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REFORM in UKRAINE: Decentralisation Are the Most Widely Known Reforms Launched Since the Revolution of Dignity
INTRODUCTION Ò There is demand for systemic reform in Ukrainian society. The majority of citizens believe that these changes must be initiated by the country’s leadership, primarily by the president. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS Ò Healthcare reform, police reform and REFORM IN UKRAINE: decentralisation are the most widely known reforms launched since the Revolution of Dignity. Some 82.9%, CHANGE FOR THE BETTER 72.2% and 61.8% of the population have heard about them. However, only 15.3%, 20.6% and 32.6%, respective- OR AN IMITATION ly have had a positive experience with OF PROGRESS? the results of these reforms Ò Most citizens consider compromise for Svitlana Balyuk, Nataliya Klauning, the sake of peace and the settlement Lyudmyla Chetvertukhina, Maria Koval-Honchar of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine unacceptable. Citizens are of the April 2020 opinion that the most undesirable de- velopments for Ukraine would include the recognition of Crimea as Russian territory, the transfer of control of Ukraine’s gas transportation to Russia and a full amnesty for militants in the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR and LPR). 1 DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS REFORM IN UKRAINE: CHANGE FOR THE BETTER OR AN IMITATION OF PROGRESS? Contents 1 INTRODUCTION 3 2 METHODOLOGY 4 3 KEY FINDINGS 5 3.1. UKRAINIAN PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY ....................................5 3.2. WHAT UKRAINIANS UNDERSTAND BY THE NOTION OF »REFORM« ..................................................6 3.3. CONDITIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING EFFECTIVE REFORMS AND THE DRIVING FORCES OF CHANGE .....6 3.4. REFORMS AND THE POPULATION’S STANDARD OF LIVING .............................................................11 3.5. -
Bulletin of the GHI Washington
Bulletin of the GHI Washington Issue 36 Spring 2005 Copyright Das Digitalisat wird Ihnen von perspectivia.net, der Online-Publikationsplattform der Max Weber Stiftung – Stiftung Deutsche Geisteswissenschaftliche Institute im Ausland, zur Verfügung gestellt. Bitte beachten Sie, dass das Digitalisat urheberrechtlich geschützt ist. Erlaubt ist aber das Lesen, das Ausdrucken des Textes, das Herunterladen, das Speichern der Daten auf einem eigenen Datenträger soweit die vorgenannten Handlungen ausschließlich zu privaten und nicht-kommerziellen Zwecken erfolgen. Eine darüber hinausgehende unerlaubte Verwendung, Reproduktion oder Weitergabe einzelner Inhalte oder Bilder können sowohl zivil- als auch strafrechtlich verfolgt werden. ACCESS—PRESENTATION—MEMORY: THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES AND THE MEMORIAL FOUNDATIONS OF GERMAN POLITICIANS Conference at the GHI, September 8–11, 2004. Conveners: Astrid M. Eck- ert (GHI), Christof Mauch (GHI). Co-sponsored by the GHI and the Office of Presidential Libraries at the National Archives (College Park, Mary- land), the Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus (Rhöndorf), the Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung (Berlin), the Reichspräsident- Friedrich-Ebert-Gedenkstätte (Heidelberg), the Otto-von-Bismarck- Stiftung (Friedrichsruh), and the Stiftung Bundespräsident-Theodor- Heuss-Haus (Stuttgart). Participants: David E. Alsobrook (Clinton Presidential Library), Thomas S. Blanton (National Security Archive), John Brademas (New York Uni- versity), Frank G. Burke, Richard Claypoole (Office of Presidential -
When Fear Is Substituted for Reason: European and Western Government Policies Regarding National Security 1789-1919
WHEN FEAR IS SUBSTITUTED FOR REASON: EUROPEAN AND WESTERN GOVERNMENT POLICIES REGARDING NATIONAL SECURITY 1789-1919 Norma Lisa Flores A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY December 2012 Committee: Dr. Beth Griech-Polelle, Advisor Dr. Mark Simon Graduate Faculty Representative Dr. Michael Brooks Dr. Geoff Howes Dr. Michael Jakobson © 2012 Norma Lisa Flores All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT Dr. Beth Griech-Polelle, Advisor Although the twentieth century is perceived as the era of international wars and revolutions, the basis of these proceedings are actually rooted in the events of the nineteenth century. When anything that challenged the authority of the state – concepts based on enlightenment, immigration, or socialism – were deemed to be a threat to the status quo and immediately eliminated by way of legal restrictions. Once the façade of the Old World was completely severed following the Great War, nations in Europe and throughout the West started to revive various nineteenth century laws in an attempt to suppress the outbreak of radicalism that preceded the 1919 revolutions. What this dissertation offers is an extended understanding of how nineteenth century government policies toward radicalism fostered an environment of increased national security during Germany’s 1919 Spartacist Uprising and the 1919/1920 Palmer Raids in the United States. Using the French Revolution as a starting point, this study allows the reader the opportunity to put events like the 1848 revolutions, the rise of the First and Second Internationals, political fallouts, nineteenth century imperialism, nativism, Social Darwinism, and movements for self-government into a broader historical context. -
IMPERIAL POWERS and DEMOCRATIC IMAGINATIONS
Conceptos y fenómenos fundamentales de nuestro tiempo UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES SOCIALES IMPERIAL POWERS & DEMOCRATIC IMAGINATIONS DAVID SLATER Junio 2006 IMPERIAL POWERS & DEMOCRATIC IMAGINATIONS Por David Slater1 The thematic nucleus of this paper is formed through an exploratory analysis of some primary aspects of the interconnections between a resurgent imperialism and a contested terrain of democratic politics. There are three sections: in the first part an initial examination of important elements of the contemporary literature on imperialism is developed, and this includes a brief discussion of the significance of the relationality of imperial power, as well as the differentiation between imperiality and imperialism. The second section attempts to tease out some of the specificities of the United States as an imperial democracy which leads into a final discussion of the geopolitics of democratization. The paper takes the form of a preliminary exploration of what is an extensive conceptual and political terrain. Conceptualising Imperialism Today As a way of beginning the first part of the analysis, it would seem to be useful to consider the forms in which key concepts have been defined and deployed. In this case, it is necessary to discuss the delineation of the term ‘imperialism’ especially as it has been used in the last few years to describe an apparently new phenomenon of globalising power. In fact, the apparent ‘newness’ of the phenomenon is frequently captured in the phrase the ‘new imperialism’. The Marxist geographer Harvey is a good example of someone who has attempted to theorize the ‘new imperialism’ and it would seem appropriate to begin with a brief signalling of Harvey’s (2003a) interesting perspective. -
Germany. Is the Populism Laggard Catching Up?
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter edited by Toril Aalberg, Frank Esser, Carsten Reinemann, Jesper Strömbäck, and Claes H. de Vreese published by Routledge as Populist Political Communication in Europe on July 26, 2016. The book is available online at: http://www.tandfebooks.com/doi/book/10.4324/9781315623016 9. Germany. Is the Populism Laggard Catching Up? Nayla Fawzi, Magdalena Obermaier, and Carsten Reinemann Introduction In Germany, the phenomenon of populism has been discussed intensively in recent years; however, empirical research on populism and populist political communication is scarce. This shortage can presumably be explained by the populist parties’ lack of success on a national level, a characteristic that distinguishes Germany from many other European countries (Bornschier, 2012). More fundamentally, consensus is missing as to whether some of the parties analyzed can actually be considered populist (Decker, 2014; Gebhardt, 2013; Holtmann, Krappidel, & Rehse, 2006; Jaschke, 2013; Neu, 2003; Oberreuter, 2011; Werz, 2013). The few existing empirical studies are mainly single-case studies of mainstream political movements, parties, or politicians, all partially behaving in a “populist manner.” In addition, little international comparative research includes German populist parties, their communication, their media resonance, or the effects of their communication on citizens (for exceptions, see Kienpointner, 2005; Pauwels, 2014; Rooduijn, de Lange, & van der Brug, 2014). Nevertheless, this chapter aims to systematically -
The Politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens and States
The Politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens and States Findings from ten years of DFID-funded research on Governance and Fragile States 2001–2010 A Synthesis Paper Acknowledgements This paper was written by DFID Research and Evidence Division Staff, with help and advice from Graeme Ramshaw of IDS and from the directors and staff of the four Re search centres. Disclaimer: This synthesis presents some key findings of DFID-funded research and the resulting policy recommendations of the researchers: it does not necessarily reflect DFID policy. Cover Photo: Justice and Peace Commissioners, Masisi, DR Congo. © Sarah MacGregor / DFID The Politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens, and States EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Executive Summary Evidence shows that in order to deliver sustainable international development we must be able to understand and work with its politics. Governance describes the way countries and societies manage their affairs politically and the way power and authority are exercised. For the poorest and most vulnerable, the difference that good, or particularly bad, governance, makes to their lives is profound: the inability of government institutions to prevent conflict, provide basic security, or basic services can have life-or-death consequences; lack of opportunity can prevent generations of poor families from lifting themselves out of poverty; and the inability to grow economically and collect taxes can keep countries trapped in a cycle of aid-dependency. Understanding governance, therefore, is central to achieving development and ending conflict. During the 1990s donors came to realise that development required better ‘governance’, and DFID recognised early on the need to work with the research community to identify ways of improving governance for better development outcomes. -
The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics
MORRIS P. FIORINA The Decline of Collective Responsibility inAmerican Politics the founding fathers a Though believed in the necessity of establishing gen to one uinely national government, they took great pains design that could not to lightly do things its citizens; what government might do for its citizens was to be limited to the functions of what we know now as the "watchman state." Thus the Founders composed the constitutional litany familiar to every schoolchild: a they created federal system, they distributed and blended powers within and across the federal levels, and they encouraged the occupants of the various posi tions to check and balance each other by structuring incentives so that one of to ficeholder's ambitions would be likely conflict with others'. The resulting system of institutional arrangements predictably hampers efforts to undertake initiatives and favors maintenance of the status major quo. Given the historical record faced by the Founders, their emphasis on con we a straining government is understandable. But face later historical record, one two that shows hundred years of increasing demands for government to act positively. Moreover, developments unforeseen by the Founders increasingly raise the likelihood that the uncoordinated actions of individuals and groups will inflict serious on the nation as a whole. The of the damage by-products industri not on on al and technological revolutions impose physical risks only us, but future as well. Resource and international cartels raise the generations shortages spectre of economic ruin. And the simple proliferation of special interests with their intense, particularistic demands threatens to render us politically in capable of taking actions that might either advance the state of society or pre vent foreseeable deteriorations in that state. -
The Neglected Nation: the CSU and the Territorial Cleavage in Bavarian Party Politics’', German Politics, Vol
Edinburgh Research Explorer ‘The Neglected Nation: The CSU and the Territorial Cleavage in Bavarian Party Politics’ Citation for published version: Hepburn, E 2008, '‘The Neglected Nation: The CSU and the Territorial Cleavage in Bavarian Party Politics’', German Politics, vol. 17(2), pp. 184-202. Link: Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer Document Version: Peer reviewed version Published In: German Politics Publisher Rights Statement: © Hepburn, E. (2008). ‘The Neglected Nation: The CSU and the Territorial Cleavage in Bavarian Party Politics’. German Politics, 17(2), 184-202 General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 28. Sep. 2021 © Hepburn, E. (2008). ‘The Neglected Nation: The CSU and the Territorial Cleavage in Bavarian Party Politics’. German Politics, 17(2), 184-202. The Neglected Nation: The CSU and the Territorial Cleavage in Bavarian Party Politics Eve Hepburn, School of Social and Political Studies, University of Edinburgh1 ABSTRACT This article examines the continuing salience of the territorial cleavage in Bavarian party politics. It does so through an exploration of the Christian Social Union’s (CSU) mobilisation of Bavarian identity as part of its political project, which has forced other parties in Bavaria to strengthen their territorial goals and identities. -
Democracy As a Way of Life: Critical Reflections on a Deweyan Theme
Democracy as a Way of Life 155 Democracy as a Way of Life: Critical Reflections on a Deweyan Theme José María Rosales1 ABSTRACT This article aims to critically assess John Dewey’s ideal of “democracy as a way of life”, an evocative though elusive moral and political ideal linked to both his communal notion of democracy and his reformist view of liberal- ism. Beyond the school, where citizenship education begins, Dewey claims that individuals learn democratic habits when they associate and participate in political activities, which are not solely confined to political institutions. Exploring Dewey’s democratic theory invites a twofold account. It takes to contextualize Dewey’s views in light of the political debates of his time, in particular the interwar debates on the crisis of liberalism and democracy. And it takes to examine his democratic thought in terms of educational theory and policy. Both aspects integrate into the argument. KEYWORDS Democracy, democratic theory, liberalism, rhetoric, Dewey. Few thinkers have kept an influence on American public life so enduring as John Dewey. From his early 1882 philosophical essays to his latest 1952 philosophy, politics and pedagogy writings amount to seven decades of con- tinuous publishing. Most interestingly, by cultivating scholarly research and publicistic activities Dewey has crossed the frontiers of academic debating to become a public intellectual. His extra-professional involvements fairly illustrate the itinerary of a moral philosopher turned reformist academic, cur- rent affairs critic and political activist. As social thinker, he argues a gradualist program of liberal reforms, a move that balances the social engineering pro- pensity of his pedagogical theory. -
DSA's Options and the Socialist International DSA Internationalism
DSA’s Options and the Socialist International DSA Internationalism Committee April 2017 At the last national convention DSA committed itself to holding an organizational discussion on its relationship to the Socialist International leading up to the 2017 convention. The structure of this mandatory discussion was left to DSA’s internationalism committee. The following sheet contains information on the Socialist International, DSA’s involvement with it, the options facing DSA, and arguments in favor of downgrading to observer status and withdrawing completely. A. History of the Socialist International and DSA The Socialist International (SI) has its political and intellectual origins in the nineteenth century socialist movement. Its predecessors were the First International (1864-1876), of which Karl Marx was a leader, and the Second International (1889-1916). In the period of the Second International, the great socialist parties of Europe (particularly the British Labour Party, German Social Democratic Party, and the French Section of the Workers International) formed and became major electoral forces in their countries, advancing ideologies heavily influenced by Marx and political programs calling for the abolition of capitalism and the creation of new systems of worker democracy. The Second International collapsed when nearly all of its member parties, breaking their promise not to go to war against other working people, rallied to their respective governments in the First World War. The Socialist Party of America (SPA)—DSA’s predecessor—was one of the very few member parties to oppose the war. Many of the factions that opposed the war and supported the Bolshevik Revolution came together to form the Communist International in 1919, which over the course of the 1920s became dominated by Moscow and by the 1930s had become a tool of Soviet foreign policy and a purveyor of Stalinist orthodoxy. -
ESS9 Appendix A3 Political Parties Ed
APPENDIX A3 POLITICAL PARTIES, ESS9 - 2018 ed. 3.0 Austria 2 Belgium 4 Bulgaria 7 Croatia 8 Cyprus 10 Czechia 12 Denmark 14 Estonia 15 Finland 17 France 19 Germany 20 Hungary 21 Iceland 23 Ireland 25 Italy 26 Latvia 28 Lithuania 31 Montenegro 34 Netherlands 36 Norway 38 Poland 40 Portugal 44 Serbia 47 Slovakia 52 Slovenia 53 Spain 54 Sweden 57 Switzerland 58 United Kingdom 61 Version Notes, ESS9 Appendix A3 POLITICAL PARTIES ESS9 edition 3.0 (published 10.12.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Denmark, Iceland. ESS9 edition 2.0 (published 15.06.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden. Austria 1. Political parties Language used in data file: German Year of last election: 2017 Official party names, English 1. Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) - Social Democratic Party of Austria - 26.9 % names/translation, and size in last 2. Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) - Austrian People's Party - 31.5 % election: 3. Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) - Freedom Party of Austria - 26.0 % 4. Liste Peter Pilz (PILZ) - PILZ - 4.4 % 5. Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative (Grüne) - The Greens – The Green Alternative - 3.8 % 6. Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (KPÖ) - Communist Party of Austria - 0.8 % 7. NEOS – Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum (NEOS) - NEOS – The New Austria and Liberal Forum - 5.3 % 8. G!LT - Verein zur Förderung der Offenen Demokratie (GILT) - My Vote Counts! - 1.0 % Description of political parties listed 1. The Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ) is a social above democratic/center-left political party that was founded in 1888 as the Social Democratic Worker's Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, or SDAP), when Victor Adler managed to unite the various opposing factions. -
Instituto Juan March Juan March Institute
Instituto Juan March Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales (CEACS) Juan March Institute Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (CEACS) No third way : a comparative perspective on the left Author(s): Lipset, Seymour Martin Date 1991 Type Working Paper Series Estudios = Working papers / Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales 16 (1991) City: Madrid Publisher: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales Your use of the CEACS Repository indicates your acceptance of individual author and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any document(s) only for academic research and teaching purposes. NO THIRD WAY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE LEFT Seymour Martin Lipset Estudio/Working Paper 1991/16 April 1991 Seymour Martin Lipset is Senior Fellow al the Hoover Institution (Stanford University) and Hazel Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University. This paper is an extended version of an oral presentation given by Professor Lipset at the Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences of the Juan March Institute (Madrid) in July 1990. -1- NO THIRD WAY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE LEFT by Seymour Martin Lipset While the attention of the world has been focused on the startling transformations in the Communist world, equally important if less dramatic shifts have been occurring in the noncommunist parties of the Left. Although less noteworthy, since they do not involve revolutionary economic and political changes, they are as ideologically significant, for they represent a withdrawal from the centralized redistributionist doctrines of the democratic Left.1 Their record confirms the conclusion of Pierre Mauroy, Prime Minister of France’s first majority Socialist government, who noted in the Spring of 1990: “We thought we could find a third way, but it turned out there isn’t one.”2 In country after country, socialist and other left parties have taken the ideological road back to capitalism.