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South Korea and China Table of Contents 05 Greetings from the President Day 2: December 12, 2012 06 About the Asan China Forum 80 Session 4 08 About the Asan Institute China’s Defense Policy China and India Day 1: December 11, 2012 Public Opinion in China 12 Opening Ceremony 96 Plenary Session III Opening Remarks China and the US Welcoming Remarks Keynote Speech (Summary) 101 Session 5 China and East Asian Regional Integration 20 Gala Dinner China’s Economy Cross-Strait Relations 22 Plenary Session I China’s Leadership in Transition 116 Session 6 China-North Korea Economic Cooperation 27 Session 1 Ethnic Minorities in China China and the ROK-US-Japan “Virtual Alliance” China and Russia China and Japan Political Reform in China 131 Plenary Session IV South Korea and China 42 Session 2 China and Nuclear North Korea 136 Asan China Forum 2012 Photos China, Central Asia and the Middle East South Korea-China FTA 142 Participants 58 Session 3 149 Rapporteurs China and the Two Koreas China and the ASEAN 150 Asan People China and Global Governance 154 Statistics 73 Plenary Session II China in Northeast Asia 156 Comments 02/03 Greetings from the President Greetings! ᛘྭ! It is my great pleasure to welcome you to the Asan China Forum 2012. This year’s Forum, titled “China in Transition,” brings together more than 150 leading China experts and policy analysts from around the world to analyze, discuss, and debate the past, present, and future of China’s place in the region and the world. 2012 marks the 20th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China. While China is undergoing a leadership transition since last November’s 18th National Party Congress, South Korea will undergo its own leadership transition following the Presidential Election in December. This time of transition presents us with an exceptional opportunity to discuss China’s role in the region and the world, as well as the future of South Korea-China relations. I hope that our discussions over the next few days will contribute to raising the level of understanding and public debate over China and provide policymakers with the means to develop informed and effec- tive prescriptions for better dealing with a rising China in a moment of transition. Sincerely, HAHM Chaibong ૨൘匣 President The Asan Institute for Policy Studies 22/23 About the Asan China Forum The Asan China Forum is an annual gathering of some 150 leading China experts and policy analysts seemingly fundamental changes affecting East Asia as well as the world. The United States and the from around the world. The Forum will feature four plenary sessions and 18 panels over two days. European Union are still struggling to emerge from major economic crises and Japan is entering into its third decade of lackluster growth. All the while China continues its rise. The resulting shift in the global Asan China Forum 2012: “China in Transition” balance of power is affecting every aspect of the international political economy and geopolitics. What are the policy options confronting China’s new leaders? What choices will they make? What constraints The recently concluded 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) ushered in the do they face? These are some of the questions that will inform the discussions, debates and analyses fifth generation of leadership. China’s leadership transition is taking place in the midst of rapid and during the Forum. About the Asan Institute The Asan Institute for Policy Studies was founded with a mission to become an independent think tank that provides effective policy solutions to issues which are critical to Korea, East Asia, and the rest of the world. The Institute aims to foster wide-ranging and in-depth public discussions which are essential for a healthy society. By focusing on areas including foreign affairs, national security, public governance, energy, and the environment, it strives to address some of the major challenges that our society faces today. The Institute addresses these challenges not only by supplying in-depth policy analysis but also by endeav- oring to promote a global and regional environment favorable to peace, stability, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. In addition to policy analysis and research, the Institute undertakes the training of specialists in public diplomacy and related areas in an effort to contribute to Korea’s ability to creatively shape its own future. Opening Ceremony Day 1 Opening Remarks Welcoming Remarks Keynote Speech (Summary) December 11, 2012 Gala Dinner Plenary Session I China’s Leadership in Transition Session 1 China and the ROK-US-Japan “Virtual Alliance” China and Japan Political Reform in China Session 2 China and Nuclear North Korea China, Central Asia and the Middle East South Korea-China FTA Session 3 China and the Two Koreas China and the ASEAN China and Global Governance Plenary Session II China in Northeast Asia Opening Ceremony Date: December 11, 2012 Time: 09:30-10:15 Place: Orchid Opening Remarks Welcoming Remarks by Dr. Hahm Chaibong, President of the Asan Institute by Dr. Chung Mong Joon, Honorary Chairman of the Asan Institute ݅ܩʭ ၹr᜖ܩᦩֶ⦹ᝎ ᖸ儈㠸㾻֐ ֐ྭ ܩ⮵ʭ᪅ᝒᨵ ᪅⦹ܩ Good morning, and welcome to the Asan China Forum. Let me start with a joke about how important China has become in global affairs. “President Obama offered bailout money to keep Greece from defaulting on its loans. When Greece thanked him, Obama said, ‘Don’t mention it... to China, because it’s their money.’” This morning, please allow me to focus my remarks on South Korea-China relations. Good morning, welcome everyone to the inaugural Asan China Forum. It is wonderful to have you all here. Thanks for making it, especially all of you from abroad, during this bitter cold time in Seoul. Today, we actually have about 70 experts from China and experts from 17 other countries also participating. Altogether we have about 200 people participating in this Forum. We titled this inaugural forum “China in Transition,” but I think it is not just China. We are all in transition in one way or another. We started this year with political transitions in Taiwan, and then Russia, and now in a couple of days Japan before, of course, we have our own transition here in South Korea. I think it is very incumbent upon all of us here to try to formulate the policies and inform the public so as to ensure a smoother transition everywhere that it is taking place. Now it gives me great pleasure to introduce someone very special—our Founder and Honorary Chair- man of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Dr. Chung Mong Joon. Dr. Chung is a seven-term National Assembly member, making him the most senior member of the National Assembly. Not in terms of age, but in terms of his term, he is certainly the most senior member. He has actually taken this time out of his very busy schedule. He is the chairman of the Presidential Election Commission for the ruling Saenuri party. So even this early morning, he was out there campaigning in this bitter cold. But now he has joined us and so, I would like to ask him to make a few welcoming remarks for all of you. Please join me in welcoming Dr. Chung Mong Joon. My first visit to China was in January 1993. During my visit to the Museum of the Chinese Revolution in Tiananmen Square, I saw a young couple with a small boy who was about three to four years old. The weather was very cold but the couple left the child outside while they went inside the museum. At the entrance, the child was alone and eating uncooked ramen for his survival. I was born in 1951 during the South Korean War. The child whom I met at the museum entrance reminded me of my childhood trying to survive after the war when South Korea was the poorest country in the world. As you see this morn- ing, I am 61, alive, and healthy. I expect that long before the child turns my age he will be living in a country just as prosperous as South Korea today. This year marks the 20th anniversary of normalization of relations between South Korea and China. China is South Korea’s largest trading partner and South Korea is China’s third largest. There are more than 200 flights per day between our two countries. More than 60,000 Chinese students study in South Korea and an equal number of South Korean students study in China. Despite these exchanges and despite the fact that our relationship has been elevated to a Strategic Cooperative Partnership, there are not only diplomatic tensions in South Korea-China relations but also tensions on a more popular level. I still remember the football match between China and Turkey during the 2002 FIFA World Cup Tourna- is “something leftover from history,” but so are the North Korean regime and the division of the Korean ment held in South Korea. 2002 was the year that celebrated the 10th anniversary of South Korea-China Peninsula. Today, many North Korean defectors in China are repatriated to North Korea against their diplomatic normalization. It was the first World Cup Tournament held on the Asian continent and the will. We feel responsible but helpless in the face of this situation. I hope that China can do more to better first time that China’s national team was qualified for the tournament. So, I had hoped the occasion protect the rights of North Korean refugees. would bring our two countries closer together.
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