollegiets protokoll, serie A II, vol. 2, Military archives, Stockholm. 37 Protocol 27 March 1926, Proposal for new curriculum, Protokoll militärläroverksinspektionen, krigsunder- visningskommissionen A, vol 4, Military Archives, Stockholm; General Order (GO) 20 September 1926, nr 1650 Torsten Holm 13 May 1927, syllabus proposal ”Förslag till undervisningsprogram i krigshistoria för yngre kursen, läroåret 1927-1928”, ibid, vol 5;

3-2008 52 3-2008 KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT

gic conditions, only one or two lessons almost all military history before 1914 dis- were dedicated to Sweden’s situation appeared. The Swedish war college students before 1809. In 1933, the teacher asked were to focus their studies on the experience that even this lesson should be removed of the world war, and on current strategic from the syllabus, as the time would not and security policy issues. The preceding suffice otherwise. On the other hand, the generations of general staff officers had geo-strategic situation of contemporary viewed Sweden’s wars in the past as the Finland received much attention – eleven key to understanding future wars, believing lessons, or half the teaching-time dedicated that the nation’s neighbours would always to conditions outside Sweden.38 Finland in wage war in the same way. In part because this period held a more central position in of Carl Bennedich’s ideological awareness Swedish defence planning than ever before and his strong Conservative views, it would since 1809, and contacts between the gen- seem, his approach to military history seems eral staff in Sweden and that of the newly so modern. Bennedich simply could not independent Finnish republic were very limit the analysis of the conflict which had close. Consequently, when the 1808–09 led to Sweden’s final fall from great-power War was removed from the military history status and the erosion of royal power, to an syllabus, ten hours of lectures on the Fin­ exclusively military context. That would nish Civil War of 1918 were added instead. have been intellectually and emotionally In 1935, the military history teacher tried impossible. Paradoxically, this made him to exchange these lectures for a series of scientifically more progressive than most lectures on the Polish-Soviet War of 1920. of his colleagues in military history at the The Board of Officers’ Education (krigs­ time. undervisningskommissionen) protested. General staff officers in the 1930s, who At the Swedish War College, the Board had begun to accept modern democracy declared, special attention must always be and the mechanisms of parliamentary con- paid to the situation of Finland.39 trol within their own professional domain, Major revisions of the war college cur- realized that they needed to convince So- riculum occurred in 1935 and 1938. Now, cial Democratic and Liberal politicians in

38 Kleen, Willy; 23 May 1927: syllabus proposal, ”Förslag till undervisningsprogram i läroämnet Sveriges strategiska förhållanden. Äldre lärokursen 1927-1928”; C A Ehrensvärd 31 August 1928, syllabus proposal, ”Förslag till undervisningsprogram i läroämnet Sveriges strategiska förhållanden. Äldre lärokursen 1927- 1928”, Protokoll militärläroverksinspektionen, krigsundervisningskommissionen A, vol 5; Ehrensvärd to the board of officers’ education (krigsundervisningskommissionen) 3 July 1933, ibid, vol 7. 39 Ribbing, Olof: 30 June 1934, Proposal for military history in the academic year of 1934-1935, Protokoll militärläroverksinspektionen, krigsundervisningskommissionen A, vol 8; protocol 19 September 1935, ibid, vol 9.

3-2008 53 KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT

order to secure a stable development of the of operations for the , defence sector. Then, historically founded was of no significance. The war of 1808–09 arguments would not do.40 That Finland quickly became just another old war. in the inter-war period had become more important than ever in Swedish security Författaren är professor i historia på För­ policy, and even figured as a likely theatre svarshögskolan och ledamot av KKrVA

40 Åselius, Gunnar: ”Krigshistoria i kris: Historia, strategi och kampen om undervisningstimmar vid Krigs- högskolan under mellankrigstiden”, Artéus, Gunnar; Molin, Karl & Petersson, Magnus: Säkerhet och försvar. En vänbok till Kent Zetterberg, Stockholm 2006.

3-2008 54 3-2008