A" Time When Principles Make Best Politics"? the Western Response To
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A “Time When Principles Make Best Politics”? The Western Response to “Genocide” in East Pakistan by Richard David Pilkington A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of PhD-History Department of History University of Toronto © Copyright by Richard David Pilkington 2016 A “Time When Principles Make Best Politics”? The Western Response to “Genocide” in East Pakistan Richard David Pilkington PhD-History Department of History University of Toronto 2016 Abstract This study examines the formulation of and interplay between the US, Canadian, and British policies generated in response to the mass atrocities perpetrated by Islamabad authorities in East Pakistan during 1971. It focuses on the reactions of these three closely-connected North Atlantic powers to the gross human rights abuses, analyzing the decision-making processes in Washington, Ottawa, and London during the crucial first few months of the crisis, identifying the forces at play in determining policy, and investigating the nature, development, and resolution of debates over national interests and ethical concerns. The analysis is built primarily upon documentary evidence from the US National Archives, the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Library and Archives Canada, and the National Archives of the United Kingdom. In Washington, President Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, exerted great personal influence over the determination of policy and favored a strategy of appeasement. Importantly, their secret initiative to secure rapprochement with China, which only sprang into life at the end of April, did not drive their thinking during the vital first month after the clampdown began as Kissinger has previously claimed. In Ottawa, the Canadian government ii developed a tentative four-strand response, unwilling to hazard bilateral ties with Islamabad or draw attention to its own separatist issue in Quebec. In the UK, notably strong public sympathy for the victims of the clampdown only influenced policy to a limited extent. Nevertheless, London’s response, though similar in form to that of Ottawa, in substance demonstrated a greater willingness to coerce Islamabad into ending its oppressive action. This work considers the limited interplay between the North Atlantic powers in determining their reactions, discussing the collaborative opportunities both accepted and spurned. The overall conclusion compares policies and their determinants, assesses the alternative options available, considers the blinkered nature of government institutional cultures formed around the protection of national interests narrowly construed, and explains the techniques of obfuscation and excuse employed by officials to avoid demands for firmer action. iii Acknowledgments The research for this study was generously funded, in part, by scholarships from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, Canada, and the University of Toronto. My academic advisers, Robert Bothwell and Ronald Pruessen, deserve enormous credit for their insights, suggestions, constructive criticisms, and indefatigable good humor throughout the project. When other supervisors would have run for the hills, Ron showed both the patience and generosity of spirit to support me. Far from passing unnoticed, this great kindness was, and is, truly appreciated. Of course, the usual caveats apply. Although I have benefited greatly from the guidance of others, any errors contained in this work are my own. Finally, I would like to thank my family for all they have sacrificed to make this dissertation possible. Their unwavering encouragement and support were essential, and only Sylvia, David, and Andrée know the full extent of my gratitude. iv Table of Contents Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... iv Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... v Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................. x Chapter 1 Introduction....................................................................................................................1 1 Setting the Scene .........................................................................................................................1 2 Systems of Forces........................................................................................................................3 2.1 Context – Domestic Fission .................................................................................................3 2.2 Context – Regional Tension.................................................................................................9 2.3 Context – Global Stress .....................................................................................................10 3 Framework of Discussion..........................................................................................................11 Chapter 2 United States: Context .................................................................................................13 1 Historiographical Introduction ..................................................................................................13 2 Torrid Affairs ............................................................................................................................25 3 US Mindset................................................................................................................................36 3.1 Apparatus of Power............................................................................................................36 3.2 Nixon-Kissinger Worldview ..............................................................................................41 3.3 Reopening the Door ...........................................................................................................43 3.4 China Investment ...............................................................................................................47 Chapter 3 United States: Phase One .............................................................................................56 1 Let’s Do Something ..................................................................................................................56 1.1 “Selective Genocide” .........................................................................................................56 1.2 “Time When Principles Make Best Politics” .....................................................................65 1.3 US Public Space.................................................................................................................67 2 Let’s Not Bother ........................................................................................................................72 2.1 Inertia in Islamabad............................................................................................................72 v 2.2 Shrugs in State ...................................................................................................................75 2.3 Nothing from the White House ..........................................................................................76 2.4 Smoke, Mirrors, and Motives ............................................................................................81 3 Let’s Rejoice .............................................................................................................................85 Chapter 4 United States: Phase Two ............................................................................................91 1 Let’s “Shake the World” ...........................................................................................................91 1.1 Refugees and Relief ...........................................................................................................91 1.2 War and Worry...................................................................................................................96 1.3 Eggs in One Basket ............................................................................................................99 2 Let’s Pamper Pakistan .............................................................................................................104 2.1 Life on the Ground ...........................................................................................................104 2.2 Quiet Diplomacy or Appeasement? .................................................................................105 2.3 Self-Assessment ...............................................................................................................107 3 White House Options ..............................................................................................................107 3.1 Public Stance....................................................................................................................108 3.2 Armed Intervention ..........................................................................................................109 3.3 Military Supply ................................................................................................................110 3.4 Economic Aid ..................................................................................................................116 4 Aftermath ................................................................................................................................119