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Montenegro, Serbia and the European Union STILL BUYING TIME: MONTENEGRO, SERBIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 7 May 2002 Balkans Report No. 129 Podgorica/Belgrade/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................1 II. MONTENEGRO’S REFERENDUM DEBATE .............................................................................3 A. INTERNATIONAL OPINIONS ..........................................................................................................4 B. CONSENSUS EMERGES .................................................................................................................4 C. CONSENSUS ABORTED .................................................................................................................6 III. SOLANA'S APPROACH ..................................................................................................................7 A. ADAPTING TO REALITY ...............................................................................................................9 IV. THE 14 MARCH AGREEMENT...................................................................................................11 A. REACTIONS ................................................................................................................................12 B. MAKING IT WORK .....................................................................................................................13 V. WIDER POLITICAL DYNAMICS ...............................................................................................15 VII. CONCLUSION: THE EUROPEAN UNION AT CROSS PURPOSES? ...................................17 APPENDICES A. THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES IN MONTENEGRO ......................................................................19 B. PARTY STANDINGS ....................................................................................................................20 C. MAP OF FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (FRY) .........................................................21 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ..............................................................................22 E. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS........................................................................................23 F. ICG BOARD MEMBERS..............................................................................................................27 ICG Balkans Report N° 129 7 May 2002 STILL BUYING TIME: MONTENEGRO, SERBIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS On 14 March 2002 the leaders of Serbia, satisfied very few in either republic. Pro- Montenegro and the Federal Republic of independence Montenegrins were resentful at the Yugoslavia (FRY) signed an agreement in intense pressure to head off a referendum, while Belgrade to replace FRY with a new “state many in Serbia believed that Solana had yielded community”: a “union of states” to be called crucially to Djukanovic on substance. “Serbia and Montenegro”. That said, Solana’s agreement is significantly If the agreement can be implemented, it will redeemed by its pragmatism. While the establish a loose association in which the two Montenegrins did not get their early referendum, “member-states” enjoy virtually all the the envisaged union will conform much more prerogatives of independence except those that closely to Montenegro’s negotiating platforms than depend on international personality (e.g. UN to Belgrade’s proposals since January 2001. There membership). The republics will control their will be no roll-back of either republic’s economic borders – including customs – and become fully reforms to date. The three-year moratorium on responsible for their economies and internal independence should assist serious dialogue among security. The union will depend on the republics to the parties in Montenegro, where voters are split fund its institutions: an assembly, president, almost down the middle over independence. council of ministers, court, and the armed forces. Another likely achievement is that the federal (Yugoslav) military’s room for making political This agreement was the direct outcome of the mischief should be considerably reduced as the European Union’s determination to block federal budget dwindles, the republics insist on Montenegrin separatism and keep the two greater civilian control over the armed forces, and republics together. Before EU High Representative border control duties pass to the republics. Javier Solana intervened last November, the two republics were close to approving a Montenegrin Since 14 March, the governments have begun to referendum on independence. By cajoling address the range of practical issues raised by the Montenegro’s and Serbia’s leaders, and warning agreement, on the apparent assumption that Serbia the former of negative consequences if they and Montenegro will act as semi-independent pursued independence, Solana pushed them to states. The immediate challenge is for them to preserve some sort of federal union. agree on the detailed content of their new union. This will not be easy. The timetable given in the The 14 March agreement, however, falls short of agreement to establish the union is unlikely to be the EU’s original ambition, neither securing a fulfilled. None of the three parliaments can be federal state nor closing the debate on counted upon to adopt a Constitutional Charter by Montenegro’s status. It is provisional (either party the required majority. Although both of the can review the arrangement after three years), republic parliaments have approved the Solana ambivalent, and very incomplete; and its terms plan, the federal parliament has yet to do so, due to Still Buying Time : Montenegro, Serbia and the European Union ICG Balkans Report N° 129, 7 May 2002 Page ii wrangling between pro-republic and pro-federal RECOMMENDATIONS forces. TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: In short, the 14 March agreement may not be implementable even with good faith efforts in both 1. The European Union (EU) should be ready republics, and certainly will not be so without to accept whatever solutions Serbia and continuing EU pressure. Moreover, even if a new Montenegro can agree upon for their future union does take shape, it may not prove to be relationship, in line with the 14 March durable. Especially as the Serbian government agreement, including the possibility of takes over federal competencies, the trend of eventual separation. It should not seek to political and public opinion in both republics may impose solutions. create a momentum of disaggregation that carries the two republics beyond the union and towards 2. Member states and organs of the EU should formal separation, even within the agreed three- cease to insist on rebuilding the year limit. Already, since 14 March, the question competencies of the Federal Republic of of Serbian independence has become a mainstream Yugoslavia (FRY), which have largely been political issue for the first time. taken over the republics – a process that the 14 March 2002 agreement effectively ratifies Should this occur, the international community and practically encourages. must stand ready to reopen the agreement; it should not be seen as an end in itself but only a 3. The EU should be ready to provide impartial means to an end – a stable, sustainable solution, technical assistance to Serbia and based on democratic legitimacy. The EU should Montenegro on the practical issues that need stop trying to decide on behalf of the republics to be resolved whatever the form of their themselves what their relationship should be. It is ultimate relationship. simply not critical for the future stability of either entity or the wider Balkans region that a union of 4. In applying the Stabilisation and Association some kind between Serbia and Montenegro be process (SAp) to the FRY, or its successor maintained. The reality is that the Stabilisation and “Serbia and Montenegro”, the EU should Association process will be implemented through ensure that Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro the three entities that currently make up the FRY – are all three properly included. Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. It would be rash for the EU to rush into signing a Stabilisation and 5. The EU should not sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement purely to shore up the new Association Agreement (SAA) with the “union” structures and bind the union together FRY, or its successor “Serbia and before the questions of Montenegro’s and Montenegro”, before the status of all of its Kosovo’s status have been resolved. entities has been resolved. Rather, the EU should use the new agreement by TO SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO: helping Serbia and Montenegro to stable, sustainable solution, based on democratic 6. Serbia and Montenegro should now legitimacy. Only if it serves this purpose will concentrate on resolving the concrete issues Javier Solana’s intervention have bought time to involved in their future relationship, within good effect. the framework of the 14 March agreement, irrespective of what eventual form that relationship might take. 7. Delegates to the Constitutional Commission envisaged in the 14 March agreement should work constructively to agree a constitutional model for the new union in line with the agreement. Podgorica/Belgrade/Brussels, 7 May 2002 ICG Balkans Report N° 129 7 May 2002 STILL BUYING TIME: MONTENEGRO, SERBIA AND
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