Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:15 09 May 2016 Conflict in Afghanistan Conflict in Afghanistan provides a timely discussion of the concept of asymmetric warfare which has become one of the main issues of the day in the wake of the attacks of 9/11 and the ensuing invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Broadly speaking this describes a means of fighting where comparatively weak belligerents have been able to exploit successfully the vulnerabilities of their more powerful and sophisticated opponents. Two recent examples have been the Vietnam and the Soviet–Afghan wars, but the historical roots of the concept lie deeper, particularly in Afghanistan. Conflict in Afghanistan, laying emphasis on contemporary documents and drawing on material from Soviet archives, centres on wars conducted in Afghanistan which have been of the asymmetric variety. Subjects examined include: • five wars conducted in Afghanistan by an external invader over the past two centuries; • the decisions and actions of politicians and the military involved in the wars in question; • the successes and failures of diplomatic endeavours during the wars. This book is essential reading for those who have research interests in Asian studies, military studies and current affairs. Martin Ewans is a retired diplomat with considerable experience of South Asia, including three years as Head of Chancery in Kabul. He is author of Afghanistan: A New History and Afghanistan: A Short History of its People and Politics. Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:15 09 May 2016 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:15 09 May 2016 Conflict in Afghanistan Studies in asymmetric warfare Martin Ewans Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:15 09 May 2016 LONDON AND NEW YORK First published 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to http://www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk/.” © 2005 Sir Martin Ewans All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Ewans, Martin, Sir, 1928– Conflict in Afghanistan: Studies in asymmetric warfare/Martin Ewans. p. cm Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Afghanistan–History. 2. Afghanistan– History, Military. 3. Asymmetric warfare–Afghanistan. I. Title. DS361.E88 2005 355.4′2′09581– dc22 2004024680 ISBN 0-203-31254-6 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-415-34160-4 (Print Edition) Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:15 09 May 2016 The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win. Henry Kissinger Afghanistan may evoke the military past, but its importance is as a preview of the battleground of the future. Robert Kaplan Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:15 09 May 2016 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:15 09 May 2016 Contents List of illustrations ix Acknowledgements xi Introduction 1 4 PART I Setting the scene 1 Afghanistan and the Afghans 5 12 PART II The First Anglo-Afghan War 2 The failure of diplomacy 13 3 Invasion 22 4 Occupation 31 5 Disaster and withdrawal 38 48 PART III The Second Anglo-Afghan War 6 Lord Lytton’s folly 49 7 Occupation 56 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:15 09 May 2016 8 Retreat 64 71 PART IV The Third Anglo-Afghan War 9 Amanullah’s gamble 72 79 PART V The Soviet–Afghan War 10 The Communist takeover 80 11 The Khalq regime 87 12 The decision to invade 95 13 Invasion and occupation 106 14 Withdrawal 117 15 Aftermath 123 130 PART VI The American intervention 16 The United States, the Taliban and al-Qa ida 131 140 PART VII Conclusion 17 Conclusion 141 Notes 148 Select bibliography 160 Index 163 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:15 09 May 2016 Illustrations Figures 2.1 The end of Burnes’ mission to Kabul 20 7.1 Lord Lytton’s revenge 58 12.1 ‘Concerning the situation in “A” ’ 62 Maps 1.1 Central and Southwest Asia 6 1.2 Afghanistan: relief and main centres 7 1.3 Afghanistan: political and communications 7 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:15 09 May 2016 3.1 The First Anglo-Afghan War: the routes taken by the invading 26 armies 4.1 The First Anglo-Afghan War: Kabul and the British 34 Cantonment 7.1 The Second Anglo-Afghan War: the invasion routes 58 8.1 The Battle of Maiwand 62 13.1 The battlefields in Central and Eastern Afghanistan 104 13.2 The deployment of Soviet troops, 1983–4 108 16.1 Territory held by the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, 133 October 2001 Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:15 09 May 2016 Acknowledgements The publishers would like to thank the following for permission to reproduce documents: The National Archives of Scotland; The British Library; The Duchess of Buccleuch; and Knebworth House, http://www.knebworthhouse.com./ Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:15 09 May 2016 Introduction In the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001, as well as during the ensuing invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, much has been heard of the concept of ‘asymmetric warfare’. Broadly speaking, this purports to describe a means of fighting through which a weaker power can offset or neutralise the strengths of a more powerful opponent by applying what strengths it has to its opponent’s weaknesses. The concept is as old as history and could, for example, be used to typify the encounter between David and Goliath. It fits set battles between trained and organised armies, as, for example, the Battle of Agincourt of 1415, where a stronger force including armoured horsemen was defeated by a weaker force using the armour-piercing longbow. More frequently, however, it is used to describe situations in which formal state power is confronted by non-state or guerrilla activity. In 9 AD, three Roman legions commanded by Publius Quinctilius Varus were destroyed in the Teutoburger Wald by German tribesmen, having been lured onto terrain in which they were unable to deploy the tactical formations which would have rendered their superiority irresistible. Among the most spectacular of more recent examples were the Boer and Vietnam Wars, where the use of asymmetric tactics against regular forces was supplemented by political and public relations activity. The ability to erode the stronger power’s will to fight by adducing a moral dimension to the conflict is a valuable asset in an asymmetric context. For both parties, to ‘win hearts and minds’ is a significant step towards success. Since the beginnings of nation-state formation in the seventeenth century, asymmetric warfare has been the exception rather than the rule, except possibly in colonial environments. As states developed and became embroiled in warfare, so they made greater use of regular armies. These were equipped with progressively more sophisticated weaponry, and became increasingly permanent and professional. Mechanisation, which began during the First World War, became the principal characteristic of inter-state ‘conventional’ warfare from the Second World War onwards. This meant that warfare became both more expensive and more destructive, until, with the development of nuclear weapons, the scale of destruction and expense became self-defeating. In a nuclear war, there would be no winners. In recent years, with major inter-state warfare largely stalemated, the main focus has Downloaded by [University of Defence] at 20:15 09 May 2016 been on asymmetric warfare. While ‘conventional’ warfare has not been precluded – Iraq/Iran, India/Pakistan, Britain/Argentina, Iraq/Kuwait – it has generally been either short-lived or has been kept within strictly local limits, or both. The threat currently facing the ‘elite’ countries, mainly of Europe and North America, as well as the centres of superior power in the Third World, does not now arise from open warfare between nations. In its place is a threat from non-state organisations, some based in known localities, as for example Chechnya and Kashmir, others, notably al-Qa ida, with no readily accessible focus of command or activity. Their ability seriously to challenge major state power is doubtful, but their potential to inflict material damage and loss of life is undeniable, the more so if they should gain access to weapons of mass destruction Conflict in Afghanistan 2 or can find means to disrupt the extensive and intricate infrastructure on which modern societies depend. A discussion of the nature of asymmetric warfare and the applicability to current circumstances of the lessons to be learnt from its past employment, is thus one of considerable contemporary interest, if not urgency. There are other aspects, both political and military, which need to be part of such a discussion. One is the nature of decision-making, or decision avoidance, at the governmental level. Why, asked Barbara Tuchman, instancing the Trojan War, the War of American Independence and the Vietnam imbroglio, do governments act in so stupidly counter-productive ways?1 Why do big powers do so badly in small wars? The frequent inability of governments to deal sensibly and appropriately with threats emanating from lesser power centres bears closely on a study of asymmetric warfare.