FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN : ASSESSING POTENTIAL RISKS Egle E. Murauskaite

Vilnius institute for policy analysis Vilnius institute for policy analysis

© 2020 Vilnius institute for policy analysis www.vilniusinstitute.lt Egle E. Murauskaite is a senior researcher and simulations designer for the ICONS Project with Maryland University. Presently based in , she is responsible for high-level political-military crises simulations in Europe, alongside academic research and government consulting projects. Egle has been working with unconventional security threats for the past 9 years – from gray zone warfare to proliferation of nuclear weapons. Egle is also a senior non-resident fellow with the Vilnius Institute for Policy Analysis, where she is currently exploring the issue of foreign fighters in Ukraine. She is a co-author of a monthly podcast “NYLA Update”, where she explores the long-term geopolitical trends and challenges, and also a regular commentator on security issues in national and international media. Egle holds a Master’s degree from Sciences Po Paris (International Security) and a Bachelor’s degree from SSE Riga (Economics and Business Management); her professional experience spans the Netherlands, Australia, Egypt, France, and the U.S.

Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

Abstract

This study analyzes the profiles of foreign fighters, who have joined the conflict in Ukraine on either side, and assesses the risks of radicalization as these fighters are increasingly returning home. With considerable attention given to potential terrorism risks posed by foreign fighters of the Islamic bent returning from Syria and Iraq, foreign fighters in Ukraine receive relatively little coverage - and when they do, this faulty analogy at play risks making the potential radicalizing factors worse. The study systematizes extensive foreign fighter profile case studies, and draws on several interviews with returning fighters from the Caucasus, Eastern Europe and Scandinavia. Far from uncovering a budding network of violent extremists, it suggests that the conflict in Ukraine is becoming the grounds for many strongly right-wing and left-wing bent men to settle the scores of historic injustices. This cluster of fighters disappointed in the global system, Western way of life, and increasingly ideologically hardened (perhaps less by battle and more by the surrounding political realities) is cause for serious socio-political concern, in terms of breathing enthusiasm, resources, and know-how to extremist movements. This is especially problematic, given that Europe is already struggling to pose a credible alternative to these socio-political trends in many of its corners.

Introduction

The 2014 conflict in Ukraine1 has often been stagnant conflict has continued well into noted as a wake-up call for Europe, in terms the 2019, with the influx of foreign fighters2 of the severity of the looming Russian threat, gradually slowing down or changing in profile. the source of renewed relevance of tactical In contrast to the early arrivals, the interviews nuclear weapons in military planning, as well conducted for this study, as well as interviews as the new wind under the wings of NATO published in the media, indicate that those - as the alliance had been struggling to find fighters continuing to serve after 2018 seem relevance and maintain cohesion in the face increasingly kept by their lack of alternative of rising non-state actor threats. Following prospects at a livelihood at home. growing Russian pressure on Europe - from cyber-attacks against in 2007 to With Europe witnessing the rise of violent the incursions into Georgia in 2008, - the extremism - including Islamic fundamentalism Ukrainian side enjoyed considerable support fuelled by the ongoing wars in Syria and in Europe (particularly Lithuania) where fears Iraq - there were concerns that the conflict mounted that one of the Baltic countries in Ukraine might spur it on, as Europeans could be next. While the fighting has been who had joined the fight started to return somewhat reduced in intensity, following home. After all, the MENA region had seen the signed yet frequently broken Minsk-2 consecutive waves of violence unfold in the ceasefire agreements in February 2015, the 1990s, as fighters from all over the region

1 For a more detailed recap of the conflict, see the Background section. 2 For a more detailed discussion of who is generally considered a foreign fighter, and the ap- proach adopted in this study, see p. 4

1 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

previously involved in the war in Afghanistan, Legiec 2017), and additionally enhanced by started to return home and, finding it difficult in-depth interviews with returning fighters to reintegrate into civilian life, founded or from the Caucasus (one of the largest sources joined violent movements. Looking at Ukraine, of arriving fighters), Eastern Europe (a region there were particular concerns over the rise where state-level political support for Ukraine of violent neo-Nazis - helped in no small is among the strongest), and Scandinavia (a part by Russian information campaigns, and region particularly concerned with the conflict lack of independently verifiable information in Ukraine as one of the sources fuelling the about the extent of ongoing radicalization. domestic rise of neo-). Due to the Europe is only starting to deal with fighters dearth of reliable information, and primarily returning from this conflict – with considerable a European focus, the nature and particular controversy concerning the appropriateness challenges of the numerous fighters “native” to of treating them the same way as Islamic the conflict, i.e. hailing from Ukraine or Russia, militants returning from the wars in Syria are discussed only in passing, and mostly as a and Iraq, regardless of whether they fought comparative contextual background.3 for Russian- or Ukrainian-backed forces. Far from uncovering budding network of This study seeks to better understand the violent extremists, this work suggests that types of foreign fighters who have joined the conflict in Ukraine is becoming the the conflict in Ukraine on either side, and grounds for many strongly right-wing bent compare these developed typological profiles men to settle the scores of historic injustices with the known risk factors for radicalization - committed by or against Russia. Some do and violence. It is important to note that with seek to gain combat experience, or engage all the policy and academic attention to the in conflict cruising, having recently gone fighters of the Islamic bent as a potential to battle elsewhere. But this pooling of terrorism risk in Europe, to date, the matter anti-systemically inclined European youths, of foreign fighters in Ukraine has primarily disappointed in the West, and increasingly been traced through investigative journalists ideologically hardened - perhaps less by battle reporting in-depth fighter profiles, or law and more by the surrounding political realities enforcement agencies keeping tabs on recent - is cause for serious socio-political concern, returnees. The edited volume by Rekaweck in terms of breathing enthusiasm, resources, (2017) has been the only academic study thus and know-how to right-wing movements. far to consider the issue of foreign fighters This is especially problematic, given that in Ukraine - but even there the attention is Europe is already struggling to pose a credible equally split between, and parallels are drawn alternative to such movements in countries to, the conflict in Syria. This study, focused like Hungary or . Moreover, as the exclusively on Ukraine, systematizes 49 publicly Balkans are experiencing increasing political available detailed case studies on fighters tensions and teeter on the verge of violence, from various European countries, looking at the influx of fighters from that region risks their backgrounds and motivation, outcomes having a particularly destabilizing influence. upon their return. These insights are further complimented by trend analysis of available This paper is organized as follows. The battle deaths and injuries data (compiled by background section briefly recaps the origins

3 Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the fault lines and risks of the returnees identified here are only felt worse in those countries due to significantly more limited state capabilities to monitor, absorb, and assist.

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and the current status of the conflict in returning foreign fighters. The fourth part of Ukraine. The first part outlines the overall the study recaps some of the types of destiny background of foreign fighters in Ukraine, and that the returning foreign fighters have met discusses their four generalizable archetypes. across the globe – although the data on this The second part discusses some of the common subject is particularly limited in terms of scope concerns regarding the returnees, based on and reliability. The paper closes with a brief research on radicalization, and relates a few discussion of the likely security and socio- common historical analogies and logic chains political implications of the foreign fighters that have developed, in no small part, due returning from Ukraine, potentially in ever to the lack of reliable information. The third larger numbers if the conflict starts drawing part discusses some of the emerging practices closer to resolution over the next few years. in states’ legal approaches to dealing with

Background

Before delving deeper into the analysis, it in that capacity. Namely, the Russian armed might be helpful to briefly recap a few of forces have invaded and seized the Ukrainian the key developments of the highly complex Black Sea port of (without too much and nuanced conflict in Ukraine. However, resistance), and following a show referendum as there is no shortage of high quality held in March, the territory was annexed by analysis of multiple aspects of the conflict Russia. Subsequently, local pro-Russian and – from fighting techniques to accompanying foreign Russia-backed protesters, militants, information campaigns – the purpose of this and other violent and/or political elements study is only to plug one of the remaining gaps: have started taking over government buildings understanding the roles of individual foreign in (, , , fighters (i.e. persons not native to Ukraine or , and other cities) demanding that Russia, who have not come as part of one of similar types of referenda be held to decide the mercenary ). their status. In July 2014, a commercial airplane carrying a large number of Dutch passengers Ukraine had gone into the initial internal crisis was shot over Ukraine by a Russian-supplied in November 2013, when the pro-Russian surface-to-air missile, and soon thereafter the president retreated from EU and the U.S. have instituted economic the EU trade partnership negotiation and sanctions against Russia. In summer 2014, swung an agreement with Russia instead. several units of have With the Ukrainian population being divided entered the region – in addition to the between pro- and anti- Russian sentiments, previously mentioned smaller units, privateers, this political turn brought about a wave of and individuals. As the fighting continued protests. However, the government security with no swift outcome in sight for either side, forces have brutally dealt with them, sparking in September, the first truce agreement was even more massive protests and starting the signed in Minsk, and Putin had started to Maidan phase of this still domestic, albeit withdraw some of the Russian troops from foreign influenced, crisis. Amidst the internal Eastern Ukraine. turmoil, in February 2014 the crisis turned into an international conflict – one fought through During this most violent conflict phase, the thinly veiled proxies, mercenaries, and state- absolute majority of the fighters involved sponsored or state-sanctioned troops rather were Russian and Ukrainian. While there was than official state armies facing one another some international presence in the crisis early

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on (e.g., protesters, medics, NGO workers, rounds of sanctions against Russia. In 2018, journalists, expert advisers etc.), the foreign NATO has held a large military exercise in fighters that are the focus of this analysis had Western Ukraine, and the country has been mostly started to arrive later, as the conflict receiving military assistance in the form of wore on and stagnated. fighting equipment and fighter trainers. In September 2019, the newly elected Ukrainian International powers have struggled to president Volodymyr Zelensky has agreed broker a peace agreement between Ukraine to exchange prisoners with Russia, and the and Russia since February 2015 through European powers had once again attempted several iterations of the Minsk accords, but to broker a peace agreement, but as of January the sporadic fighting continued. The U.S. and 2020, the conflict remains politically stagnant, EU have maintained subsequent new annual if not particularly militarily active.

I. Fighter profiles

By various estimates between 1,500 and in Ukraine is very modest. Nevertheless, it 2,000 foreign fighters from 54 different is important to understand that no small countries have come to take part in the number of these foreign fighters were conflict in Ukraine on either side of the ethnic Russians and/or Russian-speaking battle between 2014 and 2019 (Metodieva citizens of the foreign countries – this may 2019, Rekawek 2017)4. Most of the fighters imply that the numbers provided here are interviewed or featured in the media seem underestimated, if the arriving foreigners are to have come during or after 2015, with the able to sufficiently blend in with the locals. brokering of the first – ineffective – ceasefires. While all of these conflicts seem numerically But because of their typically regular rotation dominated by amateurs using old or in and out of Ukraine every few months, makeshift weaponry, military experts suggest and porous borders facilitating unchecked that in Ukraine the individuals fighting for access, it is somewhat difficult to tell whether both conflicting parties are somewhat better that constitutes the majority, or whether trained and equipped – despite the fact that the bulk of those who had come prior to Ukraine is not receiving nearly as much 2015 had been killed, or were unwilling to financial support or publicity (Mil.Today raise publicity about their activities. Mares 2015). (2017) also suggests that the largest influx of foreigner fighters had started in the 2015, Still, active social media campaigns seem with the main wave arriving as the conflict to have been the number one recruitment increasingly stagnated – although there was technique that helped most foreign fighters considerable presence of foreign extreme on both sides find their way to the conflict zone right-wing protesters during the Maidan – from fighter Youtube videos and Instagram phase. or Facebook posts to media profiles featuring either prominent hero fighters or appealing Compared to the estimate that over 20,000 to the nobility of the cause at stake. It has foreign fighters are engaged in Iraq and been suggested that the pro-Russian side has Syria (Barber 2015), the number of fighters been recruiting softball players, trained in

4 For fighter affiliations by country see Figure 1; for units that include foreign fighters, see Table 1.

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Russia

Ukraine

Number of fighters FIGURE 1. Number of Foreign Fighters in Ukraine by Country 2014-2016 Source: Legiec 2017

historic battle tactics and already delighted individual fighter narratives). In this study to spend their free time operating as armed I attempt to group the fighters into larger units – but neither personal interviews nor categories based on the self-identified key publicly available information could confirm underlying sentiments bringing them to this definitively. It is also worth noting that the battle, accompanying these categories many known foreign fighters have previously with examples from different ideologies and been involved with nationalist groups of nations within these groupings. Because most some kind ranging the full spectrum of countries had nationals fighting on both right-wing movements. This varies from sides of the conflict – though sometimes in persons espousing white supremacist and different proportions, – national realities anti-Muslim sentiments to members of better serve as contextual background nationalist political parties and organizations rather than the key distinguishing feature. (formal or informal), from movement leaders Grouping the fighters by the key motivating to youth branch members or non-active / no- factors helps sift through the core differences longer active supporters. and highlight the potential risks associated with each group, which often are non- Reporting on the conflict in Ukraine and country-specific – even though many tend to the foreign fighters involved has typically exhibit several prominent traits rather than categorized them either by country, by being clear-cut single category examples. battalion, or by the side they were fighting Still, it is important to recognize that for (and has generally tended to spotlight within the categories, personal interviews

5 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

often constitute samples of convenience, so the UN Security Council voted to include extrapolation about other members of such a non-combatant and support functions into group should be approached with caution. It is the definition of foreign terrorist fighters; interesting to note that financial rewards did many governments have subsequently chosen not play a significant, if any, role in attracting to treat everyone who travelled to the fight foreign fighters to the pro-Ukraine side (the (including the fighters’ wives and children) as standard monthly pay seemed to be around foreign terrorist fighters and prosecute them $300), even though on the pro-Russia side, accordingly. However, with returnees from some of the poorer fighters were lured by Ukraine the legal practices are currently in the rewards that were said to be in excess of formation, and while they are informed by $1,000. Among most foreigners, this marks the Syria precedents, so far has been a clear distinction from mercenaries and the only state to prosecute returning non- private contractors, where financial reward is combatants, with most states choosing to the prime motivation pulling fighters into a focus on combatants only (so far, mostly on conflict they are otherwise unrelated to. the pro-Russian ones).

A final note of caution applies to the This study identifies four major categories of definition of a foreign fighter: this paper foreign fighters, based on the key sentiment is squarely concerned with combatants, i.e. bringing them to the battlefields in Ukraine, persons actively wielding weapons – weather listed in the order of prevalence: (1) veterans in battle, in guarding the supplies or providing with historical grievances, (2) disillusioned armed protection to convoys moving through ideologues, (3) armed opposition, and (4) the disputed territories. This focus has been battle chasers. The next four sections discuss chosen despite the recognition that a large each category in detail, noting the specific number of support personnel (e.g., doctors, backgrounds characteristic to different psychologists, NGO and aid workers), as well nationals in that type. Each category – except as journalists have also been exposed to, and for the armed opposition - contains both, some have been profoundly affected by the pro-Russian and pro-Ukraine fighters, and conflict in Ukraine – so much so as to possibly more generally, people with left-wing and share some of the risk factors attributable right-wing political convictions of varying to the returning fighters. Trying to address levels of extreme.5 concerns stemming from the foreign fighters travelling to, and returning from Syria and Iraq,

5 As the next four sections explain, political ideology greatly varies in importance from one category to another – from being central to hardly relevant. In the categories where it is considered significant, the pro-Russian fighters would generally identify with left-wing beliefs, and pro-Ukraine – with right-wing beliefs. However, it is important to understand that the political left and right each involve a much broader spectrum of ideas (e.g. role of a nation in general or in particular, relation of a state apparatus to the citizens, attitudes towards market regulation and property ownership etc.) that the clash of ideas specific to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

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TABLE 1. Military Units in Ukraine That Include Foreign Fighters Pro-Russia Pro-Ukraine Vostok Battalion Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion

Wagner Brigade* (it is not clear if this is a private Sheikh Mansur Battalion contractor company, or a unit reporting to Russian MoD)

Bryanka SSR Battalion Georgian Legion

International Brigade ^ (under the National Guard of Ukraine)

7th Brigade ’ (under Ukrainian Ministry of Defense)

Ural Unit Pravyi Sektor (includes Tactical Group Belarus) Serbian Hussar 1st Slavic Unit

Ryazan Unit

Batman Unit

Rusich Unit

1. Veterans with Historical Grievances prominent veteran of both Chechen wars, It seems that the largest number of fighters and mostly consists of men who have also have been drawn into Ukraine by historic fought in one or both of those wars. They experiences of conflict involving their had been scattered in the West in exile, and homeland and one of the warring parties. have come to Ukraine explicitly to continue Significantly, these men came not only with this fight against Russia. Many men in the general military or paramilitary skills, but other, Sheikh Mansur battalion, are Chechen were familiar with the particular enemy they Muslims who claim to have come to avenge were facing. Imperial Russia’s 18th century conquests of their lands. In addition, prominent Chechen Among the pro-Ukraine fighters, many have war veterans can be found in other units, lived through, or held strong family and/or e.g., the ferocious Aidar battalion defending ethnic narrative memories about, conflicts Eastern Ukraine – they come driven by an with Russia, and were keen to fight to prevent oft-repeated sentiment of refusing to “bend another country from falling victim to the over for Putin” (Jackson 2014). Similarly, regime. For some the desire to continue the the Georgian Legion (as well as other units fight was mainly colored by anti-Russian accepting Georgians) has attracted many war sentiment, while for others it was more veterans hardened by the country’s lasting broadly about defending the principles of confrontations with Russia. Some were state sovereignty. drawn in by strong anti-Russian sentiments (Legiec 2017), while others claim that “love Many Georgians and Chechens, who for Ukraine is what brought us here, not our comprise by far the largest number of supposed hate for Russia” ( Press fighters present (an estimate of about 100 2017). In addition, as a more pro-Russian in each ethnic group), fall into this category. government took over in Georgia, many Consider, for instance, the two Chechen of the veterans of the Georgian war found fighter units discussed by Racz (2017). The themselves out of work and under pressure Dzhokhar Dudayev battalion is led by a – feeling cornered, to them it seemed natural

7 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

to bring the fight back to Russia in another constituted a sizeable portion of foreign theater. fighters supporting Russia’s efforts in Crimea (Mares 2017). In terms of the driving factors, Moldova’s Transnistrian territory is another some cite this as a favor they have to return prominent source of this type of foreign for Russia’s support to Serbia against Kosovo’s fighters – though far less numerous (an bid for independence (in confrontation with estimate of 40 fighters), they mostly come NATO). Others seem motivated to support to fight for the pro-Russia side, driven by the pan-Slavic and/or pan-Orthodox unity anti-Ukrainian sentiment that dates back (DFRLab 2016, Metodieva 2019). Indeed, to the Transnistrian war in 1990. Ukrainian on national policy level Serbia has refused volunteers and Cossacks had come to fight to join the EU’s anti-Russian sanctions, and against the Moldovan government forces Ukraine’s pleas for Serbia to stem the flow – and alongside Russian forces – in support of its fighters have largely fallen on deaf ears of independence claims of the Transnistrian (Coynash 2019). Unsurprisingly, Croats have enclave (which had a large ethnic Ukrainian been coming to the pro-Ukraine, and anti- population). These sentiments and narratives Serbian, side of the fight. Interestingly, a were deliberately further stoked by Russian French veteran of the Balkan war who had information campaigns in the Transnistrian fought on the Croat side and subsequently territory and among Moldovans living in stayed in , Gaston Besson, has formed Russia (Secrieru 2017). These volunteers saw a strong network and became a prominent the conflict in Ukraine as payback time, and recruiter for the pro-Ukraine Azov battalion those who came seem to have joined the ( Jackson 2014, Scimia 2015). Although he battalions known for their particular brutality may be more appropriately categorized in – such as Bryanka SSSR. Nevertheless, there the battle-chaser category below, his example were some individual stories of Moldovan helps highlight the extent of the presence veterans coming to fight on the pro-Ukraine of Balkan wars’ grievances in the Ukrainian side – seemingly driven by the increasing conflict. Russian pressure in the country. Moldovans fighting on this side seem to also have In a similar vein, dual-nationals from the chosen some of the most brutal battalions, West have been attracted to the conflict out like Shakhtersk (Secrieru 2017). It is worth of historic sentiment. It is worth mentioning noting that the particularly brutal pro- the American-Ukrainian Mark Paslawsky, Ukraine battalions, including Shakhtersk, who became the first foreigner to die in this were subsequently officially disbanded. conflict – a West Point graduate – he enlisted soon after the conflict broke out driven by The Balkan, or more precisely Serbo-Croat, Ukrainian patriotic sentiment (DFR Lab conflicts are also getting an increasingly 2016). Another example are two Italian- intense replay of historical hostilities in the Russians: Vladimir Verbitsky of Moldovan Ukrainian theater. Up to 300 Serbs – many descent and Oli Krutany of Albanian with combat experience from the nineties – descent – both had previous experience have flocked to support the Russian cause, with with the Russian military, and Krutany had some joining the Wagner mercenary group, reportedly fought in Chechnya, and both and others spread among the following eight were drawn to fight on the pro-Russia side units: the International Brigade, the Seventh (Wesolowsky and Kreshko 2018). The desire Brigade, the Serbian-Hussar Regiment, the to right historical wrongs has also brought Ural Unit, the Batman Unit, the First Slavic several members of the “Essence of Time” Unit, and the Ryazan Unit (Zivanovic 2018). international communist movement from Serbian nationalists, known as “Chetniks”, Spain to fight on the pro-Russian side –

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they claimed to see it as a way to repay for conflict in Ukraine for an opportunity to the USSR’s support to the left-wing forces resettle old battle scores with either Ukraine fighting against Gen. Franco in between the or Russia. It is important to fully appreciate World Wars (DFRLab 2016, Jackson 2014, the geographic, temporal, and ideological Mares 2017). breadth of the scope of appeal of these historic injustices. Overall, a significant portion of experienced individual foreign fighters have come to the

Armed Opposition Adventurous Left-wing Civilians

Battle chasers Disillusioned Idealogues

Trained Right-wing fighters Veterans with Historical Grievances

FIGURE 2. Fighter Types Scheme

2. The Disillusioned Ideologues to stop the freedom-seeking people from The second-most-prevalent type of foreign being slaughtered en-masse. The pro-Russia fighters in Ukraine are men generally fighters described their mounting anxiety as disappointed with the state of the Western NATO and the West increasingly encroached world in reaction to emerging global on Russia’s traditional sphere of interest with challenges – particularly those posed by increasingly bold war-mongering. Both confrontation with alternative world views, types subsequently took it upon themselves such as that of Russia or China. This is the to address the situation, often reluctantly, broadest and perhaps the most complex as somebody had to finally do something. category to analyse. The pro-Ukraine fighters Present in this segment was also a number of in this segment describe watching with armchair preachers of the great clash – e.g., of growing frustration as governments of their capitalists and the simple people, of the U.S. country, and other Western institutions, and Russia, of the and freedom. helplessly admonished tyrannical regimes Seeing the conflict in Ukraine unfold, they – of Syria or Russia – while doing little were moved to join it as a symbolic partaking

9 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

in the advancement of their cause. Many get involved (Allen 2015). disillusioned ideologues had at least some military, police, or paramilitary training Similarly, a few fighters from Poland could be (though most have not seen an actual battle), found on either side of the conflict, with those and some had pondered joining the war in supporting Russia espousing strong anti- Syria as a symbolic cause but were deterred NATO and anti-globalization sentiments, by its perceived brutality and/or the fact that while those who supported Ukrainian rebels it was primarily dominated by Arab political cited diametrically opposite need to defend narratives. liberal democracy ( Jackson 2014).

This category seems to fit the few Baltic Among the well-known albeit arguably less fighters present. Those fighting on the extreme examples in this category is Chris Ukrainian side seem to see this as the Garett - a British veteran volunteer de-miner final frontier to be defended from Russian and fundraiser for the pro-Ukraine Azov expansion – or their country might be next – battalion – who claims to have been moved while those supporting Russia see Ukraine as to action by Ukrainian Facebook posts the final pro-Russian frontier to be defended calling for help from experienced fighters in from NATO’s encroachment. Historically, defending the country’s sovereignty (Allen Lithuania has been actively advocating 2015, DFR Lab Nov 2016). A sentiment the EU to pay more attention to Ukraine of rejection of the Western-decadence has and to offer assistance to Ukraine once the prompted men to different types of non- conflict started. It is thus hardly surprising violent albeit more ideologically colored that of all the Baltic states Lithuania had the action. For instance, the American Russell highest number of fighters involved (up to Bentley came to fight on the pro-Russia 20), and most of them were on the side of side; he identifies as a communist and has Ukraine. With ’s large ethnic-Russian called the U.S. government – he runs population and a quieter political stance on a podcast, a Youtube channel, and a website the issue, the balance seemed to favor the covering the battles in Ukraine (DFR Lab pro-Russian side. But it seems somewhat Sep 2016). Interestingly, another young surprising to that the 2014-2016 statistics American Santi Pirtle claims to have come captured no Estonians backing Ukraine, and to Ukraine driven by similar contempt for only a few fighting on the Russian side (see the overly frivolous U.S. culture – but chose Figure 1 on page 7). to fight with the pro-Ukraine Pravyi Sector (Clapp 2016). Colombian Alexis Castillo Among the 20-or-so estimated French fighters Idodeai, who came to fight on the pro- flocking to both sides of the battle, many can Russia side with the Vostok battalion, was a be categorized as disappointed ideologues member of the communist “Essence of Time” as well. France’s historical sympathies for movement and was prompted to action by communism are well known, and a number of the perceived atrocities against the Russians: young French fighters with previous combat “we could not sit on our hands while Nazis experience in Afghanistan came to defend from bombed peaceful cities the Russian side, as to them it represents “the and killed civilians” (DFR Lab Sep 2016). final bulwark against liberal Anglo-Saxon globalism and the decadent West” (Jackson The significant right-wing presence from 2014). But the Frenchmen who had joined Scandinavia, as well as Italy, Austria, and -wing Azov battalion to fight for Germany have found they could channel Ukraine also point to the primarily political their nationalist and/or white-supremacist and ideological drivers behind their choice to sentiment into the battlegrounds in Ukraine.

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The widely known Swedish far-right veteran curious part is that oftentimes men with Mikael Skillt claims to have joined the pro- the same (or very similar) sentiments, such Ukraine Azov battalion to fight for the as the disappointment with the consumerist “survival of white people” (Jackson 2014). society or the lack of response to other global Fighters from Italy seem to have been drawn conflicts, have ended up on the opposites to the more extreme left-wing and right- fighting sides in Ukraine. wing factions in Ukraine – reportedly, these were mostly unemployed males with some 3. Armed opposition military training and criminal records, and In addition to the foreign fighters coming to a history of participating in radical political get another chance to refight their historic movements (Scimia 2015). Those joining the conflicts with either Russia or Ukraine, a pro-Russian Vostok battalion felt they were faction has come driven by the desire to helping “resistance against the “fascist” and turn their political opposition to Putin and “repressive” government in ”, while those his cadre into an armed struggle, despairing supporting Ukraine tended to join the Pravyi about the hapless political processes at home. sector – but most fighters from Italy seemed Many ethnic Russians fighting on the pro- to share a disdain for the U.S., NATO and Ukraine side could be found in this category the EU (Scimia 2015). ( 2017), but because of the primary focus on foreign and European While there has been no shortage of in- parties involved, they will not be discussed depth profiles of extreme right-wing fighters, here in greater detail, although this by no gloating over their cause and proud to means reduces the significance of their take part in the battle, that is but the most struggle or their presence, which spotlights intense shade of the ideologically-driven the fighters from Belarus – one of the foreign fighters – it ought not lead one to most numerous single-nation presences in infer that all ideologically-driven fighters are Ukraine (similar in scope to the Georgians extremists. Many men in this category seem and Chechens). to emphasize and value their ideological convictions and the shaping of a desired Most of these men come to Ukraine with no world order – and shaping it through battle prior military training or experience. Some of is but one and the most extreme way. Indeed, them are dissidents running from persecution many seem to have come to fight in Ukraine by the FSB and its supporting structures reluctantly, out of perceived necessity – in – they or their families having either contrast to the extremist elements, who seem experienced that already, or where certain to prioritize collective action, often violent, persecution would come if their activities over ideological nuance. It is also important became any more visible. For instance, one to recognize that most men with the more young man has come to fight in the Ukraine extreme views have held them before joining after being sentenced to prison for posting this conflict, and some were even on the law “No fear” stickers in Minsk: “For Lukashenka, enforcement radar for that reason. I’m a terrorist. Our families are constantly harassed by the KGB” (Legiec April 2017). Overall, the conflict in Ukraine has Other illustrative examples come from an attracted no small number of individuals interview with a Latvian fighter, where he from abroad, who are convinced the world recalled “A Belarusian computer specialist is about to fall apart and somebody has to who was unable to withstand the captivity in do something. They have actively chosen to Belarus”, as well as a Russian veteran, who be that somebody, with the range of actions “is by nature a democrat, wants to overthrow spanning both violent and non-violent. The the Putin regime, but he thinks the fight

11 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

inside Russia is pointless” (Vikmanis 2015). A fighter from Sweden interviewed for Most of the Belarusian men have joined the this study recalled receiving around 50 Tactical Group Belarus – part of the pro- requests from people willing to join the Ukraine right-wing Pravyi Sector battalion, battle, of which no more than 5 had military although some also blend in Azov and Aidar experience – 2 of them ended up finally battalions. showing up in Ukraine, but one soon got killed in a car accident while the other could Nevertheless, a large portion of Belarusians not handle the reality of trench warfare and come to fight on the pro-Russia side – they left without seeing any battle in the end. A would be captured in the disillusioned Lithuanian NGO worker regularly present in ideologues category above, as they seem to Ukraine similarly reported receiving dozens be deeply convinced of the narrative about of Facebook requests by inexperienced Russia being under siege by the West, and adventurous youths, and turning them down. the need to defend pan-Slavic unity. However, there seems to be no shortage of battle chasers elsewhere in the Western world Overall, the conflict in Ukraine has provided a – countries unshaken by conflict for decades. theater to settle not only lasting international, but also intra-national struggles. This armed A known Austrian fighter Ben Fischer, political opposition ranges from Russians, accused of war crimes in Ukraine, is one of who have come to symbolically fight Putin’s the examples in this category: a military man, regime, to Belarusians, who came to fight who had deliberately rotated through Kosovo against a local repressive regime supported and Iraq looking for a battle experience by Putin. (unsuccessfully), attempted to enlist in the French Foreign Legion (also unsuccessfully) and was finally glad to join the pro-Ukraine 4. Battle Chasers right-wing Pravyi Sector fighters (Clapp Any on-going conflict in the world inevitably 2016). Nevertheless, Fischer also claims to attracts a number of fighters mostly seeking have been “disillusioned by the war and the the battle itself, rather than a particular cause enforcement of the Minsk agreement,” and – and Ukraine is no exception. This category claimed to support an armed overthrow of includes experienced individual foreign the current hapless government in Kiev (DFR fighters, who come to join one conflict after Lab Nov 2016) – showing characteristics of a another6, as well as inexperienced civilian disillusioned ideologue. adventurers, curious about tasting the battle. Of the latter type, most get turned away by In 2016, an Australian veteran came to fight the fighters they reach out to, but a few such with the Pravyi Sector attracted by action inexperienced adventurers have nevertheless Facebook posts by American fighters he made it to the Ukrainian battlefield. knew (Rubinsztein-Dunlop et al. 2018). A

6 The experienced individuals here are not considered mercenaries – many have other professional experience and none report being primarily motivated by financial rewards. Nevertheless, it is important to note reportedly substantial presence of private military contractors, who usually arrive and operate in units, rather than single individuals – and thus fall outside the scope of this analysis. Often these are nationals of one of warring parties, i.e. Russia or Ukraine, and thus would fall outside of the geographic scope of this paper’s analysis – but given their exposure to the same risk factors and reportedly limited access to post-conflict reintegration support mechanisms, this category of returnees could pose a potential risk of violent radicalization.

12 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

year later, a young Australian neo-Nazi and above, can also be classified as battle chasers. gun owner reported searching the internet These few are supporters of the Islamic State, for weeks looking for battalions that take and have fought in its ranks in Syria and/or in volunteer foreign fighters – he had Iraq (Racz 2017). considered going to fight ISIS in Syria first, but the fear of terrorism charges led him to Overall, the conflict in Ukraine has inevitably go to fight with the pro-Ukraine battalion attracted some battle chasers – including a instead (Rubinsztein-Dunlop et al. 2018). very small number of adventurous civilians, Two Americans, who had come to fight on who either managed to withstand the scrutiny the pro-Ukrainian side, reportedly got bored of recruiters, or simply showed up on the with the lack of action and subsequently left battlefield. However, the analysis of available to seek more intense combat experiences in data and the in-depth interviews suggest South Sudan and Venezuela (Meger 2019). that the number of such battle chasers is much smaller, and their fates often much less It is also important to note that, in addition glorious (and rather short-lived) compared to to experienced Western fighters and what the media accounts might lead one to adventurous youth, some of the men of the believe. Chechen Sheikh Mansur battalion, discussed

II. Concerns and Lessons (Not) Learned

Most of the current academic understanding the one Islamic battalion of Sheikh Mehsud about the typical behavioral patterns of, and in Ukraine). Furthermore, despite numerous potential risks associated with, the returning arrests and charges of acts of terrorism brought foreign fighters rest on the extensive research against the returnees, discussed in the section about conflicts in the Arab world – from Iraq on State Approaches below, it is important to and Somalia to Yemen and Libya, as well as note the lack of – at least publically identified Syria and the international terror campaigns – presence of known international or regional linked with Al-Qaeda and ISIS. The different terrorist organizations in Ukraine. Instead, cultural and political background of the the fighter motivational profiles described conflict in Ukraine means that while some above suggest that fighters arriving in Ukraine of these insights might still apply, they ought tend to already hold more extreme political to be re-examined with care against the views and possess at least some military particular local context. training. They are often already on the local law enforcement radar, and so it is less about The most common concern is that the battle capable young men getting radicalized and hardened fighters will come back radicalized equipped to fight, and more about radicals by the combat and ideas they fought for, and getting better trained and networking among put their skills to use locally – establishing the like-minded. Indeed, there seemed to be domestic chapters of international extremist no shortage of foreign fighters who, upon organizations or founding new extremist encountering the broad spectrum of fighters groups. However, the tactics adopted by on their, as well as the enemy side, have come foreign fighters in Ukraine – on either side of out with a more moderate worldview, akin the conflict – seem to mimic guerilla warfare to the sentiment described by a pro-Russian more closely, rather than suicide bombings fighter self-identifying as anarchist “I got more common in the extremist Islamic bored with it, all this opposition of right wing circles (and this seems to hold true also for and left wing people. I found friends among

13 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

the enemies and I got to understand that it media, without any direct personal contact was all just a game” (Meger 2019). seems sufficient to inspire self-radicalization in individuals so inclined. A noteworthy A common related concern is that the example here would be the Christchurch returnees will serve as heroic examples and shooter – an Australian extremist, who claims recruit, or help the recruiters attract, new to have visited Ukraine (although does not fighters for the cause. This seems to be a appear to have participated in the fighting) somewhat valid risk in Ukraine, albeit it and references the conflict in the infamous seems to be most pronounced while the manifesto he distributed as justification fighters are still on the battlefield rather for shooting up a mosque in New Zealand than upon their return. Namely, the absolute in 2019. With the growing international majority of foreign fighters claim to have prevalence of lone-wolf terrorism (as opposed been inspired by social media posts by other to organized terrorist groups), the concerns fighters on the battlefield, and have found about self-radicalization are justifiably on the their way to Ukraine through social networks rise – but it seems yet again that radicalism is – reaching out to the fighters they knew or feeding into the conflict in Ukraine more so approaching unfamiliar prominent fighters. than the other way around: the Christchurch Thus far, there are only a few publicly known manifesto has been promptly translated into cases of returnees serving as a recruitment Russian, Ukrainian, and other less-common point to attract new fighters (in Italy and languages and was reportedly making the ), potentially because by the rounds among the far-right fighters, including time these fighters may make the decision to the Azov battalion (Bellingcat 2019). return they might be experiencing the fatigue and/or loss of faith in an armed solution to It is further worth considering the latent the conflict. Nevertheless, there might be threat posed by returning foreign fighters. another long term risk – as some of the Through time spent in the conflict new returning foreign fighters are sentenced and networks of relationships are forged that jailed for their activities, they could contribute share a particular worldview, and the fighters to radicalization in their homeland’s prisons. tend to keep in touch after returning home. Subsequently, such networks can be used Nevertheless, through no additional active to collect and/or share intelligence about effort on their part, the foreign fighters the situation in the home country. More may become inspirational examples for significantly, they could be used as a latent others to take violent action – through self- spearhead for disruptive action, or as a radicalization. For instance, Malet (2015) has transformational agent operationalizing found that the heroic effect of foreign fighters domestic supporters of a particular cause. serving as inspiration to others through social One example shedding light on the media is much greater while they are still active disruptive potential of returning fighters was in the conflict, compared to when they return the foiled 2016 coup in Montenegro: the home. In another example Mares (2017) has plot to murder the prime minister on the found that the heroic coverage about a pro- day of election involved several right-wing Russian Czech soldier killed in combat in extremists, who have fought in Ukraine, as Ukraine mobilized both, the right- and left- well as two Russia’s GRU agents (Beslin and wing, political extremists in the country. It Ignjatijevic 2016; Bellingcat 2018). In this is difficult to assess whether and how much regard, returning fighters in the disillusioned additional risk there might be associated ideologues category would be of particular with the physical return of the fighters, as concern – sufficiently dissatisfied with the observing their combat actions on social state of the world to risk their life in a foreign

14 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

country, now better trained and networked see; and many of those potentially bent on such cadre could likely be convinced to assist bringing the armed fight back home still in anti-government / anti-minority / white- lack the competence to do so alone and/or supremacist activities. The returning ethnic do not receive international support for their Russian fighters supportive of the Putin intended local cell activities. In Ukraine, regime, who are citizens of other countries, the death rate would not be anywhere would be of particular concern in this regard. near that high, as suicide bombing is not a prevalent tactic, and most of the foreign Following the discussion on the potential fighters have arrived in the last, and the less security risks that returning foreign fighters violent and intense, stages of the conflict. could pose, it is worth also presenting some Continued battle seeking certainly seems to of the mitigating factors that have thus be channeling fighters from that category far prevented some of the international towards more violent conflicts elsewhere in concerns about radicalization and terrorism the world, rather than back home. However, from coming to fruition. Hegghammer and disillusionment with fighting as a solution Nesser (2015) estimate that in Islamists seems much discussed, but it is difficult to circles, approximately only 1 in 360 (i.e., judge its prevalence among the fighters. Based 0.28%) returning foreign fighters proceed to on the personal interviews with the returnees bring the fight back home and plot attacks and the open source literature, disillusionment against their homeland. Drawing, again, on applies to some of the ideologically motivated the literature on Islamic fighters in Iraq and individuals with prior military training who Syria, Byman (2015) offers a summary of did not hold extreme views prior to coming the key explanations: approximately half of to combat, and also to many of the battle the foreign fighters – often the most radical chasers without prior military experience. and enthusiastic – end up dying on suicide These individuals seem more inclined to missions or the front lines of combat; some return, give up the fight, and publicly discuss continue moving from conflict to conflict their experiences, but this would only mean without spending much time in their a higher remaining concentration of radical- homeland; others become disillusioned with minded foreign fighters in Ukraine, who will fighting as a solution to the problems they not be able to stay there indefinitely.

III. State Approaches to Returnees

Effective functioning of the state security the alternative routes – various re-education apparatus is often mentioned as key to and re-integration mechanisms. However, preventing the returning foreign fighters it is necessary to acknowledge that both from engaging in violent extremism – and of these approaches inherently isolate the it seems that in all the nations from which returning foreign fighters from the rest of fighters have flocked to Ukraine, the national society, and – by design or in case of failure – security services have kept tabs on them can exacerbate the feeling of “otherness” and since, for better or worse. Since many states risk sharpening their antagonism. Essentially, approach returning fighters as a potential the “more positive othering” that singles out security risk and choose to deal with this a person to be re-educated or monitored, or risk through criminal prosecution, this the “more negative othering” that prosecutes section starts by reviewing the different law and imprisons or fines them, risks amplifying enforcement approaches the states have the very core factors in radicalization that adopted to this end. It proceeds to present these measures are designed to reduce.

15 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

The concern about the potential for violent approach, the implementation differed extremist activities conducted by foreign significantly – from a formalized political fighters who return from Syria and Iraq, has led slap on the wrists, to serious prison sentences. a growing number of countries to adopt laws Of the countries discussed in this study as that allow them to put these returnees on trial originators of foreign fighters in Ukraine, the for terrorist activities abroad. Hegghammer UK, Czech Republic, Italy, Spain, Belarus, and Nesser (2015) suggests that pre-emptive Latvia, and Serbia would fall within this arrests geared towards minimizing this threat primarily punitive category. were by far more extensive than anything related to previous conflicts, and that they The first EU citizen to face punishment have contributed to reducing the potential for fighting in Ukraine was Ben Stimson threat of acts of terrorism. However, only a from the UK – his fighting for the pro- few countries have used this new legislation Russian side was termed as assisting acts of designed to counter terrorism at home and terrorism, and he was given a 5 year prison abroad to charge fighters returning from the sentence (Coynash 2019). Following this conflict in Ukraine. The present variety of conviction, there were serious considerations punitive approaches is such that the states given to the equivalence of treatment dealing with this issue do not lend themselves of fighters on the pro-Russian and pro- neatly into categorization, and ought to be Ukrainian sides. The UK’s official position considered in small groups by verisimilitude, on the matter remains that each case is to be according to their current practices (see assessed individually, depending on the acts Table 2 below). Most of those caught in the committed by individuals on the battlefield, prosecutorial net were pro-Russian fighters – but establishing the reliability of evidence officially unacknowledged, but nevertheless has been problematic. Subsequently, some of sometimes saved from prosecution by the interviewed fighters lamented that Chris the Russian state. The legal status of pro- Garrett (the abovementioned British de- Ukrainian fighters seems more diverse and miner fighting with the pro-Ukraine Azov complex: some have served in battalions that battalion) was also repeatedly picked up for are under the official command of the state questioning by the police for his involvement of Ukraine (like Azov or Aidar), others were in acts of violence – although he was not part the Pravyi Sektor movement that grew formally prosecuted, and official accounts on political and social branches in addition to the the matter are scant. fighting capability, while others still fought in independent units (like most Chechens and In addition, in Czech Republic in 2019, 10 Georgians). fighters were under criminal investigation for their participation in the pro-Russian In the elusive categories of state approaches separatist campaign, and one Czech to returning fighters from Ukraine, the first army veteran had been charged with acts one could be considered as primarily punitive. of terrorism for fighting to support the Within it, the punitive measures would breakaway republics – facing 5-20 years in vary, as some states chose to treat this as an prison (Coynash 2019). This might be the act of terrorism (or support for one), using strictest punitive measures brought against Iraq and Syria as a precedent, while others a foreign fighter returning from Ukraine to chose to apply criminal measures (usually date. for possession of arms or illicit funds), and still other states have turned to their special Spain was another early prosecutor of its legal provisions prohibiting foreign fighting citizens fighting on the pro-Russian side, in general. Regardless of the formal punitive arresting eight young men in 2015 on

16 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

TABLE 2. Range of Punitive Approaches to Fighters in Ukraine LV, CZ BY UK, IT ESP EST Australia PLN, SK Serbia Approach punish punish punish punish punish extradite watch denial

Charges terrorism, foreign terrorism criminal foreign terrorism foreign criminal criminal fighting fighting fighting

charges of “possessing arms and explosives, Kreshko 2018). Moreover, the right-wing complicity in murders and assassinations, and Italians fighting on the Ukraine side are not influencing the neutrality of Spain” (Draper being prosecuted, and are being provided a 2015). However, most of these investigations legal cover by Ukraine (Scimia 2015), at least seem to have been dropped, lacking supportive for the duration of their stay. evidence (Matveeva 2017). Belarus has been the only country where the In 2015, Italy introduced an anti-terrorism state security services summarily prosecute law that threatened citizens going to fight all returnees from Ukraine – combatants and abroad with prison sentences of 3-10 years, non-combatants – as mercenaries (Astapenia and also made punishable auxiliary activities, 2015). This exceptional treatment is likely such as recruitment, financial support, and related to their presence in Ukraine being social media activities (Scimia 2015). By an act of more forceful political opposition, 2018, up to 20 men have been arrested in rather than Belarus’ stricter policy against Italy on charges of recruiting fighters to foreign fighting in general, or the behavior of go into Ukraine – they were reportedly of Belarusians in Ukraine. neo-Nazi convictions, linked with the pro- Russian Rusich fighter unit, – and 25 more By mid-2019 Serbia – a state, which Ukraine men who had found on the pro-Russian side has repeatedly petitioned to address the have been listed as wanted for questioning problem of a large influx of its nationals into (Wesolowsky Kreshko 2018). In 2019, the conflict – has pressed criminal charges three more men associated with the fascist against 45 men for fighting in a foreign political party of Forza Nueva were arrested conflict (all on the pro-Russian side). Most of for fighting on the pro-Russian side – with the accused have pleaded guilty, and had their a cache of Nazi plaques, automatic weapons, sentences reduced or suspended, conditional and even a complete missile discovered on upon no repeated offence; four men have been their premises (CBS 2019). However, Italy sentenced to six months under house arrest seems to be applying justice to these fighters (Zivanovic 2018, Metodieva 2019). Given selectively: among those prosecuted for that these men were involved in some of the fighting on the pro-Russian side, associates of most notorious pro-Russian units, including the Lega Nord (a nationalist and pro-Russian the Wagner Brigade, and how the issue has ruling party of Italy’s deputy PM Matteo been increasingly straining the diplomatic Salvini) seem to be receiving a free pass. A relations between Ukraine and Serbia, Serbia son of one of the Lega Nord’s members who might be classified as applying the most went to fight on the pro-Russian side was formalist law enforcement approach that is even publicly praised for it (Wesolowsky barely a slap on the wrists for the offenders.

17 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

While the European states discussed above responses. In 2016, Estonia extradited its apply analogous legal approaches to their citizen, an ethnic Russian who fought on the citizens who went to fight in Syria or Iraq, pro-Russian side, to Ukraine on terrorism and Ukraine, Australia might be one of charges (Coynash 2019). Meanwhile, Latvia the exceptions that treats these conflicts chose to prosecute its returnees but treated decidedly differently on legal grounds. While these activities differently than terrorism – in all of the Australians who have gone into 2019, it sentenced a pro-Russian fighter from the Ukraine conflict on either side have been Daugavpils (of non-citizen status) to 5 years under the watch of law enforcement agencies in prison for participation in armed conflict since their return, the official legal stance outside Latvia (Coynash 2019). In Lithuania, is that they have not violated these foreign there is no public record of persons having fighter laws (Rubinsztein-Dunlop et al 2018), been put on trial for taking part in the conflict and have thus not been prosecuted. in Ukraine on either side, although several pro-Russian fighters were investigated. Another, somewhat exceptional, course of action has been chosen by Poland. The Overall, it is important to note that official country officially denies any presence of its prosecutorial approaches to fighters returning citizens among the fighter ranks in Ukraine, from Ukraine into their home countries are while at the same time threatening them still under formation and differ significantly with criminal prosecution should they from country to country (as summarized return ( Jackson 2014). The Slovak approach in Table 2). This stands in contrast to a was somewhat comparable: the Ministry seemingly general EU-level acceptance of of Foreign Affairs was not able to confirm the need to prosecute the fighters returning the presence of Slovak fighters in Ukraine, from Syria or Iraq on terrorism charges, and but condemned such behavior, while the the broad adoption of associated legal codes. Intelligence Service did acknowledge Slovak With fighters returning from Ukraine, there participation in the conflict and expressed is a lack of uniformity not only in the legal concerns about their possible radicalization approach to the punitive practice, but also (Cuprik 2015). in its implementation, and even still, most countries have only chosen to consider In the Baltic states, the treatment of applying it to fighters on the pro-Russian returning foreign fighters seems to be a side. mixed bag, in terms of law enforcement

IV. Fates of Returning Fighters

This section looks more closely into the fates one, as many combatants have tended to go of some of the returning fighters, and the into Ukraine for repeated stints of several social attitudes they tend to be met with. weeks or months at a time. Since none of These positive and negative experiences are the interviewees or persons identified in the much more scarcely reported in public sources public accounts expressed intent to go back and more difficult to glean from personal there, they can be considered having returned interviews, compared to the accounts of – but so would the fighters presently residing their fighting. It is also worth noting that in their home countries if they would be in the concept of returning is a somewhat fluid between the stints.

18 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

Marginalization was one of the most elsewhere in Europe. This spread-out due common outcomes of the returnees from to marginalization is especially noteworthy, either side of the conflict. A Swedish fighter given the large Georgian presence among the on the pro-Ukrainian side interviewed foreign fighters. for this project, who could be classified as a disillusioned ideologue, felt the To date, the foreign fighters who have found experience had isolated and disadvantaged themselves marginalized upon return, have him. Prominent radical right-wing fighters, not been known to get involved in politics7, regularly engaged – and demonized – by join violent movements, or commit acts of the Swedish media, have led to a neo-Nazi violence. Given the breadth of motives and scare in the country. As a result, being known backgrounds of these marginalized fighters, as a fighter automatically branded him as a the lack of violent radicalization – despite similar type of radical in the eyes of society. the strong pushing factors of social exclusion He was regularly visited and questioned by and resentment combined with combat skills the police, struggling to find employment, – is noteworthy. One of the staying factors that and was considering changing his legal name came up in a few interviews was going into and moving to a different country to start the conflict with the clearprospect of return, anew. Coverage of a known Australian fighter, and the need to be able to continue working best categorized as battle chaser, indicates and living a regular life upon returning – this similar discontent with extensive attention spurred on the need for self-preservation, by the local authorities, struggling to shake keeping fighters away from the most intense off the label of a potential threat to society battles and controversial companions. A after his six-month involvement on the pro- few other potential staying factors could be Ukrainian side (Rubinsztein-Dunlop et al associated with the theater of war type of 2018, Bucci 2019). A Georgian fighter on restrictions, whereby the suspension of norms the pro-Ukrainian side interviewed for this against the use of violence and adapting a project, who could be classified as a veteran certain lifestyle become acceptable only in with historical grievances, experienced a a specific place for a specific time. Once the more complex form of marginalization. The fighter exits this time-space frame by returning current Georgian government with pro- home, the norms proscribing violence kick Russian leanings had him and several other back in. Concerning the choice to limit Georgian fighters forcibly repatriated from the violence to the selected territory, the Ukraine, and he was subsequently regularly disillusioned ideologues seemed to be moved questioned, struggled to find employment, and to act abroad by the injustices they saw unfold found former acquaintances avoiding him for abroad – despite facing some frustration with fear of being persecuted by the government the politics and or environment in the home as well – although in private many have country, they nonetheless seem to choose to welcomed him as a hero. He described this focus on the injustices seen abroad rather marginalization and confrontation with the than engaging in non-violent or violent security services as fairly typical among the protest actions at home first. Concerning the pro-Ukraine fighters, many of whom have specific target against which the violence was subsequently relocated either to Ukraine or justified, many in the marginalized category

7 It is worth noting that a growing number of Ukrainian volunteer fighters have been elected to parliament since 2015: commanders from the Azov and Aidar battalions were elected as independents, and commanders from the Pravyi Sektor, , Dnipro 1, and Mirotvorcheskii unit have joined political parties (see Puglisi 2015).

19 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

report willingness to continue fighting Regarding other paths of concern discussed Russia in other forms or in countries other in section II, returning members do seem than Ukraine, and many in the category of to have potential to be used as latent tools veterans with historical grievances have for silencing political opposition, or more evidently done so. By contrast, these men specifically – opinions that run counter to showed no willingness to join a fight in Russia’s interests. A notable example of this Syria or Iraq – unlike the battle chasers – type is a Slovak pro-Russian fighter who emphasizing the target specific nature of their upon his return in 2016 started threatening a decision to take-up arms. Nevertheless, while local journalist with violence (including death some fighters might have an inherently more threats) over his coverage of the Ukraine mentally balanced approach to the challenges conflict (Mares 2017). Meger (2019) has they were faced with in the conflict and also noted a case of two foreign fighters, who upon return, and might not view violence as have returned to Australia in 2018 and have the immediate or preferred response, those cultivated ties to local extreme right-wing with inherent anti-social propensities, low groups, including participating in protests empathic skills and other signs of potential and rallies. Overall, interviewees reported mental instability might not take so mildly regular Russian efforts to recruit and spur to to marginalization. violence the members of battalions (and their associated groups) with the more extreme There was already a small number of views on both sides of the conflict – including foreign fighters who did get engaged in a the pro-Ukrainian Azov battalion as one of streak of violence, or threatened to do so. the more right-wing examples. Arguably, their propensity for radical action and violence was detectable before their Nevertheless, there were also more neutral engagement in the conflict. Rather than and/or positive personal outcomes of being prompted to radicalization by their returning foreign fighters. A Lithuanian experiences or eventually putting their newly interviewed for this study, who had supported acquired battle skills to violent ends – as is the pro-Ukrainian efforts and could be commonly feared – these men seem to have classified as a battle chaser with prior military gone into the conflict with the specific experience, reported experiencing a boost in purpose of gaining the necessary skills to confidence upon return, which helped him conduct the acts of violence. For instance, start his own business. Even still, he reported in 2017, two Swedish members of the neo- being confronted with criticism over the Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement (which decision to go to Ukraine – which seems is fiercely anti-immigrant) have reportedly curious, given the firm and vocal backing of gone into Ukraine to train with a Russian Ukraine as Lithuania’s official state position. battalion fighting there, and upon their Comparably, the pro-Russian fighters from return bombed a center for asylum seekers in Serbia, who are not criminally prosecuted, are Sweden (Bucci 2019). Another comparable not construed as a threat in public discourse case is an American member of the Rise (Metodieva 2019) – with Serbia taking the Above Movement (white supremacists), who mirror-opposite official state position to that travelled to Europe in 2017 to celebrate of Lithuania’s and backing Russia in this Hitler’s birthday, and he met with members conflict – but the returnees have not reported of the pro-Ukrainian Azov battalion (he marginalization or negative social feedback. was not known to go on to actually fight in Ukraine) – he subsequently went on to Unsurprisingly, the in-depth interviews assault protestors during the Charlottesville indicate that most foreign fighters have rally (Bucci 2019). kept in touch in some way or another with

20 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

the people they’ve met on the front lines. in violence upon return is unlikely. Indeed, Interestingly, Matveeva (2017) has found most have chosen not to get involved in even that in most countries some of the returnees more benign forms of domestic activism, such from both sides of the conflict in Ukraine as protests or politics. Nevertheless, a number have banded into more formalized national of individuals with demonstrable propensity or international unions, based around the for violence have managed to either go into idea of volunteerism. These examples range battle in Ukraine, or get in touch with those from the Union of Donbas Volunteers who did, and the concern over potential (international) to Donbassforeningen extremist activities could be rightfully (Sweden) or Coordinamento Solidale per il channeled here. Since many of them were on Donbass (Italy), among others. Regardless the law enforcement watch lists prior to their of whether they are right- or left-leaning, connection to the conflict in Ukraine, such a most of these movements seem to share the connection might only serve as an additional traits of disillusionment with the Western warning sign. The study indicates that the capitalist world order – as described in the two greatest concerns with returning fighters disillusioned ideologues category. is their marginalization or becoming tools of external influence. With active Russian Overall, the data analysis and in-depth recruiting in the field, some countries have interviews suggest that the most feared already seen attempts to use the returnees outcome – the radicalization of foreign for political purposes or even to incite fighters in Ukraine – with the potential to violence. The potential consequences of social turn to violence upon return home – has so far marginalization run much deeper, and risk not been observed, and remains a somewhat producing second or third order effects that remote possibility. The nature of action being might eventually lead to violent outcomes – so target- and locale-specific suggests, that for especially among persons with lower social most foreign fighters in this conflict engaging skills and sparser support networks.

V. Conclusions and Implications

This study has analyzed four basic types of Russian citizens, who felt they have exhausted foreign fighters coming from Western, mostly the means of political activism (through art, European, countries to fight in support literature, and NGO work) in their home of one of the warring parties in Ukraine. countries. The battle chasers, perhaps more Experienced veterans coming to resettle commonly encountered in captive media old scores with either Ukraine or Russia profiles, actually formed the minority of seemed to be the most common type. The those present in the conflict – most of the second most prevalent category was mostly adventurous civilians tended to be weeded civilian highly ideologically engaged men, out before making it to war or quickly got who went to fight in Ukraine because they disappointed in its realities, while the battle- were convinced that the modern Western hardened veterans gradually moved on to world order and lifestyle was failing them other, more active conflicts. in particular, and has pushed the Ukrainian or Russian societies into conflict in general. Having looked at the common social concerns The study has identified a new, frequently and analysed the different ways, with which overlooked category of armed opposition, European governments are choosing to mostly represented by Belarusians and deal with their returning fighters, the study

21 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

concludes that the disillusioned ideologues to get trained in Ukraine or by experienced and battle chasers of the adventurous fighters from Ukraine – in other words, the civilian type are of the greatest concern. The concern ought not be about persons going to analysis suggests that the aggrieved veterans, Ukraine and turning radical, but about the prompted to action by (foreign) target- radicals committed to violence and trying to specific motivation, would be unlikely to burst learn from, or getting inspired by, the fighters out against other (including domestic) targets. or events in Ukraine. The available data indicates that the veterans seem to activate for battle only where the In general, it seems that in searching for “nemesis” is present – e.g., bringing the fight analogies and drawing inferences for against Russia from Chechnya or Georgia assessing the risks, fighters flocking to the into Ukraine, but not other conflicts. While Islamist cause in Syria and Iraq tend to be upon return from their original warfighting brought up as the first choice of a precedent experience some of these men had gotten – however, they make for poor comparisons. involved in other illicit activities (e.g., As noted at the outset of this study, in these trafficking or other gang activities), they do conflicts, driven in no small part by religious not seem to have a record for involvement with sentiment, a significant portion of the arriving politically radical or other terrorist groups. In individual foreign fighters receive training, this respect, individuals representing political get armed, and are organized in small groups opposition, who have decided to take up for a prolonged campaign in order to actively arms, are similarly oriented against a specific take part in either sporadic attacks or suicide target. This group has mostly never engaged missions – all of which stands in contrast to in any form of violence prior to entering the the conflict in Ukraine. The second analogy conflict in Ukraine, and even there, many that could potentially be more insightful is have taken up non-violent support functions. the of 1936-1939, which Thus the core concerns over the potential for unfolded in a catholic European country, and radicalization and violence among the foreign pitted the right- and left- wing ideologists, fighters returning from Ukraine should be fascists and communists against each other directed towards the highest risk groups: the in a country trying to decide its status. Even disillusioned ideologues and civilian battle though the conflict in Ukraine is not a civil war, chasers – and the subsequent analysis focuses in addition to the somewhat similar cultural on them. and religious background, the Spanish civil war offers an insightful historic precedent of Their potential to inspire, enable, and a situation where large numbers of foreigners otherwise contribute to radical political and came to aid both fighting sides there out of social movements at home seems enhanced by ideological conviction or desire to put their the experience of mixing with other fighters battle skills to use. As the Spanish civil war of similar conviction. These fighters have concluded, most countries have agreed to the potential to pose a latent destabilizing assist their nationals returning from combat threat from socio-political perspective, financially and logistically, and despite and their activities ought to be monitored widespread fears that they would bring the more carefully for this aspect. The overall spark of communism or back home pre-occupation with returning fighters as to energize the local masses against the a potential terrorism threat (in light of the government, where these movements did take discourse on the fighters in Syria and Iraq) root, these returnees were not their backbone seems misplaced. The study suggests that the – although some did get involved in politics singular cases who seem ready, willing, and and social movements (see, e.g., Tammikko able to conduct such acts of violence attempt 2018). A third set of analogies potentially

22 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

more helpful for understanding the push and implications of the increasingly extreme pull factors affecting the foreign fighters in right-wing nationalist individuals coming Ukraine could be the extensive literature on out of Azov, Aidar, and Pravyi Sektor fighter the right- and left-wing extremism. Rather groups and various youth, political, and than focusing the combat aspect of their informal groups associated with them. It is experience, lessons and insights could be not a stretch to get concerned about the gust drawn from the mechanisms through which of wind under the sails of similar movements these movements spread across countries, elsewhere in Europe as the conflict in Ukraine and what types of persons tended to get starts to wind down – with some parties involved in the more extreme ideological end, inevitably feeling scorned by any peace deal or even turn to violence. Indeed, Ukraine is to be. already reeling under the political and social

VI. Recommendations

The first recommended policy step would be to to the battlefield, governments wishing to establish a clear position towards the citizens reduce the number of their citizens going to going to fight in Ukraine: is it encouraged or fight in Ukraine should considerflagging discouraged? How will it be treated from a and limiting this coverage. Similar to the legal standpoint? Will the same rules and best practices in covering news stories about conditions be applied to fighters joining suicides, when the method is not disclosed both sides of the conflict – or if not, why? and helplines are provided, new stories The issue is, unsurprisingly, highly politicized covering fighters present in, or returning in Europe, with different domestic factions from, Ukraine could limit the publishable supporting different sides of the conflict, and content about aspects such as the fighter’s the legal frameworks still in development. identity, location, and means of traveling to However, extended ambiguity risks creating the conflict, in addition to avoiding heroic a situation where punitive legislation could aspects of the stories. In particular, it would be used to target political opposition linked seem worthy accompanying such news stories to the conflict in Ukraine (not necessarily with the contacts of local support services, in combatant capacity), or where seemingly such as psychological assistance in general selective application of justice exacerbates or veteran psychological services in particular, domestic tensions between right- and left- social workers able to assist with housing or leaning organizations of various degrees of employment in general, or counselling for radicalization. The public messaging should exit from radical organizations in particular cover the appropriateness of active support to (if such services are available in the news- the different sides of the Ukraine conflict in publishing country). Regarding social media various forms (e.g., charity and NGO work – posts and potential communications regarding domestic or in the field, - versus taking part joining the conflict in combat role they could in combat), and be coordinated with the be flagged and/or removed, manually or foreign policy stance. with the help of algorithms - similar to the current practices of flagging inappropriate Given the considerable influence of social pornographic or criminal content. The scope and traditional media in the heroic portrayals and type of coverage would largely depend of fighting in general and certain fighters in on whether these measures are agreed upon a particular, and its subsequently significant pan-European, regional, or national level. facilitating role in getting new volunteers

23 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

In addition, significant effort ought to go activities there, differ quite dramatically into prevention, namely, the intelligence from foreign fighters joining radical Islamist services flagging and tracking the activities of causes. In terms of exposure to war trauma, persons in right- and left-wing organizations they might be more closely compared to that take extreme positions, especially ones local armed service veteran experiences and, that could be linked with the narratives if deemed appropriate, similar counselling currently playing out in Ukraine. This should and/or reintegration assistance should be be considered a particular risk factor in offered. On the other hand, persons in the combination with combat training of any disillusioned ideologues category might be kind – from gun shooting skills and hunting more deeply immersed in political activism, hobbies, to broader survivor challenge courses, both in Ukraine and upon return, potentially to experience in the armed services or law self-selecting into roles that involve less enforcement, or a criminal record for violence. combat and more associated support tasks. Still, the acute picture of the mental state and Here, for persons deemed at risk, counselling propensity for violence might be difficult geared towards exiting radical circles might to establish in youth cases, petty offenders, be more appropriate than the war trauma and persons marginally involved in such support. In addition, it is important to networks. Sharing intelligence on such at risk consider the returning fighters who are being persons with regional authorities, particularly held in prison, awaiting trial or serving their those monitoring entry to and from Ukraine, sentence there – without careful assessment, is paramount to ensuring that the groups counselling, and monitoring, incarcerating most at risk do not enter the combat zone persons at risk would not only risk furthering where they could be trained and/or further their self-radicalization by othering, as radicalized. Nevertheless, monitoring the mentioned above, but could open them political and social activism of returning to a literally captive audience of potential fighters ought to be significantly higher new recruits for radical political or violent on the priority list of national intelligence causes. Furthermore, countries experiencing services – with the current preoccupation a considerable inflow of immigrants from of preventing violence, the risk is that the Ukraine, who may have been exposed to, types of potentially destabilizing influences or actively participated, in combat, should that unfold over a longer period could be consider extending these services to them overlooked. as well – especially since their availability in Ukraine is extremely limited at this point. The final recommendation regarding the Overall, it is important to actively consider returning foreign fighters would be to measures that could help reduce the risk strengthen the network available to support of social stigmatization of fighters and their reintegration into the society. Social related persons. Emphasizing their multiple marginalization and alienation could push other social identities (role(s) in the family, persons to join radical circles at home, or professional skills, religious affiliation etc.) connect to the ones abroad and/or establish could help gradually reduce the significance a local faction of it. While clearly not of the fighter identity. all marginalized foreign fighters turn to radicalism or violence, all those who did To sum up, national government agencies turn have faced social exclusion, oftentimes of European countries keen to engage and even before heading off to the battle. On collaborate in addressing concerns over the one hand, the types of persons who foreign fighters in Ukraine ought to take up went to fight in Ukraine, and their combat consistent positions on the matter; take steps to

24 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

stop glorifying the battle; step-up prevention actions to countering violence, if any. While of radicals seeking combat experiences; the devil is unsurprisingly in the details and support fighter reintegration to avoid of implementation and in mustering the marginalized grievances exploding. Moreover, political will to address the issue head on, it is the significantly more focus should be shifted important to appreciate the nuances involved towards monitoring and countering radical and to put aside the notion that continuing political activities rather than the currently to flirt with ambiguity will somehow lead the narrow approach to limit the government storm to pass.

25 Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Assessing Potential Risks

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