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Amnesty International Report 2014/15 the State of the World's Human Rights

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Amnesty International Report 2014/15 the State of the World's Human Rights human rights and governance work. Police Kony, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) investigations into most of these break-ins leader, and three LRA commanders. The men remained pending. were still at large at the end of the year. On the night of 5 May, the offices of Former LRA commander Thomas Kwoyelo, HURINET-U were broken into. A server, who in 2011 pleaded not guilty before the 29 computers, office cameras, safes, and International Crimes Division of the High security cameras were stolen. Court to charges of murder, wilful killing and On the night of 17 May, the offices of other offences committed in the context of the Uganda Land Alliance were broken the conflict in northern Uganda, remained into. Documents, computers and cameras remanded in prison. The government appeal were stolen. against the Constitutional Court’s decision A petition challenging the constitutionality that Thomas Kwoyelo was entitled to amnesty of the Non-Governmental Organizations under the Amnesty Act of 2000 remained Registration (Amendment) Act filed in 2006 pending before the Supreme Court. A remained pending. Proposals made in 2013 complaint submitted by Thomas Kwoyelo to further amend the NGO Law ostensibly to to the African Commission on Human and expand government control over NGO funding Peoples’ Rights challenging his continued and activities remained pending before the detention by the Ugandan government Cabinet. Authorities also proposed a Civic remained pending. Education Policy which if adopted would mean that any programmes to provide civic education - including on human rights - would need accreditation at the district level. Organizations deemed in breach of the policy UKRAINE could have their activities suspended for up to six months, have their accreditation revoked, Ukraine or even blacklisted. Head of state: Petro Poroshenko (replaced Oleksandr Turchynov in June, who replaced Viktor POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES Yanukovych in February) In July, groups of armed men staged violent Head of government: Arseniy Yatsenyuk (replaced attacks mainly on police posts in Bundibugyo, Mykola Azarov in February) Kasese and Ntoroko. At least 65 people were killed in the attacks, including civilians, some of the attackers, and members of the police Violence resulting from the protests in the force and the army. Following the outbreak capital Kyiv and later in eastern Ukraine of conflict in South Sudan, Ugandan troops escalated into a civil conflict with Russian were deployed to Juba city in December 2013 involvement. Violations by police, including in response to a request by the South Sudan torture and other ill-treatment as well as government to help secure the capital. In abusive use of force during demonstrations, January, Ugandan troops were present in Bor, continued with near-total impunity for the Jonglei state, where they supported the South perpetrators, while investigations into such Sudan authorities to regain control of the incidents remained ineffective. Abductions city from opposition forces. Ugandan troops of individuals were carried out, particularly remained in South Sudan throughout 2014. by pro-Russian paramilitaries in the occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE and by both warring sides in eastern Ukraine International Criminal Court arrest warrants affected by conflict. Both sides violated the issued in 2005 remained in force for Joseph laws of war. In Crimea, Russian restrictions 382 Amnesty International Report 2014/15 on the rights to freedom of expression, headquarters, in the cities of Donetsk and assembly and association were fully applied, Luhansk and several smaller towns, effectively and pro-Ukrainian activists and members of taking control over large parts of Donbass. the Crimean Tatar community were targeted On 15 April, the government announced the by paramilitaries and persecuted by the de beginning of an “anti-terrorist operation”. facto authorities. The situation rapidly escalated into an armed conflict between government forces BACKGROUND and separatist armed groups supported by Pro-European demonstrations in Kyiv Russia. Pro-Kyiv forces were making steady (“EuroMaydan”) sparked in 2013 by the advances until late August when Russia government’s decision not to sign an stepped up its covert military involvement Association Agreement with the EU, resulted in Ukraine.1A ceasefire between the warring in the ousting of President Yanukovych sides was agreed at negotiations in Belarus in on 22 February. Following the violent September, although fighting continued on a dispersal by police of the initially peaceful reduced scale, resulting in the deaths of more demonstration on the night of 29 November than 4,000 people by the end of the year. 2013, the demonstrators became increasingly After the de factoauthorities in Donetsk and radicalized. Protesters erected tents on the Luhansk held “elections” on 2 November, central Independence Square and occupied Kyiv withdrew its offer of limited devolution for several buildings. While most protesters the region. remained peaceful, violence by both sides Early presidential and parliamentary escalated. At least 85 demonstrators and elections were held on 25 May and 26 18 police officers died as a direct result October respectively, returning pro-European of violence at EuroMaydan in Kyiv, and parties and politicians to power. On 16 hundreds were injured. September the European Parliament and the After Viktor Yanukovych secretly left Ukrainian parliament ratified the Association Ukraine and an interim government was Agreement with the EU, but it had not been formed, increasingly violent protests began in agreed by all EU member states by the end the predominantly Russian-speaking Donbass of the year. region in eastern Ukraine. In Crimea, buildings belonging to the local authorities IMPUNITY - EUROMAYDAN were occupied by armed paramilitaries calling The three months of EuroMaydan themselves “self-defence forces” on the night demonstrations shone a spotlight on the of 26 to 27 February. Jointly with members of systemic problem of impunity for the abusive regular Russian forces they blocked Ukrainian use of force, and for torture and other ill- military installations across the peninsula, and treatment of individuals by law enforcement on 27 February, in the presence of armed officers in Ukraine. Riot police first used men, the Crimean parliament elected a new force against entirely peaceful protesters on leadership. A “referendum” was called on 16 30 November 2013, when they refused to March on the status of Crimea. Participants disperse, resulting in dozens of injuries and overwhelmingly voted in favour of unification the brief detention of 35 peaceful protesters with Russia while opponents boycotted it. On on charges of hooliganism. In response to 18 March, the de facto authorities of Crimea widespread condemnation, the authorities signed a “treaty” in Moscow resulting in its dismissed a senior Kyiv police official and annexation by Russia. reportedly initiated criminal proceedings By April, armed opponents of the new against him and four others, but these were government in Kyiv had occupied government never brought to any conclusion. In the buildings, including police and security subsequent weeks and months, the police Amnesty International Report 2014/15 383 repeatedly resorted to the abusive use of in April to review EuroMaydan-related force at EuroMaydan as well as making investigations. It had not reported on the arbitrary arrests and attempting to initiate progress of the investigations by the end of arbitrary criminal proceedings against the year. demonstrators.2Eventually, firearms with live ammunition, including sniper rifles, were ABDUCTIONS, DISAPPEARANCES deployed at the demonstrations, although AND KILLINGS it remained unclear which forces had used During the protests in Kyiv, several dozen them and under whose orders they had EuroMaydan activists went missing. While the acted. The head of the Ukrainian Security fate of over 20 remained unclarified at the Services (SBU) stated in November that 16 end of the year, it transpired that some were former riot police officers and five senior SBU abducted and ill-treated. In December, the officials had been arrested in connection with Prosecutor General’s Office reported that 11 the killings of protesters in Kyiv. men suspected of abducting EuroMaydan After the downfall of Viktor Yanukovych, activists had been arrested and several others the new authorities publicly committed to placed on a wanted list. None were law effectively investigating and prosecuting those enforcement officials, although they allegedly responsible for deaths during EuroMaydan acted under orders from former senior and all the abuses against protesters. police officials. However, apart from indicting former senior Yury Verbytsky and Igor Lutsenko went political leadership, few if any concrete steps missing on 21 January, from hospital. Igor were taken in this direction. Lutsenko reported that he was blindfolded Only two law enforcement officers stood and beaten by his captors, and then dumped trial for torture and other ill-treatment during in a forest in freezing temperatures. Yury EuroMaydan, both low-ranking conscripts Verbytsky was found dead in a forest, his from the Interior Ministry Troops. On 28 ribs broken, with traces of duct tape around May, they were given suspended sentences his head. of three and two years respectively for Abductions and ill-treatment of captives “exceeding authority or official powers” were common
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