Reengineering Municipal Services 1994-2001
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Reengineering Municipal Services 1994-2001 Mayor’s Management Report Fiscal 2001 Supplement The City of New York Rudolph W. Giuliani Mayor Joseph J. Lhota Deputy Mayor for Operations Michael T. Carpinello Director, Mayor’s Office of Operations INTRODUCTION New York City government is in an activist phase, in which “intractable” problems are being attacked using new approaches, and in which expectations and demands for government performance are rising. Improvement is evident in a broad range of services; even in areas where enormous challenges remain, a vital process of reorientation has occurred on which new solutions can be built. In almost all cases, service improvements during the period 1994-2001 were not attained through new spending – the rate of growth in government spending has been drastically reduced, taxes have been cut, and the City’s position in the bond market is the strongest ever. Managers have had to “reengineer” service delivery, in four main ways: by changing the structure of line agencies; by coordinating action across organizational boundaries; by implementing improved service delivery models, particularly through information technology; and by violating old assumptions about how government is allowed to deliver services. Above all, City government has made progress through increased accountability – that is, pressure to perform – applied from the top down. This volume reviews key reengineering accomplishments from the past seven and one- half years, while also listing further challenges and issues yet to be addressed. The two main volumes of the Mayor’s Management Report, containing service narratives for 44 agencies and covered organizations as well as extensive indicator tables comparing planned and actual service levels, provide ample information for a thorough assessment of the pros and cons of agency performance. This reengineering summary is designed to provide additional information by presenting a perspective not easily assembled from a single edition of the Report. The purpose of this summary is to document, with as much relevant detail as can practically be included, how service improvements were brought about, by recapitulating developments from the managers’ and planners’ point of view. Its potential value is to suggest areas for the recreation of successful methods and the transfer of these methods to new service contexts. Each general topic is discussed under four headings – challenges, solutions, outcomes, and further challenges. Selected charts are included at the end of chapters. In describing outcomes of the initiatives, an effort has been made to include relevant quantitative indices, reflecting the direct impact of services on citizens and the quality and timeliness of services, wherever possible. Each of the first 17 chapters covers initiatives within a single broad category of services, usually involving a number of City agencies. The final three chapters discuss approaches that can be applied to any area of services – privatization initiatives, information technology, and procurement reforms. The last section of this volume contains five-year tables of indicators drawn from agencies with related service missions; this group of indicators has been tracked in the same format within the summary volume of the MMR over the past three editions. The section on indicators added to and deleted from the MMR, which previously appeared in the summary volume, has been moved to Volume II of the Report. i POLICING The Challenge One of New York City’s gravest problems during the second half of the twentieth century was crime. All categories of crime, from nuisance offenses and property crimes to racketeering and murder, seemed to be out of control. From 1985 to 1990, homicides rose by 62 percent to a one-year total of 2,245, and despite modest declines, the period 1990- 1993 continued to see an annual average of over 2,000 homicides. The City’s longstanding image problem made a grim situation look even worse. In 1994, New York City ranked 21st among the 25 largest American cities in per capita reported crime, but first in the perception of fear and crime. Dealing with the crime problem was key to improving City services in general. The willingness of businesses to invest in the City, of employees to work here, and of the public to use and support public transportation and other public facilities depends on attitudes about personal security and the authorities’ capacity to maintain order. The City’s economy, and thus its ability to provide critical services of all kinds, are in turn dependent on public confidence. The challenges faced by the City in restoring public safety as of 1994 can be analyzed as follows: Lack of Direction. The New York City Police Department (NYPD), like many large bureaucracies, had been organized around avoiding risk and failure. For years, precinct commanders had been unduly constrained by regulations and procedures. Many police operations could only be conducted by centralized units, reflecting an abiding distrust of precinct personnel and resources. Yet, despite micro-management, the Department provided little direction in key areas. It was clear what precinct commanders and personnel weren’t allowed to do, but much less clear what they ought to be doing to combat crime, disorder, and fear. Narcotics. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, rampant drug trafficking was the primary cause of crime and violence in many neighborhoods in New York City. The link between drugs and crime was firmly established; drug users turned to crime to fuel their addiction or committed illegal acts while under the influence of drugs. One survey revealed that one in four U.S. inmates convicted of property and drug offenses had committed their crimes to get money for drugs. Another survey of inmates at state and federal correctional facilities disclosed that 33 percent of state prisoners and 22 percent of federal prisoners were under the influence of drugs during the commission of their offense. In New York City, 70 to 80 percent of the individuals arrested each year tested positive for drug use. Drug dealers engaged in violence to settle disputes, discipline employees, prevent the theft of drugs and drug monies, or eliminate competitors for drug markets and customers. At least a quarter of all homicides in the City during the period 1989-1993 were directly related to drug trafficking. 1 Policing Quality of Life Offenses. Citizen’s lack of perceived safety was exacerbated by increased signs of disorder in the public spaces of New York City. These spaces were besieged by aggressive panhandlers, squeegee cleaners, street prostitution, public drunkenness, excessive noise, and graffiti. Surveys conducted in 1992 and 1993 by the Commonwealth Fund and Manhattan Institute found that 59 percent of people who left New York City did so to improve their quality of life. Similarly, 22 percent said that if their old neighborhood had been kept free of graffiti, litter and debris, it would have had a major impact on their decision to move. Another 17 percent stated that if the Police Department had taken minor crimes and disturbances more seriously, that, too, would have had a major impact on their decision to move. Of the people who still lived in New York City at the time, three out of five said that graffiti, homeless people, noise and panhandlers had radically reduced the quality of life for themselves and their families. Noise, alone, was consistently given as one of the top three reasons people cited for leaving the City. The importance of neighborhood quality of life in determining overall public safety was formulated in an article entitled “Broken Windows,” by the sociologists James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. In their article, the two theorists postulate that based on perception, disorder and crime are inextricably linked. They claim that when a building window is broken, it is inevitable that all the windows will soon be broken. Similarly, “the unchecked panhandler, is, in effect, the first broken window.” They further conclude that in neighborhoods where disorderly behavior is ignored by police, serious street crime flourishes. The Police Department, at the time, was aware of deteriorating conditions but was ill equipped to address them adequately. The Department was hindered by a wide array of ineffective practices. Over-specialization within the Department, inadequate resources within the precincts, and reliance on outside agencies combined to deprive Precinct Commanders of the tools and authority to address even the most basic quality of life conditions. Precinct Commanders had been forced to wait their turn before conducting law enforcement operations that required collaboration with other units within the Department and other agencies. By the time their turn had come, the condition had often worsened or led to more serious crimes. This served to convince neighborhood residents that the police were lacking in commitment, competence, and even integrity. Police-Community Relations. The NYPD deserves its reputation as the finest law enforcement organization in the world. Nevertheless, perceptions that the NYPD is unresponsive to the varied communities it serves and insensitive to the ethnically diverse population that it protects have always existed. Certain communities experience poor relationships with the Department; they feel that police officers represent to them little more than a uniformed occupying force, and that the community has no input into the manner in which police service