Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified
March 24, 1971 Letter by Federal Chancellor Brandt to the Chairman of the American Council on Germany and Chairman of the Advisory Committee to the President of the United States of America for Disarmament Issues, McCloy
Citation:
“Letter by Federal Chancellor Brandt to the Chairman of the American Council on Germany and Chairman of the Advisory Committee to the President of the United States of America for Disarmament Issues, McCloy,” March 24, 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Archives of Social Democracy, Willy Brandt Archive, A 8, 43 and Amherst College Library, Archives and Special Collections, Re: John J. McCloy (AC 1916) Papers, Series 14 (Germany), Box GY 1, folder 27. Published in: Berliner Ausgabe, vol. 6. English translation: Dwight E. Langston. Included in CWIHP e-Dossier #22. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113401
Summary:
Federal Chancellor Brandt's letter to McCloy on Disarmament Issues of the Cold War explains the German view of the West and their strategies for reducing the tension in the Cold War. Brandt talks about intercontinental missiles and a peaceful debate and a step-by-step improvement of the situation in Europe. Brandt also invited McCloy to the GDR for an extensive debate on considered issues.
Original Language:
German
Contents:
English Translation Scan of Original Document No. 1 Letter by Federal Chancellor, Brandt, to the Chairman of the American Council on Germany and Chairman of the Advisory Committee to the President of the United States of America for Disarmament Issues, McCloy 24 March 1971i
AdsD, WBA, A 8, 43 und Amherst College Library, Archives and Special Collections, Re: John J. McCloy (AC 1916) Papers, Series 14 (Germany), Box GY 1, folder 27. Published in: Berliner Ausgabe, vol. 6. English translation: Dwight E. Langston
Dear Mr. McCloy, in your letter I can detect the voice of the very man I know: open, direct, energetic, but not biased.ii That is how one wants a friend to be. I would like to reply in the same spirit. We regard our “Ostpolitik” – we did not coin the word – not with the attitude that Germany is the centre of the world, but rather as a part of the policy of the West toward the East. We developed this policy jointly within NATO.iii It also relies on the expectation that the antagonism between Communism and Democracy, between these two systems, will remain and must be confronted. This confrontation can not be avoided; we must be prepared for it. I believe that it is not in the interest of my country alone to see to it that this confrontation – if somehow possible – does not take a violent turn. To that end and in the interest of our common security, all necessary efforts are required to assure that the risk of an armed conflict remains too severe for the Soviet Union. In addition, the highest degree of political unanimity by the West will be necessary to achieve that goal. My government has contributed something to both endeavours. I do not consider it an exaggeration to say that, only since the Hague Conference, the European ship has become seaworthy again.iv The decision about British entry [into the EC] has not yet been made, but I will make every effort to see that it is a positive one.v Furthermore, we have overcome the fear which has existed for years of unilateral American troop reductions; by the end of the coming year nothing will have changed with regard to the present strength of US forces in the Federal Republic. Our attempts in favour of increased efforts by our European alliance partners were showing some initial successes; soon I will speak with Mr. Heath about how we can make further progress in this area.vi We will also attempt again to bind France more strongly to the [North Atlantic] Alliance. I can not share your concern that the Soviet Union will get most of what it wants without any quid pro quo and expand its influence westward. Nothing about the situation in German is changing; the Four Powers retain their special privileges; the relationship between the Federal Republic and the Three Powers is not affected. On the contrary, co-operation by the four western governments in concrete matters is closer than it has been in a long time. We were in danger of becoming not credible: the privileges of the Three Powers in Berlin were not able to prevent the Wall. They were not able to prevent difficulties on the access routes for civilian traffic nor even the introduction of a transit-visa on the access routes which only the dependants of Western garrisons do not need.vii Fact is that after 20 years, the existence of the GDR can not be disputed, even though this nation would not exist without the presence of the Soviet Army. After we have all experienced the reality that neither the Soviet occupied Zone, nor Hungary, nor Czechoslovakia or Poland can be extracted by force from the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, it is in the interest of the West to see that the Federal Republic of Germany no longer continues to be the pretence which the Soviet Union and the GDR exploit to domesticate the other members of the Warsaw Pact. This moment can have far-reaching effects. There is some interesting information about this. But it is better to speak about that personally. As necessary as intercontinental missiles are for our security, we should also not underestimate how much fascination with freedom is likely to affect a peaceful debate and a step-by-step improvement of the situation in Europe. That is also true for Berlin. In the contemporary situation there, time is not working in our favour. The over-aging of the population is increasing, as well as the people’s wish for normal relations. Now the necessity is for an agreement on Berlin which, for the first time since the Blockade, will give the city the prospect of a stability unlimited in duration.viii The East will have to respect the fact that West Berlin is a reality which one can not call into question. It will have to relinquish its potential to cause disturbances on the transit routes. It will have to accept the city’s representation in foreign policy by the Federal Republic. Perhaps it will even be possible to restore what was lost many years ago, which other than I no one has become particularly excited about: recognition of Federal passports for West Berliners even through the East. Such a Berlin agreement would, for the first time, bestow on the city a natural attraction and a new prosperity. West Berlin’s vital force is more important to me than the already ineluctable acceptance of the Oder-Neisse-Line, which other than the CSU, no one on earth still calls into question. For me, West Berlin is even more important than good or less- than-good relations with the GDR. Based on some of your arguments, I must surmise that you had somewhat one-sided interlocutors. But that is not your fault. I fervently wish that, when you come to Europe, we will find an opportunity to speak at length with each other. Certainly, I will not be able to allay all your concerns with respect to your own country, the general situation of the West or some developments in the world, but at least those which you have concerning our policies. All the same, one must admit that the 15th (or however many) of my visits to the United States aroused less attention than my first one to the Soviet Union did.ix That is simply the way of public opinion, here and elsewhere. Let me know if you can be here, so that I can adjust my appointment schedule accordingly. – I will not be able to be in the States again until June and hope to be able then to accept an invitation by the Council as well.x Fondest greetings Yours, signed: Brandt
AdsD, WBA, A 8, 43 und Amherst College Library, Archives and Special Collections, Re: John J. McCloy (AC 1916) Papers, Series 14 (Germany), Box GY 1, folder 27. Published in: Berliner Ausgabe, vol. 6. English translation: Dwight E. Langston
Dear Mr. McCloy, in your letter I can detect the voice of the very man I know: open, direct, energetic, but not biased.ii That is how one wants a friend to be. I would like to reply in the same spirit. We regard our “Ostpolitik” – we did not coin the word – not with the attitude that Germany is the centre of the world, but rather as a part of the policy of the West toward the East. We developed this policy jointly within NATO.iii It also relies on the expectation that the antagonism between Communism and Democracy, between these two systems, will remain and must be confronted. This confrontation can not be avoided; we must be prepared for it. I believe that it is not in the interest of my country alone to see to it that this confrontation – if somehow possible – does not take a violent turn. To that end and in the interest of our common security, all necessary efforts are required to assure that the risk of an armed conflict remains too severe for the Soviet Union. In addition, the highest degree of political unanimity by the West will be necessary to achieve that goal. My government has contributed something to both endeavours. I do not consider it an exaggeration to say that, only since the Hague Conference, the European ship has become seaworthy again.iv The decision about British entry [into the EC] has not yet been made, but I will make every effort to see that it is a positive one.v Furthermore, we have overcome the fear which has existed for years of unilateral American troop reductions; by the end of the coming year nothing will have changed with regard to the present strength of US forces in the Federal Republic. Our attempts in favour of increased efforts by our European alliance partners were showing some initial successes; soon I will speak with Mr. Heath about how we can make further progress in this area.vi We will also attempt again to bind France more strongly to the [North Atlantic] Alliance. I can not share your concern that the Soviet Union will get most of what it wants without any quid pro quo and expand its influence westward. Nothing about the situation in German is changing; the Four Powers retain their special privileges; the relationship between the Federal Republic and the Three Powers is not affected. On the contrary, co-operation by the four western governments in concrete matters is closer than it has been in a long time. We were in danger of becoming not credible: the privileges of the Three Powers in Berlin were not able to prevent the Wall. They were not able to prevent difficulties on the access routes for civilian traffic nor even the introduction of a transit-visa on the access routes which only the dependants of Western garrisons do not need.vii Fact is that after 20 years, the existence of the GDR can not be disputed, even though this nation would not exist without the presence of the Soviet Army. After we have all experienced the reality that neither the Soviet occupied Zone, nor Hungary, nor Czechoslovakia or Poland can be extracted by force from the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, it is in the interest of the West to see that the Federal Republic of Germany no longer continues to be the pretence which the Soviet Union and the GDR exploit to domesticate the other members of the Warsaw Pact. This moment can have far-reaching effects. There is some interesting information about this. But it is better to speak about that personally. As necessary as intercontinental missiles are for our security, we should also not underestimate how much fascination with freedom is likely to affect a peaceful debate and a step-by-step improvement of the situation in Europe. That is also true for Berlin. In the contemporary situation there, time is not working in our favour. The over-aging of the population is increasing, as well as the people’s wish for normal relations. Now the necessity is for an agreement on Berlin which, for the first time since the Blockade, will give the city the prospect of a stability unlimited in duration.viii The East will have to respect the fact that West Berlin is a reality which one can not call into question. It will have to relinquish its potential to cause disturbances on the transit routes. It will have to accept the city’s representation in foreign policy by the Federal Republic. Perhaps it will even be possible to restore what was lost many years ago, which other than I no one has become particularly excited about: recognition of Federal passports for West Berliners even through the East. Such a Berlin agreement would, for the first time, bestow on the city a natural attraction and a new prosperity. West Berlin’s vital force is more important to me than the already ineluctable acceptance of the Oder-Neisse-Line, which other than the CSU, no one on earth still calls into question. For me, West Berlin is even more important than good or less- than-good relations with the GDR. Based on some of your arguments, I must surmise that you had somewhat one-sided interlocutors. But that is not your fault. I fervently wish that, when you come to Europe, we will find an opportunity to speak at length with each other. Certainly, I will not be able to allay all your concerns with respect to your own country, the general situation of the West or some developments in the world, but at least those which you have concerning our policies. All the same, one must admit that the 15th (or however many) of my visits to the United States aroused less attention than my first one to the Soviet Union did.ix That is simply the way of public opinion, here and elsewhere. Let me know if you can be here, so that I can adjust my appointment schedule accordingly. – I will not be able to be in the States again until June and hope to be able then to accept an invitation by the Council as well.x Fondest greetings Yours, signed: Brandt