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Download (615Kb) 14 panorama DHAKA, FRIDAY MARCH 29, 2013 panorama panorama panorama panorama panorama panorama panorama panorama panorama panorama The international context of Bangladesh Liberation War n 1971, the world’s wit - violent suppression of the USSR were still dominant, new Zedong was also ready to open perhaps even to dismember its East Pakistan and the forma - alliance with India to counter - nessed the emergence of its Bengali people through the emerging players were gaining up towards Washington - neighbour. Given the fact that tion of a new independent state balance China. 136th nation, Bangladesh. West Pakistani armed forces more international leverage, because it was confronted with Washington saw the Pakistani of Bangladesh as a fait accom - The Bangladesh Liberation For most analysts of the South marked one of the most sig - most notably China with its Soviet forces amassing at its military as the most suitable pli. The only remaining issue War demonstrated that the US Asian region, this did not come nificant and dramatic events growing economic power and borders, ostensibly in prepa - partner for accommodating US for the US, China, and partly and other members of the by surprise. The matter why on the subcontinent after its India with respect to its large ration for an invasion of China- interests in the Pakistani rump- also for the Soviet Union was, United Nations (UN) were will - was quite apparent for the bloody Partition in 1947. land mass and huge popula - the US had no direct access to state and the extended region, how to get West-Pakistan ing to fade out any esteem for experts, but the when and how The question that arises is tion. Nevertheless, the sharp the Chinese leadership at that an Indian intervention was through the‘East-Pakistan cri - democratic principles and especially with which conse - why the international com - Cold War antagonism as well time. This brought Pakistan in perceived as an existential sis’ with as little damage as pos - human rights in order to quences made the interna - munity was not willing or able as the omnipresent threat of a the picture.With the help of the threat to US interests: it would sible. To be sure, all major play - achieve their goal in 1971. The tional security circles and lead - to stop the military operations ‘Third World War’ remained. government in Islamabad and lose its only ally on the sub - ers (besides India) had no prevalence of inaction regard - ing politicians feel quite in Pakistan’s Eastern wing right This very context had severe the strong support of military continent which also provid - interest to get deeply involved ing the Genocide of the Bengali uncomfortable. from the beginning? Of course, implications for the top brass a secret liaison ed the key towards China. To in the conflict, neither militar - people committed by the After the formation of Yahya Khan explicitly denied Bangladeshi independence between Washington and prevent such a scenario from ily nor diplomatically by put - Pakistan Armed Forces must Pakistan, in 1947, an extraor - any involvement of Pakistani struggle. The political leader - Beijing was facilitated. China happening, Washington ting sufficient pressure on be interpreted as a clear igno - DR. SIEGFRIED dinary rift existed between its soldiers in a ‘Genocide’ and ship of the most significant was increasingly seen as an‘ally announced a policy of ‘maxi - Islamabad to stop the genocide rance of the 1948 UN O. WOLF two wings, East Pakistan and condemned it as propaganda players at the global scene were of convenience’ in order to mum intimidation’ against among Bengali people and the Convention on the West Pakistan, which were sep - against West Pakistan. aware that the newly emerging secure US interests in South India. Therefore, US naval pogrom-like killings of Bengali Punishment and Prevention of arated by about 2,000 km of However, due to the presence international system became Asia, and Pakistan was identi - forces were sent into the Bay political leaders and intellec - the Crime of Genocide Indian territory. A major dif - of international media and more politically volatile. Hence, fied as the only possible con - of Bengal and China was asked tuals. Moscow andWashington (Genocide Convention) by the ference was language, with diplomatic missions, there was it became more difficult to duit for it. However, at the same to amass troops at the Indian just wanted to be sure that their respective national govern - Urdu the main and state-sup - credible and impartial report - maintain control over areas time Washington was also frontier to increase pressure on respective adversary wouldn’t ments. To retrieve at least part - ported language in West ing about the start of large- the Indians. At the same time, gain too much influence in ly the ‘democratic reputation’ Pakistan, and Bengali the sup - scale massacres and target- the US attempted to enforce a South Asia and that no region - of the Western sphere, one pressed language of its Eastern killings in Dhaka. Most remark - ceasefire through the UN al player would gain regional a might differentiate between the part. This disparity resulted in able in this context were the Security Council (UNSC) to too dominant position. governments and societies in an ethno-linguistic movement reports of US Consul General protect Pakistan from a mili - Therefore, maintaining the US and the bandwagoning in the early 1950s demanding Archer Blood from March 27th, tarily enforced break-up. contentious triangle of India- Western Europe. There were that Bengali be made a state 1971 until he was recalled from However, none of these Pakistan-China appeared the deep sympathies towards the language too. The movement his post in Dhaka –obviously measures of the Nixon admin - most appropriate strategy to freedom struggle of the Bengali got further aggravated by the for being too inconvenient. istration worked out as intend - maintain some kind of balance people among the civil soci - tremendous economic and Most significant was his last ed. First, the US proposal for in South Asia. With the inde - eties and much activity was political inequalities to the dis - cable on 6 April 1971, the so ceasefire at the UNSC got pendence of Bangladesh and carried out to pressure their advantage of the Bengali peo - called ‘Blood Telegram’, in vetoed by the Soviets. Second, the preservation of territorial political leadership to change ple. In order to maintain supe - which he denounced the com - the Chinese did not build-up integrity of West Pakistan, this the policy direction in favour THE NATIONAL riority, West Pakistan, which plicity of the US administra - much military pressure on its common goal was apparently of the Bengali people. Here, the LIBERATION STRUGGLE treated its Eastern part as an tion of then US President borders with India. Third, New achieved. ground breaking article by internal colony, responded to Richard Nixon and his National Delhi was not impressed by the Therefore, leaving aside Anthony Mascarenhas OF THE BENGALI PEOPLE notions of autonomy and sep - Security Advisor Henry American ‘gunboat diploma - Pakistan, the governments of ‘Genocide’ (Sunday Times, arate identity with violent Kissinger in the genocide. In cy’ and just ignored the pres - the major powers were offi - June 13th, 1971) functioned as AGAINST THE repression. Consequently, the this context one has to state which were seen as part of their aware of Islamabad’s limited ence of the 7th fleet of the US cially satisfied with the out - a final wake up call. This phe - OPPRESSION OF WEST language movement gradual - that the whole process of respective influence. Especially capacities, especially due to the in ‘its waters’. Instead, it inter - comes of the war. The US was nomenon found not only its ly but persistently transformed Bangladeshi state formation inWashington, after the failure tremendous asymmetric vened and Bangladesh gained able to achieve its minimum expression that the US con - PAKISTAN COINCIDED into a struggle for independ - didn’t happen in a‘South Asian of its‘Roll-Back policy’ against power relations, to compete its independence. But the most goal to preserve an allied gress was forced to pass an WITH AND BECAME ence that began with its dec - vacuum’. The national libera - Communism, as the KoreaWar militarily successfully with the fundamental mistake of Nixon Pakistani rump-state and embargo of weapons against laration on 26 March 1971 and tion struggle of the Bengali and Bay of Pigs invasion Indian Union. More concrete, and Kissinger were their fatal maintain its strength as much Pakistan (which was illegally ENMESHED IN A MAJOR ended with the liberation of people against the oppression demonstrated, a major redef - US were very sceptical regard - misperception of Indira as possible. Furthermore it was undermined by Nixon) but also Bangladesh on 16 December ofWest Pakistan coincided with inition of its foreign policy was ing the prospects for West Gandhi’s intensions regarding able to keep the Soviet Union in some of the world’s greatest STRUCTURAL 1971. The trigger for open con - and became enmeshed in a getting off the ground, name - Pakistan to maintain control Pakistan and the Soviet Union. out of the conflict. China was charity events -concerts for TRANSFORMATION OF flict between East and West major structural transforma - ly its ‘Détente policy’. At the over its eastern wing in case of In contrast to US fears, India able to stand-up against the Bangladesh- were organized in Pakistan were the 1970 gener - tion of the international polit - core of this decision was the an armed confrontation. The was not at all interested ‘to slice Soviet Union which had to New York to raise funds and THE INTERNATIONAL al elections and the negligence ical system. The most charac - understanding that a relaxation chance for Islamabad to keep the West Pakistani pie’.
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