DEMOCRACY and the STATE of EMERGENCY Easing Measures and Rising Tensions in the Struggle with the Corona Crisis in the Western Balkans, Croatia and Slovenia Contents

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DEMOCRACY and the STATE of EMERGENCY Easing Measures and Rising Tensions in the Struggle with the Corona Crisis in the Western Balkans, Croatia and Slovenia Contents ANALYSIS This is the third edition in a DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS series of reports which sets out to analyse the effects of the Corona crisis management on institutions, political and civil rights, parties, civil society, DEMOCRACY as well as external factors. AND THE STATE While the anti-Corona measures are being relaxed in most cases, the State of OF EMERGENCY Emergency has not been lifted in all countries of the region, Easing Measures and Rising Tensions in the yet. North Macedonia is struggling with a worrisome Struggle with the Corona Crisis in the Western increase of infections. Balkans, Croatia and Slovenia Max Brändle, Tamara Brankovic, Arjan Dyrmishi, Besa Kabashi-Ramaj, Igor Luksic, Five countries of the region Nenad Markovikj, Tara Tepavac, Nenad Zakosek, are preparing for elections. Miroslav Zivanovic The Corona virus crisis is in a way a mirror held up to each Report Three, June 15, 2020 country revealing its strengths and weaknesses as well as its state of democracy. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS DEMOCRACY AND THE STATE OF EMERGENCY Easing Measures and Rising Tensions in the Struggle with the Corona Crisis in the Western Balkans, Croatia and Slovenia Contents EDITORIAL 2 1. ALBANIA 4 2. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 9 3. CROATIA 15 4. KOSOVO 20 5. MONTENEGRO 24 6. NORTH MACEDONIA 28 7. SERBIA 33 8. SLOVENIA 38 1 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – DEMOCRACY AND THE STATE OF EMERGENCY Editorial Max Brändle After an initial shock of the arrival of the Corona Virus in Eu- the political processes as it caused a blame game that goes rope and in the region, governments have taken a robust along ethnic and religious lines. Yet, North Macedonia was approach in containing the spreading of Covid-19. The severe not the sole example of religion-based rifts, because the po- measures, in many instances a State of Emergency, have litical dynamics in Montenegro were also marked by tensions been successful in preventing the often already weak health- between the government and the Serbian Orthodox Church. care systems from collapse. There might have been a short Religious organizations were not the only ones that violated moment of unity between the government and the opposi- the measures. The main opposition parties in Albania called tion in the beginning. But soon afterwards, we could witness upon the public to disregard the measures and to ‘take back how the fight against the Corona pandemic has been be- their rights’, while in North Macedonia the opposition leader coming more and more of a political battle inside the coun- personally violated measures on three occasions. In a very tries of the region. In addition to the debates about econom- creative way, the citizens of Slovenia expressed their dissatis- ic measures to mitigate the consequences of the pandemic, faction with the government by organizing the so-called bi- the traditional debates are re-emerging, in many countries – cycle protests. In this context, it must also be emphasized like North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Montenegro – this has that the civil society in Albania as well as Bosnia and Herze- meant a return to toxic polarization. The opposition has been govina were very active and have also shown their vivacity. accusing the governments of misusing the crisis to advance its political agenda. However, the issue of elections probably explains best the different states of democracy of the countries of the region. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has been active in all the coun- This can be regarded as a proxy for overall democratic devel- tries of the region for many years, supporting the develop- opment: In Montenegro and Albania, the opposition is not ment of democracy, social justice and the path to member- satisfied with the electoral environment and demands elec- ship in the European Union. Through our network in toral reform; in Serbia, the government unilaterally decided academia and civil society, we have asked experts, political about the date of the parliamentary elections and many op- scientists, sociologists and political analysts, to write reports position parties announced their boycott amid the lack of fair on the response of the governments to the crisis and their conditions; in North Macedonia, the political actors still hav- effects on democratic institutions and public life. The reports en’t made a deal on the new date for the parliamentary elec- cover the situation of “Democracy and the State of Emergen- tions; and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the opposition is cy” in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, against the postponement of the local elections and is accus- Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia. As the ing the Central Election Commission of overstepping the le- Corona pandemic and responses to it in the region are un- gal framework. In contrast to that, the parliamentary elec- folding, we will continue to monitor the development. After tions in Croatia will take place in July and there are no signs our reports in April and May, this is the third publication in that they will be in any way contested. this series which will be followed by a fourth report in July 2020. This third reporting period from May 18 to June 8, 2020, was also marked by the continuation of a return to business as In our analysis of this third month of the Corona virus pan- usual. In the case of Kosovo that means the talks about the demic, we can clearly identify the strengths and weaknesses dialogue with Serbia, in the case of Montenegro the debates of the political systems of the countries. The Corona virus about the national identity, and in the case of Slovenia the crisis is in a way a mirror held up to each country. And this anti-immigrants discourse. It was also again revealed that po- situation showed a rather mixed picture. We still have a State litical elites in many countries of the region are incapable of of Emergency in Albania and North Macedonia. All observed achieving national solidarity even when faced with an exter- countries bar North Macedonia have continued easing the nal threat such as the Corona virus. For example, Kosovo, measures adopted to fight the pandemic. Unfortunately, Montenegro, Serbia, and North Macedonia appear more po- North Macedonia had to deal with a dramatic worsening of litically polarized than ever. In Albania and Bosnia and Herze- the epidemiological situation, which is also strongly affecting govina, the opposition accused the ruling majority and gov- 2 EDITORIAL ernment for using the pandemic as an excuse to enrich its These recent developments have shown a more and more cronies. And last but not least, in this third period under ob- diverse picture. While the danger of a second wave of infec- servation we could determine new developments within the tions is still looming, the relaxation of the anti-Corona-meas- foreign policy component. The period was not marked by ures is leading to the re-emergence of political disputes with- actions of the ‘great powers’, but by bilateral disputes be- in and between the countries of the region. The State of tween the countries that were caused by the decision to Emergency has not been lifted in all countries of the region open (or keep closed) their borders. The decision of the Mon- and a worrisome increase of infections is menacing the social tenegrin government not to open the border with Serbia led and political situation in North Macedonia. All this is happen- to tensions between the two governments, while the Slove- ing while five countries of the region are preparing for elec- nian government expressed its dissatisfaction that Austria tions. Detailed analyses of the developments in the respec- initially decided not to open its border with Slovenia. In addi- tive countries can be found in this publication. We hope that tion to that, an issue between Greece and Albania emerged we can provide an insight into these processes and allow for because the Greek border authorities fined Albanian citizens some interesting comparisons. The fourth and last report of for violation of Schengen rules who had remained stuck in this series will follow on July 13. Greece due to the closure of the border. 3 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – DEMOCRACY AND THE STATE OF EMERGENCY ALBANIA Arjan Dyrmishi Abstract Despite the State of Natural Disaster remaining in force until 23 June, the lockdown measures were considerably reduced – The Covid-19-measures in Albania were further eased from 1 June, including: the removal of curfew hours; the during May and early June due to a combination of fac- movement of citizens and vehicles throughout the country; tors that included a continued low number of infections the reopening of land borders (except air and maritime ones); and fatalities, and growing economic hardship and pub- the reopening of beaches and resumption of seaside activi- lic dissent over the handling of the pandemic. ties under special authorisations and measures; the resuming – Public confidence in handling the pandemic by the go- of sports competitions without public attendance; the reo- vernment declined as citizens and civil groups gathered pening of educational, cultural and training centres, internet to defy government decisions by disregarding social dis- centres and gyms but according to safety protocols; the reo- tancing rules. Opposition parties that fully supported the pening of kindergartens. imposition of emergency measures in March, including the deployment of the military, called on the public to disregard the emergency measures after May 23 as The Albanian economy being unconstitutional. – Civil society action gained steam as protestors rallied will shrink by 9% in 2020 against arbitrary government action and the disproporti- onate use of violence and so actions for equitable elec- The negative impact of the measures on the economy may toral reform were organised throughout the country.
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