FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN UKRAINE: ASSESSING POTENTIAL RISKS Egle E. Murauskaite Vilnius institute for policy analysis Vilnius institute for policy analysis © 2020 Vilnius institute for policy analysis www.vilniusinstitute.lt Egle E. Murauskaite is a senior researcher and simulations designer for the ICONS Project with Maryland University. Presently based in Lithuania, she is responsible for high-level political-military crises simulations in Europe, alongside academic research and government consulting projects. Egle has been working with unconventional security threats for the past 9 years – from gray zone warfare to proliferation of nuclear weapons. Egle is also a senior non-resident fellow with the Vilnius Institute for Policy Analysis, where she is currently exploring the issue of foreign fighters in Ukraine. She is a co-author of a monthly podcast “NYLA Update”, where she explores the long-term geopolitical trends and challenges, and also a regular commentator on security issues in national and international media. Egle holds a Master’s degree from Sciences Po Paris (International Security) and a Bachelor’s degree from SSE Riga (Economics and Business Management); her professional experience spans the Netherlands, Australia, Egypt, France, and the U.S. Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks Abstract This study analyzes the profiles of foreign fighters, who have joined the conflict in Ukraine on either side, and assesses the risks of radicalization as these fighters are increasingly returning home. With considerable attention given to potential terrorism risks posed by foreign fighters of the Islamic bent returning from Syria and Iraq, foreign fighters in Ukraine receive relatively little coverage - and when they do, this faulty analogy at play risks making the potential radicalizing factors worse. The study systematizes extensive foreign fighter profile case studies, and draws on several interviews with returning fighters from the Caucasus, Eastern Europe and Scandinavia. Far from uncovering a budding network of violent extremists, it suggests that the conflict in Ukraine is becoming the grounds for many strongly right-wing and left-wing bent men to settle the scores of historic injustices. This cluster of fighters disappointed in the global system, Western way of life, and increasingly ideologically hardened (perhaps less by battle and more by the surrounding political realities) is cause for serious socio-political concern, in terms of breathing enthusiasm, resources, and know-how to extremist movements. This is especially problematic, given that Europe is already struggling to pose a credible alternative to these socio-political trends in many of its corners. Introduction The 2014 conflict in Ukraine1 has often been stagnant conflict has continued well into noted as a wake-up call for Europe, in terms the 2019, with the influx of foreign fighters2 of the severity of the looming Russian threat, gradually slowing down or changing in profile. the source of renewed relevance of tactical In contrast to the early arrivals, the interviews nuclear weapons in military planning, as well conducted for this study, as well as interviews as the new wind under the wings of NATO published in the media, indicate that those - as the alliance had been struggling to find fighters continuing to serve after 2018 seem relevance and maintain cohesion in the face increasingly kept by their lack of alternative of rising non-state actor threats. Following prospects at a livelihood at home. growing Russian pressure on Europe - from cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007 to With Europe witnessing the rise of violent the incursions into Georgia in 2008, - the extremism - including Islamic fundamentalism Ukrainian side enjoyed considerable support fuelled by the ongoing wars in Syria and in Europe (particularly Lithuania) where fears Iraq - there were concerns that the conflict mounted that one of the Baltic countries in Ukraine might spur it on, as Europeans could be next. While the fighting has been who had joined the fight started to return somewhat reduced in intensity, following home. After all, the MENA region had seen the signed yet frequently broken Minsk-2 consecutive waves of violence unfold in the ceasefire agreements in February 2015, the 1990s, as fighters from all over the region 1 For a more detailed recap of the conflict, see the Background section. 2 For a more detailed discussion of who is generally considered a foreign fighter, and the ap- proach adopted in this study, see p. 4 1 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks previously involved in the war in Afghanistan, Legiec 2017), and additionally enhanced by started to return home and, finding it difficult in-depth interviews with returning fighters to reintegrate into civilian life, founded or from the Caucasus (one of the largest sources joined violent movements. Looking at Ukraine, of arriving fighters), Eastern Europe (a region there were particular concerns over the rise where state-level political support for Ukraine of violent neo-Nazis - helped in no small is among the strongest), and Scandinavia (a part by Russian information campaigns, and region particularly concerned with the conflict lack of independently verifiable information in Ukraine as one of the sources fuelling the about the extent of ongoing radicalization. domestic rise of neo-Nazism). Due to the Europe is only starting to deal with fighters dearth of reliable information, and primarily returning from this conflict – with considerable a European focus, the nature and particular controversy concerning the appropriateness challenges of the numerous fighters “native” to of treating them the same way as Islamic the conflict, i.e. hailing from Ukraine or Russia, militants returning from the wars in Syria are discussed only in passing, and mostly as a and Iraq, regardless of whether they fought comparative contextual background.3 for Russian- or Ukrainian-backed forces. Far from uncovering budding network of This study seeks to better understand the violent extremists, this work suggests that types of foreign fighters who have joined the conflict in Ukraine is becoming the the conflict in Ukraine on either side, and grounds for many strongly right-wing bent compare these developed typological profiles men to settle the scores of historic injustices with the known risk factors for radicalization - committed by or against Russia. Some do and violence. It is important to note that with seek to gain combat experience, or engage all the policy and academic attention to the in conflict cruising, having recently gone fighters of the Islamic bent as a potential to battle elsewhere. But this pooling of terrorism risk in Europe, to date, the matter anti-systemically inclined European youths, of foreign fighters in Ukraine has primarily disappointed in the West, and increasingly been traced through investigative journalists ideologically hardened - perhaps less by battle reporting in-depth fighter profiles, or law and more by the surrounding political realities enforcement agencies keeping tabs on recent - is cause for serious socio-political concern, returnees. The edited volume by Rekaweck in terms of breathing enthusiasm, resources, (2017) has been the only academic study thus and know-how to right-wing movements. far to consider the issue of foreign fighters This is especially problematic, given that in Ukraine - but even there the attention is Europe is already struggling to pose a credible equally split between, and parallels are drawn alternative to such movements in countries to, the conflict in Syria. This study, focused like Hungary or Poland. Moreover, as the exclusively on Ukraine, systematizes 49 publicly Balkans are experiencing increasing political available detailed case studies on fighters tensions and teeter on the verge of violence, from various European countries, looking at the influx of fighters from that region risks their backgrounds and motivation, outcomes having a particularly destabilizing influence. upon their return. These insights are further complimented by trend analysis of available This paper is organized as follows. The battle deaths and injuries data (compiled by background section briefly recaps the origins 3 Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the fault lines and risks of the returnees identified here are only felt worse in those countries due to significantly more limited state capabilities to monitor, absorb, and assist. 2 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks and the current status of the conflict in returning foreign fighters. The fourth part of Ukraine. The first part outlines the overall the study recaps some of the types of destiny background of foreign fighters in Ukraine, and that the returning foreign fighters have met discusses their four generalizable archetypes. across the globe – although the data on this The second part discusses some of the common subject is particularly limited in terms of scope concerns regarding the returnees, based on and reliability. The paper closes with a brief research on radicalization, and relates a few discussion of the likely security and socio- common historical analogies and logic chains political implications of the foreign fighters that have developed, in no small part, due returning from Ukraine, potentially in ever to the lack of reliable information. The third larger numbers if the conflict starts drawing part discusses some of the emerging practices closer to resolution over the next