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16. Dnevi Varstvoslovja | Ljubljana, 11. Junij 2015 Zbornik Prispevkov Univetza V Mariboru, Fakulteta Za Varnostne Vede 11

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16. Dnevi Varstvoslovja | Ljubljana, 11. Junij 2015 Zbornik Prispevkov Univetza V Mariboru, Fakulteta Za Varnostne Vede 11 DNEVI 2015 VARSTVOSLOVJA 16. 16. DNEVI VARSTVOSLOVJA | LJUBLJANA, 11. JUNIJ 2015 ZBORNIK PRISPEVKOV UNIVETZA V MARIBORU, FAKULTETA ZA VARNOSTNE VEDE 11. JUNIJ 2015 16. SLOVENSKI DNEVI VARSTVOSLOVJA Zbornik prispevkov Izdajatelj Univerza v Mariboru, Fakulteta za varnostne vede Kotnikova 8, Ljubljana Uredniki Benjamin Flander, Igor Areh in Maja Modic CIP - Kataložni zapis o publikaciji Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica, Ljubljana 351.74(063)(082) SLOVENSKI dnevi varstvoslovja (16 ; 2015 ; Ljubljana) Zbornik prispevkov [Elektronski vir] / 16. slovenski dnevi varstvoslovja, Ljubljana, 11. junij 2015 ; uredniki Benjamin Flander, Igor Areh in Maja Modic. - El. knjiga. - Ljubljana : Fakulteta za varnostne vede, 2016 Način dostopa (URL): http://www.fvv.um.si/knjigarna/eknjige/pdf/DV2015-Zbornik.pdf ISBN 978-961-6821-52-0 (pdf) 1. Flander, Benjamin 282970880 2 16. DNEVI VARSTVOSLOVJA ZBORNIK PRISPEVKOV KAZALO 5 SIMBOLI NEONACISTIČNIH GIBANJ Miha Blažič in Izidor Nemec 29 SOSEDSKA (PO)MOČ PRI GRADNJI OBJEKTA V LASTNI REŽIJI – (NE)LEGALNA GOSPODARSKA DEJAVNOST? Zoran Cunk, Mojca Klemenčič 43 DINAMIKA TERORISTIČNIH NAPADOV V KENIJI Nenad Donau 64 NASILJE V DRUŽINI IN NUJNOST USKLAJENEGA DELOVANJA PRISTOJNIH INSTITUCIJ Adil Huselja 79 ORGANIZACIJSKA KULTURA POLICIJE Adil Huselja 91 ZAVEDANJE O VPLIVU STRESA NA POČUTJE IN ZDRAVJE TER SEZNANJENOST S SISTEMSKIMI UKREPI POLICIJE IN SINDIKATA POLICISTOV SLOVENIJE NA PSIHOSOCIALNEM PODROČJU DELA Adil Huselja, Jelka Smrekar 109 UMETNINE IN VARNOST - KAKO PREPREČITI KAZNIVA DEJANJA ZOPER UMETNINE Saša Kuhar 117 UČINKI USPOSABLJANJA POLICISTOV S PODROČJA INTEGRITETE Simon Slokan, Robert Šumi 124 KDO NADZIRA NADZORNIKE KOMISIJE ZA PREPREČEVANJE KORUPCIJE David Smolej 132 MAŠČEVANJE, ODPUŠČANJE ALI SPRAVA – REAGIRANJE NA ZAZNANO KRIVICO NA DELOVNEM MESTU Monika Šajt, Branko Lobnikar 145 MIGRACIJE I PROTUZAKONITO ULAŽENJE, KRETANJE I BORAVAK U REPUBLICI HRVATSKOJ Marijan Šuperina, Joso Vuksan, Damir Šneperger 3 UNIVETZA V MARIBORU, FAKULTETA ZA VARNOSTNE VEDE 11. JUNIJ 2015 163 ANALIZA KRŠITEV ZAKONA O VARSTVU JAVNEGA REDA IN MIRU NA OBMOČJU POLICIJSKE UPRAVE KOPER MED LETI 2009 IN 2013 Mirko Vavpotič 176 ANONIMNOST NA INTERNETU IN UPORABA TOR-A Anže Zaletel, Igor Bernik 185 DOVZETNOST SLOVENSKIH PODJETIJ ZA NAPADE S POMOČJO SOCIALNEGA INŽENIRINGA Klemen Zupan, Filip Božič, Žiga Primc 4 16. DNEVI VARSTVOSLOVJA ZBORNIK PRISPEVKOV SIMBOLI NEONACISTIČNIH GIBANJ Miha Blažič in Izidor Nemec Namen prispevka V prispevku bomo prikazali simbole neonacističnih gibanj. Simboli razmeroma veliko povedo o neonaci- stičnih gibanjih ter skupinah in na ta način prispevajo k razumevanju samih neonacistov in ne nazadnje k večji varnosti družbe. Metode Ker gre za teoretičen prispevek bomo uporabili metodo analize že obstoječe literature o simbolih neonaci- stov ter slikovno analizo simbolov, ki jih uporabljajo omenjena gibanja in skupine. Ugotovitve Dandanes se na spletu pojavlja vedno več gibanj, skupin, političnih strank, ki z delovanjem, predstavitvijo svojih aktivnosti ter uporabo in prikazom različnih simbolov, vzbujajo negotovost in strah pri ljudeh, prav tako pa predstavljajo določen zaprt del družbe, do katerega je tako rekoč nemogoče pristopiti. To otežuje delo subjektov nacionalno-varnostnega sistema, še zlasti policije. Izvirnost/pomembnost prispevka Prispevek je pomemben, saj se v zadnjem času predvsem na spletnih straneh pojavlja vedno več skupin in njihovih simbolov, o katerih nekateri še ne vedo veliko. Prispevek je namenjen policistom in ostalim, ki se vsakodnevno srečujejo s pojavom različnih že omejenih gibanj, skupin itd.. V prihodnosti načrtujemo tudi izdelavo izvirne brošure o simbolih, ki jih ta gibanja in skupine uporabljajo. Ključne besede: radikalne skupine, simboli, ekstremistična gibanja, ogrožanje 1. UVOD Neonacistične skupine najbolj sovražijo jude, homoseksualce, kristjane in druge pripadnike raz- ličnih ver, vendar od vseh naštetih še najbolj sovražijo in prezirajo jude. Za neonaciste je jud smr- tni sovražnik, boj proti judom si predstavljajo kot sveto vojno, kot vojno med dobrim in zlom saj naj bi jud po njihovem nadziral vlade držav, medije in finančne institucije ter tako bil odgovoren za vse globalne težave. Če imajo neonacistične skupine skupno sovraštvo do judov in ostalih sku- pin, jim je skupno to, da ljubijo in obožujejo Hitlerja in nacistično Nemčijo. Obstajajo razlike med neonacističnimi skupinami, saj niso vse skupine nasilne oziroma nekatere skupine prikazujejo samo sovraštvo, rasizem, netolerantnost ipd., medtem, ko druge skupine delujejo nasilno, spet tretje pa delujejo politično, z namenom ustanovitve fašistične države (The Southern Poverty Law Center, 2015). Nasilnih dejanj se poslužujejo predvsem skupine z ekstremistično radikalnim razmišljanjem, ki 5 UNIVETZA V MARIBORU, FAKULTETA ZA VARNOSTNE VEDE 11. JUNIJ 2015 informacijsko tehnologijo uporabljajo za razširjanje svoje politike, agende. S pomočjo spleta raz- širjajo ideološko propagiranje, zbirajo nove simpatizerje ter varno komunicirajo med posamezni- ki in skupinami (Weiman, 2004). Simboli skupin imajo po navadi globlji pomen in lahko že iz njih razberemo za kakšno vrsto skupine gre ter kakšna je vsebina sporočila (The Anti-Defamation League, 2004). »Nacisti so kot virus na škornjih. Lahko jih obrišete z ognjem z neba, z izobrazbo, kaznovanjem njihove simbolike ali s posmehovanjem. Nekako pa se jim vedno uspe prilagoditi in razviti tako, da se prikažejo na najbolj čudnih mestih in v najbolj čudnih oblikah. Opisujemo vam 10 manife- stacij modernega neonacizma, ki jih celo Hitler ne bi prepoznal1« (Tormsen, 2015: 1): ΅ Patrol 36 (Izrael). ΅ Tsagaan Khas (Mongolija). ΅ Nispters (Nemčija). ΅ Gay Aryan Skinheads (Rusija). ΅ Golden Dawn (Grčija). ΅ Sao Paolo Skinheads (Brazilija). ΅ Creativity Movement (ZDA). ΅ AZOV Battalion (Ukrajina). ΅ Vigrid (Norveška). ΅ National Socialist Japanese Workers Party (Japonska). Poznana kot Nationalsozialistische Ja- panische Arbeiterpartei (NSJAP) oziroma Japonska nacionalsocialistična delavska stranka. V prispevku bomo z analiziranjem javno dostopnih virov predstavili posamezne kratice, simbole, rune, glasbene skupine in blagovne znamke, politične stranke in gibanja ter skupine po državah, ki simbole uporabljajo. Poznavanje simbolov lahko ljudi pravočasno opozori na nevarnost pojava ekstremistov na določenem območju, kjer lahko skupaj s policijo in drugimi organi, ki zagotavlja- jo varnost, povečajo preventivne ukrepe za preprečitev morebitnih napadov, izvrševanje kaznivih dejanj in prekrškov teh skupin. 2. KRATICE NEONACISTOV V mnogih državah je neonacizem prepovedan, zato so prepovedani tudi njihovi simboli. Neonaci- sti se v javnosti ne smejo kazati z nacističnimi simboli (svastiko, razno raznimi runami, ss lobanjo ipd.), prav tako ne smejo komunicirati z raznimi gestami, zato so naredili kratice. Neonacisti kratice povečini uporabljajo na spletu. Najbolj pogosto uporabljene kratice so, 88, 14/88, 4R, C18, 28, HH, BH, B&H, RAC, RaHoWa, HFFH, ROA, ORION, WPWW, ACAB in ZOG (Guide-to- -spotting-klansmen-neo-nazis-racist, 2012): ΅ 88 pomeni Heil Hitler, 8 pomeni h, ker je črka h, osma črka v abecedi. ΅ Kratica 14/88 je sestavljena iz 14 besed in iz pozdrava Hitlerju. 14/88 – David Lane: “We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children”. (Moramo zagotoviti obstoj naših ljudi in prihodnost belih otrok) (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2015). ΅ Kratica 4R pomeni, četrti rajh. ΅ AB predstavlja arijsko bratovščino. 1 Več na: http://listverse.com/2015/04/15/10-of-the-worlds-weirdest-neo-nazi-groups/ 6 16. DNEVI VARSTVOSLOVJA ZBORNIK PRISPEVKOV ΅ C18, predstavlja t.i. novodobni SS, saj C pomeni combat, pod 1 je črka A in pod 8 je črka H, torej, Combat Adolf Hitler, ali novodobni SS, tako kot je bil včasih to SSLAH (SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler). ΅ Kratice 28, BH in B&H, pomenijo kri in čast ali blood and honour. Hitlerjeva mladina je imela na nožih, vgraviran napis, kri in čast. ΅ 100 % pomeni, 100 % arijska rasa. ΅ HH je enako kot 88, torej Heil Hitler. ΅ WPWW/WP pomeni Bela moč ali bel ponos, širom sveta, gre za t.i. rasizem, saj je edino bela rasa, »prava« rasa. ΅ RAC, predstavlja kompilacijo neonacističnih skupin, ki se borijo proti komunizmu, saj RAC po- meni, Rock against communism. ΅ RaHoWa ali sveta rasna vojna, bele rase. ΅ Gott mit uns so uporabljali vojaki Wehrmachta, kot bog z nami, sedaj ga uporabljajo neona- cisti. ΅ Meine ehre heiSSt treue, je bil slogan vojakov SS-a, kar pomeni, zvestoba je moja čast. Vojaki SS, so bili zvesti Hitlerju, saj so bili njegova osebna garda, tako kot so bili v starem rimu pre- torijanci osebna garda cesarja. ΅ Kratica ZOG ali zionistična okupacija, ima antisemitsko sporočilo. Beseda zionizem se nanaša na žide oziroma na Izrael in Wall street v Ameriki. ΅ Kratico ACAB uporabljajo tako desni kot levi ekstremisti, pomeni pa, da so vsi policaji svinje. ΅ HFFH pomeni, Hammerskin za vedno, za vedno Hammerskin. HFFH predstavlja državo Hammerskin, ali državo bele rase. Hammerskin predstavlja rasistično, neonacistično glasbe- no skupino, ki se je specializirala za »trženje« in promocijo rokovske glasbe. Skupina je bila ustanovljena leta 1988, v Dallasu, Teksas. ΅ ROA pomeni, rasa čez vse, torej bela rasa nad vsemi rasami. ΅ ORION (Our Race is Our Nation) pomeni naša rasa, je naša nacija. Kratice ORION se poslužuje- jo rasisti (KKK – Ku Klux Klan), neonacisti in desni ekstremisti. Našteli smo najbolj pogosto uporabljene kratice. Le-te se večinoma uporabljajo na spletu, pred- vsem na raznih forumih in spletnih straneh (youtube).
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