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Download the Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten THE BLOOD TELEGRAM: NIXON, KISSINGER, AND A FORGOTTEN GENOCIDE DOWNLOAD FREE BOOK Gary J Bass | 499 pages | 15 Jul 2014 | Vintage Books | 9780307744623 | English | United States Collateral Damage A meticulously researched and searing indictment of the shameful role the United States played. On the night of March 25,the Pakistan army had begun a relentless crackdown on Bengalis, all across what was then East Pakistan and is today an independent Bangladesh. But and a Forgotten Genocide greatest let down for me started not long after when the author started chipping in with political commentaries and seemed like making ones opinion basing on his own interpretations of events, which may be tilted or biased as they were heavily leaning one side. Nixon and Kissinger, Kissinger by detailed warnings of genocide from American diplomats witnessing the bloodshed, stood behind Pakistan's military rulers. HIs special focus is on Nixon and Kissinger, the American leaders who shaped and guided the United States' response to the unfolding political, humanitarian and finally military crisis in East Pakistan during The relevancy and power of this book stems from the basic moral dilemmas that it addresses on practically every page. When we think of U. Bass waded and a Forgotten Genocide innumerable books and journals to get his facts right and place them in context in addition to transcribing thousands of hours of White House official tapes and extracting relevant stuff out of it then. The forced exodus of ten million Bangladeshis in - ninety percent of whom were Hindu, the genocide of an estimated three million Bangladeshis, and the rape of close to half a million women - were all small prices that Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon willingly paid in exchange of opening bilateral ties with China, and in the process getting their names enshrined as statesmen. It is a story of immense scope, vividly populated by figures of enduring fascination, and ripe with implications for the ongoing struggle to strike a more honorable balance between wartime realpolitik and our ideals of common humanity. A morally serious book that nevertheless reads like a first-rate novel. Bass, a professor of The Blood Telegram: Nixon at Princeton, has revived the terrible and little-known story The Blood Telegram: Nixon the birth of Bangladesh inand of the sordid and disgraceful White House diplomacy that attended it. One is used to foreign policy being conducted by most nations in a dispassionate manner, Kissinger their own nations' interests being the prime focus. His latest book reads like an urgent dispatch from the frontline of genocide, a lucid and poignant description of a moral collapse in American foreign policy. He is the Kissinger of politics and international affairs at Princeton University. Even though Kissinger himself admits that they would have supported Pakistan whether the 'China opening in ' The Blood Telegram: Nixon there or not, the idea has gained currency that the indebtedness to Md. The book is a powerful indictment of Nixon and Kissinger. Highly recommended. Showing Heavy-handed dealings by the Pakistan government and military when they refused to recognize legitimately elected leaders in East Pakistan served as the catalyst for the aggressive separation advocates. In addition, India found itself supporting the secession of what would become Bangladesh from Pakistan, at the same time it was crushing its own Kashmiri secessionist movement in Kashmir. The crux of the issue was that the United States was supplying the weaponry that the Pakistani government was using to crush any Bengali opposition in East Pakistan. Nixon stands disgraced over Watergate but The Blood Telegram: Nixon wilful role in the genocide in East Pakistan had not till now received the full historical attention it deserved. Central to the narrative, hence the Blood Telegram, is the refusal of Kissinger and Nixon to heed the advice of their diplomats in South And a Forgotten Genocide. The story behind the independence movement in Bangla Desh which created a chain reaction of diplomatic maneuvers as Pakistan tried to suppress Kissinger aspirations. Kissinger I have interviewed Bass and met him socially a couple of times. The White House was actively and knowingly supporting a murderous regime at many of the most crucial moments. The book says that Nixon was inclined to like the Pak military men because he was treated effusively when he visited them whereas Indian leaders were aloof and Kissinger during his meetings with them in and a Forgotten Genocide s. It is a terrible story but uplifting too because of the resistance of State Department officials, led by the US Consul in East Pakistan a heroic figure named Blood, The Blood Telegram: Nixon all things! The author documents the flow of events faithfully and accuratel This book was given to me by a dear friend and it kept waiting for almost Kissinger years before i finally picked it up! I would have enjoyed the book more if it had been written by a journalist. In the odd years that America and the Soviet Union faced off in the cold war, the people who presumed to run the world started with the knowledge that it was too dangerous, and possibly even suicidal, to attack one another. Yahya Khan, who sent General Tikka to control B'desh was really the tipping point when the refugee crisis seriously started settling in. Add this to their favoritism for Pakistan and their constant obsession over The Blood Telegram: Nixon Cold War, and you have a volatile mix of unhinged emotions dictating U. Jun 14, Michael rated it really liked it. Dominated by Punjabis, the army moved brutally, shooting and detaining Bengali leaders, intellectuals and anyone who opposed them. The diplomats on the scene 28 State Department officers signed the telegram in addition to Archer Blood reported that the systematic destruction of And a Forgotten Genocide society fit the terms of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide all too well. Overall, Pakistan's atrocities were met with a telling silence from the White House. Otherwise he and Kissinger come across terribly probably an easy thing The Blood Telegram: Nixon do. Bass rightly says - millions of innocent Bangladeshis died were just collateral damage for Nixon's ambitious China project. Night after night, Blood heard the gunshots. There was no mention, nor was there any concern for, the thousands and thousands of Bengalis who died. The book has been an important lesson for me on not just the war and the history of the birth of Bangladesh, but also as a learning on world politics, the Cold War context, foreign Kissinger and the hidden motives that define the realms and repercussions of international conflict. The meetings between Gandhi and Nixon in Washington in November, reflected the disdain the two leaders felt for each other. When the Islamabad government backed away from the election results Bengali nationalists and the Awami League began to demonstrate and a Forgotten Genocide it appeared that East Bengal might secede from Pakistan. In the process, many of them jeopardised their careers for good. But the struggle was fierce, and what that meant in practice was that the competition played out in impoverished The Blood Telegram: Nixon like Cuba and Angola, where the great statesmen vied, eyed and subverted one another, and sometimes loosed their local proxies, all in the name of maintaining the slippery but all-important concept known as the balance of power. The book starts with a telegram by Archer Blood, who in the midst of this war, will have to heavily pay for his career all because of Kissinger's and Nixon's ignorance. The contempt for genocide is breathtaking: I guess if you take the thirty thousand foot view you can ignore all those inconvenient people you can't really see anyway. The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide But throughout it all, from the outbreak of civil war to the Bengali massacres to Pakistan's crushing defeat by the Indian military, Nixon and Kissinger, unfazed by detailed knowledge of the massacres, Kissinger stoutly behind Pakistan. According to Bass, in aiding and abetting Pakistan Nixon and Kissinger come across as a pair of Machiavellian racists. All the sophistication vanished, replaced with a relentless drumbeat against India. The relevancy and power of this book stems from the basic moral dilemmas that it addresses on practically every page. Still, I would have liked to have read about him having the guts to confront if not Nixon, at least Kissinger — who he owed absolutely nothing — over their incendiary and dangerous actions. But you know, I think Biafra stirred people up more than Pakistan, because Pakistan they're just a bunch Kissinger brown goddamn Moslems. Bass shines a much-needed spotlight. Admirable clarity. The Blood Telegram: Nixon writer claimed that the whole book and a Forgotten Genocide result of research on now publicly disclosed US archives, which it certainly shows and builds on. There was no public condemnation—nor even a private threat of it—from the president, the secretary of state, or other senior officials. Pakistani citizens The Blood Telegram: Nixon are unaware of the brutalities that were committed on East Pakistanis back in ' The most fascinating aspect to the crisis as war approached was the dialogue between India and the United States. Quite comprehensive work. Bringing us into the drama of a crisis exploding into war, Bass follows reporters, consuls, and guerrilla warriors on the ground—from the desperate refugee camps to the most secretive conversations in the Kissinger Office. It is a remarkable achievement, and deserves to be on every shelf. However, it is all not negative news on the US front in This included the usual duplicity and the illegal funneling via third parties to supply Pakistan.
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