Party Outcomes in Hybrid Regimes in the Western Balkans and Beyond
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Party Outcomes in Hybrid Regimes in the the in Regimes Hybrid in Outcomes Party In partial In Western Balkans and Beyond and Balkans Western Submitted to Central European University fulfillment Supervis Department of Political Science DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DOCTOR
of the requirements for the degree of or: Professor Zsolt Enyedi Ivan Vuković Budapest, May 2014 By
CEU eTD Collection This PhD thesis aims to offer aplausible explanation of the ir Montenegro incumbent political parties these regimes ceased to Most political parties that had been rul
thesis looks at alarger population o f model corroborated bythe established empirical framework. contribute to a better general understanding of party The thesis puts forward atheoretically innovat outcomes th challenging some of the most relevant findings Without eliminating the possibility of alternative explanations, broaderempirical domain. others, 27 in- supported bynumerous causal process observations ( mechanis in the three cases under observation of the thus constructed causal establishment. in the process of political mobilization leading to the regime institutionalization is determ parties’ (lack of) i fates of dominant parties in hybrid regimes are determined by these and power) e thesis finds the lack of outcomes, . remained politically dominant notwithstanding is fates
The m linking the .
found parties duri
(
here theoretical relevance of the depth interviews), P
party
ng the last decade of the 20 rocess tracing method is employed to test the presence to be the empirical validity of the founded upon the two in hybrid regimes that existed defined asparty outcomes aforementioned institutionalization) and
nstitutionalization; (2) hypothesized applicable to
exist ined by the salience of the national question Abstract
i.e. democratized
is
three cases. ing in hybrid regimes lost conditions (nationalist mobilization subsequently similar cases a number of assumptions:
party th ) results of the analysis,
. research ive
century of the related literature, Its main focus is onthe (the lack of) their
in
At the same time, .
model outcom Serbia, Croatia, and Yet, s
the with the ambition to assessed theregime change. cases
including, among (1)
.
diverging party In addition, the model
explaining the ome of these e (the loss of the diverging beyond the the beyond
power
within a d strongly
ifferent albeit the as
CEU eTD Collection loving andcaring people Despite my omnipresent thesis writing- along; prof. Siniša Vuković, for showing me the way to get here. and Herbert Kitschelt, for standing behind my academic ambition all hybrid regimes and helping me improve my writ me the language of science; prof. Steven Levitsky, for writing about moral and professional example; prof. Carsten Schneider, for teaching rest of (your name on the title page of this thesis makes me feel asproud as the giving me much than more one might possibly expect from asupervisor yet with all my heart andsoul, I would like to thank: prof. Zsolt Enyedi, for dehumanizing everyday thinking in terms of whereIbe am today. In amanner clearly affected bythe yearsof deepest gratitude to people without whose help andsupport I would not At the end of this long journey, I feel a strong need to express my Among them, I feel particularly grateful I dedicate this thesis to her. Vuković, gives meaning to them. my choices. The unconditional loveto andsupport of my mother, Ranka stick to energy me gives Vuković, Matija brother, my of appreciation choice right every underlies Vuković, Milorad My family has always been my biggest support. The advice of my father, one could have.
it); prof. Nenad Dimitrijević, for inspiring me with his extraordinary his with me inspiring for Dimitrijević, Nenad prof. it);
Acknowledge have throughout these years been by my side.
related frustration, to ments
Füstös Erika, typologiestaxonomies, and that I have ever made. The ing; professors Ivo Banac
the best friend
a number of
CEU eTD Collection reference. appropriate acknowledgment is made in the previously written and/or published by another person, except where other degrees in any other institutions. This thesis contains no materials I
hereby declare that no parts of this thesis have been accepted for any
Declaration
form of bibliographical Ivan Vuković, 1 May 2014
CEU eTD Collection CHAPTER 1 ………………………………………………………………….. 7 ………………………………………………………………….. 1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
CHAPTE …………………………………………… …………………… 3 CHAPTER 1. 2. 3.
1.1. HYBRID REGIMES: CONCEPTS AND THEORIES AND CONCEPTS REGIMES: HYBRID 1.2. 1.3. 1.4. 2.1. DOMINANT PARTIES IN HYBRID REGIMES HYBRID IN PARTIES DOMINANT 2.2. 2.3. 3.1. WESTERN TOWARD THE ESTABLI THE TOWARD 2.1.1. 2.1.2. 2.2.1. 2.2.2. 2.2.3. 2.3.1. 2.3.2. 2.3.3. 2.3.4. 3.1.1. 3.1.2. R 2 ………………………………………………………………… 24 ………………………………………………………………… R 2
Global proliferation Structural ambivalence Diverging regime fates Theoretical discussion Current understanding Solving the puzzle 2.2.3.1. Methodology Historical background
The challengesThe of conceptualization Diverging party out Party institutionalization Party institutionalization in hybrid regimes The model Process tracingmethod Theory- Case selection Model revisited The fog of Yugoslavia Croat BALKANS …………………………………………………………..... 1 …………………………………………………………..... ia: Socialist r Socialist ia: Natio building process tracing Table of contents of Table …………………………………………………... 50 …………………………………………………...
nalist mobilization ………………………………………………….. ………………………………………………….. …
…………………………………………….. 57 …………………………………………….. …………………………………………….. 60 …………………………………………….. …………………………... ………..…………………………... ……...
…………………. 32 …………………. ………………………… SHMENT OF HYBRID REGIMES INTHE …………………………………………….. 7 …………………………………………….. evolution of c ………………………………………... ……………………………………….. 21 ……………………………………….. omes ……………………………………….. 24 ……………………………………….. ……………………………………….. 15 ……………………………………….. ……………………………………. 12 12 ……………………………………….
......
……………………………………32 ……………………………………50 ………………………………... 28 ………………………………... ……………………………. 43 ……………………………. national aspirations …………………………. 52 ………………………….
……………………. 24 …………………….
……………………24 ……………... 36 ……………...
……………… 7 ……………… …
63 64 70 63 61 39
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CHAPTER 4 CHAPTER 4.
3.2. 3.3. 4.1. MONTENEGRO PARTY 4.2. 4.3. 3.2.3. 3.1.3. 3.2.2. 3.2.1. 3.3.1. 3.3.3. 3.3.2. 4.1.2. 4.1.1. 4.1.3. 4.2.1. 4.2.2. 4.2.3. 4.3.2. 4.3.1.
3.2.2.2. 3.2.2.1. 3.2.1.2. 3.2.1.1. 3.2.3.1. Brotherhood and unity of hopes and fears 3.2.3.2. Yugoslavia after Tito 3.3.1.1. 3.3.2.2. 3.3.2.1. 3.3.1.2. 3.3.3.2. 3.3.3.1. Serbia: One- Croatia: The state, the leader, and the party Montenegro: Single-
……………………………………………………………….. 159 ………………………………………………………………..
Serbia: The fear of (others’) freedom Montenegro: Rebirth through the uprising Montenegro: Most favored Yugoslav republic Croatia: The war is over, the battle continues Serbia: The roar Croatia:deafening The silence Montenegro:The whisper Political pluralism Old face of the new regime ……………………………………………………………… 165 ……………………………………………………………… Le partie, c’est moi! National reconciliation Independence, but nodemocracy Croatian (President’s)Democ ratic Union The years of dominance Political pluralization without democratization OUTCOMES IN SERBIA,CROATIA, AND
National question ambiguity Decadesemancipation of The spring of national renaissance Unresolved national question A lone voice against decentralization Wading in collective self Rise of the leader E Pluribus Unum The echo of Kosovo Reunifying the Republic Fading apathy Maspok is over ...... 159 man show …………………………………………. 120 …………………………………………. party multipartism ………………………………………... –
……………………………………… 171 ……………………………………… ... …………………………………… ……….. 161 ……….. …………………………… more than just ademocratic fa ...... ………………………………
………………………………...… 179 ………………………………...…
.. 1 ………………………………… ...... ……………………………… ………………………………… 208 ………………………………… ……………. 134 ……………. ………………… ……………………………… 134 ……………………………… …………………………….. 161 …………………………….. - .. ………………………….. pity ...... …………………… . 96 …………………………
……………………... 188 ……………………...
…………………….. 100 …………………….. …………………….. ……………………..
…………………….. 85 …………………….. …………………… 203 ……………………
………………….. 105 …………………..
………………… 84 …………………
. 90 ……………… ……………... 196 ……………... …………….. 179 …………….. ……………… 81
…………... 105 …………... . 96 …………. …………. 85 …………. ………... 203 ………... ça
148 120 148 119 111 129 153
43
de
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CHAPTER 5 CHAPTER SUMMARY LIST OF INTERVIEWS REFERENCES 5.
4.4. PERSPECTIVE HYBRID REGIME PARTY OUTCOMES IN COMPARATIVE 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 4.3.3. 5.1.2. 5.1.1. 5.1.3. 5.1.4. 5.2.4. 5.2.3. 5.2.2. 5.2.1. 5.2.5. 5.2.6. 5.2.7.
Concluding remarks Problematic cases of hybrid regime democratization Party fates in democratized hybrid regimes Comparative lessons AND AND
………………………………………………………………..
Party as a political value Ghana and Nicaragua Benin Guyana Maliand Ukraine Romania Taiwan Macedonia Slovakia Mexico Peru The Dominican Republic
…. 272 ………………………………………………………… CONCLUSIONS . CONCLUSIONS .. 254 .. ……………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………
… .. 251 .. …………………………………………………… . 243 . …………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………
…………………………………………………... …………………………………………………... ……………………………… ………………………………………………….. 222 ………………………………………………….. ………………………………………………... ………………………………………… ……… ………………………………… .. 262 .. ……………………………………… …......
………………………………….
………………………………... 211 ………………………………... ………………………………... …………………… .. 248 ………………… ……………… …….. 265 …… ..
230 231 225 219 235 227 225 235 293 239 259 222
CEU eTD Collection votes) in the elections in hybrid regime Croatia Table 10. The winning results (vote % andabsolute numbers in million 178 ………………………………………………………………………………. votes) in the elections in hybrid regime Montenegro Table 12. The winning results (vote % andabsolute numbers in thousand T Table months Montenegro Table 13 Croatia votes) in the Serbian general elections Table 8. The winning results (vote % andabsolute numbers in million Table 6. Serbian ………………………………………………………………………………… Table 4. Party institutionalization model Table 3. Fates of ruling parties in democratized hybrid regimes 11 ………………………………………………………………………………… Table 1. Numbers and percentages of electoral democracies 1989 - his party Table 14. Electoral performance (vote %) of Vladimir Meciar relative to votes) in the 1990 Serbian general elections Tab Table 2. Competitive authoritarian regime trajectories 1990-
Figure 1. Theory mobilization on party outcomes in hybrid regimes Table 5. Causal mechanism explaining the effect of nationalist able 9. SPS’s electoral performance after the regime change in Serbia le 7 le 11 …………………………………………………………………... 203 ……………………………………………………………………... . The winning results (vote % andabsolute numbers in million – organization
. DPS’s electoral performance after the regime change in HDZ’s . out of atotal 268 ………………………………………………………………... 219 ………………………………………………………………... -
building process tracing (Democratic peace example) political List of tables and figures and tables of List electoral performance after the regime change in before and after hybrid regime collapse representation in the Kingdom (in number of –
in thein
governmental
………………………………… 169 …………………………………
. ………………………………… .. ………………………… ……………………….. 201 ………………………..
………………… office) …………………. 216 ………………….
………. 68 ……..………. 2008 …… ……… 22
…… …… 49 ... 2014 238 164
16 41 54
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transition party organizations’ in hybrid regime Romania Table 17. Electoral performance (vote %) Iliescu of Ion relative to his transition Table 16 PRI’s rule Table 18.P candidates in hybrid regime Mexico Table 19. Electoral performance (vote %) of the PRI its presidential and outcomes in democratized hybrid regimes Table 23. General applicabili Balaguer’s party chairmanship Table 22 party organizations’ Table 21...... 256 Table 20
. Peruvian voters’ presidential preferences (1990 elections) . PRSC’s electoral performance (vote %) during and after
…………………………………………………………………... …………………………………………………………………… . KMT’s electoral performance during Taiwanese political Fujimori’ ………………………………………………………………….. residential elections (vote %) during s electoral performance (in million votes) relative to his
. 258 ……………………………………………………… ty of the research model explaining party ………………………………………….. . 254 ……………………………………
nia’s post …………………………….. ……………………….. the last three decades of - communist political
. 242
252 250 261 244 264
CEU eTD Collection DSS DSS DS DPS DPP DEPOS BiH ADEMA
JNA JNA IMF IMF ICG HZDS HTV HRSS HPSS HDZ HSS HSS HSLS HDS FSN FSN FSLN FNRJ – – – – –
– – – – – – – –
Democratic Party(Serbia)
Bosnia andBosnia Herzegovina
– International Monetary Fund
–
International Crisis Group –
– – Yugoslav People’s Army – Croatian Television National Salvation Front (Romania) Democratic Party of Serbia Democratic Party of Socialists (Montenegro) Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan) CroatianDemocratic Union Croatian Peasant Party Croatian Democratic Party
Sandinista National LiberationFront(Nicaragua) Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia Croatian Social Liberal Party – – Movement for Democratic Slovakia Croatian People’s Peasant Party Croatian Republican Peasants’ Party
Democratic Movement of Serbia Alliance for Democracy in Mali List of abbreviations of List
CEU eTD Collection PDS PDS Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights OSCE/ODIHR OSCE/ODIHR NS NGO States) NATO NDI NDI NDH NDC PRSC PRSC PRI PDSR MASPOK LSCG PS PPP PNDC PNC KSHS KSHS KPJ KPH KNS JUL KMT KMT
– – – – – –
– – – – – - – – Socialist Party (Senegal) People’s Party (Montenegro)
–
Institutional Revolutionary Party (Mexico) National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (United
Yugoslav United Left (Serbia)
Communist Partyof Yugoslavia
– – Kuomintang – – –
– People’s Progressive Party (Guyana) Senegalese Democratic Party Communist Party of Croatia Coalition of People’s Accord People’s National Congress (Guyana) Independent State of Croatia National Democratic Congress (Ghana) nongovernmental organization
Liberal Alliance of Montenegro Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes North Atlantic Treaty Organization Social Christian Reformist Party (the Dominican Republic) Partyof SocialDemocracy (Romania) Provisional National Defense Council(Ghana) –
Nationalist political movement in Croatia active in 1970- –
Organi
zation for Security and Cooperation in
1971
CEU eTD Collection SKS SKS RTCG SKJ SKJ SKH SKCG SFRJ
SRS SRS SPO SDP SDP SANU SDSM SDSM SDS SDPCG RTS UDBA UDBA SRJ VMRO USSR UJDI SPS ZAVNOH WWII Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity – – – – – – – – – – –
– –
League of Communists of Yugoslavia
- F – – –
– – League of Communists of Serbia Radio TelRadio Socialist PartySocialist Serbia of – League of Communists of Croatia Serbian Radical Party Social Democratic Party (Croatia) Serb Democratic Party (Croatia) Serbian Renewal Movement
DPMNE DPMNE
Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative Second World War ederal Republic of Yugoslavia
Socialist Federal Republicof Yugoslavia
– Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Yugoslav State Security Administration (Secret Police) Radio Television of Montenegro League of Communists of Montenegro SocialDemocratic of Union Macedonia
– Social DemocraticParty ofMontenegro
State Anti- – evisionof Serbia
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - Fascist Council for National Liberation of Croati
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governance in the face of the institutionalized risk of electoral turnover. And indeed, And indeed, turnover. electoral of risk institutionalized the of face in the governance socijalista p ( Serbia of Party Socialist the of 2007) (Greene, advantage’ incumbent ‘hyper Theresultant ones. ruling the of in favor skewed washeavily Montenegro transition. post their of phase first the marked elections, andfair free medi the of control political resources, state the of extraction incumbents’ The place. take did not systems political their of character of change genuine the however, essence, multi andMontenegro. Croatia, Serbia, regimes such in the1980s, late system political authoritarian Yugoslav 69). 2010: (Schedler, governance’ nondemocratic of constellation in the new stars ‘the became soon regimes these arrangement, structural the specific dueto 1995) (Karl, Labeled worldwide. flourish to began elements authoritarian (substantial) democr (formal) of combination the by characterized regimes political time, scholars most by ated anticip originally than countries democratization brought has century preceding the toward authoritarianism from transitions political of wave The global INTRODUCTION zajednica artija Srbije artija party electoral competition, were formally established in the three states. In states. three the in established formally were competition, electoral party of the the of crisis the from originating proliferation, their of process the of a part As a, repression against political opponents, and, as a consequence, the lack of of lack the as and, aconsequence, opponents, political against repression a, During this period, the playing field for political parties in Serbia, Croatia, and Croatia, in Serbia, parties political for field playing the period, this During
- -
DPS) over political competitors was to ensure the durability of their their of durability the ensure to was competitors political over DPS) HDZ)
-
SPS), the Croatian Democratic Union ( Croatian Democratic the SPS), , and the Democratic Party of Socialists ( Socialists of Party Democratic the and ,
Democratic political institutions, including including institutions, political Democratic 1
to a significantly smaller number of of number smaller significantly a to
(Carothers, 2002). At the same the same At 2002). (Carothers, Hrvatska Demokratska Demokratska - communist political political communist d Socijalistička Socijalistička
emokratska emokratska emerged end of the the of end
atic and and atic ‘hybrid’ ‘hybrid’ p artija artija in in -
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and identified been clearly have the Cold endof War the after period in the trajectories developmental different their and shaping dynamics political their influencing factors recent regimes hybrid some why explain to ambition the with done been has research extensive hand, other the On change. regime the despite office in stay to managed others while exist, to ceased hadgoverned they in which regimes the as power these of why some reasons possible about speculated onlybe therefore of fates these diverging for valid explanation atheoretically regimes onhybrid literature in find to was one if However, 21). (2010: power’ from fall governments those after or they may occur [...] governments authoritarian by overseen be may ‘democratization regimes, hybrid of study referenced most in the Way Lucan and Levitsky Steven by Asnoted in power. turnover the and continuity the both post in the transformation change. regime the notwithstanding in office remained us andth triumph electoral another scored serious, as threat a facing albeit party, incumbent Montenegro’s the opposition, two former the Whereas differently. performed in tization democra of beginning the and regimes hybrid endof the marked that elections in the Yet, theirrule. of results general negative very despite power and consolidate challenges of electoral number pri the to due largely their ruling parties ( parties ruling their thoroughly ly collapsed whereas others consolidated and survived to date. As a result, the the Asaresult, date. to and survived consolidated others whereas ly collapsed Within the universe of hybrid regimes that experienced democratic democratic experienced that regimes hybrid of universe the Within
elaborated. elaborated. vileged political status, these parties managed to overcome a a overcome to managed parties these status, political vileged party outcomes party - Cold War era, one may identify many similar examples of of examples similar many identify may one era, Cold War
HDZ, HDZ, SPS, the states, three the )
it would be in vain. At the moment, it can can it moment, the At vain. in be would it 2
suffered defeat to the nearly unified unified nearly the to defeat the existing existing the parties lost lost parties and DPS DPS
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gime alteration. gime re the notwithstanding changegovernment the of lack in versa, turnover party ruling of irrespective survival regime the of high incidence arather address unable to them makes two the between differentiation of The lack andt regimes hybrid equate analytically to scholars interested of tendency the to relates important most the as recognizes thesis Theonethis many. 1 out grew mentioned, previously as regimes, Thethree unexpected. variance politics. comparative in contemporary issues puzzling most onethe of remain thus parties dominant their pol diverging functioning, their in studying made progress significant the and regimes hybrid for interest academic growing the constantly of spite In question. in outcomes party the overlook to alsobound are scholars these Consequently, eveloped were, albeit specific, much alik much specific, albeit were, developed they in which conditions t selected dom of fates political diverging the about knowledge anew produce to generally, more ms ai it Secondly, andMontenegro. atia, Cro in Serbia, regimes in hybrid outcomes party different the of determinants potential identify to anambition has thesis Theresearch phenomenon. political ted investiga poorly yet interesting extremely this of understanding crisis of the Yugoslav one- the Yugoslav of crisis distinguish between electoral turnovers and democratization. For a good example, see: Wahman
In relationIn to the former group of cases, there are still few avery articles critical ofthe approaches that not do inant parties in hybrid regimes in hybrid parties inant Potential causes of the academic neglect of hybrid regime party outcomes are are outcomes regimeparty hybrid of neglect the academic of causes Potential abetter to contribute isto thesis doctoral this of purpose The main A number of traits shared by the observed cases – cases observed the by shared traits of A number hem as ‘most similar’(Gerring, 2007) –
- socio and The political system. socialist party goal it thereby seeks to achieve is twofold. Firstly, the the Firstly, twofold. is achieve to seeks thereby it goal
applicable to a larger sample of the cases. cases. of the sample alarger to applicable 3
above said above the make
in view of which this thesis thesis this which of view in heir ruling parties. parties. ruling heir e. Relative to Relative e. itical fates of fates itical (s) (2012).
economic economic and, vice vice and, outcome outcome
the the 1 ,
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advantage. were period regime hybrid during rivals political the amount the which in organizations party on studies related thus It institutionalization. structure to Thethe points sis institutionalization. parties’ lack these of) (the identifies it determinant, Asmain their Socialists. of Party Democratic the and Union, Democratic ofCroatian the Party Serbia, of the Socialist fates political the explaining argument (communist origins institutional all, above concerning, differences relevant andtheoretically important several also finds in the three parties, crucial for shaping their power structures. structures. power shaping their crucial for parties, three in the leadership of type agiven of emergence the influencing factor key the as processes these in question national the of salience the out singles thereby It dominated. wh in regimes hybrid of establishment the to leading processes political of the different stru c relevant analytically sole the outcomes. party expected the into either translate not do differences Yet, these dominance. their challenging those of oppression political - (state policies economic their hypothesized the linking employed as employed ( outcome party and ) institutionalization the presence To test W
ithout ir ir the of process the for crucial as parties three the of power of
At the same time, the levels of the opposition coordination and activity activity and coordination opposition the of the levels time, same the At
the m the
an thesis on,builds the rest to grounds solid theoretical their ruling parties enjoyed significant – significant enjoyed parties ruling their DPS, the thesis looks at the the at looks thesis the DPS, and HDZ, SPS, in the power of ctures research qualitative in inference causal of tool ajor conditions ( conditions
takes a different analytical approach than most of the of most than approach analytical a different takes observation under cases the in ategory. Furthermore, to find reasons for to reasons find Furthermore, ategory. rship/privatization), and the scale (high/low) of of (high/low) scale andthe ownership/privatization), - successor/anti comparable across the cases. the across comparable nationalist mobilization nationalist the loss power the of 4
- establishment) of the three parties, parties, three the of establishment)
) ,
tracing process and a similar kind of kindof a similar and taken as as is taken power their of of the causal mechanism mechanism causal the of
and and
Among them Among party party of lack the ich the
the existence existence the (Beach and and (Beach innovative innovative method
parties parties
o the the ne ne is is –
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theor of population larger with consistent ( regularities 2012) Mahoney, 2005; Bennett, and George 2010; Collier, and Brady 2012; Pedersen, of helps in it analysis, document dynamics parties dominant their to belong countries world significant introduces general concepts and theories used in the analysis. the in used theories and concepts general introduces model, the chapter the model, fates party different the of explanation this for interest scholarly of lack regimes. to post in the trajectories developmental distinct ir the regimes, hybrid of proliferation global recent findings of – of findings section case selection criteria. selection case Vennesson, Vennesson,
the the y- . - cross
building In line with the aforementioned, t aforementioned, the with line In mes in democratized hybrid hybrid in democratized mes outco party diverging the of neglect academic - open onintensive, Based brings an extensive elaboration of the choice of the research method and method research the of choice the of elaboration extensive an brings
Chapter 2 Chapter
of hybrid regimes hybrid of
as as well as in as well as case
2008: 234) 2008: the literature on hybrid regimes and political parties political and regimes hybrid on literature the a in this field this in lmost the second major goal major second the
pattern causal
cases of cases chapter begins by discussing in detail the reasons behind the the behind reasons the detail in discussing by begins chapter offers
all
should . credible ‘hybrid the The discovering discovering
.
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same the At the the .
e th of findings
In this respect, this In provide ing rstand unde would would s. regime hybrid democratized
indicators , participant observation and and observation participant , ended interviewing ’ regime
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s call it addition, In period. Cold War particular decisive adecisive mark of of
into insight a valuable he thesis is structured as follows. C follows. as is structured he thesis into is put forward 5 time t
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Studies C Europeanization’, to Prior Democratization Montenegro: of
Science Political of Journal Romanian Montenegro’, Serbia, Croatia, of The Cases Regimes: Studies Graz University, Center for Southeast for Center University, Graz Omnipotence’, Organizational 1990- Serbia of Party ‘The Socialist 2013; August - One Montenegro: Communist ‘Po author: the by articles following the in published competitiveness of hybrid regimes are proposed. proposed. are regimes hybrid of competitiveness criteria well yet missing far thus respect, this In examined. are Europe communist andpost America, Latin Asia, from Africa, cases of thirteen A total domain. research the of applicability the testing at aimed (2010), andWay Levitsky by identified regimes hybrid democratized the in outcomes party of analysis comparative a contains chapter last The era. regime hybrid playedin the they roles the political of significance andthe investigation, under anizations org party the in power of structure the period; this during processes political dominant in the national the question of the importance elements: following o Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro. To that goal, the 20 the goal, Tothat andMontenegro. Croatia, Serbia, of cases in the model research the underlying mechanism causal the of presence f these states is states these f Finally, it should be mentioned that certain segments of this thesis have been been have thesis this of segments certain that mentioned be should it Finally, Ch , , Working paper No. 3 (August 2012); ‘Diverging Party Outcomes in Hybrid in Hybrid Outcomes Party ‘Diverging 2012); 3(August No. paper Working , , for defining the minimum life span and the necessary level of electoral electoral level of necessary andthe span life minimum the defining for
Vol. Vol. Vol. apter
2 , No. 11, , No. 1, No. , pp. s 3 and 4 represent and 3
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comprehensively and systematically, and comprehensively
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Available at: Available Soviet republics -Sovietost republics 1991; in .1. . HYBRID REGIMES: CONCEPTS AND THEORIES lobal rope atthe end ofthe 1980s; Global proliferation
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emocracy has by any conception expanded dramatically dramatically expanded conception any by has democracy And indeed, ‘ T ( political landscape has been lastingly changed lastingly been has landscape political . During this period, the form of government has been altered in nearly 100 100 in nearly altered been government has of form the During period, . this
Diamond, Diamond, he fall ofrighthe fall -wing regimes authoritarian Sout in hern Europe themid the in -1970s; K . Faced with the tide of political changes, scholars have sought to to sought have scholars changes, political of tide the with Faced . worldwide nown as the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991), (Huntington, democratization waveof third nown the as
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In this respect, In global movement toward toward democracy global movement the of thebreakup Soviet decline ofonedecline -party-Saharan regimes many ofsub in parts
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CEU eTD Collection
competition multiparty limited introduced newcomers authoritarian the of most survival, political d ensure an governance legitimate to order ( regime authoritarian another of establishment the about brought 2003 1972 to from breakdowns authoritarian M systems. political democratic stable of ation cre only to instances 703) 2000: Way, 2002: 51) 2002: Way, pos central the occupied have democratization and democracy of Thematters (Ibid). democracies pluralist into regimes political ‘totalitarian’ and authoritarian of transformation the than more science political of agenda research the influenced has century much diminished’ (2004: 1). (2004: diminished’ much appeal their of much lost since have democracy to alternatives political t tha wave indicates and Zakaria Fareed modernity, respectabl ‘T world. modern in the rule of political system legitimate 01973 http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Country%20Status%20%26%20Ratings%20Overview%2C%2 account into taking be might developments broad that we have witnessed a clear trend of democratic stability in this per in this stability democratic of trend aclear witnessed we have that argue fairly might one breakdowns, democratic outright of incidence inconsiderable Wolfgang - 2014.pdf Summarizing the effects of of the effects the Summarizing ther subject in the final decades of the last the of final in the decades subject other any hardly reason, that For –
ems ems se relevance theirempirical view; of point anideological onlyfrom not fashionable attire of attire fashionable the of it isapart democracy; to e alternatives . Yet, c .
Merkel maintain that ‘a glance back at the three decades of the third third the of decades three the at back ‘a glance that maintain Merkel ition within the realm of contemporary comparative politics (Bunce, (Bunce, politics comparative contemporary of realm the within ition
transitions from authoritarian regimes in this period led in rare rare in led period in this regimes authoritarian from transitions ontrary to ‘overly optimistic’ scholarly expectations (Levit expectations scholarly ‘overly optimistic’ to ontrary the the persistence of old liberal democracies as well as an an as well as democracies liberal old of persistence
thus 2007: 152). At the same time, in in time, same the At 152). 2007: Teorell, and Hadenius identified as its as identified
notes
(1997: 42). In a similar vein, Aurel Croissant Croissant Aurel vein, In 42). a similar (1997: late 20 late 8
most important most th
century (Ibid)
, change political global .
t raits here are no longer longer no are here .
On the one hand, onehand, the On ore than 3/4 3/4 ore than iod. Despite Despite iod. sky and sky and
two two
CEU eTD Collection inte of the restrictions on pluralism; or those which, following aperiod of minimal democracy, are subject to the without those preceded by a period of author regimes’ (2004: 2). of a triumph of political liberalism and liberal democracy than a success story for ‘hybrid’ or ‘ambiguous
recently lost recently students S governance. combine that regimes of tion prolifera global difficulties 4 3 even or illiberal essentially with liberties political civil and of sphere alimited for respect and institutions, democratic formal some of existence the democracy, liberal Put offer. to nothing almost competition, electoral from multiparty apart human and human democratic a 2002 to one(Schedler, two than more by not who did century, democracy global augured had that aperiod during authoritarianism of durability the andsignified repression 2001‘ by that writes Brownlee ( democracies western older the from profoundly differ world communist former the and America Latin Asia, Africa, in regimes new political these of many that apparent become has with break cut regimes. was the first scholar to use scholar the first the was concept.
ng with political regimes in Central America in the last decade of the 20 the of last decade the in America Central in regimes political with ng Deali Bearing rvention of non
creating acreating more lessor regime authoritarian stable (2009: 281). As a result, the world haswitnessed world the As aresult,
this
4 autocrats allowing some form of multiparty elections outnumbered those those outnumbered elections multiparty of form some allowing autocrats thus
In essence, t essence, In encountered, in mind, in
principles political rights, these regimes these rights, political ’
(
Plattner, Plattner, came to realize that a great number of the new born democracies had, had, democracies the new of born number agreat that realize to came
Wigell, Wigell, the oon after the results of the third wave began to clarify, many of its its of many clarify, to began wave third the of results the after oon - elected bodies (e.g. the (e.g. military) elected bodies Croissant and Merkel admit the that trend global ofdemocratization could become less non-
while at the same time regularly resorting to blatant abuses of of abuses blatant to resorting regularly time same the at while 2008: 230). Shedding a light to their murky character, murky their to alight Shedding 230). 2008: democratic past. democratic 2010: 82). 2010:
‘combine systems ambiguous hese ‘ no well
’
(2007: 16). (2007: itarian or traditional rule, follo rule, traditional or itarian five dozen of these regimes blended liberalization with with liberalization blended regimes these of dozen five
Morlino identified Morlino - established or consolidated democracies have been been have democracies consolidated or established
the of Yet, dominant more
Moreover, before the end of the precedin the endof the before Moreover, ’ incumbents 9
that place r
nd authoritarian andauthoritarian democratic of elements proliferation
two sorts of regimes to which it could it which to of regimes sorts wed by liberalization and liberalization wed by estrictions o estrictions
in effect failed to make a clear make to failed effect in
of of : 47). : so th rhetorical acceptance of of acceptance rhetorical two trends two
century, Terry Lynn Karl (1995) - n competitive pluralism yet yet pluralism competitive n called ‘hybrid’ political political called ‘hybrid’ 3
Formally embracing embracing Formally
relates to
partial relaxation differently
be applied:
Jason
the , it it , g -
CEU eTD Collection (Turkmenistan) endured through the 1990s (Levitsky 19). and Way, 2010: fell from 29 in 1989 to zero in 1994, and in post in and 1994, in zero to in 1989 29 from fell democracy is based (Ibid: 4). communal cultural traditions that precluded the egoistic individualism on which, they claimed, liberal their countries’ leading intellectuals, openly reject Soviet (Ibid). regimes’ authoritarian within competition electoral multiparty that Juan Linz's 1975 encyclopedic tolerating competition for political office’ (Bunce and Wolchik, 2010: 43). 2010: andWolchik, (Bunce politicaloffice’ for competition tolerating of feature common ‘the share regimes hybrid elements’, anddemocratic authoritarian of themselves contemporary hybrid equivalent hybrid contemporary 1970s, and 1960s democratic systems of governance. of systems democratic non- advocating continue to willing were few governments very rights, human conditio competition. electoral regimes political authori and procedures democratic of Thefusion 3). 2003: (Ottaway, traits’ authoritarian 8 7 6 5 period even as they resisted substantive democratization ( democratization substantive resisted they as even period 19). (Lev democracy bring necessarily did not it elections, multiparty of diffusion the encouraged and autocracies undermined environment international
The change Arguing that this type ofregime is acontemporary world product, Larry Diamond calls attention to the fact In thisIn regard, Ottaway reminds that until endthe of the Cold manyWar governments, often supported by In that context, Michael McFaul underlines
their
A Union has only sometimes has only Union uthoritarian rulers increasingly adopted the forms of democracy during this this during democracy of forms the adopted increasingly rulers uthoritarian The end of of The end tarian practices in a way that formal existence of the former masked the the masked former the of existence formal that way a in practices tarian ns of emerging liberal hegemony and hegemony liberal emerging of ns
. reality basis of the the latter provided thus 5
. expansion global was particularly striking in Sub striking particularly was The ’
( Lindberg, Lindberg, m of these important ost the Cold War has given a particularly strong impetus to the processthe to impetus strong aparticularly given has War Cold the
elections
D e jure or de facto non or- defacto e jure Different in terms of ‘the weight accorded to to accorded weight ‘the of in terms Different 89). 2009: –
in 8 out of 28 cases, to be precise – 6 Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes
Following the collapse of communism, under communism, of collapse the Following serve s - Saharan Africa,whe
and that the transition the that from communism the Europe in and former - communist Eurasia, where only one de jure one de one jure whereonly Eurasia, communist as the basic source of legitimacy of source basic the as ed liberal democracy in the name of people’s democracy or 7 ‘
democratic a means by which they which by means a 10 Yet though even , existent in authoritarian regimes in authoritarian existent global promotion of democracy and and democracy of promotion global re the number of de jure single
procedures procedures for
ledto democracy (2002: 212).
the establishment of hybrid hybrid of establishment the
‘contains barely a mention of Brownlee, Brownlee, itsky and Way, 2010: 2010: andWay, itsky the post the re
to lates uce uce reprod to try
2009: 515). 2009: - - Cold War War Cold party regimesparty - party regime party multiparty multiparty
of their of
of
the the the 8
CEU eTD Collection democracy, even as global democracy has advanced in certain distinct ways’ (2010: 166). public access of major political parties to the electorate through open campaigning and the media (2007: 3). elections contested regularly system, political Table 1) post the of years five than in less cent per 60 by grew er numb counter autocratic noticeable with other of adozen regimes over yielded demi USSR’s the states, democratic new more to in addition Consequently, 11 types/freedom’world#.UzIhIKhdUlD 10 9 ‘ ways discovered survival, political ensure to as so process the manipulating whilst elections competitive for andallowing parties opposition legalizing 69). 2010: (Schedler, democracy’ 227). 2002: (McFaul,
Having thatmind, in Bruce The complete report available at: These systems, as noted by noted as systems, These Table 1. Number 1. Table sion of electoral democracies, electoral of sion expan global An impressive Source: , was hence followed by followed washence ,
, House Freedom ds for democratization democratization for ds deman external and internal to acquiesce to 9
Arch s Gilley writes that post ‘the that writes Gilley
and
Puddington, are defined by universal adult suffrage, competitive multiparty . http://www.freedomhouse.org/report
p ercentages of ercentages Freedom Freedom
Throughout Throughout
without without elections multiparty of spread ‘startling without massive, outcome massive, without 11 World in the
Latin America, Africa and Eurasia, by Eurasia, and Africa America, Latin - e 1989 has thought us to be pessimistic about lectoral lectoral 2014 - d - emocracies changing fraud, and considerable 10
- 1989 transition authoritarian rulers rulers authoritarian
11
whose overall overall whose 1989- - currents currents 2014 ( see
se se
CEU eTD Collection 1 2006: 365). Roessler, twenty the of beginning the at world in the system political widespread most also‘the but countries developing in the government t only not become have regimes hybrid way, This 1). 2008: (Hale, result on power hold their maintaining still while Hybrid institutions, major political change in hybri in change political major institutions, democratic andmeaningful incumbents authoritarian of coexistence in the rooted regimes. hybrid of stability the to danger ( animals’ domestic betame to ‘meant though time, the At same 8). (2009: authoritarian substantively they remain nominally democratic, that, sure to make try i.e. creations, institutional st will always they says Schedler, In effect, other. at the uncertainty anddemocratic oneside, at control, authoritarian considerable structural resemblance to democratic political systems. political democratic to resemblance structural considerable to forced are Levitsky and Way (2002) Way and Levitsky As 70). 2010: (Schedler, democracies’ liberal from indistinguishable ged by jud Roessler,
.2. S , roughly a third of all regimes have arguably fallen into the hybrid category category hybrid the into fallen arguably have regimes all of a third roughly ,
hybrid nature, in authoritarian t albei onehand, the On characterized are regimes tructural ambivalence ‘ ’ possible often but certain, never
the institutional set up, set institutional the operate within the specific the within operate Schedler, Schedler, , these ), these institutions still represent a potential potential a represent still institutions these 71), 2010: by ‘competitive authoritarian’ ‘competitive rive to constrain, contain, and control their own own their control and contain, constrain, to rive
an
inherent functional tension. Their incumbents incumbents Their tension. functional inherent
12 ’
(Howard and Roessler, 2006: 365) 2006: Roessler, and (Howard (2006: 380). (2006: ‘virtually ‘virtually may seem regimes hybrid Because of the structural ambivalence ambivalence structural the of Because institutional quote to is, d regimes
- first cen arrangement
four four comprise regimes tury’ (Howard and and (Howard tury’ he modal form of of form he modal regimes bear a a bear regimes , enclosed by by enclosed ,
In fact, Howard and and Howard
noted by by noted . w As a a As hen CEU eTD Collection Wolchik no fewerno than fourteen major attempts to semioust another crucial element of political dynamics in hybrid regimes. hybrid in dynamics of political element crucial another challenges, they are, however powerful, hence ‘forc hence powerful, however are, they challenges, inter as well as electoral with Faced triumph. opposition possible a fear regimes in these officials 12), 2010: andWay, (Levitsky victory’ incumbent oppositi nor they neither because elections of another way, unlike full unlike way, another 54). 2002: andWay, (Levitsky incumbents autocratic defeat even occasionally power executive wayfor a meaningful 931) 2008: (Alexander, challengers’ and the existence costly 27). ( democracy’ of architecture formal the maintaining while control and coercion of mechanisms employ informal to incumbents for incentives created environment formal, i.e. single . standing international jeopardizing without office in stay to of enable thethem time, most which, techniques manipulative mastered have leaders ( arenas 14 13 12
restrictions o restrictions independent judiciary bylimiting its jurisdiction and ‘packing’ the system with loyal servants; impose fragmentand legislatures so as to make them objects oftheir directcontrol; neutralize the threat of voter preference of articulation the 2002: 42). Way, and (Levitsky power their of challengers potential other as well as and activists politicians opposition
Hybrid regime incumbentsthus habitually And indeed, in the Balkans and the countries of theEastern old Bloc only, ‘ In addition to these, some scholars (Ekman, 2009; Schedler,socie civil 2010) identify
other potentially very very potentially other or fraud, electoral repression, naked to resorting of Instead , 2009 regime hybrid defeat, p olitical of risk the mind in keeping hand, other the On sorts of blatant power abuse, they make use of incumbency to create unfair unfair create to incumbency of use make they abuse, power blatant of sorts
electoral yields ‘dynamic process of repeated interaction between the government government the between interaction repeated of process yields ‘dynamic n (free) media content and consumption; b : 93).
, legislative - party authoritarian rule, ‘the post ‘the rule, authoritarian party - fledged authoritarian leaders that can ‘rest easily on the eve eve the on easily ‘rest can that leaders authoritarian fledged
, and distorting jud and , icial manipulate the electoral process by process electoral the manipulate n the polling stations; disempower disempower stations; polling the in pressed ex will popular -
author 13 and ) of democratic contestation. democratic media of ) .
and O
’ means elections of regimesby itarian periodically challenge, weaken, and and weaken, challenge, periodically pposition forces can forces pposition
on leaders expect anything but an but anything expect leaders on
regularly ed to(Ibid). sweat’ violate civil and political rights of of rights political and civil violate - the years from 1996 to 2009 saw Cold War international international War Cold 14
obstructing
ng the cost of of cost the ng raisi By - electoral opposition opposition electoral ty (i.e. the (i.e. publicty ) thus 13
the formationthe and
compete in in compete
(Bunce 12
Stated Stated
Their Their Ibid
and and
as as :
CEU eTD Collection and mobilize public servants to achieve their own political goals. goals. own achieve political to their public servants and mobilize – machinery te sta the exploit heavily likely to are incumbents in particular, campaigns electoral during Furthermore, 10). 2010: and Way, (Levitsky these resources to access the and denied ’blacklisted’ usually are financiers opposition same time, the At supporters. ent promin their of the into hands assets transfer to contracts andstate licenses, credit, processes these of course the In ncing. fina incumbent of source vast another as serve programs privatization related and reforms economic liberal Besides, 147). 2003: (Ottaway, campaign’ election its to finance treasury state the dip into can it because ahugeadvantage, enjoys party governing ‘the regimes these in means, same the by money raise to have opposition in the andthose parties or party incumbent the where systems democratic Unlike one impai seriously is in elections compete and organize to ability opposition’s the that extent the to favored systematically resources disparities and thus disparities resources to order in mechanisms several employ regularly incumbents oneisconcerned, first the When law. the and media, resources, to access privileged 2002b (Schedler, field’ playing ‘uneven i.e. , advantage democracies. However, w However, democracies. finance and media guaranteed, for the most part, by pork by part, the most for guaranteed, advantage incumbent of a degree that argue rightfully would one regard, that In challenges. opposition thwart andthus competition political of conditions
m U ost ost incumbents’ incumbents’ of basis onthe created is regimes in hybrid field playing neven to relates employed commonly –
is basically a matter of political routine even in liberal liberal in even politicalroutine of amatter is basically hat we fi hat
render , ruling parties may use discretionary control over over control discretionary use may parties ruling ,
red (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 10). 10). 2010: andWay, (Levitsky red
buildings, vehicles, and other infrastructure – infrastructure andother vehicles, buildings, nd in hybrid regimes is hyper is regimes in hybrid nd the - 14 barrel spending and privileged access to to access privileged and spending barrel direct partisan use of public resources. resources. public of use partisan direct competitive. competitive. un politically opposition those in power in those which in ) tain tain main or create
- incumbent incumbent
The are are –
CEU eTD Collection against against compete to trying When concessions. democratic formal abovementioned the of each for compensate to is which 2002b) (Schedler, manipulation’ of ‘menu the play into bring regularly thus incumbents regime hybrid power, political to maintain order In 1 constitutes control patronage, and proxy ownership, they usually manage to politically ‘absorb’ most ‘absorb’ politically to usuallymanage they ownership, andproxy patronage, br as such means, corrupt of a variety using by fact, In media. to access in the monopoly incumbent prevent necessarily not does stations radio and television T promotion. media of possibility the denied effectively state are audience national with stations andradio only television the where situations manipulation over these institutions (Ibid). these institutions over manipulation to the victims fall often opponents political their time, the At same risk. legal any running without procedures democratic violate to them allowing incumbents, favor independent purportedly other and commissions electoral judiciaries, over leverage political considerable exert officials state activities, illicit other and intimidation bribery, Through regimes. hybrid in field uneven the playing of dimension crucial third the for law stands I entities. media private the
.3. - owned, governing party has an easy task of establishing abs establishing of task easy an has party governing owned, Diverging party outcomes Along the resource disparities, incumbent privileged access to media media to access privileged incumbent disparities, resource the Along the the coverage, partisan their from benefit incumbents And while . them another important elementof important another sition movements opposition ,
legal bodies of significance. As a result, they systematic they As aresult, significance. of legal bodies n addition to resources and media, skewed access to the the to access skewed andmedia, resources to n addition
therefore ‘ therefore
15
field in hybrid regimes. In In regimes. hybrid in field playing uneven
’ battle uphill an face he existence of private private of he existence
( opposition is is opposition Howard and and Howard olute media media olute ibery, ibery, ally ally
of of
CEU eTD Collection l America, andpost l America, Centra Asia, in Africa, regimes authoritarian competitive of 35examples at Bylooking bereal. to proved instances many in regimes hybrid in competition political unfair, indisputably Albeit think. normally 1990 and2008. Way and Levitsky one, than to anticipate harder ismuch games such of score final the showthat decades two the last of course Roessler, 15 At the same time, ten regimes, most of wh collapse. their followed it others in whereas governments, authoritarian by overseen during the observed the during
sevenplayers’ (1995: 131). heights and breadths and where one teamincluded eleven players plus the umpire and the othera mere six or goalpos match the where ‘soccer process resembled the electoral that wrote Castaneda incumbent Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was privileged in access to media and resources, Jorge
In In famous thehis to reference 1994 Mexic Table Table As shown in Table As shownin ) (2010 andWay Levitsky Source: 2006: 370). 2006: 2 . Competitive authoritarian regime t regime authoritarian Competitive .
(2010)
period. In a few cases, the process of democratization was was democratization of process the cases, afew In period. 15
Nonetheless, different trajectories of hybrid regimes in the in the regimes hybrid of trajectories different Nonetheless,
2
thus identify three distinct paths they followed between between followed they paths distinct three identify thus , a
s regime of these number considerable
keeping in mind the uneven playing field, would would field, playing uneven the mind in keeping an general election, intended to emphasize the extent to which the
16 ich African, experienced one or more more or one experienced African, ich rajectories 1990- - communist Europe, Europe, communist ts were of different werets of 2008 democratized democratized
CEU eTD Collection West, WesternWest, democracy economic development, splits between hard- elements which, elements coercive forces, i.e. forces, coercive regime’s the among anddivisions fraud; electoral protest to demonstrators more or thousands of tens mobilizing of capable opposition apolitical vote; falsified the about resul voting that point the home drive to quickly anability opposition; organized and aunited incumbent; asemi countries: democratic of cases Ukrainian and Serbian, Georgian, onthe concentrated primarily instance, for Thus, . variance this determined econom regime’s contingency, historic such leadership, as of factors, variety dizzying a highlighted They decades. two last of the course in the 2005) andWay, (Levitsky (I terms presidential/parliamentary consecutive three at least for power hand- or their incumbents authoritarian establishment, their Following period. this throughout stable onremained focus andWay Levitsky sam the Finally, democratic. not were governments formed subsequently decades, two last in the once least at overthrown were incumbents E democratize. to failed still but changes transition 16 factors brought to light by the recent literature on hybrid regime ‘ regime onhybrid literature the by recent light to brought factors (political and communal) and (political Western – notion (2010) Way’s and Levitsky
McFaul also identifies several ‘unessential factors’ in this regard, including: the state of state ec the including: this in regard, factors’ several ‘unessential identifies also McFaul ‘diverging fates’ fates’ ‘diverging of their causes the to identify tried scholars of A number ic performance, and opposition strength and strategy, which supposedly which supposedly andstrategy, strength andopposition performance, ic democratizing
- non ousting for crucial were view, in his - autocratic rather than fully autocratic regime; an unpopular anunpopular regime; autocratic fully than rather autocratic -
assistance programs, the pivotal role of the opposition leader, etc. (Ibid: 15). ‘splits among guys with guns’ (2005: 6). (2005: guns’ with guys among ‘splits ts were falsified; enough independent media to inform citizens inform citizens to media independent enough falsified; were ts ce, influen
activity
.
incumbent ( incumbent
and softand -
three into grouped be crudely can 17 liners, the relationship between incumbents and the
breakthrough, breakthrough, state state and party) ven though their authoritarian authoritarian their though ven picked successors stayed in in stayed successors picked democratic leaders in these these in leaders democratic McFaul McFaul
e number of regimes regimes of e number power, 16 outcomes
These and These lists the following following the lists
bid and onomy, or level of or of onomy, level : 22). : categories: opposition opposition ’ –
to use use to
other other
CEU eTD Collection international or factor most often applied by the European Union (Schim the United States (McFaul, 2004; Peceny, 1999; Carothers, 1991, 1997, 1999), conditionality, and multilateral (Ethier, 2003; Gershman and Allen, 2006; Ottaway and Chung, 1999) direct democracy promotion, largely by linkage Americas Americas result anew in competitive authoritarian government (Ibid: 71). weak states,by par between Western influence and regimedemocratization as, in the absence of linkage, transitions characterized pressure during the last two decades (Ibid: 43). They warn, however, that one should not draw simple equality multilateraldominated is to understanding central institutions effectiveness the ofinternation theories (Lipset 1959 (Lipset theories - Western andpost in developing analyses took the international environment very seriously. very environment international the took analyses 1996) and Stepan thereby Western powers Western 19 18 17 of int sorts various for open increasingly worldwide regimes of arenas political domestic rendered 36), whichsystem only isthe democracy that consensus andthe ‘growing West, to the alternative matter (2010: 38). (2010: matter whether from change regime on debate the turned thus andWay, Levitsky say years, twenty last in the democratization
thus creatin thus reconsider the impact of the internati measured by measured environment. Building upon their 2005 work, Levitsky and Way argue that variation the Western in temporal dimensions ofthe aforementioned political transformati much less which can predictably cause their regimes to collapse’ (1986: 18). However, in view of the spatial and regime survived after regime survived 2004)
To answer the question, the authors bring togethera large number of mechanisms of international leverage, These included democracy- In his work with O’Donnell, Schmitter accordingly claims that it ‘seems fruitless to search for some for some search to it ‘seems fruitless that claims accordingly Schmitter O’Donnell, work with his In to the West, as the density of their ties to the United States, the European Union, and Western-
The collapse of the Soviet Union, as an ideological, military and economic andeconomic military anideological, as Union, the Soviet of The collapse -
raising the external cost of authoritarianism and creating incentives for elites elites for incentives creating and authoritarianism cost of external the raising where linkage is extensive - isextensive linkage where g ag concise theoretical framework based on the two dimensions ofthe post- style democracy ( style democracy
governments’ vulnerabilitytoexternal democratizing pressure, and, in particular, governments’
ties, and civil societies create numerous opportunities for incumbent abuse and are likely to to are likely and abuse incumbent for opportunities numerous create and civil societies ties, confers legitimacy upon a government’ (Gershman and Allen, 2006: 2006: andAllen, (Gershman uponagovernment’ legitimacy confers
context which can reliably compel authoritarian rulers to experiment with liberalization, liberalization, with experiment to rulers authoritarian compel reliably can which context 19 thus
. influence ernational political primarily structured around domestic variables, more recent recent more variables, domestic around structured primarily , a
whereas ll, 1973; Linz Linz 1973; ll, O’Donne 1966; Moore, 1963; Verba and Almond ;
by by Western programs governments internationalassistance and organizations urage and defend democracy, democracy, defend and urage enco to upefforts d steppe - communist countries to adopt the formal architecture of architecture formal the adopt to countries communist
y, y, andWa Levitsky onal context upon regime change’ in the regions characterized by medium and low levels medium low by and characterized thein regions
democratization was m
elfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Vachudova, 2005). international factors matter to how much 18
widespread 2010: 17). U 17). 2010: 17
on, later he it was that wrote ‘ And indeed, T
he United States and other andother States he United (1996: 27).
(not a single competitive a authoritarian(not
in Central Europe and the the inEuropeand Central nlike earlier related related nlike earlier Cold War international War Cold 18
of linkage al democratizing Widespread Widespread
leverage -
time to such as they they , CEU eTD Collection the topic, see: Beissinger (2007), Georgia (2003); Georgia (1999 peasant and urban marginal backgrounds whose social mobility might otherwise have been quite limited’ from those especially society, the in individuals mobile and upwardly ambitious, able, most the of many jobs, and positions in government, ‘single parties can typically claim the loyalty (or at least acquiescence) of She ones. argues years) (nine military period, single instance - path stability. importance crucial of element second the as parties strong 2006; Haber, back, acentury half time, post on work 2005 Way’s outcomes 22 21 20 ofout 25 competitive authoritarian regimes survived) sub Asia, East ( non- in sustaining role its enlightens thus Way’s and Levitsky democratization, strengthfor the state of significance accentuating 2002) Carothers, 1996; andStepan, Linz 1999; 1993, (O’Donnell, analyses ( elections steal) (or andwin on protests, down capacity their enhancing by challenges opposition surviving of odds incumbents’ increase organizations party and state Effective strength. party incumbent and capacity coercive state stability: authoritarian competitive for critical elements
Geddes, 1999; Geddes,
the term to relates The In her seminal piece on democratic transitions, Barbara Geddes shows that, in the post Political scientists have long for advocated the See, importance stability. of party organizatio political for ns : 134). breaking 2008 study 2008 breaking mainly pursuing the existing line of argument which, stretching back more than than more back stretching which, argument line of existing the pursuing mainly : Another
Duverger 22
- co defection, elite prevent to
- relates to their incumbents their to relates
- Buildin party regimes lasted, on average, c average, on regimes lasted, party Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet Union -
Ukrai
( Brownlee, 2007; Brownlee, 1954 rid regime regime rid diverging the hyb of determinant acknowledged widely g upon her work, Beatriz Magaloni
nian ‘Orange’ Rev Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; al. et deMesquita Bueno ),
following Huntington 21
tly been articulated by a number of scholars of anumber by beenarticulated tly recen has Bunce andWolchik (2006), Fairbanks(2009),
- of the color revolutions, color the of
Cold War transition in the former Soviet Union and his and his Union Soviet former in the transition War Cold set of
( that, through control over the allocation ofeducational opportunities, 1968 olution (2004);
events: ‘Bulldoz Hale, 2008; Hale, ) , Sartori ’ power capacit ’ power onsiderably longer (23 years) than personalist (15years) and opt or repress opponents, defuse or crack crack or defuse opponents, repress or opt
( ( 19 1976)
Levitskyand Way, and Kyrgyz ‘Tulip’ Revolution a year later. For more on
er’ Revolution in Serbia (2000);
. writes that writes
Magaloni,
the patternthe is strikingly diffe democratic governance. democratic : 56). 2010: 20
ies
Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; Przeworski, and Gandhi
Levitsky and Way and Levitsky
. 2005: 32). ‘autocratic political parties the play
In this regard, this In 2006,
Tucker(2009) (2007) , Way Contrary to many recent recent many to Contrary
2008) for authoritarian authoritarian for rent
‘Ros - Second World War , , they argue, they ,
building upon building
they
(as as many ten At the same theAt same e’ Revolution in set out tw out set
identify identify .
o
CEU eTD Collection conflict during the period of regime formation (2007: 37). future effectively control access to political positions the and on that fact the party can be expected tolas informal) for the specific goal of (despite regional, ethnic, and ideological differences) or form own parties interests and or submitting by toacharismatic had all been in serious trouble for years, their leaders managed to hold on to power (2009b: 102). commitment’, arguing that ‘t possible, increasing the longevity of dictatorships’ (2008: 24). Similarly, Howard and Roessler regard Roessler and Howard Similarly, incumbent power, power, incumbent be explain the to m 1995), 24 23 functional role ofmaking intertemporal power 72). (I activists’ democratic local and regional, Western, of network transnational a by transferred and applied, wasfashioned, that elections winning for strategies of elements Highlighting s regime : 71 (2009a anddisunited’ demobilized are citizens and and disputatious, isdivided opposition the alsobecause but weaknesses, hide to ability andtheir capacity structural their of ‘competitive the lies
international election moni and pressuring regimes to improve the quality and transparency of electoral procedures through domestic and throughout the country; making extensive use ofrallies, rock concerts, street theater, and alternative media; registration and turnout drives; forming a united opposition, linked to NGOs, that campaigns am
For this reason, they posit that In this context, Bunce and Wolchik mention the following activities: orchestrating large recognized
24 between structural between ’ contribution important most
(Ibid: 2). For Bunce and Wolchik, t Wolchik, and Bunce For literature the of much Finally, concentrates on the strength, cohesion, and strategies of opposition forces. opposition of andstrategies cohesion, strength, onthe concentrates ass protests (Tucker, 2007), (Tucker, protests ass ( opposition strategic coalition and widespread publ widespread and coalition strategic opposition
- -
2). t just because because just not in power staying at effective are regimes authoritarian According to Brownlee, this largely depends on the party elites’ success in resolving their core t he factors such as such he factors process of process as 23
crucial for regime survival. regime for crucial they Therefore, toring and parallel vote tabulation (Ibid). he credibility of the power
- so propose (incumbent
winning winning undermining
even thoughtheBulgarian, Serbia
the ability ofopp adjacent an election (2006: 371) 371) (2006: an election he diffusion of these opposition techniques is techniques opposition these of diffusion he
organized labor (Bellin, 200 (Bellin, labor organized - called called related) , arguing that arguing , theirbetter understanding to
- sharing deals between the dictator and his ruling coalition coalition ruling his and dictator the between deals sharing and regime on the
the to 20 electoral model electoral insurgency (Wood, 2000) (Wood, insurgency - osition elites tocome together –
sharing deal factors and electoral change in the post in the change electoral and factors
Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchi Sharon and Bunce Valerie
stability post
– leader,by but elaborated previously ing
- as as crucial regime for change. Cold War development of development Cold War She therebyaccentuates ‘the problem of n, Georgian, Ukrainian, and Kyrgyz regimes
a strategic coalition (whether formal or cruciallydepends the on party’s abilityto
. In that sense,two that In . within’ ‘from
which ic mobilization ic support 0), civil society (Fish, (Fish, society civil 0),
‘involves specific set set ‘involves specific ing , scholars sought sought scholars ,
not bygivingtheirup
a single candidate
elem
- ) scale voter
came to to came
ent of of ent k bitiously bitiously hybrid hybrid t in the the t in
gave what what bid - : -
CEU eTD Collection the usethe of non 6) mobiliz massive and monitoring; electoral opposition established in part through foreign prodding; 5) external diplomatic pressure and unusually large order 3) the organization of radical youth movements using unconventional protest tactics prior to the election in against pseudo 12). victory of Viktor Yushchenko over Viktor Yanukovych in the Ukrainian presidential contest of late 2004’ (2006: Shevardnadze. Finally, Serbs and Georgians, along with Slovaks, Poles, Czechs and contributed tothe eventual in 2000. Graduates of Serbian elections in 2000 assisted the Georgians in their 2003 showdown with Eduard remarkable Slovaks drew help from Bulgarians and Romanians, who had themselves been influenced by Serbia’s one of the key determinants of development of t development of the determinants key one of as to be acknowledged came thus above, outlined as , organization party argument, theoreti broader a with line In (2010:61). institutions’ democratic through power and exercise retain must incumbents gimes, re authoritarian other unlike ’because, dynamics political their for important particularly are parties strong Way, noted As scholars. interested the of focus analytical the into came of source basic the as competition electoral multiparty regularlyorganized in particular, and, these regimes of edifice democratic the Given attention. academic considerable generated expected, incr asharp by 1 261). (2007: movements local by social andemulated NGO’s an produced has revolution democratic successful each way that a in phenomenon’ a ‘modular wave. interrelated single a of parts 9 (200 (Ibid). Europe communist 26 25 recent anutshell, In
.4. Theoreticaldiscussion Beissinger Beissinger The diffusion effects across region the are summarized by Bunce and Wolchik
to undermine the regime’s popularity and will to repress and prepare for a final showdown; 4) a united a )
claims that r the protests in 1996 and 1997; Slovak activists in turn helped their Croatian and Serbian counterparts lists its six major elements: 1) the use of stolen elections as as the elections stolen of use the 1) elements: major six its lists - violent resistance tactics (Ibid). - democratic regimes; 2) foreign support for development the oflocal democratic movements; experience that has been consciously borrowed by others, by borrowed consciously been has that experience ease in number in ease as to a great extent to has agreat development al political glob evolutions that took place in place took that evolutions 25
Following the line of their of line the Following
ation uponation the announcement of fraudulent electoral results and
of hybrid regimes. Such political dynamics, as as dynamics, political Such regimes. hybrid of
their political legitimacy, political parties naturally naturally parties political legitimacy, political their T hese events hese
21 hese regimes. hese , he argues, he , the post the
argument, Mark Beissinger Mark argument,
occasion for massive mobilization mobilization for massive occasion
-
communist states were were states communist represent examples of of examples represent in the following way: in following the by Levitsky and and Levitsky by
been 26
spread by by spread marked marked
‘The cal cal
CEU eTD Collection experiencing suc experiencing without regime hybrid of end the saw period this during democratized have in parties dominant the about unclear remains much particular, In answers. satisfying lack still regimes turnover in power. turnover with linked causally arule, as was, collapse regime decades, two last the in imes reg hybrid from transition democratic undergone have that countries the in Namely, thought most the t
heir ‘most important non- important ‘most heir
Nonetheless, many important questions concerning political parties in hybrid in hybrid parties political questions concerning important many Nonetheless, conceptually problematic beconceptually to found and regime democratic stable the following of establishment the witness did not these countries that argues thesis case of hybrid regimedemocratizers hybrid of S F 3. Table
ource: Author’slist ource: T he Nicaragua
from this category this from Dominican Montenegro* Macedonia Nicaragua Romania Slovakia Guyana Country Taiwan Croatia Mexico Ghana Serbia Benin Peru h political change h political - ates of r of ates provoking puzzle relat puzzle provoking
However, indicated years
Ora by labeled regimes, such
(
Republic
the reason why the
uling democratic institutions’ (2012: 3). In this regard, perhaps regard, In 3). this (2012: institutions’ democratic
based on the previously outlined Levitsky andWay’s list Levitsky outlined previously onthe based
Table 3, in Table demonstrated as
; The cases of Mali and Ukraine are left out left are andUkraine Mali of Thecases ;
parties in democratized hybrid r hybrid democratized in parties (se
. D
emocratic change emocratic , table in the e
; * the last the
es to diverging political fates political toes diverging they are listed above) listed are they Montenegro isaddedt Montenegro 22 1996 1998 2000 1996 2000 1990 1998 2000 2008 1992 1996 1998 2000 1992
(see (see
chapter
Ibid) founded in
Reuter and Rostislav Turovsky Turovsky andRostislav Reuter year
) ;
regime was regime such Although
a number of countries that that countries of a number Benin, Benin, , Turnover power in are cases these list as another another as list o the egimes
Ghana, Guyana, Ghana, of those parties. those parties. of Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
as this this as
also
a ,
CEU eTD Collection phenomenon. phenomenon. political this particular for interest academic of lack the behind reasons the highlight in outcomes party diverging of the determinants neglected. been largely have parties theirruling those of studied, thoroughly above, elaborated as are, period Cold War
And
while different developmental trajector developmental different while
The next thesis chapter seeks to explain the the explain to seeks chapter The next thesis 23 democrat ies of hybrid regimes in the post the in regimes hybrid ies of ized
hybrid regimes and regimes hybrid to to - CEU eTD Collection 2 decade, have been preceded by an authoritarianism, a traditional regime (possibly (possibly regime atraditional anauthoritarianism, by preceded been have decade, uns or stable bethey persistent, been have that sets ‘institutional as Leonardo date, to offered definitions comprehensive most the In oneof 366). 2006: andRoessler, (Howard chosen’ are leaders determ that andprocedures rules ‘the represent foremost confusion. conceptual from precisely arises politicalphenomenon this of neglect academic aforementioned the much of as s observation such mind in bearing of importance the about strongly speaks regimes in hybrid outcomes party diverging the about knowledge of Thelack 7). (2002: generation data of process entire the affects decisions’, all subsequent for anchor ‘the which provides concept, the meaning of the of specification that note Verkuilen MunckandJay Gerardo point, the to More 529). (2001: validity’ measurements of discussion meaningful for prerequisite politica in task isafundamental concepts of refinement and clarification ‘the that argue Collier David and Adcock Robert asimilar tone, In 83). (1998: contested’ and beconfusing will phe on the agree we cannot if analysis: causal the for problem straightforward a pose concepts defined ambiguously or ‘poorly that writes Levitsky science, political in research the for conceptualization appropriate of importance emphasize to the anattempt In 2
.1. Current understanding . DOMINANT PARTIES IN HYBRID REGIMES 2 Namely, just as any other form of political regime, hybrid regimes first and first hybrid regimes regime, political of form any as other just Namely, .1.1. The.1.1. c nomena we are studying, then arguments about their causes and effects effects and causes their about arguments then studying, are we nomena l science, and carefully developed concepts are, in turn, a major amajor in turn, are, concepts developed andcarefully l science, hallenges of conceptualization
24 Morlino thus characterizes them them characterizes thus Morlino ine how national, executive executive ine how national,
table, for about a a about for table, CEU eTD Collection incumbent turnover in Albania took place after the June 2013 parliamentary election, won by a Socialist June 2001 parliamentary election. In July 2005, however, the Democratic Party returned to power. The last parliamentary election. Five years later, the Democrats lost tothe Socialist Party which triumphed agai coalition. more than one party; and dif parties during the last decades. last two the during parties 1404). 2009: andMitchell, ills’ (Kalandadze their to soluti than rather regimes, hybrid andauthoritarian of problems the of ‘symptoms be to proved often thus revolutions Electoral it. hadinstitutionalized who those of office from removal the notwithstanding persisted practice political democratic non- antly predomin the aresult, As adversaries. political their as manner same in the ruling andcontinued mechanisms power the over took simply challengers opposition triumph, electoral an following cases, these In analyses. such underlying obvious make in power least one turnover at of face the two. the between difference analytical a necessary p in parties with equated simply are compete actors political rules which by of systems specific 282). (2009: democracy minimal of aspects four the oneof least at of absence the but participation, break the by characterized andare democracy or aminimal even characteristics), colonial with 28 27 And 88). 2013: (Dolenec, democratization’ further and law of rule the of strengthening the to inimical rule authoritarian ‘perpetuated instead but credentials had democratic Socialists, the and Democrats the parties, major e two th of neither that out turned it
The opposition Democratic Party of Albania s Morlino here Morlino refers to: universal suffrage, male female; and free, recurrent, competitive, elections; fair and In Albania, for instance, hybrid regime survived several changes of incumbent incumbent of changes several survived regime hybrid instance, for Albania, In post the from examples Numerous
- ower. In other words, scholars of democratization, in general, do not make make not do general, in democratization, of scholars words, other In ower. up of limited pluralism and forms of independent, autonomous independent, of forms and pluralism limited up of ferent sources. and media alternative 27
However, in most of the related works, hybrid regimes as as regimes hybrid works, related the of in most However,
28 cored a landslide victory (62.3 per cent
Following an Following 25 - Cold War period of the regime survival in in survival regime the of period Cold War
introduction of political pluralism, pluralism, political of introduction
the conceptual fallacy fallacy conceptual the
of the vote)of the in 1992the n in the ons ons - led led
CEU eTD Collection and incomplete (report available at: which made outlets, media the implementationowned of OSCE and Council of Europe commitments uneven resources, the intimidation of public employees and opposition the activistsand biased coverage by privately unanimously elected president, elected unanimously Saakashvili, Mikheil that ar cle became soon it corruption, anti of field in the in particular achievements, reform important Notwithstanding Rose Revol 124). (Ibid: authoritarian’ but competitive still democratic, ‘nearly was Albania 2008, in even reasons, same the For 122). 2010: y, andWa (Levitsky party’ governing the of onbehalf deployed and politicized were authorities andelectoral courts, media, andstate arrested or attacked occasionally were activists opposition media; non- remained country the but declined abuse power of Thelevel game. political rules of the alter andauthoritarian’, dictatorial ‘increasingly res rule former’s the while 32 31 30 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/albania/087- 29 in 2008. elections presidential clean organize to failure government’s new the by confirmed strongly This was existin the of framework the within work to easier it found Saakashvili circumstances, these Under 1049). 2009: Orenstein, and (Kalandadze Saakashvili to opposition viable no with Revolution, the after uncontested remained arena political Georgian asserted that ’Georgia is not an electoral democracy’. anelectoral ’Georgia isnot that asserted House Freedom report,
Available at: at: Available In the election held on 4 January 2004, Saakashvili got 96 per cent The OSCE As noted by an Inter g political system than to attempt to change it wholesale (Hale, 2006: 313). 313). 2006: (Hale, wholesale it change to to attempt than system g political At the same time, initially praised as a democratic breakthrough, the 2003 2003 the breakthrough, democratic a as praised initially time, same the At /ODIHR http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom ution failed to bring about bring to failed ution s ‘the Socialist government used libel suits to bully the bully the to suits libel used government Socialist ‘the as democratic
monitoring mission thereby identified a number of problems, including problems, of number a identified thereby mission monitoring ulting from the 1992 electoral victory was characterized as as wascharacterized victory 1992electoral the from ulting
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/30959?download=true national CrisisGroup 2000 country report (available at: 31 30
Accordingly, in the 2009 Freedom in the World World in the Freedom 2009 in the Accordingly, nda. The The nda. age democratizing aclear have did not 26
29 substanti
the opposition triumph in 1997 did not not in 1997did triumph the opposition - world/2009/georgia#.
of the vote.of the al regime change in Georgia. Georgia. in change regime al albania- state
- of-
UtVjrrQx7OM the the the - na
tion.aspx the abuse of state state of abuse the new, almost almost new, .
32 ). ).
). ).
- CEU eTD Collection reso desertedleaders the PS and opportunistically moved the PDSinto Coupled fold. with greater numbers supporters.opportunities for his Significant or tomaximizevoters’ the wishes of representativemore tobe ofthe te]presidential designed candida install asystem could power tomodify theelectoral system, Wade[thePDS’s Secretary and General the 2000 (Creev the systemhighly inequitable PDS suddenly had attacked the attractive’previously seem signal of genuine democratic change in this country. For more, see: Kelly (2012). alternation in power led to any democratic changes in Senegal, it was actually to the worse (Wahman, 2010: 9). substantially following the takeover of power: of takeover the following substantially calc political The party’s democratic. so benot to out turned (PDS) Party Democratic Senegalese ledthe by new government democratic supposedly Yet, election. presidential 2000 the lost independence, 1960 the since country the ruled hadundemocratically t (PS) tha Party Socialist the them, of one mention post the outside found are dynamics 34 33 inner their about unclear remains much regimes hybrid in parties ruling on studies asemi remains arguably transition. ademocratic experience did not Senegal turnover, 2000electoral despite the Therefore, 9). 2012: (Wahman, liberties civil in improvements of signs clear no were there and advantages
In fact, in view in fact, In resultant ofthe increased level ofpersonalism, political many analysts that, if concluded the Some authors urces urces now available for thePDS, e Similar examples of regime continuity undisrupted by changing political changingpolitical by undisrupted continuity regime of examples Similar Reuter and Turkovsky write that, in spite of an increasing number of important important of number an increasing of in spite that, write Turkovsky and Reuter electoral increase to steps took further government the following period, the In theincluding andwithby ofthepresidency torule theright control ‘Once in decree, y 2005:487). etal, argue that the last presidential election, organized successfully in February 2012, might be a - authoritarian state’ (2003: 91). (2003: state’ authoritarian
including thefull weight ofthe presidency 33
- communist political sphere. In Senegal, to to Senegal, In sphere. political communist Instead, Ottaway notes, it ‘hasbeen it notes, and Ottaway Instead, 27
34
ulation changed changed ulation
this made
CEU eTD Collection opposition politicalopposition force, S Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Taiwan, and Ukraine. different political fates of the ruling parties in hybrid regimes. regimes. in hybrid parties ruling the of fates political different that shows chapter this of section the first step toward between differentiation tual concep aclear that confirm strongly above mentioned ses The ca 2). (2012: workings 36 35 democratization, experienced recently 15that counted thus Way and Levitsky countries, of 35observed Out the period. in this hybrid regimes from transition democratic underwent world the throughout countries of number significant a said, Aspreviously regimes. these in parties dominant of fates diverging the last in the fates diverging w conceptualization, the erroneous to Conforming political practices which included disrespect for the rule of law, favoritism, corruption, corruption, favoritism, law, the of rule for disrespect included which practices political party came first by tight margin, the Eventhough transition. democratic country’s the of process in the juncture critical the represents election 1998parliamentary the in (HZDS) Slovakia Democratic i would be usually party, incumbent an of serving interests hitherto politicalgame rules of the of alteration substantial a as democratization, of process the words, other In power. in turnover with linked causally arule, as was, collapse regime untries, co In these 21). (2010: field playing andalevel civil liberties, of protection broad elections, free of and fair establishment
The HZDS won 27 per Those are: Benin, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guyana, Macedonia, Mali 2 In Slovakia, for instance, the defeat of Vladimir Meciar’s Movement for for Movement Meciar’s Vladimir of defeat the instance, for Slovakia, In .1.2. Diverging party outcomes party Diverging .1.2.
cent vote ofthe and 43/ lovak Democratic Coalition a understanding better
two decades two
36
a majority of Slovaks voted against its authoritarian authoritarian its against voted Slovaks of a majority the nitiated by its electoral defeat. electoral its by nitiated
conditio sine qua non sinequa conditio a also is it
150 seats, against the 26.3 per cent and 42 seats of the main , scholars have generally paid little attention to to attention paid little generally have scholars , regimes andtheir regimes . 28
of the latter the of
hile studying hybrid regimes’ regimes’ hybrid studying hile
. At the same time, the next the next time, same the At . dominant parties dominant
, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru,
for explaining explaining for 35
sents sents repre
i.e. the the i.e. CEU eTD Collection cases managed to stay in office. Thus, they would initiate and, in large part, oversee oversee part, large in and, initiate would they Thus, in office. stay to managed cases in these parties incumbent regimecollapse, the by caused position political privileged cons democratized in the post in the democratized have that countries of anumber defeat, electoral incumbent with hand hand in undoubtedly qualified Mexico as an electoral Mexico as qualified undoubtedly which revelation’ ‘democratic the of moment wasthe words, in Schedler’s That, 160). 2010: and Way, (Levitsky office from 2000 its removal after only democratic’ ‘fully became country the 1990s, the of half cond se in the reforms political certain initiated had PRI the Although regime. hybrid Mexican the of end the marked defeat electoral the had‘dominated report, World in the 2003Freedom the by reported as which, (PRI) - decade seven the endof the marked – (2006) andRoessler Howard of 92). 2010: andWay, (Levitsky enforced’ were television public on coverage balanced dictating andlaws overturned, restri fair, and free were ‘elections period, following the In in Slovakia. democratization genuine of process the motion in andset government the coalition formed subsequently parties Four opposition 80). 1999: and Butorova, (Butora policy al nationalist andaconfrontation politics, with crime of intertwining the world/2003/mexico#.U0QOmqiSwlA 37 repression’. and corruption, patronage, optation,
The reportThe ava country by means of its corporatist, auth corporatist, its means by of country loss of the hyper the of loss the of Regardless change. political such experiencing equently On the other hand, while in most transition states the regime change went went change the regime states transition most while in hand, other the On Another thoroughly studied ‘liberalizing electoral outcome’ – outcome’ electoral ‘liberalizing studied thoroughly Another ilable at: at: ilable http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom - Cold War period saw the end of hybrid regime without without regime hybrid endof sawthe period War Cold
.
s to the 2000 Mexico’s general election. It election. general 2000Mexico’s tos the relate long rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party Party Revolutionary Institutional the of rule long 29 - co through maintained structure oritarian
democracy (2000: 5). (2000: democracy 37
At the same time, the party’s 2000 2000 party’s the time, same the At - ctive media laws were were laws ctive media
to use the notion notion the use to - CEU eTD Collection harassment, andthere private existed arobust media – independent anom judiciary, an and ofrights, presidentialpresident tenure, abill legislature, atwo limit to -term media environment and no serious media environment andnoserious incidents of violence or fraud’ (2010: 127-8). won was which by VMRO election,The 2009presidential round. improvedthesecond in Consequently, conditions international contingent alarge andencouraging totheregion police thatre elections -running byresponded were deemed or unfair fr violence and Albanianmanipulation in regions, the VMRO were crisis Although the2008parliamentary elections varietyviewpoints. of and well and write the following about this particular case: particular this about following the write House, of Freedom Based onanumber victory. 2006 electoral its to subsequent period in the place took democratization though even power remainedin DPMNE party VRMO ruling the instance, for Macedonia, In transition. democratic of process the http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/83666?download=true 38 in non- the changing reforms political elections, general 1992 in the triumph landslide their Following Rawlings. Jerry of (NDC) Congress Democratic National the by wassupervised democratization ss of proce the in Ghana, Similarly, aresult. as alter did not party ruling
In addition, the 2011 parliamentary election was deemed by the OSCE the 2012 Countries at the Crossroads report on Ghana: onGhana: report Crossroads the at Countries 2012 the ‘By 2008, Macedonia had democratized. There were few reported incidents on media had onmedia There incidents Macedonia democratized. were‘By few reported 2008, ‘ the though even country in this unfolded gradually thus change The regime A new constitution wasA new promulgated constitution 1993thatprovides in for apopularly elected OSCE/ - administrated throughout the country’ (report available at: ODIHR, a DPMNE candidate candidate Gjorge Ivanov,-DPMNE nd the U.S. Department of State reports, Levitsky and Way andWay Levitsky State of reports, Department U.S. nd the democratic regime character were implemented. Asnoted implemented. were character regime democratic
budsman, and a media commission, among other measures. among other andamedia measures. commission, budsman, 30
). ).
reach reach national with /ODIHR was characterized by was characterized anopen audulent, sending a massive
-DPMNE
as ‘competitive,transparent, -observer presence. led government government -led –
that reflected athat reflected -ridden dueto 38
- CEU eTD Collection under significant civil con civil under significant trol’. governance have under theFourth Republic steadily improved, come has andthemilitary exceptionally interesting yet largely understudied political phenomenon. phenomenon. political understudied largely yet interesting exceptionally this of explanation a potential offers chapter this of remainder the parties, dominant regime hybrid of oninstitutionalization Focusing regimes? in hybrid outcomes party diverging the of determinants the are what (2010), andWay Levitsky paraphrase notwiths dominant politically remained them of some exist, to ceased regimes when these power their lost regimes in hybrid regime institutions’. democratic consolidate to continued slowly seats. though even outcome the accepted now opposition the contested, heavily were results observers. international by fair and free judged significant deficitsWhile democraprotection remain, cy, of rights, 42 41 previouspoll’. See: each been seen by domestic observers and the international community as successive improvements over the 40 39
Available at: at: Available Rawlings won 57.4 per cent of the vote at: Available The NDI, forinstance, The NDI, reports ‘ that 41 were 1996, December in held in Ghana, elections general next the As aresult, one happen, it How did change inchange G
Rawlings was re was Rawlings In the following period, another Freedom House report said, ‘the country country ‘the said, report House Freedom another period, the following In http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries http://www.ndi.org/ghana hana did not bring about an immediate turnover in power. turnover animmediate about bring hana did not - elected the president and his party won a majority of won amajority his party and president the elected 39
successive democratic elections in 1996, 2000, 2004,2008 and 2012 have
may ask, that while most while that ask, may
and his National Democratic Congress got 53 per cent. .
31 tanding democratic changes? Or, to Or, changes? democratic tanding 40 -
- world/1998/ghana#.UtVm4rQx7OM crossroads/2012/ghana#.U0QP4aiSwlA Moreover, while the 1992 elections’ elections’ 1992 the while Moreover, 42
parties that had been ruling hadbeenruling that parties Thus, as in Macedonia, the the Macedonia, in as Thus, and the
quality of .
.
CEU eTD Collection consolidation process’ (Yardimci process’ consolidation the for requirements chief the oneof are parties, institutionalized words other e organizational astrong have and public the with relations stable form that parties political in thread that ’a have common studies All their democracies. established newly the of functioning for institutionalization parties’ of importance sustain governments (2011: 3). At the same time, these authors time, same the At 3). (2011: governments sustain and andform leaders; political socialize nominateand recruit, interests; aggregate and articulate andpractices; norms democratic to public the habituate politicians; t the rise of anti of rise the t preven actions; its for accountable government make they reasons: following the for new democracies to important are parties Ezrow, Natasha by Asnicelysummarized 2007). andWhite, McAllister 2002; and Svasand, Randall 1999; Mainwaring, 1994; Lewis, 1992; Dix, 1990; (Pridham, consolidation democratic of process the in parties political by played role key the acknowledge to 24). (1976: parties’ andby place ‘through takes democracy, of principles fundamental the oneof representation, Sartori, Giovanni of words In parties. political through is, that office, political for contenders among choosing by decisions major influence to population the of part possible largest the permits wh ich system a political b (1959 Lipset Seymour Likewise, ago. decades seven wrote (1942) Schattschneider ofElmer parties, the terms in save isunthinkable democracy constantl has democracy for parties political of The ’indispensability’ 2
.2. Solving the puzzle 2 democratization waveof third of the many students path, this Following .2.1. Party.2.1. institutionalization y reaffirmed in political science. in political reaffirmed y
- Geykci, 2013: 2). To be able to play the role in role playthe to Tobeable 2). 2013: Geykci, 32
Parties created democracy and modern modern and democracy created Parties
) defined democracy as democracy defined )
long been long
emphasize the the emphasize xistence, in in xistence, known and and known - came came party party
CEU eTD Collection institutionalization as, on the one hand, ’value infusion’, ’value onehand, onthe as, institutionalization party understands Levitsky lines, same Along the ambitiousleaders. of their interests the to subordinated not are that those are organizations political institutionalized that write Scully (1995) andTimothy Mainwaring Scott Similarly, 49). (1988: itself’ i solidifies’, organization the way ’the as institutionalization explains Panebianco Angelo democracies, in established onparties focusing Mainly 19). (1980: mind’ public in the institutionaliza the of perception public of importance the underlines works, relevant most the of some mention to Janda, Kenneth been made. have measurement times, in recent and, conceptualization its of attempts noteworthy of number a period, this ughout Thro Huntington. Samuel by notion the of 1968 introduction the after decades in the steadily grew institutionalization onparty literature of body ‘inst be to need parties political agree, scholars properly, democracy advancing 43 rence in interfe from freedom the party’s i.e. autonomy, decisional astructure; as party the constitute that interactions the of regularity and density scope, the to relates which systemness, institutionalization: party of elements basic four identify Svasand 79- (1998: entrenched become an organization within interaction social shape that game’ the of ’rules which by process isthe that routinization’, ’behavioral other, the on and, in hand’, task the of requirement technical beyond value with ’infused becomes an organization
The notion firs notion The itutionalized’ (Randall, 2006: 1). 2006: (Randall, itutionalized’ Thus, as a result of the increased academic interest in democratization, a a in democratization, interest academic the increased of result a as Thus, Lars andLars Randall Vicky findings, scholars’ well as other as these Summarizing .e. ’slowly loses its character as a tool and becomes valuable in and of and of in valuable becomes as and a tool character its ’slowly loses .e. t mentioned by Selznick (1957). tion process, arguing that an institutionalized party is one that is ’reified onethat is party aninstitutionalized that arguing process, tion 80). 80).
33 43
i.e. the process by which by process which i.e. the CEU eTD Collection Basedau and Alexander Stroh, various aspects of party institutionalization are are institutionalization party of aspects various Stroh, and Alexander Basedau Matthias to According 13). (Ibid: parties individual of onthat depends directly system a party of alization the institution that assumption beenthe has approaches these behind rationale Themain organizations. party individual level of the to measures system applied or parties, individual andnot systems party measured or rchangeably, inte two the used either they Consequently, system. party andthe parties individual between differentiation make aconceptual to failed thereby 3). (2013: treatment’ separate ire requ that phenomena different two as institutionalization system party reason, Yardımcı reason, that For 2). (2011: system aparty of context established the in function also must institutionalized, become to parties individual for sufficient not is it that out points Bertoa Fernando Similarly, themselves. parties constituent the with do directly out isthe explain, they institutionalization with that of party system institutionalization’ (Ibid: 6- (Ibid: institutionalization’ system party of that with institutionalization party of issue the elide to literature related in the tendency ‘an erroneous institu organization party the of scale the measuring for tool comprehensive a provide to failed still authors the the analysis, for framework sophisticated conceptually 13- (2002: imagination public the in existence party’s the of establishment of level the as described and reification, party; the to and commitment with anidentification acquire andsupporters actors which party to extent the to referring valueinfusion, strategies; and own policies its determining
tionalization. tionalization. Yet, most authors who did offer certain measurements of institutionalization institutionalization of measurements certain did offer who authors most Yet, On the other hand, Randall and Svasand made a very important remark about about remark important avery made Svasand and Randall hand, other the On - Geyikci writes, ’it is critical to approach party institutionalization and and institutionalization party approach to iscritical ’it writes, Geyikci
come of a range of developments of range a of come 34 14). And while thereby offering a a offering thereby And while 14).
only some of which have to to have which of only some - level institutionalization level institutionalization 8). Thelat 8).
for they they for ter, CEU eTD Collection and personal resources, and nationwide organizational presence (Basedau and Stroh, 2008: 12- impossible toimpossible without obtain -depth in research’ field (2008: 11). Information on asquantitative party datasuch identification or parties in trust require costly survey polls. in supportchanges electoral subjective of forparties, large (volatility), even numbers party (whereby ‘moderate relations as opposed to splits and heavy infighting work best for coherence’) (Ibid). the identification with it (Ibid). and groups (qualitative assessment), and popular appreciation of particular party, i.e. the level of popular in party leadership, changes in electoral support after such alte autonomy is measured by Basedau and Stroh with respect tothe following indicators: of number alternations 12- (2008: assessment) (qualitative society civil to of links strength the and elections, legislative recent two most party Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001 (excluding massive violations of party st party of massive violations (excluding from defections the parliamentary group during the legislativetolerance intraparty period, for dissidence organization and the society in acts in; acts in society andthe organization party ties the between of strength the to relating in society, roots elements: following conceptualization, they also propose afour alsopropose they conceptualization, avai not or obtain to difficult isoften data relevant the because primarily research empirical in neglected 47 46 45 44 strength; meas institutionalization party of model existing comprehensive most the probably forward put andStroh Basedau 6), (Ibid: separately’ them analyze to isimportant it and phenomena different remain from powerful individuals within or interest groups outside the party; the groups outside interest or within powerful individuals from
Building upon the work of Dix (1992), Mainwaring (1998), Kuenzi and Lambright (2001), and Basedau (2007), It Often referred to in the institutionalization literature (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mainwaring, 1998; Also mentioned b mentioned Also 13). authorsuse three indicators tomeasure level the of party’s coherence: prevalence offloor is measured by membership strength, regularity of party congr age relativeage toindependence, party age relative to multiparty period, volatility of electoral support the in ’While we have’While difficulty little capturing objective quantitative dataon party or ages At the same time, rig
46
and coherence, that is the party’s ability to act as a unified organization. actaunified as to ability isthe that party’s and coherence, features such as organizational strength or coherence will sometimes will be or organizational coherence strength as such features y a number of authors (Panebianco, 1988; Dix, 1992; Levitsky, 1998; Randall, 2006),
), thisparticular dimension Basedau and Stroh measure by the following indicators:
lable whatsoever lable htfully arguing that ’single parties and the party systems party and the parties ’single that arguing htfully atutes and principles), and relations between the factions within a urement. Using Randall and Svasand’s andSvasand’s Randall Using urement. 44 35
autonomy :
- dimensional model consisting of the of consisting model dimensional rnation(s), decisional autonomy from individuals esses’ organization, esses’ , i.e. the level of independence independence of level the i.e. ,
the 45
amount of material
organizational organizational 14). - crossing and/or
either 47
CEU eTD Collection apparent. apparent. – model measurement their of limitat certain regimes, in hybrid parties political of analysis the to comes it when beov cannot institutionalization party of study empirical and elaboration theoretical the gapbetween the bridge to made they contribution - sub of countries in nine parties political e fourth, 80 per 80per e fourth, cent th for cent 60per third, the for cent in the post fact, In long. too last did not chapter, A over time – time over elec in agiven parties political for vote total the of proportion the of enhancement whi Stabilization Party of Index Lewis’ 8- (2011: anorganization of measure important most the as scholars by regarded widely level the of indicator basic the as organization aparty age of average the uses author the latter, the to comes it When systemness. organizational and rootedness social institutionalization: party of dimensions basic two the of existence the implies 007), (2 White and Webb of work the with line in which, model measurement Bertoa’s for goes same The cases. in these alternations) leadership party (e.g. inapplicable often or age) party (e.g. institutionaliz of anumber Therefore, establishment. the after a decade within democratized
considerable number of hybrid regimes, as thoroughly elaborated in the previous previous in the elaborated thoroughly as regimes, hybrid of number considerable 2 u and Stroh use to analyze 28 28 analyze to use Stroh u and Baseda index, institutionalization created Thus .2.2. Party.2.2. institutionalization in hybrid regimes 10). At the same time, to measure rootedness in society, Bertoa employs employs Bertoa society, in rootedness measure to time, same the At 10).
by 20 per cent 20per by ation indicators mentioned by Basedau and Stroh are either irrelevant irrelevant either are Stroh and Basedau by mentioned indicators ation
of its systemness. Average party age, he argues, has been been has heargues, age, party Average systemness. its of
ppearance in the parliament, 40 per 40per parliament, in the appearance second aparty’s for
section following the in argued as ch, he explains, ’involves the progressive progressive the ’involves explains, he ch, Saharan Africa. The significance of general general of Thesignificance Africa. Saharan 36 - communist world, most of them
for the fifth, and so forth’ eremphasized. However, However, eremphasized.
–
become fully fully become ions tion tion CEU eTD Collection symbols; ra symbols; (1988: 179). leader is the national president, the organizational vitali post in citizenry the c) leadership; depoliticized to existing the challenges powerful emergence of potentially the small and state), member the they on rely (rather resources members financial for on not depend do parties because memberships small relatively to favor likely are b) exist; parties not preexisting party loyalties, since under aut forcedbe to appeal to a wide clientele of voters, largely because parties cannot count voters on having role by constituencies, in which a relatively unimportant role is played by the party membership, and the dominant organizationalparticular political forms this in context todevelop are ‘formations with electoral loose under better to obstacle major another represents category, relevant only analytically the as amount its andtake structure its ignore to tend students institutionalization impossi regimes hybrid in many institutionalization their of measurement the renders suggested, already as which, organizations party of existence longer rather presuppose thus, indicators, Both 9). (Ibid: 50 49 48 routiniz effective of absence the in and run, longer the in survival’, and cohesion party to stages initial at the ‘contribute may leadership personalistic such whereas Moreover, that, evidence empirical cr isabsolutely power their of structure the about knowledge the pluralism, political of tradition longer a without in countries parties political on research successful for mobiliza personal the than more ‘little as serve regularly systems democratic (formally)
I would like to thank Annelle Mendez for helping me with this formulation. formulation. this me with for helping Mendez toAnnelle thank like would I In his analysisIn ofparty organizations post in In this regard, focusing on political parties in the Third World countries, Randall notes that when the party ucial. - - all with intensively to identify unlikely are systems communist standing of party institutionalization in hybrid regimes. Namely, there is there Namely, regimes. hybrid in institutionalization party of standing party leaders’ (1995: 517). John Ishiyama explains this by the following reasons: a) parties are likely to Furthermore, the fact fact the that Furthermore, 50 ation, ‘it could seriously inhibit institutional development’ (Ibid). development’ institutional inhibit seriously could ‘it ation, tion instruments for ambitious politicians’ (Randall and Svasand, 2002: 19). 2002: Svasand, and (Randall politicians’ ambitious for instruments tion ther citizens are more likely to identify with strong personalities (2002: 273).
Nonetheless, scholars regularly fail to look inside it while analyzing the level level the analyzing while it inside look to fail regularly scholars Nonetheless,
regardless of their of regardless
horitarian rule such loyalties between party and individual simply did did simply individual and party between loyalties such rule horitarian
while focusing - communist Europe, Petr Kopec Petr Europe, communist 37
power capacity, power ty andty adaptability ofthe party are likely tosuffer organizationstrength party on ble.
encompassing ideologies and party ky thus notes the that most likely
parties in newly created in newly parties ship limits the probability of of probability the limits ship
49
Therefore, Therefore,
strong strong most 48
CEU eTD Collection allies within the government, in the legislature, and at the local or regional level (2010: 61 (2010: level regional or the and at local legislature, the in government, the within allies national territory and soc party strength: scope structure of their power. Building upon t subsequent changes in electoral sup (Ibid: electoral port’ in 13). changes subsequent andthe oftheparty thefounding any, in if changes since theleadership, number of get access to power rather thanemerging from them, may bebest throughcaptured the of the time seek merely to describe its surface. its describe to merely the seek time of most box, they black opening that of Instead parties. political of institutionalization of 51 Yardımcı him, Alike unit. measurement basic the as age party takes above, outlined as (2011), Bertoa institutionalization, party of dimensions is the is decisional autonomy their of significance the accentuates andthereby parties political Bertoa, 2007; andWhite, Webb 2005; Torcal, and Mainwaring 2002; Svasand, and Randall 1980; Janda, 1968; (Huntington, analysis institutionalization system party of context the in merely issue particular wi deal internal organization works onparty most Yet, institutionalization. party for main the preconditions oneof as individuals powerful from independence organizational out did point authors of a number same time, the At 4). (2013: resources financial and comprehensiveness territorial strength, membership indicators: following the to referring by operationalizes author the organization, party of strength the indicating Theformer, in society’. ’roots and development’ ’organizational of consisting tion, institutionaliza party of model dimensional
Even those authorsEven interested particularly in
one by Thus, for instance, albei instance, for Thus, ’The independence’The fromMen, Big
2011). In fact, the only study that focuses entirely on institutionalization of of oninstitutionalization entirely focuses that onlystudy the fact, In 2011).
Basedau and Stroh (2008). In their words: In their (2008). andStroh Basedau , referring to the size of a party’s infrastructure (i.e. degree to which it penetrates the penetrates it the to (i.e.which infrastructure degree party’s a the of size to referring , iety), and cohesion
t mentioning internal organization as one of the two two the of one as organization internal mentioning t heir work, Levitsky and Way thus
, , proving incumbents’ ability tosecure the cooperation of partisan Mainwaring, 1998; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; 2001; Lambright, and Kuenzi 1998; Mainwaring,
hybrid regime who might create partiescreate who electoralmight as vehicles to 38 51
po
parties litical
use two variables tooperationalize tend not to not attentiontend pay - Geyikci two uses - 64).
th this this th to the to the - CEU eTD Collection parsimonious model of party institutionalization. institutionalization. party of model parsimonious anew, forward puts next chapter the regimes, in hybrid parties political dominant of outcomes diverging the aim explaining the of andwith that of light In offered. be to yet are sort that of rations conside applicable widely however, moment, this At 16). (2002: transition democratic of circumstances the by isaffected process this how consider to we needfinally suggest, Svasand and Randall institutionalization, context. political specific within this institutionalization party of analysis the in unusable basically but 22), (Ibid: literature pertinent the in underdeveloped only not remains institutionalization party political of measurement for operationalization practical Thus, regimes. hybrid in parties political of onthe institutionalization research of purposes the serve cannot propose the first section of this chapter show that incumbent party survival in power is not isnot survival in power party incumbent show that chapter this section of first the in outlined examples anumerous same time, the At last. regimeto the for triumphs electoral of continuity ensure to needs party ruling the opposition, democratic by challenged if terms, simple In power. in survival party‘s incumbent on depends i that argues This thesis the existence of a viable democratic (anti democratic aviable of existence the of case in chapter, preceding in the explained As institutionalized. be to needs party incumbent its regime, hybrid the of collapse of face in the in office stay to be able to that, with line In leader’s. its of irrespective influence political acquires organization party agiven which through process to the relates primarily institutionalization
2 If the discussion so far has helped t helped has far so discussion the If here they measurement the however, above, mentioned reasons the For 3. The model The 3. .2. n the context of recent of context n the
39 - system) alternative, survival regime hybrid o clarify meaning and criteria of party party of criteria and meaning o clarify ly pluralized political systems political pluralized ly
party party CEU eTD Collection prevails institutionalized. institutionalized. be to i.e. autonomy, decisional of amount asufficient have to needs party the fate, regime the notwithstanding in power stay to isto beable that this, To avoid e th leader, its by monopolized regime withinthe authority the as political differently, Put leader. its of destiny political share to likely is organized thus party incumbent an change, regime of amoment at Hence, in charge. onthose dependence political determined structurally their upon contingent development political their of course the makes this time, same the At appeal. political personal leaders’ of their strength onthe predominantly 27). 1999: (Mainwaring, coterie asmall of or leader instrument personal isthe aparty as long as limited reason, identi concentrated gets When institutionalization. its des preclu effectively chapters, following party incumbent withinagiven authority political of party. Thepersonalization the within asingle individual of hands in the concentrated usually is power the showthat systems political pluralized recently of examples vested be to needs power political be possible, Forto that reforms. democratic initiating by competition political of content the alter own power. onits predominantly depends case the be will this whether And collapse. regime of face in the ruling may continue party the say, isto That survival. uponregime contingent necessarily
ties’ political competition with the opposition, these parties rely rely parties these opposition, the with competition in political Accordingly, to needs first party the in office, change regime the survive to order in Namely, ,
making it more difficult for parties to de to parties for difficult more it making (Ishiyama,
in the hands of a of hands the in 2002: 279). 2002:
party is likely to lose power as the regime collapses. collapses. regime the as losepower to likely is party
The institutionalization of political parties is, for this for is, parties political of The institutionalization e individual singl 40 in the incumbent party. Yet, many Yet, party. incumbent the in , as thoroughly elaborated in the in the elaborated as, thoroughly ve lop coherent programs and and programs lop coherent
‘the politics politics ‘the of personality personality of the authority authority is is CEU eTD Collection a regimes, hybrid In 21). (1988: consequences’ organizational what with and modified get relations power how isreproduced, how it distributed, is organization within the how power structure: power its investigate first we must order organizational party’s a examine to order ‘in Panebianco, by As out pointed operates. wayit the about - waydecision the general, In organization. aparty in personalization power of level the shows It ranks. party ( institutionalization party of model t decades, two last in the fates diverging their of explanation apotential offer to in particular, and, regimes hybrid in parties political on literature current the of confines the beyond venture to ambition regimes democratic s power the of neglect analytical the of a result is explained, previously as This, research. such for tool valuabl of anumber as well as richness theoretical and conceptual the despite however, works, aforementioned In the institutionalization. their lookat primarily oneshould parties, dominant regime
institutionalization of ruling parties – parties ruling of institutionalization of) lack (the above, elaborated s The internal dimension of the model relates to the composition of power within power of composition the to relates model the of dimension The internal ______(Affectional) External (Organizational) Internal hybrid of fates diverging the behind reasons the mprehend co to Therefore, Dimensions Dimensions ______Party 4. Table
represents the k the represents
i nstitutionalization which parties these of tructure making power is structured within a political party tells a lot lot tells a party apolitical within structured is power making
e measurement models, we cannot find an appropriate anappropriate find we cannot models, e measurement
Indicators Popular perception of party organization of party perception Popular (De - two asimple proposes his research Table - ey for understanding their functioning. With an With functioning. their understanding for ey )
personalization of power in party organization in party power of personalization 4 41 ). m
odel
in newly establis newly in
critical their for hed formally formally hed dimensional dimensional
CEU eTD Collection electoral electoral the words, other In 21). 1996: (Ihonvbere, characteristics’ leaders’ on their fixation ‘pathological ensuing the by isdetermined electorate the with communication 293). For this reason, the content of - of content the reason, this For 293). (A programs’ party with organizations party real than leaders party around like entourages ‘more often mentioned, previously as are, these parties time, the At same parties. ruling their of performances electoral by conditioned is usually survival as their regimes hybrid of dynamics political the overall for important is This 23). 2002: Svasand, and (Randall actors’ political of behavior the shaping ‘a factor as imagination public in the established becomes aparty which to extent the shows it literature, g existin the upon Building organization. party of perception popular makeup. organs’ of changes these andsignificant constant s will heads party personalization, power of in cases isthat here Theargument bodies. central and leadership party should possible, if assessment, thr collected data the to addition In organization. party given a within personalization power of level the assess wayto analternative identify to we need institutionalization, party measuring indicators aforementioned the of cases in these inapplicability resultant and the its power. of amount the at than rather structure organizational its of inside look oneshould development, political its of course the about there and purpose political given a party’s comprehend to reason, that For – power in survival
The external dimension of the party institutionalization model refers to the to refers model institutionalization party the of dimension The external hybrid regimes most of lifetime short relatively the considering regard, this In
is determined by the distribution of power within their structures. structures. their within power of distribution the by determined is - much ough the also be based on the analysis of the composition of of composition the of analysis onthe bebased also eek to ensure obedience to their authority through through authority their to obedience ensure to eek needed in- needed 42
and the success in - success and the depth qualitative research, t research, qualitative depth
mundsen, 1997: 1997: mundsen,
their political political their from infer he CEU eTD Collection candidate(s). In both cases, opinion polls data polls opinion both cases, In candidate(s). presidential its of those to becompared should results electoral a party’s elections, in legislative partake to likely is leader aparty in which of governance, systems effici most the like seems period time observed in an results electoral party’s his and his of juxtaposition the presidency, for run to expected is leader party in a which systems, political presidential personalization? power of level the of in terms differ regimes in hybrid parties placedodominant first explains what in particular, And, not. did ers oth the while institutionalize to manage parties agai it measure awayto find then, theirtop. at those of appeal personal of strength political on the arule as depends regimes in hybrid parties ruling of result (such as nation’s history, language, symbols, culture) in pursuit of collective collective inof pursuit culture) symbols, language, history, nation’s as (such identity national of feature some around organize groups which by process the as defined bebroadly could (1983), Olzak Susan paraphrase to mobilization, Nationalist ). institutionalization ( perceived publicly is organization wayits andthe structured ( regime hybrid of collapse leader. its and aparty of perception public the on information of source a complementary
2 To assess real political ‘weight’ of a hybrid regime dominant party, one should, oneshould, party, dominant regime ahybrid of ‘weight’ political real To assess To summarize the argument, whether the ruling party will survive in power the the in power survive will party ruling the whether argument, the To summarize .2.3.1. Nationalist mob
the diverging patterns of their power organization. Put differently, why in the whyin the differently, Put organization. power of their patterns diverging
Having said that, the question remains why did some of theseof did some why question remains the that, said Having par ) depends on the way its power is internally isinternally power wayits the on depends ) outcome ty ilization nst the political ‘weight’ of its leader. In (semi leader. its of ‘weight’ political the nst
ent method of analysis. In parliamentary parliamentary In analysis. of method ent 43
,
if possible to obtain, possibleto if
should
serve as serve political political party party - ) CEU eTD Collection the most desirable and politically practical ways to maximize their own power and the rights, representation, representation, rights, the and power own their maximize to ways practical politically and desirable most the independent state creation. Their objectives, as Bunce points out, depend on ‘what national leaders define as ationhood, however politically ‘framed’, politically however nationhood, that confirmed region the across examples Numerous 407). (2005: in play’ much very still was nation, the idea, structure o the determines regime iswhat hybrid of establishment the preceding mobilization political of process in the question national the of the that salience argue will le. strugg sy constructed asocially as who serves aleader to loyalty group proces the question, national typic they time, same the At context. empirical given on the depending etc.) secession, state autonomy, (political vary movements nationalist d such that fact the upon founded as grievances as well territory aspecific administer to authority and/or sovereignty to rights legitimate for demands of presence the by movements ethnic/racial from differ generally actions political Such ends. 52 of communism ideals’ y. ideolog official the - long ideas, national of revival the to led inevitably regimes communist Eurasian and European of collapse 1980s Thelate states. communist movem – 11) 2005: (Horowitz, renewal’ national goal of collective the ‘based on
emands are not now being satisfied (Hechter, 2000; Olzak, 2013). Specific goals of of goals Specific 2013). Olzak, 2000; (Hechter, now being satisfied not are emands This is that tosay political movements centered on the idea ofnation do necessarilynot aspire for an ally share a number of defining traits, including the ideational primacy of th of primacy ideational the including traits, defining of anumber share ally Primarily focused on the post the on focused Primarily – ents played a major role in redesigning political landscape of the post the of landscape political in redesigning role a major played ents
referring to the strength of anti of the strength to referring
f power of its dominant party. dominant its f of power they also reminded us that another powerful powerful another that us reminded also they agenda, political f the
As noted by Bunce, by As noted
s of intense and massive popular mobilization, and the and mobilization, popular massive and of s intense - communist political context, the present study study present the context, political communist
- Fueled by the widely held ‘frustrated national national ‘frustrated held widely Fueled the by
communist/ f the momentous changes of 1989- of changes momentous the ‘if 44 - establishment reform ideologies ideologies reform establishment - building, national unification, unification, national building, time kept under wraps of of wraps under kept time mbol of the national national the of mbol
52 nationalist nationalist
91 took 91 took indeed indeed e - CEU eTD Collection to the national dimension of the communist collapse collapse dimension of the communist to the national rather mere thantreat it ly aconsequence ofthe as collapse’ (2009b process nationalism’sthis toexplicate in demise role discussion needs of communism’s (2000: 264). previously existed, they received a major boost as economic growth slowed down and job prospects declined’ heretofore been politically dormant, it now came in handy. Where element had ethnicity ‘Where following: writes the Molchanov Mikhail that period, during resurgence nationalist - ethno upon andbased modern isboth that nity commu apolitical for sacrifices of highest the make to ready who are people and produces andrepresentation mobilization permanence legitimacy, (unity, a“we” creates power, collective ‘generates 53 against its conventional understanding. of re resources th nations the and of post of new context in the anew purpose’ find ‘to sought thus communists former And while 77). people (1998: awideof variety attract strategy patriotic communist Beissinger: Mark by As noted regimes. communist of the demise to significantly contributed movements were structured around. The formation of the national movements in post in movements national the of Theformation around. structured were they which idea national the ying embod individuals charismatic by dominated were organizations. political founded recently various by embraced wasalso tactics political similar andpotentially important highly
Analyzing the way the repub eliteslican the throughout Soviet sought Union topolitically benefit from the - Sovietization ofBelarus identity under Lukashenka, apursuit of interest national can go completely cultural and historical factors’ (Kuzio, 2001: 170). 2001: (Kuzio, factors’ andhistorical cultural ‘It would be ‘It toimpossible understand-communist today post politics without reference Across the collapsing communist world, the national question em question national the world, communist collapsing the Across At At the same time, regardless of regardless time, same the - d what Ishiyama labels labels Ishiyama d what adopte therefore parties successor
’
which, through associating them with nationalism, was supposed to to wassupposed nationalism, with them associating through which,
ey claim to represent’ (2005: 410). Therefore, as demonstrated by the example
highly profitable political issue. A great number of of number A great issue. political profitable highly
political background, most of these parties parties of these most background, political 45 –
- one of the reasons why serious any one ofthereasons communism (Ziblatt, 1998: 119), 119), 1998: (Ziblatt, communism 53
s ofgrassroots nationalism had What is more, national national ismore, What : 346). ‘ the national the - erged as a as erged communist communist ), enables enables ), -
CEU eTD Collection qualified and to follow with enthusiastic loyalty a leadership offering salvation from distress’ (Ibid). from distress’ salvation offering leadership a loyalty enthusiastic with and to follow qualified distress. spiritual and/or material of their out stems arule, as and, hisfollowers of perception ( status anestablished from apart authority, of source the as himself toward loyalty inspire to ability the by leaders political other from differs leader charismatic 1958), s classical in Max Weber’s out pointed Asoriginally leaders. political charismatic of emergence the for ground abreeding created countries 54 breakdown of other means of legitimizing authority, these leaders would seek to to seek would leaders these authority, legitimizing of means other of breakdown the In regime. existing the against program national the advance politically would that leaders charismatic of emergence the expect to likely was then it found, were ideals) national (frustrated grievances those Where 47). 2002: (Beissinger, mobilization nationalist of atide created and groups multiple across grievance national of sense the At states. communist multinational the of foundations very the uprooted crisis ideological and institutional 1980s, late in the Culminating era. communist the of period last the for alsocharacteristic was phase, 80- 1965: andWillner, (Willner prevails unpredictability and uncertainty aclimate of and undermined is authority legal traditional of basis the when change, cial so major of in times articulated isusually future’, uncertain andthe past discredited between bridge ’asa leadership, charismatic The needfor 388). 1977: (Tucker: salvation’ for formula or characteristics special of personal virtue by distress their of out them lead can onewho as sufferers the wayto convincing
com Willner and Willner and in Willner quoted
As emphasized byPanebianco ponents Such atmosphere, most often exemplified by the colonial age’s terminal age’s terminal colonial the by exemplified often most Such atmosphere, 54
but from state ’a ofacute social stress that gets the people ready to perceive as extraordinarily
Charismatic leader then comes forward and ‘presents himself in a himself and‘presents forward comes then leader Charismatic ,
the charisma the , 1965: 80- 1965: ,
does not necessarily result from th from result necessarily not does 81). His charis 81). 46 same time, same 81). 81). matic appeal resides with the the with appeal resides matic
it exacerbated submerged submerged exacerbated it
tudy (translated by Gerth, Gerth, by (translated tudy e leader’s messianic messianic leader’s e
CEU eTD Collection the attempted the hard certain regard programmatic, i.e. (re)built to ‘advertise ideals about a desirable adesirable about ideals ‘advertise to i.e.(re)built programmatic, regard certain a in albeit And indeed, 50). (1988: person’ his from inseparable become which symbols of political aset of andinterpreter conceiver, founder, undisputed the as himsel who imposes [...] leader acharismatic for, andvehicle by, created essentially is party the not or ‘whether wrote, Panebianco formation, party’s the of process the for iscritical It consolidated. and originated they which in manner the by determined thus were parties these of characteristics organizational the development, 231). 1981: (Schonfeld, him’ with identify to tends organization entire ‘the where decision’, group’s of a shaping the in person single a of role prime the by ‘defined creation the we witnessed hence, cases, these In individual their to besubordinated to came accordingly, organizations, leader these of hands the in concentrated be to came th in resulted authority political into legitimacy popular their of transformation necessary of Theprocess longer. rtainly isce rule authoritarian perpetuate to question national politica of number a as well as Mečiar Vladimir Slovakia’s Milošević, Slobodan Serbia’s Tuđman, Franjo Croatia’s including order current the destroy to promising culture, their of symbols sacred the themselves with associate and evoke 55 post of process the to tries. coun respective in their democratization communist contributed greatly which Kučan’s, Milan and Havel’s,
Interestingly, Russia’s Boris Yeltsin is a is Yeltsin Boris Russia’s Interestingly, personalized highly of e creation As anticipated by Panebianco’s genetic model of party organization and and organization party of model genetic Panebianco’s by As anticipated Among them, we find cases of leadership such as Lech Walesa’s, Vaclav Vaclav Walesa’s, Lech as such leadership of cases we find them, Among - line coup d’étatin August 1991 (Bernhard, 1998)
and build a new one (Willner and Willner, 1965: 84). 84). 1965: andWillner, one(Willner and build anew lso mentioned in this context on the basis of his success in thwarting thwarting in success his of basis on the context this in mentioned lso systems of governance. As political power thus thus power political As governance. of systems l leaders in post l leaders 47 of monocratic form of headship form monocratic of
- Soviet states, Soviet 55 s, their respective party party respective their s,
Yet, the list of those, those, of list the Yet,
political goals. goals. political who used the who the used
- f
CEU eTD Collection Table in Table demonstrated As parties. dominant respective their within power of personalization the in resulted thus regimes hybrid these of establishment the to leading mobilization political of course in the idea national the of Thedominance leaders. their by monopolized - decision the which in organizations political r hybrid of inception marked the chapter, first in the explained as This, elections. multiparty national their to favorable a rallying of people mass anunstructured than more much ‘not representing party, charismatic the of aform took organizations political these interest), national the of promotion society a eventually lose power when the regime change took place. took change regime when the power lose eventually expected to have a rather different, i.e. de- different, arather have to expected a the experienced hadnot but regimes hybrid of formation sawthe competition, in post
d rise of nationalist sentiment nationalist of d rise forementione Consequently, throughout the following period, these countries were ruled by by ruled were countries these period, following the throughout Consequently,
- egimes in many post egimes communist countries which, subsequent to the introduction of multiparty multiparty of introduction the to subsequent which, countries communist s the collective good they promise to produce’ (in this case, protection and and protection case, this (in produce’ to promise goodthey collective the s round a leader’ (Kitschelt, 1995: 449). Yet, due to political conditions conditions political dueto Yet, 449). 1995: (Kitschelt, leader’ a round 5 , these parties would therefore fail to instit to fail therefore would parties these , - patriotic strategy, a number of them triumphed in the first first the in triumphed them of anumber strategy, patriotic - communist countries. countries. communist 48 personalized structure of power. structure personalized
the regime dominant parties are are parties dominant the regime
making power was effectively effectively was power making
Following the same logic, logic, same the Following utionalize and and utionalize
CEU eTD Collection First, is shaded mechanism *the model; Author’s Source: party outcomes 5. Table managed to stay in office stay to managed place took change regime the as power lost them of most selecting the givencases. the selecting for used criteria of as well as model the testing analysis study case the in employed the of salience i.e.the establishment, regime the to leading mobilization political of character the by determined was parties ( Second, institutionalization.
Theoretical Empirical Level level level the the of fates diverging anutshell,the In lo methodo aparticular of choice the explains section The next
Causal mechanism* explaining the effect of nationalist mobilization on mobilization nationalist of effect the explaining mechanism* Causal
Frustrated anti structured structured presence collective collective hybridin regimes national
ideology renewal national national around around ideals reform strong strong goal goal regime -regime The The of a of the the of
model this research will test rests upon two presumptions. upon presumptions. rests two test will research this model
dominant parties in hybrid regimes, i.e. the fact that while while that fact the i.e. regimes, in hybrid parties dominant
- Broad the the intensive action is is action fulfilling fulfilling political motion motion aim of of aim set in in set goal goal
with with and this this the the lack of) institutionalization of hybrid regime dominant dominant regime hybrid of institutionalization of) lack based based were d were mobilization Nationalist
national question in this process. in this question national
representing representing organization the national national the faction best best faction charismatic transferred transferred movement 49 legitimacy legitimacy etermined by these parties’ (lack of) of) (lack parties’ these by etermined mobilized mobilized from the the from Political Political leading leading group group figure figure party party of a of a to
is
personalized organization establishing establishing triumphant elections elections Political Political institutionalization regime hybrid power power with party party the the in in is is
The lack of of The lack in
party party
a number of a number and political and political irrespective irrespective its leader’s leader’s its strength of of strength
decisional decisional autonomy autonomy politically Dominant Dominant personal personal interests interests
appeal, appeal, having having on the on the
of hi of party party relies relies thus thus no
s
gical tool tool gical
elections elections defeat marking marking change Party regime regime power power loses loses party party
The The the the the in them them
CEU eTD Collection bumped andfifty, numbered or have over one could pushed dominoes Your only colleague is, they-vary.is, co mean Doesthis that domino either d cause and domino number fifty are now lying with flat pointing tops their in the same direction; that you outoftheroom andwhen she you calls in back you observe thatdomino number one front ofthe dominoes so thatonly number oneandnumber fifty are visible. She then sends straight line with their dots facing the same way on the table in a room, but puts a blind in mechanism mechanism – process causal intervening the to identify attempts Bennett andAndrew George Alexander temporal – evidence of pieces diagnostic from inferences power of the links which mechanism causal an observable of existence the implies section preceding in the forward put model The theoretical 2 tracing process paragraph, following in the explain effectively they As 206). (2005: variable tracing process broad terms, In tracing. isprocess 2012) Pedersen, and (Beach mechanisms causal of analysis asystematic permits that onlyone the some, to according and, 2012) Mahoney, 2005; and Bennett, George 2010; andCollier, (Brady research study case ) institutionalization .3. Methodology 2 ws you fifty dominoesws you standing thatacolleague numbered a sho ‘Suppose in upright is about what lays in lays - what is about .3.1. Process method tracing ) with the given conditions ( conditions given the with ) sequence of events or phenomena (Collier, 2011: 824). 2011: (Collier, phenomena or events of sequence –
ependent variables independent between can be defined as defined be can .
The most important tool of causal inference in qualitative and in qualitative inference tool causal of important The most
between observable effects and their potential causes: causes: potential andtheir effects observable between
an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal causal and descriptive drawing for tool an analytic nationalist mobilization nationalist , t his particular method of qualitative analysis, analysis, of qualitative method his particular 50
and the outcome of the dependent dependent the of outcome and the party
often understood as part of a part as understood often
the other to fall? Not necessaril
outcome in question ( question in outcome the causal chain a causal the
and and the lack the
As noted by by As noted nd causal nd causal
of partyof the loss loss the y. y.
CEU eTD Collection combined to generate the observed sequence of events’ (Goldstone, 1991: 59). conditio convergence of several conditions, independent variables or causal chains; those those chains; causal or variables independent conditions, several of convergence r outcome the in which those events); of chain (straightforward causality linear by characterized processes the between differentiate one can regard, this In investigation. under process causal the of nature on the depending 45). (2007: effect’ purported its and cause structural some lying between factors intermediate ‘locate to as so causality’ processes’potential (Ibid: 206-7). must remove theblind andlook at theintervening dominoes, which give You atonce. fell thedominoes or thatall fell, dominoes two these thatonly away in the table 56 tracing process Yet, 363). 2008: (Checkel, steps’ intermediate predicted theoretically of ‘a series way’ through informed theoretically specific, avery ‘in traced is process the phase, second the In verification. theoretic the of clarification stages: research ‘situations 215). 2005: and Bennett, or cases afew of basis onthe inference causal permit and spuriousness, for check cases, of comparison initial in the out left otherwise were that variables out point outcome, an to paths different or single ‘identify tracing process regard, this In 12). 2012: andPedersen, (Beach methods analysis comparative from most differs tracing linking Xprocess andY’, mechanism(s)
To that goal, must one perform ‘the difficult cognitive feat of figuring out which aspects of the initial ns observed, in conjunction with which simple principles of many that may be at work, would have
Whether it focuses on ‘the unfolding of events’ or events’ of unfolding on‘the focuses it Whether tracing process Gerring, John by As noted over time over ’ (Collier, 2011: 824) 2011: (Collier, ’
proved to bea to very proved
56
By ‘a By 51
ttempting to trace the theoretical causal causal theoretical the trace to ttempting tracing process al model and its subsequent empirical empirical subsequent andits al model goes beyond correlations and, hence, hence, and, correlations beyond goes
useful methodological tool as it can it as tool methodological useful allows us to ‘peer into the box of box the of into ‘peer to us allows can
take different forms primarily even a single case’ (George (George case’ asingle even
, usually comprises two two comprises usually
as
this thesis does thesis this esults from the evidence on ,
CEU eTD Collection analyzes) (Goldstone, 1991: 50). 50). 1991: (Goldstone, andplaces times other of those to similar are that sequences those of aspects some recognize e to possibl it is , toto unique in are sequences historical although that, premise the from departs thesis the sense, that In 19). 2012: Pedersen, and (Beach cases’ of context abounded across be can generalized that mechanism istheory section, following in the elaborated as approach, methodological Its 215). (Ibid: explanation’ parsimonious or of anadequate parts important beparticularly to thought in expl couched explanation causal ananalytical into narrative ahistorical convert to which aims explanation’ ‘analytic theory general tracing 213). way’ (Ibid: the along points decision at made choices the by restricted were acase of outcomes possible andhow extent what ‘to assess tracing process of type processes, last causal the with Dealing 212). 2005: Bennett, and (George directions’ other in outcome the steer and development in the - path and, finally, interact; other each of independent not are that variables casual where hypothesized causal mechanism is present in a population of cases of a of cases of in apopulation is present mechanism causal hypothesized three least at beused, identify whichone can may for it purposes research onthe Depending
dependent 2 process process of design the process, analyzed of the character uponthe Contingent narrative’ with no theoretical ambitions to more more to ambitions theoretical no with narrative’ ‘detailed from vary can .3.2. Theory .3.2.
consisting of ‘a sequence of events, some of which foreclose certain paths paths certain of which foreclose some events, of ‘a sequence of consisting different types of of types different - based explanation (Ibid: 210- (Ibid: explanation based
processes ( processes - centric - building process tracing process building
n of ‘building parsimonious causal causal parsimonious ‘building n of ambitio the with , the cases it it cases the in identified have to argues thesis this which process tracing icit theoretical forms, while focusing on ‘what are are on‘what while focusing forms, theoretical icit 52 211). This thesis uses Thisthesis uses 211). : theory
- testing
(testing whether a whether (testing tracing process can can as as CEU eTD Collection functioned as predicted in a given case, theory case, in agiven predicted as functioned actually it whether and waspresent mechanism acausal whether about made and (Beach isway around it other the latter, in the whereas fact, before ‘comes’ theory (Ibid: 19- outcome) historical explaining - andoutcome agivenphenomenon), of apopulation to begeneralized can that hypothetical causal mechanism (Ibid: 24- (Ibid: mechanism causal hypothetical 1 theory tracing on focus the ‘share they though even time, same the At (Ibid). theory’ atypological of construction inductive empirical, for blocks ‘building as serve then can paths causal These 215). 2005: Bennett, and (George identified be can cases’ different in outcome asimilar lead to causalthat paths on which ‘different based observations’ numerous ‘generates it because development andtheory testing theory for tool indispensable tracing process regard, this In (Ibid). case’ single the of confines phenomenon),
ructured analysis of empirical material aimed to detect a plausible aplausible detect to aimed material ) starts empirical of with analysis a structured Pedersen, 2012: 25). Thus, while theory Thus, while 25). 2012: Pedersen, - Contrary to the last, the first two types have ‘theoretical ambitions beyond the the beyond ambitions ‘theoretical typeshave two the last, first to the Contrary
testing and theory and testing a generalizable causal mechanism by detecting its empirical manifestations’, manifestations’, empirical its detecting by mechanism causal a generalizable
(crafting a sufficient explanation that accounts for a particularly puzzling puzzling aparticularly for accounts that explanation asufficient (crafting theory - building - building building 20).
(building a theoretical mechanism between X and Y X andY between mechanism atheoretical (building
tracing process 25). 5 3
- testing type enables inferences to be be to inferences type enables testing - building building differ in a sense that, in the former, former, in the that, in asense differ tracing process may be used as an an as beused may (see (see Figure Figure CEU eTD Collection shows what is being traced (Ibid) 57 attem ‘no write, Pedersen and Beach knowledge’, our ‘To neglected. surprisingly is method particular this demanding, rather its practice makes which , tracing process the causal process backwards from Y aplaus toward from backwards process causal the – analysis the case, latter the In 25). (Ibid: ) building theory ( causes the are what unsure are we where but (Y), outcome an with familiar theor have we as donot ) building theory centric ( two the linking mechanisms potential regarding dark the in are we but and Y, X between a correlation is there that we know when situations: research particular
Bold lines represent lines inferences; direct Bold shaded stand lines indirect for (seconda Figure 1. Theory 1. Figure Furthermore, most likely due to inductive character of the theory the of character inductive to likely due most Furthermore, theory employs This thesis Sour ) (2012 andPedersen Beach ce: - building process t process building
- building 54
process tracing, commonly utilized in two two in utilized commonly tracing, process
racing ( racing y to guide us; and when we are we are andwhen toy guide us; Democratic peace Democratic ible X (Ibid). X(Ibid). ible
such as this one one this as such ry) inferences; shaded area
e ) xample Y - – building building -
centric centric traces traces X pts pts 57 - Y
CEU eTD Collection counterfactual analysis. Yet, as noted by George and Bennett, ‘a plausible, useful useful ‘a plausible, andBennett, George as by noted Yet, analysis. counterfactual outcomes observed the of explanations alternative the potential of some andexclude assess to seeks it section, following in the same time, the At 222). 2005: andBennet, (George tracing process of given set any with consistent mechanism causal d onehypothesize than ‘more of existence the of possibility the envisages hence the is al, et Mahoney from borrow to cause, sufficient A 26). (Ibid: outcome the explain 78). 2012: context empirical given the beyond effects causal have to only model theoretical the in includes it cases, of apopulation across present be to expected is that mechanism causal oretical athe tracing addition, In 222). 2005: Bennett, and (George tested being model theoretical the by specified as analysis of level the appropriate at effect, the observed to causes putative the linking path causal uninterrupted an establish to goal, main Its investigates. it process of the specific nature the to theory of principles general thesis applies this that, view of In 25). (Ibid: literature’ in the in practice isdone actually it showhow to made been have tracing process particular this that to acknowledge important istherefore It . tracing process tracing process – background theoretical solid a of lack - amid of level the to isgeneralizable that mechanism
one ‘whose presence inevitably leads to the outcome’ (2009: 121). This thesis Thisthesis 121). (2009: outcome’ the to leads inevitably presence ‘whose one To that goal, one could also support support also could one goal, To that Put differently, another ambition of this thesis is to identify a causal a causal identify to is this thesis of ambition another differently, Put variant does not claim that the detected causal mechanism issuf mechanism causal detected the that claim not does variant .
departs
–
‘ considerably limits the inferential power of theory of power inferential the limits considerably parts systematic 55
of the mechanism [ mechanism the of from which, in contrast, theor in contrast, which, process tracing process range theory (Ibid: 25). the Yet, 25). (Ibid: theory range ’
- (Beach and (Beach centric centric …]
which are believed believed are which
tracing process application by by application reiterate, is to Pedersen, Pedersen, evidence’ evidence’ ficient to to ficient - y building building - tes ting ting
CEU eTD Collection groups of people’ (Ibid: people’ of groups historical certain by created as elements these andsee thinking, their organize that elements instinctual ctive or affe cognitive, the of function a doas people ‘what to refers it as ‘ideational’ considered be should mobilization) political of processes the of character the (about claim first the Thus, complexity. its to contributes also thesis and incentives (Ibid: 71). (Ibid: and incentives constraints institutional observed the within aposition to force causal the assigns it - path - man within position their of a function as do people what ‘explains it that given category ‘institutional’ the to belongs parties) political in the power of structure the (about claim Theensuing 97). (Ibid: actions’ same the allowing) least at (or encouraging as situation institutional or structural any objective couldinterpret someone that powerful beso ‘might chapter, following – (2007) Parsons Craig of notion With respect to that, the combination of different types of causal claims – claims causal of types different of the combination that, to respect With tracing process of hallmark ‘the represents inference single (Ibid). interdependent’ but each of other independent not are explanation in the causal ‘the variables other, and, on the in time’, point over development a of sequential form ‘in the isgiven it onehand, onthe complex since, is very thesis this by proposed explanation the criteria, their by Judged 231). (Ibid: complex’ avery is explanation that if especially explanation, of ahistorical support in anything if much, add not does attempted, if and, not possible often is case counterfactual
- man by implied process dependent nce for the verification of a of verification the for evide nce of types multiple of employment the Besides, time, and not a single variable or cluster of variables at a given agiven variables at of cluster or asingle variable andnot time,
12). Ideational instructions, as demonstrated throughout the the throughout demonstrated as instructions, Ideational 12).
nation proposed by this this by proposed nation expla in the comprised made organizations and rules (and within the the within (and rules and organizations made made constraints)’ (Ibid: 12). Put differently, differently, Put 12). (Ibid: constraints)’ made 56
’ (Gerring, 2007: 172). 172). 2007: ’ (Gerring,
to use the the use to CEU eTD Collection or or negation andits itself concept the instead but , degree in differences i.e. e concept, th of variation full the upon defining isnot focus the used, are when concepts contrast, In 167). (2005: case’ given a in Y occurring of probability the in X raises increase an ‘where relationship causal probabilistic describe set adopted, and the selection of cases for analysis’ (Ibid). analysis’(Ibid). for cases of selection andthe adopted, is that measurement to approach the beinvestigated, to hypotheses specific the study, the guides that theory the about choices and universe this of understanding investigator’s the between interaction aclose is ‘there writes, he ‘Ideally’, – conditions of conceptualization tracing process us by not bemet must explanation historical a supporting of burden ‘the outcome, historical produce to time over interacted andvariables conditions how various of account a chain causal andconstruct infer to in order that, Bennett and George of ggestion su the accepts thesis this forward, puts it mechanism explanatory the of complexity the in particular, and, analysis cases, Munck points out, isafundamental out, points Munck cases, of universe the Defining 19). 2007: (Gerring, time’ of period some or over in time asingle point at observed unit) (a phenomenon delimited ‘a spatially precisely, more or 17), 2005: Bennett, and (George events’ of class a of instance ‘an Case connotes
not - noted as Variables, relationships. theoretical
differences in kind i.e.differences present), 2 Because of the absence of a well a of absence the of Because .3.3. Case selection method’ (2005: 231). Finally, in doing so, this thesis uses the the uses thesis this so, doing in Finally, 231). (2005: method’
and not variables – and not (Beach and Pedersen, 2012: 73). 73). 2012: andPedersen, (Beach 57
- task in any research project (2004: 109). 109). (2004: project research in any task structured theoretical framework for the ing a counterfactual but by employing the the employing by but counterfactual ing a
by Gerring, are employed to to employed are Gerring, by commonly applied to analyzing analyzing to applied commonly (that is, ispresent the concept
CEU eTD Collection specified variables other than X1 and Y) (Ibid: 90). caused apositive outcome); h) are most (cases relat X1on or Y relative tosome univariate distribution); d) ‘deviant’ (cases deviate from observed an cross values extreme/unusual (cases illuminate ‘extreme’ c) X1/Y); or X1, Y, on variation of range full the exemplify a) ‘typical’ (cases are selected as typical examples of a given cross dies stu generating analyses. study in case advised strongly therefore, is, selection (nonrandom) Purposive 87). (Ibid: aninvestigation animates that question research the into will leverage it provide that study in case problematic case random while Yet, 88). (Ibid: leverage) (causal interest theoretical of dimensions al of features causal relevant the reproduce that cases identify to aim analysis study case and analysis - large both hand, one On the 86). 2007: (Gerring, cases’ of population per inference - nation often (most phenomenon one either 59 58 apparent an with begins thus analysis The 131). (Ibid: outcome that to contributed mighthave that factors various on similar are but interest theoretical of outcome the most the employs it advice, the with aforementioned Consistent research. study acase as
Also referredAlso to the as ‘method of 1843). (Mill, difference’ To that goal, Gerring writes, it is possible to choose between one of the following case following of one the between to choose ispossible it writes, Gerring goal, that To ionship); e) ‘influential’ (cases with influential configurations of the independent variables); f) ‘crucial’ - - - large in applied regularly is selection similar method similar This is of particular importance in case study research which investigates which investigates research study in case importance particular This isof Seekin -
or least or g to explain party outcomes in three hybrid regimes, this thesis qualifies thesis qualifies this hybrid regimes, in three outcomes party explain g to tains to provide insight into a causal relationship across a larger a larger across relationship acausal into insight provide to tains 58
- likely to exhibit an outcome); g) ‘pathway’ (cases where X1 and not X2, is likely to have –
59 arger universe (representatives) and provide variation along the the along variation andprovide (representatives) universe arger such as this one– this as such
- acase to make
‘most
research as there is no guarantee, given the small sample, sample, small the given noguarantee, is there as research
- similar’ (defined above); and i) most
selection. In the exploratory, i.e. hypothesis i.e. the exploratory, In selection.
the researcher looks for cases that differ on on differ that cases for looks researcher the 58 state) or a selected few, whereby ‘the ‘the whereby few, or a selected state) sample studies, it might prove highly highly prove might it studies, sample
- onship); relati case b) ‘diverse’ (cases - different (cases are are on different (cases different - selection procedures: selection - N cross case case - case case - CEU eTD Collection Yugoslavia and until 2006, Montenegro and Serbia continued living in a joint state. state. in ajoint living continued and Serbia Montenegro 2006, anduntil Yugoslavia communist the of disintegration the following addition, In entity. political single a of realms the within development political of decades seven than more witnessed – fact In federation. socialist Yugoslav the in pluralization political of process the of aresult as being came into regimes hybrid pressures. democratizing Western from isolated largely hence process the outside remained Serbia years, unlike most post most unlike years, - socio unprecedented resultant andthe Yugoslavia t of incumbency divergent divergent in high- resulted competition political hand,unfair such other the hyper opposition, the to relative and had, the game of rules manipulated parties ruling the organized, regularly were elections text we saw period time observed the vi in surprising seem outcomes party Such diverging change. regime the of face the in office remainedin party incumbent regime hybrid latter’s the collapsed, regimes theformer two, Whil 1990s. in the andMontenegro Serbia, Croatia, in existed that regimes hybrid (Ibid). outcomes different unexpectedly obser anomaly:
ew of a number of similarities of the three cases. To begin with, in each country in country in each with, begin To cases. three the of similarities of number a ew of at least officially officially least at The present study reflects upon the diverging fates of incumbent parties in parties incumbent of fates diverging the upon reflects study The present opposition parties that had been ruling in hybrid regimes lost power when these these when power lost regimes in hybrid been ruling had that parties ved cases are ostensibly quite similar and yet demonstrate demonstrate yet and similar quite ostensibly are cases ved he three parties was marked by the violent collapse of former former of thecollapse by violent marked was parties he three
–
groups in each state. At the same time, the period of of period the time, same the At state. each in groups its integral parts for another two years. Previously, they they Previously, years. two another for parts integral its - communist European states, Croatia, Montenegro, and and Montenegro, Croatia, states, European communist es of European and Euro Atlantic integration, integration, Atlantic and Euro European of es
- book examples of hybrid regimes. Although Although regimes. hybrid of examples book , Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia remained remained Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, , 59 - privileged access to power resources. On resources. power to access privileged economic crisis. Throughout these these Throughout crisis. economic
level coordination of of coordination level Furthermore, these Furthermore, e in in e
CEU eTD Collection single dominanton party persistence and decline goes back at least a half century, we still aviable lack theory of few solid theoretical blocks for one to build his research upon. As noted by Kennet thisthere Yet, very theory a rule. are in regard, hegemonic here even party the of thesis refers general to the in Croatia and Montenegro). Montenegro). and in Croatia (hi forces opposition the of repression incumbent of level and the - state (maintaining to raise the costs of participation in the oppos in the participation of costs the raise to ability andits advantages resource party’s the dominant i.e. advantages, incumbency single- about writing instance, for Thus, default. by exist institutions political said above which the in regimes hybrid of study the to applicable also are below, discussed briefly Others, type. regime this to specifically linked are rule, authoritarian of and longevity credibility newly vs. (communist parties ruling the of origins institutional the to which relate of important most the investigation, under cases in the conditions different of anumber identify also onecan time, the At same similar. , albeit were specific, unfolded process very this which under circumstances the 60 electoral 2012), Turovsky, and Reuter 2008; Magaloni, 2007; (Brownlee, organizations t positing literature. related the of findings important most the of anumber to reference with beexplained cannot in question outcomes party diverging the that This implies Svolik, 2013; Gandhi and Przewor and Gandhi 2013; Svolik,
Givenaforementioned the lack oftheoreticalframework - party dominance (2007: 10). Thus, both the starting point in the evolution of the three hybrid regimes and and regimes hybrid three the of evolution in the point starting the both Thus, 2 .3.4. Model revisited competition he importance of power of importance he - created anti created ownership in Montenegro and Serbia vs. privatization in Croatia), Croatia), in privatization vs. Serbia and Montenegro in ownership
(Blaydes, 2011; Magaloni, 2008) and legislatures (Boix and (Boix andlegislatures 2008) Magaloni, 2011; (Blaydes, - establishment party in Croatia), their economic policies policies theireconomic in Croatia), party establishment
party dominance in Mexico, Greene attributed it to it attributed Greene in Mexico, dominance party - sharing sharing ski, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Truex, 2013) – 2013) Truex, 2008; Gandhi, 2007; ski, - successor parties i parties successor 60 – forthe study of dominantparties in hybrid regimes, ition (2007: 5). The former, he holds, is is heholds, Theformer, 5). (2007: ition
through the establishment of party party of establishment the through n Montenegro and Serbia Serbia and n Montenegro h Green gh in Serbia vs. low low vs. Serbia in gh e, e, although work the 60
Some, Some,
for for CEU eTD Collection increasingly for marketplace fair votes opposition parties allows toexpand’ 6-34). (Ibid: patronagegreased networks run dry, up, ofdominance themachinery seizes andthe dominant because parties their limits it access […] partiesthat they to opposition support [.] use Conversely, could weakens privatization have resources sector that politically fewer the private in thebureaucracy, agents dominates over the economy’, he posits and further elaborates: andfurther heposits economy’, the over ownership state of degree the with andfalls rises advantages resource incumbent’s the of ‘The magnitude persistence/decline. party’s dominant of determinant regime. hybrid of collapse the in power survive to onlyonemanaged advantage, political kindof hadthis investigation under parties three all the Eventhough (Ibid). favor’ in their voters bias that goods patronage with policyappeals supplement to importantly, most and, canvassers, of legions deploy campaigns, on outspend ‘to incumbent the allows it as significance greater of le the neither Finally, period. ime reg hybrid of phase later in the forces opposition the of coordination of level high similarly find we where Montenegro the explain not does it Serbia, extent, agreat to and, Croatia in collapse incumbent of case in the holds argument this And while incumbency. its of decades last the during dominance political PRI’s of perpetuation the behind coordination opposition of failure the that (2006) Magaloni with agrees Greene Furthermore, policies. economic incumbents’ in the difference aforementioned the despite andSerbia, in Croatia outcomes party similar
verage (Levitsky and Way, 2010) andWay, (Levitsky verage Moreover, Greene recognizes the economic role of the state as another another as state the of role economic the recognizes Greene Moreover, Contrary to this – this to Contrary portions oftheeconomypublically by substantial rolled ‘Where cont anincumbent are
l logica otherwise ,
which were which 61
to funds, andwithout public funds, these well –
argument, the present study identified identified study the present argument,
l the three hybrid regimes hybrid three l al the in similar
in Mexico was a major reason reason amajor was Mexico in incumbent survival in in survival incumbent level s of linkage and and linkage of
- ,
CEU eTD Collection inquiry. lines of of converging development the through sources data of triangulation employs possible, wherever thesis, the observations, biased potentially Ben hypothesized andthe outcomes observed the level the nor 3: 85). At the same time, as it in great part great in it as time, same the At 85). 2003: (Yin, observations direct and interviews, documentation, records, archival including research, study case in found usually evidence of sources various uses thesis the 2006), and Seawright, empir particular this beyond it , in Serbia than and Montenegro set a identifies thesis the explanations, alternative of possibility the acknowledging while Thus, 224). (Ibid: empirical evidence the upon based induction rd backwa using point, – above the - time, the At same unexpected. outcomes observed the make cases X and potential Y(s), it takes it Y(s), potential X and linking mechanism causal theoretical Tobuild aplausible 218). 2012: and Pedersen, outcome the situationwhere the from departs study present the Hence, outcomes. these
theoretically as significant – significant as theoretically - theoretical causal relationship causal theoretical n ett, 2005: 111), the thesis subsequently seeks to tests its robustness by tracing tracing by its robustness tests to seeks subsequently thesis the 111), 2005: ett,
In collecting empirical material, i.e. causal process observations (Brady, Collier Collier (Brady, observations process causal i.e. material, empirical collecting In relevant theoretically of anumber To summarize, (Y) is known, but where we are unsure what caused it to happen (Beach happen(Beach to it caused what unsure we are where but isknown, (Y) s causal mechanism has been ‘previously overlooked’ (George and (George overlooked’ ‘previously been has mechanism causal of politi of cal oppression (Wintrobe, 1998) (Wintrobe, cal oppression ical domain.
empirical evidence ( evidence empirical
the explain can differences between the cases do not account for for account do not cases the between differences
(presented in the following two chapters) two following the in (presented causal conditions causal
62 observe party outcomes) as the starting starting the as outcomes) party . In addit In . ,
d significantly lower significantly
s. outcome party e three e three th by shared traits ion, arguing that the the that arguing ion,
in Croatia Croatia in
relies on on relies between between listed listed CEU eTD Collection IN IN them. period. The political and economic status of Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro in the in the Montenegro and Serbia, Croatia, of status and economic political The period. disc the for frame apolitical up also set collapsebut its to contribute onlygreatly not would that movements and national) inter in the domination Serb s two in these disappointment of sense The general development. political theirlater of course the determined largely period as important - (1918 state Yugoslav the first of ning andfunctio establishment the examining beginsby It regimes. hybrid into states these of transformation of processes the framed that ideas political the of development the explain and origin the post of the character the understanding say,isthe forkey isto that past, political common their about knowledge agreat to were variation this about ught bro that countries three in the processes historical complex same time, the At considerably. differ other, onthe andMontenegro, onthe one hand, Serbia, and Croatia cases of the chapter, in this elaborated thoroughly as regard, that In establishment. question national the salienceof isthe above outlined model of the research elements the central of One 3 3
.1. Historical background .
TOWAR THE WESTERNBALKANS
The goal of anin- of The goal
the D
unfolding processes political THEESTABLISHMENT OF ime ime reg hybrid to leading mobilization political of process the in dep - th hist th war Yugoslavia fueled the creation of political (socialist (socialist political of creation the fueled Yugoslavia war istherefore follows that analysis orical
tates caused by the unanticipated absolute absolute unanticipated the by caused tates
63 - communist political transition of each of of each of transition political communist ussion of the national question in future future in question national the of ussion in Croatia and Montenegro during this this during andMontenegro in Croatia
extent causally linked. The The linked. causally extent
HYBRID REGIMES HYBRID to identify identify to 1941), 1941),
CEU eTD Collection unification of all South Slavs into one political unit’ (Robinson, 2011: 23). First World War, World First self national decade eralist principles. eralist fed on founded state in anew Montenegro and Serbia from brothers their join to were they allowed, circumstances andpolitical achieved was Once this entity. political autonomous - Austro the in living Serbs Slovenesand Croats, n of unificatio the to related realization its to challenge greatest The goal. political this Croat the of representatives prominent the of most statehood, for aspirations Croats’ the fulfill to Fighting in Croatia. circ intellectual and political within advocated andvociferously formulated largely been identity, andcultural ethnic shared on their based had, peoples Slav South period. this during question national the in success answering of) (lack federalgovernment’s the by conditioned – power of structure the determined resulted which mobilization political of processes - (1945 Yugoslavia socialist 61 19 the of half second the Throughout Committee delegation agreed the basic principles for unification with representatives representatives with unification for principles basic the agreed delegation Committee the 1917, in July Corfu of island Greek the on held meeting the At Montenegrins. and Serbs with unification state their for ground the prepare to was purpose sole ( Committee Yugoslav
The 1905 formation of an alliance of Croat and Serb political parties in Austria- - long series ofits triumphs electoral Croatia in and Dalmatia on the platform ofYugoslav unity and 3 In April 1915, political leaders of the Habsburg South Slavs formed the the formed Slavs South Habsburg the of leaders political 1915, April In .1.1. The fog of Yugosl of fog The .1.1. - determination, demonstrated popular astrong for support these ideas. With outbreak the ofthe
the Yugoslav movement was provided an opportunity to ‘actually begin working Jugoslavenski odbor) Jugoslavenski
1991) is subsequently analyzed. The character of the the of Thecharacter analyzed. subsequently is 1991) 61
avia th
ian
of hybrid regimes in the three states was states three in the regimes of hybrid century, the concept of political unity of the the of unity political of concept the century,
64
national movement were as committed to to committed as were movement national , aCroat - dominated political body whose whose body political dominated in the creation – creation the in
Hungarian Empire into an an into Empire Hungarian Hungary , and,inparticular, a
as well as as well as toward
les les the the
CEU eTD Collection nations and work on their unification into an independent, democratic state (Goldstein, 1999: 111). course of itsdevelopment. overall of course would unanswered ly effective state joint within afuture politicalrelations of question the Leaving Assembly. votingConstituent in the majority to by bedecided wasleft state the organization of the character Yet, beequal. would well as religions all as the andLatin) (Cyrillic scripts two the flags, andthe names three the which in dynasty, đorđević Kara Serbian the of rule the under monarchy, accordingly, was, andSerbs Croats Slovenes, of The new state Serbian the government. of 63 62 aresult. as created was Empire collapsing Vijeće ( Council National founded recently the of power political supreme the recognized it time, same the At state. independent single a into Slavonia and Croatia the survive, Yugoslav ajoint of establishment of idea the end, an to brought effectively being unification supposed to prevent Italy to fully realize its territorial pretentions over Croatian Croatian over pretentions territorial its realize fully to Italy prevent to supposed was community political a larger of part a becoming importantly, More war. in the side winning the to Croatia of transfer political oth asmo meant this view, their In 33). 1993: goals(Irvine, national best Serbia wayto their the of achieve as Kingdom the
Its official name was the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs ( Established in Zagreb at the beginning of October 1918, the Council was to politically three the represent ) of the Slovenes, Croats andSerbs. Croats Slovenes, the of ) - Austria that obvious became it as 1918, October In At thatAt moment,
state finally became a matter of political reality. reality. political of amatter became finally state
to be organized as a constitutional, parliamentary and democratic democratic and parliamentary aconstitutional, as beorganized to Croatian Parliament ( Parliament Croatian Croat
ian
political leaders saw an unconditional unification with with unification anunconditional saw leaders political
Sabor
65 ) proclaimed the unification of Dalmatia, Dalmatia, of unification the proclaimed ) 62
63 A new state of the South Slavs in the in the Slavs South the of state A new
Dr With the process of their political political their of the process With žava Slovenaca, Hrvatai Srba) , in fact,
Hungary was unlikely to unlikely was Hungary largely determine the the largely determine .
Narodno Narodno CEU eTD Collection circumstances, the National Council appealed tothe international community for the assistance intodeep Istria, occupied the of city Rijeka were and preparing to take other parts ofDalmatia. Under such forinning jo the alliance. Accordingly, by mid- forthcoming former was promised considerable post considerable promised was former as as Instead, 31). (Ibid: unity’ Slav South idea of the to ‘less receptive generally were internationally own their Having 33). 1993: (Irvine, position political preeminent a shouldhold they campaign, war victorious in the sacrif enormous and experience political of previous by virtue that, believed Serbs most state, founded newly the in relations political future of vision their to Contrary disillusionment. to way greater even embodiment, its formal after soon gave, However 113). 1999: (Goldstein, tion’ equal founda an entirely on several nations of of ‘unification moment Slovenes ( Slovenes ( Unification of Act prophetically – heunsuccessfully fog’, into geese drunken like rush not ‘Do be formalized. to was unification the which of occasion the on officials Serbian the with meeting upcoming the to delegation its sending against voted Radić 1918, the At Counc guaranteed. firmly shouldbe autonomy stranka stranka ( Party Peasant People’s Croatian the of leader the Radić, Stjepan from came Council National the within dissent of voice Theonly 32). (Ibid: state Slav South anindependent of establishment immediate endorse the to them prompted thus idea the for Yugoslav enthusiasm the genuine to adjacent reasons and Istria. Dalmatia of regions 64
By the 1915 Treaty of London, a secret plan between Italy and the Triple Entente (France, UK, Russia), the For a vast majority of Croats and their political elite, this was a historical ahistorical was this elite, political andtheir Croats of majority avast For -
- HPSS), who insisted that, prior to its political merger with Serbia, Croatia’s Croatia’s Serbia, with merger political its to prior that, insisted who HPSS), exceptSerbia’from potentially ( Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca - i Slovenaca Hrvata Srba, Kraljevina –
appealed to the Council members. A week later, on A week later, members. Council the to appealed Akt o ujedinjenju o Akt l unity l unity Slav politica South idea of the for enthusiasm great their ,
- war territorial Croatia what in are gains today Slovenia and return in 64
Ramet, In ) establishing the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Croats Serbs, of Kingdom the establishing ) November 1918, Italian troops were nearby Ljubljana, entered
the chaotic historical circumstances, practical practical circumstances, historical chaotic the 2006: 43). 66
Belgrade. Belgrade. in signed was KSHS)
- recognized state from 1878, they they 1878, from state recognized il session held on 24 November on24November held session il Hrvatska pučka seljačka seljačka pučka Hrvatska
and, it turned out, out, turned it and, 1 December
’none was
, the ice ice CEU eTD Collection state’ (Ramet, Ibid: 37). regard, the new kingdom of South Slavs was actually ‘the fulfillment of the dream of unifying all Serbs in one Serbian expansion into Montenegro, Macedonia, Koso ( Interior of Minister and the National Council representatives was drawn up ministers. of by his wasup one drawn representatives Council National the and to the King’s earlier proclamation, was supposed to be constituted by agreement betwee its first, provisional government. Moreover, listthe for the provisional parliament ofthe KSHS which, according like an occupying force’ (Irvine, 1993: 33). 1993: (Irvine, force’ occupying like an occasi by population local the ‘alienating thereby Croatia into spread andarmy Serbian the bureaucracy same time, the At dissolved. andthen authority nation. entire the unify would that state Serbian agreater of creation the with concerned primarily were they period, this during representatives political their of activity the from evident 67 66 65 on, Croatia ( governor Croatian the of powers the 1920, 1919and throughout out carried reform administrative following new the of state. institutions of political over control took i of adoption the to prior Accordingly, 37). 2006: (Ramet, solution’ “logical” centralisma as strict andsaw new state the within hegemony and cultural economic, political, than less nothing to ‘aspired leaders the political Serbian throne, virtually established, without the acquiescence of Croats (Ibid). Croats of acquiescence the without established, virtually hadbeen arrangement political aunitary 1920, in November held were Assembly
and and the first minister of interior i Načertanije
‘ The ideological foundations (Great) ofthe ideological policy Serbian The were Ilija laid Garašanin, by who served as Serbian While participating with less than 40 per cent in its p its in per cent 40 than less with participating While Only strict centralization could secure the position of Serbs in Croatia’, then commented their political leader
Serbia firml With the Kingdom’s capital in Belgrade and the Karađorđević Karađorđević the and Belgrade in capital Kingdom’s the With
–
), published in 1844 and followed bymany future generations of Serbia the main political symbol of its statehood – statehood its of symbol political main the 65
and Prime Minister in mid the Prime Minister and y controlled the state of political affairs in the Kingdom in the politicalaffairs of state the controlled
Ban n the KSHS government, Svetozar Pribićević (Janjatović, 1995:
)
e Parliament of of e Parliament th whereas reduced, significantly were - 19th century. His statement on the Serbian national interests 67 vo,Bosnia and Herzegovina and northern Albania. this In 67 opulation, Serbs thus came to hold 2/3 of ministries in of in ministries 2/3 hold to came thus Serbs opulation,
By the time elections to the Constituent Constituent the to elections time the By
was first was 66
ly In the course of the the of In the course
’s then From deprived of political political of deprived ts constitution, they constitution, ts
political elite, called for called elite, political n then Serbian officials
onally behaving behaving onally (see (see dynasty on its onits dynasty
58). Table
moment 6 ) .
CEU eTD Collection everything in Montenegro came in two colors’ (1992: 160). pro – whereas afew ofthose who were against prin and of all neutral States. Delegates in support of the proclamation printed their agendas on white paper brought tobrought the cognizance of ex the accomplishment of the union of Montenegro and Serbia; 4. The present Resolution of the Assembly will be Executive National Council composed of five Members who will have charge of affairs the until definite threethe nam of people our fatherlandthe common to into entranceits hence andKarađorđević(Serbian) dynasty, the understate unified one in Serbia withMontenegro sy political and legal unconditional integration of Montenegro into Serbia, declared the following, thereby suspending the country’s narodna skupština) convened in Podgorica and, predominantly composed of the delegates favoring heavy presence of the ‘liberating’ Serbian military in the country, so and Croats. Slovenes, Serbs, of Kingdom the into incorporated such as and Serbia by annexed first was Montenegro parts, as its constitutive oneof state Yugoslav newly created 1878Berli the at recognized been internationally had that sovereignty its lost country the Allies, victorious the along fighting Albeit 68 to wassupposed believed, they Slav states, g South neighborin with Any union out. had beencarried integration Yugos majority avast Eventhough 335). 2007: (Roberts, restored being independence its without one
at least symbolically – symbolically least at At the moment when the Montenegro’s king Nikola I Petrović and his government were still in exile, with a with exile, in still were government his and Petrović I Nikola king Montenegro’s the when moment the At - unionistand pro in the world that had entered the Great War on the ‘winning side’ and finished it it finished side’ and on ‘winning War the Great the hadentered that world in the lavia, a considerable number of them stood up against the manner in which the the which in manner the against up stood them of number aconsiderable lavia, The Croat sense of disenchantment was shared by many in Montenegro. in Montenegro. many by shared was disenchantment of sense The Croat (2009) Jović Source: months months Table 6. Table –
if not all – all not if 68 Minister Prime
By 1920, the smallest of the South Slavic nations thus became the only only the became thus nations Slavic South the of smallest the By 1920, 264 – stem: 1. The deposition of King Nikola I Petrović I Nikola King of deposition The 1. stem:
Serbian political representation in the Kingdom (in number of number (in Kingdom the in representation political Serbian
- out of a 268– of total out independence oriented words oriented Mark In independence of Montenegrins. T
markbeginning the the of great White
Montenegrins wanted their country to become a part of the first the of apart become to country their wanted Montenegrins
- King of Montenegro, of the Serbian Government, of the Entente Powers be based on the principles of equality and respect for for andrespect equality of be principles onthe based Minister n Foreig 247 ted theirs on green paper. Seemingly irrelevant, this detailwould
in the governmental office) office) governmental in the
68
es: Serb, Croat and Slovene; The 3. election of an - Green ( Green Minister of the joining of Instead n Congress. Interior 240 - Njegoš and his dynasty; 2. The union of - Bjelaši called Gre called
- Zelenaši at National Assembly ( Assembly National at ) political divide between between divide political ) Army and Navy Army
hompson, ’henceforth Minister of Minister 268
Velika Velika
CEU eTD Collection development, Montenegro’ was industry, no few crafts, little and trade’ (1988: 290). almostWith funds allocated no to its economic in the nahije miles [, Montenegro had] maze grewmaze alongside and collars, potatoes. chardGrapes orchardsthecould and name worthy of of bit where a fields, karts lowland few a to limited was possible agriculture The only number. that even sustain period in the following terms: ‘Numbered only sl federation’ (Andrijašević and Rastoder, 2006: 199). political the goal creation of ‘independent Soviet Republic ofMontenegro as apar received an international recognition. KPJ). particular, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia ( of Party Communist the particular, from vocal protest to moved swiftly of affairs the with state disillusionment Montenegrins, on the bestowed be to unlikely was characteristics Montenegrin uniquely recognized that status Montenegrin 73 72 71 70 69 133). ‘marginal was role and national cultural political, its population, the of cent per two only comprised Montenegro which in Kingdom centralized situation. political current the with dissatisfaction dem 1920clearly November in held parliament ( Party Federalist Montenegrin in the refuge census Yugoslav the in ‘Montenegrin’ term the of The absence 46). (Ibid: independence’ of period Montenegro’s of conclusion ‘an inglorious symbolized end. to apolitical brought was Question’ ‘Montenegrin the and neutralized largely
year later, the party was officially banned.
LikeMacedonians, Montenegri The KPJ won 38per cent roatian historian, describes the socio the describes Ivoprominent historian, Banac, Croatian In line with Lenin’s principle of self Already in January 1919, at the Paris Peace Conference, the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes 70 73 71
Throughout the following years, those opposing the unification found political political found unification the those opposing years, following the Throughout end of 1919 the by endof Yet,
The latter’s impressive result in Montenegro in the first election for the KSHS KSHS the for election first the in in Montenegro result impressive latter’s The Hence, as they were ‘forced to recognize that the regime was failing to to wasfailing regime the recognize that to ‘forced were they as Hence, [areas oeegt (alvć 20: 9. tl, s t eae paet ht a that apparent became it as Still, 89). 2003: (Pavlović, sovereignty –
I.V.] of Crmnica and Metohija, the latter having been won by Montenegro in 1912. There
lavia. But this stone wilderness [...] could not could [...] stone wilderness this But lavia. in Yugos density population lowest the
of the vote the of Montenegro,in whereas its re armed uprising (Morrison, 2009: 43). 2009: (Morrison, uprising armed s nati ns ns were officially incorporated into onal income in 1938 stood at 31 per cent
- determination, the Montenegrin communists proclaimed as their main main their as proclaimed communists the Montenegrin determination,
the military campaign against the unification was was unification the against campaign military the ightly less than 200,000 people
69 ) and, in and, ) stranka federalistička Crnogorska - economic conditions in Montenegro during that Komunistička partija Jugoslavije Jugoslavije partija Komunistička
onstrated the level of popularof the level onstrated the sultatthe KSHS level was 12.4 per cent 72
Serbian national corpus. Within the new, politically politically new, the Within
of the Yugoslav average. Its share in
li ving on some 3,733 square ’ (Rastoder, 2003: 2003: ’ (Rastoder, t of the futuret ofthe Balkan
held that year that held
befound only . A . 69 -
CEU eTD Collection and Rastoder, 2006:183). higher in perce the fact that the number of killed, arrested, detained, and tried during the 1930s was ‘several dozens of times HRSS), thus openly casting off monarchy. idea of the off thus openlycasting HRSS), cent the renamed was party Radić’s Croatian December, 8 on Zagreb in held protest strong - a100,000 at addition, In period. following in the work its boycotted and Parliament H the parties, opposition biggest two the 44), 2006: (Ramet, noconsensus’ of ‘politics Serb the by dismayed Profoundly constitution. new the of adoption for berequired would vote majority simple that decided a qua foreseen had which Declaration the Corfu to contrast sharp In signs. warning political these ignore to chose King. the to allegiance of an oath - Serbia but (all Assembly the in represented parties nine of out seven of members as moment that anti the Serbia, Outside Croats. among becam party Radić’s Assembly, Constituent the for election 1920 the in seats 419 of out 50 Winning disillusioned. became soon Assembly Podgorica the of decisions the supported had wholeheartedly 337), 2007: (Roberts, state’ new Yugoslav the heapin the of bottom the near placedMontenegrins which had ills social and economic address 75 74 totalthe number ofY
the warthe reparations that it should have been awarded after the First W
Between 1919 and 1941, the volume ofgovernment grants for investments Montenegro in wassmaller than The discontent scale ofpopular with Montenegro’s status Kingdom the in ofYugoslavia demonstrated by is , i n the total number of jobs 0.10 per cent 3.1.2. Republican ntage’ when compared to the population than in any other part of the KSHS (Ibid: 207).
Croat based Democ based ugoslav factories was 0.52 per cent, in total assets 0.20 per cent, in driving power 0.17 per
ia: Socialist revolution aspirations of national e the fourth strongest in the KSHS and the leading political force force political leading and the KSHS in the strongest e fourth the
75 Peasants’ Party ( Party Peasants’
rats and Radicals) refused at its initial session to swear to initial session its at refused andRadicals) rats
Nonetheless, t Nonetheless, , and in i lified majority voting procedure, the Assembly Assembly the procedure, voting majority lified - unitary sentiment seemed to be dominant at bedominant to seemed sentiment unitary Hrvatska republikanska sel republikanska Hrvatska 70 ndustrial production value 0.33 per cent parliamentary majority majority parliamentary he Serbian PSS and the Communists, left the left Communists, andthe PSS
orld War (Ibid: 184). 74
even many of thos of many even jačka stranka stranka jačka
(Andrijašević (Andrijašević
e who -
CEU eTD Collection prison by its authorities. He served nearly a year, during 1919 and 1920. his fierce criticism character ofthe ofthe new state, the Peasants Public Order and the State ( State andthe Order Public Subs Zagreb. and Belgrade including cities, larger of anumber won Communists the March, in held elections local the at Interestingly, constitution. new the of adoption the Croatian Republican Peasant Party was, because of the firm anti firm the of because was, Party Peasant Republican Croatian the outlawed, Albeitnot in the country. strongest the third Party, nist Commu banned the 1941, in the Kingdom of collapse very the until being in effect from here which, ( stance, also put under an enormous political pressure. political anenormous under alsoput stance, ( decree a issued government the 1920, 29December On opposition. political toward authorities KSHS the of attitude hostile anextremely by strengthened further was Such impression 2006: 57). (Ramet, many Croats in the of eyes illegitimate kingdom the rendered kingdom, within autonomy be granted Croatia that demand the consideration into taking andwithout party political significant Croatia’s most of participation development. political future its for prospects the to detrimental extremely proved 36), 1993: (Irvine, state’ new the in leaders political Serb of position ‘hegemonic ensuring while adopted, annivers the at 1921, 28 June on proclaimed wasofficially new Kingdom the of the constitution overtone, symbolic 77 76 popular support for the for HRSS. support popular didso the time, over
advocating a radical change of poli of change aradical advocating
This 1389 battle against the Ottoman Empire occupies the central position in the Serbian national narrative. Thus, equently, on 1 August 1921, the Assembly passed the Law on the Protection of of Protection on the Law the passed Assembly the 1921, on1August equently, in May 1921, its political rallies were temporari were rallies political its May 1921, in Notwithstanding the lack of political compromise and not without a strong astrong without andnot compromise political of lack the Notwithstanding ) prohibiting all act prohibiting ) Obznana
The fact t The fact
Zakon o zaštiti javne bezbednosti i poretka u državi i poretka bezbednosti javne ozaštiti Zakon ary of the Kosovo battle. Kosovo the of ary hat the constitution was passed without the the without passed was constitution hat the - andsocio tical 71 ly banned bythe Ministry of Interior. Previously, due to ’ leader, Radi ivities of the Communi the of ivities
77 76
economic system) economic
, as the repression grew grew repression the as , Still The manner in which it was was it which in The manner ć, had twice been sentenced to sentenced been twice had ć, - monarchist monarchist
st Party until theuntil )
CEU eTD Collection election was called. was election gov seven as many as of collapse the and scandals political numerous following later, two years Merely 67). (Ibid: apart’ ‘poles remained two the parties kingdom’, the for point beaturning to potential ‘had the agreement their Eventhough later. months r fou Radicals the with government coalition unlikely an formed (HSS) Party Peasant Croatian the Serbian to parties, partner political legitimate a becoming Thus name. its from ‘republican’ word the dropped even good faith, of proof a as and, constitution 1921 the and dynasty ruling the accepted officially HRSS the 1925, on27March Assembly to aletterthe read In authorities. the with communication of to open channels order in concessions political significant make to wall,agreed the against pushed leadership, its surprise, everyone’s result. electoral improve slightly to managed actually and second came again party the in custody, held being still leader its with conditions, political irregular 37). 1993: (Irvine, Croats infuriated drawn, been have could lines administrative the which along principle’ 33 central into Kingdom the organizing which, law administrative anew of adoption 1922 the by influenced wascertainly success electoral Its earlier. years three as votes many as 79 78 i participate allowed to
(quoted in fiily eonzd tla anxto o te iy f iea A ta mmn, ai ws u o te country, the of out was Radić moment, that avoiding At arrest for his July 1923 speech in which Rijeka. of city the of annexation Italian recognized officially officially banned. consequence, Belgrade authorities ‘translate HRSS’s advocacy ofCroatian the to sointerests as treason’ into (Ibid: 64). a As International a year earlier. This ‘essentially empty gesture of protest’ was successfully manipulated bythe member Pea a his the made of party leader
The HRSS won 22.4 per cent, 0.5 Another In the 1923 parliamentary election, Radić’s party came second, winning twice twice winning second, came party Radić’s election, parliamentary 1923 the In
majorenthusiasm blow to their for new the stat e came in January 1924, when the KSHS Ramet ly controlled administrative areas by completely disregarding ‘historical ‘historical disregarding completely by areas administrative controlled ly
Radić was, upon his return from Moscow, put in prison, while the activities of his party were party his of activities the while prison, in put Moscow, from return his upon was, Radić , 2006: 62). In July 1924, seeking an international support for the Croatian cause, the HRSS
n the 1925 election for the KSHS National Assembly. In the In Assembly. National KSHS the for election 1925 n the more than in 1923.
78
Albeit prevented from campaigning, the HRSS was was HRSS the campaigning, from prevented Albeit sant Internationalsant
he said that Croatia was imprisoned in a ‘Serbian Bastille’ Bastille’ in a ‘Serbian imprisoned Croatia was he that said
72 , an an , organization establish ernments, a new parliamentary a new parliamentary ernments, ed by the Communist government 79
To To CEU eTD Collection elite circl elite could rightfully conclude that his actio ignor to afford longer no therefore could elite political Serb 44). 1993: (Irvine, Croatia in built was proportions’ massive of movement national ‘a assassinated, was Radić time rem polit satisfying a without Left question. national Croat the address properly to elite political Belgrade of failure the of confirmation in Y association and Serbia with alliance for of andambition the ‘much desire that shocked so were in Croatia people Goldstein, of words In hegemony. Serbian the against demonstration popular least at leaving 81 80 anti violent Democratic Party dependent In the by besupported came to reforms democratic and decentralization signi grew leverage political party’s the Moreover Kingdom. in the ats Cro of voice political dominant the remained still HSS ai ad or te HS eeae i te ainl Assembly. National the in delegates HSS other four and Radić shot deputy, Radical a Račić, Puniša June, 20 on atmosphere, such In newspapers. - pro various in appear to began murder their for calls public where point mid By Belgrade. in media and circles political nationalist the of target main the became soon f coalition, Their in Croatia. Serbs of amajority represented
The party finished the third in the September 1927 election, losing six out of pre In viewIn ofthe fact that Ra ained the greatest problem of the Yugoslav state for many more to come. By the Bythe come. to more many for state Yugoslav the of problem greatest ained the e Croat In essence, the physical removal of its main political symbol was just a tragic atragic just was symbol political main its of removal physical the essence, In P es. olitically punished for the ‘unholy’ coalition with the Serbian Radicals, Serbian the with coalition ‘unholy’ the for punished olitically
- government protests swept Croatia during the next couple of days, days, of couple next the during Croatia swept protests government ian
demands for full political emancipation. The necessity of political political of necessity The emancipation. political full for demands ie epe ed Rdćs uea i Zge tre it a mass a into turned Zagreb in funeral Radić’s dead. people five -
1928, the campaign of demonization of its leaders reached the the reached leaders its of demonization of campaign the 1928, which, led by a disappointed unitarist Svetozar Pribićević, Pribićević, Svetozar unitarist disappointed a by led which, čić was subsequently placed under house arrest but never actually trialed, one trialed, actually never but arrest house under placed subsequently was čić
ugoslavia disappeared’ (1999: 121). 121). (1999: disappeared’ ugoslavia n was intaken cooperation with, or at least 73 ficantly after its demands for power power for its demands after ficantly ical answer for an entire decade, it decade, an entire for answer ical ormed in October 1927, 1927, in October ormed with the consent of the ruling viously 67 seats. seats. 67 viously
81
A big wave of of wave A big
ime ime reg 80
the the ian ,
CEU eTD Collection throughout the country, in Croatia under the banned national colors. In November November In colors. national banned the under in Croatia country, the throughout out broke subsequently absolutism royal the against Theprotests rule. political personal his cemented actually powers, of separation the guaranteeing formally an was’at life parliamentary when its moment the at time the first for used beofficially to came thus name TheYugoslav Yugoslavia. of - pre the ( governorships founded newly nine of borders the in which organization anadministrative on3October inaugurated King the politicalsystem, the of let alone afederalization autonomy, regional any endorse not would he that clear it making by There activists. communist of hundreds with together arrested, were Pribićević Svetozar and Party, Peasant the in successor Radić’s Maček, Vladko months, few next the Within opponents. political his against dr i vrhovnoj vlasti kraljevskoj Administration State Supreme Royal Rule Law and onthe the of adoption introduced. officially was dictatorship hispersonal 1929, January Constituti the abolish to decided King the Zagreb, in place took establishment, its of anniversary th ten the on which police with clashes violent the following country, the in crisis political unprecedented Serbia Peasant when the 1928, in August apparent more ever in became KSHS the reforms 82
public display of tribal, i.e. national symbols (Ramet, 2006: 81).
In addition,In determined tocut people’sattachment totheirhistorical regions, the King strictlyprohibited the - On 3 September 1931, the King issued a new constitution which, albeit albeit which, a new constitution issued King the 1931, 3September On the through authority, political absolute Aleksandar’s of The legalization nd seize to recognize the Kingdom. In light of an of light In Kingdom. recognize the to andseize parties based WWI period. WWI - Democratic Coalition leadership made a decision to break off relations with with relations off break to adecision made leadership Coalition Democratic 82
On the same occasion, the country was renamed the Kingdom Kingdom the renamed was country the occasion, same the On
B žavnoj upravi) žavnoj ) cut ) anovine on and dissolve the National Assembly. On 6 On Assembly. National the dissolve on and 74
across national across , was followed by a brutal campaign campaign a brutal by wasfollowed ,
- all time low’ (Ibid: 44). low’ (Ibid: time - provincial borders from from borders provincial
( Zakon o Zakon o
CEU eTD Collection ( now left without the supreme political authority and the main guarantor of its unity. of andthe guarantor main politicalauthority supreme the without now left impact strong a had certainly it Yugoslavia, of collapse immediate an cause not did regicide the expectations, with associated terrorist Macedonian anti ent viol of aseries orchestrating After 126). 1999: (Goldstein, blood’ and descent by people Croatian of ‘members for only reserved be would affairs political in rights making - decision in which Croatia of state anindependent of wascreation goal political te ultima organization’s this achievement, its for struggle in the methods radical 87). 2006: (Ramet, ‘commonplace’ became Yugoslavia in trials political and violence political years, these During Zagreb. nearby killed moment that signatories the one of A in Asaconsequence, Yugoslavia. of reorganization federalist demanded hegemony, Serbian and dictatorship Croat the 1932, 1932 83 l year a deadlytask out the carry to managed they Failingtime, this next year. in December Zagreb to hisvisit of course the in Aleksandar King against attempt an assassination Croatia in emerged
), punktacije Zagrebačke
Available at: at: Available .
- a Bulgarian by in Marseille was killed King the 1934, 9October On ater. In such political atmosphere, a new, extremely nationalistic pol nationalistic extremely new, a atmosphere, political such In - government protests throughout Croatia during 1932, Ustaše 1932, during Croatia throughout protests government http://www.domovod.info/showthread.php?322-
de facto ian
under the name Ustasha movement ( movement Ustasha name the under political opposition released a resolution named Zagreb Points Points Zagreb named aresolution released opposition political
to t to leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, Josip Predavec, was Josip Predavec, Party, Peasant Croatian of leader the . A few in prison years hree 83
in which, while strongly condemning Aleksandar’s Aleksandar’s condemning strongly while which, in
on the Kingdom’s political future as the country was was country the as future political Kingdom’s the on sentenced was Maček 1933, pril 75 Ustaše. Zagreba%E8ke
months later, his deputy and at at and hisdeputy later, months Although, contrary to their to their contrary Although,
Ustaški pokret Ustaški - Punktacije (for treason) (for - The ). Advocating Advocating ). - Zagreb
itical force force itical organized organized - - Points
as as CEU eTD Collection governing party and engaged in state health, agriculture, and industry. The Croatian Peasant Party thus f policy granted were officials resolve Croat the question, which today to easier nonetheless be will it in which trust, ofmutual an atmosphere such create shall we country entire the N 86 85 84 Croat of creation in the newly a and Maček between talks the April1939, in Concluded country. the of reorganization political on opposition the with opennegotiations to agreed finally ment govern Yugoslav the results, electoral the of view In vote. the of cent per 80 than less no by was supported list its Croatia, In vote. the of cent per 44.9 respectable won Maček, president HSS the by headed Accord, Popular of coalition opposition the 1938, held in December Assembly, the National for election subsequent in the aconsequence, As solution. E 2006: 105). (Ramet, was long overdue question’ Croatian becalled ‘the to hadcome what of aresolution that understanding massive, communist massive, following later, days Two 1941. 25 March on Pact the joined government its pressure, political enormous an unde r Put forces. (Axis) Pact Tripartite the by encircled be to came kingdom Yugoslav the a year, Within 49). 1993: (Irvine, late too came deadlock, institutional Stoja Milan public. voting was that fact and the vot the of cent per 37.4 as much as won
were to be allocated in accordance with the vote. ational Assembly were assigned to the government list in advance in list government the to assigned were Assembly ational
In the territory the In consisting of tod In this regard, it should be mentioned that, bythe electoral law adopted In anIn address tothe National Assembly from July 1935, Stojanovi In the May 1935 parliamentary election, the Peasant the election, May 1935parliamentary the In Albeit ’probably realistic and beneficial’, this solution of the Croat the of solution this beneficial’, and realistic ’probably Albeit dinović
appeared genuinely interested in finding a way out of the ensuing the ensuing of out inaway finding interested genuinely appeared - elected Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Dragiša Cvetković, resulted resulted Cvetković, Dragiša Yugoslavia, of Minister Prime elected - organized protests in Belgrade, a group of high- of agroup in Belgrade, protests organized - making authority in a number of areas, including justice, internal administration, 85 ian autonomous region ( region ian autonomous
his government failed to deliver a sustainable political political asustainable deliver to failed government his ay’s Croatia Croat - and
- building activities it had previously shunned (Irvine, 1993: 48).
looks so difficult’ (quoted in (quoted difficult’ looks so
84 though ven 76
e despite numerous reported irregularities irregularities reported numerous despite e At that moment, there was a general ageneral was there moment, that At dominated of part Herzegovina, Bosnia and the Croat B ). anovina
Ramet ć declared the following: the declared ć , whereas only the remaining whereas , 60 per the only remaining cent a
w Yugoslav Prime Min Prime new Yugoslav inally assumed responsibilities of the the of responsibilities assumed inally , Ibid: 101). 101). Ibid: , 86 in 1933, 40 per cent
- led opposition coalition coalition led opposition
ranking military military ranking ‘I be ian
of seats the in lieve that in in that lieve
question question
ister,
CEU eTD Collection soon faced a serious economic crisis, which additionally weakened their political position. areas to German the greeted how they - German the under Acting powers. its by occupied andswiftly attacked was Yugoslavia treaty, accession Pact the ratify not would of Croat of parts decision significant cede May to its following heightened wasfurther leadership of them. most antagonized of idea the with out carried Roma, and Jews Serbs, of executions mass Subsequent camps. concentration of number a up set and laws racial first passed authorities its proclaimed, officially was state 134). (1999: NDH the of establishment the and Yugoslavia of defeat the at pleased seemed Croatia ( of State Independent name underthe state Nazi puppet anew proclaimed 10, onApril and, Croatia in power d’état acoup organized officials 88 87 political strength in Croatia and the lack of illegal work experience, ‘sitting tight during during tight ‘sitting experience, work illegal of lack andthe in Croatia strength political lming HSS’s the overwhe given choice, political areasonable as seemed have may it Although strategy. resistance apassive to switched soon Party Peasant Croatian of leadership the authorities, state fascist the with cooperation advocating initially
German interests (Ibid: 147). ear
Thus giving away shipbuilding industry and maritime economy to the former and most The The ly reports,ly that ‘bestial behavior ofthe Ustasha authorities is causing unrest and rebellion’, thus damaging attrocities were so widespread and brutal that even the and representativeswarned, German in that brutal were attrocities NDH widespread so a month after new the after amonth than Less long. last did not however, The enthusiasm, the latter,the while at the same time for paying the troops’occupying maintenance, the authorities NDH - populated territory to its allies, Italy and Hungary. Italy allies, its to territory populated
87
The sense of popular disappointment with the NDH NDH the with disappointment popular of The sense . After a newly army in Zagreb, Goldstein argues Goldstein in Zagreb, army
creation of a pure living space for space living apure of creation Neovisna D Neovisna 77 - ment announced that it that announced ment govern elected r žava Hrvatska- Italian patronage, Ustaše Italian patronage, 88
uence, while while uence, As aconseq
NDH). Judging from from Judging NDH).
- that most Croats developed agricultural
Croats, actually actually Croats,
in their
took took CEU eTD Collection membership loss. membership concentration camp, and ensuing organizational paralysis ofthe Party, greatly contributed to its rapid NDH NDH thus caved in merely a day after the unconditional surrender of its main Nazi ally. ational struggle were, unlike Serbia, closely associated in Croatia. Croatia. in associated closely unlike Serbia, were, struggle andnational class above, elaborated the reasons For creation. state federal a arguing for them, emphasized strongly Communists Croatian aspirations, national Croat the of importance downplaying thus Yugoslavia, socialist a future in order political centralized inter the throughout While, question. national post Croatia’s in particular, and, of Yugoslavia future Com highest the within differences major became horizon. onthe large loomed war in the victory Army’s the NDH territory. By mid now by quadrupled number whose original – Partisans Croatian 1943, September in capitulation Italian of moment the At rapidly. the 140), anti (Ibid: terror’ genocidal Ustasha lives from in Cr Serbs by supported mainly first self of basis the on built Croatia ‘a free with peoples’, equal and free of Yugoslavia democratic anew of ‘establishment andthe domination’ ‘li in the result to was campaign military the Committee, Central its of 1941proclamation in July stated As invaders. foreign or Ustashas. Communists joined subsequently members its of most as interests Party’s the to detrimental proved in fact tactics war’ the 90 89 Hrvatske
Ma And, indeed, Belgrade was liberated on October 20. On 8 May 1945, Partisan troops ente ček The Yugoslav Communists had, in fact, long been divided on the Croatian Croatian onthe long beendivided in fact, had, Communists The Yugoslav ( Party Communist Croatian HSS,the the to contrast In ’s
arrest in -
KPH) soon organized armed resistance against against resistance armed organized KPH) soon
October 1941, followed by his five - 1944, with the Germans in decline, the National Liberation Liberation National the in decline, Germans the with 1944,
oatia, who ‘took up arms to defend their very very their defend to uparms ‘took who oatia, beration of the country from foreign rule and and rule foreign from country the of beration 78 - mon –
- held under control more than than ofa half more control held under d advocate Serbia in those period, war th longth imprisonment in the infamous Jasenovac - munist ranks regarding political political regarding ranks munist war status. war 90 -
determination’ (Ibid: 142). At At 142). (Ibid: determination’ 89 At the same time, as evident as evident time, same the At
- fascist movement grew movement fascist
ouitča partija Komunistička Ustaša
red Zagreb.red The regime and regime
CEU eTD Collection war’. war’. stood instood KPH the Croatia, of however, This, mobilization. parts for call military 1939 Yugoslav government’s the to replied positively leadership certain to pretentions territorial Italian about concerned Finally, 223). 1981: (Jelić, became clear that the political status ofCommunists would improve, not the KPH was critical’ less iceably ‘not while the KPJ took a negative stance on the 1939 agreement establishing Croatian Banovina it after especially , ideological opponent, the KPH endorsed its candida Sabor ses historic third, its At movement. national Croatia was, accordingly, to dedicate itself to achieving the aims of the Croat the of aims the achieving to itself dedicate to accordingly, was, Croatia in movement Partisan of institution main the as 1943 June in founded ZAVNOH), autonomy of the party and party the of autonomy - state afederalist formulate i national idea of the carried KPH. the of high officials of number a replaced Tito Broz Josip 1937, headin its of position Part Communist the of course political official the from deviating started they ideological, before national putting increasingly Thus (Ibid). Party’ Peasant Croatian andthe movement national t years couple of next the during tactics their adapted Communists Croatian the struggle, revolutionary their for support popular sufficient to as so get sentiments national people’s the was i its most people’ Croat the of liberation national the for ‘fighting that pledged delegates 1937, first in the Hence, 91 National
Thus, forThus, instance, notwithstanding the that fact the KPJ regarded Croatian the Peasant Party as an
sharp contrast to the KPJ’sComintern Regardless of the pressure from the Party central, Croatian Communists Communists Croatian central, Party the from pressure of the Regardless –
abolished subsequent to the 1918 unification – unification 1918 the to subsequent abolished Liberation Liberation mportant task (Irvine, 1993: 78). Knowing that they had to respond to respond to they hadto that Knowing 78). 1993: task (Irvine, mportant - o ‘the overwhelming political reality of the power of the Croat Croat the of power the of reality political o ‘the overwhelming ever meeting of the Communist Party of Croatia, held on 1 August held on1August Croatia, of Party Communist the of ever meeting ( Zemaljsko anti Zemaljsko y of Yugoslavia. of y
state organs in Croatia. The Croatia. in organs state nterest over into the war. Based on it, the KPH would KPH the would it, Basedon war. the into over nterest building strategy that envisaged substantial political political substantial envisaged that building strategy fašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske Hrvatske oslobođenja narodnog vijeće fašističko - guided positionof non- 91
For that reason, soon after he assumed the the heassumed after soon reason, that For tes at the 1938 Yugoslav parliament elections. Moreover, 79 sion, held in May 1944, the Croatian Croatian the 1944, in May held sion, interference in the upcoming ‘imperialist ‘imperialist the in upcoming interference
was proclaimed the highest highest the was proclaimed - Anti Fascist Council Council Fascist of
the the ian -
CEU eTD Collection 153). official correspondence with the KPH the with correspondence official Irvine notes, proved ‘increasingly out of out ‘increasingly proved notes, Irvine s leader, Communist the Croatian Hebrang, Andrija occasion, On this sovereignty. its of expression true andthe in Croatia body political 92 Theref state. in afuture power political of decentralization for allow to intend KPJ did not (‘ appeals and national invader’) the against struggle in the unity and (‘brotherhood class of combination dida use Yugoslavia ( system federal the about held officials significantly improved, Tito embarked on the centralization of its poli its of centralization onthe embarked Tito improved, significantly 1943 late Asin organization. state of model Bolshevik followthe its ending, to subsequent KPJ would, the war. of months first the in l Serbs loca of entirelycomposed almost were units Partisan above, mentioned as where, in Croatia importance particular of Thiswas (Ibid). movement Partisan the for support popular garner to hegemony’) onSerbian based order This process first andforemost first This process
of Croatia and about her relations of Croatia andabouther relations and with other peoples states’ ative about decisions order make Croatia ofCroats theinternal andSerbs in authorit can will theirdecide fate. Inother words, only theCroatian Sabor 1993: 193). , Irvine in (quoted units’ Partisan in majority the compose Croats until succeed never will in Croatia movement abut very small of number Croat peasants’, the leader ofthe Yugos weakness ofthe Partisan movement Croatia in is that it includes the Serb population Kordun in and Lika etc.,
The challenge ofrecruiting Croats the in National Liberation Army was particularly emphasized Tito’s in
ore, the local party units were throughout the war const war the throughout were units party local the ore, These views on the independent authority of Croatian political institutions, institutions, Croatian political of authority independent onthe views These ‘Croats alone,‘Croats through Sabor their
92
Still, while promising national justice for Yugoslav peoples, the the peoples, Yugoslav for justice national promising while Still,
leadershipduring this period. In the fall 1941, while pointing outthat ‘the political and military positions of the Partisan movement movement Partisan the of positions military and political
included the establishment of full political control over over control political full of establishment the included as thevesselas ofsovereignty, [are to]independently
Irvine, step’ with the ideas Tito and most KPJ high KPJ high and most step’ ideasTito the with 80 a struggle against the old repressive old repressive the against a struggle 1993: 164). The Communist Party of of Party TheCommunist 164). 1993: tated the following: the tated
as anexpression ofthe democratic lav Communists concluded that ‘the antly reminded that the the that reminded antly
(quoted in t ical institutions. institutions. ical
Irvine , 2008: CEU eTD Collection e attributes of its sovereignty its of e attributes th of restoration the guaranteed equality, 205). (Ibid: Croatia’ i course anindependent pursue to likely and ‘less tendencies’ “revisionist” Zagreb to susceptible ‘less Bakarić, Vladimir leader, youth Communist former a by replaced was interests, national Croatian for struggle its who symbolized veteran Party terms with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia, Slovenia, and Serbia, Macedonia, Croatia, Herzegovina, and Bosnia with terms prin ( 1941- the during powers Axis against resistance popular who organized the communists, Yugoslav first Yugoslavia, the of failure the Denounci communist politicalre their before belong would it not ns, expectatio party new the of centralization and consolidation political the to athreat posed nolonger demands national ’Croat prio silenced were Yugoslavia socialist emerging the in beguaranteed to sovereignty political Croatia’s demanding voices strong andother Church Catholic the Hebrang, posts. their from ved remo aresult, as were, Communists Croatian leading the period, following the In ZAVNOH. ‘undisciplined’ the of history’, the country was reestablished as a political entity. apolitical as reestablished was country the history’, of After theSe
aonolbdlči rat Narodnooslobodilački ciple of nationality under centralized party control (Morrison, 2009: 66). On equal On equal 2009: 66). (Morrison, control party centralized under nationality of ciple that seemed it moment, that At 1945. November in establishment official its to r The ZAVNOH was thus politically subordinated. The Croatian Peasant Party, Party, Peasant Croatian The subordinated. politically wasthus The ZAVNOH 3.1.3. ng the greater Serbian hegemony Serbian greater the ng - led Partisan movement, won on the platform of social and national national and social of platform on the won movement, led Partisan cond World War which Montenegro once again once which Montenegro War World cond
Montenegro: Rebirth through the uprising the through Rebirth Montenegro:
)
endorsed a federation of six republics based on the onthe based six of republics afederation endorsed - state’ (Ibid: 251). Yet, contrary to the general general the to contrary Yet, 251). (Ibid: state’ 81
which they cited as the cruci the as cited which they 1945 National Liberation War War Liberation 1945 National - actualization. finished on ‘the right side side right on‘the finished
The victory of the the of The victory
highly
lost after 1918. 1918. after lost al factor in al factor - respected respected n CEU eTD Collection permanently disabled (Marović, 1987: 28- as well as sites ( Yugoslavia country’s towns and its physical infrastructure were almost entirely destroyed, entirely almost were infrastructure physical its and towns country’s t In high. extremely was movement fascist 227). 2006: Rastoder, and (Andrijašević capital moral huge merel Containing 170). 1995: (Hobsbawm, Montenegrin were generals army Partisan ( Yugoslavia of Republic People’s Federal new, the entered thus Montenegro 96 95 94 93 communist the of cent per 36 as many as and officers the of cent per 17 war, the At the end of 162). 1992: (Thompson, republic inother any than in Montenegro party Yugoslavco the to belonged population of percentage ahigher War, World nations. its constituent oneof as Montenegrins listed constitution up to 50,000 Montenegrins lost their lives (Bennett, 1995: 45). 1995: (Bennett, lives their lost Montenegrins 50,000 up to Axis in uprising popular largest the hitherto organized they support, logistic Communists’ the with 1941, 13July On nation. Yugoslav other any by unmatched were Montenegrins creation, its for struggle the in sacrifice their and state new the for zeal their in Namely, reason. agood without not was however, This, later. decades five end nearly most Yugoslavia’s socialist of the status the enjoyed
initially successful, leading to liberation of most ofthe country’s territory. e superior militarily over the triumph lasting Montenegrins’ in resulted possibly have Federativna narodna r narodna Federativna
Morethan 30,000 peoplestood upagainst theItalian occupiers. Albeit prematurein a sense that it could not P The official death toll stands at 40,446. Another 95,346 Montenegrins were imprisoned, while 26,144 were In 1963, with the adoption of a new constitution, the state was renamed the Socialist Federal Re ajović writes that more than 21, than more that writes ajović y two y On the other hand, the price that Montenegro paid for being a part of the anti the of apart being for paid Montenegro that price the hand, other the On , as demonstrated in the next section of this chapter, Montenegro Montenegro chapter, this in of next section the demonstrated as , Furthermore Socijalistička federativnarepublika Jugoslavija -
80 per cent per 80 per cent of its population, Montenegro thus joined federal Yugoslavia with with Yugoslavia federal joined thus Montenegro population, its of cent per
of bridges epublika Jugoslavija Jugoslavija epublika - occupied Europe. occupied
000 private homes and public buildings, 321 school buildings, 15 industrial
inMontenegro were demolished (2005: 36). 30). 30).
82 94 he course of four years of the warfare, the warfare, the of years four of course he
- Moreover, both during after the Second Second the after during both Moreover,
SFRJ). FNRJ).
93 - favored republic until its very very its until republic favored
, the 1946 federal 1946federal the , In addition
96
Yet, a considerable aconsiderable Yet, nemy, the rebellion was was rebellion the nemy, mmunist 95 public of
while while - led - CEU eTD Collection Romania. For more on the topic, see: Marković and Pajović (1996). Macedonia, asignificant portion Croatian ofthe territory, as well ofAlbania,Hungary, Bulgaria, as parts and communist official from Monte Montenegrins, Peko Dapčević, who duly entered the city on a white horse’ (Roberts, 2009: 387). commander, decided that rolethe ofliberation ofthe Yugoslav future l ‘should capita fall to oftheone state. See: Rastoder (2003). (2003). See: Rastoder state. killings of Muslims in the northern part of the country, in line with the i 1941, which served as the ideological program of the movement - - nation ethnicall of creation the envisaged program nationalist extremely Montenegrin Partisans and the Serbian royalists ( royalists Serbian the and Partisans Montenegrin adversari oneliminating cused they fo authorities, occupation the with collaborating while meantime, the In power. seize to them for came time the until theirs conserve in opted for 135), 2003: basis’(Rastoder, onafederal berestructured would that andastate equal peoples of asociety for ‘fighting who, Partisans the Unlike - old White the echoed strongly that differences logical ideo unbridgeable the by beseparated to soon were camps two the from resulted casualties these of number 100 99 98 97 from Montenegro in early 1945. early in Montenegro from asthe so Axisforces. to defeat army join Tito’s to all Yugoslavs to appeal public Belgrade, into entry victorious Partisans’ the d, decide was war the of outcome the That minimized. were triumph final the for chances their 1943, September in Italy of capitulation the particular, in and, Balkans the in position Germany’s
discriminate attacks on the German and Italian forces, the royalists chose to to chose the royalists forces, andItalian German onthe attacks discriminate During 1942 and 1943, after the Partisan were forced out of Montenegro, the Četnik
In viewIn of‘the significant contribution of Montenegrin partisans to the war effort’, Tito, Partisan the war Except Serbia and Montenegro, such state - When, a few months later, he visited his home country, Milovan Djilas, the highest The last occupying forces com forces occupying The last state e s and s
under the Serbian crown. Serbian the under
implementing
negro negro
–
later to become one of the most famous communist dissidents dissidents communist famous most the of one become later to
the the royalists knew a year later year knewa royalists the 100
ideological program. ideological
Četnik Četnik of posed according to 97 In the following period, proud of their war war their of proud period, the following In
Initially united in resistance to the invaders, invaders, the to in resistance Initially united 83 99
Green political division in Montenegro. in Montenegro. division political Green
after the document ‘Homogenous Serbia’ from June an internal conflict between the between conflict an internal
would encompasswould Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the and German soldiers withdrew withdrew soldiers and German dea of creatinghomogenousdea ethnically enc o Chetnics or Četnici Serbian 98
With the weakening of weakening the With
and a month prior to prior amonth and King Peter issued a a issued Peter King units carried out mass carried units y homogenous homogenous y - ranking Yugoslav ranking
domestic domestic ) whose whose ) –
wrote CEU eTD Collection capital capital – Podgorica rename to decided leaders Communist Montenegrin architect chief the of in honor Tito, Broz Josip after where instance, for Thus, republics. other by unrivaled Yugoslavia new the for zeal demonstrate to continued Montenegrins achievements, confidence of the victors and the silence and shame of the vanquished’ (1977: 445). in the boundless in Montenegro, synthesized was Yugoslavia if to of seemed as me all ‘It following: the country. the throughout welcomed enthusiastically were Yugoslavia in revolution socialist the of triumph subsequent the particularly, and, collapse kingdom’s the Hence, reforms. political necessary for allow to unwilling proved however, elite, political The challenged. stability political Consequently, a onenation. by dominated bepolitically to came Slav kingdom would which they community apolitical of Instead peoples. its constituent of aspirations political fulfill did not Yugoslav state The first 3.2. out Through the forty 401). 2007: (Roberts, republics all the in offered be should andliterature’ history as areas critical ‘in such curriculum school acommon that - run in the addition, eoples. Their cultural identit cultural Their peoples. Yugoslav all the for emancipation national about 392). (Ibid: shipafloat’ Yugoslav - Serb traditional balancing in part vital a played nations smaller the by provided ballast ‘the that recognized who rulers its by nurtured becarefully would enthusiasm such Yugoslavia, second the of life year
Brotherhood and unity of hopes and fears and hopes of unity and Brotherhood In addition to the new ideology, the end of the Second Worl Second the of end the ideology, new the to addition In –
Titograd, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of t of anniversary fifth the of occasion the on Titograd,
inception its very from was political new state the of up agreement on the 1946 constitution, they strongly advocated advocated strongly they 1946 onthe constitution, up agreement
Croat rivalries and thus in thus and rivalries Croat 84 all enter on equal terms, onequal the enter S all as each of them named a town atown named them of each as
of the Yugoslav federation, Yugoslav the federation, of
he 1941 uprising. In he 1941uprising. helping to keep the the keep to helping
the republic’s new new republic’s the
d War brought brought War d continuously continuously ies
outh outh - and six -
CEU eTD Collection and the guards were ordered to kill thosewho could not keep upor became exhausted. Some lucky survivors spot. The others marches, death on were ofthe the called Cross’, ‘Way taken tovarious parts ofYugoslavia, by mid by below, explained as question, al nation the period, this during answered re reforms, later andits was arrangement constitutional aforementioned the by solved be to considered officially question, national the Consequently, debates. political of focus the into moved gradually interests national of protection the decades, following Yugosl in circumstances economic and political changing with Yet, the 101 new the citizens, its for life better communist the of won candidates by were all seats Assembly, Constituent its for election preceding the In proclaimed. the 1945, 29November On thousands of of thousands What invaders. the with collaborated in Serbia, regimes hybrid of andestablishment pluralism political of introduction to 1980s the end of the toward leading mobilization political of processes in the salient less or more being were singled out, taken to prison and legally tried, but many of the anonymous refugees (Bleiburg and Viktring) handed back the fleeing soldiers and civilians. Some of the more important prisoners Partisans or Soviets. the request the of At Yuthe hope of reaching Austria and surrendering to the British, whom they expected to treat them better than the (joined by a ‘When Partisans reached the outskirts of Zagreb, the NDH leaders, Ustashas, smaller groups of Serbian Chetniks
- Goldstein writes following the about the destiny ofthose dayswho, before its final collapse,left the NDH: opened in most of the Yugoslav republics. Depending on how successfully it was was it successfully how on Depending republics. Yugoslav the of in most opened political equality of the republics representing them were constitutionally defined. defined. constitutionally were them representing republics the of equality political 3 3 - , 1945 .2.1.1. Unresolved national question .2.1. bout 40,000 German soldiers) and many civilians, fearing retaliation, fled through Slovenia in the
101 Croatia: The war is over, the battle continues Ustaša
they they
Croatia,
and continued thr continued Četnik
and Montenegro. and Montenegro. Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was officially officially was Yugoslavia of Republic People’s Federal
members/followers who had fled liberated territories territories liberated fled had who members/followers
oughout the following years in the form of form in the years following the oughout authorities showed no mercy for those who had those who had for nomercy showed authorities - goslav army, the British army in the Austrian border region controlled People’s Front. While promising a a Whilepromising Front. People’s controlled
85 began as a massive retaliation against against retaliation a massive as
were killed on the on killed were avia in the
turned out out turned
political political CEU eTD Collection 1948, the Yugoslav authorities sought for a model of Socialist development development Socialist amodel of for sought authorities Yugoslav the 1948, USSR the in with breaking Politically 1953constitution. its of adoption the with paved the At . question national Croatian the of resolution a final meant goals political two these of achievement the wasconcerned, leadership as Yugoslav the Asfar Yugoslavia. hence, and, Croatia to returned were Mussolini of forces the by occupied previously andD in Istria territories all the Conference, Paris the Peace at signed Italy with treaty FNRJ government’s the of aresult as addition, In federation. within the statehood its confirming anew constitution got Croatia republics, sixthe constituent in Goldstein (quoted Yugoslavia’ in united remain wish to their expressed freely who had peoples equal of community ‘a FNRJ as - re to bepublically came role thehistorical NDH’s of question the politicalsubjects, taboo other many along with long to was sentenced s and the Zagreb of Archbishop while the death, to sentenced were officials NDH highest the Croatia, In trials. Bleiburg and on the Way of the Cross’ (1999: 155). walked up to 1,000 km authorities. republican and federal the between power economic and political of distribution the over intense of course in the when, apparent became attitude such of Thefallacy 251). 1993: (Irvine, ‘unimportant’ as regarded were Croatia, in population Serbian of autonomy
same time, a number of related, of number a time, same The road to the substantial change of political atmosphere in the country w country the in atmosphere political of change substantial the to The road the defining waspromulgated, constitution anew Yugoslav 1946, January In political liberalization in Yugoslavia during the 1960s, the debate was opened opened was debate the 1960s, the during Yugoslavia in liberalization political
to the final goal. to 50,000 Up former Domobrans and Ustashas were killed around
- term imprisonment for pacting with them. A few decades later, later, decades few A them. with pacting for imprisonment term discussed in Croatia. discussed enior Catholic prelate in the country, Alojzije Stepinac Stepinac Alojzije country, the in prelate Catholic enior
86 politically sensitive issues, including the the including issues, sensitive politically e of oneof as later, A year 163). 1999: ,
almatia almatia as as
CEU eTD Collection of national identities of its peoples. its of identities national of only prevented be could in Yugoslavia ideas (re) that belief the on founded leadership, state the of policy national anew with line in was This 208). 2006: (Ramet, remained power political Yugoslavia ( of Communists ‘guidin a to ‘directing’ from socialfunction its of transformation ensuing an Emphasizing organizations. - decision of economic transfer self of concept the launched hence they reform, of As constitutional apart the state. centralized Soviet the to alternative 102 one a into Yugoslavia of lities nationa the of transformation progressive of policy the 1964, December held in major the marked federation, the and even republics six the of atives prerog enhanced which considerably The1963constitution, liberalization. economic and political (Ibid). interests’ authority political its of reduction gradual for underpinning a theoretical provided constitution 1953 the government, the central of role nomic eco the limiting significantly However, control over itself, and only then can it make a free decision’ (quoted in decision
As pointed out by Edvard Kardelj, then chief Party ideologist and one of Tito’s closest associates, ‘for a free Throughout the f the Throughout of anation form the on of its with cooperation other nations, it is this necessary that first hasnation
and, consequently, ‘articulation of pluralist interests, including national national including interests, pluralist of ‘articulation consequently, and,
g’ force (Ibid: 254), the KPJ renamed itself the League of Leagueof the itself KPJ renamed the 254), (Ibid: g’ force ollowing decade, Yugoslavia was put on the path of intense of path onthe wasput Yugoslavia decade, ollowing s officially casted off as ‘tantamount to ‘tantamount as off casted wa officially s nation ‘Yugoslav’
concentrated Jugoslavije komunista Savez
making authority to workers’ and municipal andmunicipal to workers’ authority making 102 step in the direction of political decentralization decentralization political of direction in the step -
management which, in simple terms, implied in simple which, terms, management Accordingly, at the Eight Congress of the SKJ SKJ of the the Congress Eight at Accordingly, 87 - within its highly its within emergence of hegemonic and separatist separatist and hegemonic of emergence through self through guaranteed their right to leave leave to right their guaranteed Jović - governance and affirmation andaffirmation governance , 2009:, 64). -
- SKJ). For the moment, moment, the For SKJ). centralized structures. structures. centralized
CEU eTD Collection number of changes in the SKJ organization, SKJ the in changes of number a achieve managed to they the By decade, endof the system. political federal - decision maximizing by statehood Croatian of respect the t sought Communists Croatian period, war the from comrades their of steps the following that, view of In decentralization. power of process the onwith carry to determination Tito’s of asign as was taken associates Party, the of control over took forces official. communist Serbian ranking 22). 1990: (Cuvalo, centralism’ andbureaucratic assimilation 105 104 103 - decision its making by government federal the of powers the curbed constitution Yugoslav to the 1968 the amendments addition, In 256). 1993: (Irvine, organizations’ party republican the to leadership party central the away from authority and power who leadership Yugoslav the from Those republics. the to administration economic the transferring essentially, and, enterprises of orientation market the increasing werein motion, put reforms economic of series President, powerful head of the state security service (UDBA), service security state the of head powerful President, Aleksandar of office from removal 1966 the with message apowerful sent were course, liberal new, its with up catch not could centrism, state members of the KPJ Central Committee (Ibid). whereas republics’ party congresses assumed responsibility for drawing their party statutes and picking numerical Serb minimize to order in was, organizations its in representation
and politically uncontrolled that many had considered it a ‘state within state’, the following Tito following daydreaming’ (quotedin of kind national integration [of] various which advocates ofhegemonism or denationalizing terror have been the rest of the Serbia (
The KPJ leading bodies were, consequently, increased in size and were to meet less frequently, proportional were size toin meet less and frequently, were, increased consequently, bodies leading KPJ The Dušan Bilandžić, Dušan by witnessed As ‘Our federation‘, Kardelj explained, ‘is nota frame f In Croatia, where around that time liberal and nationally and liberal time that around where Croatia, In ’s move. Danas
Along Ranković, around 1,500 people were fired from the service, , 3December 1991). Hondius , 1968: 294).
prominent Cro prominent
atian historianatian politician, and UDBA, so up powerful tothen
88 or making some new Yugoslav nation, or a frame for the the decision to sack one of his closest closest his oneof sack to decision the o protect the national interest and ensure andensure interest national the o protect 105
result ,
still clinging to the concept of of concept the to clinging still ing in a ‘fundamental shift in in shift ing in a‘fundamental preponderance, replaced by parity, making authority within the the within authority making
Ranković, Yugoslav Vice- Yugoslav Ranković, 103
At the same time, a time, same the At 104
- found itself in dismay dismay in itself found mainly in Belgrade and
oriented political political oriented and the highest highest and the CEU eTD Collection književnog jezika). književnog ( Language’ Literary Croatian the of Name named document the published signed and institutions andcultural academic 18leading Croatian of representatives 1967, March in spirit, this In Serbs. the nation, Yugoslav biggest the of favor in worked f general a by was underlined period this during Croatia in unfolded which debate Thepublic circles. political official the outside raised be to federation in the position Croatia’s concerning issues various Institute for the History of the Workers’ Movement, Workers’ the of History the for Institute ry Gazette, Litera theCroatian in the elements’ ‘nationalistic time, same the At life. public from removed were forward it put who had those while damaging’, politically and ‘tendentious labeled was TheDeclaration negative. extremely were initiative this to institutions political federal in particular, and, republican the of reactions The republic. their in language literary Croatian the of use consistent as well as language, Macedonian and Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, of institutions federal in all equal status they demanded hegemony, linguistic Serbian the masked actually organizations. political federal the decision unanimity the introduced SKJ Presidium the later, years Two (Ibid). representatives republican among consultations upon contingent making 107 5%BEevnog%20jezika/ http://www.matica.hr/kolo/314/Deklaracija%20o%20nazivu%20i%20polo%C5%BEaju%20hrvatskog%20knji%C 106 institutions were effectively neutralized (Ramet, 2006: 235). 235). 2006: (Ramet, neutralized effectively were institutions president of independent Croatia)
Available Croatian)(in at: Franjo Tuđman, general of the Yugoslav army and t and army Yugoslav the of general Tuđman, Franjo At the same time, the liberali same time, the At .
106
- Serbo of official use the that Arguing was expelled and forced was expelled forced and retire. to
eeling that, in all spheres, the status quo actually actually quo status the spheres, in all that, eeling
zation of the Yugoslav political system allowed allowed system political Yugoslav the of zation 89 he Institutehe chair at that time (later tobecome firstthe Deklaracija o nazivu i položaju hrvatskog hrvatskog položaju io nazivu Deklaracija ‘The Declaration on the Status and the and the Status onthe ‘The Declaration 107
and a number of other public public other of anumber and
Croatian language language Croatian - making rule in all in all rule making CEU eTD Collection (Interview, October 2011) peoples eyes ofCroats philosopher revived toward the end of the 1960s. During this period, marked by the process of of process the by marked period, this During 1960s. the of end the toward revived (Ibid). federation withinthe autonomy’ of measure ‘a real provided with wasnot believed, many Croatia, republic, Yugoslav equal of status the to raised albeit Thus, 259). 1993: (Irvine, period centralism post in the negated was essentially dimension ‘national’ its Struggle, Liberation National the of outcome triumphal the notwithstanding and aspirations political their to Contrary authorities. party regional to power political its of decentralization i statehood of Croatian protection the that argued the KPH regard, In leaders people. this its of the at aimed class, to adjacent was, War World Second the during As a sat given be to yet out, turned soon it as was, framework political particular this within question national Croatian the state, Yugoslav first the of the creation after acentury Half 177). 1999: (Goldstein, Croatia take placethroughout to wasabout at wh heralded
later
elaborated above, the Communist the above, elaborated
only The wartime federalist strategy of the Croatian Communists was politically waspolitically Communists Croatian the of strategy federalist wartime The Although having ‘an unsuccessful outcome for Croatian interests Croatian for outcome unsuccessful ‘an having Although 3.2.1.2. ‘ F
would rom the dream about
put away
and isfying answer. isfying n a future socialist Yugoslavia was to be achieved through through beachieved to was Yugoslavia socialist n afuture
into adungeoninto ofnations have
The spring of national renaissance national of spring The sociologist:
i n the communist fridge n the communist its, own space Yugoslavia was,by theearly transforme 1920s, d .
As a state of a state unitynational which in of theeach South Slav
nicely put by put nicely
dominated by Serbs - organized resistance movement in Croatia in Croatia movement resistance organized 90 and thus
Croatian prominent Dvornik, Srđan
prevented from .
Their
ensuing politically developing’ national liberation liberation national resentment ’, this initiative initiative this ’,
in thein - was war war
CEU eTD Collection co greater demanded therefore leaders SKH power, political more to addition In 228). in Ramet (quoted 15per cent that more somewhat controlled thus Croatia Yugoslavia, in capital foreign all of a half nearly in bringing andremittances, tourism ugh thro mainly While, income. country’s the of 3/4 than garneringmore sector, this in monopoly virtual had a capital Yugoslav the from companies trade foreign Moreover, credits. foreign of cent 80 per than more and credits total the of ahalf than - Belgrade argued, they Asaresult, Yugoslavia. in resources financial of centralization further led to actually intention, basic their to self decade the early that claimed experts economic republi the Namely, borders. its within power of redistribution necessity the 259). 1993: power (Irvine: most the the that so organized be must state Yugoslav the that insisted now SKH leadership comrades, his Partisan and LikeHebrang 26). (1971: Socialism’ administrative of period the during question established were ‘which in Yugoslavia relations national concerning those principles of for called elite political new the Croatian most figures, notable its of so ‘fair’ a of post the reform a radical demanded - pro Comm of League the 1952 in (renamed KPH the Yugoslavia, in liberalization political intense
ntrol in the economic sphere, particularly over Croatia’s revenues. Croatia’s over particularly sphere, economic in the ntrol democratic andnationally democratic unist of Croatia Croatia of unist Croatia’s economic position in the federation served as a major argument for argument amajor as served federation in the position economic Croatia’s lution for the Croatian national question. As explained by Miko Tripalo, one one Tripalo, Miko by Asexplained question. national Croatian the for lution during the National Liberation Struggle and which were called into into called were and which Struggle Liberation National the during
republic republic –
SKH) came to be dominated by by to bedominated SKH)came Hrvatske, komunista Savez - – oriented political forces. In the years to come, they come, yearsto the In forces. political oriented
political embodiment of the national principle – national the principle of embodiment political
- - 1945 state 91 based banks controlled in controlled banks based building strategy and, in particular, in particular, and, strategy building - management reforms, contrary contrary reforms, management
the reaffirmation reaffirmation 1969 more more 1969 c’s leading leading c’s , 2006:,
had had CEU eTD Collection ‘nationally awakened’ Croats of diverging political views, the mov the views, political diverging of Croats awakened’ ‘nationally of number large a by joined Spontaneously 257). 1993: (Irvine, discouraged’ even or prohibited be longer no would grievances and issues national of discussion the unitarism, on as negative wasas nationalism state Bolshevik WWII post the of revision radical more ever demanding in Croatia emerged abbreviated) inter national Croatian of protection compromised. was heavily success its of much Croatia, in nationalism of outbreak ensuing the with However, Croat the of triumph political the 181), 1999: (Goldstein, own development’ their for responsible ’become to wouldthem allow that extent the to competences republics’ the increase would which reforms constitutional t later When, occasion. on this Party the - long its Žanko, Miloš SKH ranks, the idea within ( Croats’ among variety Yugoslav romantic the of ’unitarists against warned who associates, closest Tito’s of one and ideologist chief Party the Bakarić, Vladimir by supported was position Her ( nation’ responsible andmost largest [its] of tendencies point she liberalization, economic politicaland further its to opposition Their in Yugoslavia. centralism’ ‘bureaucratic Dapčević Savka head, neglect and demanding redistribut demanding and neglect economic Croatia’s Whileemphasizing 1970. held in January Committee, Central
By the end of the year, inspired by the SKH’s intense political activity on the onthe activity political intense SKH’s the by inspired year, the of end By the Their political determination was manifested at the Tenth the at manifested was determination political Their - building concept. Even though the Party’s official position on on position official Party’s the though Even concept. building - Kučar vociferously attacked political forces of ‘unitarism’ and and ‘unitarism’ of forces political attacked vociferously Kučar Ibid
). Widely perceived as the embodiment of this political political this of embodiment the as perceived Widely ). ion of the federal financial resources, the Party the Party resources, financial federal the ion of ed out, masked nothing else but ‘hegemonic ‘hegemonic but else nothing masked ed out, ests, a mass popular movement ( movement popular amass ests, 92 hat year, Tito announced the adoption of of adoption the Tito announced year, hat time high official, was excluded from was excluded official, high time ian leadership seemed complete. complete. seemed leadership ian uary Plenum ‘signaled that the the that ‘signaled Plenum uary Jan quoted in in quoted meeting of the SKH the of meeting , 1989: 112). 112). 1989: , Tripalo ement reached reached ement Maspok - , CEU eTD Collection to Cro company,the 1918- such as: the endangered status of the Croatian literary language, the establishment of a Croatian airline 1971). its notin advocate justifiable deciding andis outside what interest’ is ( national Yugoslavia, without losing onepart nationalits essence and to be completely sovereign within the framework of a federal intellectuals. economist and a future dissident: andafuture economist Mark by written articles many oneof in presented was outlook political political relations in Yugoslavia ( Yugoslavia in relations political of redefinition for platform SKH’s the endorsed strongly they system’, management and ter Tjednik Croatia the named publication its April, in Launched institution. ( Croatica Matrix by was played period this during formulation ideological its in role Thekey 1971. of half first in the culmination 109 108 – was struggle Partisan the mber, Septe moment of renewal (on a new, class basis) class a new, of (on renewal moment rical histo momentdefining fo for the Croatian statehood. Croatian the for argumentation political their in confines its beyond ventured als soon intellectu based Cro then member ofVrdoljak,
Tjednik The contributors to the very first issue of the weekly, published on April atian origin,atian and the economic exploitation ofCroatia. theFor full bibliography and listthe of contributors atian Democraticatian Un ‘In fact, Matica from people And while principally supporting the Party’s official national policy, Maticapolicy, national official Party’s the supporting principally And while ‘The Croat‘The likenation, the other nations in Yugoslavia, wanted tocompletely realize ) r , see: Brleković (2002).
withinthe [...] being national the Croatian of itorial integration soon became the leading voice of Croatian nationalist Croatian of voice leading the became soon 108
1971 history of unitarism in Yugoslavia, the public activity of Croatian intellectuals of non of intellectuals of Croatian activity the public Yugoslavia, in of unitarism history 1971 With the aim to contribute to the ‘completion of the process of spiritual spiritual of process the of the ‘completion to contribute the to aim With ion told me ion told Matica’s Presidency and later one of the founders and the highest officials ofthe
did not want not did Yugoslavia anymore; the enoughCroats had ofit’
109 (Interview, October 2011).
r the Croat national liberation – liberation national the Croat r on 10 on10 Tjednik in Hrvatski in published anarticle Thus,
Hrvatski Tjednik Hrvatski of its sovereignty and without recognizing any kind of
93 contrary to its official interpretation as the the as interpretation its official to contrary Matica Hrvatska
of the centuries the of , 16 April 1971). The core of their their of The core 1971). April 16 ,
16, 1971 thus analyzed the topics topics the analyzed thus 1971 16, ), Croatia’s oldest cultural cultural Croatia’s oldest ),
characterized - n Weekly ( n Weekly old Croatian legal legal old Croatian o Veselica, an an o Veselica, socialist self socialist , 3 August , 3Ibid August - Hrvatski Hrvatski oriented oriented
–
as ‘a ‘a as Antun - - -
CEU eTD Collection the state of the Serb nation in Croatia, and the nationalities that live in it’ ( it’ live in that nationalities andthe Croatia, in nation Serb the of state the nation, Croat the of state national ‘sovereign the as be defined wasto Croatia reform, constitutional the of proposal presented SKH’s the to earlier According controversial. ( amendment – sixth in the only mentioned accordingly, Ma by forward put Constitution, in continued Croatstate, of the continuity historical the andperpetuating been guarding loc the which during period continuity’. 110 ( nation’ Croat the of state national ‘unified, as defined officially Croatia of Republic Socialist the demanded they andinalienable’, indivisible, ‘one, it Considering sovereignty. Croatian of division a implied it as was unacceptable Matica around organized intellectuals the For 1971). September 240). As 1971 drew to a close, the entire Croatia was, nevertheless, caught caught up in the nevertheless, was, Croatia entire the aclose, to 1971drew As 240). Croatian ( republic in the language official sole the be would Croatian this, all of top On forces. defense independent own its complet only not have proposal, their to according would, Croatia constituted, Thus 1971). the Croatianthe national struggle, the was, under letter capital
coverpage (11June 1971).
Accordi Tjednik The remainder of Matica of The remainder Ultimately, the draft amendments put forward by the SKH were passed in the the in passed were SKH the by forward put amendments draft the Ultimately, e control over its tax revenues its over e control ngly, on the occasion of his birth centenary, a large picture of Stjepan Radi Sabor ’s four November issues. In the proposal of amendments to the Croatian Croatian the to amendments of proposal the In issues. November four ’s 110
Hrvatski Tjednik Hrvatski The diminution of the historical role of the Second World War, as a a as War, World Second the of role historical the of The diminution . Matica Hrvatska
al communists, al , 24 September 1971). 1971). 24September , Ibid tica Hrvatska
from Ramet, ‘lost this round’ (2006: (2006: round’ this ‘lost Ramet, from borrow to had, ’s document appeared even more politically politically more even appeared ’s document ).
but but
94
also a separate monetary policy monetary aseparate also ‘the most loyal Croatian sons’ Croatian loyal most ‘the
instead of the first – first the of instead - , the National Liberation Struggle was, was, Struggle Liberation National the , title ’Radić lives
’
previously published on Ibid
ć, one of the symbols of symbols the of one ć, , such formulation formulation such , articlethe of first , 24 September September 24 ,
had simply simply had
and a Ibid Tjednik to beto even even , 10 , ’s
CEU eTD Collection (Interview,January 2012). onewhich Croat, one Muslim, and rest the ofSerbs [.] It seemed like some kind occupationof an force’ there were 80 per cent of Croats and somewhat less than 20per cent of Serbs, we had 33 policemen, among high disproportionately indeed was administration theand second President of independent Croatia, told me the that number of Serbs state the in localand (Serb time appealed to him to prevent publishing for the first time ever an article about the national structure of (quoted in Irvine(quoted preservation’ national of in their task help them ‘to Serbia lookto to advised were Croatia in Serbs the endangered’, ‘increasingly were rights andpolitical cultural their as Previously, 168). 1989: (Tripalo, Croatia in region Serb autonomous an entirely of establishment the demanded openly members, its oneof Bulat, Rade when point rapidly. grew minority Serb the among unease of 129). in Ramet (quoted history political recent the from events tragic the with parallel awarning making thereby members, its asked leader Yugoslav the again?’ the Croat to effect detrimental Matica tolerating for leadership political republic’s the to critique asharp issued henow policies, reform its of supportive Initially in. counterpart, ction. Similar dissatisfa political to their its for Croatian mouthpiece the into turned Prosvjeta Croatia, in Serbs the of institution cultural leading over exultation. national of state 113 112 111 1971 (Ramet, 1992:128). public opinion in Croatia, increased twentyfold in a year, from2,323 in November 1970 to 41,000 in Novembe
Stjepan Mesi Vrdoljak, then a council member of Hrvatski Matica’s membership, which, in the given political situation, might be considered a reliable indicator of - - dominated) police in Croatia. ‘Common, help us out here’, Tripalo said, ‘ representation in the state and party or and party state the in representation 113 Fac
Soon afterwards, the Zagreb U Zagreb the afterwards, Soon ed ć, then mayor of a small town (Orahovica) in Slavonia, later to become the first Prime Minister Minister Prime first the become to later Slavonia, in (Orahovica) town small a of mayor then ć, Matica with , 1993: 268). 1993: ,
the growing nat growing the
, this organization gradually radicalized political rhetoric to the to rhetoric political radicalized gradually this organization ,
111
In such political atmosphere, with the question of their their of question the with atmosphere, suchIn political - Serb relations. ‘Do you want to see 1941 all over over all 1941 see to want ‘Do you relations. Serb ional tensions in Croatia, Tito finally decided to step step to decided finally Tito Croatia, in tensions ional
Tjednik
niversity students organized a mass strike in in strike a mass organized students niversity g thisg period.durin ‘In Orahovica’, he exemplified, ‘where 95 , recalled a meeting with Miko Tripalo who around that around who Tripalo Miko with meeting a recalled , gans being frequently raised, the sense the raised, frequently being gans ’s nationalist activities and their activities nationalist ’s 112
Throughout this period, the the period, this Throughout rasi Tjednik Hrvatski , was consequently wasconsequently , will bring us us bring will , 1992: , r CEU eTD Collection to obey’ (Interview, January 2012). Miko, and demandedan immediate stop of the strike [;] Convinced they wouldeventually prevail, they refused the students. ’Quite the contrary’, he said, ’I once met with the student representatives onof Savka behalf and carpet. carpet. consequences, I decided to leave the Croat the aconsequence, As 271). 1993: bestopped (Irvine, andmust far had gonetoo processes political resultant the that believe to came thus president its in Yugoslavia, in Croatia. forces c had effective no longer party her that convinced deeply - well and positive were the students of portion greatest the of motives the that convinced 182). 1999: (Goldstein, Croatia’ in situation tense already the ‘exacerbated only it as productive Croatian leadership. the of support 115 114 down’. ‘The edit different more been have not could level federal post the In 342). 2007: (Roberts, ministers Montenegrin to belonged onlyfour wars, world two thirty in the 819 of mandates Out political elite political words, arguing that ‘ University students, and Marko Veselica, a prominent economist who joined their action, confirmed Tripalo’s Zagreb of leaders the of one then Čičak, Zvonimir Ivan organization. its strike’, in i.e. part take that they did not
For the full list of their demands, see: Hrvatski demands, their of Tjednik list full the For Interestingly, Miko Tripalo later claimed that the Croatian leadership ‘did not know whatsoever about the meaning and progressive’ (quoted in (quoted andprogressive’ meaning ian 3 3 reforms liberal the initiated even in part, and, endorsed hadfully he Although
.2.2.1. .2.2.
- national question was once again to be swept under the Yugoslav political political Yugoslav the under beswept to again once was question national 1945 era, the political treatment of Montenegro’s representatives at the the at representatives Montenegro’s of treatment the1945 political era, ’
( Danas 115 orial board’, Vrdoljak continued
Montenegro: Most favored
Consequently, while Dapčević while Consequently, Decades of emancipation the strike was merely an excuse for for t excuse the was an strike merely , 3 December 1991). Mesi
weekly’ (Interview, October 2011). - nine ć also supported the claim that the leadership did not control not did leadership the that claim the supported also ć 114 , ‘refused to follow his advice and, anticipating bad political
Yugoslav governments formed between the the between formed governments Yugoslav 96 T heir political action turned out counter out turned action political heir Ramet , 26 November 1971. November 26 , he federalhe authorities tomove the against Croatian -
Ku Yugoslav republic Yugoslav
čar was, in her own words, ’deeply ’deeply words, own her in was, čar , 2006: 256), Tito now seemed as now seemed Tito 256), 2006: , . On the account of the role they they role the of account On the .
ontrol over popular political political popular over ontrol
-
CEU eTD Collection the generous allocations to their Republic from the federal budget for industrial industrial for budget the federal from Republic their to allocations generous the in Yugoslavia. region agricultural fertile most the as known province, in the d resettle on were live land to sufficient without families Montenegrin of number great a assets, their of expropriation ensuing the and Vojvodina from groups minority other and German of the expulsion to subsequent Moreover, World War. First the after uired acq originally region, Sandžak northern of the part asignificant of return and the peninsula, Sutorina adjacent andthe Kotor of Bay the of acquisition the with enlarged ( simply Put new Yugoslavia. the of the creation from immensely benefited Montenegro than four onemore Communists, t of Committee Executive onthe representatives had four thus Montenegro war, the of end the after years twenty almost 1963, In noticeable. particularly was federation of the structures military and in political presence Their Y socialist the of institutions in the overrepresented heavily remain decades for networks, clientelistic strong to due and, bureaucracy’ federal the ‘colonize to managed Montenegrins War, Liberation National the in played 117 116 much as carried Montenegro GDP, in its percent two andwith Yugoslavia of population in the percent three than less with participating while period, this Throughout are you managing?’ rather than with ‘what are you doing?’ (Fleming, 2002: 156). that when two of them would meet in the street during those years, they would greet each othe Yugoslavia (Shoup, 1968: 269).
Andrijašević and Rastoder and Andrijašević
At the same the At time, Montenegro by far the had highest ratio of A joke inspired by the extraordinarily high ‘visibility’ of Montenegrins in Belgrade, the federal capital, says as one eight of its political muscle (Thompson, 1992: 160). 1992: (Thompson, muscle political its of oneeight as - pre with in common in 1945hadnothing Montenegro , , the power of the Montenegrin political elite was most clearly reflected in in reflected clearly most was elite political Montenegrin the of power the , Still Owing to the strong influence of its political representatives at the federal level, level, federal the at representatives political its of influence strong the to Owing
,
2006: 231). Its territory, to begin with, was considerably wasconsiderably to begin with, Its territory, 231). 2006: - time 97 - its - size Macedonia andSlovenia. Macedonia size Party membership per head (6.7 per cent ugoslavia (Lampe, 1996: 303). 303). 1996: (Lampe, ugoslavia he Yugoslav League of he YugoslavLeague
117
war Montenegro Montenegro war r with ‘where ) in in ) 116
CEU eTD Collection center of the Republic, as well as a number of new industries (Jovanović, 1983: 104- 1983: (Jovanović,industries new of number a as well as Republic, the of center services in the republics (Ibid: 230). during the 1960s, the foundations for the Republic’s economic development were largely put into place. of in 19 in Montenegrinplan envisaged the increaseof industrial production share in Montenegro’s GDP fromper 12 cent powerplants, hundred s of kilometers ofnew roads, state the- from federal still came revenues at the moment ofits adoption there were merely 15 small technically picture. - socio its of change asubstantial about did bring problems structural – Montenegro Republics, - socio accelerated for conditions create development 122 121 120 119 118 post four the during growth annual official Montenegro’s Moreover, times. six almost rose 1990 period 234), 1968: (Shoup, Republics’ funds. andless developed the gapbetween e economic th to was narrow that Fund’ Investment of the ‘General establishment 1953 the following in particular, and, the Republic, the Sea, nor paved roads to connect it with anywhere. almost after its adecade however, opening, there was the neither toconnect arailway mill Adriatic the with from import their on dependent entirely was mill steel aforementioned the Nikšić, in materials underdeveloped areas without basic conditions for their sustainable growth. Thus, for instance, with no raw 230 dinars for every 100 invested in the federation (Lampe, 1996: 276). and 7.94 in Slovenia (Shoup, 1968: 231).By the end of the decade, the smallest Yugoslavrepublic thus received Montenegro, compared to 4.56 in Serbia, 4.59 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5.53 in Macedonia, 6.18 in Croati
the major projects such as the port of Bar, the steel mill in Nikšić, and the aluminum plant in Podgorica in plant aluminum the and Nikšić, in mill steel the Bar, of port the as such projects major the In accordance with the federal, each Yugoslav republic was supposed to create its own five During the 1950s, the average annual expenditure per capita in thousands of Yugoslav dinars was 8.69 in Only by the end of its first Five During this period, notwithstanding all the investments, as much a In line with the Republic’s official economi official Republic’s the with line In 46 to 51 per cent per 51 to 46 119 121
Albeit failing to alter its ‘unenviable status as the least developed of the the of developed as least the status ‘unenviable its alter failingto Albeit
With factories – factories With - Five first the of the course In . 122
ntenegrin economy in the 1945- in the economy ntenegrin in Mo sector industrial of share the in 1951 (Perović and Ilić, 1986: 489- - hadbeen war decades
the poorest one– poorest the often against any economic logic – logic economic any against often - Year Plan, Montenegro, among other things, got six thermal and hydro 120 funded grants
such
economic development of the federation, the of development economic c policy, new industries were largely established in in established largely were industries new policy, c a railway connecting Titograd and Nikšić, future industrialfuture Nikšić, and Titograd connectingrailway a
98 continuous efforts to tackle Montenegro’s Montenegro’s tackle to efforts continuous 490). 490). - in
an - received a disproportionate share of of share adisproportionate received - (1947 Plan Year aid, aimed at improving the provision of social social of provision the improving at aimed aid,
impressive 6.7 per cent (Miljković, (Miljković, cent per 6.7 impressive - backward industries in the Republic, the
s one half of Montenegro’s budget
mushrooming all over over all mushrooming 106). 1952) designed to to designed 1952)
With the finalization the With - yearplan. Since elsewhere. For elsewhere. For - developed developed economic economic
118 a, a,
CEU eTD Collection (Rastoder, 2003: 137). one million in 1979) and the construction of the merchant fleet, consisting of 28 large ships in mid- (starting with 5,000 the in first years after the WWII, the ofnumber tourists visited that Monteneg ( countries education institutions in other Yugoslav republics. Yugoslav in other institutions education 1974, in was founded Montenegro of TheUniversity (1973). Arts and Sciences of Academy andthe (1969), Radio National the (1951), Archive State the (1948), Institute Historical the as such institutions educational and cultural important most the got Montenegro period this during Moreover, (Ibid). 1980s of end the by Yugoslavia years were for many the best in Montenegro’s entire history entire in Montenegro’s best the many for were years Yugoslavia the then, surprisingly, Not others. the to compared status privileged regards, republic federal respected a me beca country the integrated, lly illega was it which into astate of province an unnamed in renaissance six to under war the before 56per cent from dropped population Republic’s WWII. the of end the following decades in the development Montenegrin the marked emancipation 137). 2003: (Rastoder, entire history’ its in economic regeneration greatest the experienced ‘Montenegro aword, in Yugoslavia, Socialist Within 189). 1986: 125 124 123 mid by lished estab largely thus were and culture identity Montenegrin anarticulate of the development for prerequisites institutional establish an institution of higher education. of higher an institution establish Sarajevoof the University 1949, Bosnia Herzegovina in and was, prior last toMontenegro, the to republic
The University of Zagreb, the oldest one in the socialist Yugoslavia, was founded in 1669. With the opening Apart from the heavy As a result, with GDP per capita of $2,300 in 1989, Montenegro reached the leve To sum up, Montenegro witnessed the social, economic, cultural and political and political cultural economic, social, the witnessed Montenegro up, To sum progress, economic rapid the to Adjacent Praksa,
1975: 9). As a result of major investments in education, illiteracy rate in the in the rate illiteracy in education, investments of As a major result the - socialist Yugoslavia. Within a few decades of its existence, from from existence, its of decades afew Within Yugoslavia. socialist industry development, this came as a result of the steadily growing tourism industry industry tourism growing the of steadily as result a came this development, industry
decades and centuries after the establishment of higher higher of establishment the after andcenturies decades
od attributes all stateho with 99 - Television (1963), the National Theat the National (1963), Television - 1970s (Ramet, 1984: 67). (Ramet, 1970s 124 125
- socio an intense A lbeit ‘long in coming’, in ‘long lbeit
l of middle l of and, in many many in and, 123
(Roberts, (Roberts,
ro reached per cent per
cultural cultural - income income 1980s r e
CEU eTD Collection
country’s republics. country’s his of smallest the in debate political of the content woulddetermine largely facts two these death, 1980 Tito’s following period the In controversial. highly remained countr andtheir identity national Montenegrins’ of issues the neutralized, successfully albeit time, same the At subventions. government federal without itself support to unable re Montenegro andeconomy, infrastructure its in investments abovementioned the of despite all Thus, unanswered. substantially left were development future Republic’s - 393 2007: purges during this period wasMontenegro. period this during purges w onlyrepublic the fact, In federation. the throughout occurred cadre changes the party tendencies, political similar Due to positions. leavetheir to forced also were establishment the political Serbian of figures key the later, A months few year. that r in Decembe associates andhisclosest communists Croatian the of head the Tripalo, Mika office from removing by reacted Tito sections, following in the Aselaborated 131). Jović2009: , in (quoted Yugoslavia for structure confederal a more on agreeing to close came even they interests, national republics’ ontheir focused primarily 1971, April In state. federal the of decentralization political and liberalization economic of level greater a demanded openly politicians in First republics. biggest the in mood political prevailing the with odds wasat in Yugoslavia affairs economic and political of state the current that clear became it 1970s, andearly 1960s late in Already mained the least developed Yugos developed least the mained y’s national interest – interest national y’s 3 .2.2.2. National question ambiguity question National .2.2.2. 4).
Nonetheless , some of the most important questions concerning the the concerning questions important most the of some ,
as elaborated in the remainder of this chapter – chapter of this remainder inas the elaborated lav republic and, the general impression was, impression general the and, republic lav 100
Croatia and then in Serbia, the leading leading the Serbia, in then and Croatia
hich did not witness political political witness not hich did
CEU eTD Collection
andfavored state, ‘it was their feltthat they establishment, in its role significant a Playing interests. national their of realization the to anobstacle as Yugoslavia of architecture political (Rob regions’ poorer the for designated subventions the by own economies ontheir imposed burdens the 126 2 (Morrison, orthodoxy’ the Titoist of outpost - pro most the remained Montenegro 1980s, the end of the until reasons, these For jeopardized. being as perceived ‘die of reputation the acquired level, political federal the at overrepresented significantly officials, local party the time, Atsame the infrastructure. cultural and political solid - single of ‘confederation defacto level, Republics’ the to federal - decision the through which, constitution 1974 federal - socio unprecedented of period a experienced federation, socialist the within of republic status the to being raised after Montenegro, that fact the by strengthened was additionally Republic’s , Gore Crne komunista M of Party Communist the of establishment 1948 the of anniversary 20th the of occasion in Yugoslavia. separateness national Montenegrin of feeling at least 2/3 of its citizens who declared themselves as Montenegrins. themselves Montenegrins. who as declared citizens of its least 2/3 at
Thus, for instance, until the collapse of Yugoslavia, in every census organizedin Montenegro there wer - hards’ (Ibid: 420), boundto 420), (Ibid: hards’ ontenegro (renamed in 1952 the League of Communists of Montenegro - Montenegro of Communists of League the in 1952 (renamed ontenegro In contrast to their compatriots from other republics, ‘increasingly resentful at resentful ‘increasingly republics, from other compatriots to their contrast In The Republic’s dynamic development was followed by the strengthening of the of strengthening the wasfollowed by development dynamic The Republic’s
first post- - pro Their 76). 2009: (Morrison, it’ of part being war Prime Minister, erts, 2007: 422), Montenegrins did not seem to perceive the perceive the to seem not did Montenegrins 2007: 422), erts, mic development. Moreover, following the adoption of the the of adoption the following Moreover, development. mic econo
SKCG), Blažo Jovanović, Blažo SKCG), party regimes party
defend the political status quo whenever it was it quo whenever status political the defend Yugoslav of all the republics and, as such, ‘the ‘the such, as and, republics all the of Yugoslav ’ (Lampe, 1996: 127), it acquired ever more more ever acquired it 127), 1996: ’ (Lampe, pointed out that ’it is of particular importance importance particular of is ’it that out pointed 101 009: 72). 009: transformed Yugoslav state into a into state Yugoslav transformed
its long its
making power transfer from the from transfer power making - time highest official and the andthe official highest time 126
In this spirit, on the Yugoslav sentiment sentiment Yugoslav
Savez Savez e are e are CEU eTD Collection hey cherished the [;] institutions upofnational the they thesetting they in theothers behind cherished lagged (“class ardentabove protagonists struggle of theclass most nation”); were(1948); they the (“Our communis nationality is
Radonjić in (quoted creation’ political artificial an as Montenegro present to who seek those by constructed dilemma a‘false was not’ or exists nation Montenegrin ’whether Papović in (quoted reasons’ various for disputed being albeit existed, had which nation andthe Montenegrin people, Montenegrin of individuality national that th utin_papovic.html http://www.montenegrina.net/p 127 ( Milatović Centra the Similarly, period this throughout had officials R the 262), (1975: voluntarily’ joined Montenegro which states they represented ‘an ideal surrogate of Yugoslav nationality’: of the surrogate ‘an ideal represented they national the neutralize to sought effectively leaders party local the dogmas, communist Yugoslav the to adherence strict the Through 92). 2003: (Pavlović, uniformity’ ideological of Montenegrin Montenegrins. of rights national the question into within the federation, they avoided tackling the problem of under of problem the tackling avoided they federation, within the
Available at: at: Available At the same time, while determinedly defending Montenegro’s statehood statehood Montenegro’s defending determinedly while time, same the At ‘Throughout nationally-war thepost [they period, were] less e founding [Party] congress reaffirmed the statehood of Montenegro, the the Montenegro, of statehood the reaffirmed congress [Party] e founding , 2006: 527). In line In 527). 2006: , then president of the Montenegrin Presidency Montenegrin the of president then
identity issue. In practice, Andrijašević and Rastoder accordingly argue, argue, accordingly Rastoder and Andrijašević practice, In issue. identity nationhood. Instead, they purposefully chose to cover it with ‘the blanket blanket ‘the with it cover to chose purposefully they Instead, nationhood. .
l Committee of the SKCG concluded in 1970 that the question of of question the that in 1970 SKCGconcluded of the l Committee ages/pages1/istorija/cg_u_2_svj_ratu/politicka_misao_blaza_jovanovica_drag
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internationalist”), the being to found last a national party with the idea of Yugoslavia as, Yugoslavia of idea the with been been 102 very critical of any initiative that could bring bring could that initiative any of critical very
)
‘an alliance of the free free the of ‘an alliance oriented thanany-oriented other
in words of Veljko Veljko of in words epublic’s highest highest epublic’s , 2011). , - defined defined 127
CEU eTD Collection 2012). same time, we Montenegrin nation
during the second half of 1980s of the half second the during conversation: 1982, from 1977to Committee SKCGCentral the head of time positions. two the between balance political internal an maintain to was determined leadership Republic’s the War, World Second in the revival - Green withvocabulary and replete phrases slogans’(2006: 259). policy of inferi 128 such such prominent been created in Montenegro’ in been created hadnever program national anunambiguous forward would put that mass political the SKJthe Central Committee (1986 aware of January 2012).
During this period, Orlandi member position party Marko Marko rooted deeply the bridging at aimed primarily was policy national ‘neutral’ Such n iw f aoa Radonjić, Radovan of view In ‘ ‘ White political div White political None of us theproblemWe hadinherited ofidentity howpolitically sensiti
representative of the the of representative ority and the extended hand [;] t
radć te highest the Orlandić, of of never had an open discussion an open neverdiscussion about had the the
b [ ut we SKCG was , leadership political andYugoslav Montenegrin ć served as the head of the SKCG (1984SKCG- the of head the asserved ć
greatly - primarily ision in Montenegro. With strong memories of its bloody bloody its of memories strong With Montenegro. in ision 1989).
leadership members]leadership
ve itve was,
(Interview, December 2011). December (Interview,
differed in terms in differed of Republic’s communist Republic’s
a result of the fact that ‘a critical that fact the of a result , told me -
decided tokeep ranking communist official from Montenegro Montenegro from official communist ranking Montenegrin University professor and professor University Montenegrin 103 hey operated by aand used clichés political
, dating back to1918, back , dating the ever questionedever the [existence of the] : same its these matters
understanding and definition. and understanding it 1986), and a member of the Presidium of
under the 128
leadership
H confirmed this during our our during this confirmed eld in April 1974, at the at 1974, April in eld party ’
were we were and, because
(Interview, December Vojo Srzentić, Vojo
, period this from ’ (Interview, ’ carpet
and intellectual serving as the the as serving another
At the long-
CEU eTD Collection
peoples’ (Ibid). peoples’ among our mistrust and updisbelief stirring as well as closing and cultural economic Republics, the between boundaries creating at which aims nationalism [Montenegrin] ‘Separatist the and Yugoslavia’, of unity the jeopardizing for equality national policyof Communists’ of League Montenegrin the blaming while equality, and cultural nomic, eco political, Montenegro’s challenges culture, and nation Montenegrin denies positions, centralistic from often which, nationalism Serbian ‘Greater the both to - 179 1974: (quote dangerous’ equally are anddimension, form the of regardless nationalism, of ‘all sorts that concluded thus Congress Sixth SKCG the horizon, political Yugoslav onthe large loomed rights national of question when the moment 129 death, Tito’s Even after state. Yugoslav the to belonging of sense strong in the unified appeared Montenegrins privileged and economically politically WWII, the after poles. two its political between tensions the the issues of Montenegrin national identity and the related Montenegrin national national Montenegrin related andthe identity national Montenegrin of issues the hand, other the On 2007: 426). (Roberts, memory’ toMan’s Old revere to ‘continued ’ palette alarger into tones two Montenegro’s ( ( reprint of book. his reprint Montenegrin nationalist, politically marginalized and even expelled from the Party subsequent to the 1988 of Montenegrins. For refuting a widely- SKCG officials and, perhaps, the only one who at that time sought to systematically analyze the ethno genesis psak irzou crnogorsk razvoju i postanku O , 1989: 6), as cha as 6), 1989: AS,
The latter primarily referred to the 1974 book ‘On the Origin and Development of the Montenegrin Nation’ communist leaders of Montenegro had been able to keep under control potential potential control under keep to hadbeenable Montenegro of leaders communist T he s 180). This, as emphasized in the final document of the Congress, related related Congress, the of document final in the emphasized as This, 180). ocialist federalism ocialist 129
Through this ‘undefined dual politics without a national program’ program’ national a without politics dual ‘undefined this Through racterized by Jevrem Brković, Brković, Jevrem by racterized nacije e
an ethnic origin, Brković was marked as marked was Brković origin, ethnic an Serbi their on thesis accepted ), written by Savo Brković, a WWII national hero, one of the highest the of one hero, national WWII a Brković, Savo by written ),
seemed to ‘ to seemed 104 engulf this demarcation by absorbing absorbing by demarcation this engulf
( Thompson, Thompson, prominent Montenegrin novelist, novelist, Montenegrin prominent : 160). For decades For decades 160). 1992: d in Vrbica
they , CEU eTD Collection
ng and ng and stro keep to attempt any heunderlined, perspective, that from Viewed society. aself with state the replacing about was in general project Socialist the Kardelj, by elaborated As federation. in the ambitions hegemonic Serbian anti in theory, was, centrism Yugoslav of policy the view, their In apparatus. andparty state federal the of role central the of weakening demanded decentralization economic and political of advocates in C Mainly based 1960s. early the in initiated federation, Yugoslav the of future the on debate political of anintense a result This was andprovinces. republics to the federalcenter the from power transferring effectively amendm constitutional of aset mentioned, previously as and1971, 1967 Between circles. intellectual Serbian the among appeared first federation socialist the in Serbia of position political concerning dissatisfaction (Ibid). theiradvantage’ to greatly worked m was for hoped have could Montenegrins that the best programs, national ambitious and defined less or more with crisis political of period the entered peoples Yugoslav the of most while And shake. to started federation socialist the of foundations Yugos within status political unresolved. essentially remained interest 130 anew Y of adoption 1974 the Ahead of national empancipation of Montenegrins was essentially left unfinished’ (Interview, September 2012). the first intellectuals who openly supported the idea of Montenegrin independence, told me, ’the work on the
ore of the same, i.e. ‘the continuation of a system that they rightly believed had had believed rightly they that asystem of continuation ‘the i.e. same, the of ore ‘ Because of the communist elite’s policies’, Milorad Popović, a prominent Montene prominent a Popović, Milorad policies’, elite’s communist the of Because 3 3 .2.3.1. A lone voice against decentralization .2.3.
Serbia: The fearof (others’) freedom
- bere boundto were they lavia, - Socialist and, in practice, s in practice, and, Socialist
105 130
Determined principally by Montenegro’s Montenegro’s by principally Determined ugoslav constitution, serious signs of of signs serious constitution, ugoslav ents was passed in Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia, in passed was ents
roatia and Slovenia, the the andSlovenia, roatia
problemati erved as a cover for acoverfor as erved grin writer and one of one grin writer and zed - managing managing
as the
CEU eTD Collection ideological guise’ideological (1981: 228). orpeoples, whether it fall will into the hands ofhegemonic forces in any or political -managing, of equal self and d emocratic communityto continue a Socialist, develop as
influence (Jović, 2009: 64). 2009: (Jović, influence leaders’ republican the of stayindependent must forces, security and the army, the Party, placethe first in the institutions, e federal th that hebelieved reason, that For disintegration. its to lead eventually would view, his in which, process the Yugoslavia, of liberalization economic and decentralization political of opponent leading the as t of symbol A Ranković. Aleksandar by represented were ideas their federation, of the summit political the At 12). 1996: (Pešić, ‘Yugoslavism’ and power of center the with siding strategically while Yugos dominant politically Socialism: of purpose the main to bedetrimental in essence, in placewould, state Yugoslav centralized 132 131 he came to acknowledge the necessity of the country’s political decentralization. political country’s the of necessity the acknowledge to he came national the resolving permanently of aim an andwith state, the of decline natural of concept Marxist the with accordance In Tito. from came that ideas its of endorsement the was regard m previously as long switched back and forth between the two camps. However, as an experienced politician, now thinking of a statist ideology that would “
Jović notes that, b that, notes Jović Interestingly, before he finally made uphis mind in this regard, Tito’s support had, o - lasting legacy of his rule (he was well in his 70s), while being aware that the national question could be On the other hand, the majority of party members from Serbia, the largest and and largest the Serbia, from members party of majority the hand, other the On The 1964 Congress of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia represented, represented, of Yugoslavia Communist Leagueof the of Congress The 1964 ‘The alternative‘The here is not whether Yugoslavia survive will or not,but whether will it entioned, a big triumph of the former political camp. Crucial in this in this Crucial camp. political former of the triumph abig entioned, y ‘ he gemonic forces’ ‘ meant Kardelj
naturally” rely on the strongest nation’ (2009: 67).
question in Yugoslavia on the basis of equality of its peoples, its peoples, of equality of basis onthe Yugoslavia in question lav republic, strongly opposed such developmental concept concept developmental such opposed strongly lav republic,
131
he state apparatus, Ranković was seen by many by seen was Ranković apparatus, state he 106 Soviet - type Communiststype other or any type of gre
n several occasions, occasions, several n 132 at-
CEU eTD Collection institutional fissures along which Yugosla which along fissures institutional national oligarchies and entrenched their power in the constituent republics of the SFRJ, created the Communism in practice - practice in Communism asrepublics sovereign states formulated (as 1974 the in Constitution), ideological the narrative ofYugoslav argues nations’ (2009: 20). Similarly, Ramet notes that ‘the formula, which established a network of quasi Ibid: 65). Jovi
economy economy (Ibid). organization political aunified as disappeared basically party ruling Yugoslav the organs, republican in Marc summoned Congress, next SKJ the following Moreover, (Ibid). country the in sovereignty of bearers real the in Pešić (quoted ‘unitarist’ and ‘bureaucratic’ as nations awayof withering idea about the ling labe thereby assimilat as culture’ ‘Yugoslav of notion the rejected therefore The Congress 133 manipulated, easily The liberal republic. own their on entirely be focused should mission political their that other, the – modernization on onehand, the that, belief on the wasbased Serbia’ ‘A Modern called program political Their freedom. and economic political more from benefit couldonly republics other as well as Serbia that arguing Lat : 412). In this regard, Perović, Perović, regard, this In 412). 1997: (Budding, internal’ considered were republics other in that all affairs in intervene f the (because interference political and federation's) the with beidentical to assumed wrongly were interests economic Serbia's (because neglect economic of dangers twin the to itself from then on depended primarily on a
The fact The fact that the Yugoslav state was thus based on anti‘an , n o te an ore o is usqet crisis. subsequent its of sources main the of one ć, inka Perović and Marko Nikezić, strongly endorsed the policy of decentralization, decentralization, of policy the endorsed strongly Nikezić, Marko and Perović inka that
Appointed a year earlier, the new Serbian liberal political leadership, led by by led leadership, political liberal new Serbian the earlier, ayear Appointed ‘by treating Yugoslav constitutive as nations completed (as Kardelj formulated it in 1970) and their – s thus assumed that identifying Serbia with Yugoslavia ‘exposed Serbia Serbia ‘exposed Yugoslavia with Serbia identifying that assumed thus s
would eventually resolve the problems of Serbia and Yugoslavia, and, on and, Yugoslavia, and Serbia of problems the resolve eventually would ederation assumed in Serbia, and especially in Belgrade, the right to right the in Belgrade, andespecially in Serbia, assumed ederation
the Yugoslav leader decided to take the country down the path of political reform (Jovi
and perhaps unintentionally - , 1996: 12). Nations/republics were, accordingly, to become become to accordingly, were, Nations/republics 12). 1996: , 133
political compromise of the republics’ political elites, was, according to according was, elites, political republics’ the of compromise political h 1969, which effectively transferred its power to the the to power its transferred effectively which h 1969, via wouldbreak up’ (2002: 6).
at that time the S the time that at 107
shielded and promoted nationalism in its constitu its in nationalism promoted and shielded
In his analysis of the Yugoslav collapse, the author author the collapse, Yugoslav the of analysis his In - state ideological conception’, i.e. that its stability its stability that i.e. conception’, ideological state ecretary to the Serbian League League Serbian to the ecretary
primarily in the sphere of of sphere in the primarily - feudal ory, ory, tive tive ć, ć,
CEU eTD Collection of theminority notaproblem is for theminority, butfor themajority’: 123). Ibid (quoted in committed. andnationalities ofsmaller nations wider possibilities (than necessary)for thedevelopment
(quoted in Jović (quoted in Prime Minister and an uncle of the future Serbian president, Ivan Stambolić, Stambolić, Ivan president, Serbian future the wayinany Yugoslavia: in being endangered of Serbia possibility the discarded of uncle an and Minister Prime 109). 2009: (Jović, Yugoslavia elsein everyone to being a‘guardian’ of suspicion permanent the from relieved Serbia, democratic modern, of emergence the for chance unique was a it officials, political the Serbian For ideas. these of realization way for openedthe centrism state Yugoslav the of embodiment the represented said, previously as who, Ranković of 1966 deposition TheJuly 268). (1991: itself’ Serbia in areas and cultural economic, chances the and minimizing onher pressures further reducing thus equals, among an equal as Serbia of position the strengthened also they ‘because acceptable were changes constitutional the ( Communists’ of 134 Y the of decentralization political of aresult as jeopardized be could republic of their interests thus stated the following the stated thus
The latter term used for national minorities, i.e. ethnic groups without their own republic in Yugoslavia. in republic own their without groups ethnic i.e. minorities, for national term latter used The In a similar vein, Petar Stambolić, veteran of the Serbian politics, then Federal Federal then politics, Serbian the of veteran Stambolić, Petar vein, similar a In sam the At ‘It is only is ‘It themajority put thatcan onpressure minorities, and therefore theproblem and rights more granting of themistake was noother place ‘At noother time andin ugoslav federation. ugoslav 134
History has never thatsuch recorded a“mi , 2009: 95). , Savez komunista Srbije- komunista Savez e time, the Serbian leadership saw no reason for concern that the concernthat for noreason saw leadership Serbian the e time,
in 1968: June
Nikezić, the president the Nikezić,
for renewal of hegemonic tendencies in the political, political, in the tendencies hegemonic of renewal for
108
SKS) Central Committee, Central SKS)
of the SKS’sCentral Committee, stake” committed was toward them’
later
wrote that wrote
CEU eTD Collection the ownof its national state, ideal historic old and goal national by might an beinflamed also people [...]thentheSerbian conquer orientations endure and (Komunist, 1968:111).
called for protect for called who University, Belgrade the of Faculty Law the at professor anda philosophers best the of one Djurić, Mihailo from came amendments constitutional nationalism: Serbian the of revival consequential anticipating thereby policy, disintegrative Party’s the to opposition his voiced Yugoslavia, and in Serbia crisis thi of member a Ćosić, – of one state borders within living all Serbs confeder its possible a as them, to made which Yugoslavia, of weakening structural the gradual of consequence According 15). 1996: (Pešić, system communist the by mediated and‘Yugoslavism’, ‘Serbianism’ between asymbiosis considered Serbs what the to areaction was activism their political effect, In 34). 1999: (Thomas, integrity territorial Serbia’s to a threat posed authorities federal the by pursed the policy that duringperiod this fears their began expressing intelligentsia Serbian 135 14 the at mind, Jovi is no
ć in a completely different manner:different completely a in ć Stamboli by was perceived process political same the Interestingly, ć current current oftheborders Socialist of Republic ( Serbia?’ , 2009:, 124). t disintegration; this is integration because integration can be successful only if it is voluntary’ (quoted in Even more ardent and politically controversial attack on the aforementioned aforementioned onthe attack controversial andpolitically ardent Even more the of s representative of a prominent number arguments, these to contrast In ‘At the moment when it is led by led ‘At themoment toward ofcircumstances when is theforce it theestablishment . Yugoslavia in ‘If i.e traditional,
th
ion of ‘the endangered national interests of the Serbs in Yugoslavia’: in Yugoslavia’: Serbs of the interests national ion ofendangered ‘the Plenum of the SKS’s Central Committee held in May 1968, Dobrica Dobrica 1968, May held in Committee Central SKS’s the of Plenum alization and, even, dissolution, the fundamental Serbian goal Serbian fundamental the dissolution, even, and, alization
can the Serbiancan people remain s body and one of the key figures of the upcoming political political upcoming the of figures key the oneof and body s
- the unification of the Serbian people in a single state’ state’ of the Serbian a in single people the unification 109 nationalist policies and-statist particularistic
was called into question. into was called Anali indifferent to its to indifferent its manyoutside parts , 1971:230-233). - known Serbian known Serbian 135
With thatin
fading of of fading ‘This ‘This –
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the system ( system the of features symbolic or decorative mainly hadremained but 1948 since been in place of its political autonomy was, nonetheless, yet to be achieved. As pointed out by by out Aspointed be achieved. to yet nonetheless, was, autonomy political its of the Kosovo’ to cadres Albanian of promotion noticeable more province, in the majority Albanian the against police heavy a continuous of end the marked things, other arr constitutional future the on debate political the of issue sensitive most the represented Kosovo of federation. Yugoslav the of republic biggest the weakening purposefully thus body, political Serbian the of remainder the from provinces the detach functionally to supposed was andVojvodina in Kosovo institutions ‘bureaucratic’ of strengthening proposed they argued, Thisway, 417). 1997: should in Croatia, Serbs including minorities, significant all numerically of rights national representatives, its to According politics. state federal the of inconsistency of proof best the elite, intellectual Serbian of the part aconsiderable of in view was, republics Yugoslav in other arrangements ( proper Serbia to only applied parliaments their by approved not were laws that whereby powers, andjudicial executive, legislative, i.e. statehood, of attributes main Kosovo) and (Vojvodina provinces Serbian two adoption, amendments’ constitutional the aforementioned of aresult as 1960s, late the in already creation the was Serbia, of interests national the for damaging most the as regarded group this of members Serbia without its autonomous provinces). The absence of similar constitutional constitutional similar of The absence provinces). autonomous its without Serbia Due to its immense symbolic importance in the Serbian mythology, the status the mythology, Serbian the in importance symbolic immense its Due to the which plan, decentralization Yugoslav the of element particular One Cohen, Cohen, angement for Serbia. The principles of provincial ‘autonomy’ provincial of principles The Serbia. for angement 2001: 21). Only after the removal of Ranković, which, among among which, Ranković, of removal the after Only 21). 2001: of politically autonomous entities within its borders. Namely, borders. Namely, withinits entities autonomous politically of s governing positions could take place. Full realization Full realization place. take could positions governing s 110 have got territorial expression (Budding, (Budding, expression territorial got have - handed repression of his secret secret his of repression handed
seized the the seized
had CEU eTD Collection ammunition for all their [Serbian and Croatian] id federal institutions, while Croatia was controlled the by local Serbs. ’Such solution, unfortunately, provided bel intellectuals, not even have autonomy?’ total (
hence, their delegates could vote – couldvote delegates their hence, represented were assemblies provincial the Republic, from independent being functionally while time, same the At andVojvodina. Kosovo over jurisdiction effective no had Serbia andcourts, governments, presidencies, parliaments, units. 1974 the rel other many and Hoxha’s the to An answer War SecondWorld the from veteran Movement Partisan Yugoslav a and official communist Albanian aKosovo Hoxha, Mehmet 138 137 136 (Pešić, republic the SFRJ, the of Presidency collective in the equal representation of veto, right hadthe provinces the practice, In 19). 2002: (Dimitrijević, optional be to was Serbia of affairs the in ‘role’ their whereas own, their in conducting as well as affairs federal the in participation Yugoslav republics. Yugoslav provi autonomous as designated formally andVojvodina, Kosovo 202), 1984: law (Repishti, federal the parts of Yugoslavthe federation. death. his until lavia Yugos in power political absolute the of bearer remained Tito existence, its Despite chairman. constitution, it consistedof nine
In the article 3of the Constitution, the provinces were, alongside the republics, enlisted as the constitutive Created in 1971, this particular body served as co Žarko Puhovski, Zagreb University Zagreb Puhovski, Žarko 136 3.2.3.2. ’Why
W constitution which defined Yugoslavia as consisting of eight constituent of eight consisting as constituent Yugoslavia which defined constitution ith their legal status being f status legal ith their 370,000 Monte havenegrins their own republic ieves that Tito that ieves 138
Wading in collective self- and the right to present their own interests without consultation with with consultation without interests own their present to right and the ia in Serb nces 137
1996: 30). Furthermore, given that they got their own theirown they got giventhat Furthermore, 30). 1996:
had an idea of In that sense, the Constitution clearly emphasized their their emphasized clearly Constitution the sense, that In
members, one from each republic and province, plus the SKJ Presidium
professor, liberal and most philosopher ofthe one prominent Croatian , 5March 1968). Borba
de facto
Yugoslavia being organized so that Serbia was controlled by the in its parliament. In addition, until the end of the endof the the until In addition, parliament. in its eologies later emerged’that October (Interview, 2011). Serbian onthe merely not ormed 111 llective ofstate head SFRJ. ofthe According tothe 1974
got similar political status as the six as six the status political similar got : pity came questions ated
while 1.2million doAlbanians the adoption of of adoption the but alsoon but –
and,
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27). (2002: situation’ constitutional abnormal in ‘an itself found Serbia that all this, of be cannot It 15). 1996: (Pešić, republics other like the party asovereign negotiating not therefore was Serbia federallevel, the At 172). 2009: (Jović, compromises political on based were provinces its with relations republi Yugoslav biggest the Constitution, new the to according word, a In assemblies. three the of upon consensus t as andeducation, such defense as laws in matters important pass not could Serbia wasabolished, autonomy provinces’ its when 1980s 140 139 climate was taking place in the province (Cohen, 2001: 26). Coupled with spectacular spectacular with Coupled 26). 2001: (Cohen, province the in place taking was climate political of change asignificant that wasobvious it membership, and party population in the sharply as drop actually not did influence political their that fact the despite Montenegrin non made nationalism, Albanian of manifestations frequent by followed affirmation, and ethnic emancipation political rapid Their rights. andlinguistic cultural broad given were Albanians Kosovo country, the - long the was Kosovo - new socio the by jeopardized essentially, Whatwas, rights. conviction that Serbia had to sol officialhighest Socialist ofthe Party ofSerbia, me told that general the awareness about this problem the and of the anti Republic’s authorities (Interview, January 2012). ‘The adoption of the years, noted,he people grew increasingly frustrated with the lack of adequate an political reaction ofthe al intelligentsia in Kosovo were also overwhelmingly non also in were overwhelmingly Kosovo technic intelligentsia al and elite Academic personnel. managerial a of provincial more the and half functionaries, legislative and its total still population, held positions 1/3 in p the as the only loser’ – loser’ only the as of a nationalistic atmosphere in which, while all the other republics supposedly profited, Serbia was regarded
The 1971census, for instance, showed that Serbsand Montenegrins Kosovo in In relation to such claims, Milan Jovanović, Belgrade University political science professor and a long a and professor science political University Belgrade Jovanović, Milan claims, such to relation In 139
More to the point, being the only constitutionally recognized ethnic minority in minority ethnic recognized constitutionally only the being to the point, More
- Milošević opposition mentioned during our talk (Interview, January 2012). –
Žarko Korać, Belgrade University psychology professor and one of the most notable figures figures notable most the of one and professor psychology University Belgrade Korać, Žarko population in the province feeling deprived of pr of deprived feeling province in the population lasting power hegemony of this minority group. this minority of hegemony power lasting veeventuallyit had already existedin thisperiod. Throughout the following
arty and mass organizations, 45 per cent 112 c was formally a unitary state whose whose state unitary a was formally c denied, Dimitrijević concludes in view view in concludes Dimitrijević denied, - Albanian (Cohen, 2001: 24)
1974 Constitution resulted in the creation - Albanian Albanian heir adoption was contingent wascontingent adoption heir political developments in in developments political , who made up per21 cent eviously held political political held eviously –
mainly Serb and and Serb mainly
of the government government the of
140
Hence, Hence, - term
of CEU eTD Collection
demographic growth of the Albanian majority, Albanian the of growth demographic 141 d criticize they Kosovo’, in people Serbian the of essence andbiological spiritual the of ‘the protection for calling while in which, an appeal 21 younger later, A year 156). 1997: (Judah, girls’ Serbian little of rape the including violence, of acts andfrequent graveyards and churches their of destruction the Serbs, Kosovo of persecution the about circulate to s began ‘storie country, the Throughout demanded. openly was republic Yugoslav aseparate into province the of transformation the which during April 1981, and in March Albanians Kosovo of demonstrations narrativ political anationalist of the construction for abasis as served crippled politically country and 1980s. 1970s the during Kosovo from andMontenegrins Serbs constituency in Serbian politics’ (Cohen, 2001: 53). 2001: (Cohen, politics’ in Serbian constituency silent rather still but animportant of the support enjoy likely would interests, - hard a as mantle [Ranković’s] post his assumed ‘whoever that signal wasaclear it importantly, More 230). (2009: the criticized Ćosić) (like who those with solidarity of asign also but 1966, in office of from ousting his with Serbs many of discontent the of demonstration ‘a words, Jović’s in was, thousands of presence The 1983. August in funeral Ranković’s at manifested fully be to came public Serbian the of psychology tow pursued the policies for authorities the century, and 3.5 million by 2021 ( It was estimated that, as aresult, its population of1
During the 1970s, with 27 l The ensuing wide- The ensuing - wakening Serbian Orthodox Church publicized publicized Church Orthodox Serbian the awakening of priests generation e in Serbia. Such impression was only enhanced by the massive massive the by enhanced only was impression Such e in Serbia. ivebirths per1,000 people, spread belief that the new federal constitution had left the the hadleft new constitution the federal that belief spread
Radio Free Europe Research d to Serbian national national d to Serbian devote leader communist nosed .6 million (in 1981) would growto 2.6 millionby the end of 113 ard the province. The ‘wounded lion’ lion’ The‘wounded province. the ard
Kosovo theofficially had highest rate birth in Europe. 141 , 7 August 1987).
this led to asizeabl to led this
the political and religious religious and political the -
Ranković Yugoslavia’ Yugoslavia’ Ranković
e exodus of CEU eTD Collection Albanian minority?Albanian of Inthecourse peripheralising developments Yugoslav in federalism the denselyby populated also that are andMontenegro Macedonian in of parts instance, minority,Albanian thiswhyhas been done only the in Serbian federal andunit, not, for
then Koštunica, from Vojislav came also claims such for support A strong 3). (1986: discrimination’ drastic to exposed is (Kosovo) Serbia Republic of the of the provinces oneof in population Serbian isbecau It history. constitutional country’s other which hadnoequal in any system constitutional Yugoslav the within position he wrote, Accordingly, . leadership cal politi Serbia that instance, for argued, well a and professor university Belgrade Tadić, Ljubomir and shared 142 1986: later to become the leader of the anti of leader the become to later Drašković, Vuk province. southern its particular, in and, Serbia of destiny political the about concerns their voiced Association Writers’ Serbian the around gathered suppression of the opposition. ideological foundations, arguing that the Communists had come to power through intimidation and Koštunic minority (1988: 78 rights genuine enjoying same time without atthe unit federal minorityown of their national part in the Serbs have been put the in paradoxical situation of being reduced to the state of a
n i 18 wr wt Ksa aok, nte rpeettv o te eba ntoait intelligentsia, nationalist Serbian the of representative another Čavoški, Kosta with work 1985 his In
a even into called thequestion entire historical legitimacy Yugoslavof the state party one its and At the same time, same the At In addition to the academics, a number of ‘national romantic’ novelists novelists romantic’ ‘national of anumber academics, the to addition In ’One may rightly ask: if territorial and political autonomy was to be established for the andautonomy territorial if ’Oneto be established ask: may political rightly was –
a strong Yugoslavia’ was act was Yugoslavia’ a strong publically publically -92).
ressed exp
in the process of adoption of the 1974 Constitution, ‘a weak ‘a weak 1974 Constitution, the adoption of of process in the 142
a considerable part of the Ser the of part a considerable
lecturer at the the nationalist sentiment of the wider public. public. wider the of sentiment nationalist the ual behind- - Milošević opposition, thus lamented in April April in lamented thus opposition, Milošević 114
se of this, Tadić concluded, that ‘the ‘the that concluded, Tadić this, of se the Serbian Republic was placed in a in placed was Republic Serbian the
- the B elgrade scene strategy of the Yugoslav Yugoslav the of strategy scene - known Marxist philoso Marxist known Law Faculty: Law Faculty: bian intellectual stratum intellectual bian
pher pher
[ ...]
CEU eTD Collection between the Autonomous Provincbetween theAutonomous country. changes These are unimaginable without changes likewise therelationship in ingenocide Kosovo becombated cannot […] without deeper social changes the in whole undercontinue headed thedouble thebannereagle, ofaforeign state?’ (1990: 17). brutal and most primitive outpouring of hatred and fascism and allow their Golgotha to which consolation of thepromises words and the soothing of theknowledge we remove Serbia? Can andneighbors, thegovernment that in area, which is now only formally considered a part of and Metohija, are
desperate cry and its awoken consciousness’ (Magaš, 49), 1993: (Magaš, consciousness’ awoken andits cry desperate show have ‘who those of criticism strong with conjunction In in Kosovo. compatriots the to support of petition their signed scene intellectual Belgrade the of representatives 200prominent than more authorities, political the by initiative this of emnation cond the Following ancient hearth. the from exodus theirforced andprevent rights their constitutional of protection ensure would – in life the province’ of conditions – which in 1985, in October assemblies Yugoslav and Serbian to the andsent Serbs Kosovo 2,000 than more by signed petition a by was preceded It 1986. in January happened intelligentsia and populace Serbian 143 in the document: stated remarkable for its failure to relate national tensions in Kosovo toany inhabited areas of Yugoslavia to neighboring Albania and so on, the Belgrade intellectuals’ petition is
The author argues that ‘quite apart from the absurdity of its charges ofgenocide, surrender of the Albanian - l moment in the process of political rapprochement between the the between rapprochement political of process in the moment l The critica ‘Everyone in this country‘Everyone this not indifferent long has who in ago realized is that the ’Can we remove the thatonewhole nation, Kosovo Serbianin nation theknowledge have been offered to the Kosovo Serbs so that we can tolerate can the most thatwe so Serbs been offered totheKosovo have being subjectedbeing to a campaignterror of organized Albanian by their
es andthees of Republic Serbia [.]Genocide cannot be
they demanded decisive political measures that that measures demanded political decisive they 115 n themselves to be deaf to their nation’s nation’s their to bedeaf to n themselves
social and economic causes’ (Ibid:
because of ‘the unbearable unbearable ‘the of because 143
the following was following the
52).
CEU eTD Collection
a result of a result As worse. been never had (BiH) Herzegovina and Bosnia and Croatia in communities Serbian of status the Croatia, of State Independent the of exception the with that, - socio and political t interests; Serbian to contrary policies adopted communists Yugoslav the Comintern, the of directives the following War, World Second the before and ideology’, impoverished and, impoverished waseconomically Serbia much’, done so had Serbia people whom of Serbophobia” long- ( Croats concl country in the problems andeconomic political important most the of ananalysis prepare to in1985 June Academy the by appointed commission - aSerbo into an ‘all contained document the Kosovo, of Communists of League the of President the 1988 as 1986 and daily Serbian the ( Arts and Sciences capitulation leads which to apolitics treason’of national (quoted). Ibid in prevented by the[…] surrender gradual ofKosovo – andMetohija http://www.trepca.net/english/2006/serbian_memorandum_1986/serbia_memorandum_1986.ht 144 an as portrayed in aword, was, Yugoslavia in question’ ‘national the to approach republ other all by enjoyed statehood
The text is available at: at: text is available The lasting lasting usion that the Serbsgre were at the victimsthat usion of Titoist regime, Later that year, sections of a draft ’Memorandum’ of the Serbian Academy of of Academy Serbian the of ’Memorandum’ draft a of sections year, that Later Rusinow, 1995: 403 1995: Rusinow,
anti the ’ingr the ‘genocidal’ policies of other peoples, in the first place Albanians and and placeAlbanians first in the other of peoples, policies ‘genocidal’ slavia’ - Serbian coalition between Croatian and Slovenian communists; and and communists; Slovenian and Croatian between coalition Serbian Večernje Novosti Večernje economic difficulties of Serbia in Yugoslavia were a product of the the of aproduct were Yugoslavia in Serbia of difficulties economic
being divided into three parts, three into divided being i umetnosti – iumetnosti nauka Srpska akademija
atitude and machinations motivated by “chauvinism and and “chauvinism by motivated machinations and atitude (Interview, October 2011) October (Interview,
- ). Among other things, the Memorandum stated that even even that stated the Memorandum things, Among other ). encompassing program transformat for program encompassing . 144
In words of Azem Vllasi, who served between between served who Vllasi, Azem of words In 116 ics’ (quoted in Ibid in (quoted ics’
. And . politically ‘deprived of the kind of kind the of ‘deprived politically
indeed, SANU) were published in published in were SANU) ). The official political political official The ).
worn out out worn ‘historically its to the Albania: unsigned
came to a general to a general came
ion of Yugoslavia Yugoslavia of ion the 16- the hat growing growing hat ml member member .
CEU eTD Collection (Croat) and Kardelj (Slovenian), who implemented Yugoslavia’s anti name of its unity; There i illusion’, since only the Serbs love it, were the only ones to fight for it and to abdicate their nationality in the policies continue (1996: 19- and immutable anti hatred’ of each Yugoslav nation; ‘Serbs are exposed to genocide’ as a consequence of their enemies’ enduring their war victories enormous and sacrifices, only the ones without astate proper; ‘Serbs are exposed tothe Croatia and Slovenia, which results in its economic backwardness historical defeathistorical peacetime in beimagined’ (quoted in cannot Trifunovska the in after four decades new Yugoslavia it not is alone tohave A own worst state. its decrees theday lived tosee members, when ofapparatchiks committee aParty that has for andachieved acivil democracy, andwhich thelast in 2.5milliontwo wars lost ofits
tions’ among the nations in Yugoslavia ( in Yugoslavia nations the among tions’ rela andpoisoning conflicts ‘inflaming for intended initiative’ ‘chauvinist 1986as in October Memorandum of Presidency the of President Stambolić, i as ifsuch new reality a produce Dimitrijević, Nenad of words in was, nations hostile nat the of image - non Yugoslavia’s over hegemony Serb establishing andfor revenge for program ideological an than else ‘nothing was put as Ramet, by the SFRJ, Memorandum, in the victimized uniquely were Serbs document: in the As summarized 59). 2001: (Cohen, interests Serbian and Serbia harmed hadseriously that deceit elaborate 145 self in collective Wading (Ibid). interests’ national own their declare and ‘define and being’ and spiritual historical their of ‘regain isto that awareness subject’, ahistorical ‘become to the for Serbs come
As a whole, Pešić argues, the Memorandum was built upon seven basic hypotheses: ‘Yugoslavia is a Serbian Serbian a is ‘Yugoslavia hypotheses: basic seven upon built was Memorandum the argues, Pešić whole, a As After a long period of passivity, of along period After which‘A nation after a long andbloody struggle its regained own state, foughtwhich fficial political circles. political official country’s the among no support had deas - - anti the should result, inevitable isan all Serbs’ of states national ‘A policies; Serb ion as an innocent victim surrounded by coalition of enemies, i.e. by by i.e. enemies, of coalition by surrounded victim aninnocent ion as s ‘a conspiracy against the Serbs’ of the Comintern, the SKJ, and its leaders, Tito 20). ’
(1998: 130). At the time of its publication, however, it seemed it however, publication, its of time the At 130). (1998:
Serbs’ (2002: 20). The inherently chauvinistic chauvinistic Theinherently 20). (2002: Serbs’
its authors therefore asserted that asserted therefore authors its 117 - pity and basking in the certainty that the that certainty in the andbasking pity
Serbia ; ‘Serbs are the losers’ as, notwithstanding
‘ presented as reality in order to to order in reality as presented - thus Serbian policy; ‘Serbia is exploited’ by
strongly condemned the the condemned strongly , 1999:32). Jović,
ad had time the 2009: 251). 2009: 251). 145
Ivan Ivan Serb
CEU eTD Collection tions, exhibi lectures, in newspapers, found also and novels’ (2001: was and heroes themes national traditional revival The same of etc. Has Killed”, Milos Been “Prince Kolubara”, featured performances such as “The Fall of the Serbian Empire”, “World I of War “The Speak”, Battle Veterans in Serbia with the Serbs’ alleged historical uniqueness, their courage, and their martyrdom. Belgrade theaters
dy bubbling through various structures of the Serbian society, Serbian the of structures various through bubbling dy alrea lived in’ (Trifunovska, 1999: 32) 1999: (Trifunovska, in’ lived they province autonomous and republic which of regardless integrity and cultural i authorities andreligious intellectual highest as well people as ordinary among mood Despiteprevailing the the moment. for confined politically nonetheless remained ders in Serbia and other republics. republics. andother in Serbia ders politicallea fromof anumber came leadership, Serbi dissatisfact of sense agathering 1980s, early the from apparent absolutely 33). 1995: Little, and (Silber Serbs’ deepamong ran that sentiments concluded. wasan ‘The Memorandum 147 146 sens that In - broad a advance and defend publicly to leader political communist amajor for was scene political onthe occurred not political de political tobound provoke dissatisfaction’ of their governance centralization political domination and federation. the in particular, could In notthey level accept the ofself - needed economic reforms. However, in Serbia, the biggest republic, they had always prioritized the matters of democratic society, like other [Yugoslav – other [Yugoslav like society, democratic for Kosovo [. the for wait to still were Serbs the country, n the
Azem Vllasi made a similar point during our talk: ‘In the last decade of its existence, Yugoslavia desperately Yugoslavia its existence, of last decade the ‘In our talk: during point similar a made Vllasi Azem An interesting remark inAn interesting thi a with the political status quo, status political the with a The draft Memorandum did not create nationalism but simply ‘tapped ‘tapped simply but nationalism create not did Memorandum The draft - legitimation poor and ] wanted They territory the ofKosovo, but never would allow to Albanians Kosovo live a in
Similar attacks, including demands for resignation of the SANU SANU the of resignation for demands including attacks, Similar e, e, provinces, primarily Kosovo. Atthe sametime, Serbia had never had a democrati political rise of Slobodan Milošević turned out to be of crucial crucial of be to out turned Milošević Slobodan of rise political s regard is byCohenmade
(Interview, October 2011).
economic performance of post
in memoriam
I.V.] citizens. Mor citizens. I.V.] . While notions of a national renaissance were were renaissance anational of notions While ranging nationalist program (Cohen, 2001: 62) (Cohen,2001: program nationalist ranging
rimarily on the national question, national the on primarily focused 118
for Yugoslavia’, Stambolić prophetically prophetically Stambolić Yugoslavia’, for eover, they were always treated in away was that
. During the mid the During .
- ‘
Tito Yugoslavia had stimulated an obsession an obsession had stimulated Yugoslavia Tito 70- establishment of their full national national full their of establishment 7 1). 1).
- 1980s,writes, he ‘thegrowing 147
what had still hadstill what 146
Though Though c solution c solution ion in
.
CEU eTD Collection Therefore, if M if Therefore, at that time (Interview, January 2012). apparatchik an was Milošević general feeling of dissatisfaction existed Serbia in because ofthe Constitution1974 associates, serving as the head of the Serbian Constitutional Court in the early 1990s, made a similar point: ‘A During our talk in January 2012, Balša Špadijer, politicalcom science professor and one of Miloother from way any in differ not did Milošević 1986 ’until underlined, enjoy ed samethe kind ofpolitical support. fact, In Pavlovi have would he did, Milošević before discourse other high other science pro (2008: 46).
late president, and with the economy seriously deteriorating, seriously economy the andwith president, late the of successor legitimate nopolitically With symbols. unifying main the of and one the without country the left departure His life. for President SFRJ the him to name 333), (article Constitution newly adopted the with accordance in made Parliament, federal the of 1974decision May the by enhanced further was influence political Tito’s 1980. in May death his until matters political Yugoslav Broz Josip elites, political andprovincial republican the of power of i.e.the expansion authority, political state’s devol of process legitimized constitutionally the Notwithstanding 3.3. 2000). (Milosavljević, Serbia in ‘power’ and ‘opinion’ between fusion the achieving for importance 149 148 should be solved in cooperation with the pushing Kosovo Serbs into a conflict with the political institutions of the province, he believed their problems Stambolić [.] N [.] Stambolić not did interpretations, partythe leaders atthat time, I historicalclaim, without any uncertainty, that their first choice had, many to contrary Milošević, necessarily that have to be the one: ‘Had they not found strongly so individual political strong importan More ‘Unfortunately’, hesaid, ‘in mid- they wanted to penetrate officialthe political institutions, in the first place Leaguethe ofCommunists. unemployment rose to over 16.3 per over 16.3 rose to unemployment or 20times the European average between 1979 and 1985. By the end of this period, unemployment and inflation gradually increased; the provinces, had borrowed around $10 billion so that foreign debt reached $18 billion by 1980. Both
Talking about the nationa Nebo
Yugoslavia Tito after jša Vladisavljević, for instance, reminds that ‘since 1975 Yugoslavia, or more precisely its republics andrepublics its precisely more Yugoslavia,or 1975 ‘since thatreminds instance,Vladisavljević, forjša
- fessor University Belgrade at ranking Serbian official understood had power the decided toembrace] of[and the nationalist ilo onetheless, tly, tly, Vllasi underlined that the Serbian nationalists were forward looking tothe emergence ofa šević did not show up, someone else certainly would certainly else someone up, show not did šević
Stambolić 148 listic circles in Serbia, led by the SANU and the Church, Vllasi mentioned how badly who simply managed to understand and promised to fulfill what people wanted wanted people what fulfill to promised and to understand managed simply who
1980, theysucceeded in finding a political manager at the very top ofthe SKS’. Tito continued playing the role of role the playing continued Tito
knew where the red line was and was not ready to ready was not was and line red knew the where
cent [. cent
whom I interviewedany inor June 2011, alsoStambolić argued that if
a Pavlović, seinstitutions’ (Interview, October 2011). Dušan
] Living standards fell by one 119
Milošević, they would have kept searching. Being one of one Being searching. kept have would they Milošević, aggregate figur e for the latter exceeded 1,000 per cent per 1,000 exceeded e forlatter the ’. Likewise, Milan Jovanovi Milan ’. Likewise, - munist apparatchiksaround him’. quarter betquarter supreme political authority authority political supreme
indisputable arbiter in the in the arbiter indisputable 149 ution of the federal the of ution - imposed political status. political imposed
ween 1979 and 1985’ Yugoslavia had had Yugoslavia
cross it. of Instead
in fact, beenIvan šević ć argued that that argued ć
registered registered ’s closest closest ’s
political political ć ,
CEU eTD Collection
realize that Tito wasdead’ ( Tito that realize to politician Yugoslav first ‘the was Milošević Slobodan official, Serbian a by noted C of League the outside politicians by both resource political valuable a as recognized be to came nationalism of use the punished’, harshly often and condemned part onthe nationalism of expressions extreme the non- ‘all in which period alonger After support. political of mobilization for anew formula as republics Yugoslav in some emerging wasnow 6), (Ibid: rest’ laid to ‘had been to seemed scene. public in its activism political for space a expanded dramatically also above, mentioned as but, government country’s in the vacuum functional avast created only not death Tito’s Accordingly, ( respond should they how to as uncertain being authorities the with and opinion dissident by question into brought being increasingly were state socialist the of s value core the where culture” “apocalyptic of period a ‘entered On 24 April 1987, Milošević, recently recently Milošević, 1987, April 24 On you’ ‘ uttered: famously Milošević violence, police of scenes demonst and Serb police local between out broke clashes thecommunity, Serb of representatives political with the meeting of course In the Polje. Kosovo of municipality Serb predominantly asmall, visited Communists, ommunists – 3.3.1.1. 3.3.1.
The national question which, following the adoption of the new constitution, new constitution, the of adoption the following which, question The national a sentence that, in words of the Kosovo Serb leader Miroslav Šolević, Šolević, Miroslav leader Serb Kosovo the of words in that, sentence a
In this regard, as later later as regard, this In 52). 2001: (Cohen, stalwarts Titoist former by and
Serbia
R socialist forms of ethnic participation were officially prohibited, while while prohibited, officially were participation of ethnic forms socialist ise of the leader : The roar The : The Milwaukee Journal The Milwaukee
appointed head of the Serbian League of of League Serbian the of head appointed 120 , 10 October 1988). October 10 ,
rators. Purportedly moved by the the by moved Purportedly rators. of any ethnic group were strongly strongly were group of ethnic any No one should dare to beat beat to No oneshoulddare Ramet,
1985: 3). 3). 1985: CEU eTD Collection leader institutions [. institutions achieve what they want only if they came to Belgrade and rallied in front of the republ had been comingĆosić to KosovoDobrica to give themthat instructions, instance, suggesting that they would for knew, ‘We intellectuals. nationalist Serbian of the advice the followed Serbs local argues, so, Vllasi doing Ser 2001: 17). disintegrate without Kosovo. not givewill ia (quoted Yugoslavia in away’ it and Serb
the same tone: tone: same the in continued and mass, the before pledged Milošević soil’, this on tyranny no be will , 2009: 259). 2009: , in Jović (quoted difficult’ is situation the when demoralized become to fight, must when they demobilize to people Serbian the of spirit the of acharacteristic been never has ‘it that reminding peoples Yugoslav the of which 13- the endof the Following authorities. provincial by brutality police and oppression political alleged of cases numerous on Belgrade from guest the informed who Serbs local the of representatives ( Tsar' a[Serbian] as him ‘enthroned 151 150 earlier period (Judah, 1997: 162). Thus, Stambolić later recalled, Milošević had not not had Milošević recalled, later Stambolić Thus, 162). 1997: (Judah, period earlier in the question national in the interest noparticular expressed he hadgenerally policies, Tito’s andpraise nationalism attack Except to 64). 2001: (Cohen, platitudes’ the offering apparatchik well of alexicon from vapid formulations communist population reserved and ‘cautious hitherto Milošević, (Interview, October2011) .
bs organized a number of rallies in the Serbian capitalin order to get public attention fortheir ‘problem’.By as well was visit Milošević’s around everything that me told Vllasi ‘This was the key moment Milo moment for key the was ‘This
overnight’
and ‘brotherhood of ideal the Titoist of preservation the for calling while Subsequently, the meeting was resumed in the presence of several hundred hundred several of presence the in meetingwasresumed the Subsequently, visit to Kosovo Polje was the moment of epiphany for epiphany of moment wasthe Polje Kosovo to visit the that believe Many ‘We will win will ‘We battle. this Yugoslavia not exist does without Kosovo. Yugoslavia will ] A few]months A later, wasit decided that Milošević should –
Žarko Korać similarly noted (Interview, January 2012).
to Kosovo Serbs, thereby thereby Serbs, Kosovo to support political he promised
šević ; ; it turned him theinto national hero and the absolute national 151 Silber andLittl in Silber quoted
hour assembly, M assembly, hour 121 - planned in Belgrade. ofit, Ahead Kosovo - honed and officially condoned condoned officially and honed
go and “see” what was going in Kosovo’ in going was what “see” and go
ilošević gave a speech in in speech a gave ilošević e , 1995: 37). 1995: , ican and federal 150
‘There ‘There Djukić unity’ unity’ ,
CEU eTD Collection Television of Serbia (RTS). Serbia of Television launched him’launched and Silber (quoted in 1995: Little, 31).
came back from Kosovo as a different man (Djukić, 1992: 81). 1992: (Djukić, man different a Kosovoas from back came Milošević that apparent was it period, this from associates closest his to according (Vladi nationalism Albanian from support alleged , Belgrade Miloše Mitević, a became he television, Serbian on wasshown tears in people and brutality police of scenes the to reaction his After 41). 2002: (Sell, Yugoslavia postwar in role their about Kos – province in the authority undisputed an with – Kosovo from officials party former of anumber that as well as problem, this to relation in performance organs’ and state in Kosovo woul in Kosovo leader: the of asession calling of aim the with started Milošević Belgrade, to return his Upon in the province. sentiment nationalist the of onhisperception impact had astrong obviously occasion onthis hemet demonstrators the by viewspresented of intensity the Yet, 165). (1995: event to this prior Kosovo regarding concerns shown political 152 courage of a politician speaking on a behalf of an of onabehalf speaking apolitician of courage
In 1992, it was merged with it was merged 1992, In ovo Serbs, Milošević tapped into a broad vein of dissatisfaction among the Serbs Serbs the among dissatisfaction of vein broad a into tapped Milošević Serbs, ovo More importantly, it soon became clear that, by taking as his own the cause of of cause the hisown as taking by that, clear became soon it importantly, More Milošević’s patriotic words were widely perceived as a refreshingly honest honest refreshingly a as perceived widely were words patriotic Milošević’s ‘We were‘We pl
152 hero in the eyes of many of his countrymen. As later confirmed by Dušan Dušan by confirmed Aslater countrymen. his of many of eyes the in hero
media played a very important role in his promotion into a national anational into promotion his role in important avery played media then and associate close vić’s d be discussed. H discussed. d be aying Milošević’s promise [to Kosovo Serbs] on TV non-stop. This is what TV on Serbs] Kosovo [to promise Milošević’s aying
the
Radio Television Novi Sad Novi Television Radio e demanded that specific targets be set for the party party the for beset targets specific that e demanded
including Fadil Hoxha, an old guard communist communist guard anold Hoxha, Fadil including SKJ 122
Central Committee in which the situation situation the in which Committee Central
deputy director of of the director deputy be held politically accountable for their their for accountable politically held be
and lobbying among the party comrades party the among lobbying
Radio Television Priština to create the oppressed minority (Djukić, 2001: (Djukić, minority oppressed savljević, 2008: 101). Even Even 101). 2008: savljević,
Radio Television Radio Television
Radio CEU eTD Collection
then simply got on’ got simply then elite European province’, would province’, European e political 404). 1995: (Rusinow, rewarded finally was and resentment anger Serb of amobilizer for search the party, Serbian the by denounced formally and media the wasleakedto memorandum Academy’s the after well. as elite nationalistic Serbian the among sympathies enjoyed Milošević signthat was anunambiguous Association, Writers’ Serbian the of magazine official , the Novine in Kosovo Književne his to after visit aweek only published 44) 1999: in (quoted speaker’ young handsome ‘a about A poem 17). 154 153 collecti of the practices earlier the unlike Entirely he led. organization party the into discipline iron an heintroduced changes, necessary make politi anauthoritative of appearance make apublic to order In positions. his strengthening gradually started Milošević moment, the at enjoyed Serbian – hadinitiated it processes the he looks nice’ (2010: 27). Strategically divided roles. [He] hits at the right moment and he knows the m spea does not he what convinced Serb. He speaks little, and intends a lot. He says only what can possibly be said, while working on think, or want. great A master ofpolitical tactics and strategy – doe he what even enlist they rule, a as virtues, his Under everyone. almost by deified is Milošević concerning Greater Serbia’ (interview, Janua Greater Serbia’ Yugoslavia, something that we had missed to create in 1918, to fortify our Western borders and establish a finally became aware of it, saw they in it an opportunity for Serbia and its people to create, on the ruins of communism and the creation of a new European [political] reality. But once this change happened, and they ex more even intellectual elite was did not understand when I spoke about historical processes, the approaching Drašković collapse of respect, this In 2012). January Writers
ak Korać: wordsIn of Žarko In In , including myself, including , i atborpia nvl Dakvć nicely Drašković novel, autobiographical his ’ Association.’ saw They this as aSerbian national revolution decided and to take part’ (Interview,
Fully aware of the political potential of the popular and media support he he support andmedia popular the of potential political the of Fully aware an Milošević vent, i.e. ‘a i.e. night vent, d world history’ (Cohen, 2001: 156). 2001: (Cohen, history’ d world : ‘I am attending debates in cabinets and cafe of the Academy of Science [SANU]. k about. A great actor. He works for Americans, whereas his wife works for Russians. Russians. for works wife his whereas for Americans, works actor. He A great about. k
,
u Dakvć od e Itriw Jnay 2012). January (Interview, me told Drašković Vuk
‘Milo which horse the andsaddled groomed prepared, ry 2012). - ei rcie a lbsiain upr o te hrh te AU ad the and SANU, the Church, the of support plebiscitarian a received šević
time meeting in an unimpressive hall located in a remote remote in a located hall an unimpressive in meeting time –
owing to the extent of political change brought about by by about brought change political of extent the to owing
turn out to be ‘a major benchmark in contemporary in contemporary benchmark to be ‘a major out turn
depicted the elite’s 123 154
Supposedly just another insignificant insignificant another just Supposedly
plicit: ‘Initially, most members of the Serbian Serbian the of members most ‘Initially, plicit:
this is how they see him. A communist, and a a and see communist, him. A ishow they this
ve leadership, ve general sentiment from that period easure. [;] Cruel, but a tolerant cal leader determined to to determined leader cal , Branson and Doder
he now issued issued he now 153
On s not speak, s not Milošević Milošević e year e year
‘ The The nd nd CEU eTD Collection a Koso
officials, some of whom very skeptical about his political prospect. In their In prospect. hispolitical skeptical about very whom of some officials, nonetheless Milošević independent, Kosovo on session party abovementioned the calling for initiative unilateral his support to Yugoslavrepublics other from leaders communist the of decision the sense, ( advice for circle party inner the asking without orders they Ser of security the threatening and‘irredentists’ ‘separatists’ an Albani challenge needto the recognizing Albeit 83). 2002: (LeBor, itself state the of Communist cause national Party Serbian the with Kosovo in group oneethnic sidedwith had openly – 68) 2008: buy time. buy to chose Milošević moment, given the at risk political considerable a bear would party different: apparently - pro moderate the support - and long and dem outside of the SKS. His positive reputation of a devoted ‘Yugoslav’ and a communist andacommunist ‘Yugoslav’ adevoted of reputation positive His SKS. the of outside withinand support garnering of purpose the with Ibid) (LeBor, seduction’ political Serbian ( nationalist’
vo. The distance betweenvo. Thedistance beganto grow’ (quoted us in Silberand, 1995: Little 39). argued Knowing that an open confrontation with Stambolić and his followers in the the in followers his and Stambolić with confrontation open an that Knowing was recalled, later he issue, sensitive highly this to approach Milošević’s ‘I sawwe‘I were in totally opposed our methods. Wehad two policies different on Serb ‘Every – emphasized as Instead, onstrations.
ie ioei’ pltcl arn te eb wr pltcly bie t fully to obliged politically were Serbs the patron, political Milošević’s time
In seen by them as ‘firmly remaining on the Titoist course’ (V course’ Titoist onthe remaining ‘firmly as them by seen
the strongly
was a strong wind into his political sails. Ever more pol more Ever sails. political windhis into strong was a course of the next few months, he would ‘deploy all his powers of his powers all ‘deploy hewould months, few next the of course who denies BBC
against their political mobilization, in particular through rallies rallies through in particular mobilization, political their against , 5 May 1987). , 5May 1987). regime Albanian communist leaders in the province: province: in the leaders communist Albanian regime
confidence toconfidence communi Albanian
still had to count with an opinion of senior party party senior of opinion an with count to had still 124 by Stambolić, then Serbian President President Serbian then Stambolić, by and against the police, the symbol symbol the police, the against and and had aligned the Serbian Serbian the and hadaligned Jović, sts should be told thatheis betold should sts 2009: 262). In that In that 262). 2009: bs in Kosovo, Kosovo, inbs ladisavljević, ladisavljević,
view, he view, he
itically itically CEU eTD Collection (quoted in Ibid (quoted in a struggle for thepress [.]These are notchildren’s games. Weare slipping into anarchy’ andforcefully. Theoppositionalready has we are now many over wa taken ging associations, formsall of counter
SKS leadership, including Dragiša Pavlović, the head of the Belgrade party party Belgrade the politica lower to of wanted simply who protégé, head political Stambolić’s and the organization Pavlović, Dragiša including leadership, SKS the of members the of some by ‘scandal’ this to reaction mild a of view in greater legacy: hispolitical and president Milošević by d presente was provocation polit different under would What birthday). Tito’s of celebration mass traditional upcoming the to allusion (an adventure Kosovo his after – ideology ruling the of principles main communists: Serbian the headof the for election 1986 Milošević’s of occasion and general Tito’s favorite most the as regarded widely Ljubičić, Nikola As cadres. party of generation influential very still and dogmatic, more elder, the of sympathies the winning for key bethe to supposed was legacy Titoist the to loyal unreservedly apparatchik 155 Student Serbian gover Serbian Djukić
Milošević had served as the head of the Belgrade communist organization from 1984. , 1994: 35). An unexpected opportunity for Milošević to reaffirm his commitment to the the to commitment his reaffirm to Milošević for opportunity unexpected An On ‘We are confronted with an offensive of the opposition, and we must strike back and must strike we with are anoffensive confronted ‘We oftheopposition, engaged‘Slobodan a in against struggle nationalism, against liberalism, andagainst
printed its May issue cover page with the title ‘The Dance of the Vampires’ Vampires’ the of ‘The Dance title the pagewith cover issue May its printed
hi s initiative, the editorial board of the paper and two ministers of the the of ministers andtwo the paper of board editorial the initiative, s : 63). mn wr fre t rsg. Milošević’s resign. to forced were nment
-revoluti lon g - time key figure of his military apparatus, elaborated on the onthe elaborated apparatus, military his of figure key time on in Belgrade.
ical circumstances be taken as a humorous a as betaken circumstances ical –
occurred when the Belgrade University Youth paper, paper, Youth University Belgrade when the occurred
125 155 which one could have called into question question into called have could one which
I think he has passed the test’ (quoted in as an open attack on the deceased deceased onthe attack open an as
political tr political
iumph was even even was iumph
regime regime l CEU eTD Collection flirt any nosurvival thedisintegration there nation after is which that is, to nationalism. ofdarkest Itmeans system theliquidation our socialist thecurrent country, in
they lived and how they acted’ (Jović, 2009: 264), numerous shops and kiosks kiosks and shops numerous 264), 2009: (Jović, acted’ they how and lived they where of regardless betrusted, to not were ‘they that message repeated constantly tone’ vis tone’ Serbian press – press Serbian partsthe of summer, the during Kosovo in incidents motivated ethnically of series he had just condemned (Ibid: 66). (Ibid: condemned he hadjust that viewpoints encouraging and begin appropriating able to washence he speech, his time after ashort Only ideas. their of potential mobilizing a recognize to talent ha heapparently period, this during Memorandum of the authors the and Milošević between contact direct any of evidence no still is there Although Aca the d against campaign hunt’ witch ‘the of in charge those from distant ’ population general the in as well as SKS the of elements the among perspectives such for support andthe intelligentsia June: in early meeting party closed a at Memorandum SANU’s the attacked fiercely Milošević credentials, hisideological bolster Toadditionally 64). (1997: unpatriotic and unreliable as them of both portray to able now was Milošević Djukić, by argued As tensions. 1987: 171-2). goal. goal. ruin
wit successful political theLeagueofCommunists development which Only h nationalism or yielding toit In September, Milošević September, In On the other hand, ‘ hand, other the On ’The appearance’The ofthe Memorandum nothing butthe oftheSANU else represents -
à Ti - vis the Albanians the vis to’s brotherhoodto’s andunity sec can
considered
keenly aware of the nationalistic mood in the Serbian Serbian in the mood nationalistic the of aware keenly to be close to Milošević Milošević to close be to
(Sell, 20 (Sell, decided to
cannot contributecannot ,
( Cohen, Cohen, 02: 48) 02: 126 move ure Yugoslavia’s survival’ ( 2001: 73), 2001: . In the atmosphere heated by the the by heated atmosphere the In . against
but only impede, halt, –
adopted ‘the ugly nationalistic uglynationalistic ‘the adopted
Milošević remained Milošević the party rivals party the
or nationality [.]A has taken tobethe taken has d enough political political d enough Na . In light of the the . In of light š slowdown and slowdown and e A
ktuelnosti publically emy. ny ny ,
CEU eTD Collection (Corriere Sera, 8October della 1987). social single especially problem, to able improve and without being inter in themse oftheSerbian saviors fact lves cause in as toKosovo, able being without solve a todaySerbian nationalism among other because, things, Serbian nationalists imagine speeches,media, public andsome ofthe onthealso various ill -considered statements concerning Kosovo thatappear some in ofour well? as streets [...]Serbian nationalism nownotonly feeds onthesituation Kosovo, in but doesfeeling notexist only issued thewarnings in by [party] thehighest but organs, our in
participants were informed, were participants rem Pavlović’s demanded Milošević September, P SKS the of ameeting At 87). 2002: (LeBor, war’ political of week later, at the televised Eight televised the at week later, was proposal Milošević’s A members. Presidium the of 20) of out (11 votes of majority narrow a by supported end, the In committee. party Belgrade the to Pavlović Stamboli accused Milošević Concomitantly, Vladisavljević in (quoted organs’ party higher of decisions challenging of implementation the ‘obstructed hehad that argument ( […] which Kosovo in situation c was absolutely a conflagration’: but in nothing result words media Belgrade the of editors f and chie directors summoned Pavlović aforementioned the end, an to hysteria nationalistic bringto the anattempt In Serbia. throughout smashed were Albanians owned by Ibid )
were aimed at aimed were The political connotation of the P the of connotation The political ‘How many shopAlbanian wi lear that the entire speech and, speech entire the that lear
Milošević
support for for support of letter a earlier days two he hadsent . For him For .
relessly promised haste’ haste’ promised relessly ca by beimproved cannot ndows must bebroken to usconvince that anti
Session of the SKS Central Committee, Milošević Committee, Central SKS the of Session the other hand, this hand, other the on , avlović’s critique was critique avlović’s 127 institutions ofourinstitutions system [.]Wemust criticize
with a clear message that ‘inflammatory ‘inflammatory that message aclear with fr h aue f oe since, power of abuse the for ć oval from its membership oval from
especially
,
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meant ‘a declaration declaration ‘a meant -nationality relations’
, 2008: 68). 68). 2008: , important. It -Albanian
with an with
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CEU eTD Collection Kosovo andSerb togain nationalism supreme power 2002: (Sell, Serbia’ in 49). almost everything except what they were really guilty of of Stambolić and Pavlović accuse to podium the to tly troopedseem, obedien ninety speakers problem of ofKosovo thepeople theinterests in all who live ( there’ (BBC’s whomembers obs Those here. toward him: toward fos that arguing unacceptable’: ’politically as hisside: taking by suicide political hadcommitted out, turned it as who, Stambolić importantly, more and, Pavlović on attack final launched : period this during atmosphere political the recalled later complete Stambolić, now without control of the the of control without now Stambolić, session SKS the presidency of conclusion far importantly, more and, overwhelming was leadership Serbian
same. It started with some vague charges. The basic qualification was, vague anopportunist, Thebasic first, same. with charges. some Itstarted theydishonored, were persecuted, andousted. for theend.The method left Iwas the was tered dissent within its ranks, its within dissent tered
Although Pavlović and Stamboli and Pavlović Although leadership SKS the against lism nationa of The accusations The victory of ‘revolutionist of The victory ‘For two‘For months, newspapers in and on television, warrants were issued ‘For […] two days, classicin Communist fashion where words do not mean what they ‘No one can Serbian us label expected‘We from trouble theKosovo separatists,butwe didn’t expect it from party ,Death ofYugoslavia 1995). August The He He months. more afew for President Serbian as remained , blockade media
while always speaki while always
truct our reforms violate ourparty reforms truct They deny discipline. can’t it’ onalists’ (Jović, 2009: 268) 2009: (Jović, onalists’ ‘instituti over s’ ng about
lists becausenationalists we want to it was clear that the power balance had tipped tipped had thebalance power that wasclear it ć proved to be tough opponents, tough be to proved ć main levers of political power political of levers main 128
Pvoi ws xeld rm h party the from expelled was Pavlović , the unity of the party the unity of the
–
trying to block Milošević’s use of use Milošević’s block to trying
, 4OctoberNIN 1987). and
Milošević rejected rejected Milošević Milošević actually actually Milošević - reaching. At the At reaching. will do
and under and
ociferously vociferously
resolve the for within the the within people;
the .
CEU eTD Collection 7 December 1987). 7 December other republics. Some do individuals this,not see or it’ donotwant tosee ( ( notbemissed thatshould for mobilization achance is this andbehaviorlife andthat
status in the Yugoslav federation: in the Yugoslav status legal its change to also but Serbia, in life political democratize and problem, Kosovo the eliminate crisis, political and economic the solve onlyto not was mobilization this ago. ayear hehadoutlined program political the of to realization road the fi on step major wasthe first it time, the same At hispower. of consolidation of process the marked ranks, its from followers Stambolić’s of remainder was helpless, unable todoanything (quoted publically’ Stambolić in of l An atmosphere traitor of the Serbian people. and thena ambitions of the new political leadership, very indicative very new leadership, political the of ambitions of the future terms in were, 1987 endof the toward held meeting Committee’s Party Belgrade the of conclusions The provinces. autonomous country’s the over control Milošević proper, Serbia in unchallenged Standing he claimed on embarked instead, and, procedures party established the heignored however, This time, Af battle. political new
now e Belgrade communists, communists, e Belgrade th head of the Gruden, Slobodanka by out As pointed Stambolić Accordingly, within the next half a year, Milošević prepared the ground for a for ground the prepared Milošević year, a half next the within Accordingly, ‘Serbia should notbe ‘Serbia should members ‘The think that we have a reached turning withpoint regards to our political 3.3.1.2.
complete. The following restoration of the Party’s unity, i.e. removal of the of removal i.e. unity, Party’s the of restoration Thefollowing complete. , ‘institutions , a
mass nationalist mobilization of his supporters. In the situation where, situation In the supporters. his of mobilization nationalist mass Reunifying
was o was ter the reunification of the Party, he was now to reunify Serbia. Serbia. reunify to now hewas Party, the of reunification the ter fficially fired in mid in fired fficially
were not working’, Milošević gave way to ‘street democracy’, democracy’, ‘street to way gave Milošević working’, not were ] It should be in the same position as as position thesame bein constitutionally [.]Itshould undefined
the Republic the
129 - December and December
now sought to establish political political establish to sought now :
, 2006:89- Milošević’s political triumph triumph political Milošević’s ynch was created. One created. was ynch was 90). ). ). Ibid nal stage in the in the nal stage
Politika ,
CEU eTD Collection
vince. At vince. pro Serbian northern Coordinated from Belgrade, the wave of popular protests against the political political the against protests popular of wave the Belgrade, from Coordinated scene. political the from away swept were gues his collea and Sogorov later, a week less than Yet, autonomy. its giving up accept never would province the of leadership thethat saying colleague, Serbian the to replied bluntly body, in this representative Vojvodina’s Sogorov, Milan status. nstitutional co its of alteration of necessity clear made mid meetingin aparty during leadership its of criticism the remembering clearly still while in 1981), cent per (54.5 population in Vojvodina majority viewSerb the In of attack. ’ opinion and society Serbian of awide section across ‘ people involved of number andthe demonstrations mat and organizational with provided by cultivated Albeit Serbia. throughout held were 75), 2001: (Cohen, sovereignty’ Serb reassert would that changes constitutional ’obstructing and Kosovo’ in Serbs of plight the to insensitive ing ‘be for accused leaders provincial against hispolitics and to support of rallies 100mass than more 1989, March 1988to July From country. in the resistance of political last pockets the eliminate to a heorchestrated campaigns, political similar in organizing experience hadconsiderable hadalready who leaders replaced the with in compliance following politicall of phase opening anew thereby - 1986 on the account of h of account on the 1986 Mlšvć was Milošević , encouraged more Ever ’
conference SKJ ( , 30 May 1988). Subsequently 1988). May 30 Tanjug,
that Serbia must become a ‘real republic’, thereby clearly implying the the implying clearly thereby republic’, a ‘real become must Serbia that wishes of the people they represent or should, otherwise, be otherwise, should, or represent they people the of wishes to point out point to
the SKJ Presidency SKJ the series of protest meetings and demonstrations in order in order anddemonstrations meetings protest series of is allegedly nationalist activity, he first turned to the the to turned first he activity, nationalist allegedly is
that that erial suppor erial 130 the the used the the heused spirit, In this in Serbia. ife were leaderships party
the with , getting
meeting t by the state, the by t clearly showed the support from support the showed clearly
( Thomas, Thomas, ready for another for ready assistance of assistance held
the
1999: 46). 1999: on 30 September, he September, 30 on
official media and and media official the scale of the the of scale the ‘ obliged to work work to obliged
Kosovo Serb Serb Kosovo
political political CEU eTD Collection
carried Tito’scarried pictures and the cheered constitution (Maliqi, of1974’ 1994:241). war, Imay if thecitizens say, between and October 1988). [,] ontheleaders other hand.Thewar must beended,ofcourse, theinterests in ns ofthe citize the province’: the Novem the analyst, political alocal by Ascommented iconography. different a considerably by characterized this in Kosovo, discontent political of manifestations public earlier peacefully to Priština of streets onthe out went miners and students of Thousands reacted. that Feeling political obvious that Milošević did not think of it as the last: – was needed – intervention military the initiate occupied to attempt afailed after 6October, On resignation. their until stay to determined supporters Milošević’s of thousands of tens when culminated June, from underway been had which Vojvodina, of establishment Moreover, f Moreover, post in the in Yugoslavia government legitimate - extra of use the through overthrow first the was toppling Their a bove all in the interests of those ofthose bovewho theinterests toterror in are Kosovo’ currently in all ( exposed the in the 1988, November during Already ‘The Albanian‘The flags were into tied aknot with theYugoslav The flag. Albanian’s could‘We have donethis in the civil move, a number of Kosovo of high anumber move,
protest against the forced political resignations. Compared with some some with Compared resignations. political forced the against protest rom his cynical comment of the ‘cadr the of comment cynical his rom
a
agreed to step down. down. step to agreed leaders Vojvodina the crowd, the disburse to political storm was storm political - pro last ‘the were rallies ber
for which the approval of the republican presidency presidency republican the of approval which the for
coming, the Albanian majority in the province province the in majority Albanian the coming, ized way, hadwe beenlucky [.]Instead we had a 131 - the communists ontheone hand ranking communist offic communist ranking course of the preparation for hisne for the preparation course of e change’ in Vojvodina, in e change’ - Second World War War period. Second World Yugoslav demonstrations in demonstrations Yugoslav its government building government its institutional means of a a of means institutional ials were purged. purged. ials were
and certain one BBC
it
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CEU eTD Collection 78). Beca
strong stand on behalf on Serbian national interests (Ibid). interests national onSerbian stand onbehalf strong a take still would but socialism, to committed ideologically was who Ranković since politician Serbian first the herepresented them, For 1974. since for waiting been (Ibid levels and popular e elite th onboth Serbs of numbers large of yearning nationalist politicia legisl and political constitution to nts Serbian the amendme the accepted legally united and Milošević was its absolute political leader. political absolute its was Milošević and united legally pr political anenormous under an Subsequently, put end. was thus andPriština Belgrade between dialogue cal politi ongoing the 156 w changes stated: Milošević capital, Serbian I outburst. separatist nationalist hatred’ ( knots...They were doing that on the wave of mass, force, and speed, hot themselves and us into tying thousands thereby sword, a with it of cut new Other Albanians. Kosovo
With this regard, regard, this With the hewas intellectuals, ‘patriotic’ the of eyes In 80). the : use of use that, K thods of power of thods me andcynical drives familiar all too Beyond the hehadsupported after later, months Three onthe Belgrade, In ‘Every nation has a love which eternally warms its heart. For Serbia it is Kosovo. heart. For Serbiais it its eternally which warms ‘Every alove has nation ns Mlšvć lo nutvl udrto ad fetvl epesd the expressed effectively and understood intuitively also Milošević , ere formally proclaimed in the R in the proclaimed formally ere political changes, Azem Vllasi was arrested. The possibility of any any of possibility The arrested. was Vllasi Azem changes, political BETA tmoi ltr omne: W wr tyn t ute h Ksv ko tgte with together knot Kosovo the untie to trying were 'We commented: later Stambolić osovo remain will Serbia [. in ] Kosovo is Serbia’(quotedCohen in , 2001: ative autonomy of the province. the of autonomy ative ,30 August 2000). n response, at a massive rally amassive at n response,
, the protest was portrayed as yet another as another yet wasportrayed protest the hand, other essure from Serbia proper, the P the proper, from Serbia essure
132 epublic’s epublic’s 156 the
On March 29, the constitutional constitutional 29, the March On
held on November 18 in the 18in the November held on Kosovo miners Kosovo A ssembly. Serbia was again again was Serbia ssembly. -
headed and overcome with crazed
which effectively ended effectively which arliament of Kosovo Kosovo of arliament one who they had had one who they ’
strike against against strike - seeking seeking CEU eTD Collection whether he was a nationalist, I honestly don’t know’ (Interview, January 2012). me you’reasking convictionsIftruewere. his what knewnever apparatchik Icommented: ’Miloševićan[;] was long time.long The Serbian intelligentsia under was pressureterrible [.]A position avassal a Yugoslavia in for time. existed Weoccupied Serbian coalition for along he got to ride. In the end, the tiger got to ride him’ (Interview, October 2011). been a nationalist. He made amistake, however, thinking that he could control that tiger [nationalism] which ‘ argues that Milo
apology from the SKS for the earlier political campaign against them, against campaign political SKS the the earlier from for apology 158 157 H 48). 1999: (Thomas, politics and party of considerations normal the all transcended which authority Tito psyc the fill was to appearance addition, hispowerful In (Ibid). state communist the of prohibitions the under unsayable considered been long for had what saying actually was Milošević ageneral was there i historical ‘correct to determined the essence captures Milošev to adviser future and SANU the of member influential an Mihailović, ( new regime the favored their publish views, their express publicly to rights including the treatment institutional different entirely ain f ioei ws already was Milošević of lation adu population close, appearance appearance (1989:of Slobodan Milošević’ 12). gather most creative intellectual forces, it ought to distance itself from quasi As amatterAs me, told offact’, he ‘
Available at: Ina SKS’s public statement published in Politika , the Moreover, Moreover, At the same ti ‘Serbia had beenpolitically andeconomically dominated Yugoslavia. in An
embodiment - http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/06/world/yugoslavs šević pragmatically sought to use nationalism in order to get popular support as a communist. communist. a as support popular get to order in nationalism use to sought pragmatically šević soon after he had as he had after soon hological vacuum opened in opened vacuum hological
books, and not have their opinions censored, particularly if those if particularly censored, opinions their have andnot books, me,
of the new the alliance: of
e was widely acknowledged as a strong and outspoken leader leader outspoken and strong a as acknowledged e waswidely of poli of sense that, in his attacks on the autonomous provinces, provinces, autonomous onthe attacks in his that, sense Dj I believe Milo believe I in
ukić, 1994: 30). A 30). 1994: ukić,
As the decade drew to a a drew decade to As the Yugoslavia. in authority tical the the Serbian njustices’ made to his compatriots. his to made njustices’ šević received they power, sumed
on 5 February 1988, it wa ’s 133
wife was right when saying that her husband had never public 158
New York Times York New , Milošević gained a reputation and and reputation a gained Milošević , the people’s - astir
transformed into a ’cult of of a ’cult into transformed - fighters against nationalism’. nationalism’. against fighters s stated that ‘If Party the wants to over
minds
In - serbian
ll
a similar tone, Žarko Korać Žarko tone, similar a
interview with Kosta Kosta with interview this not only an official official an only not
with the death of death the with
- changed with the s
- rise.html In th 157 is ić, nicely nicely ić,
. regard, regard, but an an but Puhovski Puhovski anti
- CEU eTD Collection (The Ledger 32
nation. battle Kosovo Times York TheNew then W.Browne, 1996:Malcom 315). (Lampe, decade endof the the the 1968 and1976, between Quadrupled unaddressed. left were problems economic structural country’s the time, same the played in slogans. and songs in celebrated name andhis dwellings, private and offices business rallies, political at being displayed portrait his with personality’, 159 cr political serious most the to ananswer give to wassupposed constitution 1974federal the of The adoption even made possible an unearned rise in liv in rise unearned an possible made even that countrymen hisfellow of predictions economic ont centered period this during worries popular real the future’ political Yugoslavia’s of gravity January 2012).
‘The ‘The only appropriate way to desc per cent inflation rate, rising unemployment, and the prospect of much worse to come’
moment,
3 3 llowing Tito’s death in 1980, the pessimistic pessimistic the 1980, in death Tito’s llowing fo years in the And indeed, ‘Most Yugoslavs seem politicsto take fairly casually [. ] What concern does [them] is
correspondent from Belgrade, from correspondent .3.2.1. The echo of Kosovo of echo The .3.2.1. .3.2. , 16February 1975).
he economic hardship: he economic
Montenegro it had primarily been continued borrowing that kept the state afloat and and afloat state the kept that borrowing continued been hadprimarily it was to symbolically verify his new status of the leader of the Serbian Serbian the of leader the of hisnew status verify symbolically was to 1989 June s isi
e 600th anniversary of the of anniversary e 600th th of celebration spectacular since the establishment of of establishment the since : The whisper The : ribe this atmosphere is “nationalistic hysteria”’, hysteria”’, “nationalistic is ribe atmosphere this
thus 134
sum of its its foreign debt of sum
ing standards (Roberts, 2007: 425). By By 425). 2007: (Roberts, ing standards commented that ‘d that commented
Many believe that Many believe true. came
the the socialist Yugoslavia. At the At the Yugoslavia. socialist
espite the potential potential the espite 159 Korać told me (Interview, me told Korać rose even faster by faster even rose
The main role he he role The main ,
u ntil ntil
CEU eTD Collection cent 1976-
demands ( demands economic growing and existing population’s the meet no longer could aid, on foreign I 53). depression generous allocations from the federal level level federal the from allocations generous and– onthe impact smallest Its federation. the austerity drastic by introducing reform economic an initiated thus authorities central Yugoslav - decision monetary influenced politically of result a as andprovinces republics poorer to transferred funds’ of that argued they happen, to that For 58). 5: 199 (Woodward, home at efficiency improving by growth generating and start to markets Western in the competitive were that goods of production to reorient hadto system economic Yugoslav the anddebt, deficits trade persistent i that, believed Fund advisers Monetary International and the economists liberal Domestic control. of out spiraling were costs living the 162 161 160 gone, Montenegro, ‘ Montenegro, gone, period ofstagnation that resulted in 0.6 per cutting the public expenditures, and prioritizing export producers in federal allocations (Ibid). economic remedy, quite contrary, they proposed strengthening the income rights of enterprises and republics, which, consequently, diminished the incentives of the mos
The term used by Montenegrin political science professor Veselin Pavi Veselin professor science political Montenegrin term by used The ‘After decades in which GDP growth was among the highest in Europe’, Jović writes, ‘Yugoslavia entered a entered ‘Yugoslavia writes, Jović Europe’, in highest the among was growth GDP which in decades ‘After This way, the liberal economists maintained, potential resources for new investments had been lowered, been had new investments for resources potential maintained, economists liberal the way, This
and in December 1989 inflation peaked at more than 2,000 per time Tito passed away, passed Tito time 1980 and 5.9 per t became glaringly apparent that Yugoslav socialism, long time relying heavily heavily relying long time Yugoslavsocialism, that apparent glaringly t became Before most of its citizens even reali even citizens its of most Before This This 1982. in measures Morrison,
which during
cent in 1971- the nation of donation’, of the nation 2009: 76). ‘all economic indicators were negative and wo and negative were indicators economic ‘all
the federal government first had to put an end to ‘the waste waste ‘the endto an had put to first government federal the
5’ 5’ 197
the country’s international debt, inflation rate and the and the rate inflation debt, international country’s the making (Ibid: 61). (Ibid: making 161 led (2009: 157). In this periodst, the
cent GDP growth from 1981 to 1989, compared to 5.6 per
t he country 135 zed that the beloved Yugoslav leader was was leader Yugoslav beloved the that zed 162 – t productive workers and firms in the country. As the
still
was hit hard by the economic crisis in in crisis economic the by hard was hit 160 into the least developed republic of the the of republic developed least the
Following the libe the Following
cent ( cent
notwithstanding the decades of of decades the notwithstanding a extended n n order to escape the trap of of trap the escape to n order ćević during our Septe Bennet, andard of living fell nearly 40 per 1995: 69). period of e of period rals’ advice, the the advice, rals’
rsening’ rsening’ mber 2012 talk. 2012 mber conomic conomic
cent in ( Ibid: Ibid:
CEU eTD Collection January 2012). [...] peace social the of preservation the toensure we had other hand, the On was unsustainable: ‘We had aware been of that fact the there were way workerstoo many in state enterprises. Yugoslav average per employee, they were 2.6 times higher (Andrijašević and Rastoder, 2006: 258).
reduction w Faced subventions. government federal onthe dependent substantially were they Assuch, 77). (Ibid: profits’ sustainable generate or practice business to facilitate labor but nothing with areas in located ‘mainly were planning, upon capital negative. particularly SFRJ was 164 163 Montenegr of attempt ambitious The line. poverty the under lived population its of cent per 20 than more that wasestimated it 1988, By endof the later. years three bankruptcy Moreover, Consequently perspective. economic had believed they that those support instead, and, enterprises unviable these in workers of numbers large off lay to chose authorities Veselin Dj Veselin dislocati andsocial disenfranchisement economic of sense growing the shared now m the of majority avast prosperity, economic and peace social of atmosphere in the living of long period the After close. to came decade the before well gone was 1980s the welcomed had Montenegrins the which with optimism The great 78). (Ibid: de redundant’ ma who hadbeen workers disgruntled of resentment the ‘assuaging i.e. crisis, economic the of dimension social the with high high oflaborcost and the low
In this regard, Srzentić admitted that admittedSrzentić regard, this In The losses of the Montenegrin economy in 1986 economy Montenegrin exceeded of the losses The profits by 110 per cent At the same time, the Republic’s leadership was even less effective in coping coping in effective less even was leadership Republic’s the time, same the At
which came along the abovementioned austerity package, austerity abovementioned the along which came uranović, uranović, nt to to the revitalize nt o’s governme
together with Macedonia and Kosovo, Montenegro officially declared declared officially Montenegro Kosovo, and Macedonia with together - intensive basic industries which, as a result of the central economic economic central the of aresult as which, industries basic intensive , already in 1984, one in four Montenegrins were unemployed. unemployed. were Montenegrins four onein 1984, in already , Montenegrin - level level
productivity
the previousthe strategy ofMontenegro’s official economic development 163 high communist official who served as the president president the as who served official high communist
The Montenegrin economy was primarily based based wasprimarily economy The Montenegrin had therefore chosen to over to therefore chosen had 136 economy thus suffered a big failure. abig failure. suffered thus economy
and, in the face of the extremely ofthe face the in and, on. With this in mind, this in mind, With on. - employ people’ (Interview, people’ employ ith their significant significant their ith
and, compared to the
the Republic’s Republic’s the
164
CEU eTD Collection
interests. come hadsomehow federation the that the republics of most in growing was suspicion the problems, economic the with Along system. political its of legitimacy the undermined considerably somewhat different leitmotif. leitmotif. different somewhat a having out turned leadership its against protests public resultant the Republic, socio the - from emanating albeit Yet, bland. toxic political andincreas unemployment rising conditions, social worsening 1988, of end the Toward questioned. beopenly to came soon aconsequence, as legitimacy, their Republic, in the th Having these problems. to know to ananswer seem did not leadership state the from ( crisis’ economic out - (1984 - (1982 Montenegro of Presidency the of 166 165 political wasno indisputable there however, time, This federation. the throughout rise wasonthe sentiment nationalist the 1970s, early the Like in 74). 1995: (Woodward, economic reform, economic necessary the over bargaining in their order constitutional country’s the of principles contribution republics.of the Theirfisc resultant compromise according to which the federal state was to rely on federal revenues only, without any financial of the republics to pay their obligatory share in the first half of 1986. Later that year, they reached a parts’ ( commitment to common the was and, effect, an fate’ in to‘thethat its largerend put idea ofawhole than others’ advantage’ (1996: 326). Communist leadership. They suggested instead that the disadvantages suffered by their republic came at the exposed social problems and individual abuses ofpower, but stopped short of confronting their own republic’s
tion tion situa overall the for responsibility absolute the andhence power of e monopoly Th As noted by Lampe, ‘the modern and therefore sensation- us, for instance, the continuing quarrels over the federal budget financing resulted in the refusal of most Woodward, - drown long, the with impatient becoming people are ’the that warned 1985), - mid the in in Yugoslavia crisis the economic of The escalation 165
As the As 1995: 74). 166
leaders
Krug its legitim its
, 22 September 1990). On the other hand, his comrades comrades his hand, other the On 1990). September 22 ,
ing poverty in Montenegro were thus transformed into a a into transformed thus were Montenegro in poverty ing of Yugoslavrepublics of
ating principles were eroding at the popular level level popular the at eroding were principles ating to be used by the others and against their particular particular their andagainst others the by beused to al sovereigntyal 137 1983) and the Presidency of Y of Presidency the and 1983) hungry media of Serbia, Croatia, and Sloven ia
were picking apart the fundamental fundamental the apart picking were
marked the ‘break fundamental the in economic hardship in the in the hardship economic ugoslavia ugoslavia 1980s 1980s CEU eTD Collection
period, reviving and advancing the long latent argument about Montenegrins as a as Montenegrins about argument long latent the advancing and reviving period, this during circles intellectual Serbian the of activity political intensive the at glimpse from a mere wasclear respect in choice this behisfirst to wasgoing Montenegro his That level. Yugoslav the at leverage political ensure respectable to order in Republic outside allies needed Milošević provinces, Serbian two the of control political assuming to ition in add Namely, leadership. communist the Montenegrin of fall the behind motive political main being the out turned it time, same the At politics. Serbian th was proper Serbia throughout welcomed was Belgrade in power political concentrate - re to plan his which with enthusiasm the province, southern in the Serbs the of interests the protect to determination declared publically Milošević’s Considering andthe country in the change constitutional instantaneous of necessity the of evidence ultimate non- the of oppression systematic alleged quoi status political the to opposition in the united largely seemed Serbia Serbia in public general the as well as circles intellectual and political The republic. biggest in the strong exceptionally chapters, related the in elaborated as was, structure post its with dissatisfaction of sense the federation, Yugoslav bang the drum of nationalism’ ( of drum bang the together, country the hold to him Without (Ibid). expressed freely more ever hence were era Tito the of authority that could neutralize t neutralize could that authority erefore hardly surprising. hardly surprising. erefore The Kosovo issue was thus was issue The Kosovo And while initiatives for political reform were coming from different parts of the of parts different from coming were reform political for initiatives And while -
legally deprived of effective control over the two autonomous provinces - provinces autonomous two the over control effective of deprived legally
onwhich question ‘the way was open for opportunistic and unscrupulous politicians to to politicians andunscrupulous opportunistic for ‘the way wasopen Roberts, he
inter
the key to his rapid ascent to the summit of the the of summit the to ascent rapid his to key the the Serbian elite based its political narrative. political its based elite Serbian the - republic resentment republic 2007:429). 138 Albanian minority in Kosovo served as the the as served in Kosovo minority Albanian
. Challenges to the myths myths the to Challenges . - 1974 constitutional 1974 constitutional n Yugoslavia. The n Yugoslavia.
CEU eTD Collection Serbian Question i 1989). The notion that Montenegrins were, in fact, ethnic Serbs was later systematized in the book titled ‘The
(Woodward, 1995: 89), 1995: (Woodward, increasing andnationalism interest national when moment the At federation. Yugoslav the of rest andthe in Serbia developments political new the by unprepared already have half of the country under political control. political under the country of half have already would leader the new Serbian onedelegate, with was represented parts constitutive same occasion, the SKCG called for ‘an uncompromising battle against the causes causes the against battle ‘an uncompromising for called SKCG the occasion, same eight in the republic smallest 36). 2002: (Ramet, nation Serbian wider the of branch 168 guardian throughout the centuries The Montenegrins are the mainstay of the Serbian ethnic being and Montenegro as a state has been its the Serbs in Montenegro and those in Serbia, but they are insufficient to determine them as separate peoples. (Islamized Serbs living in Serbia and in Montenegro) [.] It should be noted that there are differences between Montenegro), the Montenegrins (the Serbs who live in Montenegro and fewer in Serbia), and the Muslims in thisarea [Serbia and Montenegro – by theUniversity of Belgrade 167 workers and equality national the of principles constitutional onthe based Yugoslavfederation of the development self socialist the of strengthening a‘continuous for ort supp full pledged Communists of League Montenegrin the of 1986Congress the spirit, this peoples. In its of andunity brotherhood language ‘in all military circumstances’, whereas, in view Serb view the in of whereas, circumstances’, all military ‘in language openly demanded that Slovenes allowed be military todo se andintellectuals against theYugoslav People’s Army (JNA)’. During 1987and 1988, various youth organizations were founded not on Slovene sovereignty byopposing all federal institutions that seemed to interfere with republican rights and roots Novine the whole, 1 Serbian Diaspora began to fragment and spiritually weaken’ (Književne then argued that ‘Montenegrinism is the most Serbian part of the Serbian nation, and when republic(Ibid: 90). army’s officer corps, a number of intellectuals forcalled the creation of ‘nationally homogenous ar
In this spirit, Dobrica Ćosić, a communist dissident and, in view of many, father of the Serbian nationalism, Serbian the of father many, of view in and, dissident communist a Ćosić, Dobrica spirit, this In In this regard, the author mentions the case of Slovenia where ‘the policy of protecting and enhancing Montenegrin authorities were caught completely completely caught were authorities Montenegrin the hand, other the On n thenBalkans’ (chapter: ‘The Ethnic Structureofthe Populationof Mo
parliamentary and republic supremacylinked up with a campaign of radical young people . The author,arguesfollowing:VujadintheretheRudić,The‘ . 168
’ the government in Titograd still clung firmly to the idea of idea of the to clungfirmly still in Titograd government the
(1995: 82).
- - I.V.] is divide I.V.] member Presidium of the SFRJ, in which each of the the of which each thein SFRJ, of Presidium member class interest’ (quoted in Radonjić (quoted interest’ class -
management and the democratic andall democratic andthe management throughout the country the throughout d into three nations: the Serbs (living in Serbia and fewer in 139 ly framed public debate and participation’ participation’ and debate public framed ly rvice in their Republic and to use the Slovene -
dominated composition of thedominated Yugoslav compositionof 167
With With ‘the political rhetoric of of rhetoric political ‘the 06: 531). On On the 531). 2006: , Today the Serbian people the the ntenegro), published rt of the rt of suppo it was torn from its mies’ in eachmies’ in - - 15 July, round round
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modernizer and, in particular, his outspoken political manner stood in sharp contrast contrast in sharp stood manner political outspoken his in particular, and, modernizer - which mid by movement gained a great popularit great a gained soon leader Serbian new the awhole, as federation Yugoslav andthe his Republic anti populist, Milošević’s 161). (2008: discontent’ popular of outburst amajor for ‘ripe economically and was politically republic Yugoslav smallest the argues, rightfully Vladisavljević point, tha At t in it. positions privileged their preserve to desire the but laid nothing believe, to came Republic in the many system, political current the of maintenance for support declarative strong their Behind interests. act was country quoin the status political the on insistence leaders’ communist its that Montenegro of people disgruntled among 1980 in sawnone figures, representatives. political their toward anger demonstrating openly were Montenegrins more and more Asaconsequence, period. this during catastrophe nearing above, outlined - socio the difficult, more even position its Tomake face. to was about Republic the that challenges historical the to answer political acredible lacked clearly elite the Montenegrin 259), 2006: and Rastoder, onadead- itself exactly (Ibid). nationalism’ Croatian and Albanian Muslim, Serbian, Greater Montenegrin, the of and manifestations progressively progressively Owing to the decisiveness with which he approached the burning problems of problems burning the which with heapproached the decisiveness to Owing r than rather repairing to ‘Prone the opposite direction, opposite the –
end political course. end political and, as it soon turned out, more importantly – importantly more out, turned soon it as and, T he number of strikes in the Republic that Republic in the strikes of he number 1988 y in Montenegro as well. as Montenegro in y thus With
began to ‘flow out’ ‘flow to began the communist leadership of Montenegro soon found found soon Montenegro of leadership communist the
mutd o 0 n 97 Fč, 99 17. As 127). 1989: (Fočo, 1987 in 50 to amounted in in changing in Yugoslavia circumstances political
eplacing the inefficient system’ (Andrijašević (Andrijašević system’ inefficient the eplacing economic situation in Montenegro was, as as was, in Montenegro situation economic 140 ually motivated by personal political political personal by ually motivated
of Serbia served as the trigger. the as Serbiaof served
ioei’ reput Milošević’s , according to the official official the to according ,
grew the suspicion suspicion the grew - bureaucratic bureaucratic ation of a a of ation
CEU eTD Collection 2012). 1999). inevitability ( andcommitment it’ of change toimplement Yugoslavia’s of other from differed who up, with about acrystal in position politicians anewthe clear rhetoric, thatheintroduced turned Milošević Then end. dead a from mov thatwould stage Yugoslavia oftheformer effort onthepolitical impressive
two than officials. state Montenegrin the of image popular the with 172 171 170 169 Kosovo’ to go ‘Let’s like slogans the Milošević, of support in chanted those to addition In Montenegro. of population disenfranchised greatly among audience receptive messages Kosovo. from andMontenegrins Serbs the with solidarity show to Titograd in gathered thousands Serbia, in seen already scenario the 1988 18 August on evident became appeal hispolitical of The strength in Montenegro. strongly resonated people’ the to back power the ‘bringing call for as Montenegrins, recalled, of the overall population. popularityamong them. socio to Montenegro ’not to call for rebellion’ but ’to inform [Montenegrins], directly and in a solidar de they rally, Titograd the at speaker keynote the and representatives their of one Basara, Arsić supported from Belgrade, had already organized a number ofsimilar in gatherings Serbia. words In of Svetozar pressure’, Arsić concluded,Arsićpressure’, the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovowere endangered and close to extinction’. ’They did not suffer political language’ as one of main reasons behind his rapid political ascent (Interview, September 2012).
It is also worth mentioning that, after 1948, their number in th in number their 1948, after that, mentioning isalso worth It The meeting was initiated by the political leaders of of Serbs leaders political the by initiated was meeting The The fact that Milošević’s family was originally from Montenegro should, given the strength of traditional of strength the given should, Montenegro from originally was family Milošević’s that fact The Similarly, in th in Similarly, - cultural values upheld byits people, be taken into account as another reason behind his political
170 For this reason, in the atmosphere of grave- socio of atmosphere in the reason, this For ‘ All, andAll, especially the younger anxiously generation, awaited acredible attempt, an
Milošević represented everything that their political leaders were not: were leaders political their that everything represented Milošević
per cent of Montenegrins in the province at that at moment, that province in the of Montenegrins cent per about the forced migration of non- of migration forced the about e course of our abovementioned talk, Veselin Pavi
his future political ally political future his
but ‘prosecution and genocide’ (
141 – turned opponent, Milo Dj Milo opponent, turned Radio Television of MontenegroTelevisionof Radio Albanians seemed to find a genuinely agenuinely find to seemed Albanians and Montenegrins from Kosovo, who, logistically logistically who, from Kosovo, Montenegrins and e had province exceedednever four per cent Radio Free E ei pitd u Milošević out pointed ćević 171 economic crisis, Milošević‘s Milošević‘s crisis, economic 169
Although there were less less were there Although
the In urope,19 October eyes of ordinary ordinary of eyes ukanović -
, 3 February, 3 RTCG e things away things e when, under when, it 172 y manner, that cidedto come
’s ‘simple ’s ‘simple political political , later
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negative coverage on state media. Behind the radical – radical the media.Behind state on coverage negative received they that sure making rallies, the regarding stance ahostile took leadership The Republic. the throughout organized subsequently protests of a series in culminated governance their of results economic the with as well as issue andMontenegrins. Serbs Kosovo the with empathy no showing for accused publically were authorities Montenegrin the nationalism’, Serbian of breakthrough a‘direct meetingas the of characterization negative their of and ‘ 173 1982- the Keković, Vladimir protests’, the before time of period extended an ‘For motive. workers industrial for rise pay cent unrealistic would not disperse peacefully, the Montenegrin state leadership declared a state of of astate declared leadership state Montenegrin the peacefully, disperse not would crowd the that became obvious it after morning, Thenext government. republican reform constitutional the for support political standard, living better demand to building of Parliament the Montenegrin in front gathered thousands of when tens leadership, Vojvodina of toppling the after y ada merely 7, onOctober true came predictions ( government’ its of fall expected an for preparingground in effect, and, enterprises larger the in nationalists Serb with t Montenegro’s on active been had agitators Montenegro [...] and a return toits authentic roots and origi well a
The protest was, as expec as was, protest The - w known Serbian poet of Montenegrin descent, thus publically characterized it as ‘the rehabilitation of 1989 National Security executive, recently recalled, ’Belgrade recalled, recently executive, Security National 1989 - The popular dissatisfaction with their political position vis position political their with dissatisfaction The popular e , finally, the resignation of the of resignation the finally, and, leadership Serbian the of activities related
want arms want –
economic economic ’ were frequently heard during the rally. At the same time, in light in light time, same the At rally. the during heard frequently ’ were ted, strongly supported by the Belgrade nationalist intelligentsia. Matija Bećković, Matija intelligentsia. nationalist Belgrade the by supported strongly ted, demands of the protesters ( protesters the of demands
, 26 August 2012). Such Such 2012). 26August , Evropa Radio Slobodna ) ,
Montenegrin state officials saw a clear political saw aclear officials state Montenegrin 142 erritory, establishing close connections connections close establishing erritory, ns’ (NIN 173 , 9 July 1989). , 9July such as an immediate 100per such animmediate as
and, needless and,
- à - vis the Kosovo Kosovo the vis Montenegrin Montenegrin - sponsored sponsored
to say, say, to
CEU eTD Collection (Interview, July 2013).
e 15hour th up break to police ordered and capital in the emergency 174 the of members the of resignation the confirming letter the morning, next the On accordance. in act to but doanything not could leave to asked who were those importantly, crowd the from was heard demand noother however, This time, leadership. communist Republic’s of the the for resignation ask to building Parliament the before gathered thousands of tens earlier, months three like Just elite. political its against uprising popular another witnessed Montenegro 1989, 10January On mobilization. and political ill too simply were authorities Montenegrin the disoriented, politically and Demoralized 85). 2009: (Morrison, widening’ was gitimacy andle legality between chasm ‘the as cause its to detrimental being out thus turned protesters the against violence sanction of the Albeitlawful, Montenegro. of leadership the on backs their turned indifferent politically hadbeen who those even people’, ‘ordinary against the use force decisionto the of Because inevitable. measures drastic such andMacedonian), Serbian but demonstrations. whom had – mid the in government were of tired personally. us desperately’ neededit
šević, University of Montenegro professor who entered the Republic’s the entered who professor Montenegro of University From the ofpoint view ofIlijašević, Vujo
3.3.2.2. ‘ The same faces hadbeenThe same faces circulating within Albeit supported by the Yugoslav and most of the republican presidencies (all (all presidencies republican the of most and Yugoslav the by Albeit supported
often due tonepotism –
E Pl
dency Presi
- 1980s, 1980s,
(Interview, 2012) December uribus Unum uribus ‘Montenegrin state institutions seemed ossified and their officials, most of most officials, and their ossified seemed institutions state ‘Montenegrin
In They demanded refreshment
words of Marko Orlandić
of Montenegro andits Montenegro of
held variousheld political positions for over years, 20 appeared very tired’
143 - equipped to survive the following social the following survive to equipped . 174
the party time. for thelongest People
: representatives in the Yugoslav Yugoslav in the representatives
and, honestly,
could only postpone the the only postpone could I
also
and, more more and, thought we - long CEU eTD Collection
s had had s authoritie Belgrade the that i.e. in Vojvodina, coup political successful the with dissatisfaction popular of culmination the that assume to naive too be would it Moreover, propaganda. nationalist Serbian of ideas the by motivated politically were in Montenegro people of number aconsiderable period, this that, during fact the ignore not one can Montenegrins. among wisdom political of conventional amatter become has revolution the 1989 of interpretation such decades, two last fact, the In 537). over (2006: Serbia’ of jurisdiction the under Montenegro bring and old elite the topple to patrons Belgrade their of goal political ‘fulfilled actually revolutionaries the representatives’, 147). (2003: character’ dominant [its] of favor in clearly spoke […] opponents Milošević’s were who officials communist Yugoslav the against attacks problem, Kosovo ’ andthat overtones’ nationalistic - Serbian a base was‘at officials Montenegrin at professor Darmanović Srđan 1988. October in Sad Novi in happened what Titogr in happened What Montenegro. in nationalism Serbian of avictory as event this characterized many Belgrade, from receiving been had organizers the which support logistic declared Bulatović, Momir win’, hadto y the because won have ‘People mass. ecstatic the to wasread Presidency Similarly, Radovan Radonjić comments that, while playing the role of ’popular ’popular of role the playing while that, comments Radonjić Radovan Similarly, This thesis holds that This thesis scenery protest the of elements certain of impression the Under ( RTCG, 3 February 2012) 3February RTCG,
the
University of Montenegro, of University ad in Janu ad
Montenegro of president future and leader a protest with the Montenegrin leadership just happened to coincide coincide to happened just leadership Montenegrin the with
it is too simplified and hence largely incorrect. Of course, Of incorrect. largely hence and simplified istoo it in their view in their 1989was, ary numerous posters of Milošević, deliberation over the the over deliberation Milošević, of posters numerous .
144
thus argues that the overthrow of the the of overthrow the that argues thus ng ng stro with coup engineered , essentially the same as as same the essentially , , political science science political ,
and in view of and in view of joyfully joyfully CEU eTD Collection thousands protested in front of the Montenegrin Parliament building due to the standards. Six months later, occasion the first on ofthe anniversary January 1989 ofthe demonstrations,
originated largely from the local sources’ (2008: 162). In that sense,a that In 162). (2008: sources’ local the from largely originated apparent w - socio prolonged the from resulted the onein Montenegro from Belgrade, andorchestrated in designed entirely and Kosovo in Vojvodina revolts bureaucratic anti the Whereas Montenegro. within from came change political for incentive ’c anti Montenegrin the that maintains thesis the protagonists, main its of andambitions motives diverging the considering Instead, would erroneous. elements beas other its ignoring while aspect share the hardship of t of hardship the share did not members its privileged that fact the dueto important, equally and, Republic in the situation overall the improve to inability its of because elite old political - pro in andchange mobilization However it. do with to nothing 175 between government and people’ ( andpeople’ government between - ‘re allow thus and scene’ political leave the must leadership andcowardly irresponsible, ‘the incompetent, that stated protest, 1989. On 20August hi omplex political phenomenon’ (Sć phenomenon’ political omplex
With ashort breakWith wake in the January of the the coup, social protests Montenegroin allcontinued through le the effect of the protests in Serbia on the situation in Montenegro was was Montenegro in situation onthe in Serbia of the protests effect le the tum of the Montenegrin society, many demanded departure of the of departure demanded many society, Montenegrin tum the of stra Serbian In this regard, one must bear in mind that, albeit supported from abroad, the abroad, from supported albeit that, mind in bear onemust regard, this In In this spirit, Vlastimir Golubović, one of the key speakers of the January January the of speakers key the of one Golubović, Vlastimir spirit, this In ,
‘t he demonstrations in Titograd and other parts of the small Republic Republic the small of parts and other Titograd in he demonstrations , more than , he ordinary people. he ordinary economic crisis in the Republic. in the crisis economic 5 -
,0 pol gtee i Nki t demand to Nikšić in gathered people 0,000 tic revolution is ought to be understood as a a as beunderstood to ought is revolution tic bureaucra Montenegro solely to this one– this to solely Montenegro , to reduce the analysis of the process of political political of process the of analysis the reduce to , ekić, 2011: 324). 324). 2011: ekić, RTCG 145 175 , 3 February 2012). Hence, contrary to the to contrary Hence, 2012). 3February ,
ken links links ken bro the long of establishment had purely political character political had purely
As noted by Vladisavljević, Vladisavljević, by noted As
same reasons. reasons. same better jobs and higher living
however important – important however longside
and were
the the -
CEU eTD Collection the Montenegrin nation. We admire him because him because hewantsto transform Montenegrins Serbs. into He won’t do Wewill it. remain for
iia Pejanović Milica ( order’ and social future our on [decide] ideasand of market the on monopoly the have to beallowed must SKCG, figure key Momi alongside who, Stanković Ljubiša revolution, January the wake of the In 434). 2007: (Roberts, path’ Communist Yugoslavia’s with break clear a for ‘pushing were that Slovenia of ts movemen youth progressive in the inspiration non- in t part took who people of number notion the to related knowledge by the ideas of political liberalization and democratiz and liberalization political of ideas the by majorityof them name of democracy’ ( democracy’ of name ‘in the undertaken action apolitical as it understood communists andyoung students self Parlia national the of Montenegrin outside the crowd the to demonstrating in address his company, railway leader union influential politically Vučinić, Drago by emphasized As them. to back power the bring wasto who politician capable and straightforward, embraced Montenegrins of
his - interested and detached from the popular- the base from anddetached interested existing among the anti the among existing
ment building: building: ment wisdom thatno andcourage In this regard, as it was often heard during the January protest, many workers, workers, many protest, January the during heard wasoften it as regard, this In ’Montenegrin did people o notcho - socio asingle ‘not that argued thus ( - who, as arule, as who, jršć a nvriy rfso and professor University a Djurišić,
, 22 November 1991). And whil 1991). 22November , Europe Radio Free Milošević not as a nationalist a as not Milošević , January 1989, Special edition). In a similar vein, asimilar vein, In edition). Special 1989, January , NIN - bureaucr
one ) neither
this was merely a symbolic message, asymbolic merely was this he demonstrations were actually and primarily and actually were he demonstrations
before se Milošević because he is a Serb. We do not like not do We Serb. a is he because Milošević se
atic revolutionaries in Serbia, in revolutionaries atic 146 had had shown’ ( had shown’
practical experience nor any theoretical theoretical any nor experience practical of simple things, pol itical organization, including the the including organization, itical leadership, a significant number number asignificant leadership, ation. This current of opinion, current This ation. Pobjeda, 10January 1989).
but as an allegedly honest, asbut anallegedly one of the Montenegrin Montenegrin the one of for saying what he thinks, r Bulatović, was its its was Bulatović, r e for avast e for
found its its found rtaina ce
led
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mobilization in Serbia, many stood up against the indifferent political stance of the the of stance political indifferent the against up stood many Serbia, in mobilization c popular different three least the anti interests, national Serbian of name the in solely out carried were changes political the where Kosovo, Milošević would Milošević s popular most the of andseparati ‘nationalism Albanian Kosovo the who Yugoslav those Serbs, the of new leader the celebrated rally, Sad Novi the at present Milošević, num as well as Montenegro, socialist of flags andthe Yugoslav the carrying songs, partisan andrevolutionary anthem Yugoslav the chanting building Parliament the before came in Titograd protesters symbols the and heroes, medieval Serbian of portraits the banners, Serbian under down government provincial the brought who Sad Novi in comrades their Unlike iconography. Yugoslav the by dominated was protest the observation, Darmanović’s aforesaid the to Contrary r. symbolic characte onits light different asomewhat alsocasts demonstration 2012). February ( levels’ society the all at democratization of process challenging long and conditio the of creation of beginning the but world the of end the represent do not resignations forced ‘[their] that leadership outgoing the of representatives with 12 meeting January the during out pointed leaders, Youth Communist tioned by Darmanović, Darmanović, by tioned men opposite aword, In the composition, its to adjacent Finally, –
take Tito’s place’ (Ibid). (Ibid). place’ Tito’s take as he often pointed out out pointed he often as logans of the January protest January the of logans - of of bureaucratic protest in Montenegro brought together at at together brought in Montenegro protest bureaucratic the situation in Vojvodina and and in Vojvodina situation the onstituencies. In line with the process of political political of process the with line In onstituencies. one could accordingly argue, portrayed a devoted devoted a portrayed argue, accordingly one could
the of erous pictures of Tito. And while those of of those And while Tito. of pictures erous
147 –
Četnik protect the Federation against against the Federation protect to sought through expressed as Hence, sm’.
movement, a vast majority of the the of majority avast movement, mise
‘Mo - ntenegro kept asking when when asking kept ntenegro en- scè –
a few months later – later months a few ne of the January January the of RTCG, RTCG, ns for a for ns one one 3
CEU eTD Collection of the Serbianof the ofYugoslavia kings was with another meeting Zagreb facto de Government [...] that totell them ondawn December 1971,1, fifty the - their presence creation the Kingdomof the Croats, Serbs, ofthe and vanishing Habsburg Monarchy, and responded to their urgent request for immediate union by proclaiming in Nationalthe Council i credit: ’On December 1, 1918, the Serbian Prince
and the party youth organizati youth party and the initial lack of a clear political agenda. agenda. political aclear of lack initial – chapter e following th in discussed – leadership Montenegrin new the of heterogeneity The for. aimed bewasactually it to what seen wasyet it against, wasaimed protest collective its of confirmation awritten receiving upon staircase building Parliament the from declared famously Bulatović Momir fulfilled’, been have demands our ‘All leadership. political the Montenegrin of change of necessity the of idea around the ther toge regime. existing the with discontinuity systemic making for in anopportunity saw Montenegro reforms andeconomic political genuine socio elite, ruling the by motivated politically were s of Montenegrin number avast time, non- of fate the regards as leadership Montenegrin 176 o convened meeting Committee Central SKJ extraordinary the at speech afamous In n 1 December 1971, n 1December
For the the For following observation ofa - economic hardship in the Republic. Finally, mainly recruited from the University University the from recruited mainly Finally, Republic. in the hardship economic Whatever their different agendas may have been, the demonstrators came demonstrators the been, have may agendas different their Whatever 3 3 .3.3.1. Maspok is over .3.3.
resignation. Thus, although from its very beginning it was clear what the the what was clear it beginning very its from although Thus, resignation.
rs did not share their destiny, their share not did rs membe privileged whose
Croatia n Zagreb, a de facto ade Zagreb, n Government Croats, ofthe Croatian Serbs, Slovenes and ofthe : The deafening silence 176
Tito officially put an end to the Croatian Maspok Croatian the anendto put officially Tito third third anniversaryof this proclamation, the Croatian Communistsuccessor great symbolicism of this date, Rusinow unquestionably deserves some deservessome unquestionably Rusinow date, of this symbolicism great ons, a progressive minority of those who wanted wanted who those of minority aprogressive ons,
evidence convincing most the was perhaps -
Regent Aleksandar Karadjordjević received a delegation from delegation a received Karadjordjević Aleksandar Regent 148
Albanians in Kosovo. At the same same the At in Kosovo. Albanians
whose political development is is development political whose
Slovenes, later renamed Yugoslavia. At At Yugoslavia. later renamed Slovenes,
to ameliorate the ameliorate to inability of the the of inability . He He . of its CEU eTD Collection and external enemy, a well ( Hrvatska R (Hrvatska whole,indivisible thanI “unitarism” am ofsuch a favor in andofsuch Yugoslavia’ united resolutely opposed toit. But it if is a matter oftheunity ofour country, ofYugoslavia an as
Ibid fe the of organization the andthat country in the anywhere intervene to right hadthe that one organization wasthe ‘SKJ that clear it hemade parties, republican the of affairs the in interfere to right the one had no that position Croatian the to Contrary 271). 1993: (Irvine, lism’,centra i.e. for acting‘ leadership Croatian blamed W struggle. Partisan the to appealing by it legitimize to Communists of League Croatian of the attempt reject thereby andchauvinistic, nationalistic as movement the denounced 177 308). their policies and activities were endangering that union and that they must bear the consequences’ (1977: was over. Spring Croatian the that it was obvious symbols, political its of dismissal formal a without wasclosed meeting the though Even NDH. the restore ‘unitarism’: against words were reserved for for reserved were words counter prepared a as ‘carefully protest their condemned president Yugoslav the and Tito’, SKH the of leadership in the ‘confidence underway in Cro Danas
Tripalo, in contrast, characterizes Tito’s the move as‘Stalinist a reaction against the process which hadbeen ). 177 , 3 December 1991). h the Zagreb students concluded it by expressing expressing by it concluded students Zagreb although the same time, the At ‘If it is it ‘If theunitarism of Versailles [First] Yugoslavia, Itoo,it without goes say -
revolutionary activity’ (quoted in (quoted activity’ revolutionary In this context, Tito referred to the SKH leaders’ insistence on the struggle struggle onthe insistence SKH the leaders’ to referred Tito context, this In evija atia for , December 1971).
more than a decade [.
- deration must continue to be based on this principle’ (quoted in in (quoted principle’ onthis be based to continue must deration known political the trick, process ofdemocratization our in was republic stopped’ hile accepting most of their economic argumentation, Tito Tito argumentation, economic their of most accepting hile Matica Hrvatska as if if as for the prolonged neglect of the ‘dictates of democratic democratic of ‘dictates the of neglect the prolonged for it was it ] Under the excuse of an danger alleged from coming internal
responsible to no higher authority than itself’ itself’ than authority higher no to responsible 149
n o SR hae b Dapčević by headed SFRJ of and , 1999: 183). Tito’s 183). 1999: , Goldstein which he ly accused of seeking to to seeking of openly accused
strongest strongest ing the ing the ing, aming, - Kučar Kučar
CEU eTD Collection from the party, while another 280 resigned (Tanner, 1997: 202).
of further of necessity the of oblivious be to afford not hence could authorities SFRJ determined, Albeitpolitically 313). 1977: (Rusinow, views andeconomic political predecessors’ their support to continued Croatia of elite governing new the l prejudices’, and regiona national betraying arguments of ‘stripped although fact, In remained. dissatisfaction popular widespread resultant and the federation Yugoslav the of organization in the beginning of ‘Croatian Silence’. ‘Croatian of beginning the marked The 1971thus endof Ibid). decades two almost (Irvine: for emerge not would it which from apathy political into descended which Croatia fled people Many police. upby broken swiftly were Republic, the ughout thro organized spontaneously protests, popular Massive 200). 1997: (Tanner, had expected’ anyone than savage more be‘much to out turned thus movement the against action political the expected, of purged were Croatia in andmedia government, (including 179 178 members party by taken were positions political Their off its of hundred few subsequently sentenced to prison. to sentenced subsequently of populace’ the of andaspirations sentiments nationalist wake fall ofthe ofTripalo andDab to three months (2006: 259).
By May 1972, ‘political measur Altogether, Ramet writes, some 200 some writes, Ramet Altogether, student leaders and nationalist and leaders student Eve Throughout the weeks and months weeks the Throughout
reforms. And Hrvatski Tjednik Hrvatski n without the disobedient Croatian leadership in the picture, the problems problems the picture, in the leadership Croatian disobedient the n without icials
adopted in the following following in the adopted measures of aseries through indeed,
čević were forced to resign and prohibited from public activity. public from prohibited and resign to forced were ) were shut down. From top to bottom, the judiciary, local local judiciary, the bottom, to top From down. shut were ) es’ were taken against more than 1,600 SKH members, 892 were expelled
- Kučar,thousandswith without morebeingheld formal chargestwo for
- 300 persons were imprisoned for political reasons in Croatia in the the in Croatia in reasons for political were imprisoned persons 300 - oriented intellectuals were put on trial, to be to ontrial, put were intellectuals oriented 179
Matica 150
that followed, the SKH leaders SKH the followed, that
and its 14 periodical publications publications 14periodical and its Maspok
(Irvine, 1993: 14). A number 1993: 14). (Irvine,
‘ less responsive to the the to responsive less
sympathizers. Albeit Albeit sympathizers.
along with a with along 178
CEU eTD Collection value of Croatian foreign exchange earnings’ (1972: 109).
depicted by Tanner: by depicted As enough. strongly echoed 1971still December from words Tito’s could say, one realm, political its Within Croatia. in situation onthe effect any have to seem not removal. its after years three than less place in put therefore were leadership Croatian ( i Thus, 6). 1999: (Meier, importance’ any of all affairs practically ‘in right aveto given were sixthe republics same time, the At policy. andforeign defense to basicallyreduced were government of elements political system was essentially transformed into an institutional amalgam of amalgam institutional an into transformed essentially was system political the - decision of the devolution of process the with continued leadership the SKJ, Yugoslav of the authority political absolute the while preserving addition, In in Croatia, nt investme Yugoslavia. period 181 180 coast. oil pipeline that would supply much of Yugoslavia, and a significant num industries, Croatia got the first highway along with a road network connecting Dalmatia with the mainland, the tourists, Croatia to stood benefit most.) the from 20to 45 per cent cent 12per to seven earlier of instead earnings their earnings instead of 12 per cent Goldstein, Goldstein,
During the 1970s, adjacent to ma As explained by Alvin Rubinstein: ‘Export republics. republics.
Still, further political liberalization which the new constitution brought about did did about brought new constitution which the liberalization political further Still, By the end of the decade, as a result of these measures and of heavy federal federal heavy andof measures these of aresult as decade, the of end By the the federal government considerably improved Croatia’s economic status in in status economic Croatia’s improved considerably government federal the
180 ). Ironically, most of the reforms demanded by the previous previous the by demanded reforms of the most Ironically, ). 185 1999:
W
federalism andconfederalism federalism
ith the adoption of the new constitution of SFRJ in February 1974, its its 1974, SFRJ in February of new the of constitution ith the adoption , depending, the on total amount oftourist revenue. (As the republic with the most
181
th e standard of living in the R the in living of e standard
n many respects, n many . The total foreign exchange quota s of the for each jor investments in its shipbuilding, metal, pharmaceutical, and chemical chemical and pharmaceutical, metal, shipbuilding, its in investments jor
The dinar was devalued by 18.7 per cent firms to were allowed retain 20 per cent , and tourist enterpri 151
. The competences of the federal federal the of Thecompetences .
‘the republics had become states’ states’ become had republics ‘the ses were permitted to retain 45per cent retain ses wereto permitted - all its at was epublic ber of ber large high , thus boosting the dinar ix republics now ranged - makin class hotels along the
of foreign exchange g power to to g power time high. high. time
various
of
CEU eTD Collection against thefaintest against hint of criticism’ (1997: 203). (Ibid: 204). – Dabčević and Tripalo others. many were as iled, ja was Tuđman
more lop- more which Serbs had already been heavily over heavily been already had Serbs which folded in Croatia. The post The Croatia. in unfolded processes national current of discussion the from absence its by isconspicuous factor Croatian the is why which 13 years, deceptivel perhaps (and unusually been has question national the Den had the Croats of most sam the At 307). 2006: (Ramet, were underground’ ‘driven forces nationalistic the period, this during new authorities the by repressed Systematically politics. 182 andeconomic political aforementioned many of those Croats who had recently suffered the consequences for their political political their for consequences the suffered recently had who Croats those of many that, view of In (Ibid). the community’ Serbian over hanging previously extermination and genocide of ‘threat alleged the to appealing by promotion political their justify to leadership new Croatian the of attempts frequent by worsened additionally was groups ethnic two the between relationship the 1971, of events the by Yugoslav population by 20 per cent, ethnic Croats made up only 14 per cent these figures, as a high proportion of the Party members were Croatian Serbs. Thus, while participating i from 20to 16 per cent
the price for notbeing tojail. sent Theauthorities in the mid remained-1970s vigilant As noted by the author, Croatia’s share of the total SKJ membership had, by the e n ison Rusinow was Rusinow ison However neral apathy would dominate Croatian Croatian dominate would apathy general of asense decade, anentire For ‘The leaders of the Croatian Spring were dispersed. Holjevac 1970. had in died Spring were of the Croatian dispersed. leaders ‘The
sided in its ethnic composition’ (Tanner, 1997: 202). 1997: (Tanner, composition’ ethnic sided in its , beneath this seemingly calm surface, potentially troubling political political troubling potentially surface, calm seemingly this beneath , . The disengagement from Yugoslav Communism was even greater than suggested by suggested than greater even was Communism Yugoslav from The disengagement .
therefore
s reason good - question issues’ (1985: 141). 141). (1985: issues’ question in a position to comment that ‘the Croatian front of front ‘the that Croatian comment to in aposition
reforms in Yugoslavia. E in Yugoslavia. reforms - Maspok 152
with the effects of the the of effects the with besatisfied to - represented made the organization ‘ever ‘ever organization the made represented
‘exodus of Croats from the in the Party’ from Croats of ‘exodus
Kučar retreated into silence silence into retreated -Kučar
of the Party membership in 1981 182 - mid in the ven
y) quiet for the past past the for quiet y) Adversely affected affected Adversely nd of the 1970s, shrunk e time, 1980s, 1980s, n the the n CEU eTD Collection
of its la dolcevita for price The crisis. economic unprecedented of period a entered 329). 2006: (Ramet, chaos andpolitical weakness institutional producing was framework party long hewasaround. as as only case be the could this that however, , 1980proved May in death his followed that Theyears controllable. ultimately remained Yugoslavia of rest and the in Croatia 308). anti Croatia, of regions rural in the particularly Asaconsequence, on Serbs. them blame to came orientation cl became it on, wore 1980s the as Consequently, 206). 1997: (Tanner, revolution’ the of men old ’grand of the authority the have did not politicalshoes their into stepped who figures humdrum The (1983). Bakarić and (1979) Kardelj associates, closest Ti of death the by facilitated wasadditionally forces political centrifugal of release ensuing The 272). 1993: (Irvine, unravel beganto system institutional decentralized dis party of enforcer ‘the Without strongly. felt was Yugoslavia in authority political life its of departure the of aftermath the In ear that the fragmentation of power engineered by Tito’s quasi Tito’s by engineered power of the fragmentation that ear cipline and ultimate arbiter of national conflicts’ in place, the country’s largely largely country’s the place, in conflicts’ national of arbiter and ultimate cipline
Shortly after the 1981 escalation of political tensions in Kosovo, Yugoslavia Yugoslavia in Kosovo, tensions political of 1981 escalation the after Shortly As long as Tito was around, similar political tensions and nationalist pressures pressures nationalist and tensions political similar wasaround, Tito As long as 3.3.3.2.
Fading apathy Fading -
became more intense than ever (Ramet, 2006: 2006: (Ramet, ever than intense more became feelings Serb
153 - long president, the absence of supreme supreme of absence the long president, - confederal but one- but confederal to’s to’s CEU eTD Collection Free Europe compelled to take new foreign credits, or would be threatened by a complete halt of its whole economy’ (Radio Croatia helped] not [If crisis. bewould economic its present of out get not will it republics, by helped other not illustrates, perhaps most convincingly, the complexity of the economic situation in the republic: ’If Croatia is
Croatia, due to its specific nature, suffered serious consequences of the crisis. the of serious consequences suffered specific nature, its dueto Croatia, of economy Theentire 1997: 207). (Tanner, debt e foreign th financing at aimed firms exporting of currency hard of the cent 76per appropriate to decision its by hard which export of most companies, Croatian measures. secti preceding – federalgovernment the loans, foreign enormous bepaid. to was now 1970s late the during people 184 183 What is more, they were principally committed to the struggle against the ideological ideological the struggle the against to committed principally were they more, is What the Croatian viewpoint, 1960s the endof the toward ere atmosph similar in a who, predecessors their Unlike process. this to nocontribution made 208). 1997: (Tanner, republics’ the the crisis cam how explain to seeking media, the as rise onthe were country the in tensions political in all parts apparent wasbecoming discontent ( the world in in volume time one third at industry, shipbuilding Croatian [.] The countries construction industries los money shortage. Major new contracts that had been pl import of in rise consumption very a Trieste and and sharp Rome private cars, washingmachines, televisions and other prestige goods, foreign holidays, shopping expeditions to 1999: 189). The following statement made in October 1982 by Jure B
The terminal phase of Tito’s of phase rule terminal The was, as Tanner notes, symbolized by an enormous rise in the number of In words of Goldstein: ’Construction, one ofits Goldstein: main of words branches, was first the In to be by hit the slump and - socio the deepening of As aresult , 12 October 1982). e about and how to deal with it deal with andhow to e about ons
about Montenegro – Montenegro about t their previously assured markets in the Soviet Union and o political
leaders were now unreser were leaders
Nevertheless, 1 54
anned failed to materialize [. introduced a series of drastic of aseries austerityintroduced
embraced the majoritar the embraced
economic crisis, a growing popular popular agrowing crisis, economic ’started playing on divisions between between ondivisions ’started playing
s (1997:s 2007). Croatia’s conser Croatia’s of Yugoslavia. At the same time, time, same the At Yugoslavia. of
elaborated in the in the elaborated thoroughly as ilić, then Croatia’s highest political official, official, political highest Croatia’s then ilić, - 183 oriented, were hit particularly particularly hit were oriented,
vedly determined to defy it. to defy determined vedly Unable to further finance finance further to Unable
] The metal and machine machine and metal The ] vative political elite elite political vative ther East European European East ther , began to decline’ ian nationalist ian nationalist 184
CEU eTD Collection rea
(Goldstein, 1999: 196). 196). 1999: (Goldstein, in Yugoslavia’ dogmatism ideological of banner the over ’took Communists Croatian Bilandžić dency, demanding poli demanding dency, Presi SKJ the a to petition andsubmitted signed them 100of than more Croatia, from attack nationalistic even and dogmatic a initiative this Considering republic. neighboring the of circles intellectual the belonged to document in their mentioned nof have are persecuted, they that moaning time the all the regime, order, the politicians, leadership, the Communists, League of they individuals only not insult and denounce who ’freethinkers authors their of names the Tito’s death after rs yea the in published works unacceptable’ ’politically Book( White the named later publication, wasa meetings these of outcome final The regime. the of critique public of issue debate the to prominent members its with seminars advisory of a series organized originated. it form which and in where of regardless regime, political Yugoslav the to opposition 187 186 185 jiževnoj, kazališnoj i filmskoj kritici, te o javnim istupima jednog broja kulturnih broja jednog stvaralaca ukojima su sadržane političkineprihvatljive istupima poruke ). javnim o te u kritici, filmskoj i tendencijama kazališnoj književnoj, stvaralaštvu, političkim umjetničkom i idejnim nekim politically unacceptable messages have been expressed’ (O which in artists creative speeches several by on public and criticism, film and theater, literary, creativity, remained dogmatic leadership pretty University. With the arrival the With of Mi University. were regularly organized and I was able to whatever say I wanted. In Zagreb, I could only speak within the liberalization Yugoslav
The official, rather detailed title some document ofthe was ideological and ‘On political tendencies in art As noted by Jovi ction by Communists in cultural institutions and in the and media institutions in cultural Communists by ction he center of center the was ’Belgrade 1980s the of half first the in that me told Puhovski Žarko context, this In e people of th most as in Serbia, reaction afierce caused they Moreover, and 1984, the leadership of the SKH the of leadership the 1984, 1983and of course in the idea, this With , 1986: 204). By issuing this ’index of politically unsuitable people’, the the people’, unsuitable politically of ’index this Byissuing 204). 1986: , 185
ć, ’the document warned about growing opposition to the regime and sought to prompt to sought and regime the to opposition growing about warned document ’the ć,
’. ‘In 1984 only’, he recalled, ‘I travelled 30times to Belgrade. There, discussion forums lošević, liberalization moved to Slovenia. At the same time, the Croatian party Croatian the time, same the At Slovenia. to moved liberalization lošević,
’ (Interview, October 2011). were were tical protection from ’the emerging Stalinism’ (Jović, (Jović, Stalinism’ emerging ’the from protection tical list ed. 187 155 Bijela knjiga Bijela
As stated in the document, those were were those document, the in stated As to reedom
’
(2009: 235).
), think, talk, think, 186
in which the references to to references the in which
do not like but the the but like do not act , etc.’ in (quoted along along with with
CEU eTD Collection autonomous provinces within the republic (2006: 333). for the strengthening of the federal government and, in particular, the curtailment of jurisdiction of the two
and more frequent attacks on the political legacy of the post the of legacy political onthe attacks frequent and more more of part a as that, aware perfectly were They future. political its over concerned legitimacy. political with endowed about Bilandžić, then close with the Croatian political leadership, stated that ’those who who ’those that stated leadership, political Croatian the with close then Bilandžić, - bere to come easily might in its territory minority of Serb status andthe Yugoslafederation v the in position unfolded – to come the years In leader. Yugoslav re for who called and Arts, Sciences - vice a then Isaković, Antonije from came cult Tito’s onthe ever open attack first the 1984, of autumn in the already Thus, grew. findings its supporting evidence the initiative, Croatian the over elite intellectual and political Serbian the of outrage the with along Yet, activity. nationalistic tolerating of leadership its accuse and affairs al intern Serbia’s in interfere to comrades Croatian their saw of they anintention publication, Behind its Book. White 235). 2009: 189 188 against Serbian calls for recentralization of the Yugoslav federation, Yugoslav the of recentralization for calls Serbian against ( history’ and recent revolution of the ’demystification for demands continual of lt aresu as question’ into called 1985, the from Black Book of Yugoslav dogmatism’ of Book YugoslavBlack (quoted in
Already in Octo Accordingly, Serbia Serbia Throughout the second half of the 1980s, as the process of process the as 1980s, the of half second the Throughout
the leading pol leading the 188 Knji –
ber 1984, Ramet notes, the party leadership of Serbia issued a draft reform program calling
Similarly, Serbian political leaders took a very negative stance on the onthe stance averynegative took leaders political Serbian Similarly, ževne N ževne similar demands would multiply and intensify until, ultimately, they got got they ultimately, until, intensify and multiply would demands similar SKH warned that ’the entire ethical basis of Yugoslav society was was society Yugoslav of basis ethical entire ’the that warned SKH ovine itical figures and intellectuals in Croatia became increasingly increasingly became Croatia in intellectuals and figures itical , the Serbian writersthe Serbian ,
problematized. Danas
Ibid ). , 11 June 1985). In a similar tone, arguing arguing tone, asimilar In 1985). June 11 , -
evaluation of the historical role of the late late the of role historical the of evaluation 156 ’ association journal, characterized the document as ‘the
as t as the of in one Thus, president of the Serbian Academy of of Academy Serbian the of president h oroughly explained in the sections sections in the explained oroughly - WWII era, Croatia’s officials documents documents officials
de- 189 Titoization Titoization
Dušan Dušan CEU eTD Collection
’congress of the strengthening of socialist self socialist of strengthening the of ’congress a as announced Although 1986. in June held SKJ, the of Congress 13th the of failure wasnecessary. federalinstitutions the strengthening reform constitutional preserved, be to legacy this for that, believed elite political the hand, other onthe Belgrade, ( or legacy’ Tito’s Partisan the understand not did simply 1974 constitution the of promulgation the with blunder ahuge making of Tito accused 190 halt. - decision fe the bringing of incapable essentially proved SKJ structures the party’, the and of number of ’politically controversial’ films during 1987 and 1988. Along with the the with Along and1988. 1987 during films controversial’ ’politically of number was the c best its Perhaps weakness. growing party’s the of indicator reliable first wasthe against asentence waspassed list Book’ ’White the from person asingle not that Thefact 196). 1999: long (Goldstein, too hold for to not was position ideological their dogmatic impose themselves’, to respected or strong sufficiently ’no longer were organizations. party respective their of outside withinor from either ged challen wassoon problems, political and economic aforementioned the tackle to unable them, of each of authority political of ncies compete the atmosphere, such In paralysis. political complete in in never carried out (Ibid). carried out never
deral units together (Ramet, 2006: 335). As a consequence, the processes of of processes the Asaconsequence, 335). 2006: (Ramet, together units deral Within the the Within next two years, most 322 acts ofthe resolution and ofthe Yugoslav presidency were therefore the 190 Having these political differences in mind, one should not be surprised by the by besurprised not should one in mind, differences political these Having In Croatia, the erosion of power of the party structures was evident. As they As evident. was structures party the of power of erosion the Croatia, In
republics were called into question. As the decade drew to an end, the the anend, to Asthe drew decade question. into called were republics I n addition to a severe economic crisis, Yugoslavia was now facing a a now facing was Yugoslavia crisis, economic a severe to n addition making within the state and party apparatus were practically brought to a a to brought practically were apparatus andparty state the within making making and, making
notwiths
tanding SKH’s open open attacks, SKH’s tanding 157 - management, the unity of the country the country of the unity management, Danas
public showing of a a of showing public , 30April 1985) , onfirmation onfirmation
elites elites . In
CEU eTD Collection identity, power, and the future of Croatian people were not lost’ ( ourselves in 1971, because we had a memory of it and feeling that we could be something else, i.e. that the commented, ‘we managed to en we dure and because only thebecome overcome had repression aware of
no longer seemed to satisfy political aspirations of the Croatian people. Croatian the of aspirations political satisfy to seemed no longer emerging political threat from Serbia only made this more obvious. obvious. more this Serbia made from only threat political emerging - re was question national particular importance for this process (Ibid: 195). (Ibid: process this for importance particular post the in spirit’ Croatian the of guardian only ’the as Church, Catholic the of influence Thegrowing away. fading be to seemed Croatia in apathy national the decades, two for it perpetuated who those of influence political 192 191 perceived intellec question national chapter subsequent in the elaborated and further . period 20 the of course in the created states regimes’ est regimes’ steadil . and Montenegro silence, Vlado Gotovac, aprominent Croatian poet once theand editor the Eight Session, people were already inflamed’ ( leadership’scowardly determination toavoid any confrontation, even face the in ofMilo stronger than the Party, than them toge
Vrdoljak thus claims that, measured by the level of influence on the ordinary people, i.e. the power to bring A fewA years later, Tripalo recalled that ‘whi y I w system political monocratic of period the as Thus,
population general as well as elites andpolitical tual n brief, t n brief, The ther organize and them arespectable into social Church Catholic ‘the force, Croatia in much was among the
accompanying ablishment. ir the of protection level of the he
The in the processes of processes in the
Serbs, Croats, andMontenegrins Croats, Serbs, s experience
contrast Matica, than
emerging in Croatia. Its post Its Croatia. in emerging
sense of sense
in this regard this in Maspok of
(dis)s politica th le silence still dominated Croatian politics as a result of our of result a as politics Croatian dominated still silence le
their Danas , stronger than anything else’ (Interview, October 2011). century 158
atisfaction national interests
, 3December 1991). Throughout those grave years of l
political mobilization political
w development development as
w 191
ere ere in manifested strongly most Ibid
– - very different very with the political status quo status political the with Maspok
). and , determined the salience of the the of salience the determined
- 1971 effective neutralization neutralization 1971 effective
–
with throughout the observed observed the throughout
a period, was certainly of of certainly was period, - as coming to end, the the end, to coming as in s previously discussed discussed previously s - in rasi Tjednik , chief ofHrvatski
hybrid the of ahead of the three states three the of
for Serbia, Croatia, Croatia, Serbia, for the two Yugoslav Yugoslav two the šević ’s emergence at emergence ’s the way the 192
grew The
CEU eTD Collection
the strength of the personal political appeal of Milošević and Tuđman respectively. respectively. Tuđman and Milošević of appeal political personal the of strength the their leaders. In effect, the course of their political their of course the effect, In leaders. their on dependent essentially were regimes hybrid andCroatian Serbian in the parties mu politically Milošević, like just and, Croatia in life political of figure dominant the heremained 1990s, the of until end the moment, long- the of symbol political anew into promoted elections, multiparty first the of ahead was, Tuđman Franjo groups, and political social different very ideologically of support the With oriented. nationally was also period this during in Croatia mobilization political of process the of the intense, less albeit me sa time, the At power. hispolitical of manifestation another status Milošević’s politics. Serbian was just decade, following the throughout the unchallenged leader, party omnipotent of master absolute the 1980s the end of the toward became he embodiment, its as public general the by Perceived - socio encompassing in question. cases three the by corroborated strongly theis model of validity Theempirical establishment. regime hybrid to leading mobilization of political process regime the as power in stay or loseoffice they whether determines that parties dominant regime hybrid of T 4. be to institutionalization above outlined model he research
MONTENEGRO PARTY OUTCOMES IN SERBIA, CROATIA, AND As previously elaborated, Milošević’s rise to power came as a result of the all the of result a as came power to rise Milošević’s elaborated, previously As Hence, both in terms of the power structure and public perception, the ruling ruling the perception, andpublic structure power the of in terms both Hence, political movement led by the idea of Serbian national renewal. renewal. national Serbian of idea the led by movement political question national the of salience uponthe contingent collapses. At the same time, the At same collapses.
lasting struggle for the Croatian national cause. From that From cause. national Croatian the for struggle lasting suggests that suggests 159 ch greater than his party organization. organization. his than party greater ch
it is it
development was determined by by was determined development
(the lack of) lack (the
it it holds
institutionalization institutionalization
their
(lack of) of) (lack in the in the - - CEU eTD Collection
of the hyper the of the i.e. collapse, regime the power in survive to managed party the importantly, Most head. than its support popular greater somewhat period this during enjoyed it counterparts, andCroatian Serbian to its contrast in sharp addition, In unchallenged. almost was governance political its of the stability party, incumbent in the vested regime hybrid Montenegrin of the capacity power With the entire organization. political institutionalized ahighly represented it years, following the Throughout t relative fate andpolitical development organizational party’s the party. ruling its of new leadership the within wasdistributed Montenegro in power political coup, 1989 the to subsequent Instead, two. aforementioned the as authoritative as nearly anindividual of scene political the Montenegrin at emergence witness did not therefore We republic. Yugoslav smallest in the force mobilizing ser not could question national the above, elaborated thoroughly reasons the For different. wassubstantially Montenegro regimes. hybrid two the of the put existence an endto that elections in the losses heavy HDZ suffered the SPS the and power, from descent leaders’ their following importantly, More period. this during politicalrule of continuity the ensuring in difficulties hadserious they disposal, at resources power abun dant with albeit reason, that For institutionalization. of alow level at remained thus organizations political two the 1990s, the Throughout determined sections, following the in argued as structure, power internal Such in hybrid regime of the establishment for pretext ideational the comparison, In - privileged political status. political privileged
160 ve during this period as a politically politically a as period this during ve o the regime’s o the
loss . CEU eTD Collection
uoe Mlšvć on ae o hne i view. his change to came soon Milošević Europe, colla the with as well as country the in pluralism ( election the after months two stated new president the same rostrum’, the from come isblood, whose motto movement Albanian) (Kosovo the for applause and pluralism political for ‘Appeals Serbia. idea - socio existing within the place take would competition the embraced Milošević SFRJ, of units federal the of in some underway well were that tendencies democratic resisting was sti hand, other on the liberalization, political its of process The anend. to brought thus was establishment communist country’s the of structures the within power political of transfer The Serbia. of Presidency the of president - unknown relatively two with competition electoral in the alandslide victory after 1989, November In 4.1. 194 pushed 193 successfully Milošević earlier, weeks few a only organized referendum How parties. political new of formation the allowed formally hence aone- into transformed effectively the moment, for was, republic Yugoslav biggest in the oligarchy communist certain number of them had already beenestablished, of had already them number certain elections had already been organized in Slovenia and Croatia. March 1990 respectively. obnove pokret DS) and the Serbian Renewal Movement (Srpski
The two main parties anti future ofthe With this regard, one could rightfully assume that Milošević also had in mind the fact that first democratic first that fact the mind in had also Milošević that assume rightfully could one regard, this With Serbia Nonetheless, faced with an increasing pressure for introduction of political of introduction for pressure anincreasing with faced Nonetheless, 4.1.1. Old face of the new regime new of the Old face : One :
‘handpicked’ ‘handpicked’ -man show
- Milošević opposition, the Democratic Part Democratic the opposition, Milošević party populist dictatorship. dictatorship. populist party -
party officials, Milošević officials, party
161 , February 7 1990). T 71990). February BBC, of nonparty pluralism where political political where pluralism nonparty of
pse of communist regimes in Eastern Eastern in regimes communist of pse -
193 SPO
), were thus founded in February and In July 1990, even though a a though even In 1990, July 194 political organ political
formally became a new anew became formally the Serbian parliament Serbianthe parliament ll not to begin. Strongly Strongly begin. to not ll y ( Demokratska stranka - he one- ever, in a in a ever, izations in in izations party party
CEU eTD Collection counter could not be challenged by the Constitutional Court (quoted in Nikolić text of the Constitution is avai The 358). 1994: (Kutlešić, decision a such for reasons the himself for decide to freedom great had he defined, other East European countries in which the cases when the president could exercise this power were strictly introduce a state of emergency in which his decisions would have legal force (Article 83), whereby, contrar consensus reache countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where the constitutions and key political laws…were adopted by leader during transitionthe period was ‘in stark contrast towhat happened in most other post-
as its new paramount political structure. In t politicalstructure. new paramount its as Srbije ( Serbia of People the Working of Alliance Socialist as earlier, months Two called. were history Serbian in the elections multiparty first when the 119). 2001: (Cohen, legitimation given democratic on based regime, authoritarian Serbian (Ibid). position dominated’ opposition be possibly, might, which parliament the by control against his safeguard ’to is that dominance, political Milošević’s of continuity the Consti the that wasobvious it Yet, 71). 1999: in (quoted systems’ parliamentary classical characterized which ility instab political ’the precluding time, the same at while, Serbia’, andaunified interest - 1987 on changes political the ’confirm would adoption vo who leaders opposition the Whileignoring into. voted besoon to he hadexpected President, the to powers strong gave that Constitution anew through 196 http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan019071.pdf 195 country
As emphasized by Vladimir Goati, Vladimir by emphasized As ciferously argued that a multiparty election should precede it, precede should election amultiparty that argued ciferously The President was to be directly elected (Article 86); his acts did not have to be ratified in the Pa ) - signed bythe Government (quoted, 1992: in 37). Jovičić In addition, he was given wide powers to The new Constitution was formally adopted on September 28, the same day day the same 28, on September adopted formally was The new Constitution - -
- socio mass powerful most the and largest the the Socialist Party of Serbia ( Serbia of Party Socialist the a result of the merger of the Serbian League of Communists with the the with Communists of League Serbian the of merger the of a result d between the ruling and opposition parties in “round table” discussions’ (1995: 12).
prominent Serbian political scientist, political Serbian prominent Socijalistička partija Srbije Srbije partija Socijalistička 162 he speech he gave on that occasion, occasion, onthat hegave he speech tution was, in the first place, to enable enable to place, first in the was, tution a system of personal rule, was thus was thus rule, personal of a system
Socijalistički savez radnog naroda naroda radnog savez Socijalistički , 1994: 327), and did not have to be
such course of of action the Serbian political organization in the in the organization political 9, i.e. prioritize national national prioritize i.e. 9, .
196 –
he claimed that its its that claimed he SPS) 195 lable at: at: lable
an office that that an office
was created was created Thomas communist communist
rliament, rliament, y to y , CEU eTD Collection the party'sthe political power in the years to come. ideological continuity and,considering a number of people employed by thestate, an important mechanism of prosperous prosperous and human world’ Vukomanović (quoted in for a more for justice, freedomand nations ofthepoor and and exploited classes struggle of achievements the workers movement, thedevelopment ofsocialism the in world, andthe andLiberation thesocialist revolution [...]andcarry theprogressive onall spiri 1990). ( establishmentthe political leaders’ by held andits from different is which that toward movement, andsocialist shown ofthecommunist amongst theleadership and suchacertain as habits, narrow which vengefulness, mindedness wasoftenpresent nofuturehas [.]It necessaryis for toliberateus ourselves from some ofour former political ofthosentioned,opinions people inte educated, well who are well andhave means, material
period of the SKS’s the rule: of period ram, prog its in emphasized the of deformations’ : ancien regime ‘bureaucratic the with break decisive a promised Milošević 198 197 boycotting the first parliamentary election held on December 9, the SPS’s triumph triumph the SPS’s 9, December on held election parliamentary first the boycotting considered seriously opposition Serbian which the dueto country, in the control media absolute almost an with combination In 1990). (Andrejević, assets financial materi worth million $160 the as well as factories, major all in organizations’ and‘workplace local branches of network awide including structure, organizational
As many as 111 out of 135 members of this body were former SKS officials. officials. former were SKS this members of body of many 111 out 135 as As The maintenance of the existing level of level state existing the of maintenance The On the other hand, as reflected by its Main Board composition and and composition Board Main its by reflected as hand, other the On More importantly, the party inherited its predecessors’ developed developed predecessors’ its inherited the party importantly, More ’SPS will keep and develop the freedom loving traditions of traditions thefreedom theStruggle for anddevelop ’SPS National loving keep will from’A party not its is birth which ready tohear andtake consideration into the
197
the SPS was to ensure ideological continuity with the the with continuity ideological ensure to was SPS the
- ownership in the economy was one of the indi 163 , 1995: 85-6).
198
tual and social and tual , 20 July , 20July NIN any opinion opinion any cators ofthis al and CEU eTD Collection the ensuing war and activities, the SPO was characterized as a party that advocated backwardness and a return to the past as well as opposition electoralopposition campaign ofthe SPS. state in Thus, controlled burned- borders should be ‘were the Serbian concentration camps were, the places of most executions, and the
iln t amt ht ioei wud rbby i te presidency, the win probably would Milošević that admit to willing from the statement of his main electoral rival, Drašković, wh (see leader by garnered votes of number the in Thediscrepancy greater. wasconsiderably leader its of presi organized concomitantly Uncertainty’, No is There Us ‘With coul 201 200 199 M Renewal Serbian same ti same than him. than to which - The op The cooperation, and equality on one hand, and prosperity, work, revival, development, and progress, on the other. or as a weakSerbia. The ruling party was portrayed as the bearer of unity, independence, freedom, peace, incumbent party positive achievements of socialist society’ (1998: socialist society’ of achievements positive
Electoral choice, says Jovanka Matić, ‘was formatted by state television simply television state by formatted ‘was Matić, Jovanka says choice, Electoral Not without someNot the irony, strong SPO’s programnational idea of‘Greater the on based according Serbia’ His estimate could have hardly been more accurate given that Milošević won almost four times more votes more times four almost won Milošević that given accurate more been hardly have could estimate His d have hardly been called into question. And indeed, running under the slogan slogan the under running And indeed, question. into beencalled hardly d have was position down Serbianchurches and villages’ (quoted in Vukomanović much as 77.6 per cent (194/250) seats of (194/250) cent per much 77.6 as Sourc That he was, in political sense, more than just his party’s head, was also clear alsoclear was head, hisparty’s just than more sense, in political hewas, That lections elections general in the 1990Serbian votes) % and ote (v results The 7. winning Table
secure would SPO the that hoping me
at’ caimtc edr u Drašković Vuk leader charismatic as stated in the early 1990 by the party’s
Table
e: Goati (2001a); Due to majoritarian electoral system, the party got as got party the system, electoral majoritarian Due to (2001a); Goati e: Milošević Milošević and the SPS was as many as 965,212 in favor of the party party the of favor in 965,212 as many as was SPS the and Milošević [ … SPS ] [ conflict, bloodshed and violence, chaos and destruction (Matić, Ibid). … Its pronounced anti
] 7 portrayed as the bearer ofvalues diametrically opposite to those guaranteed by the ).
. second placed that ovement
dential election clearly demonstrated that the popularity popularity the that demonstrated clearly election dential - communism was portrayed as total negation ofall certainties and 199
115). three won SPS the 46.1* 65.3 164
a greater proportion of vote than the than the vote of proportion a greater , 1995:70), was the focal poi - in numbers absolute
media presentations of its pre its of presentations media 200
times more o was, prior to the polling, the polling, to o was, prior Yet, the result of the of the result Yet, the
as either avictory for the SPS 2,320 3,285
201 -
votes the country’sthe new
while at the nt ofnt anti the
than the million - election election - CEU eTD Collection 1990). and the initiator of that energy is one man
NU members - members SANU the among nationalism Serbian of representatives prominent most the and oneof still was Milošević election, first asupra as perceived the before opposition Serbian the supported 74). 1999: SPS (Thomas, 203 202 SPO of light the In manner. authoritarian increasingly an in adecade for rule would incumbents the institutions, democratic formally of existence the despite which, in regime hybrid the Serbian of development the in point starting d the marke they hand, other the On organization. political respective one- a for enough still but extent lesser to and, Milošević of dominance complete the confirmed merely Serbia in 1990elections the onehand, the On escalation of the clashes between demonstrators and police in the center of the the of center the and in police demonstrators between clashes the of escalation the Following longevity. relative its expect not probably would one however, elections, the after months three than less Belgrade in held liberalization media that ‘Milo muchthat strongerševićbeenhad party’ his than pleasant surprise, given the conditions under which the elections took place’. At the same time, he reiterated back the place in history or in Yugoslav changes, like other leaders throughout Eastern Europe did, but also correct historical injustices and give Serbia Milo candidate a was the [...]end, In himself despite Milošević if as understood been have could this population, semiliterate or illiterate differences’ (Interview, June 2011). 2011). June (Interview, differences’ not appeared on every party poster, hugging its candidates for the Parliament
Dušan Pavlović recalled those times during our conversation:Pavlovićourduringtimesrecalled thoseDušan šković told me that the SPO the that me told Contrary to this expectation,šković Dra ceived as a political leader who would not only bring bring only not who would leader political a as ceived per was He madness. collective a like was It šević. 203 ‘The SPO‘The the embodiment is of that energy was releasedwhich Kosovoin 1987 in 4.1.2.
Political pluralism –
all the manipulation, the SPS still failed to win 50 to per cent failed still SPS the manipulation, the all at the SPO’s Congress in October 1990: October in at the Congress SPO’s - political figure. As pointed out by Veselin Djuretić Djuretić Veselin by out pointed As figure. political
202
ia, taken away ia, taken by others the [. o openly o openly wh intellectuals those by even Likewise,
more th more 165
and that ‘the SPS would have lost in 1990 had M –
lbdn ioei’ ( Milošević’ Slobodan ’s res ’s ‘The entire nation Serbian was infatuated with an just ademocratic faç ult ult (15.8 per cent of vote)the ‘came as a - test pro for mass the organized ] As such, he tra .
’ (Interview,January 2012). In Serbia, with 80 per cent of , 29 October 29 October , Tanjug nscendedparty the party rule, his his rule, party -
historian historian ilo ade šević
CEU eTD Collection Peter the Peter the First’ ( are fortunate tohave atour head the f the democracy. For and freedom number of young people, who perhaps naively, believe that this current destructive action will bring more theOn other therehand, are unfortunately, participating this in treacherous attempt tobreak up Serbia a no himselfhaveDrašković gaveVuk which days 90 streets.Those the of way bymonths three within December announced that they, because they were not victorious in the elections, would come to power
eba Pbi’ n hc i dmne Mlšvć o ev te office. the leave to Milošević demanded it which in Public’ Serbian to the ‘Proclamation launchedthe Party Democratic the Croatia, and Slovenia of independence of recognition international the after weeks afew Therefore, politics. national Serbian the of defeat ensuing andthe Yugoslavia of collapse responsi most the held him leaders opposition above, mentioned reasons the For question. into called openly 1987 since time first the for was position of challenge were Mitević, fired. Dušan director Belgrade TV the and Bogdanović Radmilo Minister leadershi SPO the thousands, of hundreds aseveral to goneup protesting people of andthe number protest in the part hadtaken students Belgrade the 12, on after March later, days Three arrested. were officials party the of number a and Drašković Serb 206 205 204 Thomas assembly, which will put in place Serbia’s future state order, and its national and state interests’ (quoted in [.] The Democratic Party considers it elections necessary that are without delay held for a constitution forming the Democratic Party demands that the President of the Republic, Slobodan Milošev i anotherand well Serbianleader wasagainonce emphasized, thistimespeecha in byMihailo Marković, theSPS’s chief ideologist additioIn to n a strong condemnation of the ongoing opposition protests, special the political status ofthe (quoted in responsibility that for fact the nation the Serbian the and citizens crushing defeat n the break the n
A day before, a mass counter n ioei’ wrs ti ws t esr ht ho ad ilne r nt emte t sra i Serbia’ in spread to permitted not are violence and chaos that ensure ‘to was this words, Milošević’s In The document stated follothe wing: ian capital, the Yugoslav army tanks were deployed on its streets, onits deployed were tanks army Yugoslav the ian capital, 205 , 1999: 111 1999: , As a part of the next one, which took place less than a year later, his political hispolitical later, a year than less place took which one, next the of As apart
It was a political victory of the SPO of victory wasapolitical It Thomas p was released and a several important regime figures, including the Interior Interior the including regimefigures, important andaseveral p wasreleased - up ofYugoslavia [.
Duga – the Milošević regime. regime. Milošević the
- on the national, economic and social levels. The political leadership of Serbia must carry full , 1999: 82). known dissident intellectual dissident known ). ). , 16, March 1991).
] Those who have the greatest power must carry the greatest responsibility, and and the greatest responsibility, greatestcarry the must power have who ] Those - meetingof Milošević’s supporters wasorganized inthe other part of Belgrade. irst years, 70 time all parts the in of the Serb
most capable, ho ‘Today there can be no doubt that politically Serbia has suffered a
from the ancien regime 166 - led Serbian opposition and the first major major first and the opposition Serbian led norable and courageous man since
of Serbia have been left as the greatest losers greatest losers the as left been have Serbia of period: ‘There are leaders who in in who ‘There leaders are period: ian nation have been untied. We s resignation s resignation hi submits ić, ble for the dramatic the ble for 206
Within a few few a Within the timethe ofKing 204
whereas whereas w expired. w expired. CEU eTD Collection later. When later. he called me oneday me andtold the name ofthe candidate, handicapped, Ifelt leave for me it always suggest to with hewould it todiscuss Milošević, but several occasions, Party organs, including myself as its president, includingPartyits knew myself organs, as
( coalition opposition the join to refuse members, its with differences ideological ( people 823,648 as many as days, 207 election. ( Serbia of – Koštunica und Vojislav aro grouped faction from the nationalistic apart However, signatures. their with initiative absolute political dominance within the party: the within dominance political absolute Boris of statement following the in depicted choice, this made Milošević which in manner American an Panić, The Minister. Prime Federal the of post onthe take to origin, Serbian of businessman Milan invited Milošević community, international the within ge ima the country’s improve he would that Hoping establishment. its after a month merely new state the against sanctions economic severe introduced Council Security UN the conflict, Bosnian the in involvement government’s Serbian the of result ( Yugoslavia of Republic Federal the called Montenegro, with federation astate of e creation th through points political positive some score to he sought Herzegovina, and Bosnia in out broken hadalso war the Croatia, after when, situation the In position. his consolidate (at that time (at Milo Demokra
His presidency was merely formalsince, according to the Serbian Constitution, the President of the Republic v oi, hn h peiet f h SPS, the of president the then Jović, av n h ohr ie f h Srin oiia setu, ioei ws rig to trying was Milošević spectrum, political Serbian the of side other the On ‘About who was going to be elected for the Federal Prime Minister, people fromMinister, for people theFederal Prime to be was going elected the ‘About who
tski pokret Srbije- pokret tski Demokratska stranka Srbije - Srbije stranka Demokratska šević) was not allowed to be politically active within a party. Savezna republika Jugoslavija - Jugoslavija republika Savezna
soon to be transformed into a separate Democratic Party Party Democratic aseparate into transformed be to soon
DEPOS) formed in June, in anticipation of an early anearly of in anticipation in June, formed DEPOS) according according
DSS) 167
to the party leadership) party the to –
207 the party would, due to political and and political due to would, party the
absolutely nothing. I had tried, on Ihadtried, nothing. absolutely stands as another proof of his his of proof another as stands
SRJ). Nonetheless, as a as Nonetheless, SRJ).
supported DS’s DS’s supported CEU eTD Collection
crisis in the country, the in crisis per cent of the vote. the of cent per 17 than less winning DEPOS the with defeat, electoral acrushing suffered opposition December socio and political serious the by pressured Milošević, Although opposition. Serbian fragmented the chronically of candidate apresidential eventually, and, point rallying a became Panić politics, Milošević’s of criticism fierce his to owing meantime, Panić. purge to decided now Milošević position, the for him nominated had At Minister [.] thatknown totheothers accepted hewas our as for party’s candidate highest official,its Ihad not heard, let known alone theman who was,supposedly, well so Isimplybecause notbeli could 212 211 210 209 208 national ultra the to electorate Panić as Premier Federal l reputation. Without consulting with anyone from the the party, from anyone with consulting Without l reputation. internationa its restore to efforts in his authority political supreme country’s the as himself impose educated educated almost 2/3 of their value by the end of 1992, while several hundred thousand people – elected was time, Trajkovi hundredtelephone calls makes a he example, For orders. what as he ends up everything end the in need for not advisers [...] does be formed, be government’s work’( unfamiliar name was theproposal [...]although not objected’ (2009: 95).
The second best within the opposition the within best second The A no Cohen reminds that, compared with their 198 The same applies to the way Dobrica way Dobrica the to applies same The Milo - ć: šević confiden ioei so cm t raie ht e a md a rn coc o the of choice wrong a made had he that realize to came soon Milošević
– ‘Milo
left the country in this period (2001: 161). he forms it he forms ser Zvonimir Zvonimir ser advi by terms his in practical described rule of later was model personalistic ’s
1992, political change they hoped to see did not come about. In fact, the fact, In about. come did see not hopedto they change political 1992, šević
ce motion against his government was passed in the Federal Parliament on December December 29. on Parliament in Federal the passed was his government against motion ce the Executive Board everyone session, dumb wasstruck when they heard an -
and aonly later year removed from the of office
relied too much on his intellect and neglected the analytical approach [...] He practically Vreme
a day, instead of allowing his assista his of allowing instead day, a instead of appointing a person who would do it and then be responsible for 211 212 , 11September 1999).
decided to accept their request and call early elections for 20 20 for elections early call and request their accept to decided
On the other hand, the SPS lost a considerable part aconsiderable lost SPS the hand, other the On
-
eve an that,being incumbent party long andfor so president supposedly being easy to politically control - control politically to easy being supposedly ist , the Democratic Party, won 4.1 per cent
earlier an Ćosić, Serbian Radical Party Radical Serbian
9 level, Serbian GDP slid by 60 per cent 168
mentioned nationalist dissident in the the in communist dissident nationalist mentioned nts in the in nts office to it. Ifdo agovernment to needs -
the first president the first the new of president Federation.
( Srpska radikalna stranka - stranka radikalna Srpska .
208
the Federal Primethe Federal , and net wages lost lost wages net and ,
mainlyyoung and 209
- just as he he as just economic economic sought to to sought 210
In the the In of its
the -
CEU eTD Collection extraordinary result (29.15 per cent of the vote into which the which into and corrupt have thecriminal (quoted beenbrought’ Thomas in goverpart oftheSocialist not,however,true become nationalist Wewill andapatriot.
under Serbdom’ (Ibid: 154). In the following months, as a result of the SRS’s SRS’s the of aresult as months, following In the 154). (Ibid: Serbdom’ under bomb planted time was’a understanding, Šešelj’s in which, Herzegovina Bosnia and the Vance- to support his condemned leadership party the as obstruction political SRS’s faced president Serbian the 1993, January in Already year. upcoming the throughout compromise politically to him force nonetheless, would, Radicals the with coalition SPS’s the informal scene, political Serbian mor Šešelj, Vojislav leader, SRS the whose of support onthe dependent government aminority form had to cent. per 22.5 high exceptionally an garnered SRS) that 215 214 213 term. presidential second power: executive the make the Serbian leader look ‘moderate an Milošević
Panić won 32.1 per cent Surprising for many, the SRS’s electoral success could have perhaps been anti codn t Dakvć hs omr ly n te ofte o hs son, his of godfather the and ally former his Drašković, to According e
(see (see Source: Goati (2001a) (2001a) Goati Source: lhuh ioei hd hs eofre te esnl dom personal the reconfirmed thus had Milošević Although v Table the ensuring problem no had Milošević Panić, by challenged time, same the At a as cats he as long as Milošević, Slobodan Serbia, of President the support will ‘We ’s secret police with the idea to make an impression of someone crazier than Milo than crazier someone of to idea make animpression the with police secret ’s otes) in in the 1992 otes) Table Milošević 8 . The winning r The . winning SPS 8
) .
, i.e. one million votes less than Milošević. than less votes million one i.e. ,
214
215 lections elections general Serbian explained the reasons of his party’s refusal to partake in in partake to refusal hisparty’s of reasons the explained
Compared to his party’s list, he won 1,155,961 votes votes 1,155,961 hewon list, party’s his to Compared esults esults d more acceptable political option’ (Interview, January 2012). ) in the first Yugoslav general election, held in May 1992. (v 28.7 53.2 169 ote % ote and
in numbers absolute
213
Šešelj was ’politically created by created ’politically was Šešelj As a result, the Socialists Socialists the result, a As Owen Peace Plan for Plan for Peace Owen cipated given the part 1,359 2,515 inance at the at inance , 1999:137).
šević ’ and thus to million
nment nment
y’s y’s CEU eTD Collection erbian Radio,(Serbian everything power his in to contribute to the well doing is who man a and patriot Serbian a as Milošević admire we that stressed also have
Serbian president remained strong during this period. As stated Šešelj: by stated As period. this during strong remained president Serbian catastrophic economic situation in the country, in the situation economic catastrophic the Notwithstanding Socialists. the for beneficial extremely bepolitically to proved this December, on19 held election parliamentary subsequent the of result the ( chauvinism’ primitive ‘extremely an of them accusing Radicals, the against campaign an aggressive launched SPS the return, In on20September. government Serbian the against no confidence Panić, together with a number of senior military officers. Života Staff, General the of Chief Army Yugoslav the remove to Milošević pressured SRS the of those – Relations Economic Foreign – ministries three its abolitionof the by conditioned be would proposal budget government’s to the suppo Serbian rt their that announced Radicals the on1July, Moreover, leave. compulsory placedon discipline’, of ‘lack a or parties’ opposition the to ‘support their to due were, power, Milošević’s of bastion the Serbia, of Radio Television the from people n 1,500 tha more initiative, 216 – SRS the proposed conflict, Bosnian thus exceeding thus the Germany’sWeimer from rate inflation the 1920s. hyper the Bosnian war and the great number of refugees that fled to the country. As a result, by the end of 1993, to itprint s
Unable toborrowUnable money i - inflation in Serbia reached the leve allegiance to the the to allegiance political SRS’s the party, his with relation the to contrast In Nonetheless, mainly because of Milošević’s reconciliatory tone as regards the the regards as tone reconciliatory Milošević’s of because mainly Nonetheless, we But this. claimed always have we and opponents political [Milošević’s] his are ‘We o as to ensure the offinancingcontinuity ofthe stateSerbian structures as well side as Serb of the in 14 June 1993). - deral ministries. In addition, they successfully successfully they addition, In ministries. deral fe controlled nternationally because United ofthe Nations
whose functions, according to them, overlapped with with overlapped them, to according functions, whose l of 286 billion per billion ofl 286 ptember 1993). Measured by by Measured 1993). ptember 28Se , Radio Serbian
in in 170 spite of all political concessions – concessions all political of spite - being of hisbeing and people solve their problems’ cent (50 million dinar bill was issued in November), November), in issued was bill dinar million (50 cent 216
SPSthe won 36.7
for Foreign Affairs, Defense, and and Defense, Affairs, Foreign for
economic sanctions, Milošević chose per cent of the the cent of per
a vote of of a vote CEU eTD Collection Kingdom political entities – entities political (quoted in instea responsibilities with dealing and participating situation in Serbia could be ‘more effectively changed from the inside rather than from the outside by proposal as its its as army proposal Bosniaks and Croats, and the other to be governed by Serbs. The leadership of Republika Srpsk
and not without success - success without and not the Balkans (Cohen, 2001: 202). 2001: (Cohen, Balkans the and belligerent onthe pressure continuous a through mainly Herzegovina, and Bosnia in war the in ending role political constructive anironically By playing affairs. international in the interests Yugoslav the of representative the as acted hethereby 84), 2001a: (Goati, government and the parliament Serbian of authority the over taking to regularly Accustomed SRJ. the against sanctions economic devastating wall of the down bring to attempt an in efforts his all invested Milošević period, following the In cent. per 13.8 to down went Radicals the for public support the whereas ago, ayear than more significantly vote, 222 221 220 219 218 217 massive launched a army Croatian when to the react not finally, and, weapons, ( Srpska ( Democracy party, the New opposition then and small a with government acoalition formed SPS plan for BiH in BiH for plan will see two different men’ men’ ( different two see will Milošević’of change
Serb The SPS won 4 maintwo The political opposition Dušan Mihailović, justified the political partership political the justified Mihailović, leader,Its Dušan Even his fierciest opposition critique, Vuk Drašković, came to acknowledge what seemed as a substatial substatial a as seemed what acknowledge to came Drašković, Vuk critique, opposition fierciest his Even The plan was created by the wasThe plan by created international Group(composed Contact United ofthe - controlled part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, later to become one of its two federal units. , Germany, France, and Russia) with an idea to o 4.1.3. Thomas ), Srpska Republika ). Nova demokratija 9.2 per cent
, 1999: 190).
one, th , at that moment, controlled 70 per cent Le partie, c’est moi!
s political outlook: ‘If you comparepoliticaloutlook:you s ‘If Milo šev increasingly disobedient Bosnian Serb leadership, Milošević sought sought Milošević leadership, Serb Bosnian disobedient increasingly July 1994, July at was supposed to encompass 51 per cent Vreme
of seats.
to recast himself as ‘an icon of peace and reconciliation’ in in reconciliation’ and peace of icon ‘an as himself recast to , 21 August 1995). , 21 August
221
217 forces, DEPOS and DS, won 16.6 and 11.6 per cent 222
then to impose a trade blockade to the Republic of of Republic the to blockade atrade impose to then Once again falling short of an absolute majority, absolute an of short falling again Once
219 220 whose leaders initially refused to lay down the to lay the down refused initially whose leaders
Interestingly, his decisions to accept a new peace anew peace accept to hisdecisions Interestingly,
171 d of criticizing and ofcriticizing watchingd from safe the distance’ rganize BiH as federation of the two ethnically
of the Bosnian territory. ić
with the Socialists with an argument that the
before May 1993 and Milošević of today, you today, of Milošević and 1993 May before
of its territory, under jurisdiction of
respectively.
States, theStates, United
a rejected the the rejected a
218 - based based
the -
CEU eTD Collection demonstrations in front of the American Cultural Centre in Belgrade. against the Bosnian Serb mi of her own Milo ing our times these dur the talk. SPS were‘People in recalled frustrated extremely the by presidents, that fact retain their fate in their own hands’ (S headquarters intended to ‘provide good services for the leadership of Republika Srpska, so that its people ca Moreover, in the wake of NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serb army toward the end of 1994, he visited its to bear [.] difficult is of theRepublic’s which President, afact or for tounderstand our people andthatis that I left am ourto JUL partybecause opposed also does.
by most of the Serbian opposition parties, including those supposedly democratic. supposedly including those parties, opposition of Serbian the most by attacked vociferously were country, the els in reb Serb the against campaign military 224 223 - vice another Jović, Borisav theirs. supersede to wasactually party new the that had afeeling Socialists high- of the many compromised, bepolitically not would counterparts, was th unlike who, cadres JUL socialist reliable of source an alternative be to intended the that argued Milošević While power. of structures the within position filling important started members its as prominence political aconsiderable gained March 24/5 on founded party, marginal otherwise this Marković, Mirjana the Yugoslav United Left ( Left United Yugoslav the of rise political the to related was ranks SPS the within discontent for reason major ( accepted’ beeasily which can something - vice is capitulation price, any at peace desire who those ‘for that stated thus presidents, its of one and ideologist main party’s the Marković, Mihailo aforementioned off the of new course the with disagreement their voiced clearly said that BiH woul BiH that said clearly of the Muslim side was to create a unified Bosnia’, ‘the war would endnot theuntil international community
The DS’s president, Zoran Dj Dijana VukomanoviDijana šević allowed his wife to effectively run their party and to use it to eventually create a new, satelite party party satelite new, a create eventually to it use to and party their run effectively to wife his allowed šević More importantly, some of the prominent members of the incumbent SPS incumbent of the members prominent some of the importantly, More ’It has now has ’It come far so that ’ (Interview, January 2012). Our find people difficult it toaccept that two members of the same family should ć, who joined the SPS in the mid- the in SPS the joined who ć, d be divided into two confederative litary targets in August 1995, Dj inđić, rejected the Contact Group peace plan, arguing that, because of ‘the aim ‘the of becausethat, arguing plan, peace Group Contact therejected inđić,
president of the argued: the SPS, thus of president Jugoslovenska levica Jugoslovenska
RNA , 12 December 1994). As a response to the next NATO campaign JUL receives more on radio space and television than 172 1990s and currently serves one as of the party’s vice Telegraf ni wn a fr s o raie anti organize to as far as went inđić
- parts
, 13Septem ,
JUL). Led by Milošević’s wife, wife, Milošević’s by Led JUL). wing party is headed by-wing party the wife is eba Radio ’ (Serbian icial Serbian politics. The politics. icial Serbian
ber 1995). Another Another 1995). ber , 17 October 1994). 1995, soon soon 1995, eir SPS ranking ranking - NATO NATO 223 224
n -
CEU eTD Collection we have here the makings ofadynasty’we themakings have ( here
Slobodan Jovanović (the head of the party organization in Belgrade), Radovan Radovan Belgrade), in members other and several Vojvodina), in organization party the of head (the Pankov organization party the of head (the Jovanović Slobodan Jović, Borisav rković, Ma which Mihailo of onthe occasion 28, held onNovember ( ( daily influential most the television, the state of those had who stance Minister passive Milošević’s Foreign with disagreement Yugoslav his expressed Jovanović, Vladislav of removal August in Ser power political of personalization of process head two And parties. not only two parties 225 – directors media of a number rebels, Serb the against offensive military inner some by preceded ranks, Milošević, encouraged by the foreign policy successes, policy foreign the by encouraged Milošević, ranks, highest SPS’s the from coming still were tones political dissonant some as However, all decisi of master absolute the becoming and Party the over domination ‘establishing thus leader party the of position the to – organization Belgrade its of head the and General, Secretary of t president the former whom among officials high party of number a Whilepurging supremacy. hispolitical cement to international community’ (1999: 251). people as a man who had brought Serbia peace, relief from the sanctions regime,and acceptance backinto the inpeace the Balkans and a pillar ofthe agreement.Dayton Milošev course politics The taken. had international community had accepted him, albeit reluctantly as aguarantor of ), were replaced. replaced. were Tanjug),
ns, ’as 1995 drew to a close, Milošević had every reason to be pleased with the with pleased be to reason every had Milošević close, a to drew 1995 ’as ns, explai Thomas Robert As The culmination of this process took place on the SPS’s Main Board meeting meeting Board Main SPS’s on the place took process this of The culmination Second the in Already -
party critique of his ‘adventure’ with Panić, Milošević moved moved Milošević Panić, with ‘adventure’ his of critique party
SPS Congress held in October 1992, which had been been which had 1992, in October held Congress SPS Vreme he Central Committee of the SKS,the of SPS’s the he Committee Central –
173 because of their personal power and ambitions , 29July 1995). , ons to be made’ (Jović, 2009: 140). 140). 2009: (Jović, made’ be to ons ić could now present himself to the Serbianthe to himselfpresent now could ić Politika bia to an end. Following the the Following end. an bia to ), and the news agency agency news andthe ), 225
toward
he officially returned returned he officially decided to bring the the bring decided to the Croatian Croatian the
i ncluding ncluding –
CEU eTD Collection saying the Jovanovi which none of its members could jeopardize until the end of the decade’ (Interview, June 2011). vote’ ( or replaceappoint functionaries by party dared utter statute, asingle word,t alone le for aask Board, to theright theonlythat has oftheMain body notonemember meeting. Meanwhile, had anything closedanyone to say, present minutesand after session, in onlythe 12 whether without asking toduty; and, andappointed toberemoved ofthose out thelist around?’ ( around?’ toyou, nottheother tolisten way andthathehas decisions, themost important takes that partypresident which policy highest you defines are and the between body Congresses, How you wantnow towork doyou from on?Will ever manage upand tostand the tell
his party was. I was. his party insignificant politically how showed effect, in Milošević, leadership, its of 2/3 altering andsix Board Main preferences. political n current ow his with accordance in cadre party the reconstructed again once Milošević 1996, March 2 on held Third the Congress, In these questions. to answer SPS,easilypredictable the Marković accused them of a complete lack political of credibility: in of the power SPS: structure the possible, as fully as exposed, colleagues t discarded Milošević which in manner The purged. were leadership its of 227 226 confirmed (Interview, January 2012). to say and when. Only I can decide on that’ (Interview, January 2012).
This, in words of Du in words of This, ‘ ioei proa wl ws h utmt picpe f decision of principle ultimate the was will personal Milošević Naša B , h atne te etn, eebrd Milošević remembered meeting, the attended who ć, The following months provided a clear and, in view of the political dynamics in dynamics political the of view in and, clear a provided months The following meeting, the following members Board the to addressed letter anopen In
‘Milošević came to the Main Board meeting over which he was to preside, simply read read simplypreside, to was he which over meeting Board Main the cameto ‘Milošević ‘You silently through something thatis pushed completely toany counter democracy.
following to Vreme orba, 1December 1995). t turned out, as one Serbian journalist commented, ‘that the only task onlytask the ‘that commented, journalist oneSerbian as out, turned t , 24March his his šan Pavlović, šan
party colleagues out of 26 members of the Executive Board were reelected. By By reelected. were Board Executive the of members 26 of out 1996).
stands as ‘an anecdotal evide
: ‘Make sure this is the last time someone had dared to tell what me dared had timesomeone last is the sure this ‘Make : 226
174 227
153 of out 51 Merely , infuriated by the aforementioned critique, nce of Milošević’s power within the party party the within power Milošević’s of nce - making i
n thesen matters’, Balša Špadijer members of the
he party he party
Milan Milan
CEU eTD Collection who are now in JUL’ ( JUL’ in now are who of JUL and in this election the greatest hostility toward the SPS came from those former members of the SPS some people because of their dubiousmorals and other qualities they found their way magically into ranksthe SPS’s leader from Svilajnac, went even further in his critique of the party politics: cain, ioei ltrly ocd h SS oa laes o ie p n h party the on up instead, give throw support behind whomever JUL would put forward to (Interview, January . 2012) leaders local SPS the forced literally Milošević occasions, ( JUL’ with allied been not had better it if fared have JUL. Radovan Radović, party Radović, Radovan JUL. time political partner of Milošević’s SPS SPS Milošević’s of partner political time
knock suffered Milošević wrote, later Drašković fairytale, a in dream, a in Like country. the in cities big other the of most and Belgrade over importantly, more and, municipalities ( Serbia of Alliance - parties opposition major three the of coalition the 1996, November in held elections local the In more. any trick do not simply could prestige - mafia and created c bolstered earlier, decades level from the to standard living the lowered entity, pariah isolated aninternationally into Serbia turned state, anenlarged into the Serbs unify to hadfailed which he during adecade After in power, before. never in position entrenched 1999: 263). (Thomas, SPS’ the with relation firmly ‘already its strengthen to sought Milošević JUL, to At the 1996). 4 March ( acclamation’ by almost leader great the him proclaim was to Congress, SPS Third the to running came whistle his who at Socialists, trained well the of 229 228 leadership openly against him, openlyagainst leadership loc the at power political of amount lesser Now aconsiderably with parties. andopposition students Serbian the
Led by Led Some ofthe SPS - down, for the first time and convincing (2010: 231). (2010: and time convincing the for first down, However, his party management would soon politically backfire as s as backfire politically soon would management hisparty However, - three after only results the recognized finally Milošević
its vice - president MiloDj
officials in t in officials Ibid ). In this r like gangs (Cohen, 2001: 201), Milošević’s personal political political personal Milošević’s 201), 2001: (Cohen, gangs like rđnk svz Srbije) savez Građanski
representative fromsmall a townof Trstenik, t same time, by nominating for the party positions people close close positions people the party for nominating by time, same he provinces openly blamed the
ukanović, a faction of the incumbent Democratic Party of Socialists of Party Democratic incumbent the of faction a ukanović, espect, al level and with a significant part of the Montenegrin Montenegrin the of part asignificant with and level al 229 -
gradually distanced itself from the Serbian president. After his initial initial his After president. Serbian from the itself distanced gradually
he Milan Jovanović indeed mentioned during out talk that, talk out during mentioned indeed Jovanović Milan the strengthen decided to quoted in Thomas 175
–
won control over 41 out of 188 of 41out over control won electoral defeaton the ‘forced alliance’ w , 1999:265 228 hus pointedout that ‘the SPS would
DS, SPO, and the Civ the and SPO, DS,
month long protests of of long protests month grip on Serbian media media ongrip Serbian ). Dobrivoje Budimirović, the Budimirović,Dobrivoje ). ’s election candidates and,
‘When the SPS disowned
, Borba Naša trongly as trongly orruption, orruption, on manyon -
long ith ith ic ic a - CEU eTD Collection 48.97 per cent cent
the earlier accusations – accusations earlier the opposition. In an interview he gave following the end o voting. of rounds four after only elected was Milutinović, Milan presidency, Serbian the to successor SPS,his the within power of personalization the of consequence another As Yugoslavia. of Republic Federal the of President the of office the to moved Milošević ended, president Serbian the as term second - being forced resultantly, and, weakness political its showing again thus vote, the of cent per 34.2 win merely to managed SPS the parties, smaller two electio parliamentary 1997 September the of the opposition Serbian most conditions, such Under down. shut were stations TV andradio 55local as many as technic of because allegedly 1997, July 1996to December From election. parliamentary upcoming the of in anticipation 232 231 230 refusal toaccept th election. of the character the about ( votes Albanian Kosovo 200,000 than more ‘winning’ by triumph the secured Milutinović data, official the to according aforementioned local elections. election held on 21 September (1 the of office the from Djinđić remove to SPS subsequently the Drašković retaliation,helped of act an As 2012). January (Interview, Milošević’ have defeatedwould oppositionundoubtedly united ’a that and party’ his and Djinđić of mistake political boycott was the biggest the time the astrategic vision ofthe problems this country is facing, surroundedby unsuitable i place in the politi any in remain to Milošević Slobodan for litically po wrong completely be would ‘It office: the leave to Milošević section of this chapter. with February22 1997).partytheAs president MomirBulatović remained loyaltheBelgradeto ally,political conflict
The SRS ca Drašković, whose SPO took part in the election (winning a solid 20.6 per cent of the vote), told me that me toldvote), the of cent per 20.6 solid a (winningelection the in part took SPO whoseDrašković, Milutinović became President after winni after President became Milutinović
in the leadership of the ruling Montenegrin party was inevitable. For more on the topic, see the last needed to make the result legally binding. Interestingly, the October round elec of - tested of method authoritarianmany regimes for sake the and oftheir own petty privileges’ ( me second, with support of 28.1 per cent , was won by the SRS leader Vojislav Šešelj. Šešelj. Vojislav leader SRS the , won by was Milošević is a man of obsolete political ideas lacking the ability to form form to ability the lacking ideas political obsolete of man a is Milošević [.] Yugoslavia of life cal e 1996 r electoral
‘This was my biggest political mistake’, he admitted (Interview, January 2012). January (Interview, he admitted mistake’, political my was biggest ‘This st
to pact with the Rad the with pact to round) and 5 October (2 esults, Dj esults, –
including the Democratic Party – Party Democratic the including ng the second round of the December election. Previously, in the Vreme
al infringements on the broadcasting regulations, regulations, broadcasting onthe infringements al ukanović and his followers openly sided with the Serbian Serbian the with sided openly followers his and ukanović 176 , 10 January 2002), which speaks clearly clearly which speaks 2002), 10 January , .
f the abovementionedf the protests,Dj n. 230
nd
Belgrade mayor which he had held since the round), turno However, running in a coalition with with acoalition in running However, icals. 231
At the same time, as his his as time, same the At ut wasut officially lower than 50 per ndividuals who are following following are who ndividuals
232 tion, of with turnout the decided to boycott boycott to decided
ukanović even urged even ukanović notwithstanding notwithstanding What is more, more, is What Vreme ‘ the the
,
CEU eTD Collection
president. As the only candidate for the position of its head, Milošević got the support support the got Milošević head, its of position the for candidate only the As president. its behind unanimously stood again once party the birthday, 10th the celebrating time, same the At reelected. were body this of 26members of out 10 only addition, - vice new one only whereas Board, Executive the to - vice all four purges, of tradition party the with accordance In violence assassinations. judiciary, suppression, media of freedom continuation the witnessed hence public Serbian the period, following the In governance. of mode repressive 236 235 234 233 - measures all employ willingto features, harsher acquired elite isolated Ser the domination, for techniques of panoply a employed authorities manipulative which SRJ - the against intervention NATO ensuing the - narrowed critically maneuver political for room the with maintenance, its for necessary means financial of out Running changed its drastically. regime of character the hence, and, in Serbia circumstances y early his with compared Yet, country. in the role political important most the playing continued Milošević ceremonial, mainly be to supposed Arkan, Serbian paramilitary leader in warsthe in Croatia and Bosnia. Ražnatović Željko journalist, Serbian independentinfluential mostthe of one Ćuruvija,Slavko ter, Minis Defense office in the period from 1998 to 2000. than 250 TV and radio stations in Serbia were closed down. informisanju empowered), which to courts against act media ‘damaged that the reputation ofthe SRJ’, more
Available at: at: Available Allegedly for h vcis it aog tes icue aoa Soii, eba plc cif Pve uaoi, Federal Bulatović, Pavle chief, police Serbian Stojičić, Radovan include others, among list, victims The Within ayearWithin October 1998 from the of adoption notorious the ( Information Public Act bian regime gradually advanced into the ’authority of power’ phase, in which an in which phase, power’ of ’authority the into advanced gradually bian regime the held SPS the 2000, ruary on17Feb atmosphere, such In Although his new function was, at least according to the SRJ Constitution, the to according least at was, new function his Although - 235
to forestall its replacement (quoted in Cohen, (quoted replacement its to forestall
http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Yugoslav_Const_1992.htm
‘engaging in opposition activities’, 900 out of 2000 judges in Serbia were forced to leave the and, toward the end of his rule, a number of high profile political political high profile of anumber hisrule, endof the toward and, 236
As argued by Popov, from the ‘power of authority’ stage, during during stage, authority’ of ‘power the from Popov, by As argued
/9 war in Kosovo and in Kosovo war 1998 /9 the after especially 177
Milošević moved toward ever more more ever toward moved Milošević
2001: 345). 345). 2001: president was elected. In waselected. president .
234 presidents were ’moved’ ’moved’ were presidents ears in power, political political in power, ears
- a large Fourth Congress. Congress. Fourth urge of of purge scale
including including Zakon o 233
CEU eTD Collection
SRJ President. rig to tried had he after down step to Milošević from demanding 5, October on of Belgrade streets the into out went citizens Serbian 2000). February ( his own being vote invalid one e th with delegates, 2,309 of out 2,308 of 239 238 237 power, the Socialists won merely 13.2 per cent of the – the vote of per cent 13.2 won merely Socialists the power, in leader its Without exist. to ceased effectively thus regime hybrid Serbian the Republic, the of parliament in the seats of 3/4 than more held still partners coalition its and SPS the that fact the Despite Koštunica. Vojislav candidate, opposition than in 1997 – in 1997 than “Hey, it’s going to be OK”, he replied. “Now go, and stop scaring me”’ (Interview, January 2012). in view of the fact that the the that viewwasin fact opposition ofthe going ballot against tothe suggested box, him tocancel cal the presented him results of the opinion poll survey I had previously conducted, showing that he would lose, and, following: the me told He Jovanović. Milan was mind Bal resultthein December 2000 election clearlyshows this’ (Interview,June 2011). Neboj of Serbia did not mean much, if any members]highest were again Milo matter anyone trusted’ he people and discardsthem when they hav or at least is able to minimize the damage by blaming and then replacing high- manyon way concrete or direct any in himself commit not he does but rules, the sets and activities important all steers […] has not changed his style of ruling the country since he took power in Serbia more than a decade ago. He (2000: 5). Belgrade University political science professor science political University Belgrade regard: ‘The party [SPS] did not m
t was’i clear that, inAs terms Pavlović, noted of autonomous by political Du influence,šan the Socialist Party ša Špadijer commented (Interview, January 2012). igure: ‘Slobodan Milošević Milošević ‘Slobodan theIn 2000 ICG report on Serbia, the following is stated about its key political figure: His associates from this period claim that presidential election was called a year earlier only because because only earlier year a called was election presidential that claim period this from associates His šević, largely to due to his wife’s influence, was absolutely convinced that he would win.’Some of us [SPS us of win.’Some would he that convinced absolutely was influence, wife’s his to due to largely šević, (reports availa (reports Commission Electoral andSerbian (2010) Stover Nohlen and Sources: erformance performance electoral SPS’s 9. Table
policy issues. As a result, he does not suffer the consequences of continuous failure of his strategies,
Election year Election Vote % Vote
in the early Serbian parliamentary election hel election parliamentary Serbian early in the
238 237
On the next day, he officially recognized the defeat to the to the defeat the recognized heofficially day, next the On
In a stark contrast to this image, hundreds of thousands of of thousands of hundreds this image, to contrast astark In (available at: ble at: ble at:
st his decision but to tell Milošević not to run, well, you simply don simply you well, run, to not Milošević tell to but decision his st eana thing’ (Interview, June 2011
thing. It mattered simply because it had Milošević within its ranks. The SPS’s 2003 http://www.rik.parlament.gov.rs/index_e.htm 7.6
http://www.refworld.org/cgi e served his purpose […] He has never had close associates or for that that for or closeassociates had never […] has He purpose e served his
whom I had a cha 2007 5.6 178
‘I met with Milo with met ‘I One who actually tried make Milo to tried who actually One
after nce to interview to nce election for for election early the of results the 2008 ).
7.6 hange in Serbia in change regime the
-
bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3ae6a6eb4 š ević a few weeks before the election, the before weeks few a ević
d on December 23. December d on ranking officials. Milošević uses uses Milošević officials. ranking
, almost almost
was even more explicit in this this in explicit more even was 2012 14.5
ša Vladisavljević, ša
three ) šević change his his change šević
Politika times less 2014 13.5
’t do that’,
another 239
, 18
l ) .
CEU eTD Collection organizations the national movement. national the member beennotable hadpreviously leaders political emerging the all as spirit Maspok the revival of the witnessed Croatia symbolically, than More interest. national Croatian of protection onthe emphasis political their put parties founded newly other t all hand, other the On federation. socialist the of preservation of necessity in the believed transformation, democratic its for calling Zagreb University, Zagreb ( left the was oneestablished first the Interestingly, organizations. political opposition of anumber of emergence the of c the In 4.2. only a half of the worst result it had made during the decade in power. in decade power. the itduring hadmade result worst the of only ahalf was parties) smaller two with in acoalition out (carried performance 2000 electoral Table regime hybrid of collapse the with lost influence the political of some regaining in succeeded it election, parliamentary 2008 the to subsequent government Serbian af Moreover, politicallysurvive. to SPS the managed infrastructure, (Interview,Spring’ 2011). October remained trapped, ideationally, Ud ruženje za jugoslavensku demokratsku inicijativu - inicijativu demokratsku jugoslavensku za ruženje Croatia: The state,the leader and the party 9 4.2.1. 4.2.1. well its dueto largely followed, that years the Throughout ‘In Slovenia,‘In we witnessed around this time an emergence ofentirely new democratic ourse of 1989, Croatia’s political landscape changed substantially as a result aresult as substantially changed landscape political Croatia’s 1989, ourse of ) est post best party’s the even percentage, vote the by measured However, .
[ . National reconciliation ]
In Croatia,
made an interesting comparison: made aninteresting
In this respect, this In unfortunately intellectually, and politically,
- wing Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative Initiative Democratic Yugoslav for Association wing ,
new andnothing appeared no one political science professor at professor science political Nenad Zakošek, 179
–
contrary to the political zeitgeist the political to contrary
in the in imagination ofthe Croa UJDI) whose members, while while members, whose UJDI)
- developed party party developed ter entering the the entering ter [ . ] The country ] The (see (see s of of s tian tian he he
– -
CEU eTD Collection 2011). people within its historical and natural borders’ (Ibid expansionism’ onand calling Croats to‘finally wake up’, it demanded the ‘territorial of integrity the Croatian
Zagreb’s main square. main Zagreb’s Yugoslavia. and Croatia in society democratic liberal question, national wasfocusedsol former the oriented, being nationally both while And, 244 243 242 241 240 B of statue the of return the for initiative an forward put HSLS when t 1989 in October became evident matter this particular to approach parties’ - re of the president) in 1990 (and president HSLS), ( Party Liberal Social Croatian the of leadership stranka demokratska appropriately stranka tska demokra Tjednik Hrvatski to contributor stranka seljačka Interestingly, the first public call for its return was publi return was its for public call first the Interestingly, determinationsecession’ and (quotedin in Yugoslavia can be solved only by federalism based on consensus with the rig community in which every individual is free and socially secure can be free [...] and that the national question document, published in November, was even stronger. While pointing to in: Djuri (quoted from outside’ pressure, or threat interference, choose itseconomic, social, and cultural succeeded by Gotovac in 1996.
The statue, one ofthe symbolsold ofthe Zagreb, was removed forideological reasons afterright the WWII. As written in the party’s program declaratio ‘The Hence, at the HDZ founding session in June 1989, it was declared that Croatia had ‘the sovereign right to Budiša, one of the leaders of the 1971 student strike, became the HSLS president in 1990 and was
atmosphere in 1990 in atmosphere Among these, the two biggest political organizations were HDZ and HSLS. HSLS. and HDZ were organizations political biggest two the these, Among Democratic Croatian the established Tuđman Franjo Thus, 240
- vice first the became leader, student 1971 another Čičak, Zvonimir Ivan
titled (12 December 1989). December (12 titled - 242
HSS), while Marko Veselica, prominent economist and regular regular and economist prominent Veselica, Marko while HSS),
- while the latter treated it in the context of development of a of development of it context in the treated latter the while – 1991 was the same as in 1970 same in was as 1991 the 244
-
HDS). ‘Happy New 1971’, one of the articles in Danas articles the of one 1971’, ‘Happy New HDS).
The Liberals’ declaration stated the following: stated declaration The Liberals’ the Budiša entered Dražen and Gotovac HDZ), Vlado
, got to lead the Croatian Democratic Party ( Party Democratic Croatian lead the to got ,
Goldstein system in harmonywith the will of the people andwithout any kind of n fromMayn 1989, ‘the HSLS startsfromthe principle thata only , 1999: 205). 1999: , , 70). 241 180 shed in in shed
created Croatian Peasant Party ( Party Peasant Croatian created
- 1971’, - socijalno Hrvatska
Hrvatski ,Tjednik on 4 June 1971. ć
et al. et
Dvornik similarly noted (Interview, October , 1990: 63- 243
The difference in the two two in the The difference
the the dangers ‘Greater of Serbian 69). The next ofthe tone party an stranka liberalna ht of ht nations toself- Union ( Union Josip Jelačić to to Jelačić Josip
ely on the onthe ely Hrvatska Hrvatska Hrvatska Hrvatska
was was he he -
CEU eTD Collection for one’s ownfor one’s its nation, history, culture, heritage’ (Ibid). feelingsnational were trampled onin Croatia, social a ofasymbol policy ofheartless hatred
faster in the months to follow (Goldstein, 1999: 206). 1999: (Goldstein, follow to months in the faster incomparably multiplied members and branches importantly, HDZ’s of thenumber different: significantly was initiative 246 245 for national revival. national for need in the believed they long as as party in the welcome were affiliation, ideological political their of regardless Croats, All ideas. political diverging for openness its ( brother’ twin aCroat thus got program national Serb ‘the many, for Unexpectedly Croats. oriented nationally of voice political dominant the year, the of end the by right amarginal as authorities atian Cro the by dismissed was 1989, in February document official first its of of the publication moment the at 2011). can we replied, Tuđman nuns, With were. there people those hell the why triedhad to force m UDBA from also Kujundžić, Milivoj named guy 250, 50,000 and, by the time the first multiparty elections in Croatia were organized in April 1990, it reached ublic Squarereturned toRepublic cal purpose: Isee ‘There, cal Jo politi late 1989, nicely capture the ideological heterogeneity of the party’s founding members as well as its intended seeing the head of Joža Manolić doesn’t bring any good. any bring doesn’t Manolić Joža of head the seeing Interior, later tobecome one foun of the Yugoslav state security apparatus, in the 1960s serving as the head of the Federal Secretariat/Ministry of the Danas
The following words ofAntun Vrdoljak about his firstHDZ’s visitthe to headquarters, initiated by Tu According to an estimation of the HDZ leadership, the number of party members at the end of 1989 was 000 (Irvine, 1993: 278).
ed the HSLS’s petition. More More petition. HSLS’s ed the sign people 70,000 rning, nearly next mo the On the supporting proclamation HDZ’s subsequent the tone of the By comparison, ’s statue has become the symbol of how symbol become of the has fateoftheunhappy‘The statue ban’s should Jelačić Josip of statue the that consider citizens, undersigned the ‘We, main reason behind the HDZ’s rapid political ascent was was ascent political rapid HDZ’s the behind reason Themain 1990). March 6 ,
e into becoming their agent [. 246
In In words of of words and placed where it tostand’ used ( a Manolić ža
ders secondthe and HDZ ofthe Prime know, Minister ofCroatia You ].
Goran Čular, Zagreb University political science science political University Zagreb Čular, Goran , ln tm hget akn ofca wti the within official ranking highest time long a Manoli ć, [Josip [the Yugoslav secret police]. Iknew Yugoslav secret [the him since, back in 1962, he đman and asked asked and ] Feeling very inconvenient, I turned to Tuđman 181
It’s d one
angerous head, a bandit one [ 245
As a result, the party which, which, party the As aresult, - ’t make’t astate’ (Interview, October wing organization became, became, wing organization Danas , 17 October 1989). . ] I then saw a
Croatian Croatian đman be
in in - CEU eTD Collection Democratic (2004: Union’ 3-4). in points creating our Theymovement. thebasic were fundamentals ofthe Croatian Croatian had people the right to d with anurge tofight without compromise, and a readiness tomake sacrifices so thatthe along toabsorb, we had ofthis All space. givennever enough been had democracy, in roots andpolitical religious beliefs. Croatia’s vision of humanity, withalong
Maspok Maspok the following the SKH from been expelled who had Communist aformer them, of like most and, HDZ the of founders the of one Mesić, Stjepan regard, this In 2011). October for enough broad was ‘u organization political his label to he chose everyone, platform political this that emphasize to wanted Tuđman Zagreb Croatia’ integralist. professor 247 political views’ (Irvine, 278). 1993: (Irvine, views’ political diverse with population the of spectrum wide ‘aby besupported to came period, - pre in the Party Peasant the Croatian to the similar HDZ, platform, political of nations (2006:32). self the for provided which tradition, leftist Croatian the and republicanism,democratic Radić’s based was consciousness’ national continue. As noted by Fisher, the party’s emphasis on the need to build ‘a contemporary democratic Croatian establishing the orientation of our movementestablishing ofour theorientation
These views were reflected in the ideological richness of the political tradition which the HDZ claimed to claimed HDZ the which tradition political the of richness ideological the in reflected were views These With the Croatian national interest as the smallest common denominator of its of its denominator common smallest the as interest Croatian national the With ’With our foundations’With deeply positives Croatia’s in steeped tradition, we were –
(Interview, October 2011). October (Interview, political science professor science political :
He He ‘ Franjo Franjo took in took
Tuđman
defeat, writes the following in his political memoir: hispolitical following in the writes defeat, Usta
sh on Ante Starčević’s conception of the Croatian historical state right, Stjepan right, state historical Croatian the of conception Starčević’s Ante on
[elected the party chairman in February 1989] in chairman February party the [elected
a s, Partisan efine themselvesefine 247
‘It was ‘It
,
similarly remarked similarly 182 and even s,
- a catch –
open to different worldviews, ideals, and worldviews, and different ideals, open to and be free [.] These were the starting all concept’, Dejan Jović, Jović, Dejan concept’, all Serb nion’ and not ‘party’ (Interview, (Interview, ‘party’ not and nion’ . And precisely because because precisely And . s they were for for were they as long as its tolerance and strong
- determination
another another was an WWII
in in CEU eTD Collection Croatia’ (1993:279). Thereafter, the focus of his writings and political activities became th became activities political and his writings of the focus Thereafter, believed, had deprived the small nations of Europe of their ostensible right to national self to national right of ostensible their of Europe small the nations had deprived believed, althou convictions, Communist in Croatia. At this point, like many other participants in the events of 1971, he appears to have abandoned his “historianthe of CroatSpring“. They also him earned prison a sentence afterTito cracked down the on Maspok thefocusing on Croat movement national its struggles and for Croatian statehood earner him titl the Hrvatska as however, he regular became a tocontributor Matica removed from his as post director of Institute the and expell These activities question. sensitive natio sensitive History ofthe Workers’ Movement Croatia. in Under his leadership, Institute publications began to explore state. After the war, became he ahistorian, and was appointed director prestigious ofthe Institute for the
anticipation of the first ‘real’ elections, called on this occasion for 22 April and 6 May 6May and 22April for occasion onthis called elections, ‘real’ first the of anticipation Par its by passed were in the republic system political multiparty a establishing formally amendments constitutional later, Ten days legalized. f man right he wasthe that dilemma no had Tuđman pride’, and inspiration emotionality, Croatian expresses how he way the by politician Croatian most ‘the himself Considering together. Croats all ethnic bring politically and ‘fulfill hismission’ n stated, heofte as to, chance 249 248 - HDZ the of 2011) October (Interview, emblem’ and, soon afterwards, Croatia’s undisputed national leader. national undisputed Croatia’s afterwards, soon and, the of establishment f idea in Croatia. national the of evolution century 20th the reflected ways, many in history, personal His . Tuđman army and wasarmy and strongly committed resolution tothe ofthe Croat question within the as movement teenager war.a before the During the Second War,World he in became a the general Partisan be of be crucial im North America, ( career’ political thatfact he became of one a very few Yugoslav dissidents allowed to travel, ‘proved e or th
In 1986, following the closure of a long court case against him, Tuđman was given back his passport. The passport. his back given was Tuđman him, against case court long a of closure the following 1986, In As Irvine nicely elaborates, ‘this son of a Croat Peasant Party official was already active Communist the in s well as well as e Croatian cause On 5 February 1990, opposition political parties in Croatia were officially officially were in Croatia parties political opposition 1990, 5February On t above, As indicated nal themes in the post in the themes nal portance for the establishment of his future party (Ibid). where he made contacts with Croat émigré communities. Their financial support turned out to Fisher, 2006: 31). visited Namely, on several occasions during the next two years, Tu đman
HDZ made Tuđman a supreme political authority within the party party the within authority political supreme a Tuđman made HDZ and umn h cnue f omns Pry fiil, n i 16 h was he 1967 in and officials, Party Communist of censure the Tuđman earned or the ( the job or gh he was not quick to embrace western liberal democracy. Both systems, he
248 figure political he central - 1918 historiography of Yugoslavia, especially pertaining to the Croat
More importantly, his considerable personal sacrifice sacrifice personal hisconsiderable importantly, More Danas
a , 27 March 1990). 1990). 27March ,
183 nds for the for nds fu in securing success major ed from the party. Tuđman’s activism increased, activism Tuđman’s party. the from ed led emerging nati emerging led ’s publication and
e fulfillment of self of fulfillment e
– 249
to quote Zakošek – Zakošek quote to
. His articles articles Tjednik His . Hrvatski Thus he was given a a hewasgiven Thus onal movement was was movement onal
framework ofaYugoslav ssential for his future future for his ssential - determination for - determination. liament. In
e of of e ‘an
CEU eTD Collection of thepeople andtheChurch. That was decisive’ (quoted in Tanner
late (Djurić et al., 1990: 273). 1990: al., et (Djurić late too transformation reform its the that SKH out started turned soon it however, efforts, the with replaced be would combination unfortunate this 1990, November In SKH. the existing to (SDP) Change’ Democratic of ‘Party adding by name the modified party the symbolism, communist unpopular from the increasingly itself distancing aim of the addition with In , 211). 1999: (Goldstein, democracy andparliamentary pluralism political of introduction the for support and Milošević to resistance for pledged thus Račan, Ivica reformist Dece in Elected Serbia. from pressure growing the to response ‘adequate’ of lack a period Silence’ ‘Croatian the during role its by damaged seriously image rounds), (two 253 252 251 250 of lar politically active during ‘Croatian Spring’, later recalled: recalled: later Spring’, ‘Croatian during active politically lar scho prominent a and founders KNS the of one Supek, Ivan elections. the before just campaign poli of arrest while Tuđman was clearly not’ (Interview, September 2 faction of HSS. diverging, mainly moderately nationali organized domestic party scene that was supposed to guarantee its victory (2000: 32) alternative to the existing system. existing the to alternative loyalty to the Yugoslav idea. ‘Unlike party leaderships in Serbia and Slovenia, they did not offer any critique or (Interview, October2011).
Initiated by Savka Dab Most importantly, Jović pointed out, Croatian communists remained very conservative when it comes to the the to comesit conservativevery when communists remained Croatianout, pointedimportantly, Jović Most As explainedAs by Remembering an early 1990 meeting with Supek, Ivo Banac suggested that ‘they [KNS leaders] were afraid People’s Accord ( Accord People’s tical dynamics in Croatia. TheMaspok in Croatia. dynamics tical mber 1989, the new party leadership, led by ayounger led by leadership, new party the 1989, mber The Communists were not the only ones not to react on time to new to the toontime react not the onlyones not were The Communists ‘We were too late by April. In the previous three months Tuđman had won the supportthe won had Tuđman months three previous the In April. by late too were ‘We
250 C ular, the the ular, SKH leadership decided tocall first the multiparty elections view in weakly ofthe
the ruling League of Communists sought to improve the political political the improve to sought Communists of League ruling the čević
Koalicija narodnog sporazuma - sporazuma narodnog Koalicija
- Kučar and Miko Tripalo,
This is where the reasons of Tuđman’s political triumph should be looked for’
Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP). Despite all the 251 st and liberal political organizations, including HSLS, HDS, and one
184
the coalitionthe was ofanumber composed of ideologically nized in the broad Coalition broad Coalition the organized in veterans, 011).
KNS),
252 , 1997:222).
launched their political political launched their . . - generation liberal liberal generation
253
nd by thend by
CEU eTD Collection him that he was still his loyalist. At the same time, Tu same the time, At was loyalist. he his that still him to communicate with me the exiled Ustashe. Sheexiled to wasfrightened Ustashe. (Ibid). not’ meet Tuđman them. was Croatian émigré community Canada in and the US, some ofwhom of were descendants Dabčević
the head of the coalition and the political icon of the Maspok the of icon political andthe coalition the headof the thing. As Tanner points out: points Tanner As thing. Croatian the for sacrifice a for ready less appeared Tuđman, to compared Kučar, Y (Ibid). power into back be swept would she nostalgia’, of ‘on atide that, convinced were herself, duet part, 256 255 254 reconciliation. national Croatian of idea Tuđman’s of realization of desire for an independent homeland’ ( homeland’ an independent for desire historic nation’s Croatian the of expression an also was but crime, and aFascist the of role historical organization onlyaquisling wasnot ’it that saying by of Croatia State Independent negative the downplay to on went Tuđman exiles, Croat of past. political their of regardless the country, to return to them heinvited 1990, in February HDZ congress first the even get on a same tram with Tuđman’ (Interview, January 2012). press. Andthen he would go back to jail. Quite the contrary,Miko [Tripalo] Savka [Dab and ‘bring new capital and resolve the demographic problems’ (Djuri return theirto Croatiathat adjacentsymbolic,to would, also h ’When I’When suggested to Savka wethat should all [to go the elections] together, she metold that she ideathe of political unification ofall the
Accordingto Mesi đman was, during the 1980s, ready to speak to the foreign the to speak to ready 1980s, the Vrdoljak,during similarly, notes:was, ‘Don’t forget, only Tu đman Later referring to this as his ‘most crucial political decision’believed (Silber and Little, 1996: 84), Tu đman Establishing Establishing in large was, members KNS leading the of attitude political back’ ‘laid Such a s,] s,] [Beside twice. gone had hand, other the of Tuđman, jail. to gone not had ‘She ua ws o mc a hl o te omns rvlto t rah u t the to out reach to revolution Communist the of child a much too was -Kučar o their over o their et, although majority of Croats indeed still felt strongly about her, her, about strongly felt still indeed Croats of although majority et, ć, Dabčevićć, - links with the ’émigré’ Croats, was, in fact, merely the beginning the beginning merely in fact, was, Croats, ’émigré’ the links with - dia. Moreover, prior tothe resignation, Tripalo wrote aletter toTito to ensure reliance on the personal charisma of Savka Dabčević Savka of charisma personal the on reliance Kučar was appalled by Tuđman by appalled was Kučar
‘ 256 patriotic’ forces in Croatia ahead ofthe 1990 elections. In his words:
At the assembly, attended by a significant number number asignificant by attended assembly, the At Danas đman was in prison in đman was 185 , 6 March 1990). His preoccupation with with His preoccupation 6March 1990). , ć et al, nation ’s ave a practical dimension, i.e. that it would would it i.e. that dimension, aave practical
1990: 63). ’ (Interview, October2011). alistic language alistic
era. Many, including including Many, era.
255 and therefore rejected and 254 čević
Shortly before before Shortly - Kučar
would not not would
- ] refused Kučar, Kučar,
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be given much more. be givenmuch to likely were they triumph, electoral HDZ’s of in case that, them remind to was there conservative somehow waspronounced andhistory country native home, own one’s of and thought expression (2006: 33- (2006: expression - Croatia for feeling of passiveness systemic feeling (Intervi once put by Ante Baković, a high HDZ official and, interestingly, a priest, ‘like the the ‘like priest, a interestingly, and, official HDZ high a Baković, Ante by put once As people. its of desires national of fulfillment the guarantee can that in Croatia figure Banac The 95). 1991: al., et (Grdešić thousands numbering crowds attracted campaign electoral - ’crusade following its of course the in organized rallies The sails. party’s the congr the of aftermath in the the intensified NDH, of andrecreation movement Ustasha the of revival alleged its of basis the on Union, Democratic Croatian the against occasion. onthis adopted of documents a series in evident was general in question national the with and unity national of concept the 258 257 [independent] state’ (Interview,October 2011). seemed that no one knew anything’, hetold me, ‘whereas, in fact, Zagreb and the Croatian anthem (2004: 5). homeland and fought for its freedom and independence; the need to establish a Croatian news agency in the erec HDZ; joining
ć, these documents, among others, focused on the following topics: Croatian Diaspora Croatian topics: following the on focused others, among documents, these ć, Mesi by recalled As Puhovski charact entire country seemed to be caught in a sort of patriotic trance. patriotic of asort in becaught to seemed country entire ess. Considering their origin, similar accusations came as nothing but a wind in in a wind but nothing as came accusations similar origin, their Considering ess.
Launched by Serbian media toward the end of 1989, the public campaign campaign public the 1989, endof the toward media Serbian by Launched At t At ew, September 2011). September ew, remembered among he same time, Tuđman was constantly singled out as the only political political only the as out singled constantly was Tuđman time, same he up- erized theerized ’s HDZ 1990 electoral slogan as ‘the most brilliant he had ever heard of’. ‘It ting monuments tothosethroughout who, history, sacrificedtheir altar the lives ofthe on to - then 258 ‘the atmosphere of atmosphere ‘the 4). The party’s official campaign slogan ‘It’s known’ ( known’ ‘It’s slogan campaign official Theparty’s 4).
and nationalistic - and nationalistic
politically politically
Fisher writes that, after two decades of silence and the andthe silence of two decades after that, writes Fisher
inhibited
186 unprecedented
the HDZ gave Croats real freedom of of freedom real Croats HDZ gave the
people during which time each picture, symbol symbol picture, each which time during 257
everyone knewthat the itabout was clearly that their time had finally come’ come’ timehadfinally their that euphoria’
and
During our talk, our During ‘the general general ‘the ) Zna se like’ like’
CEU eTD Collection demonstratedthe by party’s poorelec toral performances in 1992 (5.5 per cent) and 1995 (8.95 per cent moment tocall question into loyalty SDP’s to Croatia. Theirlitical po success in defamation SDP ofthe is best integration. In the years to come, with everything that followed, their political opponents often referred to this historical national question was the key element of its political success’ (Interview, October 2011). session protesting because the docum controlled Croatian Parliament adopted the Declaration on Independence in June 1991, SDP members left the
Račan considered the HDZ a ’party of dangerous intentions’. dangerous of ’party a HDZ the considered Račan campaign, the of in course the stated hefamously as regard, In this 299). 1990: destabil the mean also would Yugoslavia of destabilization ‘the that warned often Račan leader party the achieved’, already had they what ‘preserve should Croats that Insisting place. had acentral federation SKH- 2011). October (Interview, only’ Croatia HDZ had the whereas programs, their in else and something Croatia had all ‘they that notes consi noted, journalist priority, political absolute Croatia’s as question 1990). ( face leader’s party the of image an with anied accomp accordingly, was, ourselves’, by of Croatian fate the ’We decide will posters, HDZ’s campaign al. et in Vrcan peace’ (quoted messiah, 261 260 259 Maspok another Tripalo, Miko nuance. strong nationally more wassomewhat rhetoric KNS’s argued: need and interest for Yugoslav integration, but on new basis’ (Danas in: results election, only HDZ’s voters were predominantly (54 are the Croatian party’) was, actually, very ‘basic’ (Ibid).
Račan reiterated: reiterated: later, Račan year A In thi This was in a way also reflected in the fact that, according to a big opinion poll ran right before 1990 the SPD, the idea of democratizat of idea the SPD,
s regard, Puhovski accurately notes, the HDZ’s political message ( message political HDZ’s the notes, accurately Puhovski s regard, On the other hand, while the HDZ insisted on the resolution of the national national the of resolution onthe insisted HDZ the while hand, other the On
Danas
Tuđman also offers national salvation, calls for sovereignty, and promises promises and sovereignty, for calls salvation, national offers also Tuđman , 10 April 1990. dered this ’a secondary problem’ ( problem’ ’a secondary this dered
‘Even though the Yugoslav option is compromised, we believe there is st is there we believe iscompromised, option Yugoslav the though ‘Even
, 1995: 247). One of the most frequent messages on messages frequent most of 1995:the One 247). , ent did not envisage a possibility of any kind of future political ion and economic transformation of the Yugoslav Yugoslav the of transformation economic ion and per cent per 187 ization of Croatia’ (quoted in (quoted Croatia’ of ization
For Čular, Čular, For ) in favor in ) ofCroatian independence. See pool the - color
259 veteran within the coalition, thus coalition, the within veteran 260
its political competitors, as one , 16 April 1991) Moreover, ed, but stillfar from the HDZ’s
‘HDZ’s unambiguous formulation of the In the campaign of the ruling ruling the of campaign In the ‘the
Ibid others are this and that but we 261 ). Puhovski similarly similarly Puhovski ).
By comparison, the the By comparison, , 28 April April Start 28 , ., ., al et Djurić
when the HDZ
).
ill aill - CEU eTD Collection as ‘the most ideal’ solution of the Yugoslav Yugoslav crisis ( of the solution ideal’ most ‘the as
introducing first introducing SKH the vote, the of cent per 35 winning hand, other the On Parliament. the of chamber lower i.e. Council Political Social the in seats of (55/80) cent per 57.5 as much as system, electoral majority the of aconsequence as and, vote the of cent per 41.9 TheHDZ got victory. landslide (Ibid). HDZ haddone’ the as clearly as asovereign Croatia for option the ‘define to failed ultimately leaders KNSthe statements, their of lines the between beread could interest national ( part be its to like would Croats then rights’, equal andfull [economy], amarket pluralism, ‘democracy, on based 262 April the In about (Ibid). win would statehood endangered its of defense forceful most the voters offer to managed whoever that likely was it announced, just were Croatia of history in the elections free first when even the In fact, time. that at hear to political competition was neither the SKH neither was competition political 2011) October in th in Yugoslavia is notour fate’Yugoslavia is (quoted in, Goldstein
Thus, evenThus, a few months after proclamation the of Croatia’s independence which led to outbreakthe of war is country, Tripalo called on several on called Tripalo is country,
On another occasion, Tripalo added that if the future of Yugoslavia was to be be wasto Yugoslavia of future the if that added Tripalo occasion, another On 4.2.2. 4.2.2. wanted Croats st mo what wasnot tone political a‘mild’ such out that turned It
the ‘We are not‘We against Yugoslavia at any nor price, are we at any for price Yugoslavia. hie ewe Cota n Ygsai’ Čular Yugoslavia’, and Croatia between choice - May 1990 parliamentary election, the Croatian Democratic Union won a Union Democratic Croatian the election, 1990parliamentary May Indepe .
- From the aforementioned, it stems clearly that the favorite in this this in favorite the that clearly stems it aforementioned, the From past - 262 the ndence, but no but ndence,
- provide to aimed method ting vo post
occasions for the creation ofa confe - SDP secured merely 20 (1/4) seats. Previously Previously seats. 20(1/4) merely secured SDP Ibid ). And even though the protection of Croatian Croatian of protection the though And even ). Danas - 188
SDP nor the KNS. the nor SDP democracy , 10 September 1991;
1999: 210).
d Danas
er
ation of the Yugoslav republics pointed out pointed
‘Th , 29 October 1991). , 29October e elections stable andstable strong
(Interview,
were all all were
- CEU eTD Collection
accordingly pointed out the following: the following: out pointed accordingly Tuđman election, the after interviews first his of on In e movement. political oriented transforming the long- the transforming ( Croatia’ of arevival for wish andthe government, of change ( masses’ the pulseof the felt Union ‘best tic Croatian Democra the regard, that In acounter for desire ‘their expressed voters wi of aseries pulled of members number of prominent SKH prominent of number ( Croatia’ afree of dream the mission: historical ominous all above and great the fulfill can onlythe HDZ that deeplybelieving are, they what and are who they of consideration ‘without HDZ candidates for voted many citizens commentator, another of words In claim. this corroborated strongly results abovementioned the indeed, And, ( win to order in names’ popular and strong many forward put needto not ‘did HDZ the sentiment’, national of basis onthe created party, ‘a mass 277). tra the vote for of KNS therefore, the was, cent 15.3 per of support Theoverall Accord. People’s Coalition for the to harm bigger did even rules Theelectoral miscalculation. ment govern the Second World War, in the hands of non- of hands in the War, World Second the since time first the for was, question national Croatian the of resolution the election, Danas onlythree to nsferred
The party’s electoral triumph thus came as a result of its success in in its success of aresult as thus came triumph electoral The party’s Right before the election, one commentator argued that, due to its character of character its dueto that, argued onecommentator election, the before Right , 15 May 1990). 1990). 15May , Start, ,
the the 28 April 1990). As a result, even in Zagreb where they ran against a a against ran they where Zagreb in even aresult, As 1990). 28 April fell thus fell Communists former term frustrations of Croatian people into a massive national amassive into people Croatian of frustrations term
parliamentary mandates. More importantly, as a result of the the of aresult as importantly, More mandates. parliamentary - SDP and KNS candidates, relatively unknown HDZ HDZ unknown relatively candidates, andKNS SDP ns. Jović writes that, in choosing the HDZ, Croatian Croatian HDZ, the choosing in that, writes Jović ns. 189 Communist political actors (Irvine, 1993: (Irvine, actors political Communist - aac t Mlšvć te ed o a for need the Milošević, to balance victim to their own political political own totheir victim Danas Danas , 24 April 1990). 1990). April 24 , , 3 April 1990). 1990). 3April , -
CEU eTD Collection ( Tuđman appears as appears Tuđman and creator of its own destiny’. Moreover, he concludes that ‘alongside Star missing for Croatia to transform from apowerless protagonist ofthe Yugoslav collapse a into [political] subject party’s electoral victories, to the ofpolitical part Croatian man returned that self- melancholicand benumbed Croatian least objective an two reasons: return revived he that fact and the HDZ’ ( edrehabilitat That tradition through waspreserved desirespopular and 1971. expressed in by
2011). democrac used Tuđman nationalism, smuggle to communism used Milošević ‘while noted, Puhovski as Thus, 210). 1990: , in Goldstein (quoted guest’ the and who host the is who beclear must it but Croatia, leader. its playedby above, as was, indicated HDZ program, the of principles basic the with in line which unfolded process, in this role The key ( restoration’ Croatian of year ‘the indeed year, following in the 263 in t reiterated often leader To the HDZ end, that compatriots. hisCroat of andminds hearts winning at aimed rhetoric, nationalist Tuđman’s by up stirred additionally was group national this within politicalalienation of sense Thegrowing in Croatia. Serbs antagonize to was likely ( HDZ’ the to voters passive previously many ‘led it while And 43). 2006: (Fisher, endangered’ as both showing by nation ‘ used was rallies those of one during Serb local a by Tuđman on attempt assassination unsuccessful campaign HDZ the An alleged ranks. party withinthe hisposition about clearly spoke rallies, of most at displayed homeland’, the in Tuđman and heaven editor, in the article titled ‘Croatia’s Sun King’, Danas
Quite appropriately, Tu appropriately, Quite , 1 January 1991). 1991). , 1 January
The year of 1990 was, as stated on the cover page of the first issue of Danas of issue first the pageof cover onthe stated as 1990was, of The year ‘The Croatian‘The Democratic Union was theonly party thatauthentically interpreted Danas
, 1May 1990). a potential fourth link in the process linkof Croatian the in political ofrealizationa potential fourth national and idea to underscore the link between the HDZ leader and the Croatian Croatian andthe HDZ leader the link between the underscore to đman was nominated by nominated was đman
he course of the campaign that ‘all people are equal in equal in are ‘all people that the campaign of he course [political] scene; hisown belief that he’s the onewho, through his and his
’Tuđman could now triumphally exclaim “I am the state!“ for at for state!“ the am “I exclaim triumphally now could ’Tuđman y to smuggle nationalism’ (Interview, October October (Interview, nationalism’ to y smuggle Danas Danas 190 , 3 April 1990), such electoral strategy strategy electoral such 1990), 3April , as the person of the year (1990). ed atleasted political identity tothe of apart čević, Radić, and the leftist idea, leftist the and Radić, čević, 263 , 1 January 1991). 1991). 1January , Ibid
awareness t awareness The slogan‘G As noted by its hat hadhat been od in od in ’
CEU eTD Collection
radicalized following the electoral triumph. electoral the following radicalized rhetoric HDZ’s the as considerably grew ambitions political their Yet, community. Serb the for autonomy of level ahigh with Croatia, of organization administrative representatives, supported by the Belgrade political Belgrade the by supported representatives, ‘vehicle for articulating their cause’ ( cause’ their articulating for ‘vehicle ( Party Democratic Serb the anization, org political a new established they 1990, In February NDH period. the of the horrors remembered still whom many of Croatia, 264 escalation. their prevent to wasnoone(willing) there however, Thistime, rise. on the were andSerbs Croats between tensions the earlier, decades the stolen weapons, they blocked the main roads and railways connecting the the connecting and railways roads main the blocked they weapons, stolen the in orde stations onpolice attacks of a series organized Croatian Hrvatskoj u Srba autonomiji ( Croatia’ in s Serb of Autonomy and Sovereignty onthe ‘Declaration the promulgated thus Council National Serb the President, - and symbols traditional am constitutional 217). takes toseparate itself Srpska demokratska stranka - stranka demokratska Srpska
As declared by Jovan Rašković, the first president of the SDS, ‘for every step that Tuđman’s government Tuđman’s that step every ‘for SDS, the of president first the Rašković, Jovan by declared As
His nationalist discourse inevitably led to political mobilization of Serbs in Serbs of mobilization political to led inevitably discourse His nationalist On 25 May, the same day when the Croatian Parliament passed a series of of series a passed Parliament Croatian the when day same the 25May, On Sabor
endments, erasing ‘Socialist’ from the state’s name, adopting its its adopting name, state’s the from ‘Socialist’ erasing endments, while their supporters, concentrated mainly in central Croatia, Croatia, in central mainly concentrated supporters, their while from Yugoslavia, we [Serbs] will astep toseparate ourselves take from ( Croatia’
instead of Presidency - Presidency of instead ). Subsequently, the SDS representatives left the the left representatives SDS the Subsequently, ).
SDS), which in the years to follow served as the served as to the infollow the years which SDS), Ibid 191 ). At a mass rally held in March, the party the party in March, held rally amass At ). 264
Throughout the republi the Throughout
r to get armed. With the use of the of use With armed. get to r introducing the office of the the of office the introducing Deklaracija o suverenitetu i i osuverenitetu Deklaracija
elite, demanded a new new a demanded elite, c, just like two two like just c, Ibid : CEU eTD Collection interesting remark in relation to these remark to events: relation in interesting Krajina tobecomea constitutiveof Serbia. part on the 19 Ma Krajina’s independence from Croatia. Finally, aweek before avast majority ofCroats voted for independence would henceforth abide only Krajina and Yugoslav laws (Ibid). A month later, the Serb National Council declared suspend every federal law and regulation that ‘diminished Croatia’s sovereignty’, Serb s proclaimed they that stoppaying taxes to the republican authorities. Following the February 1991 decision of Croatian Parliament to
beginning of the transformation of Croatia into atex into Croatia of transformation the of beginning direction from that promised by Tuđman at the beginning of the decade. the of beginning the at Tuđman by promised that from direction had gonein opposite an development political of Croatia’s process the that realize to one for wasenough however, structure, its of glimpse A mere in place. firmly already was regime political country’s the 1995, August in wasliberated territory Croatian of of power in Croatia hadwell in Croatia power of helped certainly independence theon war of outbreak following though even the that, underlines thereby Zakošek intense, less or more fighting, the Community, Economic European UN andthe the 1992by in January recognized was independence its Although (Ibid). Croatia’ in raging was war ‘real a side, an with August, of alarge into grew paramilitaries Serb and forces regular its between incidents armed continuous Croatia, of Republic the of independence Krajina. of Region Autonomous the rebels proclaimed Serb the R 265 introduction into “the real thing”’ (Interview, January 2012). toong Serbs [.] bel For always Milo would he really wanted was 63 per cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina which, in his opinion, had belonged, belonged, and claimed he What Croatia.concerningwhatsoever ambitions no had he that underlinedMilošević [.] them with the right to decide on plebiscite on the secession from Serbs would lose everything, he replied that they were our citizens and that we could do by Mi epublic’s northern and southern parts. On 1 August, in the territory they controlled, controlled, they territory Onin the 1August, parts. andsouthern northern epublic’s
Subsequently, lošević, he actually did not care about them about care not did actually he lošević, Namely, the HDZ’s triumph in the 1990 parliamentary election marked the the marked election parliamentary 1990 the in triumph HDZ’s the Namely, Shortly after the Croatian Parliament proclaimed on 25 June 1991 the 1991the on 25June proclaimed Croatian Parliament the after Shortly y referendum, Serbs organized their plebiscite on which allegedly 99.9 per cent of them voted for i n response to the 22 December adoption ofanew Croatian constitution which gavepeople ‘assistance’ of the Yugoslav People’s Army which took the latter’s latter’s the took which Army People’s Yugoslav the of ‘assistance’
- preceded this moment this preceded
continued for more than three years. By the time most most time Bythe years. three than more for continued
its solidification, the establishment of the new system system new the of establishment the solidification, its
ei, u differently, put šević, ‘Even
. When I once warned. When I once case ofwar, the in him Croatian that, Mesi
though all the actions of Serbs in Croatia were coordinated 192
the Yugoslav federation, Krajina’s leadership decided to , hn evn a Cota Pie iitr md an made Minister, Prime Croatian as serving then ć,
(Inte t - . regime hybrid of example book the conflict in Croatia was merely an - scale conflict. Before the end end the Before conflict. scale rview, October 2011) October rview, 265
whatever
we wanted wanted we .
Taking Taking CEU eTD Collection through secret ballot, the elected ones, esteemed to be loyal to the gov the to loyal ones, esteemed be to elected the secret ballot, through cemented with the 1994 election of the High Judicial Council members. Instead of those nominated by judges institutional committee set by Tuđman (Ibid). judiciarybetween 135 1991(2013: and 2000 30). What is more, Daniela Dolanec writes that around 200 of them (almost 1/5 of the overall number) left the levels, were replaced in the years that followed the HDZ’s 1990 electoral triumph (Hudelist and Primorac, 1994:
consult with other state institutions: state other with consult C for moments dramatic most in even the commentary, journalist following in the stated as Thus, 133). 2013: (Dolenec, 1990s the throughout parliament and government the over control elite fro - state of privatization of process the through addition, corner a powers, of separation of principle the Consequently, 211). (Ibid: system party one- a in were still they if as i.e. them’, hadtaught Party former ‘their that way the ex were offices state over took then who members leading HDZ of the majority avast As 259). (1999: ways’ in many against discriminated were mu 2010:115). Way, and (Levitsky field playing the skewed and power concentrated government Tuđman the opponents, its of weakness andthe support nationalist of asurge of advantage 266 ll levels and then packed with people based on their political affiliation. political their on based people with packed andthen levels all at decide onthedecide separation ( [from Yugoslavia]?’ Croatia, theParliamentin while notbeenconvened has for two months. and Whowill when Tuđman’s assum informal1991as has advisorybody]Januaryin established
Vladimir Primorac, then serving as a Croatia’s Supreme Court judge, notes that 60 percent of judges, a ltipartism, ‘no elections after 1990 can be considered fair because the opposition opposition the because fair considered be 1990 can after ‘no elections ltipartism, - At the same time, the judiciary and the state administration were soon purged purged soon were administration state the and judiciary the same time, the At ‘President Tu‘President đman stone of every democratic system, was neglected by the new Croatian political political new Croatian the by wasneglected system, every democratic stone of m the very beginning. In particular, Tuđman, the chief executive, had full full had executive, chief the Tuđman, particular, In beginning. very the m
For that reason, Goldstein summarizes the first decade of Croatia’s decade Croatia’s first of the summarizes Goldstein reason, that For Vrhovno državno vijeće državno together with his Supreme Council [Vrhovno State roatia during this period, its President was not willing to to willing wasnot President its period, this during roatia
- 6). The political control ofthe Croatian judicial system was 193 Danas , 28May 1991).
and socially ernment were nominated by a para bya were nominated ernment - Communists, they ruled in in ruled they Communists, - owned enterprises enterprises owned ed all thepower 266
t all all t In In , - CEU eTD Collection remark about the remarkPresident, about his work or by a 16minute report on his flight byCroatian Airlines. Never and nowhere [can be found] a single critical October 2011). from leading Feral the [then Croatian political weekly] were but nothing abunch ofcriminals (Interview, too’ opposition raopposition dio station in the country] were involved criminal in act basisthe Vrdoljak’s ofthe following observation: ’People from 101 [then Radio the most the popular minute 11 Tuđman’s with started once minutes, 30 for lasting officially where did he go and what did he go – program is becoming an itinerary of the President of theRepublic: whom did he receive and who received him, Agency for for and privatization theapproval the proposals their tosecure ofagovernment bureau, ruling party’ruling (2003: 115). connections to the HDZ. furthermore, Banks, onlyavailable made to supporterscredit of the themallocate athoroughly in andclientelistic manner, corrupt toentrepreneurs with clos owned firms were over taken newby Croatian Privatizationthe Fund, proceededwhich to
most of the private stations were ‘tightly controlled by the government’, the by controlled ‘tightly were stations the private of most while At time, the the same 261). 2010: in(Ramet, office years colleag party members, hisfamily of pockets the into transferred were money of chunks elite’, business ‘homegrown a create to was imagined, Tuđman as which, 269 268 267 129). 2006: (Fisher, laws libel of use awidespread through bullied systematically were ones independent Vlado Gotovac or Savka Dabčević Kučar Kučar Dabčević Savka or Gotovac Vlado HT ‘There never had greater as been a censorship onfollows: on HTV’s program influence the political describes Sa [...] Round tables in which everyone thinks the same are organized [ Milo based intellectuals and Serbian (as well as Croatian) opposition are given space on air when only pointing at servedHDZ, as the the of manager general Television ( Croatian ćanić, (Bi 2001:investments 170). in and ma xenophobic was leadership Croatian the of policy economic ša Milošević, one of the HTV journalists fired during this period because of his (Serb) national identity, identity, national (Serb) his of because period this during fired journalists HTV the of one Milošević, ša
Zvonimir Čičak, Čičak, Zvonimir Ivan for impossible isalmost it exist, don’t officially lists black the Although now [...] than V In his critique of Antun Vrdoljak his ofAntun In critique adjacent who, topositionsthe of a Vice Much of the government’s attitude toward independent media in Croatia during those years can be told on Designed so as to establish a new capitalist class of 200 families, as Tu as families, 200 of class capitalist new a establish so to as Designed šević Corruption, cronyism, and nepotism thus went hand in hand in Tuđman’s Tuđman’s in hand in hand went thus nepotism and cronyism, Corruption, ‘Legalization in enacted aboutayearApril 1991gave owned firms tosubmit socially e HDZ sympathizers (Ramet, sympathizers e HDZ and th ues ’s dangerous politics reports [...] foreign media favor made that Only by Croatian politics are shown R estructuring and Development [.] As a consequence, 97 per of thecent socially
269
Between 1994 and 1997, independent newspapers and newspapers independent 1997, 1994and Between
without any differentiation between important irrelevant. and Dnevnik the HDZ’ (Danas - the [...] in Belgrade to program up show figures] [notable opposition 194 , 29 October 1991).
2010: 261). Asnoted 261). Ottaway: by 2010: Hrvatska t Hrvatska ivities totheir throats [. up - long speech on referendum,long followed ...] - ny waysny discouraged foreign direct President of the Republic and ofthe elevizija elevizija Dnevnik mn ne aosy stated, famously once đman -
, the central information the , state television and and television state HTV) from 1990 to 1995, 268 ] And those] 267
a few a few large
the the e , CEU eTD Collection agreementswith the EU’ (2006: 86). Europe (Interview, October 2011). was, in contrastwas, in , democratically successful [.] And heunderstood it as awin ner
(Kusovac, 2000: 57) 2000: (Kusovac, party’ edient anob by backed was who and nation, his against conspiracies worldwide and injustices historical with obsessed was who ruler egoistic an by run incompetence, economic and corruption, nepotism, with rife regime, ‘an autocratic into transformed was Croatia , noted journalist a decade, the of end the By Tuđman. Franjo oneman, by controlled entirely again, was, 1990s the during inlife Croatia notes: nicely AsPuhovski 587). 2006: Gotovac, success. political own its for chances and maximize game the of rules the manipulate constantly to sought HDZ the authorities, electoral the through Finally, 116). 2003: (Ottaway, suits 700libel about faced journalists 271 270 cronies, his family, his and himself aggrandize to power of levers the used Tuđman ec system, educational the institutions, scientific judiciary, the the police, army, the HDZ controlled the - aone hadbecome ‘Croatia that fact the by disappointed Kasapovi a single election in Croatia was organized under the same rules between 1990 and 2000. As noted by Mirjana surprised bythe fact that the ruling party won all 12seats within the newly cre a were few in HDZ diaspora, the the of dominance political absolute the Given election. parliamentary
As such, Jovi Thus, for instance, a special voting district for Croats living was abroad created before the 1995
with such frequent and radical changes of electoral systems in a mere decade’ (2000: 5). This system of power which, many rightfully argue, controlled every aspect aspect of every controlled argue, rightfully power many of which, This system ‘It turned out that while Gotovac and Tripalo were democratically oriented, Tuđman Tuđman oriented, democratically were Tripalo and Gotovac while that out turned ‘It ć, a well a ć, Maspok Maspok the of symbols intellectual the one of ć writes, writes, ć - known Croatian political scientist, political Croatian known ‘Croatia ended the decade of the in 1990s unofficial isolation, and with no formal . 271
onomic administration, and television’ (quoted in (quoted andtelevision’ administration, onomic In the manner of Latin American old- American Latin of manner the In
‘there has been no new democracy in Central and Eastern 195 270 movement system, in which system, movement
Even people like Vlado movement, came to be be came to movement, ated district.ated is more, What not fashioned fashioned
caudillos - Ramet -all’ take , , CEU eTD Collection not been Tunot party, one journalist noted as early as in January 1991 that ‘the HDZ would have collapsed already had there analyzing growing tensions between different ideological factions within the heterogeneous Croatian ruling
Croatian state; end of story’ (Interview, October 2011). 2011). October (Interview, endof story’ state; Croatian and ideology an have sovereignty Croatian achieving of aim 1). (1998: independence’ the in Tuđman, Franjo President its leader, of authority the behind united andinterests, views political of range awide representing party, political amodern than rather movement was ‘a broad HDZ the Croatia, on report Group Crisis International an in out pointed As leader. pol its of source real the period, this during be to appeared have may party Croatian ruling the powerful however Hence, Tuđman. on dependent substantially performance political its rendered organized internally HDZ was per president’s its on rely politically to position a lastedwas in as as it the long party precisely, Put more andecade. entire for lasted 1990, in began which Union, Democratic Croatian the of domination The political was. actually than it larger seemed much of hisparty authority political the chapter, this of section next in the elaborated thoroughly as time, the same At 195). 2008: (Ramet, life’ than larger he‘seemed Croats, most of eyes in the that, period 584). (Ibid: party and his 273 272 entire his Accordingly, achievement. political personal his as Tuđman by regarded years. years.
Kasapovi Available at:
The 4.2.3. ć used the t the used ć đman accomplishment of this goal was, goal this of accomplishment
’s chari
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/Croatia%202.pdf Croa ; it ; erm ‘republican monarch’ (2008) to describe Tu sma’ ( sma’ s program was actually a call for the creation of an independent independent an of creation the for acall actually was program s tian (President’s) Democratic Union Danas 273 272
In a similar tone, Čular tone, asimilar In , 8 January 1991). is is th throughout big so was authority personal Tuđman’s 196
sonal charisma. The way in which the the which in Theway sonal charisma.
f ntioned above, ntioned me reasons the or
commented that ‘the HDZ did not did not HDZ ‘the that commented đman
’s political role throughout these itical strength was its its was strength itical
. In r In . elation to that,
CEU eTD Collection asked themasked anything’ (Interview, 2011). October noonehad because Government accountable for beheld warof theCroatian could crimes Prosecutor of the UN Criminal Tribunal for the former that Yugoslavia] not a single president Therefore, on oneoccasion, I spent awhole convincingnight Carla Pontedel [then Chief heplayedpeople cards with, people not thatdid necessarily have position political [.] any circle) could beexempt andlaws therules from appliedwhich toother people’ (2010: 259). inner his (and he which in system a over preside could country, his of Father as Tuđman, thefather in for rules family childrenset his may he to which not [...] is himself subject, too so the as should interest, bebent.Just Croatia’s andwhere therules wasin be done,what
constitution provided legal basis for much of Tuđman’s later political activity. political later Tuđman’s of much for basis legal provided constitution notes: Ramet As Nation. of the Father per presidency the during activity political http://www.constitution.org/cons/croatia.htm 274 his and Puhovski: by put Aseffectively main its function. became advisors Tuđman by made decisions strategic of implementation and elaboration that extent the to wasmarginalized Government the Accordingly, 259). 1999: (Goldstein, to’ hewanted if aninfluence have not ‘did President which the in Croatia in life of no field practically was there soon fact, In role. defined constitutionally ed his exceed greatly hands in his concentrated power of subsequently amount the (Article members government prime ministers and deputy Croatia, of Republic the of Prime Minister the relieve duty of performing their constitutional duties’ (Article 10 (Article duties’ their constitutional performing from regularly prevented are bodies government when [...] or war of state a of event the in measures
The President, who was to be directly elected (Article 95), was thus granted the authority and to appoint 98); to dissolve the Parliament (Article 104); to Establishing asemi Establishing ‘Tuđman had his own personal [political] hierarchy. He made decisions together with together decisions made He hierarchy. [political] personal own his had ‘Tuđman should what know to trusted be best could who himself he was it mind, Tuđman’s ‘In
- presidential system of government, the 1990 Croatian 1990 the Croatian of government, system presidential .
1); etc. The text Constitutionof the is available at: 197
iod was defined by the self the by wasdefined iod pass decrees with the force of law and take emergency
- concept of the the of concept 274
Yet, Yet,
CEU eTD Collection Mateša (November1995 August 1992), Hrvoje Šarinić (August 1992 (August Šarinić Hrvoje 1992), August surrounded himself himself surrounded autonomously decide on anything that the President had previously “consulted” them about [...] Tuđman to shows up, whom serve they as mere staff” advisors, i.e. [...] “support It is toimagine hard that could they make it look like a brain trust ofthe supreme state authorities the in Republic. But on of the Government and Parliament, formally the second and third person in Croatia’s political hierarchy, could journalist, then aregular contributor toDanas (1993 isl rpid s rcsl a psil: N, o ad o’ Itriw Otbr 01. ucinn o the of Functioning 2011). October the in decision party of his irrelevance (Interview, no!’ and no, ‘No, abovementioned Supr possible: as precisely as replied himself question about whether important decisions were also made within the ruling party organization, Vrdoljak Council SecurityNational and Defense[The ‘VONS clear: wasassociates, closestTuđman’s of one Vrdoljak,period, this personalaides (Ibid). cabinet members often would learn from the press about important d he a while a for overcontrol ministries the foreign defense, affairs, of and as police, well as over information the services, and were not evenwere not fromrecruited ( ranks’ its
him. by controlled personally bodies institutional other and agencies specialized of range awide up set onto went President the enough, solid wasnot politicalcontrol of form an but feature political a only ’not wid a underlying institution ruling of way autocratic the made Tuđman but party, parliament, government, 1993. in Agency Intelligence Croatian the of head the Miroslav, son, his appoint to decision Tuđman’s by surprised been couldhave few avery lection, se political of principle particular this view of In (Ibid). President the to loyalty personal onthe dependent was entirely in office stay officials 277 276 275 period. this during majority parliamentary a stable had HDZ six as prime many as and1995 1990 between nominated
In his memoirs, Mate Granić, Vice Granić, Mate memoirs, his In When I asked the him about institution wh Stjepan Me 277 - 2000), writes the following about the President’s political role during thisperiod: –
- ’decision in extensively power his using by time, Over
And indeed, to make sure the Government remained politically obedient, he obedient, politically remained Government the make sure to And indeed, As a result, during his time in office, a virtual parallel government emerged in in emerged government parallel a virtual in office, time his during As aresult, Vijeće za obranu i nacionalnu sigurnost nacionalnu i obranu za Vijeće i (May- sić lso controlled the Ministry of Finance’ (2005: 29). with people who were not nominateed by his party andsome
eme State Council also shows the level of power concentration in his hands as hands the as well his in concentration power of level the also shows Council eme State uut 90, oi Mnlć Ags 1990 (August Manolić Josip 1990), August -
January 2000). e range of social activities’ (C activities’ social of e range
- Presidentof CroatianGovernment (1991 - Danas making processes. In this regard, Marko Čulić, a well a Čulić, Marko regard, this In processes. making
-
April 1993), Nikica Valentić (April 1993 (April Valentić Nikica 1993), April
also in daily, education, sport, and such matters’, matters’, and such sport, education, also in daily, , 3 December 1991). , writes the writes , following: ‘The presence in the Council of the heads ere most the important decisions for Croatia were made during 276 ] was the supreme authority’. To m ] wasauthority’. the supreme
198
-
A uy 91, rno rgrć (July 1991 Gregurić Franjo 1991), July , the Prime Minister and the the ccordingly and Minister Prime the ,
ular, 2000: 35). And, as if this this if as And, 35). 2000: ular, ecisions ministers even though the though even the ministers - 1993) and the Fore 275
of them, mostly his advisors, his advisors, mostly them, of
ae y umn n his and Tuđman by made - How long would its its would How long y following, more precise precise more y following,
November 1995), Zlatko
’Tuđman had complete’Tuđmanhad ly until the President the President ly until making in the in the making - known Croatian ign Minister Minister ign -
CEU eTD Collection
were, as a result, regularly ignored (Ibid). ignored regularly result, a as were, procedures and rules party adopted officially The 20). 2001: (Kasapović, sses proce - decision the on influence independent any have not did leadership party 260). 2010: (Ramet, bodies’ constitutional g legitimate displacin ’covertly Croatia, 279 278 was, at the same time vijeće ( Council Presidential the of creation 1999 the with ismore, What establishment and political development, Tuđman secured the status of its its him control to able be would we thought of status the secured leader undisputed Tuđman development, political and establishment HDZ’s in the role key the Byplaying Union. Democratic Croatian the within be found 21). 2001: (Kasapović, election parliamentary upcoming an following formed been have could that government opposition potential Puhovski everything about decided which he in power his orders’ (Interview, October 2011). October (Interview, his orders’ else would he rule’ (Interview, October 2011). rts ‘umn rnfre te urm Sae oni, i avsr bd it a tt oe wih is which one, state a into body advisory his Council, State unconstitutional’ ( Supreme the transformed ‘Tuđman writes, Government, and the coalition partners about the matters ofhighest importance for Croatia. Instead, Tripalo president was ‘leading the country into totalitarianism’ (Danas politically organize nationally organize politically made above.
Thus, for instance,forTripaloThus,Miko protested againstTuđman’s t withconsult practiceto not ‘He was an autocrat, no question about it’, Vrdoljak told me about Tuđman. ‘But he was bound to be; how be; to bound was he ‘But Tuđman. about me told Vrdoljak it’, about question no autocrat, an was ‘He )
Thus, t Thus, of personalized power organization was to to was organization power personalized of pattern the same say, to Needless ‘ T umn etrd ht a t fr a peetv counter ’preventive a form to far that ventured Tuđman he party
, ‘he needed a party only as apparatus that w that apparatus as only party a needed ‘he s, note accordingly It he party that had that he party did Danas
[HDZ] not .
, 29 As As create opinions, ideas,
- was oriented Croats, criticized Tuđman even more fiercely, arguing that the Croatian the that arguing fiercely, more even Tuđman criticized Croats, oriented , October 1991). Marko Veselica,a Maspok pointed out pointed autocratically autocratically
largely
authoritatively irrelevant.
y Mesić, by
His ruled by its president. Other members of of the members Other president. its by ruled
199 shared by Banac by view isshared of point Tuđman , 279 and
I t
‘They actually existed only to mask the mask only to existed actually ‘They served as
politics ’ ‘
a
, 26 , 26 (Interview, January 2012). January (Interview, ruled Croatia throughout the 1990s the throughout Croatia ruled lthough we lthough November 1991). ’ (interview,’ mber 2011) Septe soon
a transmission belt veteran with a failed ambition to ambition failed a with veteran established the system of of system the established [the HDZ founders] [the
- government’ to a to government’ he Parliament, the Parliament, he Predsjedničko Predsjedničko ould execute execute ould
for decisions :
In effect, effect, In making making .
had 278
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critique of Tuđman’s role in the Bosnian war. Bosnian the in role Tuđman’s of critique Vice- a and Minister Prime second (the Manolić Josip and Parliament) the of Speaker the and General expul purged from the HDZ. Thebest HDZ. the from purged number of of number controlled strictly was years, these Throughout re were Board Main the of delegates 110 of out andsix presidents oc onthe 1998, In s. position Board 63Main out of ten merely time, the same At office. - vice party five the of none 1993, October in held Congress, HDZ 2011) September over control absolute 2011). October - decision informal the of dominance 281 280 above, HDZ constituency the of boundaries the exceeded significantly period this during popularity personal Tuđman’s addition, In him. by controlled personally organizations andparallel networks informal the Herzegovina so as to integrate a Tu milit sponsored - Belgrade aforementioned the to referred here [Mesi ć Greater Serbia a of creation the allowed world the
đman and Milošević and đman Only in 2002 was this practice changed and party delegates got a right to actually vote (Ibid ). onflict in and in Bosnia conflict armed the use to intention Tuđman‘s against up stood had he that me told Mesić sion of Stjepan Mesić (Croatia’s first Prime Minister, the HDZ’s Secretary Secretary HDZ’s the Minister, Prime first (Croatia’s Mesić Stjepan of sion d in locate summarize, to was, rule Tuđman’s during Croatia in power real The
most Croats regarded him as politically much greater than the party he led. In In led. he party the than greater much politically as him regarded Croats most party representatives party ary campaignBosnian of Serbs
At the same time, same the At
. wanted thewanted same’ January (Interview, 2012).
Those who had a problem to accept his accept to problem a had who Those came as a consequence of their their of consequence a as came which party), the of President
the mobility of HDZ members within the party ranks (Interview, (Interview, ranks party withinthe HDZ members of mobility the
the as
predominantly Čular Čular
cas delegates’ pointed out pointed
- vice four of onlyoneout Congress, Fourth the of ion loyal to the the President loyal to - nown example of thi of known example ], it would allow expansion the ofCroatia too[.] Concerning BiH,
Croat-
aig tutrs, ua tl m ( me told Čular structures’, making as emphasized by Banac, by emphasized as (see (see
200 populated part of its territory into Croatia: ‘He thought, if ballots would on their behalf becast behalf on their would ballots ,
t Table Table he voting process he voting 280
More to the point, after the Second Second the after point, the to More 10
). For the reasons elaborated elaborated the reasons For ). (Interview, October 2011) October (Interview, s sort relates to the 1993 1993 the to relates sort s
autocracy were regularly regularly were autocracy
at members kept their their kept members presidents stayed in in stayed presidents
the the Tuđman HDZ
Interview, Interview, me - elected. had an had an etings etings .
281 by a by
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115). In a longer run, however, the over the however, run, alonger In 115). (2010: challenges’ opposition to sideline threats security and appeals nationalist 1992- victorious manipulate to ‘his ab ility andWay, Levitsky by out pointed as and, Independence the in role leading Tuđman’s by helped certainly was cause political TheHDZ’s development. political the party’s of course pol personal Tuđman’s of strength The president. its on dependent essentially 1990s the throughout remained Union Democratic winning by president elected accurate. wasvery in Croatia structure political ruling the of understanding popular the say, onecould regard, that 282 pol various to vulnerable it making development, institutional party’s the HDZ garnered 45.3 per cent of the vote. the of cent per 45.3 HDZ garnered the 1995, October in held election, parliamentary next the In list. his party‘s than more – cent per 13 i.e. didate, can a presidential
The party secured the majority of seats (75/127) by winning all 12 reserved for Croatian Diaspora. v Thus, in the 1992 general elections, Tuđman won 57.8 per cent of the vote as as vote the of cent per 57.8 won Tuđman elections, general 1992 the in Thus, Both in terms of internal organization and public perception, the Croatian Croatian the perception, public and organization internal of in terms Both Source: Nohlen and Stover (2010); *Presidential election results election *Presidential (2010); Nohlen andStover Source: Table 10. Table otes) otes) Election year Election Tuđman HDZ in the elections in hybridr in in the elections
The winning results (vote % and absolute number % absolute and (vote results The winning
(1,201) 61.4 per cent of the vote, 244,587 more than hisparty. than more 244,587 vote, of the cent per 61.4 1990
41.9 -
201 Croatia egime -
reliance on his personality inhibited the the inhibited hispersonality on reliance (1,519)* or in absolute numbers 342,663 votes – votes 342,663 numbers in absolute or (1,176) 1992 44.7 57.8 282
- re was Tuđman later, years Two
itical appeal thus determined the the determined appeal thus itical
(1,093) 1995 1995 Croatian War of of War Croatian 1995 45.3 -
itical threats.
s in million (1,337)* 1997 61.4
-
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political figure. political its leading of departure the after a month than less collapsed regime hybrid Croatian the a consequence, As election. 1995 in the than less cent 20per almost vote, the 150), 2013: (Dolenec, campaign the during disarray Tuđman’s under triumphs electoral consecutive 1999. in December hisdeath held after became Tuđman on dependence political party’s the of level The 302). (1997: demanded it majority absolute the HDZ win the enoughto wasnot President the of prestige ‘the writes, Tanner t by stirred euphoria national of peak the at organized Zagreb, of city capital the of assembly local the for 1995election the the HDZ lost Moreover, involved. were members its which in scandals corruption of anumber dueto support public lost party cent). 48per vs. (45.5 parties opposition of coalition than the votes won fewer HDZ the Counties), of (Chamber 285 284 283 in the capital’, the Croatian president then famously proclaimed (C appointment of opposition an candidate for mayor the of Zagreb. ‘We cannotallow “opposition an situation” Moreover, a month prior to his death, they passed a constitutional amendment allowing Tuđman to remain to Tuđman as wished. he allowing supposedly in office, the to die i.e. President, amendment constitutional a passed they death, his st to prior was month Tuđman a Moreover, that claimed publically members HDZ time, same the At effectively on him. Namely, long-
Owing to the electoral s Even the way T way the Even ept te lcoa rsl, umn eue t gv hi give to refused Tuđman result, electoral the Despite Parliament the of house upper the for election in the already in 1993, fact, In he successful military operations against the Serb rebels. Serb the against operations military he successful
u mn id hwd o mc te at h cetd eedd oh yblcly and symbolically both depended created he party the much how showed died đman ystem, the HDZ got more than 57 per cent time gravely ill, Tuđman was clinically dead some time before the departure. departure. the before time some dead clinically was Tuđman ill, gravely time
283
ling ling ru the situation, war the notwithstanding Thus, fully apparent in the first parliamentary election election parliamentary first the in apparent fully 202 285
On 3 January 2000, following three three following 2000, 3January On
s
rule, HDZ was heavily defeated. I defeated. heavily was HDZ rule, -
ular, 2000:40). constitutionally required -
of seats in the Chamber the party ill successfully executing his duties. duties. his executing successfully ill
won 26.8 per cent of cent per won 26.8
284
consent toconsent the
This time, time, This n
CEU eTD Collection 98). the HDZ within reformer (2006: from a as himself presented Prime future Minister] and boss party new [the independence for Croatiaindependence for
result since the introduction of multipartism in Croatia. in Croatia. multipartism of introduction the since result confl anopen following election, parliamentary last in the Yet, election. parliamentary the win to managed even party the Tribunal, Crimes War Hague the to generals Croatian ‘delivering’ start to decision government’s the by caused discontent popular the 1 Table (see comeback political astrong make a result, as and, independence country’s the for struggle the in role leading its of memory the 286 11- anew elected delegates nominated previously anthems, International Communist decades the with party highest the of occasion the On the on was formalized ( andBright’ Handsome, ‘Young, supporters their by named polit of The transfer 4.3.
pit ot that out points Jović respect, this In
ict of its leading members over the party presidency, the HDZ made the worst worst the HDZ made the presidency, party the over members leading its of ict
Montenegro: Single x.htm http://www.izbori.hr/2003Sabor/inde Election State Croatian Source: In the subsequent period, the Croatian Democratic Union proved able to revive revive to able proved Union Democratic Croatian the period, subsequent the In 4.3.1. 4.3.1. Table Election year Election Vote % Vote . HDZ 11. Political pluralization without democratization
- long practice – practice long
– ical power to the new generation of Montenegrin communists, communists, Montenegrin of new generation the to power ical
’s electoral perfor electoral ’s and by avoiding praise for achievements in the decade of his rule since
SKCG Tenth Congress summoned at the end of April 1989. 1989. April of end the at summoned Congress SKCG Tenth
2003 33.9
-party multipartism
marked by an intonation of the Yugoslav and the andthe Yugoslav the of anintonation by marked ‘by
making reference only to Tudjman’s success in achieving meeting, whose opening was – was whoseopening meeting, Committee ( Committee mance mance 203 ) after
2007 36.6 reports available at: available at: reports
Croatia in change regime the
).
286
In 2003, on the wave of wave onthe 2003, In ), ), ipametni lijepi Mladi,
in accordance in accordance
2011 23.8
–
Sanader
CEU eTD Collection Montenegrin ( nation’ any Serb signify -ization ofMontenegro but[an expression of]
out by Veselin Vukotić, the coordinator of the Party’s interim presidency: presidency: interim Party’s the of coordinator the Vukotić, Veselin by out Aspointed demonstrations. ntioned aboveme the of character the of ‘manipulation’ political predecessors’ their accentuated speakers many Moreover, 2012). February ( institutions’ state the off parasitizing thereby decades, two than more for beencreating perfidiously had spiders and big small of lots which bureaucracy web agluey of off shaking by greatness its regained people ‘Montenegrin the that who stated delegate, Congress a Mugoša, Miomir of anaddress in sublimed d elite, political and Secretary its Party the became the Head of years to come, the in of Montenegro development political mark would who men two the ović, Djukan Milo and Bulatović Momir leadership. member representatives of the reconstructed Montenegrin leadership had different ideas ideas different had leadership Montenegrin reconstructed the of representatives ( its members awayfrom attention was existing the keep to supposed actually on, went Djukanović hallucinations’, ‘twisted on based enemy’ imaginary an against This‘battle futile’. out, turned luckily has it as and, beenshameless has state, h Serbian Greater potential a with people Montenegrin the of scaring longtime ’the that arguing old comrades, Glorification of the October and January protests and condemnation of the old old the of andcondemnation protests January and October the of Glorification On the other hand, while standing united against the political past, the highest highest the past, political the against united while standing hand, other the On the of in hiscritique ‘diplomatic’ wayless was Secretary Party elected Freshly ‘Neither from abroad nor domestically were people manipulated. These‘Neither domestically from were events donot people abroad nor ominated the discussion. The two were, perhaps, most effectively effectively most perhaps, were, two The discussion. the ominated Ibid ).
- General respectively. egemony Ibid , as a denier of the Montenegrin nation and the andthe nation Montenegrin the of denier a as , ).
elite in power and divert political and popular popular and political divert and in power elite 204
the will to dignity restore ofthe
RTCG , 3 , 3 CEU eTD Collection tnoi tl m ta ter da wr cmltl mriaie wti a er fe te 99 revolution 1989 the after year a within marginalized completely were (Interview,January 2012). ideas their that me told Stanković behalf of the progressive, democracy the progressive, of behalf multi Republic of Montenegro, abolishing the existing delega weeks later, the Parliament adopted the amendments (no. 64 to 82) tothe Constitution of the Socialist politics democratization were not followed by immediate major political changes in Montenegro. Congress to these on Nonetheless the the examples decide nomination delegates. of cadre were of obliged of the Republic’s representative in the Yugoslav collect referendum was organized, on which the Montenegrin citizens chose among three candidates for the position
place as late as in July 1990. in July as late place as – Party Democratic andThe ; alternativa Demokratska – Alternative TheDemocratic ; alternativu demokratsku jugoslovensku za Udruženje ; TheAssociati ; procesa demokratskih – Processes of Democratic Improvement for 88). Association (The 1989 of course in established organizations political of legalization 1997: (Pavićević, democracy’ more mean not do parties ‘more wasthat Congress April the of conclusions general the oneof Party, within the minority aprogressive by forward put pluralism genuine political for demands the to contrary Hence, in Montenegro. system multiparty of introduction the against opted officials SKCG the of most society, and state the of levels all at democratization - pre the with in line largely concer 288 287 October. of the beginning only at called were history Montenegrin - whole to continued t On guard. old Party the by conducted one the with consistent greatly again, was, leadership instance, l of certainpolitical developments that, subsequent tothe January protest, tookplace in Montenegro. forThus,
Such general position on political pluralism of the highest Party organ might perhaps seem surprising in view The - party parliamentary elections. elections. parliamentary party
new billon political association was passed bythe Montenegrin Parliament on 11July 1990. Afew Secondly, the official identity policy of the newly elected Montenegrin Montenegrin elected newly the of policy identity official the Secondly, ning political future. Those that prevailed for the moment were, ironically, ironically, were, moment the for prevailed that Those future. political ning ess than three weeks before the Congress, a - a Congress, the three weeks before ess than he one hand, as a matter of absolute political priority, the new ruling elite elite new ruling the priority, political absolute of amatter as hand, he one heartedly support the maintenance of the Yugoslav federal state. state. federal Yugoslav the of maintenance the support heartedly
January official Party politics. Firstly, albeit advocating advocating albeit Firstly, politics. Party official January - oriented forces inside the new Montenegrin political leadership, Ljubi 288
Moreover, the first the mult in elections iparty on for Yugoslav Democratic Alternative – Alternative Democratic Yugoslav on for 205 ive Presidency. What is more, the local Party organs organs Party local ismore, the What ive Presidency. te model of representation and allowing for direct and allowing of representation te model
politically avant- politically
Udruženje za unapređivanje unapređivanje za Udruženje
Demokratska stranka Demokratska garde time for that -
287
Consequently, Consequently, Spea
) took ) popular king on ša ša
CEU eTD Collection otngi itletas Jve Bkvć Mlrd ooi, ldn opr n See Zkvć w Zeković) Sreten and demonized by statethe media and then pressed charges against by the State Attorney. Lompar Mladen Popović, Milorad Brković, (Jevrem intellectuals Montenegrin ‘fall of Montenegro’ and the beginning of ‘a new Greater Serbian political occupation’, the four prominent old thesis about the Serbian ethnic origin of Montenegr c a in Moreover, 84). 1997: (Pavićević, nation Montenegrin toward attitude positive or positive very expressed relations withrelations other states’ ( federation, Monteneg asovereignro, as state, independently will onthe decide form of
Cetinje, the Montenegrin government organized massively organized government Montenegrin the Cetinje, of capital old royal in the Twoearlier, weeks 114). 2009: (Burzan, reality’ a definitely, andM nation ‘Montenegrin the that concluded Committee nationalists. Montenegrin as marked who were those waspaid by policy such of price highest the earlier, decades like two Just federation. the ldcou destabilize that nationalism of on all sorts position ahostile alsotook authorities its Accordingly, 290 289 was stated: following the address, opening official in the occasion, same the On Congress. April officials Party highest the by made statements abovementioned in the comprised was regard in this continuity the of indication A clear in Yugoslavia. interests national was particularly strong. was particularly event this of connotation symbolic a exile, in died they which under circumstances t Given hisfamily. of members the and King Nikola of remains – and statehood Montenegro’s of idea the promoting kept a as demonstrations January the who understood many of predictions to contrary hand, other the first multiparty elections in Montenegro - in Montenegro elections multiparty first ensusorganized next year, 61.8per cent
Thus, following their March 1989 interview in a Slovenian daily Mladina daily Slovenian a in interview 1989 March their following Thus, In this context, it is very indicative that in an opinion poll published in November 1990, a month before the In a similar vein, at the meeting held on 21 October 1989, the SKCG Central Central SKCG the 1989, October 21 held on meeting the at vein, asimilar In ‘Montenegro astate is triumph of Serbian nationalism in Montenegro, its leadership leadership its Montenegro, in nationalism Serbian of triumph 290 Krug
, 22 September1990). within Yugoslavwithin [.]Should federation there beno will
of theof Republic’s population declared themselve won won co nvincingly bythe SKCG 206 ins, they characterized the January revolution as the , in which, while arguing against the
- albeit vaguely defined – defined vaguely albeit
81.3 percent - - re attended ontenegrin state are, are, state ontenegrin
of the respondents the of s as Montenegrins Montenegrins s as burial of the the of burial he political he political 289 ere first ere first
On On
its its CEU eTD Collection Grzymala region during the transition period -
slogan ‘We Know How’ ( How’ Know ‘We slogan 85). 1997: (Pavićević, democracy of than rather revolution’ ‘January the of name in the unfolded transition – etc. andfreedoms human rights system, – rhetoric new political a accepted dominance. political the of continuation for chances the maximize to sought actually they democracy, establishing formally while Thus, pluralism. political of introduction the for anambience create arbitrarily to in aposition were leaders new party the acquired, they mechanisms power the of use unconstrained With the resources. andfinancial institutions state media, of control absolute lied imp the it in the Republic, onlyparty of the still infrastructure of intact. remained itself system the 1989, of beginning the at altered hadbeen government of system monolithic Montenegro’s of top of monopoly the concerns old elite, the from inheritance 293 292 291 Milošević Slobodan of known Montenegrin novelist, itis paradoxical most that of people the who, among others,carried the portraits well a Popović, Milorad by out pointed As 9.3). was(by comparison, theMontenegro percentage of Serbs in – name original the under later (2011: 143). 143). (2011: later both of power, monopoly information about the political alternatives were limited and– limited were alternatives political the about information n were contestatio Socialist Party of Serbia for the 1990 parliamentary election
Roberts accordingly characterized the 1989 January revolution as tIt is to no hard notice the similarity between this and the slogan (‘With Us,There isNo Uncertainty’) of the In In this regard, Montenegro asstands one of th With an enormous advantage over the recently founded politi founded recently the over advantage enormous an With Yet, the most important element of the new Montenegrin leadership’s political political leadership’s new Montenegrin the of element important most the Yet, - Busse (2007) as ’rebuilding the post
during the 1989 January demonstrations, declared themselves Montenegrins two years ‘hardly free and ( fair’ free ‘hardly
), znamo kako Mi
de jure exploitative reconstruction ofstate by political establishment, defined by entered the December elections campaign. Due to its its to Due campaign. elections December the entered - communist Leviathan’.
including terms such as democracy, mu such democracy, as terms including and e most paradigmatic examples ofthe 207 293 Bieber, Bieber, 292 de factode
the Communist Alliance of Montenegro – Montenegro of Alliance the Communist
Although the party leaders gradually gradually leaders party the Although the process of Montenegro’s political political Montenegro’s of process the 2003: 16). Thus, for instance, the the instance, for Thus, 16). 2003: , the conditions for the political political the for conditions the ,
‘a sort‘a of palace coup’ (2007: 434). 291
In effect, adjacent to the use the use to adjacent effect, In power. Whereas those at the the at those Whereas power.
where available – available where cal rivals, and the the and rivals, cal -
typical for a wider ltiparty ltiparty
-
CEU eTD Collection
SKCG, as many a many as SKCG, the for preference party their the elections before amonth expressed Montenegrins of cent per 43.1 whereas poll, opinion aforementioned the by showed as all, After t of view rightfully In 156). 2003: (Darmanović, resources’ and apparatus state the over control atotal by about brought advantages the all using party state multi in this equal of participants anumber one of as act did not SKCG the simply, Put (Ibid). opposition discrediting at aimed usually 295 294 election. presidential organized concomitantly the won Bulatović, Momir head, party andthe candidate SKCG’s the success, the best. far wasby result its Yugoslavia, socialist republics of in the elections initial multiparty in the triumphed that parties the Among seats. 125parliamentary of out 83 securing thus vote, the of cent per 52.6 impressive socijalista partija Demokratska – Socialists of Party Democratic 1991the in July (renamed Communists of League Montenegrin the leadership, its of legitimacy revolutionary and the competitors its over advantage political enormous the With place. took Montenegro of history in political elections ‘democratic’ first the 1990, 9December On keep a strong grip on the abovementioned centers of power. Throughout the the Throughout power. of centers abovementioned on the grip astrong keep cent
Winning 76.1 per cent The second-
of the 4.3.2. 4.3.2. The popular verification of its political legitimacy allowed the SKCG/DPS to to SKCG/DPS the allowed legitimacy political its of verification The popular
vote the December in 1990 election. parliamentary argue that argue best was the result of the Socialist Party of Serbia which, as previously mentio as previously which, Serbia of Party Socialist the of result the was best Theyears dominance of s 55.3 per cent anticipated it anticipated cent per 55.3 s
of
the electoral results might have fairly easily been anticipated. beenanticipated. easily fairly have might results electoral the
the
vote, Bulatović was elected Presid elected was Bulatović vote,
, DPS) won a landslide victory. The SKCG got an got TheSKCG victory. alandslide DPS)won , 208
295 s triumph (Pavićević, 1997: 85).
- party contest but much more like ‘a like more ‘a much but contest party ent in the second round. 294
To complete the great political political great the To complete hat, one could onecould hat,
ne d,won 46.1 per
CEU eTD Collection The ruling party’s political caus 2- 2001:(Ivanović, state organsstate and resources in order to squelch andcritics rivals and win elections.
parliament’ (2003: 147). dispirited opponents its bested majority and retained an absolute the Montenegrin in of seats theDPS of tactics, easilykinds oftheand manipulations system. by electoral Backed these intimidation of adversaries; the abuse of police author the packing ofoffices with party occasional themaintenance ofslush funds; favorites; -ownedwas employed, including partyof the state media; range ofmethods domination usual position to render the opposition politically uncompetitive: politically the opposition render to position e party successfully used the hyper the used successfully e party th writes, Darmanović years, following 296 authoritarian. predominantly remained regime political of its the nature reforms, democratic formal Notwithstanding Montenegro. in change political a genuine in Mont period this during caricature - Accordingly competitors’. political our over advantage a serious we had that no doubt have ’I interview, 2012 June a in me told he today’, times those about think I ‘When - Vice Party the then Djukanović, ed ed remain the Montenegrin however, regimes, similar of the Unlike most process. this of phase early in the system political hybrid of establishment sawthe Montenegro non- from in transition countries communist former of like amajority country’s economy. A number of formal steps toward privatization were made in the 1989
and perhaps a bit unexpectedly - unexpectedly abit and perhaps
Throughout the entire hybrid regime period in Montenegro, the government controlled most ofthe A fir In other words, the 1990 introduction of multi of 1990 the introduction words, other In ’The DPS’The the held system together by assiduously using its complete overcontrol plagiarism of history to say that an ambience for fair elections existed existed elections fair for anambience that say to history of plagiarism st - hand indirect confirmation of these claims recently came from Milo Milo from came recently claims these of confirmation hand indirect 3), but the state remained the biggest owner of the capital and by far the biggest employer. e was, needless to say, very much helped by this fact. enegro’ (Ibid). (Ibid). enegro’
president and the Montenegrin Prime Minister. Minister. Prime Montenegrin the and president
Djukanović also pointed out that ‘it would be a a be would ‘it that out pointed also Djukanović 209 ity the to influence electoral process; - party system did not bring about about bring did not system party
democratic rule, rule, democratic - - 1996 period period 1996 privileged privileged 296
Thus,
The CEU eTD Collection (27 per cent federation with Serbia was and created almost put un instantaneously cent
same time, after two electoral rounds, its leader, Bulatović, won the second second the won Bulatović, leader, its term. presidential rounds, electoral two after time, same At the 132). 2001b: (Goati, election second the after majority parliament an absolute post the in onlyparty the DPS the became Asaresult, seats). (46/85 in Montenegro power political of monopoly to the keep cent) per (42.7 enough votes win to managed thus - its two of result economic and political years. these throughout dominance political absolute maintained SKCG/DPS incumbent the as very collapse the until stable 300 299 298 297 137). (Ibid: unrivalled again wasonce result vote the of majority anabsolute even time this seats(45/71) but of majority only anabsolute hegemony, political its threaten even to inability the of because LSCG) parties opposition Montenegro. in situation economic the of worsening further notwithstanding again triumphed party worse electoral result. In worse In electoral1992, result. t rose to rate 23.6 per cent (Dj Montenegro’s industr 1990level (Dj
Bulatović won 63.3 per cent of the vote In 1995, the country’s GDP sto Interestingly, compared totheir individual performances years four earlier, two the parties jointly made a Following its electoral victory in December 1990, the ), whereas in the 1996 election, their ‘People’s Concord’ In the early elections held in December 1992, despite exceptionally bad bad exceptionally despite 1992, December held in elections early the In and the People’s Party ( Party People’s the and - - South the of countries communist ). ). (51.2 per cent). Among the ex Among the cent). per (51.2 urić, Ibid: 140).
299
ialoutput dropped as a consequence bymore than 30 percent Moreover, albeit challenged by a coalition of the two biggest biggest two the of acoalition by challenged albeit Moreover, 298 –
the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro ( Montenegro of Alliance Liberal the Furthermore, in the November 1996 election, the incum the election, 1996 in November the Furthermore,
urić, 2003: 140). hey got 27 (NS od at 50.2 per cent
Narodna stranka - stranka Narodna
in the second
–
year rule, 14 and LSCG –
whereas its industrial its whereas output was only 41.1 per cent of the 210 - communist parties in the wider region, its its region, wider in the parties communist
East Europe that succ that Europe East
round
socialist Yugoslavia collapsed and the and collapsed Yugoslavia socialist
( Narodna sloga . 297
NS) NS)
13 respe 13 the Democraticthe Party of Socialists –
Liberalni savez Crne Gore - Gore Crne savez Liberalni that formed political alliance alliance formed political that ctively) out of 85 mandates (32 per ) der the internationalder the sancti
coali tion won 19 out of 71 seats of 71 out 19 won tion 300 , while the un eeded in preserving preserving eeded in
the DPS won not not won DPS the employment employment
new state bent bent ons.
CEU eTD Collection because of the district organization. parliamentary election. Two later,parliamentary theyears election. pro and and the Social Democratic Party of Reformists (4.1 Social Democratic Party (SDP
its power organization and, more particularly, its high- its particularly, more and, organization power its in lies preponderance political DPS’s the of durability and stability both understanding to key real the section, following the in elaborate and maintain I Instead, status. political ‘special’ the of loss ensuing the and regime hybrid Montenegrin the of 1997 the collapse survivein power to managed party , the the unlike that, fact the for account not certainly could argument this However, competition. hyper of its aresult was period this during politics the Montenegrin over domination absolute DPS’s the that drawn be hence might aconclusion differently, suggest HDZ may the and SPS the of experience triumph. political of prospects the maximize to as so rules electoral the change unilaterally to in aposition was party Montenegrin ruling the Besides, 28). 2003: (Bieber, 10:1’ of amargin by spent of money in terms opposition the beating time ‘this 1996election, the for lavishcampaign an extremely 302 301 - broad political asolid as 1980s the the platform endof toward for served have could not Serbia and Croatia in elites intellectual and political the by forward put alike those program anational chapters, preceding in the elaborated reasonsthoroughly the For ormof Ref ( Forces Union Advocating the transformation Yugoslav ofthe federation aconfederation into ofthe six sovereign The states, coalitions that, throughout the early 1990s, promoted the idea ofrenewal ofMontenegrin independent state. much as 63.4 per cent me as ntioned Hence, single electoral district. represented above, the DPS got 51.2 per cent
icts distr at electoral 14 the introduced law national new electoral The level. Previously, the entire country This was, perhaps, most convincingly demonstrated by the electoral results of tho based popular mobilization in Montenegro. mobilization popular based Using the uncompromised monopoly of power, the DPS was able to conduct conduct to DPS wasable the power, of monopoly uncompromised Using the 4.3.3.
Party
of seats. sto same census the At time, electoral even the though
ae rfrsi snaga reformskih Savez as a politicalas value CG ) –
despite
winning 5.7 percent -
independence Lib per cenper ) won) 14percent 211 - 301
privileged position relative t relative position privileged t ) got merely) a more.few percent
the although And
of vote the – eral AllianceofMontenegro (12 percent 302 level institutionalization. level institutionalization.
of the vote (17/125 seats) in the 1990 1990 the in seats) (17/125 vote the of
Montenegrins of diverging diverging of Montenegrins
did not get into the parliament the into get not did comparative political political comparative se political parties and and parties political se od at 5per cent
of the voteof the as and o the political political the o , the the , )
CEU eTD Collection were also in their late 20s and early 30s. 30s. early and 20s their in late also were Dj
this period. this had enough of representatives its of none Serbia, in was Milošević’s as dominant politically as consolidation, power of process the in was, elite party new Montenegro’s though even the Therefore, predecessors. their political of resignation for request gle asin into converged above, outlined viewpoints political different of plethora of promotion political the stood behin program national No sound leadership. its to opposition resultant the - socio the with dissatisfaction of sense the by period this during together brought were andambitions motives political 305 304 303 Belgr the Finally, competition. political domestic of legalization the particular, in and, federation Yugoslav in the situation political worsening the by augmented in Montenegro, crisis economic prolonged the to addition in was, collaboration for Theneed authority. of positions acquired newly the consolidate and trust popular enormous the justify to as so together work to inclined were SKCGleadership the of members the leverage, and experience political of much y avery at high politics the into Launched years. following in the reaffirmed constantly operated, it in which circumstances economic - socio and political complex as well as structure personal its of because was, distributed within the top ranks of the Montenegrin ruling party. party. ruling Montenegrin of the ranks top withinthe distributed D Svetozargame’, Marovi in in two parts) Secretary General (15) nominated by the party’s local organizations ahead of its October 1990/1 Congress (held ecember 2012 interview. ukanović were 32 and 27 years old respectively. Most of the other members of the new SKCG leadership leadership SKCG new the of members other the of Most respectively. old years 27 and 32 were ukanović
‘The national idea was much greater in other Yugoslav republics. Montenegro was simply not in that political political in that not simply was Montenegro republics. other Yugoslav in much greater was idea national ‘The At time At the werethey the elected Party and SecretaryPresident the In this respect, one might find indicative the number of candidates for the party President (13) and the The resulting principle of cooperati of principle The resulting .
personal authority to impose himself as a dominant political figure during during figure political adominant as himself impose to authority personal 304
Thus, subsequent to the January 1989 coup, political power was was power political coup, 1989 January the to subsequent Thus, , long- a ć,
the the time highest official Democratic ofthe P
young
Republic and and Republic in the situation and political economic . in Montenegro cadres communist 212 - decision ve oung age, making at the party elite level level elite party the at making - Gen arty ofSocialists,arty the in me told 305 eral, Momir Bulatović and Milo and Bulatović Momir eral,
and hence not having having not and hence 303
their close their Instead, a a Instead, ade ade d
CEU eTD Collection text at: available many transition countries (including Serbia and Croatia), a new Constitution of Montenegro
Republic was equivalent to his political influence within influence the to his political party was equivalent heRepublic led. ‘classical parliamentary system’ (Goati, 2001 (Goati, system’ parliamentary ‘classical Union, and a great number of other monocratic other of number andagreat Union, inner its of process to the impetus strong another disobedience’, ‘political its of result a as elite political Montenegrin onthe pressure the increasing steadily 1990s, early the throughout were, authorities 307 306 party associates: associates: party the with consultations regular of importance crucial the accentuated Bulatović period, - decision the about him asked 156). (Ibid: leader indisputable and charismatic of than rather of role a played Bulatović, head, DPS The 146). 2001b: (Goati, 231). At the party’s top, put simply, authority political asupreme as nooneemerged (1981: heis’ than influential more significantly are collectively they but colleagues, his of any than powerful more be[…] may organization the headof titular ‘the andwhere decisions’, collective agroup’s over ce influen of share disproportionate exercise to tend people of coalition limited ‘a which in leadership of type oligarchic the as becharacterized Schonfeld, William of in words could, period this during l regime hybrid Montenegrin in the party ruling the of power of structure the systems, political pluralized decision to officially support the presidential candidacy of Branko Kostić who ran against Momir Bulatovi Momir 1992. against ran who Kostić Branko of candidacy presidential the support officially to decision during border,’ justifying the embargo by ‘a ban on the export of goods from Serbia, which were deemed strategic a rapprochement with Albania […] the Serbian authorities stopped trucks crossing the Montenegrin- Bie process. this obstruct to sought Serbia dominant politically time, same the At neighbors. the with relations political normalize to efforts its in most apparent discourse, political its thenfacing with direeconomic and political Podgorica would not always match during this period. As earlier mentioned, the Montenegrin leadership was
On thisOn subject Despite the outward of harmony their relations, political interests of governments the Belgrade in and
the times of crisis’ (2003: 24). Taking this into consideration, one cannot be surprised by Milošević’s by surprised be cannot one consideration, into this Taking 24). (2003: crisis’ of times the Therefore, Therefore, http://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/4163 tant to mention that, contrary to semito that, contrary tomention important isalso it , compared to the Socialist Party of Serbia, Croatian Democratic Democratic Croatian Serbia, of Party Socialist the to compared
ooked substantially different. What we find in the DPS DPS we in the What find different. substantially ooked s in the SKCG/DPS throughout that that throughout SKCG/DPS the in s procedure making situationin the country. This brought aboutgradual moderation of b ). Accordingly,Bulatovi 213 - led political organizations in recently recently in organizations led political - party cooperation. party ) ,
adopted in October 1992, established a ć
’s authority as President the ofthe ber thusreminds that ‘in response to - presidential systems introduced in introduced systems presidential 307 primus inter pares inter primus
When I recently recently I When 306
(an incomplete (an which gave gave which Serbian ć in ć
CEU eTD Collection continuous political successes’ (Interview, December 2012). lea the within ‘team work the emphasizing talk, precisely becauseprecisely ofthat’ (Ibid). well as indivi as well is FridaysMondays where andthis and
remained unaltered. At the same time, in comparison to the SPS and the HDZ, HDZ, the the SPS to and in comparison same time, the At unaltered. remained jršć o h ls o vice of list the to Djurišić Pejanović adding from Apart Union. Democratic Croatian andthe Serbia of Party Socialist in the alike those Socialists of Party Democratic in were the no purges there 1997, and 1990 Between party. their by defined contrary, onthe were, members leadership DPS’s the of those ambitions, political personal their with accordance (re)defined (re)defined Djukanović divorce, 310 309 308 claims: Bulatović’s his of presidency: course candidate for the 1992 presidential election. More than5,000 membersat the local party leveltook making] would, as arule,making] would, as involve consultations and shared responsibility’. members voted 50 to four in favortović ofBula nominations after receiving the biggest support of the party base. On 25 November 1992, the Main Board process and, initially, as many as 36 candidates were nominated. Bulatovi an independent candidate.
Interview,January 2012. Interview, June 2012. The intensity of political life within the DPS was demonstrated in the process of nomination of a party party of a nomination of process the in demonstrated was DPS the within life political of intensity The And while in numerous cases across the wider region, charismatic leaders leaders charismatic region, wider the across cases in numerous And while political their of bitterness the notwithstanding interview, aforesaid the In - intra ‘an intensive he emphasized same time, the At ‘Bulatović would rarely allow himself to make a decision individually. It [t It individually. decision a make to himself allow rarely would ‘Bulatović to used ‘We alot spend factionsof timethe [within debates, in Party] as allowed were ‘Everythingwent through theparty.-presidents would Vice come tomy on office dual dissentingdual organization strong opinions, wasanexceptionally andtheParty -
thereby often organizationally weakening - weakening organizationally often thereby
Svetozar Marović, another party Vice party another Marović, Svetozar
–
- aVice then
-
presidents in 1992, the structure of the top party ranks party top the of structure the in 1992, presidents 309
’s candidacy. Endorsed by Milošević, Kosti everything would be discussed andeverything would bediscussed decided’. President of the Party – Party the of President dership of the DPS as one of main reasons behind its 214
- President, confirmed these claims during our our during these claims confirmed President, party political life’ in the the in life’ political party
ad otć cetd the accepted Kostić and ć
strongly corroborated corroborated strongly political parties in in parties political 310 ć still decided to run as
- he decision
part in the in part 308
- CEU eTD Collection respectively. respectively. vice Party powerful 1994.
. se per value apolitical as party ruling its perceived public political country’s the that imply clearly collapse regime 1997 the to prior Montenegro in held elections the years. these during stable unusually remained regime hybrid the Montenegrin same time, the At unchallenged. almost domination political DPS’s the coherencerendered structural internal ahigh level of record, omic econ and badpolitical despite its Therefore, rule. its perpetuating of purpose the for used be was to Socialists, of Party Democratic party. ruling the of structures inside the entirely concentrated leadership, its within distributed albeit was, regime hybrid Montenegrin the in power political Asaresult, us’. differentiates really that issomething ‘this me, told [par comparative the at look we ’When interests. political its to subordinated effectively an exception, without remained, force political scale. smaller significantly a of were Board Main DPS’s the within changes personal 312 311 hyper the guarantying manipulation, of menu entire highest representatives: representatives: highest its among distributed were Republic the in posts political leading the election, parliamentary first the Following
Thus, mostThus, of its members of50 out top (27 Unsurprisingly, level. state the onto reflected was simply ofDPS within the then,power the constellation
311 abovem the against assessed when Moreover, During this period, the highest representatives of Montenegro’s leading leading Montenegro’s of representatives highest the period, this During
- presidents presidents Bulatović –
took the offices of the Prime Minister and the Speaker ofthe Parliament became thePresident, whe
- ranked) were re- ranked) 215 reas Dj ty] practice in the region’, Djukanović Djukanović region’, the in practice ty] elected at the second party Congress, in March - ukanović and Svetozar Marović Svetozar and ukanović privileged political status of the the of status political privileged entioned criterion, the results of results the criterion, entioned 312
Accordingly, the Accordingly, –
the two two the
CEU eTD Collection
parliamentary elections had been in line with - with line in hadbeen elections parliamentary ew, Western Western n ew, andtoward him, from away moved gradually former the politics, hisbelligerent of consequences political and economic terrible despite friend, political old the to loyal stayed former the While Milošević. with partnership political of issue the Vice a and President DPS’s between division The country. the in front political new and a opened Bulatović Djukanović, figures, leading two its 1996, November in triumph electoral great af Merely regime. hybrid Montenegro’s end of the about inner the andfollowing during strongly even manifested study. of this focus are in the that s partie two political the other of performances electoral elaborated previously onthe those against in juxtaposition when placed apparent fully becomes data these of value Theanalytical 2,900. DPS of the was in favor votes of margin the cast), votes 5,519 (29 cent per 67.3 of turnout the with later, years Two head. its than candidate presidential its high turnout of 75.7 per cent per 75.7 of high turnout v Throughout this period, the level of popular support for the DPS in the in the DPS the for support popular of level the period, this Throughout round) (first results election *Presidential (2001a); Goati Source: Evident all through this period, the DPS’s political significance came to be to came significance political DPS’s the period, this through all Evident Table Table otes) in the in otes) Election Election Bulatović DPS 12.
bsolute numbers in thousand in thousand % numbers absolute (vote and results The winning year
elections in hybridr in elections
(see (see
- (304,947 votes cast) votes (304,947 ment over the the over ment disagree their from resulted President (170,1)* Table 12 Table (171,3) 1990 42.2 56.2
). Thus, in the 1990 general elections, with a a with elections, general 1990 the in Thus, ). 216 Montenegro egime
r than - than r highe slightly and even (123,2)* (126,1)
1992 42.8 42.7 the party won 1,034 votes more more votes 1,034 won party the
- ew months after the party’s the party’s after ew months
party struggle that brought brought struggle that party
(150,2)
1996 49.9 -
that for for that CEU eTD Collection ideas’ with Dj with rules anda rules new balance offorces. In retrospect, we see can thatthesecond transition was
Congress’ in August 1997. August in Congress’ Party ‘Third the organize to on went heeven him, who supported members him presenting election. Interestingly, regardless of the inner the of regardless Interestingly, election. – later ayear her replace relative to polit to relative hyper in the wasnomore party the in power, still albeit Thus, level. and local state at both influence political deal of the DPSagreat lost (SNP), it of number asignificant As together. built had they regime the of end an to led organization vić Pejano mentioned Previously Djukanović. by stood body highest Party’s the of members 99 of 62out held Inon11July, the meeting Board. Main DPS’s the to belonged discussion in the word final The level. local party the at organized debates face series a in arguments political exchanged Djukanović and Bulatović 1997, of half first the Throughout structure. institutional its within entirely DPS unfolded partners. political 314 313 was. party the asset valuable politically how out pointing thus effectively wrote, onecommentator 1997), July 20 , Borba
A regular Third Symbolically, the stage for the political battle within the leadership of the ruli . See: footnoteSee: 229 no. . knvćs frmnind neve i wih e icre Mlšvć s ‘ as Milošević discarded he which in interview aforementioned ukanović’s The conflict between the key figures of the country’s most powerful political political powerful most the country’s of figures key the between The conflict ‘From that moment, the political game in Montenegro changed completely, game changed Montenegro with new political in moment, the ‘From that - Djurišić s members joined Bulatović’s newly created Socialist People’s Party Party People’s Socialist created newly Bulatović’s joined members s Congress of the DPS was summoned in October 1998. ical competition. As noted by Darmanović: by noted As competition. ical self as the highest DPS official. Together with the Main Board Board Main the with Together official. DPS highest the as self 313
became a new head of the DPS, whereas Djukanović Djukanović whereas DPS, the of head new a became
The political contest between the two most powerful men of the of powerfulthe men most two the between contest The political .
314
was voted for its candidate for the upcoming presidential presidential upcoming the for candidate its for was voted
‘It was all about preserving the name of the DPS’ the ( of name the preserving ‘It wasall about
217 - party defeat, Bulatović continued continued Bulatović defeat, party
ng a man ofobsolete Montenegrin party was set - privileged position position privileged –
who would would who - face of
political political Naša Naša to - CEU eTD Collection ( to mention that the biggest opposition party in Montenegro, SNP, officially accepted the result of the election behavio carried out without any major problems on Election Day. The parties should be commended for their calm and administrative procedures were adopted by consensus among all parliamentary parties, and the voting was theby OSCE/ODIHR TechnicalAssistance Team in February 1998 haveframework legal The been implemented. pleased to note that most of the recommendations issued byOSCE Election Observation Mission1997 in and
ovi Darman quote to and, development, political was This in Montenegro. leaders party all Gori Crnoj Infrastructure’minimumu princi o (Dogovor a of Democratic Development for Principles onMinimum ‘Agreement the election, the before amonth ismore, What cast). 344,000 of (out votes 5,500 than less by second agains (47.44 round first won the narrowly Bulatović After Montenegro. in place taking change political the of indicator (2003: 148). andthatsemi beginning http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/montenegro/15101?download=true 315 regime. hybrid Montenegrin the of collapse the notwithstanding continued thus Socialists of Party Democratic the of domination Political (42/78). seats of majority absolute and vote the of cent per won 48.9 parliamentary election, parliamentary and fair free observed, internationally first country’s in the 31May 1998, On field. level a on even rivals political outplay to able being out turned DPS the above, ted elabora reasons the For Montenegro. in order political a new about bring however, 149). (Ibid: late’ years held seven negotiations roundtable NIN
In the OSCE/ODIHR r , 4 July, 4 1998). r after the for elections and accepting the results’ (available at: The result of the October 1997 presidential election was an unambiguous unambiguous wasan election presidential 1997 October the of The result The substantial alteration of the conditions for political competition did not, did not, politicalcompetition for conditions the of alteration The substantial ), with ‘free and fair elections’ as one of the key elements, was signed by by wassigned elements, key the one of as elections’ and fair ‘free with ),
eport on the election, the following is stated: ‘The Election Observation Mission is is Mission Observation Election ‘The isstated: following the election, the on eport -authoritarianism 315
the ruling party – party ruling the
t 46.71 per cent), Djukanović prevailed in the the in prevailed Djukanović cent), per 46.71 t party politics were on their way out’ were-party wayout’ ontheir and dominant politics 218 pa za razvoj demokratske infrastrukture u u infrastrukture demokratske razvoj pa za the official beginning of a new age of its its of age anew of beginning official the
in a coalition with two smaller parties – parties smaller two with in acoalition again, ć ) .
In this regard, it is very important isvery important it regard, this In
‘something like a set of of set a like ‘something
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Originally emanating Originally 2006referendum. in the out carried successfully sovereignty, country’s the post to the party’s could beattributed 13 Table (see well extremely DPS performed the change, 316 argued, previously as was, respectively Croatia in and Serbia authority political Sl of ascent Therapid goals. givennational of fulfillment toward populace in the accumulated emergence the for was set stage the alike, Serbia and in Croatia 1980s, the of end the By federation. Yugoslav in the rights andeconomic political their concerning states both in dissatisfaction post their of course the determined Croatia later, the wide of - The organization 4.4. - pro in the role leading DPS’s the to Adjacent accept the outcome of the plebiscite. plebiscite. of the the outcome accept t parties opposition of most reluctance the by helped been certainly has cause
55.5 55.5 cent per voters expressed supportof for renewaltheir the of independence. Montenegro’s
Concluding remarks In fact, in all the elections organized in Montenegro subsequent to the regime regime the to subsequent in Montenegro organized inelections all the fact, In at: available (reports Montenegro of Commission Electoral andState (2010) Stover Nohlen and Sources: Montenegro Table Table Election year Election Vote % Vote obodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman to the positions of supreme supreme of positions the to Tuđman Franjo and Milošević obodan erformance performance electoral DPS’s 13.
from the intellectual circles, there was a growing sense of of sense growing was a there circles, the intellectual from
2001 42 of a political figure that would channel political energy energy political channel would that figure political a of ranging nationalist movements in Serbia and, somewhat somewhat and, in Serbia movements nationalist ranging
- toward reorientation 2001 ideational 2002 http:/ 48 219
/www.rik.co.me/ independence political bloc, its political political its bloc, political independence - communist political transformation. transformation. political communist 2006 48.6 after
the regime changein regime the ). To a great extent, this this extent, Toagreat ). ) 2009 51.9
renewal of of renewal
2012 45.6 o fully fully o
316
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different ‘political colors’ jointly stood up against what they did not want anymore. anymore. want did not they what stood upagainst jointly colors’ ‘political different of Montenegrins wanted, they what behind 1980s of end the toward uniting nationally and politically federation, the ghout throu compatriots Unlike their Yugoslavia. for alternative political anunambiguous without moment, that at were, Montenegrins national question in Montenegro was left essentially unanswered. essentially was left Montenegro in question national post the all of policy clear of lack the and attitude ambivalent the Due to movement. nationalist broad of result a was not republic smallest its in change political the period, that during federation Yugoslav collapse. the regimes’ to relative t determined resources, power considerable notwithstanding which, institutionalization their prevented effectively organizations two withinthe authority political of Thepersonalization structure. power of pattern same the beorganized along to came parties two the organization, political establishment anti an as scratch the from created was other the whereas predecessor political in the January 1989 coup. Contrary coup. 1989 January in the in Montenegro power over political took officials party unknown relatively and young communist a was them oneof that fact the despite quently, Conse headed. they organizations party the including regimes, hybrid established newly in the power political of system entire the monopolize to able were Tuđman and Milošević leaders, national lead. to got they which movements political the of character the of because precisely possible importantly, more and, political undisputed of status the into promoted Being On the other hand, as discussed in the preceding sections, a narrow circle of of circle anarrow sections, preceding in the discussed as hand, other the On - successor party that even maintained ideological continuity with its its with continuity ideological maintained even that party successor
- W to dominant political trends in most of the of in most trends political dominant to 220 WII generations of its political leaders, the the leaders, political its of generations WII
heir political fates fates political heir Consequently, only only Consequently,
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rsion of dispersion initial the Thus, rule. party’s dominant the maintaining of in function put were regime hybrid Montenegrin established newly the of collapse. the power regime in surviving party this rendered egro, in Monten mobilization ranks highest acommunist where Serbia particular, in and, Croatia of cases the to Contrary interest. political proclaimed officially its by primarily guided was period this during party ruling Montenegro’s of representatives highest the of activity political Accordingly, reaffirmed. constantly competition, the principle of cooperative deci cooperative of principle the competition, power. a into political genuine trust leader Serbian and Croatian the as influence political much as nearly acquire to position post the Montenegrin of the members noneof result, this around emerging terms political was card’ ‘national the on playing Republics, leader. political like charismatic for scene political Republic’s onthe room wasno there interest, national Montenegrin of notion widely accepted them among and articulated aclearly of absence the particular, in and, forces political prevailing . Instead, they were to work together so as to transform the enormous popular popular enormous the transform to as so together work to were they Instead, s. Throughout the 1990s, in light of the legalization of domestic political political domestic of legalization of in light the 1990s, the Throughout ideational giventhe circumstances, these Under
. emanating from the specific character of the 1988/9 process of political political of process the 1988/9 of character specific the from emanating
of of type particular the the needfor reason, that For
time in the neighboring republics was not nearly as big. as nearly wasnot republics neighboring in the time - successor party also prevailed, all the power mechanisms mechanisms power all the also prevailed, party successor
In Montenegro, when compared to the neighboring neighboring the to compared when Montenegro, In
221
the - aTuđman of appearance
sion not nearly as potentially as nearly not -
making at the party summit was summit party the at making institutionalized and capable of of and capable institutionalized - 1989 party elite wasin elite a 1989 party
heterogeneity of the the of heterogeneity political leadership leadership political
power within its its within power
or Milošević or beneficial
As a a As
in in - CEU eTD Collection PERSPECTIVE
erally defined that that defined erally gen were regimes way hybrid the concerning things two identified it 2, Chapter the in presented review literature the on based respect, this In regimes. appr research. the by covered 13were another thesis, this of focus in the are that states three the to addition In made. was decades two last the within regimedemocratization hybrid of cases of anumber of analysis comparative a empirical framework, the as study 2010 andWay’s usingLevitsky goal, that To 6). 1995: (Evans, derived’ originally was it which in setting the from ‘separable empirical a wider model within the of applicability tests chapter following the thesis, this study of the three hybrid regime cases. In line with the theory the In line with cases. regime hybrid the three of study subsequently did or did not institutionalize. institutionalize. did not did or subsequently parties dominant their was nationalist, regimes hybrid of establishment the to leading mobilization political whether on depending that second, and, exist; to ceased pow lost regimes in hybrid parties dominant institutionalized, were they onwhether depending that first, posits, It regimes. hybrid in outcomes party diverging explaining amodel forward puts study The present 50). (1997: those stories’ of d independently can bedemonstrate whoseefficacy […] - cause of chains ondiffering resting stories causal verifiable relevant, construct to have will we explanations, at arrive to we are ‘if that writes Tilly Charles 5 . HYBRID REGIME opriateness of the categorization of these cases as democratized hybrid hybrid democratized as cases these of categorization the of opriateness sis sought to ascertain the the ascertain to sought sis the the generalizability, model’s the testing Before The
context. Its main ambition is to show the extent to which the model is is model which the to extent the show isto ambition main Its context. - in foregoing the in identified isclearly mechanism causal underlying
PAR TY OUTCOMES IN COMPARATIVE 222 er or stayed in office as these regimes regimes these as office in stayed or er
- centric orientation of of orientation centric effect relations relations effect depth depth CEU eTD Collection as mainthe source of inform electoralof ‘an democracy’ and ‘not electoral an democracy’) as wellother expert analyses often as that serve the categoriesbetween forth and back shifted basis, yearly (where on House countries reports are, Freedom in
seems to change or be changing in authoritarian or democratic direction. democratic or in authoritarian change bechanging to or seems announc to tend regimes hybrid with dealing scholars Accordingly, longevity. its determines in one’sview, that, agiventime at agivenregime in affairs political of state the about forward. A puts research this one that the including dynamics, political its to relating questions most answer to impossible is it collapse, and/or establishment regime of moment the identify being to able Without regimes. hybrid of analysis the for mework fra temporal regimes in hybrid competitiveness electoral of level the determining for criteria accepted widely that fact the to n callsattentio it hand, other On the consensus. scholarly uponthe rests study this regard, that In both. from differ them makes what is systems political authoritarian and of elements democratic of combination the that to agree seem thus scholars regimes, hybrid name to use they label the of Regardless . specifica differentia typological their as recognized generally and elaborated thoroughly been has regimes these of character political Theambivalent clarification. additional for asked 317 dismantled within a single electoral term in term electoral single a within dismantled (2010: 103). The authors thus imply that hybrid regime in Romania was first re candidate was defeated [.] The subsequent transition was peaceful. Romania was democratic after 2005’ relatively clean parliamentary and presidential elections in 2004 [.] The governing party’s presidential tionsnegotia in 2000, external constraints were formidable [.] International monitoring helped to ensure 2004), Romania into fell back competitive authoritarianism [.] However, following the of launch formal EU Iliescu returned to the presidency and his PDSR won a solid plurality in the legislature. Under Iliescu (2000- was democratic […] the 2000 election was considered free and fair, and incum Levitsky and Way’s research on the regime change in Romania: 'The Constantinescu government (1996-
The conceptual ‘fluidity’ The latter criterion is necessary so that we could create an essentially needed needed anessentially we couldcreate that so isnecessary criterion The latter e (often repeatedly) their inception and demise whenever political situation situation political whenever anddemise inception their repeatedly) (often e t the moment, however, it is as a rule an entirely subjective impression impression subjective entirely an arule isas it however, moment, t the ation on political regimes in general. in general. regimes on political ation
underlying such analyses is demonstrated in the following example from the from the example following in the demonstrated is suchanalyses underlying
-
found found be can observations Similar polls. democratic two between and, even, their longevity their even, and, 223
bent forces were badly defeated. forces defeated. bent were badly are still missing. missing. still are - installed and then again 317
2000) CEU eTD Collection
of unlevel playing field, playing unlevel of regime existence, this research proposes aperi proposes research this existence, regime recognizing their longevity, is required. Thus, as Thus, isrequired. longevity, their recognizing - time precise amore it, Toavoid relativity. conceptual such against argues strongly thesis this s, tendencie authoritarian various of emergence occasional without unfold not did transitions democratic most that acknowledging albeit Therefore, country. agiven of record democratic of worsening/improvement anes as itself, regime De jure De authoritarianism. of forms various from different regimes hybrid s make what isalso competition electoral time, same At the 28). (2002: elections’ of andmeaningfulness inclusiveness, fairness, freedom, onthe crucially turns authoritarianism andelectoral democracy electoral between ‘the distinction that notes thus Diamond democracy. andelectoral regime hybrid similar ostensibly between difference key the denotes iswhat process electoral the . competition electoral fair and afree by separated elect consecutive two of proposesaperiod research this existence, regime democratic of minimum temporal the as logic, same the theory that needs to be more clearly defined. As emphasized above, As emphasized defined. clearly more be to needs that theory differentiated. beanalytically criterion, temporal on the based theshould, two regimes, democratic of creation the to lead necessarily donot ‘situations’ democratic Assuch new regime. pol institutionalize to failed new incumbents rulers, regime hybrid of defeat electoral through opening democratic witnessed point some This results in the failure to make a necessary analytical distinction between a between distinction analytical make anecessary to failure in the This results The level of electoral compet electoral of The level
separated by anun by separated tablished set of political rules, and a temporary andatemporary rules, political of set tablished itiveness is another element of hybrid regime hybrid regime of element isanother itiveness 224
- or or fair/- de facto od of two consecutive electoral cycles cycles electoral twood of consecutive free electoral competition. electoral free
the temporal minimum of hybrid hybrid of minimum temporal the In a number of countries that at at that countries of anumber In itical change, i.e. to establish a establish to i.e. change, itical oral cycles of level playing field, field, level playing of cycles oral non- framing of hybrid regimes, regimes, hybrid of framing existent in authoritarian in authoritarian existent
the character of character the
Following Following CEU eTD Collection
party systems in which incumbents regularly win elections with enormous margins, enormous with elections win regularly incumbents in which systems party a by Asdemonstrated atriumph. for opportunity meaningful minimal, however with regimes hybrid in opposition itprovide the isto regimes, 318 that thesis argues this democracy, to authoritarianism from transition direct successful its of Because Benin. is democratization regime hybrid of cases ‘problematic’ the of One 5.1. vote. the of 1/3 not than less secure continuously to able is opposition the if hybrid, as beregarded is to aregime that i.e. competitive, sufficiently beconsidered to are elections that proposes therefore thesis This 230). (1976: remarked famously Sartori Giovanni regimes, in these envisaged’ even isnot ’Turnover competitive. asystem make not does i.e. turnover, electoral of possibility a imply necessarily not does opposition legal of existence mere the implementing democratic reforms and maintaining stability of the new political regime regime new political the of stability and maintaining reforms democratic implementing and Nicaragua, Ghana, (Benin, regimes hybrid as qualify donot either they since cases six against tested be cannot model the of generalizability the section, following in the elaborated as At time, thedy. same stu comparative the for to berelevant found are and Peru, Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Macedonia, (Slovakia, elections win the following percentages: 77.4 (2001), 84.4 (2006), and 79.7 (2010).
For instance in Belarus, the only European regime of the kind, Lukashenka won the last three presidential
Guyana) Guyana) Benin should not be considered hybrid regime in the first place. place. first in regime the hybrid beconsidered Benin shouldnot
Problematic caseshybrid of regime democratization Against all odds, this poor and extremely weak African state succeeded in succeeded state weak African extremely and poor this odds, all Against list Way’s and Levitsky the from cases seven criteria, these on Based 5.1.1.
Benin Benin democratized beconsidered cannot or
225 (Mali andUkraine). the
number of dominant dominant of number Dominican Republic) Republic) Dominican
318
CEU eTD Collection office ‘without a party’ (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 292). parties were so poorly organized that three presidents elected in the course of the next two the the course of in three elected organized that presidents were poorly so parties well below the sub the below well Nationalthe Conference which initiated its democratic transition, Benin’s GDP per capita was $273 and was low level. At the same time, the country’s socio same country’s the the time, At level. low reforms but without changing the regime’s single political liberal for certain allowing and criticism of for expression the a platform providing by crisis political Forces Vives de abroad, Kérékou organizing in National out a sawConference away (officially Conférence named Nationaledes situation where was he longer no able to effectively rely security the on apparatus or assistance the from government grew toward the end of the Cold War increasingly vulnerable to rising popular protests. the In
governance, the country thus managed to stay on the democratic political democratic onthe stay managed to thus country the governance, post the of institutionalization of the process to impediments structural serious Notwithstanding 338). 2009: (Bierschenk, continent entire the in democracy’ of example ‘a shining even, and, 219) 2001: (Magnusson, democracy’ pressures. political from autonomy of high level asurprisingly demonstrated institutions dictatorship. military Kérékou’s Mathieu of llapse co peaceful to the subsequent 322 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom 321 320 319 789). 2008: (Gisselquist, power executive of alternations successful of number anda elections andfair free considered widely and competitive Soglo. Nicéphore opponent his headedby government atransitional andto name institutions democratic decided Conference aNational after ayear 1991, in March office of out voted was Kérékou (Magnussonand Clark,2005: 561). voting irregularities and accusing the Court of complicity with Kérékou, his challenger and former dictator el presidential in the young decmocracy’ (Seely, 2005: 370). Thus, in 1996, the Court nullified 25 per cent of the vote in the manipulatestate institutions (Levitskyand Way, 2010: 296). stolen (Ibid). following the In period, the Constitutional blocked Court several Kérék attemptsou’s to his way to losing the second round’ and his supporters claimed, ‘against most evidence’, that the election was
This relates primarily to the Constitutional Court which ‘successfully managed several institutional disputes institutional several managed ‘successfully which Court Constitutional the to primarily relates This Like in many Af in Like other Largely dependent on foreign assistance (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 292), Kérékou’s Marxist See: Freedom in the World 2013 report on Benin (available at: For these reasons, Benin came to be praised as ‘West Africa’s most vibrant vibrant most Africa’s bepraised ‘West as to Benin came reasons, these For –
322 ection. Soglo, the incumbent president, accepted the outcome and left the office albeit claiming contrary to his expectations – to hisexpectations contrary ) that was to confirm his political legitimacy. He thereby sought to alleviate the the to alleviate thereby sought He legitimacy. la political Nation his was )to that confirm
- Saharan African unimpressiveaverage $528 of (Gisselquist,2008: 791).Inaddition, political rican states,rican the overall of capacity state institutions Benin in was exceptionally atan 322
320
In the 2001 election, Soglo outpulled race ‘when ofthe was he clearly on
In the years that followed, Benin witnessed a series of of aseries witnessed Benin followed, that the years In - - world/2013/beni - economic picture of Benin was dreadful. In 1990, the year of party character (Bierschenk, 2009: 340). 226
to initiate the process of creation of new new of creation of process the initiate to
n#.UzQi4ahdUlA 321
At the same time, state ).
- 1990 system of of 1990 system
decades tookthe
course. course. - Leninist Leninist
319
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drafted a proposal of a new, liberal constitution (Abdulai, 1992: 66). 1992: (Abdulai, constitution liberal new, a aproposal of drafted – Council Defense National (Provisional junta andhis Rawlings Jerry Previously, 1992. December in organized semi by marked development political recent and Nicaragua’s Ghana’s in periods identify one clearly can system, ademocratic of establishment immediate in the resulted authoritarianism of collapse the where Benin Unlike 325 324 323 1996 gener character. undemocratic regime’s the altering place essentially regime. ahybrid as to qualify states two the enoughfor long last did not periods these argues that study present the criterion, longevity aforementioned the with in line Ghana. change in democratic instantaneous about bring did not infrastructure democratic activistsby government (Gyimah level who were not allowed toregister tovote, there can no be doubt that the electoral playing field was far from all the advantages of incumbency and disenfranchisement of a significant number of oppositi of exploitation blatant government’s the With earlier. month a held balloting presidential the in irregularities the same time, the Constitution remained suspended and the Rawlings government ruled by decree. imprisoned them on nebulousgrounds, and carried out many political executions (Gyimah- into or exile citizens forced cause, assigning without properties confiscated trail, without indefinitely citizens notwithstanding the severity of their authoritarian rule. Namely, throughout the 1980s, the PNDC detained efficient way to preserve positive international reputation which th they would often act against the incumbent interests (2010: 303) Commission, Supreme Court the other and important state bodies tobecome independent tothe thatpoint Rawlings government invested heavily in democratic institutions during this period, practices in the lively independent press’ (Jeffries, 1998: 190). Even Levitsky and Way point out that the were and thus policies able government to play by‘an criticizing active politicalparliament outside role media and ‘blacklisting’ of pro organization, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) got 77.5 per cent. conditions, Rawlings was elected president, winning 58.4 per cent of the v
At At endthe of Coldthe War, Ghanaianthe authorities recognized the introduction of political reforms as an Thus, the December 1992 parliamentary election was boycotted by the opposition because of numerous The NDC government had observed virtually all the constitutional provisions and the opposition parties ana were ana were Gh in coup 1981military the after elections multiparty The first 5.1.2. 324
- Yet, throughout the following years, constitutional reforms were put in in put were reforms constitutional following years, the Yet, throughout Boadi, 1994: 79). Such impression was further strengthened by the intimidation of opposition al elections in Ghana were judged free and fair by international international by fair and free judged were Ghana in al elections
Ghana and Nicaragua and Ghana - s ponsored paramilitary groups, libel suits and violent attacks against independent independent against attacks violent and suits libel groups, paramilitary ponsored - opposition entrepreneurs (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 302). Under these
- adecade lifted PNDC)
227
long ban on party politics and and politics party banon long ey earned by liberalizing the economy
ote, whereasote, party newlycreated his - author which allowed the Electoral the Electoral allowed which 325 323
As a result, the As aresult, itarian rule. Yet, Yet, rule. itarian
Boadi, 1994: 77). At of of The creation on supporters on supporters
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[easily won by the opposition] was clean’ (2010: 140- (2010: wasclean’ opposition] the by won [easily election 1990 ‘the that out point also but 1980s’, late the in Nicaragua in emerged regarded as aregime. as regarded be to long enough last not did to is say, that country, in this rule authoritarian semi of The period regime. ahybrid as to be enlisted criterion the longevity satisfy in post may be identified process democratization within awider tendencies authoritarian aparallel, to make as, just Ghana in regime authoritarian of years final the during ncies tende democratizing about talk onecould Instead, case. regime hybrid a beconsidered to it for short too was country this in 1996) of semi period the that accordingly, in 1996and, established institutions’. democratic consolidate to slowly continued country ‘the onGhana, report World seats. of amajority secured andhisparty term presidential another won Rawlings confir ultimate the as regarded – outcome electoral the accepted now opposition the election, observers. 327 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom 326 7). 2005: and Morrison, (Lindberg observers’ international of andarray competitors both by partisan fair” and “free as seen ‘widely also were elections organized subsequently the addition, In
Rawlings won 57.4 per cent of the vote; the result of his NDC was 53 pe As stated in the Freedom in the World 1998 country report (available at: ot seem to to seem not does case Nicaragua the of Rawlings, under Ghana to Similar was in Ghana regime a democratic that maintains therefore This thesis 326
Moreover, after heavily contesting the result of the 1992 presidential 1992presidential the of result the contesting heavily after Moreover,
Levitsky and Way suggest that ‘competitive authoritari ‘competitive that suggest andWay Levitsky
During this period, as stated in the 1998 Freedom in the in the Freedom 1998 in the stated as period, this During
mation of electoral competitiveness – competitiveness of electoral mation - world/1998/ghana#.UzRn1qhdUlA 228 r cent(133/200 parliamentseats). 4). As this election is is election this As 144). - - (1992 rule authoritarian - ). ). 2000 Romania.
which might be be might which
even though though even anism anism
327
-
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Liberation Front Liberation National Sandinista andhis Ortega Daniel by easilywon elections, 1984 general the that suggest 1994) Williams, 2002; andDodd, Anderson 2007; (Close, scholars exis the about talk hardly we can that years those during and destabilizing significant wasso life political Nicaraguan onthe States) United placethe first the (in factors re democratization, its of moment the as regarded generally 331 330 329 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom 328 hegem semi intensifi government Sandinistas’ onthe pressures external the followed, - FSLN strong of ‘a as product Ortega’s victory portray to sought opposition, Nicaraguan the with administration. American the of influence political the of because primarily in Nicaragua occur subsequently not did democratization during the electoral process (Ibid). process electoral the during up hadopened that space political the of tightening aconsiderable led to in return, approved $27 million in aid to the counterrevolutionary movement (known as ‘contras’). of the vote. 1984elections, Ortega and his party madealmost identical results, winning respectively 66.9and 66.8 percent approval of another million$100 aidin tothe contras (Ibid). government daily
gime lasted in Nicaragua for a few years only. Moreover, the leverage of external external leverage of the aMoreover, years only. few for in Nicaragua lasted gime ing dur this imposed were period. opposition Moreover, political the on restrictions the leadingVarious anti The Sandinistas came to power in the 1979 revolution which put an end to the Somoza dictatorship. In the The U.S. Congress first introduced trade embargo to Nicaragua in May 1985 and then, a month later, tence of any political regime in the country. In relation to that, a number of of anumber that, to In relation country. in the regime political any of tence - See theSee last Freedom the in World country report (available at: authoritarian regime emerged in Nicaragua as the FSLN established FSLN established the as in Nicaragua emerged regime authoritarian In the aftermath of these elections, the U.S. officials, already U.S. officials, the elections, of these aftermath the In onic control of the state and much of the economy (2010: 140). Yet, because because Yet, 140). (2010: economy the of andmuch state the of control onic
arm tactics’ (Anderson and Dodd, 2002: 84). Throughout the years that that years the Throughout 84). 2002: andDodd, (Anderson tactics’ arm La Prensa La
(FSLN),
was shut down in June 1986 in response to its support of the U.S. Congress's 329
were already competitive enough and that genuine genuine and that enough competitive already were 331 - world/2013/nicara
During this period, Levitsky and Way argue, argue, Way and Levitsky period, this During 229
gua#.UzRiXKhdUlA 328
it turns out that a hybrid ahybrid that out turns it ). ).
working closely closely working ed, 330
which, which, - CEU eTD Collection
ribbean state’ (Hinds, 2005: 67). 2005: (Hinds, state’ Caribbean postcolonial authoritarian most ‘the represented Guyana in 1966, independent became British colony former this since polling fair and free first the be to considered generally elections, general competitive. aregime render necessarily not do elections of organization andregular opposition political legal of existence mere - (1968 period observed moment. that at controlled be to much not was there country, the in situation general the of 333 332 lack the of dueto regime hybrid beacase of to Guyana find not does thesis this categorization, andWay’s Levitsky the to contrast In non- FSLN’s the d by marke indeed elections and the political oppression carried out by the security forces. And while And while forces. security the by out carried oppression political the and elections rigged aseries of through maintained was regime the Guyanese party, ruling the period. this during regime political any of existence the influencing substantially factor external powerful the considering Moreover, regime. hybrid as categorized be cannot it refers, it which to time of period short the of because Nonetheless, 144 aid recipient in the region and, for a while, its leading recipient per capita given that its ruling party was (Ibid: Marxist threat’ (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 147). On this basis, authoritarian Guyana was the second big thousands of lives. of lives. thousands tension between two the political camps in Nicaragua escalated afull into reduced to a shamblesby the end of the 1980s (Vickers and Spence, 1992: 552). At the same time, growing the
As aconsequenceAs ofthe internationalization of its internal political conflict, the country’s economy was The PNC’s main political rival was the leftist People’s Progressive Party (PPP) regarded by the US as ‘a US as the by regarded (PPP) Party Progressive People’s leftist the was rival political main PNC’s The - 5). 5).
efeat of the People’s National Congress (PNC) in the 1992 1992 the in (PNC) Congress National People’s the of defeat the to Prior 5.1.3. was 1980s late in the development political Nicaraguan the To summarize, 332
Guyana
1992). As previously argued and demonstrated here, the here, anddemonstrated argued previously As 1992).
country’s political dynamics, it is hard to talk about the the ishard about it to talk dynamics, political country’s democratic (semi democratic 230
electoral competitiveness in the in the competitiveness electoral - - authoritarian) governance. governance. authoritarian) blown ci 333 vil war which took tens of tens took which vil war
Structured around around Structured gest U.S. U.S. gest CEU eTD Collection
democracies it many andhow itself for reserve would PNCthe parliament in the seats how many ‘was notes, Singh Chaitram election’, to election from later years five cent per and78.5 in 1980, cent per 77.7 in 1973, vote per this during held elections general consecutive 67). 2005: (Hinds, power’ from it removing of means constitutional and legal all closing while andliberties civil rights on trampled andwhich systematically was paramount, one- adefacto into Guyana transformed PNC ‘the effect, In 147). 2010: Way, and (Levitsky killed andoccasionally arrested, spied on, were activists their public meetings, for denied permits often were parties opposition 334 thesis this which, cases two with ends Way and Levitsky by identified democratizers regime hybrid ‘problematic’ of The list the before Thus, 73). (2008: PPP’ l regime. politica hybrid andnot authoritarian competi PNC’s the governance. of legitimacy popular of impression an to create merely served elections organized regularly Instead, domination. political party’s ruling the llenge cha to opportunity a genuine have not did opposition the 267), 1997: (Griffith, in Guyana’ politics democratic to authoritarian from transition in the
The PPP garnered 53.5 per cent of the vote; Winning 42.3 per cent, the PNC came second.
And indeed, the incumbent party scored landslide triumphs three in the triumphs landslide scored party incumbent the And indeed, 5.1.4. Therefore, in line with the argument about the necessary level of electoral electoral of level necessary the about argument the with in line Therefore, - pre regards thesis this tiveness, . The first one is Mali, another extremely weak and poor African state state African poor and weak extremely another Mali, oneis Thefirst .
Mali and Ukraine and Mali
1992 electoral victory 1992 electoral 231 democratic Guyana as an example of of anexample as Guyana democratic
argues iod party state over which the party party which the over state party
, winning 70.1 per cent of the of cent per 70.1 winning , still cannot be considered beconsidered cannot still , 334
symbolizing ‘a milestone ‘a milestone symbolizing
would concede to the to concede would .
‘What varied varied ‘What CEU eTD Collection (Moestrup, 1999: 175). 1999: (Moestrup, Itsnations. GDP per capita at stood $270, while literacy the rate ofadult population was only 28 per cent
abuse in 2008, Levitsky and Way scored Mali as a democracy. At the same time, in same time, the At ademocracy. as Mali scored and Way Levitsky 2008, in abuse power government major of reports of absence the and claims such of confirmation of the voter registry etc. (Ibid). Yet, g - pre resources, state of abuse government claiming outcome, electoral the challenged opposition the again, Once 299). 2010: authoritarian of signs in 2007, place took elections next time the by However, significantly. down scaled media the and opposition the against repression government the initially, inas, Mali democracy 200). 1998: (Myers, observers international andby opposition the Malian both by flawed as condemned - re was Konaré in May, which, by procedure the addition, In irregularities. serious by wasmarred 1997, April in held election, legislative second the first, the to contrary Moreover, 298). 2010: andWay, (Levitsky and editors journalists arresting occasionally media, independent attacked frequently government The new country. in this emerged subsequently that regime tic democra not hybrid, opening, political promising very Despite 1992. February in organized was Mali in election multiparty first the in 1968, coup military in a power to came which, 336 335 authoritarianism. after the of fall system political that thethat Malian transition from one and the decision of the rebellion leader Amadou Toumani Touré not torun for presidency, led many to believe triumphed in the second round ofthe presidential election. Their victory, the fact that theele landslide victory. Two months later, with 69 per cent of the vote, the party’s candidate Alpha Oumar Konaré
In 1993, measured bythe U Winning 48.8 per cent of the vote, an anti 335 the 2002 turnover in power could mark a new chance for for anew chance mark could in power the 2002 turnover that seemed It llowing a bloody rebellion against the dictatorship of Moussa Traoré who who Traoré Moussa of dictatorship the against a bloodyrebellion Following
unlike in many regards similar Benin, did not manage to establish a stable stable a establish to manage did not Benin, similar regards many in unlike
nited Nations Human Development Index, Mali was ranked no. 171 among 174
- party rule would have democratic conclusion. backsliding became apparent (Levitsky and Way, Way, and (Levitsky apparent became backsliding - governm 232 iven the lack of a credible international acredible international of lack iven the circulation of marked ballots, manipulation manipulation ballots, marked of circulation ent Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA) scored a
elected president was was president elected
ctions werections clean 336
it was a a was it CEU eTD Collection place in November 2013.
within ayear. elections new organize to required government, atransitional to power the transfer to agreed they Soon after, constitution. the andsuspending members government the detaining Touré, deposing acoup, staged officers army of 21, a group March On region. problematic the over control restore to inability the for blamed President, the against protests popular of wave a to led which rebels, the by killed were marginalized Tuareg minority from poorly the from minority Tuareg marginalized the representing fighters held, be was to election presidential next the before months afew 2012, January In 79). 2001: away(Smith, slip to Mali gainsin democratic country. in this collapse democratic of ahigh likelihood about warned they structures, post turbulent the view of 338 337 fai and free subsequent and the governance His democratic president. anew became Yushchenko Viktor streets, the into Ukrainians of thousands of hundreds which brought fraud electoral anattempted and 2005) McFaul, 2005; Kuzio, 2001; (Darden, rule democratic regime. In 2004, after a decade of Leonid Kuchma’s semi Kuchma’s Leonid of adecade after 2004, In regime. democratic criterion. longevity regime aforementioned the of importance analytic the proves certainly past political government. central the against a rebellion organized
After 1962 After The two rounds of presidential election were held in July and August 2013. The parliamentary election took - hard the for was it easy how showed period subsequent the indeed, And Similarly, Ukraine has not yet witnessed the establishment of a functional of afunctional establishment the yet witnessed not has Ukraine Similarly, t recen country’s the be, may Mali of future political whatever anutshell, In - 1964 and 1990 and 1964 338
- 1994, this was the third such rebellion in Mali (Keita, 1998). r elections, including the 2010 presidential balloting which balloting presidential 2010 the including elections, r - authoritarian development authoritarian
233 - controlled northern part of Mali of part northern controlled
and the chronically weak state state weak chronically the and 337
Malian of Dozens
- ritarianautho soldiers soldiers won won
CEU eTD Collection
introduced anew el of the Orange Revolution were reversed in the course of Yanukovych’s presidency. presidency. Yanukovych’s of course in the reversed were Revolution the Orange of achievements democratic the of much as unsubstantiated largely proved soon claims 2010 Way, and (Levitsky period this during democratized actually Ukraine that believe many made elite, political era - apro Yanukovych, Viktor power to brought 341 http://www.osce.org/odihr/98578 340 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom 339 2012: 1). lack of transparency of campaign and party financing, and the lack of balanced media coverage’ (OSCE/ODIHR, ‘characterized by the lack of a level playing field, caused primarily bythe abuse of administrative resources, characterized by a virtual absence ofeditorial autonomy on television’ (available at: Agreement with EU. the Demanding Yanukovych to proceed withthe deal, majority his of countrymen,not to initial apreviously arranged Association of his political ambition, the Ukrainian president decided, against the will of a November2013, likely because hesaw it as apotential obstacle to the realization judiciary,and the media, all intended to secure him re- eliminate political opponents and tighten his grip onthe Electoral Commission, the outspoken political rival. imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko, former minister prime andhis most any viable political opposition, which culminated with the Octob Subsequently, Yanukovych launched a systematic campaign aimed at eliminating annul the 2004 constitutional reform that hadreduced the presidential powers. Ukrainians’ civil political and rights, established tight media control,
The OSCE/ODIHR report on 2012 the parliamentary election thus notes ‘the that media environment i Under these circumstances, independent observers found the 2012 parliamentary electio See theSee last Freedom the in World country report (available at:
Establishing political control over the over control political Establishing Notwithstanding mounting international criticism, Yanukovych continued to ectoral law favoring his Party of the Regions (Ibid). 339 ).
In addition, his administration significantly reduced : 218). Nonetheless, like in the case of Mali, such such Mali, of case in the like Nonetheless, 218). : - world/2013/ukraine#.UxWNRuNdUlC 234 - Kuchma the of representative Russian
Constitutional Court enabled him to election in 2015. In ). ).
341
er 2011
340 n to be to n
and s CEU eTD Collection
in Ukraineis yet to take place. that followed the 2004Orange revolution, the establishment of dem early presidential and parliamentary election. thedead, pr centre of Kiev. Following abrutal police reaction, which leftdozens of people hundreds of thousands- of pro 342 pretext. political asimilar had Czechoslovakia of dissolution the Yugoslav, the than smoother much Albeit 92). (2010: mobilization’ nationalist ‘in emerged regime acont the andWay, noted Levitsky as by Here, Serbia. and in Croatia we find those resembles case regime hybrid this regards, many In 5.2. extreme positions’ (Ibid: 155). The national question, i.e. the constitutional place of placeof constitutional i.e. the question, Thenational 155). (Ibid: positions’ extreme take more to forces political other and‘pushed Czechoslovakia of future economic radicali groups nationalist other and (SNS) Party National Slovak the of existence the where Slovakia, in evident particularly This was 153). 1993: (Wolchik, reform andeconomic of constitutional tasks dominate to came issues ethnic complicated throughout the upcoming months.
isis cr political in UkraineThe has continued and, because of Russia’s open interference, significantly
arty Party In the aftermath of the 1989 collapse of the country’s communist regime, regime, communist country’s the of the 1989collapse of aftermath the In 5.2.1. In brief otesters requested Yanukovych’s resignation andthe organization of
Slovakia fates in democratized hybrid regimes , while certain democratic tendencies wereapparent in the years
its political agenda and significantly complicate the complicate significantly agenda and political its European Ukrainians once again occupied the
235 zed the debate about the political and and political the about debate the zed 342
ocratic regime regime ocratic ext of of ext CEU eTD Collection which many believed was organized by the Government
pressure on independent media, onindependent pressure constant well as as NationalTelevision the over control absolute institutions, its became thus federation, the within Slovakia 346 345 344 343 f standard. less or wasmore repertoire abuse power the incumbents’ years, following the Throughout Slovakia. in regime ahybrid of establishment the apparent, became soon it as and, 207) 1997: (Carpenter, populism’ nationalist of triumph ‘the marked election 1992 parliamentary June the in victory party’s the this regard, In 48). 1999: (Fish, Slovaks’ of nonethnic mistrust and’propagated "Slovak" all things ‘touted The HZDS ontoward party the and carry winds nationalist strong in s sails its positioned question national on the ‘language - pro open take did not it initially, Although, 207). 1997: (Carpenter, apparatchiks’ and former dissidents, nationalists, mix of eclectic an ‘by 1991 in March nded fou was it Union, Democratic Croatian the Akin to influential. most bethe to proved soon (HZDS) Slovakia aDemocratic for Movement 752). 2001: member and Meciar’s long and Meciar’s member fund was then taken over byanother fund owned by the father of intelligence chief Ivan Lexa,an HZDS the license of one of the country’s largest investment funds (which owned automobiles’ (Fish, 1999: 49). and the HZDS also triumphed in the 1994 parliamentary election. significantly higher co inancial resources, inancial
Carpenter reminds that, without offering explanation,an the Slovak government withdrew in March 1995 The exception this in regard relates tothe abduction 1995 ofason of Michal Kovac, Slovak the President Winning somewhat lower percentage of the vote than two years earlier (35vs. 37.2 per cent), yet The latter brought about ’mugging and menacing o
Among political organizations promoting Slovak national interests, the the interests, national Slovak promoting organizations political Among most serious political rival of the Prime Minister and the incumbent party leader, Vladimir Meciar, Vladimir leader, party incumbent the and Minister Prime the of rival political most serious 344 mpared to what three other most successful parties won together (30.7 per cent), the
It included, among other things, hollowing out political and legal legal and political out hollowing things, other among included, It 346 - time The Meciar government, friend. Carpenter to was notes, re ’able thus -
and persecution of political adversaries. adversaries. political of and persecution
345
politically 236 -
controlled security services (Capenter, 1997: 216). f critical journalists the and bombing of their
- most salient political issue (Haughton, (Haughton, issue political salient most motivated manipulation of the state the state of manipulation motivated independence stance, the party’s the party’s stance, independence power’ (Haughton, 2001: 751). 751). 2001: (Haughton, power’ an opposition newspaper, uch a way as to catch the the to away as uch catch
Sme appoint ). This This ).
343
CEU eTD Collection personalities, each with their own base their own with each personalities, potential rivals’potential (1999: 47-8). had slowmotion leaders full This andeliminate quit. Meciar enabled toassert control coup original oftheorganization’s most himself. Meciar 1994, By party to theloyalty exclusively by were tothe attracted whopeople of mass recruiting anew included Italso formativeyears. membersof nearly ofthemany capable all
(Levitsky and Way, 2010: 93). 2010: Way, and (Levitsky Meciar’ Vladimir of career political the to linked ‘clo was sely development former’s The power. political of the is personalization counterparts andSerbian Croatian its 348 347 and private organizations without any opposition, all while maintaining a high popularity rating’ (1997: 216). political Va colleague Czech his with government, headof Asthe 1992election. the following Minister Prime of position the to returned 1990s: the throughout development organizational HZDS’s the of trait significant most A party. his of institutionalization of process 269). 2003: (Haughton, enemies its as opponents hispolitical portray to sought Meciar nation, the Slovak of father the as g himself presentin And while agenda. hispolitical of the heart at remained andindependence identity national Slovak years, following the Throughout 1993. 1January on Divorce’ ‘Velvet republics’ the led to that negotiations character of thecharacter 1992
Emphasizing strengththe of link that Similarly, Deegan Similarly, supporters to key positions in the media, to financial institutions, as well as to a host of other public public other of host a to as well as institutions, financial to media, the in positions key to supporters Beside the nationalist background, what makes the Slovak regime so similar to to similar so Slovakregime makesthe what background, nationalist Beside the ‘Personalization oftheparty‘Personalization aprocess involved ofencouraging/forcing the departure the to detrimental proved hands Meciar’s in power of Theconcentration
- - 1998 regime in Slovakia. regime in Slovakia. 1998 Krause notes that ‘while HZDS initially possessed a fairly wide range of prominent of range wide fairly a possessed initially HZDS ‘while that notes Krause 348
s ofsupport, the sawparty a steady exodus of top , Stephen Fish (1999) coined the term ‘Meciarism’ to describe the 347
The founder and leader of the HZDS, Meciar Meciar HZDS, the of andleader The founder
237 who hadstaffed rankswho theorganization’s the in s noted by Fish, ‘personalization’ was the was the ‘personalization’ Fish, by noted s clav Klaus, he finalized the process of process the hefinalized Klaus, clav - level elites’ (2006: (2006: elites’ level
CEU eTD Collection
remained unclear’ (Lewis, 2000: 166). 2000: (Lewis, unclear’ remained identit andideological programme political ’its whereas its leader’, of dominance of Meciar of movement a than political more little into evolved HZDS the gradually Consequently, (I andmotivation’ loyalty of source analternative serve as or be judged, could which hisperformance against astandard constitute leader, the could constrain that content programmatic or genuine any ideological of bestripped ’had to party parliamentary election that marked the end of hybrid regime in Slovakia. in regime Slovakia. hybrid endof the marked that election parliamentary political Meciar’s model, our ‘de- party’s was the 349 theirposition’ (2012: 195) 88- its of eyes the party totally’ and ’decided everything’ (2001: 754).
In this regard,In Tim tha Haughton reminds 97). ‘New personalitiesemerged to fill thegap’, he writes, ‘but they depended heavily ofMeciar’s favors for h Table 14. Table HZDS, the of personalization with in hand hand went which process, Another HZDS’s of HZDS’s terms In (2010) Nohlen andStover Source: Election year Election is is -
party organization Meciar followers, the party followers, loyalists which ‘consistently acted to sustain the rule and political political and rule the sustain to acted ‘consistently which loyalists HZDS
Electoral performance (vote %) of Vladimir Meciar relative to relative Meciar %) Vladimir of (vote performance Electoral
ideologization’ (Ibid). If it was to be completely pers completely be wasto it If (Ibid). ideologization’
1998* political functioning and functioning political 27 -
before thus became synonymous with the with synonymous became thus organization lost power as a result of the 1998 1998 the of result a as power lost organization
t partythe officials wouldoften out point that Meciar ’controled 349 and after
; *Presidential elections *Presidential ; 238
1999 37.2 -
the hybrid regime collapse the regime hybrid
Table 14 in Table indicated as , 2002* 19.5 -
leader onalized, the the onalized, . In line with with line In 2004 32.7 bid: 47). 47). bid:
- ,
i n the
y
CEU eTD Collection election was marked by intimidation, irregularities and fraud, and irregularities intimidation, by marked was election The1994parliamentary 125). 2010: andWay, (Levitsky controlled tightly were media and private public both while harassed, regularly were activists opposition regime; communist the from inherited power of levers unreformed used government in1992. July government VMRO as (simplified Organi Revolutionary Macedonian Internal the coalition, ruling the in partaking Initially power. ex the around based republ Yugoslav former this in placein was already regime hybrid 1991, September in independence proclaimed Parliament its time the aninter of outbreak the by wasaffected and gradually unfolded country in this change democratic the as in Macedonia collapse regime hybrid of moment the identify to difficult ismuch more it Slovakia, of case the to Compared 351 file:///C:/Users/PC/Downloads/045_elect 350 president. Communist of League Yugoslav the of VMRO government administration and a number of other issues confronting the new republic’ (available at: present to form aquorum. The parliament failed toreform const the members sufficient were because not there parliamentary were sessions cancelled Often process. legislative (available at: uneasy one: ‘Frequent w
See Freedominthe World 1998report on Macedonia As noted in the 1998 International 1998 the in Crisis noted As Group report Macedonia, on first the coalition governing was an Following the first multiparty election, held in November 1990, a coalition acoalition 1990, in November held election, multiparty first the Following 5.2.2. The SD - ruling ruling the And while voting. of round second the boycott to DPMNE decided
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom
Macedonia S M
alkoutsby VRMO ruled Macedonia in a comparative authoritarian fashion. The The fashion. authoritarian acomparative in Macedonia ruled - - communist Social De Social communist DPMNE), which held most seats (38/120), left the dysfunctional dysfunctional the left (38/120), seats most held which DPMNE), zation zation 350
In January 1991, the SD 1991, January In –
ions_macedonia.pdf - Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity Unity National Macedonian for Party Democratic DPMNE and theethnic Albanian parliamentarians [...]hampered the 239 mocratic Union of Macedonia (SD of Union mocratic s, Kiro Gligorov was appointed interim interim appointed Gligorovwas Kiro s,
- ). ). world/1998/macedonia#.UxcrH
ic. ic. S
M itution, electoralitution, system, privatization,
head and former high official high official andformer head 351 - ethnic violence. By violence. ethnic
due to which the the which to due T9dUlA S ). ). M
) took took )
CEU eTD Collection
against parliament members, parliament against comprehensive state institutions’ reform. institutions’ state comprehensive r political and government the between wassigned Agreement) Framework (Ohrid deal peace 2001, August In anopenwarfare. to which led revolt, armed the against forcefully reacted The authorities forces. security state attacked the Army) Liberation (N group aparamilitary in Macedonia, minority Albanian of empowerment political demanding 2001, of beginning the At point. critical the reached Albanians and ethnic majority Macedonian between tensions Kosovo, in neighboring war of elections. 2001municipal andthe contest new incumbents the in wasapparent continuity Theregime government. a coalition formed subsequently parties, Albanian of abloc with and, elections 1998parliamentary October/November VMRO the vote, the of cent per Winning28.1 system. political its of character the change not did nonetheless, which, in power turnover first the saw Macedonia later, years Four vote. the of cent per 52.6 with race presidential in the triumphed Gligorov of (95/120), seats avast majority easilywon thus coalition http://www.ucd.ie/ibis/filestore/Ohrid%20Framework%20Agreement.pdf 353 352 - elite official the Notwithstanding Macedoni transformed which implementation, Agreement’s the securing and population the disarming (available at: epresentatives of the Albanian rebels, obliging the latter to lay weapons in return for for in return layweapons to latter the obliging rebels, Albanian the of epresentatives
The The See Freedominthe World 2001 countryreport full text of the Agreement is available at: at: is available ofAgreement the text full Subsequent to the change in government, which coin which government, in change the to Subsequent The 2001 conflict cast a political shadow over the coming years. coming years. the over apoliticalshadow cast conflict The 2001 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom - organized media bullying, politically motivated violence, even violence, motivated politically bullying, media organized a into a de facto international protectorate (Ibid: 127). (Ibid: protectorate international adefacto a into
352
- Macedonian level and wide-
240 - vote spread 353
- world/2001/macedonia#.UxhHFz9dUlA NATO troops were employed in in employed were troops NATO Albanian political cooperation, the the cooperation, political Albanian fraud in the 1999 presidential 1999presidential infraud the .
- DPMNE came first in the the in first came DPMNE cided with the outbreak outbreak the with cided
). ). ational ational
CEU eTD Collection Albanian agreement, agreement signatories
predominantly including pr including VMRO opposition won the by elections, parliamentary 2006 the alsofound observers International elections. municipal si reported parties opposition anddomestic OSCE/ODIHR both Unsurprisingly, (Ibid). period following the throughout continued sessions, parliament of boycotts opposition and judiciary, the of control political onjournalists, attacks corruption, sponsored irregularities (Gromes, 2009: 11 2009: - (Gromes, irregularities SDS government, non- government, in change another despite and, divided largely ethnically remained country 355 world/2004/macedonia#.Uxhm 354 (SDSM) party opposition biggest the in Macedonia, practice political earlier the aga inst Moreover, 128). 2010: andWay, (Levitsky areas problematic the in presence deemed unfair or fraudulent, thereby encouraging a large international a large encouraging thereby fraudulent, or unfair deemed - re by reacted government the however, s).region This Albanian time, in predominantly (mainly irregularities and violence by marked before, many like was, 2008, June in held elections, parliamentary next the of round first andthe frequent remained boycotts parliamentary change regime genuine of process anti government gnificant irregularities with the 2004 presidential contest and, in particular, the 2005 2005 inthe and, particular, contest the with 2004 presidential irregularities gnificant
All the reports are available at: As stated in the Freedom in the World 2004 country report - corruption, media and Ohrid Agreement andOhrid media corruption, M
Under the VRMO the Under back to power, took place in an environment of violence and serious serious and violence of environment an in place took power, to back
to
and recognized militias
the
e opposed
sections’ - two election violence, ballot stuffing, vote buying, theft of ballots, etc. of ballots, theft buying, vote stuffing, ballot violence, election
2001
remained of democratic.
Ohrid to those
much
it
(Gromes,
Accords
active, parties - - greater D9dUlA DPMNE government, through the adoption of a number of of a number of adoption the through DPMNE government, (available
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/fyrom
354 20 causing – calling
) which 09: . rights
The 2002 parliamentary 2002 The Throughout
15).
13). The problems such as the government the as such Theproblems 13). for
a had
of number
at: an
barely organizing electoral process wherever it was was it wherever process electoral organizing an
241 outright -
DPMNE, to be marked by serious flaws, flaws, serious by bemarked to DPMNE, in Macedonia began. Still, opposition opposition Still, began. Macedonia in the Albanian
of
averted
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom violent following
, ‘ - partition related constitutional reforms, the the reforms, constitutional related d uring
minority, a
incidents.
civil
the
years, of war
course election, which brought the the brought which election, the
ethnic
in
At . a country
the
the of number
the country
Macedonians same
into year,
of time,
Macedonia –
three
repudiated Albanian
- as observer observer
of
355 remained the
the
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2001
anti
and five the - - -
CEU eTD Collection coalition.
(345,850) in the first round of the 2009 presidential election. Ivanov Ivanov won the election. 2009presidential the of round first in the (345,850) cent 35per got Ivanov, Gjorge candidate, its comparison, By numbers). in absolute VM the In 2008, party. the for support popular of level ahigh indicate period the observed from results electoral VMRO the of organization power internal the about data qualitative solid obtain to difficult was it while And power. in asurvival as categorized is case in this outcome party the democratization, of process the initiated it above, noted VRMO Way’s M decadesof 15. Two Table leader. its as resigned even Šekerinska Radmila which to due defeat the accepted 356 andwell transparent, ‘competitive, as characterized were and elections democratic for standards international most met incumbents, the by won both (2011), balloting parliamentary and 9) (200 presidential following the elections, organized the previously contrast in Finally,
SD
1990 wins The coalition organized around the VRMO S
M
Source: Author’s table Author’s Source:
- In view of that, as demonstrated in demonstrated as that, of view In
assessment that Macedonia had democratized by 2008 (Ibid: 127). Asthe 127). 2008(Ibid: by democratized had Macedonia that assessment DPMNE had been in power since the 2006 election subsequent to which, as as which, to subsequent election 2006 the since power in been DPMNE had
independent Macedonia 1991
SD again 1994 wins wins S
M RO
acedonia’s post acedonia’s - turnover Hybrid regime DPMNE won almost 49 per cent of the vote (481,501 (481,501 vote of 49the cent per almost DPMNE won power) VMRO VMRO 1998 wins wins (1 in in P -
st administrated’ by international observers. international by administrated’ - eriod
DPMNE secured 64/120 seats, against 28 won by the SDSM
conflict Ethnic 2001 242 Table Table
- communist political t political communist turnover 1 power) SD 2002 wins wins 5 (2
in in , this thesis supports Levitsky and and Levitsky supports thesis this , S
nd M
turnover power) VMRO VMRO 2006 wins wins (3 in in
rd
Regime Regime change 2008 2006 -
ransition -
DPMNE, the the DPMNE,
Democracy Democracy elections
(2009, period 2011) 2008 Free Free and fair fair -
- 356 led led
CEU eTD Collection
claim that democratization in this country began with the 1986/7 liberal reform as a a as reform liberal 1986/7 the beganwith country in this democratization that claim Wong Joseph and Slater Dan contrast, In 317). (2010: 2000’ after only democratic and Way Levitsky change. democratic Taiwanese of moment the as election presidential this marked authors some rule, preceding KMT’s the of length the of in view likely Most in 2000. Chan, Lien candidate, presidential (Ibid). faction party over a nationalist Gruevski, Nikola integration. and NATO corruption, against fight andpoverty, unemployment reforms, economic priorities: success. 2006electoral party’s the vote. the of 438,138) (or cent per 39 winning VRMO the election, 2011parliamentary the In before. year run in the presidency http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/040803_macedonia_make_or_break.pdf 359 nikola?country=Macedonia http: 358 357 Kai Chiang and2000. 1986 between somewhere wasestablished in this country regime a democratic that conclude might one question, in e analysis th on Depending Taiwan. of case the in demonstrated convincingly most is studies democratization underlying disorder The conceptual - pro moderate,
See: The thesis takes the 2006 election as relevant since the country democratized in the following period. //www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/bs/infoCountryPage/setimes/resource_centre/bios/gruevski_ See moreSee the in International Crisis Group 2004 report on Macedonia (available at: At the same time, nationalist ideas did not serve as a mobilizing force behind behind force mobilizing a as serve not did ideas nationalist time, same the At Undisputedly, the Kuomintang (KMT) politically dominated Taiwan from its its from Taiwan dominated politically (KMT) Kuomintang the Undisputedly, 5.2.3. - shek
Taiwan reform - led elite’s 1949 arrival to the i to arrival 1949 led elite’s .
-
faction of the VMRO of faction ring fewer votes (453,616) than his party a party his than (453,616) votes fewer stillring but garne off 358
This should be attributed to the 2004 triumph of a of 2004triumph to the attributed This shouldbe 357
Instead, the party program listed the following following the listed program party the Instead, 243 - DPMNE, led by the current party head head party current the by led DPMNE,
sland until the electoral defeat of its its of defeat electoral the until sland 359
thus argue that ‘Taiwan was was ‘Taiwan that argue thus
- DPMNE triumphed again, again, DPMNE triumphed ). ).
CEU eTD Collection
real challenge to the ruling party’ (1996: 34). 34). (1996: ruling the party’ to challenge real which in first the and date to in Taiwan democratic most ‘the was election legislative 1995 the that wrote author same the later, years afew Interestingly, 76). (1992: system’ political Taiwan’s of democratization further to ‘contributed election 1992 the that notes Copper John Similarly, (1996:1141). consolidation’ democratic of stage the initiated which transition, regime Taiwan’s of course in the event watershed Hung- e th same At time, 725). for (2013: history country’s the in contested’ fully ‘first the Table Table (see election legislative 1992 the out pointing write, Wong and Slater register. parties opposition and lifted was law martial which of result 361 360 highes country’s the for polling transition. constitutional re defeating hardliners in the 1993 party congress, Lee [Teng - they do acknowledge significance of the political reforms put in place prior to the 1996 elections: ‘After reform as (Solinger, KMT 2001: 33).the Therefore, this thesis accepts the categorization of Taiwan before the aforesaid
Up to that point, tothat onlyUp two ’tiny, co Although, as previously mentioned, Levitsky and Way consider Taiwan to be democratic only after 2000, mao Tien and Yun- Tien and mao (previously, a certain number of delegates were appointed by the President) President) the by appointed were number delegates of acertain (previously, Taiwan in election legislative direct first *The (2001); al. et n Nohle Source: t political Taiwan’s during performance electoral KMT’s 16. Table However, most scholars consider the 1996 presidential election, the first direct direct first the election, presidential 1996 the consider scholars most However,
ransition de facto an factode ‘authoritarian one the Legislative Yuan 360 Number in ofseats 361
Election yearElection ‘Democratic transition in Taiwan was thus relatively smooth and stable’, andstable’, smooth relatively thus was Taiwan in transition ‘Democratic
form to establish direct presidential elections, which would be held in 1996. The government In addition, a number of Freedom House reports point out that ‘the ‘the that out point reports House Freedom of anumber addition, In
han Chu, this particular electoral competition was‘a competition electoral particular this Chu, han - opted, and totally inconsequential’ parties wereoutsideexist to allowed - 94/130 partyregime’ (Greene, 2007: 261). 1989 t political post, to be the final point of its political its political of be point final to post, the political t 244
95/162 1992* hui, the KMT president] pushed through a 1994
85/164 1995
were allowed to to allowed were there was a a was there 123/225 1998 1 6 ) as as ) CEU eTD Collection d, winningd, thir came 13 per cent. 1995, the DPP garnered 33.2 per cent of the vote; the New Party, Progressive Party – Party Progressive financial advantage [...] KMT, or allies. Inaddition, overlapping state, party, ties andbusiness gave theKMT ahuge the state, ofthe were newspapers the hands in radio stations,two and Taiwan’s leading
superiority over its rivals, the character of political game in Taiwan changed changed Taiwan in game political of character the rivals, its over superiority a co maintained party ruling the though even years, following regimes’: authoritarian few by achieved politics domestic over supremacy ‘a with 1990s the entered KMT the write, andWay Levitsky skewed, severely still field playing the With democratic. electi presidential 1996 March the by was consolidated state ademocratic to anauthoritarian from transition country’s 364 363 362 militarythe and state in KMT’s the presence eliminating formally by example, for party, and state to delink steps additional took also 263). 2009: (Greene, winning’ of chance little very challenger and gave regime, ahybrid into authoritarian from Taiwan of transformation the led to which competition electoral multiparty of introduction the notwithstanding 1990s, early the Throughout moment. change regime the as election political persec political oppositionleading Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) sought to portray KMT the as a‘party of corruption and opposition managed to make anoteworthy electoral appearance. The leading period subsequent tothe legislative 1989 election.1992, In for first the time after state the was the founded, million a year – ayear million ilities, and utilities, (2010:banking’ 315). granted contracts or oligopolistic concessions in sectors such transportation, as construction,
Available at: at: Available Pertaining electoral tothe competitivene For good reason then, in the violence The KMT’s tremendous resource advantages ‘made elections manifestly unfair unfair manifestly elections ‘made advantages resource tremendous The KMT’s ‘Media for access, example, was badly All three skewed: television mostnetworks, ution of opposition politicians’ (Copper, 1992: 73). http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/taiwan#.UzlN46iSwlA
DPP, won 31 per cent of the vote, while another 14 per cent belonged to independents. In were channeled into [...Inexchange,] local KMT KMTwere were channeled factions coffers - run universities, and it opened the door for new private television stations’ (2010: 316).
Much of party
- marred campaign for the 1992 legislative election, members of the ss criterion, this thesis considers Taiwan to be hybrid regime in the the regime in hybrid be to Taiwan considers thesis this ss criterion, -owned enterprises’ profits on’. 362 245
Accordingly, this thesis takes the 1996 the takes thesis this Accordingly,
363 created after a1993 split within KMT, the
the country remained non- remained country the .
–
opposition force, Democratic estimated at up to $500 nsiderable financial financial nsiderable 364
Yet, in the the in Yet,
CEU eTD Collection eliminate corruption and nullify influence’ political (1996: 1155-1156). system thejudicial young in have impartiality, toprotect reforms for sweeping judges pushed -minded ofindependent number 1992 alarge changes.undergone early more Since profound underground stations operated by DPP operatoraffiliated including moreand overradio stations, manynew a former dozen starting fromstarting 14
significantly curbed the KMT’s powers. KMT’s the curbed significantly corruption and reform business contract procedures, this law, in addition to the aforementioned reforms, characterized by ‘superior party discipline and organization’ (Chu and Diamond, andDiamond, (Chu andorganization’ discipline party ‘superior by characterized being while power, in decades the During 313). 2010: Way, and (Levitsky unfolded development organizational its which under conditions historical specific dueto party political institutionalized highly represented Kuomintang the as model theoretical our into fits it such, As power. in survival incumbent’s of acase as Taiwan in outcome change regime the despite 123/225 seats) cent of the per (46.4 vote; KMT won the by write: Tien andChu inclusionary’, was‘truly system government of aseries owing to substantially 366 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom 365 andfair. be to free considered generally were later years competitive, open, and fair elections’ (1999: 808). authoritarian that have emerged since the third wave of democratization began in 1974, only in Taiwan has the former impressivelypluralistic, open, and spirited one’, Chu and Diamond point out that ‘among some 60 democracies active duty nominated was tothe were offthedelegation taken list. timeAnd for thefirst in history, noits four life imprisonment for for bid imprisonment life in Taiwan banning companies connected with political parties from bidding for public contract
It should be mentioned that in May 1998, six months before the legislative election, a In this regard, while arguing that ‘Taiwan is now indisputably a democracy, and in many respects an ‘In the ‘In summer of1995,anew network television license wasawarded toa DPP As a result, the 1996 presidential election and the legislative balloting two two balloting legislative andthe election 1996presidential the As aresult, that had previously taken place. taken hadpreviously that ruling party held on to power (while maintaining its name and organization) through repeated th
Party Congress [held [held Congress Augustin 1993], -ranking high [military]all officers - riggers (Freedom in the World 1999 country report, available at:
Central Standing Committee [.]The judicial hadbranch -
world/1999/ta
and New Partyand New 246 366
This thesis therefore regards the party party the regards therefore thesis This - initiated reforms. The emerging party party The emerging reforms. initiated iwan#.UzWwLahdUlA
politicians, were licensedpoliticians, [.]Also, 365
The latter was decisively wasdecisively The latter ). Expected to reduce reduce to Expected ).
new law was enforced enforced was law new star general in general-star in s and designates designates s and - CEU eTD Collection nominated from (1989: 496). thefloor’ candidates who hadeither beenrecommended by the party's Committee Organization or elected, fromcongress thefloor, the Central Committee membersfrom li along in PartyJune through Congress 1988were selected acompetitive process. This electoral onbased the results of theprimary. Around of two-thirds thedelegates to the Thirteenth rank with openregistration,beginning a kind ofnon-binding primary of thepreferences reflecting Nomin nolonger is leadership. ation atop-down process, but proceeds from thebottom up, and party congress, even totheparty ofdelegates ofthe ticket, ontheKMT office for public should declare unequivocally that debate on the [independence] issue notproductive and issue is declare thatdebateonthe[independence] should unequivocally able aless making it partythe ruling and Copper thus notes: thus Copper Taiwan, in election legislative 1992 the of analysis his In issue. particular on this agenda to didaclear nothave em se party the 1990s, andearly 1980s late the during factionalization the increasing of because In fact, card. playing that by establishment regime hybrid the following domination political preserve to seek did not mainland opposition: political of legalization the after period the in visible particularly was in Taiwan party ruling the within institutionalization procedures’ democratic - in decision centralism and democratic KM the 816), 1999: - and-file members, andthe of selection candidates by anominating committee largely ‘Changes have‘Changes therules in beenmade governing ofcandidates theselection who run ‘The one-China or‘The two alsoChinas proved destructive for the KMT, clearly dividing - question national the although Finally, -
had traditionally loomed large on the Ta the on large loomed had traditionally
- intra vibrant procedures, formalized strictly T developed ] Perhaps the KMT theKMT performer campaign [.]Perhaps the during making. As noted by Cheng, the process of of process the Cheng, by Asnoted making. 247
the relationship with the Chinese Chinese the with relationship the iwanese political horizon, the KMT KMT the horizon, political iwanese party life, party st ofst CEU eTD Collection
country. country. in this established was regime hybrid the time the around Taiwan in mobilization tionalist ana witness did not we model, our by predicted andas words, other In ‘cross- Taiwan in issue political asalient as period this during emerged justice economic Party New unification - pro the between it placed that unification on position that Washington hol cannot beavoided. even that the , issue be or should resolved It Beijing might admit Taipei in 367 high- government’s forces, - (2000 term presidential democratic. less become or have more to appears it whenever given regime Otherwise longevity. regime c precise more of establishment the for need the demonstrates this of beginning the at As discussed in this country, in this regime hybrid endof the marked (PDSR) Democracy Social of hisParty and Iliescu of Thedefeat in Romania. change of democratic moment the as election general 1996 the identifies study present the contrast, In breakthrough. democratic another parliamentary election with 30.2 per cent. per 30.2 with election parliamentary pres
Winning 54.4 per cent of the vote, Emil Constantinescu triumphed over Iliescu in the second round of the idential election. the At same time, Constantinescu’s Romanian Democratic Convention won the cutting the existing cleavage on national identity’ (Tien and Chun, 1996: 1142). 1142). Chun, 1996: and (Tien identity’ on national cleavage existing the cutting Throughout the following years, the KMT maintained a moderate centrist centrist amoderate maintained KMT the years, following the Throughout Levitsky and Way thus argue that w that argue thus Way and Levitsky 5.2.4.
Romania Romania 367 ds theds key’ (1992: 77).
characterized by the widespread repression of the opposition opposition the of repression widespread the by characterized
- socio of anew cleavage ismore, 2009:What 262). (Greene, 2004)
level media control, politicization of electoral bodies and and bodies electoral of politicization control, media level , one could announce the establishment/collapse of a a of establishment/collapse the announce could one ,
Romania saw an authoritarian backlash followed by by followed backlash authoritarian an saw Romania
the chapter, 248 third Iliescu’s Ion of years afew just ithin case independence independence
Romania of riterion of the hybrid hybrid the of riterion most convincingly convincingly most - pro the and DPP
CEU eTD Collection te conclusion that the revolution in Romania had been hijacked by a Communist caba leadershipFront’s the and departure rapid from party the ofmost anti be anti be importantly, notwithstanding Front’s the official anti considered theconsidered most influential politician- ofpost regime wascrucial. Constructing himself animage ofthe “savior” ofthe he nation, been has the in personality participation whose 1989events andthe breakdown ofthecommunis
played in the process of political transition from one- from politicaltransition of process the played in have) to the he(claimed role of was this a result explains, Alina Sturzu extent, great Toa Iliescu. Ion president, country’s the of hands in the concentrated was Romania research the into fits party, its incument the within of loauthority structure personalized highly the Given adefeat. was case in this outcome party the that hence, and, in 1996 place rule return of the quasi of return differently Stated democr country’s the of worsening bemporary to ate out turned 103), saw as the post the saw as Way and Levitsky media private and onstate pressure political increased the of view free andfair free as sanctioned widely were contests electoral following andthe substantially changed Romania in competition electoral the of nature the Asaresult, 99). 2010: and Way, (Levitsky state old authoritarian the of elements other of mber nu a of persistence the 368 Iliescu Iliescu
In effect, even though he did not play a significant political role in the terminal phase of Causescu’s rule,
u and Kligman, 2001: 81). 2001: u andKligman, 1989’ (Tismanean in December - had close personal and family ties to high- reformist. addition In to This thesis therefore posits that the collapse of hybrid regime in Romania took took Romania in regime hybrid of collapse the that posits therefore This thesis ‘Iliescu was‘Iliescu the uncontested leader of the National Salvation Front
ational observers ational intern by - , - 2000 re
the return to power of Iliescu and his party ’was by no means the the nomeans by ’was party andhis Iliescu of power to return the - authoritarian model. Throughout the hybrid regime period, political power in in power political period, regime hybrid the Throughout model. the prominent the establishment of semi of establishment
regime that followed the collapse of Ceausescu's Ceausescu's of collapse the followed that regime
role of severalrole of high
(Pop level Communist circles (Pop circles Communist level - 249 communist rhetoric, much of its policies soon proved to communist Romania’ (2011: 316). - Eleches, 2008: 474). 474). 2008: Eleches, - authoritarianism in Romania (2010: (2010: in Romania authoritarianism party rule: rule: party - ranking former Communist officials in the the in officials Communist former ranking - communist dissidents, this led many to led many this dissidents, communist
- Eleches, 2008: 469). More l (Ibid). Therefore, what in in what Therefore,
ss of power power of ss atic record. record. atic 368 [FSN], a
t CEU eTD Collection
party’s during the hybrid regi hybrid the during party’s his to relative performance electoral his about besaid could The same leverage. political hispersonal of amount the demonstrates clearly elections, parliamentary Front anew one(Democratic created he chaired, party the left Iliescu Romania, in communism of collapse the after organized election multiparty first Front Salvation e National th after years two 1992, in that Thefact 144). 1997: (Shafir, balloting parliamentary the overshadowed period this during contest presidential is whythe which dominate, to executive the allowed which powers of separation clear of lack the as well as of governance system
- (Pop Transylvania’ in Hungarians of plans secessionist the through Romania of Yugoslavization to lead would victory ‘an opposition that warning even point populist ‘the play occasionally did Iliescu forces, political - (1992 term presidential second his During movement. anationalist of aresult as prominence political gain did not model’s the assumption, to contrary Iliescu, not. was leader its of rise g research the by predicted enerally , soon to be to soon , nd Stover (2010); *First round results round results *First (2010); Stover and Nohlen Source: party organizations’ r hybrid in party organizations’ . Electoral performance (vote %) of Ion Iliescu relative to his to relative Iliescu Ion %)of (vote performance Electoral 17. Table semi the by strengthened further was supremacy His political And while the hybrid regime incumbent party’s fate in Romania wasas in Romania fate party’s incumbent regime the Andhybrid while Party organization Party Election year Election Iliescu renamed PDSR) and still managed to win both presidential and and presidential both win to managed andstill PDSR) renamed
1996), arguably due to his party’s coalition with nationalistic nationalistic with coalition party’s his to due arguably 1996),
me period (see Table (see period me 1990 66.3 85.1 model, the ideational background for the political the political for background the ideational model, egime Romania Romania egime
250 1
7 won two thirds of the vote in the vote of the thirds won two ). 47.2*
1992 27.7 -
nationalist card’, at one at card’, nationalist
National Salvation Salvation National - 28.2* 1996 presidential presidential 21.5
CEU eTD Collection financial linkages to the world economy and its worst economic crisis in the 20 the in crisis economic and worst its world economy the to linkages financial Latin American countries followed suit, which resulted in the partial breakdown of the region’s trade and
314). 1993: (Tismaneanu, andpeasants workers industrial Romania’s among and phobias - transition upcoming the to catering thereby support, popular win to arguments economic mainly used Iliescu Instead, role. dominant playthe not did idea national the Romania, in regime hybrid of establishment very the preceded mobilizat political of the character of terms it Yet, 161). 2001: Eleches, 370 369 (Ibid). out wascarried voting, andmultiple stuffing ballot count manipulation, vote fraud, including amajor onlyafter but Salinas, Carlos PRI’s by won wasstill It 153). 2010: andWay, (Levitsky Mexican history recent in contest ntial preside meaningful first the importantly, more and, elections municipal at triumphs opposition of series exist. not did practically competition political elections, multiparty regular notwithstanding in which, system anauthoritarian represented country is th of time, most the Throughout in Mexico. (PRI) Party Revolutionary Institutional 71- the of end the 2000marked July held in election The general economic crisis challenged the incumbent party’s political hegemony, political party’s incumbent the challenged crisis economic Table (see vote the of cent per 20 than more win could lists characterized characterized hybrid regime a as i only case
In 1982, Mexican government announced that In line with the electoral competitiveness argument, this thesis therefore maintains that Mexico could be could Mexico that maintains therefore thesis this argument, competitiveness electoral the with line In
party or candidates presidential noopposition election, general 1988 Until the 5.2.5.
Mexico
n the subsequent period of the PRI’s governance.
it no would able longer be its foreign debt. tofinance Many 251 th
related fears, neur fears, related centur 1 8 ). year y (Cavarozzi,y 1992: 665). 369
- An early 1980s 1980s An early 370 long rule of the the of long rule
leading to a a to leading ion which which ion oses, oses,
CEU eTD Collection
Accord democratized Mexico and post and Mexico democratized Accord The 12). 2000: (Schedler, field’ playing electoral level the to ‘did much nt agreeme the media, andthe resources financial to access parties’ andequalizing influence, political of free authorities electoral making By Accord. National the named pact a reform of adoption 1996 the in which resulted talks multiparty initiated who 2000) - (1994 Zedillo Ernesto President its from came country this in change democratic Way argue (2010: 160). 160). (2010: argue Way North of process the in Mexico upon brought U.S. the from pressure democratizing a number of political reforms were put in place, largely as aresult as largely place, in put were reforms political of a number a competitive authoritarian regime (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 153). Yet, by mid by Yet, 153). 2010: and Way, (Levitsky regime authoritarian a competitive post the entered in aword, Mexico, finances. state the to access and control, media tight 121), 2004: (Eisenstadt, killings activists’ opposition of dozens including repression, fraud, of use the by ruling continued PRI
Atlantic Free Trade Agreement Free Atlantic Source: Nohlen (2005a); *In the 1976 election, PRI’s *Inthe 1976 election, Nohlen (2005a); Source: Pres 18. Table the only candidate only the PRI’s rule And while the opposition finally got at least an idea of political success, the politicalsuccess, anidea of least at got finally opposition the And while Best performing opposition opposition performing Best Election year Election candidate
ote %) during ote (v elections idential
1970 adoption. A decisive impetus to the process of of process the to impetus A decisive adoption. - 14 1996 elections were democratic, Levitsky and and Levitsky democratic, were 1996 elections 252
1976 0*
1982 16.4 ecades of of threedecades the last
Jos 1988 31.1 é - Cold War period as as period Cold War
Lopez Portillo Portillo Lopez
almost unlimited unlimited almost 1994 25.9
of intense intense of
- 1990s, 1990s, 2000 42.5
w the the as as
CEU eTD Collection
succession (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 152). 2010: and Way, (Levitsky succession andpresidential advancement career for procedures institutionalized with machine 5). (Ibid: dispute’ beyond and clear became now ‘it democracy, electoral an as qualified Mexico whether Deputies. Fox Vicente to lost Labastida Francisco candidate presidential PRI’s election, general historic aforementioned in the later, years Three 7). 2000: (Schedler, government’ divided chamber, lower in the majority lost but first came PRI the contest legislative 1997 the In population. country’s the of than ahalf more andcontrolled federalstates the of athird than won more opposition the change 374 373 372 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom at: (available government on the revenue advertising for stilldepended private, 371 Rank 46). 2008: al, et (Estevez government all levelsof for candidates nominate wayto the as andprimaries’ conventions ‘open toward moving politics’, party of decentralization on‘rapid embarked PRI the discipl a into evolved party the power, in decades the Over organization. political institutionalized ahighly represented research the by 224/500 seats in the Chamber. restricted were expressions civic and political corrupt, and politicized, weak, was system judicial the widespread, were institutionalization by preventing personalization of political power in in Mexico. power of political personalization by preventing institutionalization Action Party and Party of the Democratic Revolution –
Out of500seatsOut PRI total,the secured 239, seven two shortof the biggest opposition parties – Even in the late 1990s, as stated in the Freedom in the World 2001 country report, human rights violations Fox came first, winning 42.5 per cent of the vote. The Alliance won 38.2 (against PRI’s 36.9) and secured - six one only of limit The constitutional The party outc The party not, or democracy Establishing throughout rural Mexico, government critics were intimidated, while the media, albeit largely 373
, while the opposition Alliance for Change won the Chamber of of Chamber the won Change for Alliance opposition the while , And while the late 1990s were marked with a fierce debate about about debate afierce with marked were 1990s late the And while country’s political landscape. political country’s model. At the moment of the loss of incumbency, the PRI PRI the incumbency, of loss the of moment the At model. ome ( ome
redicted predicted generally than different was Mexico in defeat) 372 year presidential term certainly contributed to the ruling y’s part
‘inaugurating an unprecedented experiment with with experiment anunprecedented ‘inaugurating - world/2001/mexico#.Uxbnmz9dUlA 371 - patronage cohesive, ined,
the 1996 reform did by all means irreversi didall by means the 1996reform 253
combined. 374
- Before the end of the decade, the the decade, the of end the Before
and- Moreover, in the course of the 1990s, the 1990s, of course in the Moreover,
file and electorate hence became became hence electorate and file
).
based vote based
the National the - getting getting bly bly CEU eTD Collection
mandate in creating systems of government in which, in terms of the access to to access the of terms in which, in government of systems creating in mandate popular acquired previously would invest incumbents regimes, group of former long- of ( se valueper apolitical as perceived waspu party the that show period regime the hybrid from candidates’) presidential its to (relative results electoral PRI’s Besides, primary. presidential (Diaz nomination party’s for contending politicians of fate the in determining decisive increasingly competitive elections (post elections competitive in triumph leaders’ political their to subsequent either being into come regimes Hybrid 128). 2008: (Cheng, democracy - reforms economic to related no clearly defined ideology and therefore employed temporary projects projects temporary employed therefore and ideology defined no clearly had party the legacy’, revolutionary of protection was‘the goals proclaimed officially PRI’s of Although one establishment. regime timeof the the agendaaround populist nationalist of lack its with corresponds party dominant regime hybrid Mexico’s
candidates in hybridr in candidates 5.2.6. erformance p Electoral 19. Table On the other hand, as hypothesized by the model, institutionalization of the of institutionalization model, the by hypothesized as hand, other the On Source: Nohlen (2005a) Source: standing authoritarian political sy political authoritarian standing PRI’s presidential candidate presidential PRI’s
Peru Election year Election - Cayeros and Langston, 2005), as demonstrated in the open 1999 open1999 in the demonstrated as 2005), andLangston, Cayeros
PRI
- communist Europe) or as a result of gradual liberalization liberalization gradual of result a as or Europe) communist
egime Mexico Mexico egime
to legitimize political hegemony and evade ful evade and hegemony political legitimize to
Table stems (e.g. Ghana, Taiwan, Mexico). In the 254 (vote %) of the PRI and its presidential presidential andits PRI the of %) (vote 1 9 1988 50.7 ). 51
1994 48.7 50.2
2000 3 36.9 – 6.1
blically blically mostly mostly
- l CEU eTD Collection (1999: 80- Lima white, co been have to perceived [...] were parties cal politi Peru's of all 1980s, Peruvians. As a result, many Peruvians came to view the entire the view to came many Peruvians result, a As Peruvians.
converted Fujimori into a democratic dictator’ (Levitsky, 1999: 80- 1999: (Levitsky, dictator’ ademocratic into Fujimori converted Ca and (Levitsky it of wake cent in the 81per as coupmuch as the to before right cent 53per from soared the for president support public Thelevel of decision. Fujimori’s endorsed predominantly Peruvians Interestingly, 8). 2003: andCameron, (Levitsky cliques party by dominated democracy a‘false of rid getting was ) autogolpe as known (widely coup constitutional of aim this the In his words, powers. legislative its andassumed Congress the dissolved Fujimori Alberto president country’s ofI people. amajority of expectations political with correspond support. electoral the won hadinitially that democracy (more) of promise wastheir it however, hyper were they power, 376 375 regard it as a sort of ’political paradox’ (Weyland, 2000). Merely a month before the the before amonth Merely 2000). (Weyland, paradox’ ’political of asort as it regard to came experts country many that unexpected so was His success nt. ce per 62.4 winning second, in the margin impressive an with triumphed Fujimori vote), the of cent 32.6 per vs. of round in (29.1 first election the novelist, acclaimed internationally April/Jun the in victory Fujimori’s to relates regime hybrid of case the Peruvian of trait distinctive the democraticthe regime was also aproduct ofalonger socioeconomic problems in the early 1990s that literally brought the state to the brink climate of ungovernability that legitimated Hyperinflation, the violent advance of the Shining Path guerrillas, and
Moreover, until the end of his first term, Fujimori’s approval rating remained above 66 per cent (Ibid). Levitsky explains the referendum outcome in the following way following the in outcome referendum the explains Levitsky meron, 2003: 8). 2003: meron, In Peru, on the other hand, the establishment of hybrid regime seemed to to seemed regime hybrid of establishment the hand, other onthe Peru, In 81).
- based political elite was that increasingly oftouch out with day the
e 1990 presidential election. Coming closely behind Mario Vargas Llosa, Llosa, Vargas Mario behind closely Coming election. presidential e 1990 375
In massively backing the coup, ’Peruvians essentially essentially ’Peruvians coup, the backing massively In -
privileged relative to political op political to relative privileged –
if it did not did it if 255 - term t of crisis
precipitate
party system as an "oligarchic" political class’ class’ political "oligarchic" an as system party : – he Peruvian political class [. class political Peruvian he ‘
executive- Peru experienced massive political and political massive Peru experienced - the coup.Yet the erosion ofsupport for opted into an aging andpredominantly legislative deadlock created a created deadlock legislative ponents. Most often, Most ponents. - to- n April 1992, the the n April1992, day realities of most most of realities day 81). 376
Another Another ] By the late the late ] By of collapse. of collapse. ’
CEU eTD Collection
Fujimori (see Table Fujimori for support of onepercent than more no polls showed opinion public election, non- u Fujimori’s attribute to many came factors, all these view of In 343). (Ibid: generalities in cast was message and his him neglected had media the because issues on the positions his about much knew Few Peruvians platform. political widely known status, g hisunderdo of because and, defined aclearly without election the hewon that nforeseen political rise and, in particular, the popular support for his subsequent hissubsequent for support popular the particular, in and, rise political nforeseen democratic decisions to the culmination of a series of structural problems in Peru in problems structural of aseries of culmination the to decisions democratic What makes Fujimori’s initial political success even more interesting is the fact fact isthe interesting more even success initial political Fujimori’s makes What (1996) Source:Schmidt lections) e (1990 preferences presidential voters’ 20. Peruvian Table 20 ).
256
CEU eTD Collection ferred toferred a trans were government officials, state abuses by prosecute of powers t the l wel as asSupreme the Court and other judicial institutions were stacked with Fujimori was transformed avirtual into stamp, whereas rubber the nominally independent National of Board Elections while a regimeperiod, of number wereto critics forced leave legal to various Peru avoid The charges. Congress (2003: 1162). executive thereby office, of use his facilitating resources state for personal political gain’ power the in toconcentrate problems; ofgovernment hemanipulated theinstitutions “anti Peru’s poor,Peru’s particularly the unorganized masses; he made heavy of an use “anti
of neo- of case a‘prototypical represented Fujimori under Peru counterparts. its by unmatched 164- 2010: andWay, (Levitsky controlled tightly were media most whereas campaigns, networks, mafia created andnewly institutions state purged previously the by persecuted were opponents and massively regularly were liberties civil nutshell, a In chapter. this in analyzed cases most resembled breakdown 1992 democratic so collapse, politics party aforementioned the including 1980s, the endof the toward 378 377 party political aproper organize to bother did not heeven will, political president’s the collapse, ‘seemed headed toward full ordinary people. As the po movement known as the ‘Shining Path’ spread across the country, killing stateofficials, community leaders and while inflation rate the went from up around 20 tomore 60 per cent. than the At same time, brutal guerilla dropped by nearly a quarter, government spending declined from above 30to less than 20 per ce
Levitsky writes that many journalists were followed, harassed, and intimidate and harassed, were followed, many journalists writes that Levitsky cio Weyland thus reminds that, between February 1988 and May 1990, Peruvian Gross Domestic Product -political” that rhetoric lambasted the political class for causing n’sthe natio many 5). - economic downfall, guerillas’ insurgency etc. insurgency guerillas’ downfall, economic In many regards, hybrid regime established by Fujimori subsequent to the to subsequent Fujimori by established regime hybrid regards, many In entirely subordinated to subordinated entirely expected, as were, institutions state other And while ‘ populism’, Robert Barr argues and further explains: explains: Barrargues andfurther Robert populism’, He a [Fujimori] in ruled top-down, personalistic manner; to hemade appeals direct 378
Yet, the level of power personalization we find in this particular regime is regime particular in this we find personalization power level of the Yet, he he Fiscal de la Nación de la Fiscal lice and military counterinsurgency was ‘equally brutal’, Peru, adjacent to economic
state resources were massively used to finance his political political his finance to used massively were resources state
- scale civil war by the end of the decade’ (2000: 485). , another formally independent body authorized to investigate and 257 377
violated;
- controlled body (1999: 79-
the president’s political political president’s the d by death threats during this - loyalists. In addition, addition, In loyalists.
80). - system” or
nt of GDP, of nt CEU eTD Collection
weakness of the Peruvian regime and, regime Peruvian the of weakness country. in this regime the hybrid anendto put effectively partake, even not 2000did Peru the in which l elections, 2001genera andfair The free country. the flee andinternational, domestic both pressure enormous under and, elections call new to forced hewas was publicized, this once However, members. Congress the of bribery compens to sought Fujimori Subsequently, (52/120). seats of a majority win to failed election, legislative 2000 the before right created 2000’, ‘Peru list, party last his as costly very bepolitically to out turned This 163). 2010: andWay, (Levitsky tion’ organiza political ‘no real but parties four Table (see in power him keep to enough bestrong would elections, 1995general in the victory landslide Fujimori (Ibid), andterrorism’ hyperinflation of crises the acute from country the of ‘savior the as himself Regarding govern. help him to 379 the ultimate reason behind its breakdown. Expectedly, the party outcome in this in this outcome party the Expectedly, breakdown. its behind reason ultimate the
Fujimori was re was Fujimori
hi The unparalleled personalization of political power thus proved to be the major to bethe proved thus power political of personalization The unparalleled as many as 1990s the throughout founded he conviction, such to Pertinent to relative votes) million (in performance electoral Fujimori’s 21. Table Source: Nohlen (2005b) Source: Party rganizations’ s partyorganizations’ Election year Election Fujimori - organization elected President with 64.3 per cent of the vote.
1990 0,81 1,93 as g as
258 enerally predic enerally ate for this political setback through the the through setback this for political ate 379
that his personal political appeal appeal political his personal that 1995
2,19 4,64 believed, particularly after the the after particularly believed, 2 research the by ted 1
).
2000 4,18 5,52
model, model,
CEU eTD Collection under a hail of assassins' of a hail under
fit entirely into our model. model. our into entirely fit in post mobilization nationalist the of equivalent functional a as serve could America Latin of rest andthe Peru in mobilization – chapter this of section last in the elaborated as – we if Still, idea. national the of presence the form, any in witness, not did we 1992), - (1990 establishment regime’s the preceding mobilization political of the course pres Fujimori’s during organization(s) party incumbent institutionalized poorly of names changing the notwithstanding acollapse, was case particular 381 380 terms, earlier the during His rul 135). 2010: andWay, (Levitsky authoritarianism 1986. in May office presidential to the return and triumph electoral Balaguer’s Joaquin with bechanged to seemed this process of course positive A generally an end. to brought successfully thus was 1990) and Espinal, (Conaghan Republic Dominican post andcomplicated Long election. general count in this regime Hybrid 1970s, office. Two years later came acivil took he after year a less than was overthrown winner the but instance, for 1962, in were held elections Free democratic but incident were that Elections respected. be would the that results ensuring in was crucial pressure international transition occur as political power passed from one political party to another through elections, though opposition limited the democratic nature of the 1970 and 1974 elections. Only in 1978 did a d legitimacy of elections held in 1966 was clouded bythis intervention, and overt military pressure against the authoritarianism.
Balaguer had previously served as the President from 1960 to 1962 and from 1966 to 1978. Throughout the In wordsIn of Jonathan Hartlyn: ‘
380 channels of representation in Dominican Republic were seriously curtailed under civilian his under curtailed were seriously Republic in Dominican representation of channels Subsequent to his - to re Subsequent 5.2.7.
The The Catherine Conaghan andCatherine Conaghan Rosario Espinal write following the about character the of his rule: - prone followe
Dominican Republic Dominican bullets,the Dominican Republic has been moving, albeithaltingly, toward democracy. 381 Ever since May 1961, when Rafael Trujillo's 31-
- military uprising, follo uprising, military was characterized by manipulation and the use against against use the and manipulation by was characterized
ry collapsed in the aftermath of the 1994 fraudulent the 1994fraudulent of aftermath the in collapsed ry d in 1982d and 1986’ (1990: 92). election, the country slid back into competitive competitive into slid back country the election, 259
wed days later days wed U.S. bya The military intervention. - authoritarian political transition of transition political authoritarian - communist Europe, this case would would case this Europe, communist
e, albeit less repressive than than repressive less albeit e, opulist populist the that presumed year - old dictatorship ended idency. In the the In idency. emocratic
the -
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ignore his party structure’ (Hartlyn, 1990: 96). 1990: (Hartlyn, structure’ party his ignore ‘largely to was able Balaguer terms, five as long as for office the Holding president. powerful the by monopolized above, mentioned as was, power The political Table poorly performed (PRSC) Party Reformist his Christian Social this time, run did not Balaguer while structure of power within the PRSC, is in line with our theoretical model. model. theoretical our with isin line of PRSC, the within power structure – observers international by fair and free bedeemed to was collap sector) andbusiness church the (including network alliance hispolitical while abroad, from criticism fierce with Faced 91). 1994: (Hartlyn, internationally’ and domestically well- were fraud electoral of charges Thisthe time, 136). 2010: and Way, (Levitsky rolls voter the of 106). (Ibid: Dominicans of numbers large by believed allegations and irregularities by was marred president incumbent the by won narrowly election, 1990 the indeed, And 102). 1994: (Hartlyn, elections competitive fair and free fully hold to him not for incentives strong created hands in Balaguer’s power n of concentratio the addition, In Board. Elections Central andthe judiciary including state institutions, important most the of opponents political 382 hand- with consultations used Balaguer [.] forces paramilitary and agencies state of tactics repressive the by limited Government did officially not ban political parties the (with exception of Marxist organizations), party life was ’Although Balaguer did not close the Congress, it was completely subordinated to the executive. While the mass constituency’, tojoin him as aVice
Thus, for instance, Balaguer invited Carlos Troncoso, ‘a politically unknown businessman withoutties toany picked individuals to replace institutionalized decision institutionalized replace to individuals picked 2 Dominican aspects, many In What is more, the next general election was stolen via massive manipulation manipulation massive via stolen was election next general the ismore, What 2 ). Hence, the party outcome in this case is scored as a defeat and, given the given the and, defeat a as scored is case in this outcome party the Hence, ). sing, Balaguer was forced to leave the office. New presidential elections – elections New presidential office. the leave to wasforced Balaguer sing, documented and ‘the accuracy of the tally widely disbelieved, both both disbelieved, widely the tally of accuracy and‘the documented
two years later, in the first democratic balloting after 1986 (see (see 1986 after balloting democratic first in the later, years two - presidential candidate on the ticket for the 1986 election. Four years hybrid regime was patrimonial (Hartlyn, 1994). 1994). (Hartlyn, waspatrimonial regime hybrid 260 - making in the Dominican R the in Dominican making 382
The fact that, at the time the 1994 the 1994 time at the that, The fact
of fraud that were widely widely were that fraud of were called for 1996. And And 1996. for called were epublic’ (1990:562).
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did not by any means jeopardize his absolute political supremacy within the PRSC. withinthe supremacy political hisabsolute jeopardize means any by did not was86- he held, was election presidential contemporary 384 383 candidate for the same position (Ibid). later, onc previous onhis weigh ‘to in masses the invited Balaguer time, same the At vis autonomy p organizational develo to the failed PRSC departure, 2002 Balaguer’s following years in the particularly, and, in 1998 performances electoral its by demonstrated as Consequently, 134). 2010: Way, and (Levitsky andclientelism personalism of a mix around structured was party his capacity, organizational a solid with Albeit wing populist who wanted to impose modernizing capitalist revolution from above. from revolution capitalist modernizing impose to who wanted wing populist chara be hecould regard, this In industrialization. substitute import and urbanization, such modernization, as reforms andadvocating and progress, - broad ona embarked Balaguer power, to return the to Prior d’. colore be‘nationally to seem often, did not and, most matters - onsocio focused was mainly 1986elections the after (re)established seriously seriously
His slogan for the 1990 presidential election, ‘Balaguer: A Route without Danger’, seemed to be taken very See an excellent analysis of Balaguer’s political career at: at: career political of Balaguer’s analysis anexcellent See hairmanship partychairmanship Balaguer’s Source: Nohlen (2005b) Source: ote ote (v performance electoral PRSC’s 22. Table Finally, as in the case of Peru, political platform on which hybrid regime was was regime hybrid onwhich platform political Peru, of case in the as Finally, by the party officials. aan n mne vr smlr o lbdn ioei’, e hs ‘t h ls mnt’ h same the minute’ last the ‘at chose he Milošević’s, Slobodan to similar very manner a in again e PRSC’s result PRSC’s Election year Election - dominican - à - vis its founder and the historic leader. leader. historic andthe founder its vis - - politics
1986 41.6 and -
society/
1990 34.6 .
based populist mobilization, promising order order promising mobilization, populist based 261 years old and almost completely sightless sightless completely almost old and years 1994 39.1
http://sdonline.org/37/joaquin- 1998 16.8
2002 24.4 %) during and after andafter %)during
cterized as aright as cterized 2006 10.9 balaguer
economic economic 2010 1.5 - and 384 383
- -
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ere identify a high incidence of mass political protests which, albeit albeit which, protests political mass of incidence a high identify ere th onecan time, same the At settled. long been arule, as has, issue national the where America Latin region the of onto stretches Taiwan, beside and, domain empirical original study’s sa politically be to expected generally is issue national the model, research the of outline in the primarily on the post onthe primarily - regime their of alization institution of lack the though even mobilization nationalist of examples the regime. In Romania, In regime. the suffered suffered party dominant institutionalized its establishment, regime hybrid the of time the around in Mexico mobilization nationalist a witness not we did Although only partially. works mechanism model’s causal the cases, other four In collapse. regime the of in the face in office stayed agendas nationalist without parties ruling institutionalized Macedonia andTaiwan, In exist. to ceased of its leader, platform upon anationalist non- of example an find we Slovakia, In cases. these of three to applicable isentirely model our that suggest regimes hybrid in democratized outcomes party of analysis comparative in shown As 5.3. model. our into theoretical fit of post equivalent functional achievem statesman
C ruling parties resulted – resulted parties ruling In that rega that In omparative lessons omparative changing elections. changing elections. –
contrary to our expectations – expectations to our contrary lient. Yet, the universe of cases examined in this chapter exceeds the the exceeds chapter in this examined cases of universe the Yet, lient.
the table below table the institutionalized dominant party that lost power as the regime, built regime, the as lost power that party dominant institutionalized rd, one should bear in mind that the analytical focus of this study is is study this of focus the analytical that mind in oneshouldbear rd, - ents’ (Liberato, 2013: 82). If 82). 2013: (Liberato, ents’ communist political context in which, for the reasons mentioned mentioned the for reasons in which, context political communist
the - communist nationalist mobilization, this case would also also would case this mobilization, nationalist communist
Dom and thoroughly elaborated above, the results of the of results the above, elaborated thoroughly and
as anticipated – anticipated as
inican Republic, and Peru, we also do not find find not do we also and Peru, Republic, inican 262
a defeat in the elections that put an end to anendto put that elections in the defeat a
mobilization populist in the turnover in power after the the after in power turnover in the was
n as a a n as take CEU eTD Collection
defeat in defeat party dominant regime hybrid of cases the to applicable entirely become would it as post in mobilization nationalist the to equivalent a functional beconsidered might countries 2012). Loxton, the ledestablishment to frequently movements populist experience, political recent region’s the by Asdemonstrated 10). 2012: andKaltwasser, (Mudde ideology’ populist of morphology the ‘defining of process the influence andgreatly electorate mobilize ey th as important very thereby is leaders populist of Therole 18). 2001: (Weyland, people’ of numbers large from support uninstitutionalized mostly yet on massive rule their base leaders personalistic ‘when about comes populism principle, In 9). 2005: izza, (Pan society structured previously had that than those other along lines socialborders of redrawing radical the call They for 1998). Oxhorn 1991; Collier and 1982; Collier Conniff, 1978; (Germani, gr social heterogeneous very to appeal movements populist these default, By mobilization. nationalist post of processes the to resemblance agreat bear different, ideationally - ase the level of generalizabil level of the ase incre would This states. communist American in Latin mobilization populist the that argue onecould basis, this On the Dominican Republic and Peru. and Peru. Republic Dominican
oups and are organized around a strong, charismatic leader leader charismatic astrong, around organized are and oups 263
of hybrid regimes (Levitsky and (Levitsky regimes of hybrid i ty of our model our model of ty - communist communist CEU eTD Collection
the test to beused not therefore could above, elaborated as cases, These democratized. beconsidered cannot or regimes hybrid as qualify donot either Way and Levitsky The Macedonia generalizability of the model. of generalizability Romania Republic Slovakia Country Taiwan Mexico Dominican Peru Source: Author’s table; *Cases of populist mobilization mobilization of populist *Cases table; Author’s Source: r hybrid democratized in party outcomes explaining model the of applicability General 23. Table gime democratization listed by by listed democratization gime re hybrid of cases six hand, other the On
1992-2000 1986-1998 1988-2000 1990-1996 1989-1996 1990-2008 1992-1998 regime Hybrid period egimes mobilization Nationalist Nationalist
Yes No* No* No No No No
264
institutionalization Party Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Outcome Survival Survival Defeat Defeat Defeat Defeat Defeat Party
Applicability Model Yes Yes Yes No No No No
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some managed to stay in office nonetheless. in office stay to managed some reasons why most of these parties lost power at the moment of regime c regime of moment the at power lost parties these of most why reasons anything, if , much know donot currently we nce, As aconseque neglected. beenlargely have regimes hybrid in parties democratized dominant of fates diverging the time, the same At trajectories. developmental their for crucial as regimes hybrid on literature in the identified been have activity) opposition and power, incumbent influence, political (Western factors types of Three period. this during democratization – rulers authoritarian their of advantage political and survi consolidated regimes of these majority a while fact the i.e. fates, diverging their to given been has attention academic Particular acentury. of quarter last the in regimes rivals. wi them provide to were which manipulation of political mechanisms of avariety they invented systems, political ‘democratized’ (Sc uncertainty’ democratic of risk the running without legitimacy of electoral fruits the reap was‘to dream Their change. genuine regime the resisting in effect, while, game the of rules democratic adopted formally rulers authoritarian elections, etitive comp for andallowing parties opposition legalizing by America, andLatin Africa, Eurasia, post in the development political global the of trends - The world SUMMARY hedler, 2002: 37). With the aim of ensuring the continuity in power in the newly newly in inthe power continuity ensuring the of aim the With 37). 2002: hedler,
A flourishing body of literature has recognized the prevalence of hybrid hybrid of prevalence the recognized has literature of body A flourishing ved to date, a number of them – them of anumber date, to ved wide proliferation of hybrid regimes has been one of the most dominant dominant most the of one been has regimes hybrid of proliferation wide AND CONCLUS 265 IONS IONS
th a decisive advantage over advantage adecisive th
notwithstanding
underwent the process of of process the underwent - Cold War period. Across Across period. Cold War the aforementioned aforementioned the hange while hange
about the the about
political political
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b personalization by looking at the composition of party of composition the at looking by personalization power of level the assess to way an alternative identifies thesis the indicators, Because organization. party - (de to is related model institutionalization leader’s. its of irrespective influence political acquires organization party agiven which through process the to relates andforemost first institutionalization party context, political in this particular that, regularly regimes pluralized in recently parties political capacity, the power of irrespective that, demonstrates It of power. their structure internal onthe primarily concentrates thesis the strength, their nsion of dime relevant onlyanalytically the as organizations party of power of amount the to referring studies related most Unlike question. in outcomes of the determinant key the as institutionalization party about argument theoretical basis, that on and, parties) political and regimes investigation. under countries in the outcomes in power turnover of face the in survival regime hybrid cases of of anumber lists thereby It parties. ruling of their that with regimes hybrid of notion elide the to scholars interested of ency tend said above the behind reason A andSerbia). gro, Montene (Croatia, region Balkans Western in the this phenomenon, etw een the two, the thesis moves thesis the two, een the Accordingly, the first (internal) first the Accordingly, hybrid (on literature of bodies distinct two together brings it goal, To that Aiming to contribute to a better understanding of this unders this of understanding abetter to contribute to Aiming
serve as personal political tools of t of tools political personal as serve
thesis focuses on the three cases of democratized hybrid regimes regimes hybrid democratized of cases three onthe thesis focuses - andvice , of the inapplicability of the existing measurement measurement existing the of inapplicability the of academic neglect, it neglect, academic clear analytical distinction distinction analytical a clear making Thus versa.
to offer an explanation for the different party party different the for anexplanation offer to 266
)personalization of political power in the in the power political of )personalization heir leaders. The thesis therefore argues argues therefore Thethesis leaders. heir
element of the proposed party party proposed of the element
firstly puts forward an innovative innovative an forward puts ’s
points to the fallacious fallacious the to points leadership and central central and leadership tudied pol tudied s a potential potential a s itical itical
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non- – of creation the into legitimacy popular the ‘invested’ them of most elections, multiparty initial in the Triumphant regimes. the existing to averse programs national th to pointed thereby it leadership, oncharismatic literature the Building upon systems. crisis institutionally and ideologically the against mobilization - broad the for tool powerful anextraordinarily as question national behind dissimilar reasons the identify to sought thesis the validity, empirical its Beforetesting institutionalization). (party perceived ispublicly organization wayits andthe structured isinternally power way its the by isdetermined outcome) (party regime hybrid of collapse the power in survive period. time in anobserved results electoral their of juxtaposition the thesis proposes the systems), political newly pluralized in institutionalization - afore the with isin line (which leverage political personal leaders’ their against parties these of influence political of amount the Toassess performance. electoral parties’ dominant their by arule, as conditioned, for importance key of is This organization. The makeup. organs’ these of changes andconsiderable regular of means by authority their to submission assure i.e. discipline’, in ‘mainta to seek will heads party structure, power personalized with organizations in party that is argument The bodies. Focusing on the recent post recent on the Focusing personali power of levels diverging established regimes, party organizations they headed would be subordinated to their their to subordinated be would headed they organizations party regimes, established e frequent emergence of politically ambitious individuals that would advance would advance that individuals ambitious politically of emergence e frequent d second (external) second emocratic emocratic rty will will party ruling the whether following: the istherefore argument main Its –
highly personalized systems of governance. In the newly In of governance. systems highly personalized
element of the model refers to popular perception of the party party the of popular to perception refers model the of element - communist political experience, it recognized the recognized the it experience, political communist zation 267 of the dominant parties in hybrid regimes. regimes. in hybrid parties dominant the of
the perpetuation of hybrid regimes regimes hybrid of perpetuation the
tated basic assumption about party party about assumption basic stated patterns of power organization, power of patterns
- ridden communist communist ridden based political political based
still i.e. CEU eTD Collection
and of Croatia status economic and political the with discontent sense of the Yugoslavia, beexplained. couldnot outcomes observed which the oppression scale andthe policies, economic and origins parties’ (dominant and differences activity) opposition significant field, playing (unlevel similarities relevant theoretically crisis past, Yugoslav (common contextual of anumber to pointed thesis the addition, In power). in (survival – and institutionalization) party the and mobilization nationalist of e lack (th absent conditions of power of observed the and them between link causal the established (nat conditions tracing process the of principles fundamental the to Pursuant model. the of validity theoretical the corroborate strongly Montenegro and Serbia, Croatia, in regimes hybrid the and below outlined As establishment. regime the to leading mobilization political of process in the question national the of salience the by determined is institutionalization these parties’ (lack of) institutionalization; and second, (the lack of) lack (the andsecond, institutionalization; of) (lack parties’ these by determined are regimes in hybrid parties dominant of fates diverging the first, bec from prevented charisma, the leaders’ from benefiting initially albeit and, goals political personal Serbia developed among their intellectual and political elites. Suppressed by the by Suppressed elites. andpolitical intellectual their among developed Serbia Throughout the decades that followed the establishment of the socialist socialist of the establishment followedthe that decades the Throughout The model tested by the thesis is thus built upon the two main assumptions: assumptions: main two uponthe built thus is thesis the by tested The model ) in the former two cases. In the case of Montenegro, the thesis found the the found thesis the Montenegro, of case the In cases. two former the in )
thoroughly of the oppos the of ionalist mobilization and the lack of party institutionalization) and and institutionalization) party of lack andthe mobilization ionalist method, the thesis identified the presence of the hypothesized hypothesized the of presence the identified thesis the method, oming institutionalized.
- elaborated in the third chapter, the cases of party outcomes i outcomes party of the cases chapter, third in the elaborated ridden development ridden ition forces ition
as therefore expected – expected therefore as tween these cases, with the reference to to reference the with cases, these between ) 268
, international isolation, etc.) as as well etc.) isolation, international ,
the different party outcome outcome party different the party
outcome (the loss loss (the outcome
their their n
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of the 1980s Yugoslavia descended into the crisis, the national program national the crisis, the into descended Yugoslavia 1980s the of course the in When unaddressed. remained identity national Montenegrin developed under the of issue sensitive potentially hand, other the On sentiment. Yugoslav socio Yugoslavia part favored most and economically politically However, ) aforementioned the Serb of change. regime moment the at power of loss their to led which incumbency, of years the during institutionalize to failed parties two the capacities, power significant notwithstanding consequence, reflect clearly better, much performed in w period, in this organized Theelections ambitions. political their of realization the for belts transmission mere into transformed were Union) Democratic Croatian andthe Serbia of Party Socialist (the organizations party their time, same the At them. by monopolized - decision the which in regimes political hybrid established basi the needed’ ’desperately the as on Subsequently, respectively. Croatia and Serbia in interests national of protectors themselves imposing in succeeded Tuđman and Milošević uncertainty, and crisis political of atmosphere the In quo. status political t against mobilization popular for platforms the into death, his after years in the turned, narratives nationalist resultant the presidency, Tito’s during authorities federal - - dominated government dominated economic progress while its political elite and public and elite political its while progress economic In Montenegro, beca Montenegro, In s of the electoral support for national the for electoralsupport the of s following the endof the following . As a result, Montenegro witnessed a few decades of the unprecedented the unprecedented of decades afew witnessed Montenegro Asa . result,
existed
use of the extremely negative political treat political negative extremely the of use dissatisfaction political of , the sense general
hich compared to the the SPS to and compared hich the throughout
nd World War World nd Seco the 269 ed the structure of their power. Asa of their power. structure ed the period -
patriotic strategy, the two leaders two the leaders strategy, patriotic the of of the Yugoslav the of ,
became small state the newly created grew a very strong pro strong a very grew making power was was power making HDZ their leaders leaders HDZ their ment ment
( similar to to similar similar to similar kingdom socialist socialist by
the the he he - - .
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t communist states, the in post mobilization nationalist the of equivalent afunctional as taken was America the however, If, partially. only works mechanism Repub Macedonia, the model found It regimes. hybrid democratized of cases in other outcomes party the for mechanism causal the as empirical study and Way’s 2010Levitsky the Using model. research of the generalizability level of the identify Montenegro. in change regime the power in survive to managed party the institutionalized, enjoyed continuity party’s the secure to dulyemployed was regime hybrid founded subsequently in the manipulation of The menu whole interests. political established its highest the come, to years the In party. ruling Montenegro’s of ranks top the within distributed the decision Instead, influence. political personal gainmuch as to able wastherefore 1989 in January power to came that leadership political new its of / – Croatia and Serbia in those 1991 O h - Tuđman n the other hand, it hand, other n the e thesis to to l Finally, in line with the theory the with line in Finally, ic,
in line with with line in strictly acted Socialists of Party Democratic the of representatives 2006
like charismatic leader – leader charismatic like somewhat greater popular support than its president. Successfully Successfully president. its than support popular greater somewhat
in power. Measured by the electoral results from this period, the DPS even even DPS period,the this from results electoral the by Measured power. in and find
and – s
Peru) to be a case of a case be to Benin Taiwan) the to due largely ,
argues argues latter –
categorized . In four other cases other four In . two of these cases would fit would cases these of two that
and, hence, the room for emergence of a Milošević a of emergence for room the hence, and, direct
entirely applicable to three of of them to three applicable entirely
framework, it tested the relevance of the observed observed the of the relevance it tested framework, the did not exist in Montenegro. None of the members members the of None in Montenegro. exist not did
d by Levitsky and Levitsky by - two cases from the Levitsky and Way’s list of of list andWay’s Levitsky the casestwo from centric orientation, the thesis also sought to to sought also thesis the orientation, centric transition emocratic 270 empirical diversity, the underlying causal causal the underlying diversity, empirical
(Romania, Mexico, (Romania, populist mobilization in Latin Latin in mobilization populist Way
into from authoritarian regime. authoritarian from
as the model. the
a
- regime hybrid making power was power making
the
, Furthermore
Dominican Dominican (Slovakia, (Slovakia, from - -
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yet ( ly legitimate ly political leave previously its anticipate possibly, that transition democratic generalizability. and, place three another democratizers regime hybrid thesis Ghana and Ghana
. In addition, In . findings findings
these focus the And while could
s regime alongside therefore help therefore might also might Nicaragua) of these regimes could not could regimes these of
the boundaries of science, led by the idea of the led by science, of boundaries the thesis thesis are still found still are
system system their
during the post the during Benin,
holds
future politicaldevelopment. future be
or were not electorally competitive enough competitive electorally not were or of the present study present the of us of governance
(Mali and (Mali of
could therefore not therefore could better that, either because they did not last long enough last did not they either because that,
practical
in a in
understand - significant be acknowledged should it period, War Cold
Ukraine) 271
of relevance be
our qualified as hybrid regimes in regimes hybrid as qualified
is on is
number of countries worldwide. countries of number not be not can time their
be used for testing the model’s model’s the testing for used be
hybrid regimes hybrid .
, provided current
When the lat the When
democratized considered
political dynamics democracy , course of
ter isconcerned, ter which underwent which
the as (Guyana)
that we we that the first
and, and, T only his his ,
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Amundsen, I. (1997) I. Amundsen, (1963) Verba andSidney A. G. Almond, Anderson, L. and Lawrence C. Dodd (2002) C. andLawrence L. Anderson, Andrijašević, M. Ž. and Rastoder, Š. (2006) Š. Rastoder, and Ž. M. Andrijašević, (2008) M. Alexander, nrjvć M (1990) M. Andrejević, (2001) Collier andDavid R. Adcock, Banac, I. (1988) I. Banac, (1992) D. Abdulai, R Barr, R. (2003) R. Barr, Beissinger, M. R. (2002) R. M. Beissinger, (2008) Stroh andAlexander M. Basedau, (2007) M. Basedau, Beach, D. and Brus Pederesen (2012) Pederesen andBrus D. Beach, EFERENCES pp. 928- pp. Tromso. , University PhD dissertation in Africa’, of Democracy Struggle for in the in FiveNations Democracy Europe’ Southeast from 2001’, 2001’, , Podgorica: Montenegro Diaspora Center. Diaspora Montenegro Podgorica: , 2003 Times to 529- 3, pp. No. 95, Vol. , Review Qualitati Europe, Europe, Today Africa Order’, New Constitutional Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. University NY: Cornell Ithaca, Toledo’, Toledo’, State Guid Studies. Area and Global Parties’, Political 28African to Applied Instrument Research A New Countries: Developing Africa in Elections and Parties Political Violence: and Money, Votes, (eds.) al. et Basedau elines , Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Press. University Cambridge UK: Cambridge, , Journal of Democracy of Journal
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