Distribution Agreement In presenting this thesis or dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree from Emory University, I hereby grant to Emory University and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive, make accessible, and display my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known, including display on the world wide web. I understand that I may select some access restrictions as part of the online submission of this thesis or dissertation. I retain all ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis or dissertation. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation. Signature: 6/28/14 David Nathaniel Vigil Date Elusive Equality: The Nuclear Arms Race in Europe and the History of the INF Treaty, 1969-1988 By David Nathaniel Vigil Doctor of Philosophy History Fraser J. Harbutt, Ph.D. Advisor Patrick N. Allitt, Ph.D. Committee Member Matthew J. Payne, Ph.D. Committee Member Accepted: Lisa A. Tedesco, Ph.D. Dean of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies Date Elusive Equality: The Nuclear Arms Race in Europe and the History of the INF Treaty, 1969-1988 By David Nathaniel Vigil M.A., Emory University, 2007 B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1991 Advisor: Fraser J. Harbutt, Ph.D. An abstract of A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History 2014 Abstract Elusive Equality: The Nuclear Arms Race in Europe and the History of the INF Treaty, 1969-1988 By David Nathaniel Vigil This dissertation draws upon thousands of recently-available American, Soviet, and European documents to present a compelling narrative of the nuclear arms race in Europe and the history of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty from 1969-1988. It argues that although the United States, the Soviet Union, and the European members of NATO all claimed to support equitable arms control agreements, conflicting definitions of nuclear equality perpetuated the arms race in Europe and undermined efforts to achieve an arms limitation treaty. While exploring the complex history of US-Soviet arms control negotiations, the dissertation sheds new light on the Soviet view of the arms race from 1969-1976, Henry Kissinger’s secret negotiations with Soviet leaders from 1969-1974, the logic behind the Soviet decision to begin deploying its SS-20 missiles in 1976, the reasons why NATO had such difficulty formulating a unified response to these new Soviet missiles at the start of Jimmy Carter’s presidency in 1977, President Carter’s bungling of the neutron bomb affair in 1978, the fragility of the NATO dual-track decision in 1979, Margaret Thatcher’s role in the deployment of American missiles in Europe in 1983, the paradox at the heart of Ronald Reagan’s policies toward the Soviet Union from 1981-1988, the Soviet reaction to President Reagan’s hard line policies from 1981-1984, and the importance of new ideas and personal relationships in Mikhail Gorbachev’s decision to abandon the Soviet pursuit of nuclear equality and make numerous concessions to the United States in order to achieve the INF Treaty in 1987. Elusive Equality: The Nuclear Arms Race in Europe and the History of the INF Treaty, 1969-1988 By David Nathaniel Vigil M.A., Emory University, 2007 B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1991 Advisor: Fraser J. Harbutt, Ph.D. A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History 2014 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am deeply grateful for the support that I received from family and friends while researching and writing this dissertation. My dear wife, Hope Vigil, was by my side through all of the triumphs and trials of my graduate studies, and I would not have been able to complete my dissertation without her. She continued to believe when my faith was small, and there were many times when her faith carried us both. Words cannot express how much I treasure and appreciate her. My two children, Nathaniel and Mercy, were a source of constant joy. My mom, Betsy Vigil, and my in- laws, Pat and Debbie Bradley, provided unwavering love and encouragement. Philip Bradley was a real brother and friend to me, and Kasia Bradley supported me and my family in more ways than we could ever enumerate. Carlos Arzabe, Brooks Dampman, Samuel Meka, James Temple, and David Yoon were true companions at important stages of the journey. The team in Athens—Robert Philips, Eric Chen, Bobby Peel, Phillip Bruce, and Lauren Bruce—gave me the boost that I needed to finish the final chapters. Stephen and Glorianna Peng, David and Grace Carlson, and Emmanuel and Eliza Yeow provided gracious hospitality on my many research trips to Washington, DC. Ron Kangas’ timely e-mail messages helped me understand my history and set a new path for my future. I am also thankful for the academic and financial support that I received during my graduate studies. Fraser Harbutt, Patrick Allitt, and Matthew Payne served on my dissertation committee. The James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies at Emory University gave me a generous fellowship for my first four years of graduate study, a Dean’s Teaching Fellowship to cover my fifth year, and a grant that paid for language training in St. Petersburg, Russia. The Graduate Student Council and the History Department at Emory provided travel grants that enabled me to conduct research in England. The Friends of the Princeton University Library supplied me with a research grant to do research at Princeton. The Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University furnished me with office space during a research trip to Washington, DC. The US Department of Education awarded me a Foreign Language and Area Studies fellowship that paid for an intensive Russian language program at Indiana University, and the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars supported my research at the National Security Archive with a short-term research grant. CONTENTS Introduction 1 Chapter One 40 Competing Definitions of Equality, 1969-1971 Chapter Two 97 Kissinger’s Duplicitous Diplomacy, 1969-1972 Chapter Three 148 Brezhnev and the Breakthrough at Vladivostok, 1972-1974 Chapter Four 200 SALT and the SS-20 Missile, 1974-1976 Chapter Five 235 Carter and the Neutron Bomb Fiasco, 1977-1978 Chapter Six 288 The NATO Dual-Track Decision, 1978-1980 Chapter Seven 327 Reagan, Thatcher, and NATO Deployment, 1981-1983 Chapter Eight 363 The Reagan Paradox, 1981-1984 Chapter Nine 394 Gorbachev’s New Thinking and the INF Treaty, 1985-1988 Conclusion 460 Bibliography 474 1 INTRODUCTION 2 The Unexpected Treaty Ronald Reagan stormed into office in 1981 pledging to rebuild America’s military might and to wage the Cold War against the Soviet Union with renewed vigor. Shortly after becoming the 40th President, he called for massive increases in the American defense budget, authorized an aggressive program of psychological operations against the Soviet Union, decried the Soviet Union as the focus of evil in the modern world, announced plans to build a missile shield in outer space, and installed a new generation of nuclear missiles in Europe that could reduce Moscow to rubble within ten minutes of being launched.1 Reagan’s hardline policies greatly heightened tensions between the two Cold War antagonists, and many began to fear that nuclear war was a real possibility. French President Francois Mitterrand likened the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1983 to the face-off over Berlin in 1948 and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.2 George Kennan, the architect of the doctrine of containment, feared that superpower relations were spinning out of control. He warned Reagan officials that he detected “the familiar characteristics, the unfailing characteristics, of a march toward war—that and nothing else."3 1 David S. Painter and Thomas S. Blanton. “The End of the Cold War,” in A Companion to Post-1945 America, eds. Jean-Cristophe Agnew and Roy Rosenzweig (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2002), 480-481. 2 Benjamin B. Fischer, A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1997), accessed January 1, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications. Jeremi Suri similarly describes the final months of 1983 as the second most dangerous period in the entire Cold War. See, Jeremi Suri, “Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?” Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 4, Number 4 (Fall 2002): 63. 3 A series of events in 1983 also contributed to the increasing tensions between the two countries. On March 8, Reagan called the Soviet Union the evil empire. The Soviets were deeply unhappy with this characterization. On March 23 Reagan announced his plan to 3 Soviet leaders were extremely alarmed by the Cold War cowboy in the White House, and they blamed Reagan for pushing US-Soviet relations to the brink of nuclear war. The official Soviet news agency TASS declared that Reagan was full of "bellicose lunatic anti-communism" and warned that Reagan’s inflammatory policies could trigger an accidental nuclear exchange.4 The chairman of the KGB was so convinced that Reagan might be planning to attack the Soviet Union that he designed a massive international espionage effort and sent hundreds of KGB agents around the world to look for evidence that the United States was preparing for a surprise nuclear strike against the USSR.5 build a defense shield in outer space.