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Briefing Political Trends & Dynamics The Far Right in the EU and the Western Balkans Volume 3 | 2020 POLITICAL TRENDS & DYNAMICS IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE A FES DIALOGUE SOUTHEAST EUROPE PROJECT Peace and stability initiatives represent a decades-long cornerstone of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s work in southeastern Europe. Recent events have only reaffirmed the centrality of Southeast European stability within the broader continental security paradigm. Both de- mocratization and socio-economic justice are intrinsic aspects of a larger progressive peace policy in the region, but so too are consistent threat assessments and efforts to prevent conflict before it erupts. Dialogue SOE aims to broaden the discourse on peace and stability in southeastern Europe and to counter the securitization of prevalent narratives by providing regular analysis that involves a comprehensive understanding of human security, including structural sources of conflict. The briefings cover fourteen countries in southeastern Europe: the seven post-Yugoslav countries and Albania, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova. PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED • Civic Mobilizations • The Digital Frontier in • The European Project in the Western in Southeast Europe Southeast Europe Balkans: Crisis and Transition February / March 2017 February / March 2018 Volume 2/2019 • Regional Cooperation in • Religion and Secularism • Chinese Soft Power the Western Balkans in Southeast Europe in Southeast Europe April / Mai 2017 April / May 2018 Volume 3/2019 • NATO in Southeast Europe • Inequality in Southeast Europe • Youth Policy in Southeast Europe June / July 2017 June / July 2018 Volume 4/2019 • Emerging Leadership • Bilateral Disputes • Deficient Welfare States in Southeast Europe in Southeast Europe in Southeast Europe August / September 2017 August / September 2018 Volume 1/2020 • Beyond Reconciliation in • Ecology and Justice • The COVID-19 Pandemic in Southeast Southeastern Europe in Southeast Europe Europe: Experiences on the Ground October / November 2017 October / November 2018 Special Edition • Gender in Politics in • Romania’s and Bulgaria’s • Nature or Politics: Southeast Europe Membership in the EU: Disaster Response in SEE December 2017 / January 2018 Progress, Challenges, Prospects Volume 2/2020 Volume 1/2019 POLITICAL TRENDS & DYNAMICS IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE EDITORIAL Alida Vračić, Jasmin Mujanović and Ioannis Armakolas On October 12, Slovak far-right politician Marian Kotleba, leader of the far-right People’s Party Our Slo- vakia (LSNS), was sentenced to four years and four months in jail. This verdict was part of a wider crack- down on extremism in the country, which has seen several high-level figures charged with racist crimes in recent years. Earlier this month Greece’s Nazi Golden Dawn party was ruled a criminal organization and found guilty by a court in Athens of operating a gang of hit squads targeting the group’s opponents and critics. These rulings are part of a broader confrontation with the far-right, which has been forced upon European governments in light of the growing popularity and influence of such reactionary movements. In past years, these groups have often been dismissed as marginal actors, which has served to obscure the danger they pose to democratic societies. Such an approach has helped to facilitate the dramatic growth of far-right parties and movements in Europe, who have, in turn, successfully tapped into feelings of po- litical alienation, while promoting sectarian grievances, to establish themselves as a definitive part of the contemporary political mainstream on the continent. Online the growth of far-right radical and extremist viewpoints is even more pronounced, with sophisti- cated, and tailored messaging easily deployed across social media networks by these groups reaching mil- lions of people in the EU and the Western Balkans. And while the online far-right sphere is “diverse”, with differently constituted local and continental groups appealing to particular, regional grievances, there is nevertheless a set of shared values among them: a general tendency towards xenophobia and chauvin- ism, with a particular emphasis on antisemitism, Islamophobia, anti-feminism, and anti-immigrant/refu- gee sentiment. To date, the brunt of the academic and pol- icy literature has focused on these manifes- CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE tations in the West. In this issue of the Po- litical Trends and Dynamics newsletter, we EDITORIAL . 3 show, however, that the far-right has made major inroads in Southeastern Europe and READY FOR THE RIDE ON THE CRISIS WAVE? the Western Balkans. Moreover, local radi- ON NARRATIVES, TOOLS AND TACTICS OF FAR cal and extremist groups have benefited RIGHT IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE . 5 from association with and tutelage by sim- Vedran Džihić and Gazela Pudar Draško ilar groups based out of the EU and the UNDERSTANDING THE ORBÁN-VUČIĆ U.S., as well as government-backed far- RELATIONSHIP . 7 right groups from Russia, such as the Night András Bíró-Nagy and James Hare Wolves motorcycle gang. And far-right ter- rorist attacks in the West - as in Christchurch THE SOUTHEAST FRONT: THE FAR RIGHT AND and Norway in 2011 – have shown a deep RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN THE WIDER BALKANS . 10 ideological familiarity with Serb ultra-na- Mark Galeotti tionalist themes from the 1990s. THE TRANSATLANTIC CONNECTIONS BETWEEN AMERICAN AND SOUTHEAST The contributions in this issue examine the EUROPEAN RACIST EXTREMISTS . 13 narratives, tactics, and tools used by far- Heidi Beirich right across Southeastern Europe, their links to like-minded groups in the conti- POLITICAL TRENDS & DYNAMICS OVERVIEW . 20 HIGHS AND LOWS . 21 nent’s West, and the acute threat they rep- ELECTORAL UPS AND DOWNS . 22 resent to regional and collective security GOVERNMENT FORMATION . 24 and democracy in the 21st century. These EU ACCESSION . 25 timely interventions offer important educa- ECONOMIC FORECASTS . 25 tional perspectives for civil society activists SECURITY . 26 and policymakers in how to deal with the 3 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG threat of a newly resurgent far-right. In short, these are no longer marginal groups; they are mobilized, well-organized, and militant. The defense of European democracy — within the EU and on its edges — will require a sustained policy framework that recognizes the true nature of the threat. Drawing on the perspective of local experts and policy analysts, we offer a series of essays on this topic with the hope that they will stimulate policy debate and conversation, as the global community tenta- tively looks to the “new normal” in the post-coronavirus world. After all, as much as the pandemic has dominated international attention, it has not eliminated the need for broader policy conversation. And as another wave of flooding presently strikes the region, we argue that now is the time to take stock — to prepare for the inevitable. 4 POLITICAL TRENDS & DYNAMICS IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE READY FOR THE RIDE ON THE CRISIS WAVE? ON NARRATIVES, TOOLS AND TACTICS OF FAR RIGHT IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE Vedran Džihić and Gazela Pudar Draško In a trial that involved 120 witnesses and took Vedran Džihić is a Senior Re- more than five years, in October 2020, Greece’s searcher with the Austrian Institute for International neo-Nazi Golden Dawn was been ruled to be a Affairs, Co-Director of the criminal organization. A court verdict in Athens Center for Advanced Studies also found the far-right group guilty of operat- of Southeastern Europe (Rijeka), and Senior Lecturer ing a gang of hit squads that aimed at eliminating at the Institute for Political perceived enemies. At least this time, Greece sanc- Sciences, University of Vienna. tioned the violence which is an extreme but inte- gral part of the political horizon of the far-right. The far-right and neo-fascist extremist party, Golden Dawn, was riding on the wave of popu- Gazela Pudar Draško (1982) is a researcher at the Institute for lar anger about EU-mandated austerity measures Philosophy and Social Theory, implemented in Greece in 2010. At the height of University of Belgrade. She is the crisis, it won 21 seats in the Greek parliament actively involved in the policy research and activities of the and became the third biggest political party in the civil society sector in Serbia, country. But, even before the financial crisis, there but also in the SEE region. Her were signs that political trust in the established fields of interest are political sociology, particularly social parties was rapidly declining. With the outbreak engagement. She writes on of the financial crisis, this potential for protest in- the intellectual engagement, creased. Golden Dawn’s extreme xenophobic, rac- social movements and gender. ist, and authoritarian discourse focused on anti- immigrant scapegoating and a rejection of the an counterparts. Analyst and philosopher Boris democratic political system in Greece. It was in Buden argues that together, they form a “right- particular young and disillusioned Greeks, who, wing pro-fascist International.”1 These groups’ plagued by high unemployment and a lack of op- skepticism towards Europe (and frustration with portunities, were attracted by the party’s right- globalization in general) often goes hand in hand wing ideology and racist stance vis-à-vis immi- with a strong affirmation of national identities grants and other groups. Finally, it was also young and the territorial unity of the nation-state. The people’s general lack of historical awareness of main discursive tools of the far right are haunt- the history of fascist movements in the country ingly reminiscent of the Second World War - in- that helped Golden Dawn increase their votes and cluding “Natives First”, “blood and soil”, xenopho- promote its revisionist and fascist views. bic and chauvinistic constructions of the “Other”. In Europe it was mainly the so called “migration As the economic crisis and a disillusionment with crisis” of 2015 that sparked the big resurgence of the EU served as a catalyst for a massive rise of the far-right: the fear of mass immigration and Is- Golden Dawn, its fall will have ramifications for lamophobia (toward refugees and already-exist- the far right across Europe.
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