CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Institute of Political Studies | Department of Political Science Geopolitical Studies
Diplomacy and Diplomatic Institutions of Unrecognized De Facto States Somaliland, Transnistria and Artsakh
Master’s thesis June 2020
Author : Samuel Lavoie Supervisor : Mgr. Martin Riegl, Ph.D ii
Abstract As a topic, international recognition has been increasingly studied over the past twenty years, particularly since Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008. This thesis attempts to advance our understanding of the underlying causes of the inability to gain political recognition by examining several factors that have been omitted from the academic literature. Specifically, it examines several key aspects of the diplomatic institutions, personnel, and approaches of three unrecognized de facto states that meet most of the criteria for statehood under international law, but have so far received no recognition recognized states. These entities are Somaliland, Transnistria, and Artsakh.
This paper also draws on partially recognized states and finds that geopolitical and ideological factors generally prevail over diplomatic ones as the main drivers of political recognition. This is especially true when an entity is located in an area of fierce rivalry for influence, such as the PMR and the Republic of Artsakh. However, while remaining a secondary factor, diplomacy becomes more important for international recognition when the interests of global and regional powers are less at stake.
Keywords Unrecognized De Facto States, International Recognition, Diplomatic Institutions, Republic of Somaliland, Transnistria (Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic; PMR), Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic; NKR), Partially Recognized States.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract ...... ii Table of Contents ...... iii Declaration ...... v List of Abbreviations ...... vi
Introduction ...... 1 Research Question; Case Studies ...... 3 Litterature Review ...... 4
Conceptualization of Key Terms ...... 7
Chapter 1: Political & Historical Backgrounds ...... 9 Republic of Somaliland ...... 7 Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic ...... 12 Republic of Artsakh ...... 15
Chapter 2: Structural & Legislative Obstacles ...... 18 Republic of Somaliland ...... 18 Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic ...... 23 Republic of Artsakh ...... 27 Legislative Obstacles ...... 30 Analysis ...... 31
Chapter 3: Diplomatic International Scope ...... 35 Republic of Somaliland ...... 36 Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic ...... 38 Republic of Artsakh ...... 41 Measurement and Analysis ...... 42
Chapter 4: Geographic Distribution ...... 49 4.1 Republic of Somaliland ...... 49 North America and Europe ...... 50 Africa ...... 51
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Middle East ...... 54 Asia ...... 55 Other ...... 56 Comparision with the SADR & Conclusion ...... 56 4.2 Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic ...... 59 Russia ...... 61 Ukraine ...... 61 Western States ...... 62 4.3 Republic of Artsakh ...... 65 OSCE Minsk Group and Participating Members ...... 66 Other International Actors ...... 70 4.4 Analysis & Conclusion ...... 72
Conclusion ...... 75 References ...... 79 Appendix ...... 85 Appendix II ...... 87 Appendix III ...... 89 Appendix IV ...... 91
Figures and Tables Figure 1 ...... 44 Figure 2 ...... 44 Table 1 ...... 45 Figure 3 ...... 57 Figure 4 ...... 57
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“NO OTHER CONCEPT IS AS POWERFUL, VISCERAL, EMOTIONAL, UNRULY, AS
STEEP IN CREATING ASPIRATIONS AND HOPES AS SELF-DETERMINATION.”
Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber
“IT IS NOT THE CONCEPT OF NATION THAT IS RETROGRADE; IT IS THE IDEA THAT
A NATION MUST NECESSARILY BE SOVEREIGN.”
Pierre Elliott Trudeau
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ANC-AU Armenian National Committee of Australia AU African Union BRI Belt and Road Initiative CONIFA Confederation of Independent Football Association CIS Community for Democracy and Rights of Nations EU European Union IGO Intergovernmental Organization INGO International Non-Governmental Organization IR International Relations NKAO Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MSSR Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic OAU Organization of African Unity OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe PMR Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic SADR Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization SNM Somali National Movement SSC Sanaag, Sool and Cayn SSR Soviet Socialist Republic TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus UN United Nations UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNOSOM United Nations Operations in Somalia UNPO Unrepresented Nations & Peoples Organization USC United Somali Congress USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Republic)
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1
INTRODUCTION ______
In the present time, there exist over a dozen unresolved cases of entities seeking external legitimacy around the world. These entities often meet many of the criteria that define sovereign states under international law1, such as having a permanent population, a defined territory and a relatively functioning government. However, they typically encounter obstacles when attempting to develop relations with recognized states and international organizations. Aspiring states may benefit from certain forms of international engagement, but insufficient recognition prevents them from obtaining full membership in the United Nations (UN), the World Bank and other international organizations (with exceptions2), and from enjoying formal state-to-state diplomatic relations with nearly all members of the international community, among other restrictions. There are currently six non-UN states with partial recognition (Taiwan, Western Sahara, Kosovo, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Northern Cyprus) and two UN members with observer status (the Holy See and Palestine)3. Besides Vatican City, which does not face any recognition obstacle, all other listed cases have obtained partial recognition from the international community with varying success. There are also unrecognized de facto states. These have failed to gain a single external recognition from UN member states and have no observer status in the UN. This thesis will study three of them: the Republic of Somaliland, Transnistria (the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic) and the Republic of Artsakh (the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic). The Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic, both of which are claiming parts of Ukraine, meet similar characteristics as the PMR and thus will be excluded from this study for duration purposes.
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For the parent state (the state faced with a separatist threat), a secessionist entity represents a vital threat to its territorial integrity. For secessionists, statehood represents an opportunity to respond to the aspirations of their communities and is often, according to their narrative, a means of ending existing systematic discrimination or oppression by the parent state government against their members. In all cases, questions of territorial integrity and self-determination are important sources of regional geopolitical instability; hence why their understanding is so important for international relations (IR) scholars. Recognition and secessionism are issues that have been increasingly studied over the past twenty years, especially since Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008 (Ker-Lindsay, 2017; Pegg, 2017; Sterio, 2013). Academics such as Eiki Berg, Raul Toomla, Milena Sterio, Pål Kolstø and Vladimir Kolossov, among many others, have pushed the limits of our understanding of these topics. Yet, a large part of the existing literature has focused on the role of external actors, in particular of the great powers, in the recognition processes (see Riegl and Doboš, 2018; Sterio, 2013; Coggins, 2011). These authors generally analyze the processes of international recognition with realist reasoning and regard competition for geopolitical influence as a dominant factor. There has also been a considerable amount of literature about the internal dynamics, used by de facto states, to shape statehood development (see Caspersen, 2008; Caspersen, 2012; Kolstø, 2006; Byman and King, 2012; Kolstø, and Blakkisrud, 2008). Other academics (see Broers, 2013; Richards, 2014; Voller, 2013) also argue that these entities often attempt to earn legitimacy through “earned sovereignty”. As Nina Caspersen (2008; 2011) has pointed out, such entities may be prompted to demonstrate that they can live up to the standards of democracy, the rule of law and functional statehood perhaps even better than many recognized states. Fewer authors, however, have examined the diplomatic institutions, personnel, and approaches of unrecognized de facto states. Undoubtedly, diplomacy plays an important role for aspiring states seeking recognition. Diplomats, in most cases, have access to and engage with a large number of foreign politicians and other influential members of civil society, and are useful to promote a state’s interests abroad. This essay will attempt to fill this void by examining whether weak diplomatic institutions and priorities may have prevented, or slowed, the recognition processes of Somaliland, Artsakh and Transnistria.
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Research Question and Case Studies
This dissertation will attempt to answer the following question: can inefficient diplomatic institutions, poor selection and training of diplomats and misguided diplomatic priorities explain the collective incapacity of Somaliland, Transnistria, and Artsakh to obtain political recognition by member states of the UN?
Hypothesis Unrecognized de facto states with inefficient diplomatic institutions, poor selection and training of diplomatic staff, and misguided diplomatic priorities find it more difficult to convince the international community to recognize them, as these problems allow the parent state to dominate the narrative surrounding the secessionist issue and prevent aspiring states from strengthening political relations with potential diplomatic allies.
The independent variables are the state of the diplomatic institutions, the methods of selection and training of diplomats, and the diplomatic priorities of unrecognized de facto states. The dependent variable is the degree of international recognition. Research methods will include examining government documents and websites, as well as domestic and foreign newspapers and academic articles. Interviews have been conducted, in the form of e-mail correspondences, with the Press Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the PMR and the Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic in the United States (see Appendix I, II & III). Unfortunately, numerous attempts to interact with Somaliland officials and heads of representation to conduct an interview have been unsuccessful. As previously mentioned, the three selected unrecognized de facto states, including the dates of their unilateral declarations of independence, will be: 1. The Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic4 (September 2, 1990); 2. The Republic of Somaliland (May 18, 1991) and; 3. The Republic of Artsakh5 (September 2, 1991). These cases have several characteristics in common: (a) they have been unable to obtain even a single recognition from member states of the UN; (b) all three have
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4 unilaterally declared their independence, coincidentally in the early 1990s; (c) they meet most of the criteria of statehood under international law. The structure of the thesis will be as follows. First, an overview of the basic theories and concepts used throughout this thesis will be presented. Chapter 1 will review the political history of the selected cases. In Chapter 2, the internal structure and management of their official representative offices, as well as the methods of selection and staff qualifications, will be examined. Chapter 3 will measure and compare the international scope (a measure of the number of external states and other unrecognized states reached) of the entities in question. Finally, Chapter 4 will look at the states and international organizations the three cases have selected to establish diplomatic relations with.
Literature Review
Previously, IR scholars have presented several theories to answer the following questions: what prompts states to decide (or not) to recognize an aspiring state? And what methods, if any, used by states and partially recognized states to obtain recognition have been successful? This section will briefly discuss the current state of the literature on the topic and present some of the most influential papers written about it. Domestic-level theories of state emergence have suggested that, during the twentieth century, the successes (or failures) of secessionist bids were primarily determined by domestic politics. According to these theories, aspiring states are more likely to obtain statehood if: (a) ethno- religious minorities show political consciousness and mobilize for statehood; (b) the community is under colonial rule or part of an ethnic federation; (c) the secessionists can effectively challenge the military power of their parent state; (d) the parent state authorizes the secession (Coggins, 2011). Most importantly is the politics between the secessionist entity and its parent state. It is a bottom-up perspective in which external actors are most likely to decide to (or not to) grant recognition after an internal outcome. Sterio’s (2013) work has also shed light on the role of external powers in the process of international recognition in the post-1945 environment. She presents four criteria as preconditions for successful secessionist attempt: (a) the secessionist group has been victim of past human rights abuses; (b) the central government of the parent state is unable to provide essential services; (c)
5 the secessionist entity has already been at the center of foreign administration by the international community; (d) it receives the support of most of the great powers. IR scholars have also attempted to solve this puzzle from a realist perspective. They suggest states weight their strategic interests before deciding whether or not to recognize a secessionist entity and conclude that secession outcomes are primarily determined upon the logic of power politics (Buzard, Graham, and Horne, 2017). Most often, they advance several presumptions: (a) states are more likely to recognize a secessionist entity if it can strategically weaken their enemies or benefit their allies; (b) states with internal secessionist challenges are less likely to recognize a secessionist entity abroad, as it can foster its domestic issues; (c) recognition often comes down to a snowball effect in which most states will recognize an entity only after one or more great powers initiates such policy (Coggins, 2011). Bridget Coggins’ (2011) work has tested the arguments of both the domestic-level and IR theories. For domestic-level ones, she concludes that ethno-religious distinctiveness and oppressed minorities, by themselves, do lead to greater prospects of obtaining recognition in comparison to other kinds of secessionists. However, anticolonial movements and members of ethnic federations are more likely to achieve independence. She also finds that domestic violence negatively correlates with the achievement of statehood, except for a war victory against the parent state. Finally, her findings support the three dominant presumptions presented above by realist scholars, particularly since 1945. The most surprising result of her model shows how mutual liberalism and democratic nature often plays against a secessionist entity’s quest for recognition. Normative theories, stemming from liberal principles, have played an important role in legitimizing secessionist claims. They can be subcategorized into two main theories (Buchanan, 1997). The first, known as the Primary Right theory, argues that the right to secede should be decided upon the territorial majority if expressed under no constraint. Unrecognized states often refer to the principle of self-determination to legitimize their quest and attempt to convince the international community by focusing on national identity, historic continuity and their domestic popular support for independence (Caspersen, 2012). The second normative theory, known as the Remedial Right Only theory, only validates secessionism in cases of permanent and grave oppression or human rights violations by the parent state against the citizens of the unrecognized state. Finally, effectiveness theories have also designed criteria under which, if successfully met
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by an unrecognized state, predict an increase in the likelihood external power support: (a) the entity has a democratic nature; (b) it has sustainable political institutions; (c) it has high economic output and effectiveness – especially relative to its parent state. In general, the higher the “effectiveness” of the secessionist entity in a practical sense, the more likely the international community will allow it inside the international system. Riegl and Doboš (2018) have shown skepticism towards normative and effective theories. Normative claims, they argue, have not been followed consistently by great powers and often only utilized by great powers when it suits them, while effective theories have not accurately correlated with their anticipated outcomes. The authors argue that external powers often compete to decide the outcome of a secessionist bid, and find that the decider of such outcome is ultimately the “strongest, highly involved external actor [of the conflict]”, which they call the (super)power. They based their theoretical model upon the work of Heraclides (1990), who listed the levels of commitment of external actors. International responses to secessionism can range from the extreme of “military action to suppress a unilateral bid for statehood” to the other extreme of de jure recognition (Geldenhuys, 2009).
Conceptualization 7
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF KEY TERMS ______Back in 1941, the Austrian jurist and legal philosopher Hans Kelsen, observing how “the problem of recognition of states and governments has neither in theory nor in practice been solved satisfactorily”, had brought important contributions to the understanding of recognition in defining and differentiating political acts of recognition of a state or government with legal ones (Kelsen, 1941). The political act of recognition, he writes, is the “willingness to enter into political and other relations with the recognized state or government”, and is shown by actions such as sending or receiving diplomatic envoys and concluding treaties with the entity. Political recognition is, in his own words, an arbitrary decision of the recognizing state, and can be conditional or unconditional. In contrast, the legal act of recognition is provided by international law. International law must clearly define what a state is to be applicable and apply unconditionally to any state fulfilling the legal conditions. Kelsen’s criteria for a legal act of recognition was strongly inspired by the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, signed in 1933 by nineteen states and currently ratified by sixteen. Article 1 of the agreement defines a state as a subject of international law if it fulfills the following conditions: it has (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a government; and 4) a capacity to enter into relations with other states. Article 3 states that “the political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states6”, meaning that political acts of recognition from external actors are (theoretically) unnecessary for political statehood. While often referring to legal recognition, this dissertation will primarily focus on advancing the knowledge of political acts of recognition, which are measured quantitatively by the number of states and international organizations extending such political recognition (Owtran, 2012).
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Conceptualization 8
Although international law embraces the concept of self-determination, notably in the International Covenants on Human Rights and in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, it does not contain a right of secession (Baer, 2000), The Charter of the United Nations originally envisioned self-determination in the colonial context only, with its application only used as a last resort for those permanently oppressed or discriminated by their parent state7. However, international law also defends the concept of territorial integrity, which puts secessionists at odds with their parent states on legal matters. This dissertation will also be incorporating the concepts of de facto states and de jure states as defined by scholars in the past. There has been a terminological proliferation in recent years to describe de facto states: “contested states”, “pseudo-states”, “informal states”, “proto-states”, “quasi-states” and “phantom states”, among others. The term unrecognized de facto state will be used throughout this essay, because it is a commonly applied one in contemporary literature (Pegg, 2017). This article will refer to Toomla’s (2016) definition of the term: “entities that fulfill the Montevideo criteria for statehood but lack international recognition.” For variation purposes, the terms “secessionist entity” and “aspiring state” will also be used with the same meaning. On the other end, de jure sovereignty will allude to “the sovereign rights and statuses attributed to states according to international law”, as defined by Knotter (2018). This term refers to states possessing widespread recognition but not necessarily satisfying the criteria of statehood under international law – will be used recurrently8.
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CHAPTER 1 POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS ______
Before comparing the diplomatic institutions of Somaliland, Transnistria and Artsakh, it is crucial to understand their basic domestic and regional political and historical contexts. The purpose of this chapter is to summarize this information.
Republic of Somaliland
Somaliland is a pro-Western, self-ruling political entity, internationally recognized as a democratic, autonomous region in northern Somalia, on the east coast of Africa and south of the Gulf of Aden. It shares international land borders with Ethiopia and Djibouti. Its capital city is Hargeisa. In 2018, Freedom House ranked Somaliland as ‘free’ in terms of political rights and civil liberties, while Somalia was ranked as ‘not free’9. In the late 19th century, Somaliland became a British protectorate (officially named the British Somaliland Protectorate), and shared borders with Italian Somaliland (now the southern part of Somalia), French Somaliland (now Djibouti) and Ethiopia. On June 26, 1960, during the processes of decolonization, the British Government approved the independence and statehood of British Somaliland, which became known as the State of Somaliland. This new state enjoyed sovereignty for a short period of five days (from June 26 to July 1, 1960) before uniting with the Italian- administered United Nations trust territory of Somalia (previously the Italian Somaliland) to establish the Somali Republic. There were presumptions that all Somali communities would join the Republic (Lewis, 1980). However, three of these communities have never joined: French Somaliland and the Somali diasporas in eastern Ethiopia and northeastern Kenya. However, the union has become problematic over several legal and political issues. The severity
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Chapter 1 10 of these issues peaked in the late 1980s and early 1990s during the rule of the Marxist-Leninist dictator Mohamed Siad Barre, who governed Somalia (which he renamed the “Somali Democratic Republic”) from 1969 up to the dissolution of his regime in 1991. During these years, his administration sponsored a massacre against the Isaaq clan10 - the largest clan in Somaliland11 - in response to the Somali National Movement (SNM), a rebel militia mainly made up of clan members who fought against their discrimination and for more democratic governance. Following the downfall of the regime in 1991, state institutions collapsed in the south and internal conflicts over the future direction of the country followed. On May 18, 1991, after an unresolved dispute between the SNM and another major rebel organization (the United Somali Congress (USC)) over the leadership of Somalia, the SNM unilaterally declared the independence of the northern region and the establishment of the Republic of Somaliland – a proclamation that was rejected by the USC in the south. Since 1991, Somaliland’s arguments to legitimize its bid for recognition have been based on the following points (Riegl and Doboš, 2018):
1. The five-days independence it obtained as part of the decolonization process in 1960. According to the uti possidetis principle of international law, the boundaries of the colonies that were created during the colonial period should be kept intact (Pegg and Kolstø, 2015). Somaliland has therefore argued that it should be granted recognition based upon the continued territory of the former British protectorate that was widely recognized for five days; 2. The legal invalidity of the Act of Union. This has been supported by arguments that Somaliland has rejected Somalia’s new constitution in 1961 and that no Act of Union bill has been passed jointly in both Somaliland and Somalia (Adam, 1994). Thus, Somalia’s
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independence cannot be a violation of Somalia’s territorial integrity since the Act of Union is legally invalid to begin with; 3. Somalia as a failed state. Somalia is a de jure state; it is unable to maintain public order throughout its territory but is nevertheless recognized. According to Hargeisa, the failure of Mogadishu to provide basic government services, such as security, throughout its territory legitimizes Somaliland’s quest for statehood. 4. The oppression and massacre of members of the Isaaq clan by Barre’s regime. The Charter of the UN envisaged the concept of self-determination for citizens victim of permanent oppression in the colonial context. Therefore, the genocide and discrimination against members of the Isaaq clan have been used as an argument for obtaining external support for statehood; 5. Somaliland’s capacity to be a reliable partner. For example, the government of Somaliland has assisted in efforts against piracy on the Gulf of Aden during the late 2000s.
In 2001, the government of Somaliland also held a draft constitutional referendum that saw 97.1% of voters support the constitution that affirmed Somaliland’s independence from Somalia (Shinn, 2011). While the results showed a high domestic approval for independence, it was rejected by the government of Somalia, the international community and also by the contested region of Puntland. In 2005, an AU fact-finding mission reported “a substantial minority, mainly among the non-Isaaq clans, who remain attached to the notion of a united Somalia” (Bryden, 2004). Though no existing state currently recognizes the Republic of Somaliland, many are sympathetic to it. This is the case of Ethiopia and Kenya, which have confronted Somalia’s expansionist tendencies since the Ogaden War in the late 1970s. Other sympathetic states to Somaliland include Rwanda, South Africa and to a certain extent the United Kingdom. Neighboring states prefer the status quo to conflict. Djibouti is concerned that a recognized Somaliland’s statehood may increase competition over foreign military installations and maritime activities. Ethiopia, which is home to the AU, fears that this political result will divide the members of the organization, especially after the experience of Western Sahara (and the withdrawal of Morocco from the organization). Addis Ababa also prefers a weak and divided Somalia. Western countries have indicated that the issue of its recognition should first be addressed by the AU, leading to believe they would follow an African lead in recognizing Somaliland (Pegg and Kolstø,
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2015). Despite a recognition deficit, the Republic of Somaliland is generally considered to be a success story, especially in the African context. Notably, it meets most of the Montevideo Convention criteria, its security forces are decentralized between clans, its policies are inclusive, its citizens enjoy relatively high civil liberties and political rights and there is some economic development particularly around the port of Berbera. Perhaps Somaliland’s most significant internal issue, however, relates to its own territorial integrity over the disputed regions of Sanaag, Sool and Cayn (SSC provinces). These areas are also claimed by the government of Puntland, an autonomous but non-secessionist region of Somalia (Pegg and Kolstø, 2015), which puts Somaliland in the odd situation of having to defend the principle of territorial integrity. Turkey is currently the leading mediator of the conflict. Delegations from Somaliland and Somalia met in Dubai in 2012 and in Istanbul in 2013. The parties agreed to the creation of a joint secretariat in the Turkish metropolis and concluded an agreement on air traffic control (Pegg and Kolstø, 2015). The mediation process is much less organized than that of the PMR and the Republic of Artsakh.
Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic
The Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, also known as Transnistria, is located on the eastern bank of the Dniester River which crosses Moldova. The region, which unilaterally declared independence from the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) in 1990, also borders Ukraine. According to a 2015 official census12, the PMR is home to a multiethnic population mainly composed of self-identified Russians (33.8%), Moldovans (33.2%) and Ukrainians (26.7%). Russian is the main inter-ethnic language and government language. Tiraspol is the strip’s capital city. In 2018, Freedom House ranked Transnistria as ‘not free’ and Moldova as ‘partly free’, making it the only aspiring state among the three selected cases to have inferior political and civil rights to its parent state. Transnistrian-Moldovan relations began to deteriorate, particularly in the late 1980s – a period
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marked by growing internal problems within the Soviet Union and a decline in its projection of power. At that time, the MSSR was one of the fifteen republics of the USSR and was still strongly influenced by Moscow. In the final years of the Soviet Union’s existence, Mikhail Gorbachev, the country’s last leader, invested a great deal of energy in implementing internal socio-political reforms (known as Perestroika and glasnost) which included some political liberalization and pro- market policies. Many Moldovans embraced Gorbachev’s ideals and came together to form a coalition movement in May 1989 called the Popular Front of Moldova. The Moldovan Communist Party strongly opposed the reforms, but eventually ceded to pressure from Moscow’s new administration and its own domestic civil society (Valh and Emerson, 2004). However, regions with significant ethnic minorities, notably the PMR and the Turkish-speaking Gagauzia of southern Moldova, did not view the Front in a very positive light. First, the PMR had stronger opposition to Gorbachev’s political movement for reformation. Second, and most importantly, the Front was viewed as a nationalist party for ethnic Moldovans targeting ethnic minorities. It supported the promotion of joint Moldovan-Romanian culture, and even unification with Romania, although public opinion was largely opposed to it. In 1989, the government also made Moldovan the official language (with Latin script to deepen ties with Romania) and adopted the Romanian national anthem (Idem, 2004). Although minority languages were to be locally protected, these sets of changes encountered strong opposition from ethnic minorities. In 1990, the PMR unilaterally declared independence from the USSR in an attempt to establish a new Soviet Socialist Republic, independent from the MSSR, and to maintain communist purity and preserve rights for its inhabitants. In 1991, however, two events radically changed the situation: 1. Moldova’s declaration of independence from the USSR and its change of name (Republic of Moldova); 2. The dissolution of the USSR. Following these events, Moldova tried by all means to assert territorial integrity in all the territories it claimed, including the PMR. In 1992, Moldovan forces fought against Transnistrian separatists who received military assistance from the new Russian state. A ceasefire was concluded later that year, leading to a joint peacekeeping force comprising six Russian, three Moldovan and three PMR battalions under a Trilateral Military Command (Valh and Emerson, 2004) that is still in effect, although Moldova has repeatedly pleaded for the removal of Russian troops. The military conflict, however, left a long-lasting impact on the collective psyche of domestic citizens.
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Russia has deep and historical ties with Tiraspol. It openly supported PMR during the Transnistrian War and maintains troops in the region as part of the joint peacekeeping force. Moscow has extended its influence over Transnistria through a number of means, including increasing the presence of Russian-language media and allowing Russian soldiers to vote on PMR soil during the Duma elections. However, even if the Transnistrian Parliament has expressed support for its annexation by Russia in 2014, Moscow has always refused to grant recognition to Tiraspol mainly because it wants to maintain an internal influence in Moldova, which expressed willingness to deepen ties with the EU. After independence, the PMR government privatized many industries, allowing the private Sheriff conglomerate to have a powerful influence on the region’s political and economic environments. The company, known for its proximity to Tiraspol officials, is largely owned by Russians and Ukrainians, and operates in many Transnistrian industries, including supermarkets, banks, and pharmacies, among many others. In 2006, referendums were held in Transnistria, asking voters for their preferences regarding the future political status of the PMR. An overwhelming majority (97%) of voters expressed support for independence and joining the Russian Federation at a later stage13. The vote was unrecognized by Moldova and the international community. Today, the territory east of the Dniester river is de facto under the control of Transnistrian forces (Bobick, 2017). The self- declared Republic prints its own currency (the Transnistria ruble) and issues many of its own documents, including passports, to extend its political exclusivity over the territories it claims. To date, only one international organization recognizes it: the Community for Democracy and Rights of Nations (CIS-2), which was founded in the early 2000s by political entities whose recognition is limited, if not non-existent, and who are historically been affiliated with the Soviet Union. Its members grant each other mutual recognition and cooperate on several issues, but have no seat at the UN. Finally, Pridnestrovie participates with several members of the international community in the settlement processes which oppose it to Moldova. Russia, the Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe (OSCE) and Ukraine act as mediators, while the EU and the United States as
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Republic of Artsakh
The Republic of Artsakh, also known as Nagorno-
Karabakh and, until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), is a disputed Armenian-speaking area located in the Southern Caucasus. It is entirely surrounded by Azerbaijan, but is also geographically close to Armenia, Georgia, Russia, Iran and to some extent Turkey. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia claim sovereignty over it. Its capital is Stepanakert. Originally, ethnic Armenians populated Nagorno-Karabakh after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and Russia’s migration policy in the Caucasus. In 1921, however, Nagorno-Karabakh was given to the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) by the Soviet Union and became an autonomous oblast within the constituent republic in 1923. The territorial dispute started in 1988 when the NKAO requested to join the Armenian SSR, a different constituent republic, the two entities being predominantly of Armenian ethnicity. The request was however rejected by Moscow, and opposition to the decision was limited due to the dominant enforcement by Moscow of the order in the region. However, the dissolution of the USSR three years after the request created a power vacuum and political instability in the region14. In 1991, Azerbaijan and Armenia declared themselves independent from the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan used its new political status to centralize power towards its Baku and to abolish the status of NKAO and make the territory a subject of direct rule. These new sets of policies were strongly opposed by locals in Nagorno-Karabakh. In response, the Government of Nagorno- Karabakh held a referendum on independence. According to its MFA, nearly 100% of voters
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Chapter 1 16 supported independence15. But it is widely accepted that the Azeri minority living in the enclave, representing around 20% of the population (Kolstø and Blakkisrud, 2012), largely boycotted the referendum. Nevertheless, the referendum results were unrecognized by all member states of the international community. To this day, only the CIS-2 recognizes it. This triggered a full-scale war between Nagorno-Karabakh, backed by Armenian forces, and Azerbaijan. The conflict was massive – nearly all Azeris living under Stepanakert’s control fled to other parts of Azerbaijan (de Waal, 2003). Critics have compared the outcome to a policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Idem, 2012). In 1994, Armenians were in full control over the enclave. Attempts at international mediation by groups such as the OSCE Minsk Group have not resulted in any any long-term peace solution agreed to by all parties concerned. The Minsk Group continues to operate with the aims of providing an appropriate framework for the resolution of the conflict, concluding an agreement to end armed conflicts, and promoting peace by deploying OSCE multinational peacekeeping forces. The conflict has stagnated since the signing of a Russian-brokered ceasefire in May 1994, although heavy fighting broke out again in 2016. Baku has recurrently pledged to take over Nagorno-Karabakh and has expressed its willingness to use force if necessary (Kolstø and Blakkisrud, 2011). Today, Nagorno-Karabakh’s population is highly homogeneous. According to a 2005 census, almost all citizens are ethnic Armenians and belong to Armenian Apostolic Church (Idem, 2012). Although the figures have been somewhat disputed, it is undeniable that the war has considerably reduced the number of Azeris living within the disputed areas. In 2018, Freedom House classified both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh as ‘partly free’ with regard to democracy and civil liberties, while Azerbaijan was ranked as ‘not free’. The Republic of Artsakh’s location is strategically important for Armenia and Azerbaijan. Geographically, it is a relatively wide gateway to Georgia, Iran, and Turkey, in addition to Armenia and Azerbaijan, and represents about 30% of Azerbaijan’s territory. Its location is highly important for pipelines16, transports and trade. Additionally, Armenia’s interest in Artsakh is also motivated
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Chapter 1 17 by the idea of creating a Greater Armenia that includes the neighboring diaspora. While the Republic of Artsakh has received no recognition from UN member states, several territories, regions or political parties and American states have supported its recognition. This is the case of nine American states, which have passed bills recognizing Stepanakert (since 2012), the Australian state of New South Wales (2012) and the Australian Greens political party (2017), the Basque Parliament, who voted in support of Nagorno-Karabakh’s self-determination (2014). Several politicians in the Philippines have also taken similar stances. Finally, the Republic of Artsakh has largely participated in mediation processes since the 1980s, which are far more organized than for the three other selected unrecognized entities. Over the years, mediators have included Russia and Kazakhstan (Zheleznovodsk Process), Iran (Iranian Mediation), UN experts and, most importantly, the co-chair mediators (Russia, France and the US) and permanent participants (Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) of the OSCE Minsk Group (Abilov, 2018).
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CHAPTER 2 STRUCTURAL & LEGISLATIVE OBSTACLES ______
Typically, an official representative office works to raise the profile of an unrecognized de facto state abroad. It can act to counter the narrative of the parent state surrounding the dispute and promote the interests of the political entity. However, representative offices of unrecognized states do not have formal diplomatic status under the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations due to the nature of their political status. This, combined with the national law of the states in which these offices are established, limits their effectiveness. Internal factors, such as their structural management, can also reduce their effectiveness when they pressure foreign governments to gain recognition. Internal factors include, among other things, the selection of representatives, staffing by office, centralization or decentralization of decision-making and financial revenues. This chapter will explore these structural management features and the legal barriers faced by unrecognized de facto states. It seeks to answer the following question: is the inability of Somaliland, the PMR and Artsakh to gain international recognition due to common internal failings in their diplomatic offices and legal obstacles beyond their control?
Republic of Somaliland
Somaliland’s representative offices typically serve as a liaison between the Somaliland government and foreign governments, business executives, international organizations, influential members of civil society and members of the diaspora. They are established to provide consular services to Somalilanders and foreign citizens, to interact with foreign media, policymakers and communities, to report on developments to the government of Somaliland, to promote cultural and scientific exchanges, to provide assistance to Somaliland citizens in emergencies, and to provide information and assistance on Somaliland’s investment climate and business opportunities. They
Chapter 2 19 also play a political role. The current Representative to the US, Bachir Goth, plans to “engage with Somaliland communities over the country and to reignite their enthusiasm for the common cause17.” Several offices, such as the Somaliland UAE Trade Office, are more commercial by nature, but can also assume consular and political roles. These offices are often inaugurated by Somaliland officials. For instance, the Mission to the US had its opening ceremony during a week- long visit to Washington DC and New York City by Somaliland’s Foreign Minister in 2017. The President of Somaliland appoints a representative (or envoy), an alternative title to “ambassador”, to head a representative office abroad. These de facto ambassadors can come from a variety of different backgrounds. Sometimes, they are prominent Somaliland-born citizens promoted by Hargeisa to represent it abroad. This was the case of Bashe Awil Omar, the current head of the Somaliland Liaison Office in Nairobi, who previously served as a senior diplomat in commercial diplomacy and development cooperation in the United Arab Emirates18. This was also the case for Bashir Goth, a former communications expert and the current Somaliland representative to the US. In other cases, ambassadors are members of the Somaliland diaspora selected to represent Somaliland in the country in which they reside. The current representative to the United Kingdom, Ayan Mahamoud, was a very involved Somalilander living in London prior to her appointment as de facto ambassador, known to be the managing director of Kayd Somali Arts and Culture19. The same can be said of the representative to Canada, Loula Isman, who worked as an accountant in Ottawa20. In rare cases, ambassadors may be non-Somalilanders living abroad. Perhaps the best illustration is the interesting case of Mikael Thorstensson, a Swedish businessman who runs a non-
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Chapter 2 20 profit school for disabled children in Somaliland and has subsequently been appointed as Somaliland’s Special Envoy to the EU21. Appointing representatives on the basis of merit and professional success, as is the case for the head of the Somaliland Liaison Office in Nairobi, is an effective way of ensuring qualified staff. These individuals were already known to Somaliland officials before their appointment and have proven themselves, which reduces the risk of them unexpectedly mishandling their new responsibilities. The same cannot always be said of members of the diaspora who have been promoted to lead diplomatic missions in the countries where they reside. In general, these individuals are better informed about their adopted countries, but have not always received appropriate diplomatic training or comparable previous experience. This situation may lead to ineffective diplomacy even in important foreign states. For example, the former Representative to the US, Rashid Nur Absiye, was known for his pro-Somaliland activism on social media and is a Harvard-educated member of the diaspora. He has been described by other members of the local diaspora as well-mannered and patriotic, but also as a polarizing figure and an undedicated manager of the Mission in the US. Some claimed that the office, under his leadership, failed to serve the Somaliland community and only opened during delegation visits. Other members criticized the representative for avoiding certain responsibilities, for not updating the office’s online website and social media, and for refusing help from volunteers. “He alone officially represents Somaliland, and he wants to keep it that way”, felt one community member22. Additionally, the allocations (stipends) received from Somaliland are relatively low given the expenses and the important role played by diplomatic offices. The representative of the Mission to the US, for example, is said to receive around $60,000 on an annual basis, which is used to finance all expenditures, including wages23. Representative offices also generate revenue from the issuance of visas. Together, they form the main revenues of the offices but barely cover basic expenses. As
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Chapter 2 21 a result, most de facto embassies have small staff and sometimes only the representative himself receives monetary compensation. In some cases, a head of mission is assisted by official staff. This is the case of the Somaliland Mission to Sweden, whose envoy is supported by a political and legal adviser and a secretary24. Low funding reduces the pool of qualified candidates for such position, limits the number of employees in a representation (which can be partially compensated by volunteers) and limits the income necessary to successfully assume the required responsibilities. In many cases, representatives work elsewhere during their mandate to afford a living, which leaves them less time to devote to their mission. Having a higher income may allow, for example, to hire a professional lobbying firm to compensate for the lack of time and political experiences of some representatives25. The diplomatic activities of Somaliland’s representative offices are extensive. The envoys often invite Somaliland authorities to the host state and help organize delegation visits. They may also organize events, information sessions and conferences for the local Somaliland community. They interact with foreign nationals to improve intergovernmental, business and civil collaboration on many fronts. For instance, a 2018 meeting between Bashe Omar, Somaliland’s representative in Kenya, and Peter Munya, Kenya’s Cabinet Secretary, helped advance a plan for direct flights from Nairobi to Hargeisa. The representative also worked hard to deepen connection between the Kenyan port of Mombasa with the port of Berbera in Somaliland. According to social networks and calendars of the various Somaliland representative offices, these activities seem to take place on average several times a season (although some informal meetings and events may not have been made public). Visits by high level-delegation also take place occasionally. In 2010, a Somaliland delegation from Somaliland to the US, which included the deputy speaker of the Somaliland parliament and the ministers of Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs, among others, held discussions with USAID officials and members of the National Security Council at the White House, in Washington DC (Mc Mahon, 2014). Somaliland envoys interact not only with members of the hosting state government, but also with other international representatives in the area. For example, Bashe Omar held meetings with Swedish and Swiss officials in 2019 in Nairobi: “I met the ambassador of Switzerland to East
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Africa (Dr. Ralf Heckner) and he was very impressed at how resilient Somalilanders are in the face of lack of international recognition and offered to push his country to work with us on how to improve our economy for the betterment of our people26.” In another case, Basche Omar accompanied the General Manager of Somaliland Civil Aviation and Airports Authority, Abdi Mohamed Rodol, to a meeting with a French Commercial Attaché at the French Embassy in Nairobi. Envoys also participate in international conferences. In 2019, for instance, the Somaliland representative to Addis Ababa participated in a conference on Sino-African cooperation27. Consequently, Somaliland representatives play an important role in broadening the political entity’s diplomacy to international actors present in host countries. The representative offices themselves are also generally well located in the host states. For example, the Somaliland Mission to the US is approximately ten miles from the White House and the Capitol, and its offices in the UK and Addis Ababa are within five miles of the central political institutions, namely Westminster and the Ethiopian Parliament. Somaliland’s Trade Office in the UAE, which maintains close relations with the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry, is located in the Emirate’s economic center, less than five miles from Dubai International Airport. The central locations of Somaliland’s diplomatic offices facilitate geographic accessibility to domestic policymakers, politicians, business executives and influential members of civil society. A few are further away from political centers, such as the Somaliland Mission Australia, whose office was established in Melbourne in 2014. However, several representatives do not have a physical office to support them in their diplomatic efforts. Physical offices provide space for meetings, delegation visits, organizing events and much more, while providing diplomatic credibility. The online presence of Somaliland representative offices is often inadequate and inconsistent. Firstly, most representations have no online presence, which makes it difficult to establish contact and find necessary information. Among those who have an online presence, many of their websites suffer from outdated design, content or both. The Somaliland Mission to the US is perhaps the
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Chapter 2 23 most striking due to importance of Washington DC in recognition processes, but other offices also suffer to some extent from these issues. On the other hand, the websites of other offices, such as ones in Kenya, Ethiopia, Sweden, and the UAE have recent designs and provide more accurate and up-to-date information.
Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic
The main duties of the PMR’s official representations are similar to Somaliland’s. Vitaly Ignatiev, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PMR, describes them as the “holding of official working meetings of the President and other heads of governments, legislators, round tables, briefings, and communication with [foreign] representatives28.” Offices also assist in establishing social, humanitarian, athletic, economic and other connections with the country of stay, and increasing cultural and scientific exchanges (author’s interview, 2019). They each help dozens of Pridnestrovian citizens every year for the purposes of study and registration, as well as for the loss of documents. According to the PMR’s official representation in the Russian Federation, they also collect, process, prepare and submit information and analytical reports related to the socio-political and socio-economic situation abroad to the President of the PMR29. Another important element of their responsibilities is to ensure participation in activities of international and regional organizations, conferences and forums. They do not offer consular services because the Transnistrian government does not require entry visas for foreign visitors. When a new office opens, it is inaugurated with an opening ceremony. The inauguration of the Official Representative Office in Moscow in January 2019 brought together Russian parliamentarians, Transnistrians living in Russia, the heads of the embassies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and several public figures30. Before their opening, the Pridnestrovian representative
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Chapter 2 24 offices often existed in other forms and had reduced responsibilities. The Representative Office in Moscow, for example, was preceded until 2012 by a Center for Cooperation, and the Abkhaz office initially first operated through the Regional Public Organization Centre for Cooperation Abkhazia- Pridnestrovie31. But in its desire to increase diplomatic engagement with Russia and CIS-2 members, Tiraspol often chose to replace these institutions with official representative offices, which have broader responsibilities. The office in Moscow is undoubtedly its most important diplomatic office abroad. Domestically, its diplomats interact with representatives of other CIS-2 countries to increase mutual collaboration. The Office also organizes receptions for the Transnistrian diaspora in Moscow, organizes marches and meets with Russian authorities. Besides deepening ties with the Kremlin, the Office also represents the PMR to international organizations. The office’s activities are held many times per month, on average, according to the “news” section of its official website. In 2019, the head of the representative office traveled to Geneva to participate in the 42nd session of the United Nations Human Rights Council and called on the international community to support Transnistria’s statehood32. The representative also called on the UN to grant Transnistria observer status and to create a unit within the organization to interact with Transnistrian authorities33. The PMR’s representative offices in Abkhazia and South Ossetia generally invest more efforts in domestic diplomacy. Originally, Transnistria sought to establish diplomatic relations with the two in the early 1990s. In 1993, it signed a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation with Abkhazia and a similar treaty with South Ossetia in 1994. The decree on the opening of the representative offices in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was signed in 2007. These representations take part in
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Chapter 2 25 important political events in Abkhazia and in South Ossetia, in particular those referring to their own independence. They also act as observers during domestic elections, work to increase higher education and legal cooperation with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, such as reducing visa barriers, meeting with domestic political actors to discuss regional issues and encourage Transnistrian athletes to participate in international tournaments held in these regions34. Pridnestrovian heads of representations, like in Somaliland, are appointed and removed from office by the President of the PMR. Typically, they are either Pridnestrovian citizens occupying high-level positions in the PMR government, or foreign citizens with extensive political or business experiences in the state or region in which they reside. They are normally not members of the Pridnestrovian diaspora promoted to head of representations. The appointment of representatives according to these standards generally ensures qualified and motivated staff. Appointing foreign citizens with extensive political or business experience in their own region as Transnistrian representatives can also be beneficial, as they are very familiar with the politics of the host state, have close ties with its political elites and have diplomatic know-how. This accelerates and strengthens the effectiveness of lobbying on behalf of the PMR. In general, Transnistrian envoys work full-time and have no other side work, which allows them to fully concentrate on their diplomatic responsibilities. The current head of the representation to Moscow, Leonid Afanasevich Manakov is a Pridnestrovian-born lawyer with domestic political success, who had been the First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the PMR35. The other two current PMR envoys are also foreign citizens promoted by the Tiraspol to head its representation offices. Alan Soltanovich Pliev, the current representative to South Ossetia, was born in the Ossetian capital city of Tskhinvali and held various governmental positions, including First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The current representative (or official title, Plenipotentiary Representative) to Abkhazia Garry Kupalba, was an Abkhazian Deputy Defence Minister before his appointment by the PMR as its representative to Sukhumi. Previously, Astamur Kakalia, Transnistria’s first representative to Abkhazia (from 2005 to 2007), was an Abkhaz businessman and a presidential candidate in the 2019 Abkhazian
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Chapter 2 26 presidential election. In a final example, Transnistria’s former representative to South Ossetia, Egor Kochiev, was head of Communication Department of the Ministry of Interior of South Ossetia36. Diplomatic agents are officers of the diplomatic service of the PMR. According to the Press Service of the MFA of the PMR (author’s interview, 201937), “employment to diplomatic service is accomplished after passing obligatory special check-ups, and in several cases candidates must pass exams to verify job suitability”. Tiraspol confers prominence to the training of its (potential) forthcoming diplomats. The establishment of the Council of Young Diplomats of the PMR, an organ of the entity’s MFA, is a prime example. The members of the Council are acting employees of the PMR’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and are potential candidates for filling vacant posts within the institution. Its members typically are students of faculties of political science, journalism, and economics. The Council aims to improve the professional qualities of the participants, to educate them on the principles of corporate ethics and the preservation of Pridnestrovian diplomatic customs, and to develop their research, practical and communication skills38. Many Transnistrian diplomats, even those working outside of representative offices, are supported by Russian experts (Kosienkowski, 2012). The Pridnestrovian MFA has remarkably centralized authority over its representative offices. It controls not only their staff, but also their funding and logistical support. Transnistrian foreign policy has traditionally been centralized. This tradition was particularly implemented under Igor Smirnov, who served as president of the PMR from 1991 to 2011, and whose administration had an authoritarian grip on Tiraspol’s external activities. At a time, Obnovleniye, the party controlling the parliament, was mainly focusing on the internal struggle for power rather than the quasi-state’s external affairs (Kosienkowski, 2012). While the political entity’s foreign policy has become more decentralized since the Shevchuk administration, the management of official representative offices remains relatively centralized. Pridnestrovian representative offices are conveniently located at the domestic level. The
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Moscow office is located in the Arbat district and is nearby many Russian political institutions. The offices in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are established in their respective capitals, and the small geographic size of the two entities facilitates access to all the domestic actors. The PMR’s representative offices are active on the Web at varying levels. The Official Representative Office in Moscow website is frequently updated, offers substantial content and has a modern design. The same cannot be said of the office in the Republic of Artsakh, which has an empty news section, as well as empty social media hyperlinks, photo galleries and “about” section. Although they are not active on key social media, their activities are frequently shared through the media channels of PMR’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Republic of Artsakh
The Permanent Representations of Artsakh also have responsibilities similar to those of Somaliland and Transnistria. They promote the culture and humanitarian needs of the people of Karabakh and respond to inquiries about business opportunities. Certain permanent representations, such as that in the US, raise awareness of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the political, economic and social developments in Artsakh by distributing newsletters to government agencies, foreign embassies, international NGOs, the media, universities and other institutions39. They also act as a medium between domestic and Karabakh citizens, organizations and businesses, while also engaging with the local Armenian diaspora. They claim to promote a constructive and peaceful resolution to the conflict with Azerbaijan, but also discuss with domestic civil, organizational and political actors to foster support for the recognition of the Republic of Artsakh. Finally, they assist travelers wishing to visit Artsakh by referring them to the consular section of the NKR Permanent Representation in Armenia and Armenian embassies and consulates (travelers can only reach the NKR through Armenia, thus requiring an Armenian entry visa as well). They do not offer consular services themselves40.
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The representatives of the NKR are appointed by presidential decree. Most, but not all, have some form of relationship with the host country and held low to medium-level positions in government institutions in Karabakh. Hovhannes Gevorgian, the current representative to France, for example, had previously worked in the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the NKR and had subsequently obtained a diploma at university in Paris. A similar path was followed by Robert Avetisyan, the permanent representative to the US, who was educated in the US and previously held various positions in the NKR’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Several representatives have come from slightly different backgrounds. Kaylar Michaelin, the NKR’s envoy to Australia, had been an active member of the Australian-Armenian community for more than four decades and has chaired Armenia Media Inc. Australia, but had no previous professional experience in the NKR government. The same can be said for Vardan Bareghian, the former NKR representative to Washington DC, who held extensive responsibilities in NGOs, but had no education or professional experience in the US (although he worked with US officials in negotiations within the OSCE Minsk Group). Finally, the permanent representative to the Mission in the Middle East, Karapet Kebabjian, is the only representative responsible for an entire region. Little background information about him is available, but reports suggest he was the founder of the International Academy of Armenian Black Belts Association41. A few other representatives are responsible for more than one state. For instance, the representative to the US is also responsible for Canada, while the one to Berlin is particularly known for his diplomatic involvement beyond Germany. The permanent representatives of Artsakh are sometimes confronted with verbal and physical threats due to the nature of their activities. In 2015, the private residence of Harutyun Grigoryan, the envoy to Germany, was assaulted by unknown assailants. A note left outside of his home suggests the attack was carried out in reaction to representative’s professional activities42. However, such incidents are rare and do not hamper the activities of the institutions. Like the PMR, the offices of Artsakh’s permanent representations are generally well located in the countries where they are established. The permanent representations in the US, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Armenia and the French Republic have opened in the capitals of the
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Chapter 2 29 host countries and are located nearby domestic political institutions. A few others are located somewhat further, but they can still easily manage the distance. For example, the permanent representation to Australia is located in North Willoughby, in New South Wales, about 190 miles from Canberra. The permanent representation in Germany (operating under the European Center for Artsakh) opened in the city of Potsdam, just West of Berlin. This distance is, however, not great enough to affect their activities43. However, a few are far from domestic or regional political institutions. The permanent representation in Canada, for instance, operates from Washington D.C., and the office responsible for the Middle East operates from Beirut. Having permanent representations responsible for more than one country is not necessarily a bad decision, because it can increase the diplomatic influence of the existing offices without having to cover the costs of opening new ones. However, it can become a problem when there are not enough staff to perform the tasks, especially in countries with strong global influence. For example, there is only one diplomat at the permanent representation in the US (personal interview, 2019), who is also responsible for Canada. Even if some permanent representations, such as the one in Australia, have more than one employee (an assistant sometimes assist the representative), there are not enough staff to exploit the diplomatic potential of permanent representations. However, the permanent representations of Artsakh often receive assistance from the Armenian diaspora and its institutions, which partly compensates for the shortage of their staff. In occurrence, the office in Australia operates at the same address as and cooperates with the Armenian National Committee of Australia (ANC-AU) and the Armenian Relief Society. In July 2019, the ANC-AU assisted the permanent representation in Australia in hosting a delegation visit led by Artsakh’s Foreign Minister Masis Mayilyan, and by participating in meetings with Australian political leaders in Canberra and Sydney, and with the Armenian-Australian community in Melbourne44. Nevertheless, the Armenian diaspora generally has a different perspective on the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict, with a preference for the unification of the territory with Armenia. Working too closely together can contradict the permanent representation’s mission to promote the statehood and recognition of the Republic of Artsakh. Indeed, international recognition of the
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Chapter 2 30 independence of the Republic of Artsakh remains Stepanakert’s foreign policy priority (interview with the NKR Representative in the US, 2019), despite a 2013 survey suggesting that a majority of Karabakh citizens – like Armenians – prefer unification to independence (Bakke, 2013). The Artsakh government should therefore increase its diplomatic autonomy vis-à-vis Armenia by increasing the number of foreign service officers. However, the offices of the permanent representations of Artsakh have been criticized. Many, like the one in the US, are flagless and unremarkable45. Physical offices provide space for a variety of events such as hosting meetings and delegation visits, and most importantly, they offer diplomatic credibility. Artsakh’s diplomatic offices may be suitable for undertaking daily activities, but they do not always convey diplomatic credibility. They are funded by the state budget of the Republic of Artsakh (interview with the NKR Representation in the US, 2019). Detailed information on the funding and expenditure of permanent representation is very scarce. However, the small number of diplomats in the representations and the inadequacy of the offices themselves suggest that the current state of funding is insufficient. The representations also suffer from relative online absence. Only a minority of them having websites. Those who have them are the offices in Germany, France, and the US (with Canada)46. Even fewer have social media accounts. On the other hand, their websites are relatively suitable. Most of them mention the Karabakh perspective of the conflict with Azerbaijan, provide background information on the NKR and guide potential tourists in obtaining the documents necessary to visit the territory. All of them report and coordinate activities with Artsakh’s MFA. However, the websites show significant imbalances in presentation and content, suggesting that they tend to operate autonomously. The website of the NKR Office in the US, for example, currently has many unfunctional links and an outdated presentation, which affects its credibility. On the contrary, the one in Australia is modernized and frequently updated. Despite their apparent autonomy, all permanent representations (and the MFA) are regulated by the Law on Diplomatic Service of the Republic of Artsakh (interview with the NKR Representation in the US, 2019).
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Legislative obstacles
An unrecognized de facto state’s representative offices often face legal challenges. The first concerns their registration in host countries. Due to the political status of de facto states, their offices cannot normally be registered as “embassies”. To carry out diplomatic activities, they must adapt to national legal environments47. For example, the Official Representative Office of the PMR in Moscow is registered as a public organization in accordance with the norms of the Russian legislation. It is titled “Transnistria Foundation for the Development of Social and Cultural Relations” rather than as an embassy. The Permanent Representation of the NKR in Berlin also acts as an organization under the title of “European Center for Artsakh”. Taiwan’s Representative Offices are perhaps the best known; they are often called “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Offices”. Legal issues also have implications for the conduct of diplomatic activities in the host countries. According to the Nagorno Karabakh Republic Office in Washington DC, which is registered with the US Department of Justice, “the lack of recognition by the US on the federal limits the level and intensity of various ties with the executive branch. Ties are less restricted with the legislative branch (US Congress). This does hamper our ability to network. Nevertheless, the NKR Office, in line with the US legislation, has the opportunity to implement most of its tasks” (interview with the NKR Office in the US, 2019). In addition, the representative does not have a diplomatic passport48. To counter legal limitations, he attends “events in the think-tanks and other fora, which are of interest for the Republic of Artsakh and do not require diplomatic credentials from participants or attendees.” Similar situations are encountered by the official representative offices of Somaliland and Transnistria, with the exceptions of the PMR Offices in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (they are registered as “embassies” due to Pridnestrovie’s recognition by Sukhumi and Tskhinvali).
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Analysis
As seen throughout this chapter, the official representative offices of Somaliland, Pridnestrovie and Artsakh face structural and legal challenges that prevent them from exploiting their diplomatic potential. Let us first review the internal structures, procedures and protocols of their diplomatic offices, which appear to hinder the success of Somaliland and Artsakh more than Pridnestrovie. Hargeisa’s protocols for the selection of its Representatives are not linear. Often, appointed representatives, whose skills have often not been thoroughly assessed by Hargeisa prior to appointment, have no diplomatic or political experience or education. This has limited Somaliland’s ability to conduct diplomatic activities effectively in key countries, including the US. Somaliland diplomatic offices also suffer from inadequate funding: representatives are often forced to have second jobs, which reduces their engagement in representative functions and must reduce support staff and diplomatic activities to maintain financial sustainability. Several representations do not even have an official physical office to conduct diplomatic activities. Artsakh offices follow similar protocols. The selection of representatives is also non-linear, but most appointed envoys have at least some professional experience in low to intermediate-level positions in the Karabakh government, which allows the government to pre-assess their qualifications for the job. However, Artsakh diplomatic offices are also understaffed. The NKR Office in Washington DC, for example, which is also responsible for Canada, employs only one diplomat. Fortunately, offices often rely on Armenian diplomatic support for their diplomatic activities, but this can also contradict Stepanakert’s promotion of independence and statehood recognition. The physical offices of the representations are also criticized for being unremarkable and flagless; this reduces the credibility of Artsakh’s diplomatic institutions and even statehood. PMR processes are on the other hand more strict, more precise and more centralized management. Its representatives to Moscow have traditionally held high-level positions in the PMR government. However, it also selects non-Transnistrian foreign nationals with extensive and high-level political experience in the state or region where they reside, and is the only unrecognized state to do so on a larger scale. Prospective diplomats must pass a mandatory special check-up and pass exams to verify fitness for employment. These processes ensure qualified diplomatic personnel and facilitates access to foreign political elites. Representatives generally work full time and do not particularly need a large numbers of support staff, as two of the three regions with Pridnestrovian diplomatic offices (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) are small territories with small
Chapter 2 33 populations and have already recognized the PMR, thereby removing the need to lobby for recognition. Finally, the online presence of the Somaliland and Artsakh diplomatic offices also reveals problems (and to a much lesser extent Transnistria). Indeed, while some of Hargeisa’s diplomatic offices have websites comparable to embassies of recognized states, many others either do not existent or have remarkably outdated presentation and content, which also affects their credibility. Artsakh diplomatic offices also suffer from these issues to a lesser extent. In both cases, the websites of their offices are not uniform, which suggests that they operate autonomously from one another. Additionally, only a few of them are present on social media, making them lose visibility. On the other hand, Tiraspol’s centralized management of its representative offices allows for the standardization of websites and helps the updating of content. Although they not present on social networks, their diplomatic activities are often shared by the PMR’s Foreign Ministry account. Legal obstacles, to a larger extent, have also hampered the success of the diplomatic offices, but (again) appear to be more detrimental to Somaliland and Artsakh than to Transnistria. Indeed, this is largely due to the location of the diplomatic offices. Somaliland and Artsakh offices are present in a greater number of states, increasing the number of national laws they must comply with. They are also often located in countries where citizens and politicians have not been exposed to the history and political complexities of their regions and are not as knowledgeable about the views of the breakup entities. Somaliland and Artsakh offices must therefore raise awareness at every societal level; however, legal obstacles prevent them from gaining access to important political actors in the host states. Additionally, although the diplomatic offices of the three political entities share similar mandates and undertake similar activities, they demonstrate significant structural differences, particularly with regards to protocols and procedures. These features appear to have hindered the efficiency of Somaliland representative offices. To a lesser extent, they have also hampered the success of Artsakh offices. These features have been least detrimental to PMR offices. On the other hand, the majority of the very few PMR diplomatic offices are recognized as embassies under national law due to mutual recognition with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thereby removing legal barriers to diplomatic activities in these regions. The Representative Office in Moscow is the only PMR representative office to a recognized state and the only institution hindered by national law. However, the legislation of the Russian Federation has not prevented the
Chapter 2 34 authorities of Pridnestrovie from establishing regular interactions with their Russian counterparts and from lobbying for recognition. The Kremlin has long been aware of the PMR’s longstanding desire to be recognized and is unlikely to recognize it unless major geopolitical circumstances pave the way for a change in foreign policy (it has historically happened with Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Consequently, the legal obstacles faced by Somaliland and Artsakh are larger than the ones faced by the PMR. In conclusion, Somaliland and Artsakh face several common (and different) problems of structural management. They can improve the structural management of their diplomatic institutions, but legal obstacles will be more difficult to overcome due to the nature of their political status. These pose less problem for the PMR. Consequently, the lack of international recognition is not due to common legal issues or structural management problems.
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CHAPTER 3 DIPLOMATIC INTERNATIONAL SCOPE ______
Diplomatic offices are commonly established by states with all degrees of recognition, whether in the form of official representative offices (sometimes called liaison offices), consulates or embassies. These offices are seen as a way to regularize communications with outside actors and a powerful way to lobby for recognition. Take, for instance, the Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic to the United States in America. It explicitly states its mission in its “about” section to “significantly raise awareness of the legal aspects of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and to work on the de jure recognition of our independence from Azerbaijan49”. The same can be said for Somaliland’s representative to Canada, Loula Isman, who described her role as pressuring Canadian officials to recognize the state of Somaliland, according to a local newspaper50. Several authors have advocated for more effective diplomatic representations to improve the likelihood of political recognition. This was the case of Mohamed Abdillahi Duale and Saeed Mohamed Ahmed (2018) who stressed that diplomatic representations of Somaliland were one of the main factors explaining Hargeisa’s failure to obtain state recognition: “The ministry has also failed to organize strong and capable missions abroad that, if put in place, could play a significant role in promoting Somaliland’s quest for recognition and building deep relations with important friends and supporters of Somaliland’s cause. Diplomacy requires constant contact and visibility within the circles of decision-makers, so as to get the country’s argument across on a wide variety of every-growing matters. So far, Somaliland’s missions abroad remain poorly equipped in terms of financial and human resources, thus limiting their ability to provide such levels of influence.” This chapter will study the diplomatic integration of states with limited recognition. More specifically, it will examine and compare the number of diplomatic offices and the number of membership or other formal status (observer, etc.) to intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and
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Chapter 3 36 international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). This section asumes that high diplomatic integration (i.e. diplomatic engagement with a large number of international actors, IGOs and INGOs) will result in a higher probability of obtaining at least partial international recognition, because are more opportunities to lobby for political recognition. On the other hand, it assumes that unrecognized states – namely Somaliland, Transnistria, and Artsakh – must have relatively less diplomatic integration than partially and widely recognized states. Finally, it seeks to answer the following question: is their inability to obtain any international recognition explained by a small number of permanent diplomatic representations abroad?
Republic of Somaliland
The Somaliland MFA describes the main objectives of its foreign policy as follows: “Somaliland is intent on taking necessary steps to raise its level of international engagement. It will formalize partnerships with neighbors through bilateral agreements; expand engagement through multilateral cooperation; secure support from key allies for the reform and functional improvement of domestic institutions; participate with international partners in an effort to promote an integrated approach to tackle common threats such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change and humanitarian disasters51.” In doing so, Somaliland prioritizes relations with states that have the highest direct influence on its political status, as observed by Riegl and Doboš (2018). Compared to Pridnestrovie and Artsakh, Somaliland is the political entity with the highest international diplomatic integration. According to its government website, the self-proclaimed Republic has twenty-three representative (liaison) offices, twenty-one of which act as representations to recognized states. The rest are special representatives: one is an ambassador at large, the other is a Special Envoy to the EU. Another, the representative to Ethiopia, is also mandated as Somaliland’s representative to AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD, an Eastern African trade bloc)52. In 2010, an Israeli spokesman said that Israel was ready to recognize Somaliland, which many saw as a consequence of the country’s
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Chapter 3 37 growing geopolitical interest in the Red Sea region53. However, no official representative office has been established since and no recognition has followed these comments. Somaliland has no representative office in other unrecognized or partially recognized states; this is in stark contrast to Transnistria and Artsakh which consider cooperative relations with other unrecognized entities as a fundamental aspect of their diplomacy. Hargeisa has very few known bilateral relations with states with limited recognition, apart from minor discussions and cooperation with Taiwan. The membership and participation of Somaliland in IGOs and INGOs is relatively low. This does not mean, however, that it has not attempted to join some. It has unsuccessfully attempted to integrate the Commonwealth of Nations under an observer status or associate membership. In 2007, a delegation led by the Foreign Minister met with members of the Commonwealth on the sidelines of the Commonwealth Summit in Kampala, Uganda (Geldenhuys, 2009). The intention to join was manifested by an open letter in 2018 written by Somaliland’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saad Ali Shire, and published by the Somaliland Mission to the United Kingdom, which expressed its dissatisfaction with the obstacles Somaliland faces in obtaining a status within the organization54. The Government of Somaliland has also attempted to integrate the AU. In December 2005, President Kahin presented Somaliland’s application for membership to the IGO and, in 2006, met with the Commission Chairperson of the organization, Alpha Oumar Konare, to discuss progress. The process, however, was unsuccessful despite a 2005 AU fact-finding report concluding that the IGO’s stance on Somaliland’s recognition (and the fear it would open a ‘pandora box’ in other secessionist movements in Africa) was unjustified and that the political entity should be treated separately (Crisis Group, 2006). Among the international organizations of which Somaliland is a member, observer or active participant, perhaps the most important is the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). The organization includes the membership of a few dozen underrepresented nations in
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Chapter 3 38 domestic and international forums, which are often victims of oppression in their own states. Members of the organization meet to discuss successes, challenges and experiences, and commit to the right of self-determination. The organization also conducts research and provides guidance to its members and the international community55. Several former UNPO members have later become recognized (notably Armenia, East Timor, Kosovo). Somaliland is also a member of the Confederation of Independent Football Association (CONIFA), which, according to its website, “supports representatives of international football teams from nations, de-facto nations, regions and minority peoples and sports isolated territories56.” Consequently, although Somaliland has few bilateral relations with other unrecognized states or minority groups, it participates in several multilateral organizations that have these members. Somaliland also participates indirectly with the IGAD processes through its representative to Ethiopia. Finally, its civil society also interacts with a number of international organizations. The SOS Children’s Village Hargeisa, for example, is part of SOS Children’s Villages International57. However, such INGOs have small influence over recognition processes.
Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic
According to the Press Service of the PMR’s MFA, “the expediency of opening of a Representative Office of Pridnestrovie on the territory of a foreign country is determined by complex of topical aims and objectives in the context of the implementation of foreign policy course of the Pridnestrovian state. The current level of relations between Pridnestrovie and the country, where it is planned to open a Representative office of the PMR, is also taken into account (response by the Press Service of the MFA of the PMR, 2019).” The PMR’s approach to international diplomacy is precisely strategic: it aims to deepen relations with very specific actors, in particular states, organizations and unrecognized states with the greatest potential for advancing Tiraspol’s interests. Pridnestrovie’s diplomatic engagement with the rest of the international community is
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Chapter 3 39 relatively weak. It engages primarily, at varying degrees, with Russia, other limited-recognition Soviet-era political entities, the CIS-2 organization, Ukraine, Moldova, the US, and the EU. With a total of three official representative offices abroad, Pridnestrovie is the most diplomatically isolated unrecognized state among the three selected cases. In the early 1990s, under the leadership of Igor Smirnov, Transnistria established close relations with other post- Soviet break-up entities (precisely Abkhazia, South Ossetia later with Nagorno-Karabakh) due to mutual unrecognition58, goals and interests. Among these, it opened representative offices (or, in this cases, “embassies”) in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. The only permanent representative office of the PMR to a recognized state is located in Russia (author’s interview, 2019). The membership and participation of the PMR in IGOs and INGOs is also relatively low. It is a member and active participant of CIS-2, whose ultimate goal is that its members (which also include Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Artsakh) obtain collective recognition from the international community. In the process, they recognized each other and worked together to develop a long- term strategic partnership on political issues and cooperate in various other areas ranging from the environment to tourism. Transnistria has been particularly active in the organization, notably since Valeriy Litskay, a former Pridnestrovian foreign minister (2000 to 2008), became its executive secretary. The commitment of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the organization has diminished since their recognition by Russia and a handful of other states in 2008 (Kosienkowski, 2012). Transnistria is a member or participates in several other IGOs and INGOs. Notably, it is a member of the CONIFA sports federation59. Its representative to Moscow also occasionally represents Transnistria in various international forums, such as the UN Human Rights Council. In 2010, Leonid Manakov called on the UN to grant the PMR observer status, create a UN team to interact with Tiraspol and a UN resource center inside the territory60. However, at the societal level, associational and organizational rights in Transnistria are limited. In 2016, Freedom House gave the entity a score of 2 out of 12 points in this regard.
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According to Freedom House, “all nongovernmental activities must be coordinated with local authorities, and noncompliant groups face harassment, including surveillance and visits from security officials. Civil society organizations face increasing problems to work in Transnistria and international organizations need the approval of the authorities for their projects, visits, and meetings with civil society and media.61” In many ways, this approach to foreign policy seems rational: Western states are unlikely to recognize an entity as politically aligned with Russia. Due to its post-Cold War mentality and the geopolitical rivalry between Moscow and the West, it is unlikely that Tiraspol would be widely recognized. Like Kosovo, recognition of Pridnestrovie would most likely be led by an external player, Russia, as it was the case in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This type of recognition has been called patron recognition (Geldenhuys, 2011). There is little reason to open representative offices beyond the region if the rest of the international community has nothing to offer it. Alternatively, the PMR’s small number of representative offices beyond Russia and CIS-2 members can be interpreted differently. First, this may be the result of a preference for reunification with Russia over full independence, as indicated in a 2014 Washington Post poll in the region62. Indeed, Pridnestrovians of all ethnicities support integration with Russia over all other outcomes, which may have diminished incentives increase diplomatic resources. In 2014, the Transnistria Parliament renewed its request to join the Russian Federation (BBC News, 2014)63. Second, Pridnestrovian authorities, especially under the Smirnov administration, have benefitted from the status quo of the de facto independence of the Transnistrian region (Kosienkowski, 2012). The regime has sometimes diverted Russian financial assistance to it and accepted bribes from smuggling, an activity that has flourished due to the political situation. Consequently, this may have dissuaded the Pridnestrovian administration from changing the political status of Transnistria.
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Republic of Artsakh
Finally, according to the Nagorno-Karabakh Office in the United States, “our government intends to have representations in as many countries as possible, and the process is underway. The priority was given to opening offices in the United States, France, and Russia, as the three countries are co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group. In addition, we focus on countries that have a strong Armenian presence/diaspora, and countries that can be of interest in the view of political, economic, cultural and other bilateral relations (interview with the NKR Office in the US, 2019).” Artsakh’s diplomatic approach is, to many extents, similar to that of Somaliland. It seeks to extend its diplomatic reach to a large number of members of the international community, while giving priority to relations with OSCE Minsk Group members states and those with a large Armenian presence, which facilitates access to domestic politicians and can influence policymaking. The international scope of Artsakh’s diplomacy can be seen as the middle ground between Somaliland and Transnistria. Currently, the political entity has established eight official representative offices, including a Permanent Mission in the Middle East, based in Beirut, Lebanon64. In addition, it has an accredited non-resident office: the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Artsakh in the USA is also responsible for Canada. Unlike other CIS-2 members, Artsakh has no permanent representations in other unrecognized states. The Republic of Artsakh is a member of CIS-2 and maintains close relations with other post- Soviet break-up entities. However, its involvement in the organization is smaller. First, Stepanakert is (to date) the only member to oppose mutual opening and hosting of official representative offices with other members of the organization, and second, it has not signed the organization’s fundamental agreement to abolish visa regimes for their citizens. Furthermore, Artsakh has contacts with the OSCE Minsk Group. It exchanges with the EU to increase cooperation and possibly include Artsakh in EU programs65. The National Assembly of Artsakh has also created parliamentary friendship groups with Lithuania, France, Belgium and the EU, while increasing interactions based upon culture, education, sport, trade and local governance with
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Chapter 3 42 the Basque country, the US, Brazil, and Lebanon, among others66. Stepanakert is also a member of CONIFA and has participated in the Pan-Armenian Games. According to Eiki Berg and Raul Toomla, the entity received the lowest score (2.7 points on 22) in terms of integration into the international community, foreign trade and communication (Berg and Toomla, 2010). According to them, this is largely due to the boycott of the political entity by the international community. Indeed, relatively few international organizations have set foot in the disputed territory, which some reports attribute to the difficulty for international NGOs to access Nagorno-Karabakh67. Nevertheless, a few international organizations are active in the region, many of them dealing with conflict resolution and varying out security activities. For instance, one of the most important is the European Partnership for Peace in Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK), launched by the European Commission in 2010, and led by five European international organizations specializing in conflict resolution. These include the London-based International Alert, Conciliation Resources and Links, the Helsinki-based Conflict Management Initiative and the Stockholm-based Kvinna till Kvinna. Many other organizations, such as the British HALO Trust, fight for a “landmine-free Artsakh68” or serve other humanitarian or security purposes.
Measurements and Analysis
This subsection will show and compare the approximate levels of the diplomatic integration of states with limited recognition to the international community and examine whether it has had an impact on recognition processes. It will take into account the number of official representative offices of selected political entities and their commitment (membership, observer, active participation) to IGOs and INGOs. The latter, however, is more difficult to quantitatively measure with precision.
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Of course, this analysis has limits due to the political and historical specificity of each case. However, many of them share similarities, desire widespread recognition and face political recognition issues. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are Transnistria’s two closest cases with partial recognition. Indeed, all three cases were formally part of the Soviet Union and largely regret the collapse of the Soviet Union. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are both de facto republics generally regarded by the international community as being legally part of Georgia, while Transnistria is legally part of Moldova. Ossetians overwhelmingly support integration with Russia over independence, while the Abkhaz mainly favor independence. Transnistrian public opinion is more mixed, but leans towards a preference for unification with Russia69. In many ways, the SADR, which the UN calls ‘non-self-governing territory70’, can be seen as Somaliland’s regional cousin. Both are governed as de facto states and were former European colonies now claimed by African states (Morocco and Somalia, respectively). However, POLISARIO is a government in exile residing and supported by Algeria, a rival of the parent state, which is not the case for the government of Somaliland. Additionally, Somalia is a fragile state receiving international support to assert authority over its territory, which changes the political dynamics. Finally, Artsakh is a more distinctive case: while being a post-Soviet de facto state, its relations with Russia are mainly based on mediation, and two states claim sovereignty over it: Azerbaijan and Armenia. Kosovo, Palestine, Northern Cyprus, and Taiwan are other cases with less similarity to the three unrecognized entities, but all desire statehood and face challenges in gaining widespread international political recognition.
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FIGURE 1. GLOBAL DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION (2019)
140 LEGEND 120 Unrecognized De Facto States 100 Selected States with Limited Recognition 80
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40 HOLY SEE) HOLY
20
0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120
NUMBER OF DIPLOMATIC OFFICES INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION RECOGNITION INTERNATIONAL (NUMBER OF UN MEMBER STATES + STATES MEMBER UN OF (NUMBER (REPRESENTATIVE OFFICES, CONSULATES, MISSIONS AND EMBASSIES, INCL. NON-RESIDENT ACCREDITED)
FIGURE 2. DIPLOMATIC REACH BEYOND DIPLOMATIC ALLIES (2019)
108 93 72 37 104 34 23 23 26 19 15 10 8 8 6 3 3 1 -1090
-20 0 20 40 60 80 100
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Table 1. International Recognition and Global Diplomatic Engagement of Selected States with Limited Recognition (2019)
International Recognition Entity Global Diplomatic Engagement
Number of Diplomatic Offices Membership, Observer Recognition by UN Member (OROs, Consulates and Selected Entities or Participation to States + Holy See Embassies, incl. non-resident IGOs and INGOs accredited)
3 0 Transnistria Very low (incl. 2 to unrecognized states)
6 5 South Ossetia Very low (incl. 3 to unrecognized states)
0 Artsakh 8 Low
15 5 Abkhazia Very low (incl. 2 to unrecognized states)
0 Somaliland 23 Low
26 1 Northern Cyprus Low (incl. 7 in Turkey)
42 SADR 72 Medium
90 100 Kosovo High (incl. 32 non-resident accredited)
138 Palestine 104 High
15 Taiwan 108 Very high
As shown in Figure 1, states with no-to-limited recognition with a greater number of representative offices (the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic - SADR, Kosovo, Palestine and Taiwan) generally enjoy higher international recognition by UN member states. On the other hand, those with fewer offices (PMR, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Artsakh, Northern Cyprus, and Somaliland) typically have lower international recognition. However, the correlation is not perfect. For instance, Somaliland
Chapter 3 46 is completely unrecognized and yet has more representative offices than the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, which have all been recognized by at least one member state of the UN. Alternatively, Taiwan is the entity with the highest number of permanent diplomatic representations but has lower international recognition than the SADR, Kosovo, and Palestine. The imperfection of the correlation can be explained by a variety of factors. Generally speaking, the more powerful and influential a parent state is outside its borders, the least likely external members of the international community are to recognize a break-up entity located inside its borders. This is explained by the fact that it is not in the interest of members of the international community to alienate a powerful state. The prime example is Taiwan (Republic of China), which has lost diplomatic allies to the People’s Republic of China, particularly since Taipei’s seat at the UN was replaced by China in 1971. In the case of the SADR, increasing Moroccan pressure to derecognize POLISARIO (which includes Rabat’s withdrawal from the AU to protest against the SADR’s membership in the regional organization) has worked in its favor; forty states have withdrawn recognition to POLISARIO since the late 1980s. Most importantly, states with successful recognition processes tend to be able to maintain de jure diplomatic support from influential members of the international community, such as superpowers, regional powers and important regional, and international organizations. Indeed, Kosovo’s recognition by the United States has enabled it to be recognized by more than a hundred states, while the SADR’s recognition withdrawal by India dealt a severe blow to its diplomatic network. Therefore, while the three unrecognized entities have relatively few official representative offices, it is not enough to explain their collective failure in obtaining international recognition. Other seemingly more important variables come into play. Furthermore, Figure 2 shows how, even if the three unrecognized entities have fewer-than- average number of official representative offices than states with limited recognition, their offices often reach a higher numbers of non-diplomatic allies without being rewarded with international recognition. Indeed, even if Somaliland’s diplomatic offices reach twenty-three non-diplomatic allies, it has received less recognition than Northern Cyprus, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Kosovo, which all have fewer diplomatic offices to non-diplomatic allies. The fact that Taiwan has lost so many diplomatic allies and is unable to convert non-diplomatic allies despite having
Chapter 3 47 the highest number of diplomatic offices is another demonstration of how they were not the most effective diplomatic tool in recognition processes. Finally, historical analysis suggests that official representative offices have rarely played a significant role in most recognition processes in modern history. In fact, nearly all diplomatic offices of partially recognized states have been established after external states have recognized them, signifying that they are traditionally a consequence of international recognition rather than a causal factor. For instance, Cuba recognized the SADR on January 20, 1980, and the Sahrawi embassy in Cuba did not open its doors until a few months later, in April 1980. Nearly all other studied states supporting POLISARIO adopted a similar chronology (IBP, 2013). An exception to this rule is Algeria. The SADR Office in Algeria opened on February 27, 1976. Algeria recognized the SADR about a week later, on March 6, 1976. However, a Sahrawi delegation was inaugurated months before these events, on June 14, 1975, suggesting the visit was the real success behind Algeria’s recognition of the SADR. The same chronology occurred for all the representative offices of Abkhazia and South Ossetia established in the states which recognized them (Russia, Syria, Nicaragua, Nauru, and Venezuela). Indeed, visits by high-level delegations to potential supporters of the state have recorded higher diplomatic successes rates in recognition processes. For instance, Mexico has recognized the SADR in 1979 following visits by Sahrawi diplomats in 1975 and the Saharawi Foreign Minister, Bachir Mustafá Sayed, in 1978. Both were former Spanish colonies. The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste recognized the SADR shortly after a visit paid by the Saharawi President Mohamed Abdelaziz in 2002, by virtue of the close ties between two national liberation movements, namely FRETILIN and POLISARIO. Representatives of the SADR have also succeeded in convincing Kenya to recognize the Western Saharan entity after a lengthy process of building a solid and informal relationship with the East African nation71. In a last example, Nicaragua recognized Abkhazia in 2009 after a delegation from the breakup republic met Daniel Ortega, the President of
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Nicaragua72. Nevertheless, states or territorial entities seeking recognition regularly increase their number of diplomatic offices and count on them to act as political lobbying tools for recognition. For instance, when the government of Québec (a French-speaking province in Canada) organized a referendum on independence in 1995, Premier Jacques Parizeau traveled to London and Paris, on the initiative of the Québec Government Offices in both capital cities, to obtain from Great Britain and France recognition guarantees in the event of a referendum victory7374. But even if Parizeau successfully obtained such guarantees from Paris75, the diplomatic efforts of the diplomatic offices have historically rarely borne fruit; they have either been established as a result of recognition or have seen their success limited to expanding collaboration between the state with limited recognition and the hosting state on various issues. This does not necessarily mean, however, that representative offices cannot be improved and effectively used to campaign for recognition. In conclusion, the expansion of a network of official representative offices has been and remains a foreign policy strategy to gain recognition. For aspiring states, these offices are seen as a means of regularizing communications with external actors and a powerful method of lobbying for recognition. For now, all three unrecognized entities have a relatively small amount of permanent diplomatic representations compared to most partially recognized states, but this is unlikely to be a causal factor for their recognition deficiency. Historically, de facto embassies have not been, with a few exceptions, a decisive factor in recognition processes.
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CHAPTER 4 GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION ______
The geographic distribution of official representative offices allows us to understand the strategic thinking behind the foreign policy of an unrecognized state. The results of the previous sections suggest that these offices play a marginal role in recognition processes. However, the choice of the location of these offices may indicate the areas that unrecognized entities accord diplomatic priority and the areas they omit. This thesis assumes that a well-designed selection of states and international organizations in the conduct of diplomacy can increase the likelihood of obtaining international recognition, whether through official representative offices or other forms of diplomatic interactions. It also assumes that unrecognized states, such as Somaliland, Pridnestrovie and Artsakh, must have omitted certain states, geographic regions or international organizations that would have helped them win diplomatic allies. Here too, the three unrecognized entities will be compared to states that have succeeded in obtaining partial recognition.
4.1 Republic of Somaliland
Somaliland, in opposition to the PMR, has the potential to obtain widespread recognition. The international community prefers supporting the territorial integrity of Somalia over Somaliland’s statehood, but a Somaliland state does not pose a significant threat to the interests of traditional recognition initiators such as the US and Russia (even if several African states such as Egypt, Sudan particularly been hostile or opposed to Somaliland’s recognition). Additionally, although Somaliland has rivals in the Horn of Africa (Berbera, the coastal city of Somaliland, is a growing rival in trade and shipping to Djibouti, for example), it has no sworn enemy besides the central government of Somalia. The same cannot be said of Transnistria, whose loyalty and fate rest on the Russian Federation. As a result, Somaliland has high diplomatic potential; it can interact with almost all international actors, but with limited means and legal obstacles as seen earlier.
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Somaliland aims to expand its international diplomacy to reach as many members of the international community as possible. According to a document published on its MFA website76, Hargeisa has established a set of strategies and objectives specific to (nearly) all regions of the world. It describes its general action plan as follows: “The government will provide the resources required to establish a presence in important locations such as the neighboring countries and international, regional and diplomatic centers, and use its presence to promote the case for recognition.” (MFA doc., 8)
North America and Europe Europe and North America are the priorities of Somaliland’s foreign policy. Indeed, the majority (12) of Somaliland’s official representations are strategically located in these regions: Belgium, the US, Norway, the UK, Canada, Sweden, France, Turkey, Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark, in addition to a Special Envoy to the EU. These strong relations have been built because of a shared colonial history with Britain, a common cultural heritage, democratic institutions and the importance of the US and the EU in international affairs. North America and Europe are also home to a large diaspora of Somaliland. According to Somaliland’s MFA (Idem, 8; 13):
“Somaliland considers the United States of America and Canada as two important partners in the Western Hemisphere. We recognize, in particular, the centrality of the USA due to its position in global politics, security, and economics. The USA has been one of the main donors that have contributed to the institutional development and the democratic process in Somaliland. […] Canada hosts of the largest Somaliland Diaspora. […] Hence, greater engagement of the Canadian government and aid agencies constitute one of the challenges of Somaliland’s foreign policy.” As for Europe, “The EU, its members, and its affiliates play a pivotal role in shaping international opinion and policy and Somaliland will be positive and constructive in engaging Europe in its quest for recognition and involvement in the Somaliland-Somalia dialogue.”
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The US, in particular, has been an initiator of recognition of the independence of several recognized and partially recognized states ranging from Brazil to Kosovo, and was a focal priority for Somaliland’s foreign policy since its first president, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuur, took office. His appointed Foreign Minister, Sheik Yusuf Ali Sheik Madar, went to New York and hired two international lawyers to prepare a legal document on Somaliland’s justification for its de jure recognition in 199377, which still serves as the most important legal analysis written on Somaliland to date (Duale and Ahmed, 2018). For these reasons, Somaliland should maintain and expand its diplomatic presence in North America and Europe, especially in cities that act as hotspots for international politics, such as Geneva. Having only one representative office and one paid diplomat in the US (in Washington DC), Hargeisa should also expand its presence in other major American cities, such as New York City, where a large Somaliland community is present and where important IGOs and INGOs have their headquarters, including the UN. However, most of Somaliland’s diplomatic expansion efforts should take place outside of these continents, as will be later explained.
Africa Africa is home to the second largest number of Somaliland official diplomatic representations. Currently, they have been established in four (4) states: Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Tanzania. The Somaliland representative to Addis Ababa is also responsible for relations with the AU and the IGAD. The political entity’s foreign policy gives priority to relations with its direct neighbors, namely Djibouti, Ethiopia and (if considered a neighbor) Somalia, while seeking close relations with Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and South Africa. However, governments since President Abdirahman have encountered obstacles in establishing relations with neighboring states, especially due to discord among political and military leaders of the SMN (Duale and Ahmed, 2018). In the African context, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Kenya are considered more favorable to Somaliland, while Egypt and Sudan (and Somalia) are most opposed to its recognition. As for international organizations, the entity wishes to deepen integration into political and economic forums, including the AU, the IGAD, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
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Africa, and the East African Community. Its diplomatic strategy for the African continent, as mentioned in the same document (Idem, 13), is the following:
“We aspire to see increased cooperation on issues of common interest between African states to foster greater economic integration, and closer security cooperation. To pursue this goal, we will seek to gain access, observer status and membership of the African Union and other continental political, security, economic and cultural multilateral organizations that promote inter-country cooperation and collaboration.”
However, all of its diplomatic offices are located in eastern Africa. Diplomatic interactions with states its northern, western and central Africa are limited to visits by diplomatic delegation. Increasing diplomatic interactions with states in western, southern and central Africa, in particular with states that have maintained recognition of the SADR, may prove beneficial for Somaliland’s quest for statehood. However, relations with certain northern African countries, particularly with Egypt and Morocco, will be more difficult. In the case of Egypt, much of that is attributed to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a former Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and later the UN Secretary-General, who did everything he could to reverse Somaliland’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence and give his country a foothold in the Horn of Africa (Jhazbhay, 2007). Cairo remains a staunch supporter of a united Somalia. As for Morocco, Rabat faces its own internal separatist threat in Western Sahara, restricting any possible relationship with Somaliland. Somaliland should pay close attention, draw inspiration from, and often imitate the SADR’s past diplomatic maneuvers for a couple of reasons. First, the Western Saharan republic successfully joined the AU despite a lack of consensus on its recognition. Indeed, membership in the AU would be a major achievement for Somaliland, as Western countries have indicated that they could follow an African lead to recognize Somaliland (Pegg and Kolstø, 2015). Due to the universality of membership on the continent and the political diversity of its members, the organization is a respected voice on all political matters in Africa and is the second most important organization for Somaliland to join, after the UN, for international legitimacy. Closer Somaliland-AU relations are made possible by a 2006 International Crisis Group report which recommended interim AU observer status for Somaliland (Mc Mahon, 2014), and would be
Chapter 4 53 even more its membership was supported by members of the organization like the SADR78. Ideally, Somaliland should seek a sort of political alliance with the SADR, such as one of mutual recognition. The SADR has de facto recognized South Ossetia since 2010, which can serve as the basis for a similar relationship with Somaliland. At a minimum, Hargeisa should seek to develop or strengthen informal relations with its regional cousin. The fact that Somalia has never recognized the SADR and is unlikely to do so in the near future (as it staunchly supports its territorial integrity at home) also creates an opportunity for the development of Somaliland-SADR relations. In the African context, Somaliland should prioritize diplomatic relations with the states which have recognized the SADR despite opposition from Morocco, and in particular with those which have maintained a consistent position supporting the SADR. Therefore, Somaliland should establish or deepen diplomatic relations with Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Africa, Lesotho, and especially Nigeria, among other nations79, and increase diplomatic engagement with the African nations already sympathetic to it, namely Ethiopia and Kenya. Nigeria should be a diplomatic priority for Somaliland due to its considerable and growing weight in African political affairs. Establishing and strengthening Somaliland-Nigeria relations is made possible by Nigeria’s early recognition of the SADR in the mid-1980s on the basis of self- determination and solidarity with oppressed nations. Somaliland can assert the applicability of these principles to the Republic of Somaliland with the results of its 2001 referendum on self- determination and oppression of the Isaaq clan by the Barre regime. Nigeria also played a key role in the SADR’s admission to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the AU. However, Somaliland-Nigeria relations are challenged by Nigeria’s close collaboration with Somalia on security issues. Nigeria is providing military and intelligence support to Somalia in the fight against the al-Shabaab terrorist group, which is linked to Boko Haram in Nigeria. The West African nation also participates in peace efforts in Somalia, in particular by being one of the main
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Chapter 4 54 contributors to the AMISOM mission80. Nevertheless, even if Somaliland is unable to make Nigeria a diplomatic ally, it can still play a role in admitting Somaliland to the AU as an unrecognized entity, as happened with the SADR.
Middle East Currently, Somaliland has permanent representations in two (2) Middle Eastern states: Yemen and the UAE. Somaliland’s foreign policy for the Middle East and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is described by its MFA the following way (Idem, 13):
“As an Islamic country with longstanding historical, economic and cultural ties with countries in the Middle East, including Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Egypt, Somaliland considers the development and nurturing of good relationships and partnerships with these countries and other OIC members for both regional security and prosperity as important.”
The Middle East is a riskier area for Somaliland’s foreign policy. It can either take advantage of regional rivalries and its strategic location along the Red Sea by deepening its already solid relationship with the UAE and Saudi Arabia81. Somaliland has already awarded the UAE a 25- years concession to the UAE for the construction of a military base in Berbera, which can be useful in conflicts against the Houthis in Yemen. Somaliland can choose to side with the Saudis and the Emiratis to elevate its reputation as a reliable partner and improve its chances to be awarded political recognition by those states, but at the risk alienating regional rivals such as Iran, Qatar, and even Russia, and potentially prevent it from receiving widespread recognition. Alternatively, it may opt for a more politically neutral stance to maintain cordial relations with all members of
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Chapter 4 55 the region, which may decrease the likelihood for any single regional actor to initiate recognition of Somaliland. Second, the type of bilateral relations that Somaliland should have with Israel is also a matter of debate. The potential for mutual support is high: both are politically isolated and strive for recognition, have democratic institutions and strong private sectors. Israel would certainly be happy to have an ally in the Muslim world and along the Red Sea region. In 2010, an Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman, Yigal Palmore, had already stated Israel’s interest in recognizing Somaliland. Somaliland, in return, would be glad to receive recognition from a member state of the UN, and especially from a Western ally. However, recognition by Israel would likely be received negatively by many states in the Muslim world. Many, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have never recognized Israel, and some, notably Iran, strongly opposes its existence. Any plan for diplomatic expansion in the region must therefore be carefully crafted.
Asia The Asian continent (apart from the Middle East) is a different story (idem, 14).
“Somaliland recognizes the growing importance of East Asia, especially in global economic terms and will enhance its level of engagement and interaction with countries in this region, including Japan, China, India and Malaysia.”
Among these countries, only China (1) hosts a Somaliland official representative office. This shows how East Asia, despite its growing importance in world politics, has still not received the necessary diplomatic attention from Somaliland. In addition, Somaliland’s diplomatic targets in the region (China, India, Japan, Malaysia) may be more appropriate trade partners than political allies. Indeed, China faces its own separatist threats in Taiwan and Tibet (and opposition to Beijing in Hong Kong), and Somalia has been a member of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) since August 2018 (and seeks Chinese investors for its recovery)82. These factors make China unlikely to support
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Other The only remaining country hosting a Somaliland official representative office is Australia. Somaliland also has an Ambassador at large. Interestingly enough, Hargeisa has an undetailed foreign policy doctrine for the Latin American region (at least according to public MFA documents) and has not established any official representative office in that region to date. Somaliland’s presence in international organizations can be more significant. Hargeisa also works effectively with the international community on piracy and other issues in order to be seen as a reliable partner in crises facing the world.
Comparison with the SADR & Conclusion
Unlike Somaliland, the SADR’s official representations are more globally distributed and serve areas where few Somaliland offices have established, particularly in Central America, South America and Southeast Asia. The POLISARIO Front, the SADR governing authority, maintains a diplomatic network with many states that have recognized the SADR, which are mostly located in Latin America and Africa, and with states that have not recognized it, mainly in Europe.
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5% 10% 5% 2% 10% 7% 26%
20% 60%
55%
North America & Europe (12) Central & South Americas (11) Africa (4) Africa (23) Middle East (2) Middle East (3) Oceania (1) Oceania (1) Asia (excl. Middle East) (1) Asia (excl. Middle East) (4)
The SADR’s participation in international organizations has also been greater than that Somaliland. These organizations have broad purposes and reach many states beyond Africa. Indeed, Western Sahara’s engagement with international organizations extends to non-AU regional associations (PALU, NAASP), international political parties and ideological associations (Non-aligned Movement, Socialist International, Progressive Alliance, COPPPAL, IUSY, WFDY, PARLACEN), humanitarian associations (International Coalition Against Enforced Disappearances, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) and more (Andean Community, Ibero-American Summits and the World Federation of Trade Unions). Figure 2 shows the extent of Somaliland’s diplomatic prioritization of North America and Europe, with 58 % of its permanent diplomatic offices (de facto embassies) located in these regions. This choice can be understandable; Somaliland has historical and cultural affiliations with the West (particularly Great Britain) and shapes many of its public policies upon Western models of governance. As Caspersen (2008) points out, unrecognized entities seeking widespread recognition may be prompted to demonstrate higher standards of democracy, rule of law and functional statehood than even some recognized states. Somaliland also assumes that many members of the international community would follow a Western lead for its recognition. But a
Chapter 4 58 historical analysis of the SADR and the African context demonstrate that the postcolonial regions of Africa, Central and South Americas and parts of Asia are generally more receptive to colonial struggles and the principle of self-determination. After all, states such as Mexico, Cuba, and Venezuela have used these arguments to justify their support for POLISARIO and Western Sahara. In contrast, Western states have traditionally recognized de facto states when it served their geopolitical interests (Kosovo) and have opposed the recognition of those who threaten their foreign policy ambitions (South Ossetia, Abkhazia). The SADR has obtained much of its outer-African recognition by virtue of skillful diplomacy, with the notable cases of Mexico, Timor-Leste, and Kenya. On the world stage, Somaliland should pursue a similar strategy. It should give priority to the expansion of diplomatic relations with countries that have recognized and maintained recognition of the SADR. Certain regions, such as Latin America and parts of Asia, have political cultures more favorable to the principles of self- determination and solidarity with oppressed nations in their foreign policy than their Western counterparts which have generally primed national interests. It is therefore unsurprising that most of the outer-African recognition of the SADR comes from these regions. As a result, Somaliland should prioritize establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba, Mexico, Belize, El Salvador, Bolivia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama, Honduras, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Laos and Syria, among others. Interestingly enough, many of these Central African countries (Belize, Honduras, Nicaragua and until 2018 El Salvador) also recognize Taiwan and Palestine, and three of them (Nicaragua as an exception) recognize Kosovo – a definite sign that Somaliland should increase diplomatic engagement with them. On the other hand, recognition from Western states would significantly accelerate Somaliland’s international integration, but these states are less likely to recognize Somaliland on the same grounds. Indeed, Western (and Russian) foreign policy on Kosovo, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Palestine suggests that it values its geopolitical interests above most other factors when considering recognizing or not an unrecognized de facto state. Until Somaliland’s statehood becomes an asset to Western interests over Somalia’s territorial integrity, it is unlikely to be recognized by most Western nations. When interacting with Western states, Somaliland should pursue a diplomacy based on geopolitical and institutional arguments. Somaliland has an advantage over the SADR to obtain recognition from the West: as Morocco is a major US non-NATO ally, supporting
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POLISARIO can lead to the loss of a key regional ally. Fortunately for Somaliland, relations between the West and Somalia are not as deep. Sahrawis have also participated in certain international sports federations, notably CONIFA and the N.F.-Board, both of which Somaliland can apply to become a member. With regard to international organizations, Somaliland has joined the UNPO but may also apply to become a member of minor ones such as the International Coalition against Enforced Disappearances and the Women’s International Democratic Federation, of which the SADR is a member. More importantly, it should intensify efforts to be admitted as an indirect member, observer or guest participant in larger organizations following the example of the Sahrawi. The SADR managed to initiate discussions about its self-determination within the Non-Alignment Movement and became a guest participant in the organization. It also established an indirect route to the UN through Mexico’s Permanent Mission to the UN83. With regard to the Commonwealth, Somaliland has attempted to gain observer status by lobbying on behalf of its Mission in the UK and writing open letters in the media. It should also seek diplomatic allies such as South Africa to push for its admission as an observer. Pretoria has never recognized Somaliland but has expressed openness to Somaliland’s statehood (Mc Mahon, 2014), which makes it a good candidate to support its candidacy. If successful in obtaining partial recognition, particularly from Africa, it will become much easier to have its recognition followed by Western states, such as the US and Great Britain. As previously mentioned, Western states have hinted they will follow an African lead in recognizing Hargeisa. Therefore, this section concludes that Somaliland has omitted certain states, geographic regions or international organizations that could have facilitated the obtaining of diplomatic allies. This is perhaps one of the main reasons behind Somaliland’s lack of international recognition.
4.2 Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic
In opposition to Somaliland and Artsakh, which have established many diplomatic offices in Western-aligned states for their recognition, the PMR does not have any representative office in Western Europe or North America. It believes that improving relations with the West (with
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Russia Moscow has always supported Moldova’s territorial integrity to strengthen Russian influence over Moldova, Ukraine, the Black Sea and more broadly Europe, and to limit the influence of NATO, the EU and Romania in the region. A strong political, military, economic and cultural influence over Transnistria makes it possible to exert an influence on Moldovan politics. It has pleaded its cause with history (the region was merged with the Russian Empire at the end of the eighteenth century), patriotism (even if the region is multiethnic, most Pridnestrovians identify themselves as part of the Russian community) and political loyalty to Moscow. But Tiraspol’s foreign policy towards Russia also provides it with stable, long-term Russian financial support, which is vital for the survival of the quasi-state. In the past, these measures have included low-cost or free natural gas from Gazprom, investments and financial assistance. Tiraspol also seeks to maintain military support from Russia: Moscow has kept soldiers in Transnistria, notably as part of a peace-keeping contingent, and the Operational Group of Russian Forces. These strengthen the military security of the PMR (Kosienkowski, 2012).
Ukraine The PMR wants Ukraine to maintain a benevolent neutrality in the Transnistrian-Moldavan dispute (despite Kiev’s support for the territorial integrity of Moldova) and counterbalance Russia’s influence when interests in Moscow and Tiraspol clash (Kosienkowski, 2012). Ukraine participated in both the 1997 Moscow Memorandum and the 2006 5+2 negotiating format. Maintaining strong relations with Kiev is also crucial for geographic reasons, the PMR being landlocked between Moldova and Ukraine. Tiraspol uses several diplomatic tactics with Ukraine. First, it takes advantage of Ukraine’s distrust of Romania (and of the strong Moldova-Romania relations) to present itself as an ally against Bucharest’s “cultural expansionism”. It also uses sentimental attachment by reminding Kiev authorities that the Transnistrian region was once part of the Ukrainian SSR, before joining the Moldavian SSR in 1940. The PMR and Ukraine have also bilateral arrangements on matters such as travel regulations easing, cross-border trade and light border presence. However, since the collapse of the Yanukovich government in Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia in 2014, Kiev’s relations with Tiraspol have worsened (Frear,
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2015). Indeed, Transnistria has recognized Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation87. Ukrainian authorities are now also concerned that Transnistria may serve as an entry point for Russian soldiers stationed in Pridnestrovian territories. Furthermore, Ukraine’s growing collaboration with the EU, such as Kiev’s participation in the EU Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, has created more obstacles to PMR-Ukraine relations. Nevertheless, strong and stable relations with Ukraine remain a diplomatic priority for Transnistria.
Western States The PMR government, particularly under Igor Smirnov, generally had an isolationist foreign policy and minimal interaction with Western countries because of Tiraspol’s pro-Russian positions and its mistrust of Brussels and Washington (Kosienkowski, 2012). The EU, while lacking a strategic framework on the Moldavan-Transnistrian conflict, has allocated funds for confidence- building measures in Transnistria and deployed a Border Assistance Mission in the region (Popescu and Litra, 2012), among other measures. Nevertheless, many members of the Smirnov administration favored normal relations with the West in order to stabilize trade exchanges and to convince Western representatives to become at least neutral in the PMR-Moldova conflict. Western socio-economic projects have sometimes aroused the interest of the Transnistrian authorities, but are carefully selected and restricted. The Shevchuk administration, on the other hand, had a more collaborative and pragmatic relationship with Western actors, especially with the EU, but remained cautious. The government fears that these collaborations will increase internal support for the EU.
Comparison with Abkhazia and South Ossetia & Conclusion
When comparing Transnistria with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the latter two have a greater diplomatic presence beyond the Soviet sphere of influence, albeit not by much. Currently, Abkhazian embassies and diplomatic offices are located in Europe (Austria,
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Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Russia), Asia (Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey), South America (Venezuela), and in Africa (Tunisia). It also has established offices in the PMR and South Ossetia. Finally, it is a member of CIS and the UNPO. South Ossetia has relatively fewer relations with the outside world. It has an embassy in Russia and representative offices in Italy and in Republika Srpska, a region of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2017, an Ossetian-New Zealander citizen was appointed as South Ossetia’s MFA representative to Nauru’s MFA88. It also has strong relations with other de facto states. Indeed, it has established an embassy in Abkhazia and offices in Transnistria and the Donetsk People’s Republic. It is not a member of any international organization beyond CIS-2. The location of Abkhazian and Ossetian official representative offices had no impact on their respective recognition processes: all five states which recognize them have established diplomatic relations with the political entities after recognizing them. Diplomatic relations may have helped pave the way for recognition, but only after Russia’s decision to recognize them. Indeed, Russia was the initiator of a small recognition snowball effect. For example, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2018 largely out of gratitude to Russia, its patron state, and following a delegation visit by the Abkhaz Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Chirikba, to the Syrian ambassador to Russia in 2015. The five states that have recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia are also supported in different ways by Russia. For instance, Nauru has received Russian economic aid since its recognition of the two breakup entities89. Venezuela, which maintains relations with Russia, in particular since the coming of Hugo Chávez to power in 1999, supported the Russian position on the five-day war with Georgia in 2008 (Rouvinski, 2019). The Abkhaz and Ossetian experiences also show how difficult it will be for the PMR to obtain widespread recognition. Unless Tiraspol radically reshapes its foreign policy doctrine by becoming politically neutral vis-à-vis Russia and the West, or unless a major geopolitical schism occurs and
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4.3 Republic of Artsakh
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Currently, Artsakh has established representative offices in eight recognized states, including one in Lebanon responsible for the entire Middle East. The political entity has given priority to opening offices in the US, France and Russia – the three decisive mediators and co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group – to formalize relations with them. It has also opened offices in other permanent members of the OSCE Minsk Group, notably Germany and Armenia. The entity’s remaining offices are located in Canada90 and Australia. It should be recalled that New South Wales (Australia) and the Australian Greens have supported the statehood of Nagorno- Karabakh, suggesting that Stepanakert is expanding diplomatic relations with states in which regions or civilians have their expressed openness to recognition, even if these positions are incompatible with the position of their central governments. Indeed, Ter-Matevosyan and Ghazaryan (2019) suggested that recognition from federal sub-states is a new phenomenon and could help de facto states in pursuit of visibility. The location of Artsakh’s permanent representative offices appears to reflect its strategic interests within the OSCE Minsk Group and in regions with a large Armenian diaspora. Indeed, the eight-million strong Armenian diaspora is largely present in many Western states, including Russia, France, the US, and Canada, among other states, as well as in several countries in the Middle East, such as Lebanon. Strengthening relations with states with large Armenian communities can bolster Artsakh’s standing in these countries and facilitate access to domestic politicians. A strong presence of the diaspora increases the Armenian electoral weight and the influence of lobbying91. The Artsakh government indeed considers the Armenian diaspora as a strategic factor in the development of its international diplomacy (author’s interview, 2019). The NKR’s foreign policy emerged very soon after its declaration of independence in 1991, when its leaders began to hold bilateral meetings with senior officials from recognized states and international institutions. These intentions were concretized with the creation of its MFA in 1993, which achieved its share of success. In December 2014, the NKR was recognized as an independent party to the mediation efforts of Russian and the OSCE at the Budapest Summit, when a tripartite ceasefire agreement was reached, to name only a single achievement (Tomskogo,
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2016). Artsakh’s diplomacy, however, has encountered many obstacles, notably from Azerbaijan, which seeks to isolate Stepanakert from the international community, but also from Armenia. Baku breaks or threatens to sever ties with states directly engaging with political figures and diplomats from the NKR or for allowing them to enter their country. This was demonstrated with the visit of the de facto president of Artsakh, Bako Sahakyan, in 2018, to a reception organized by the Armenian Embassy in Washington DC, and where pro-Armenian members of Congress were celebrated. Azerbaijan denoted to the trip as a “serious blow” to US-Azerbaijan relations and alluded to reprisals92. Sahakyan’s visit to France later in 2018 also provoked Baku, which threatened to reconsider its relations with Paris93.
OSCE Minsk Group and Participating Members
The NKR participated in the OSCE Minsk Group mediation processes from 1995 to 1997. But when Robert Kocharian became President of Armenia in 1998 (after being President of the NKR from 1994 to 1998), the negotiations were reformed and excluded the NKR’s legal access to the framework. Stepanakert adapted accordingly by increasing contacts with the co-chairs outside the framework and oriented its foreign policy towards international recognition with the rest of the international community (Idem, 2016). Nevertheless, the participating members of the OSCE Minsk Group are by far the most important external actors in deciding the political fate of Nagorno- Karabakh. This is particularly true for France, Russia and the US. Indeed, the co-chairs – especially Russia and the US – have been the most important recognition initiators in modern history. The recognition of Kosovo by the US was followed by the recognition of more than one hundred states, while the recognition by Russia of South Ossetia and Abkhazia opened the door to partial recognition by a handful of states. Furthermore, the participation of Armenia, Azerbaijan and
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Chapter 4 67 neighboring Turkey in the framework makes it powerful enough to have a decisive influence over Artsakh’s political status even if the unrecognized state is excluded from negotiations. Unfortunately, the framework has not produced any major and concrete progress since its inception in 1992, mainly due to the conflicting interests of the co-chairs and other power brokers, a lack of interest in solving the issue and the reemergence of a West-East rivalry (Korybko, 2015). Similar conclusions were drawn by the Center for Strategic Studies at ETH Zurich (Sargsyan, 2013). Baku became increasingly frustrated with the Minsk process and called for altering the format or involving additional actors in the mediation, especially its ally Turkey (Turkey is, at this time, only a permanent member). Armenia, on the other hand, remains favorable to the framework because it tolerates the de facto existence of the Republic of Artsakh (Strakes, 2019). Starting with France, the country has no fundamental foreign policy for the Caucasian and Caspian regions, unlike the US and Russia. In fact, Sargsyan describes the EU (and France) as “[external actors] who are neither committed nor able to contribute to the NK peace process”. The country is rather concerned about its energy investments in Azerbaijan, notably through the French-based company Total (Korybko, 2015), and about decrease its dependence on Russian energy supplies. Nevertheless, the NKR opened an office in Paris in 1998 (renamed Permanent Representation in 2002), and also in Germany, with the aim of establishing a regular contact and exchanges with the national authorities, to promote Artsakh through the local press and reinforcing relations with the local Armenian diaspora94. However, France (as well as Germany and the EU) are unlikely to support Artsakh’s statehood without Baku’s approval and Armenia’s consent. They also want to avoid a destabilizing situation which could lead to a refugee flow in the European neighborhood. The expansion or intensification of diplomatic relations with Paris, Berlin and Brussels may contribute to promote and defend Stepanakert’s interests, but such measures are unlikely to convince European capitals to unilaterally recognize its status as a state. Referring to Russian and American national interests, Sargsyan describes the two powers as “actors who are well placed, but unwilling to bring change [in the conflict]”. For different reasons, Moscow and Washington benefit from the status quo. Russia, as the most influential co-chair of the Minsk Process, has the ability to project its influence into the South Caucasus, where it
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Chapter 4 68 competes with Turkey and Iran (Sargsyan, 2013). Russia is also exploiting the conflict by selling arms to both Yerevan and Baku, which was criticized by former US National Security Advisor John Bolton for “hampering the settlement of [the] conflict over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh” and because of “the leverage it gives Russia over both parties95.” Finally, Russia dominates many monopolies in Armenia, notably in the energy sector, the metallurgical industry, telecommunications and banking. Russia’s economic interests in the region would be threatened if Armenia and Azerbaijan increased economic cooperation in the aftermath of a political solution to the conflict (Idem, 2015). In an article published by Stratfor, Shahnazaryan (2017) argued that Russia would only be interested in advancing the peace process if it allows Moscow to establish a military presence in the NKR region, notably through a Collective Security Treaty Organization with Armenia. However, given the similar situation in Transnistria (Russia has a military presence on PMR territory, which did not lead to recognition of Tiraspol), an approval by the NKR of a Russian military presence on its territory is unlikely to lead to recognition, especially given that Moscow already has a military base in Armenia. Consequently, Karabakh diplomacy in itself is unlikely to lead to Russian recognition. The remaining co-chair, the US, maintains good relations with Armenia and solid economic and security partnerships with Azerbaijan, but does not have the same influence as Russia on the Minsk process. The situation in which the South Caucasus finds itself is not vital to Washington’s national interests, which explains why it has not invested as much effort in solving the issue, even if it meant to prevent Moscow’s domination of the region (Blank, 2015). Nevertheless, Nagorno- Karabakh remains important to the US on several matters. Geographically, the region can serve as an air corridor for coalition forces in Afghanistan or in a potential war against neighboring Iran, even though Baku has been reluctant to join US efforts to contain Teheran (Borshchevskaya, 2019). Yet Russia has its eyes set on Nagorno-Karabakh for similar reasons. Stepanakert can choose to seek US recognition by multiplying diplomatic efforts and highlighting its strategic geographic location. However, the strategic benefits that the US can derive from this decision are far inferior to the potential disadvantages. First, recognizing the NKR would alienate Armenia and
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Azerbaijan, as well as its NATO ally Turkey, which strongly supports Azerbaijan, and could lead to subsequent violent instability in the region. It could also prompt Russia to react due to the growing presence of the US in its sphere of influence. The status quo, or a political agreement reached by all parties, are therefore the preferred outcomes for the US. Artsakh’s diplomatic efforts are unlikely to change this reality. As for the other permanent member states of the Minsk Group, Artsakh limited diplomatic relations with them (namely Belarus, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Turkey96). It has not (yet) established permanent representative offices in these countries. Of these, only Turkey has a relatively large influence on the political future of Artsakh. The other EU participants adopted the French and German position to oppose the recognition of the NKR unless an unlikely collective approval (by Armenia and Azerbaijan) is reached. Given the fierce opposition from Armenia and Azerbaijan to the state of the NKR, additional diplomatic efforts by Nagorno-Karabakh are unlikely to yield the dividends it needs to receive support. Ankara, which strongly supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and has lobbied for a mediating role within the Minsk Group, has long been at odds with Armenia, in particular with regard to the acknowledgement of the Armenian Genocide and what is calls the “occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia97”. Turkey, which has increased its influence over the Caucasus since the fall of the Soviet Union, maintains strong relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia (Sargsyan, 2013). Given Ankara’s importance in regional affairs, it would seem logical for the NKR to intensify diplomatic interactions with Turkish authorities. However, Turkey fiercely supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. It is unlikely to admit a Nagorno-Karabakh office into its territory or to authorize official interactions with diplomats from Karabakh. As stated previously, Baku threatens states receiving and interacting with Karabakh diplomats and officials. Consequently, any attempt by Karabakh officials to widen diplomatic relations with Turkey will probably not be welcomed by Ankara and even less likely to lead to a Turkish recognition of the NKR.
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Other International Actors
The NKR has not opened any diplomatic office in other states that were previous mediators of the conflict, namely Iran and Kazakhstan. The former started mediation initiatives in 1992, when senior officials from Armenia and Azerbaijan held negotiations in Tehran, which culminated in a seven-day ceasefire agreement and a joint declaration on resolution of the conflict, which earned Iran a message of appreciation from the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Ramezanzadeh, 1996). However, the ceasefire was breached and violence escalated due to Armenian military aggression, which hampered Iran’s mediating attempts and credibility. In general, Tehran’s position on the NKR conflict is considered to be moderately favorable to Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. First, it shares a religious affinity with Azerbaijan; both countries have a Shiite majority and exist in a predominantly Sunnite region. This allows Iran, which was region’s only state with a Shiite majority prior to Azerbaijan’s independence, to strengthen its role in the Muslim world. Secondly, Azeris form the second largest community in the country, and Iranian public opinion strongly supports Azerbaijan over Christian Armenia. However, Iran also maintains good diplomatic relations with Armenia and has taken advantage of Yerevan’s hostile relations with Turkey to limit its influence in the region. To maintain good relations with its two neighbors, as well as to prevent a refugee inflow and a separatist outburst in Kurdistan, Tehran prefers a peaceful resolution to avoid regional instability, while favoring Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Having a single permanent representation in Lebanon responsible for the entire Middle East is insufficient to realize Artsakh’s diplomatic potential in a neighboring region. It should widen its diplomatic interactions with Iran, other regional powers and neighbors such as Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan, to advance its strategic interests. However, as in the case of other countries, Artsakh’s political and diplomatic weight is insufficient to manage to receive unilateral recognition, since the cost of the alienation of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the consequences of regional instability, remain too high. To raise global awareness of the situation it faces and increase the chances of obtaining international recognition, Artsakh will need to expand its diplomatic relations beyond the participants of the Minsk Process and with other regional actors. Currently, it has not formalized diplomatic relations with East and South Asia, including the PRC and India, or with Latin America and Africa. Azerbaijan and Armenia have already started to adopt Asian mediation to overcome
Chapter 4 71 the failures of the OSCE Minsk Group by joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as dialogue partners in 201598. China is increasingly interested in the South Caucus (a region it had previously neglected), especially since the launch of the BRI in 2013. Beijing has consequently increased its presence in regional mediation processes to ensure political stability wherever its economic corridor crosses in contrast to its historical foreign policy of disengagement (Huseynov, 2019). Artsakh separatism is seen as an obstacle to China’s global aspirations; Chinese recognition of its statehood is therefore unlikely unless it is approved by Azerbaijan and Armenia. In all cases, Stepanakert does not have the diplomatic weight necessary to convince the SCO or its members to recognize it unilaterally. The same can be said for states beyond Asia, with the possible exception a few states in Central and South America (previously identified), which have shown solidarity with nations seeking self-determination such as the SADR and Palestine. Stepanakert can opt to increase diplomatic interactions with these nations. However, even if it succeeds in obtaining partial recognition, these countries are not sufficiently influential to create a domino effect that would open the door to widespread recognition. At best, Artsakh can expand its diplomatic presence in international organizations and with states to promote its interests in the ongoing negotiations between Baku and Yerevan. The most practical outcome it can aim for is greater autonomy within Azerbaijan, and possibly economic and political access to Armenia through a corridor. A less plausible outcome may be to place Artsakh under a sort of corpsus separatum. This was a proposed solution to place the city of Jerusalem under a special international regime (or, perhaps in this case, a joint administration of the region). The least plausible outcome would be the widespread and unilateral recognition of Artsakh thanks to successful lobbying of diplomats from Karabakh. While partial recognition may be possible for Stepanakert, notably from countries attached to the principle self-determination, widespread recognition will require the approval of Azerbaijan and Armenia. In any event, the geographic distribution of Artsakh’s diplomatic interactions has little influence on its political status. While improvements in this regard may perhaps earn it partial recognition and a greater voice in mediation efforts, Karabakh’s diplomatic potential is not large enough to convince the international community to unilaterally recognize it.
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4.4 Analysis and Conclusion
Superficially, Somaliland, Transnistria and Artsakh display very different diplomatic priorities when selecting states and organizations to establish or strengthen diplomatic relations. In short, most of Somaliland’s diplomatic efforts are devoted to attract Western recognition, but it has also developed strategic relations with several other states, particularly in eastern and southern Africa, Asia and several international organizations. Somaliland has no formal relations with other unrecognized entities. Transnistria, on the other hand, devotes most of its diplomatic efforts to attract the recognition of a single state, Russia. It also maintains strong relations with other unrecognized entities that were formerly part of the Soviet Union or of its satellite states. It is, however, relatively absent from international organizations outside of CIS-2 and a few others. Finally, Artsakh prioritizes diplomatic relations with many (but not all) permanent members of the OSCE Minsk Group, in particular the co-chairs of the organization, and countries with large Armenian diasporas. Its diplomatic engagement with international organizations is also relatively weak. Yet, the three unrecognized entities share an important similarity: they devote diplomatic efforts to the states they consider to have the highest probability of recognizing them or having the greatest influence on their political status. This can lead to a problem of perception: do they overestimate the possibilities of recognition of the states to which they have devoted diplomatic efforts? Or have they underestimated the likelihood of recognition of other states to which they have not planned to devote diplomatic efforts? For example, Somaliland has invested relatively less diplomatic efforts in Africa beyond the eastern and southern regions, as well as in Central and South Americas. Recognition of the SADR, on the other hand, has mainly come from these regions. Obviously, comparison between the two cases have limitations. For instance, the SADR and Latin America both share Spanish heritage, which is not the case for Somaliland. However, Latin American and African countries have mainly justified their support for POLISARIO in the context of self-determination and colonial struggles, which, according to many, are applicable to Somaliland.
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As for the PMR, it considers Moscow as the only state with leverage over its political status. Past experiences in Abkhazia and South Ossetia provide Tiraspol with good reasons to believe that only Moscow can provide it with the recognition it needs to trigger a domino effect. While it may choose to extend its diplomatic presence with Russian allies in the hope of elevating support for its statehood, Russian recognition remains necessary to trigger a domino effect. However, Transnistrian diplomacy will play a marginal role as long as Moscow benefits from Moldova’s territorial integrity. Indeed, the status quo gives Moscow leverage on Moldovan politics, a territorial presence for its military near Ukraine and the Black Sea, and limits the influence of the EU and NATO in the region. Finally, Artsakh prioritizes diplomatic relations with strategic countries involved in the mediation processes of the OSCE Minsk Group, a country (Australia) with some support from lower legislatures and domestic politicians in favor of Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence, and countries with a relatively large Armenian diaspora. It also has an office in Beirut responsible for the entire Middle East. It considers that these states and regions to either have the greatest concrete influence on its political status or have shown a certain openness for its recognition. However, participants in the Minsk Process, regional actors and SCO members overwhelmingly prefer regional stability or benefit from the conflict in one way or another. The unilateral recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh outside a mediation agreement entails more costs than benefits for them, through the alienation of Azerbaijan and Armenia and regional instability. This makes Karabakh diplomacy insufficient to obtain international recognition by a large number of states. Karabakh diplomacy should rather focus on making sure the positions of Stepanakert are understood and defended in ongoing mediation processes between Baku and Yerevan, but it should not expect to receive support for its statehood by states involved in the mediation processes. In conclusion, this thesis supposed that the foreign policy of unrecognized de facto states must have omitted certain states, regions or international organizations which would have helped them win international recognition. However, as this section shows, improving the conduct of diplomacy (by making changes in the geographic distribution of diplomatic relations) can only enhance Somaliland’s ability to gain recognition. In the cases of Transnistria and Artsakh, diplomacy is insufficient to achieve this objective because international actors either benefit from the status quo or, due to geopolitical factors, have much to lose from unilateral recognition. Consequently, an erroneous selection of states and international organizations to devoting diplomatic efforts is not a
Chapter 4 74 problem common for all unrecognized de facto states. It may have slowed Somaliland’s quest for recognition, but not for Transnistria or Artsakh.
Chapter 4 75
CONCLUSION ______
Member states of the international community are under no obligation to recognize an aspiring state. More often than not, states (especially superpowers and states with the greatest influence over an unrecognized entity) will decide to recognize one if it serves their interests to do so, whether for economic or geopolitical reasons, or for ideological purposes (like many Latin American states supporting the SADR’s quest for self-determination). This essay approached this phenomenon differently by studying factors on which little literature has been written. That is to say, the role and importance of diplomacy in obtaining political recognition. The hypothesis was that aspiring states with strong diplomatic institutions, qualified staff, and incisive strategies will be better suited to persuade the international community to recognize them. On the other hand, this thesis presumed that the selected unrecognized de facto states (Somaliland, Transnistria, and Artsakh), which have not obtained international recognition by any UN member state, must have weaker diplomatic institutions, inefficient staff selection methods and an erroneous selection of states and international organizations to devote their diplomatic efforts. After a rigorous analysis of main diplomatic components of the three unrecognized entities, the short conclusion is as follows: diplomatic factors do not explain their inability to obtain international recognition, except perhaps for Somaliland. Improved diplomacy may have enhanced, but not guaranteed, Somaliland’s ability to attract political recognition. Indeed, many international actors, including the US, have already indicated a certain openness to Somaliland’s political recognition, while its distance cousin, the SADR, has managed to receive partial recognition. This is not the case for Pridnestrovie and Artsakh, for which diplomacy has little to no importance for obtaining international recognition, as the costs of a separatist success would be too high for most external actors, especially those with great influence. In such cases, external actors benefit in one way or another from the status quo or consider that their national interests would be threatened if the unrecognized entity becomes recognized. States may feel frightened by a potential separatist spillover within their borders or by the consequences this would have on their
Chapter 4 76 geopolitical and economic interests in the region of the political entity. Nonetheless, the three unrecognized de facto states regard diplomatic relations as a key strategy to obtain recognition, with official representative offices acting as one of the main elements of their foreign policy. To reach these conclusions, this paper has examined several elements of their diplomatic institutions and relations to find out whether they can explain the failure of unrecognized entities to produce diplomatic allies. The research was conducted with information provided by government websites, academic articles and newspapers, in addition to e-mail responses from the Press Service of the PMR’s MFA and the NKR Office in Washington DC, among others. In Chapter 2, the internal structure and management of their official representative offices, as well as the methods of selection and qualification of staff, were analyzed. It was found that Artsakh, and especially Somaliland, suffer from several common and distinct weaknesses in some of these aspects, while the PMR does not appear to be as affected. Basically, a shortage of staff and financial resources, as well as decentralized decision-making and a weak online presence have been identified as common issues in the diplomatic behavior of Somaliland and Artsakh. On an individual level, Somaliland’s foreign diplomatic offices have suffered from a poor staff selection, inadequate diplomatic training, lack of commitment and ability of several officials to assume the necessary responsibilities and, in several cases, the absence of physical institutions. Artsakh’s representative offices abroad, on the other hand, have been criticized for being flagless, unremarkable, and unfit. Additionally, Stepanakert’s dependence on the Armenian diaspora to increase its diplomatic weight weakens its diplomatic independence, since Armenians generally oppose Nagorno-Karabakh’s recognition. Finally, the PMR has proven to have effective methods of personnel selection and its representative offices are structurally centralized, which facilitates effective diplomatic conduct. However, the representative offices of the three unrecognized entities face legislative obstacles due to their political nature. The fact that they are unrecognized prevents their representative offices from being registered as “embassies”, which consequently limits their ability to carry out many diplomatic activities. Chapter 3 analyzed the international scope of the representative offices of the three unrecognized de facto states. First, it has shown that while these offices remain a leading strategy for obtaining recognition, they have had very little success in this regard throughout history. More specifically, the vast majority of representative offices were established after obtaining recognition rather than before. This doesn’t mean, however, that they cannot be used and improved to lobby
Chapter 4 77 foreign governments and actors for recognition. In fact, a simple measurement of the number of representative offices of unrecognized states and many partially recognized states reveals that there is a certain correlation between level of recognition and the international diplomatic scope of aspiring states. In most cases, partially recognized states also have a greater presence in IGOs and NGOs in terms of membership and participation. But drawing a conclusion at this stage would be too early. Indeed, when measuring the number of foreign diplomatic offices located in states that are not diplomatic allies, the results are not as clear. In many cases, the three unrecognized states have a larger diplomatic presence with non-diplomatic allies than many partially recognized states. Consequently, the quantity of foreign diplomatic offices does not seem to be a collective factor leading to the inability of Somaliland, Transnistria, and Artsakh to obtain international recognition. Chapter 4 studied the selection of states and international organizations to establish their diplomatic relations. The objective was to find out if an issue of perception was responsible for an erroneous identification of potential diplomatic allies. The conclusions presented in this chapter are pragmatic; Somaliland has neglected regions such as Latin America, Asia and parts of Africa which that have historically shown openness to nations seeking self-determination. Somaliland should pursue partial recognition prior to widespread recognition, starting with states outside of Europe and North America, which may later attract Western recognition (it has so far focused its efforts on obtaining Western recognition). It should also increase its presence in IGOs and NGOs, including an indirect presence at the UN (as the SADR has done through Mexico) and to the AU. Transnistrian diplomacy, on the other hand, has the least influence on its ability to be recognized. Moscow has more interests in maintaining the region as part of Moldova than in recognizing the entity. In contrast, the West is unlikely to recognize the PMR because of its resolutely pro-Kremlin stance. Unless Transnistria chooses to become politically neutral and renounces its Cold War mentality (which is unlikely due to high local support for the Russian Federation), the best status it can strive for is partial recognition by Russia and a handful of Russian allies who recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Widespread recognition seems out of question regardless of Pridnestrovian diplomatic efforts due to the West’s disapproval of its statehood. Finally, Artsakh will also find it difficult to obtain diplomatic allies for similar reasons. The political status quo serves the interests of those with the most influence in determining its final status, notably the co- chairs and participating members of the OSCE Minsk Group, Iran and China. The NKR’s diplomatic efforts are unlikely to overcome these obstacles.
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Of course, this paper has limitations. For reasons of duration, it could not examine many other characteristics of the diplomacy of aspiring states. Additional research is needed, for example, on the internal structure and staff of other diplomatic institutions, such as MFAs and diplomat training centers. The activities of other members of the government, such as parliamentarians, and business leaders in lobbying external actors for recognition were also overlooked. More importantly, as Chapter 3 shows, delegation visits by top-level diplomats have proven to be more effective than representative offices in obtaining international recognition. Further research on the success of these short delegation visits is needed to improve our understanding of the successful factors that drive political recognition. Nevertheless, geopolitical and ideological considerations seem to remain the dominant explanations determining the fate of unrecognized de facto states. The national interests of external actors generally prevail over the decision to recognize an aspiring state or not. This is especially true when an entity is located in an area of fierce rivalry for influence, such as the PMR and Artsakh. However, when the interests of major international powers are less at stake, diplomacy and lobbying seem to play a more important role. For these reasons, Somaliland (similarly to the SADR), rather than the PMR and Artsakh, should reconsider its methods of conducting diplomacy to increase its chances of being recognized.
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Appendix 85
APPENDIX I
E-Mail Correspondences with Officials of the PMR and the NKR
Questions
1. How many diplomats work on average in a diplomatic representative office? 2. Structurally, how does a representative offices work? a. What tasks do representative office perform? And which ones do you spend the most time doing? (example: issuing visas, participating in events, etc.)? b. Are representative offices necessarily physical offices, or do they take other forms in certain countries (such as a representation by individuals without an office)? c. How often do you communicate with other representative offices and your government? d. How autonomous are your representative offices? How and when can the Ministry of Foreign Affairs intervene in your work? 3. How are diplomats selected? a. According to what criteria are they selected (education, personal qualities, professional experience, etc.)? b. Where were they generally educated? c. Must diplomats pass any test or take any course to prepare before starting a mission? 4. [For the PMR only] The PMR has opened very few offices abroad. Are there any special reasons for this? 5. [For the NKR only] Is diplomacy conducted mainly bilaterally (state-to-state relations) or multilaterally (through international organizations, international sports events, etc.)? 6. [For the NKR only] What events and activities do you typically attend in the US? 7. [For the NKR only] The White House does currently not recognize the NKR. How does this affect your diplomatic activities there (for example, do you think some politicians and influential civil society members are more reluctant to interact with you)? 8. [For the NKR only] What is the ultimate goal of diplomats: to persuade foreign states to recognize the NKR, or that it should become part of Armenia? What are the main arguments
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used to convince foreign political leaders (political, economic, etc.)? Are the arguments the same for Western countries as for Russia and others? 9. Are your representative offices financially independent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Can they independently earn income or are they fully funded by the central government? a. If possible for me to know, what is the budget of the representative office? b. If possible for me to know, how are financial resources spent?
Appendix 87
APPENDIX II
E-Mail Correspondence with the Press Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PMR
Response
- At present moment there are three Official Representative Offices of Pridnestrovie abroad: in the Russian Federation, in the Republic of Abkhazia and in the Republic of South Ossetia. The Decree of the President of the PMR on the opening of the Representative Office in the Republic of Abkhazia was signed on January, 18, 2007, in the Republic of South Ossetia on November, 28, 2007. Official Representative Office of Pridnestrovie to the Russian Federation was opened on January, 22, 2019.
Diplomatic Representative Offices of Pridnestrovie are the part of the system of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PMR. In their activity they are accountable to the MFA of the PMR and function under its control. They are guided by Pridnestrovian legislation on diplomatic service, by normative and administrative acts of the Ministry, by norms of international law and of the country of staying. The MFA of the PMR provides all necessary conditions for functioning of foreign institutions, including centralized financing, staffing and logistical support.
- Main tasks of the Official Representative Offices of the PMR are: assistance in establishment of social, humanitarian, economic and other connections with the country of staying, maintenance of direct contacts with local authorities and interaction with non-governmental organizations. Significant role is also played by cultural and scientific aspect of the activity of the Representative Offices: art exhibitions, roundtables and conferences are held on its premises, editions are prepared for publishing.
Established posts in the structure of the Official Representative Offices of Pridnestrovie are filled by the officers of diplomatic service of the PMR. In accordance with acting legislation citizens of the PMR, who received higher education relevant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who possess knowledge, necessary for diplomatic service duties, are entitled to fill the posts on diplomatic
Appendix 88 service. The Heads of the Official Representative Offices of Pridnestrovie are appointed and removed from office by the President of the PMR. Employment to organs of diplomatic service is accomplished after passing of obligatory special check-up. Applicants may be asked to pass exam in order to check job suitability.
- The expediency of opening of the Representative Office of Pridnestrovie on the territory of foreign country is determined by complex of topical aims and objectives in the context of implementation of foreign policy course of Pridnestrovian state. Current level of relations between Pridnestrovie and the country, where it is planned to open Representative Office of the PMR, is also taken into account.
Today options of expanding of the network of diplomatic foreign institutions of Pridnestrovie are elaborated. Primarily the possibilities of opening of Official Representative Offices of the PMR in Kiev and Brussels are analyzed. In particular, this task was given to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the President of the PMR V.N. Krasnoselsky during the collegium of the MFA of the PMR in February, 2019.
Information on contacts of Official Representative Offices of Pridnestrovie abroad is located on the official site of the MFA of the PMR. You may also get acquainted with Protocol On Measures Aimed at Procedural and Legal Support of Representative Offices (Embassies) of the Community for Democracy and Nations Rights Member States in Republic of Abkhazia, Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic and Republic of South Ossetia (attached hereto).
Appendix 89
APPENDIX III
E-Mail Correspondence with the NKR Office in Washington, DC
Response
1. Number of diplomats varies for every Permanent Representation. In the United States, there is one diplomat from Artsakh, without diplomatic credentials from the US Government, and is registered with the United States Department of Justice. 2. Like any country’s foreign representations, NKR Office is part of the Republic of Artsakh’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with all the corresponding reporting and coordination of activities with the MFA in Stepanakert. Here’s the mission statement of the NKR Office in the USA: http://nkrusa.org/nkr_office/nkr_office.shtml. 3. Artsakh MFA’s activity is legislatively regulated by the Law on Diplomatic Service of the Republic of Artsakh. Will soon be available for public. 4. Head of offices work in accordance with the requirements; business hours can be compared to any office with the same range of responsibilities. 5. Lack of recognition by the United States on the federal limits the level and intensity of various ties with the executive branch. Ties are less restricted with the legislative branch (the US Congress). It does hamper our ability of networking. Nonetheless, the NKR Office, in line with the US legislation, has the opportunity to implement most of its tasks. 6. Most of events in the think-tanks and other for a, which are of interest for the Republic of Artsakh, do not require diplomatic credentials from participants or attendees. Normally, those are discussions of the regional developments in the South Caucasus, separate countries / issues, etc. Academic freedom and freedom of expression are and have historically been among top priorities of American democracy and normally are not restricted by diplomatic credentials or political status. 7. Our government intends to have representation offices in as many countries as possible, and the process in underway. The priority was given to opening offices in the United States, France and Russia, as the three countries are co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group. In addition, we
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focus on countries that have a strong Armenian presence / diaspora, and countries that can be of interest in the view of political, economic, cultural and other bilateral relations. 8. International recognition of the independence of the Republic of Artsakh, and peaceful resolution of the conflict with Azerbaijan are the foreign political priorities for our state. The process starts and ends in Stepanakert. We continue building our lives and develop as a sovereign democracy, willing and capable to protect its freedom, and provide its population with all the human rights and liberties inherent for any democracy around the globe. At the same time, we work towards raising international awareness about the process in and around Artsakh. The argumentation is the same everywhere – legal, historical and moral grounds for the sovereignty of the Republic of Artsakh are firm, and we hope the international community will accept the fact rather sooner than later. 9. Ties go bilaterally, multilaterally and in any other format that would allow delivering our messages and establishing practical cooperation. We do not put any artificial restrictions, and resort to the entire available set of actions (sports, cultural and humanitarian initiatives, etc.) 10. Representations are financed by the Republic of Artsakh state budget.
Appendix 91
APPENDIX IV
E-Mail Correspondence with the Council of Young Diplomats of the PMR
Response
The main goals of the Council of Young Diplomats of the PMR are to improve the professional qualities of the participants, to educate the principles of corporate ethics, to maintain the traditions of the Pridnestrovian Foreign Ministry, to increase public awareness of the main aspects of the activities of the PMR’s MFA. The Council aims to develop scientific and practical, research, communication skills of young people and to motivate the search for non-standard solutions, including on those topical issues that may be needed in the current work of the Pridnestrovian foreign ministry.
The members of the Council of Young Diplomats of the PMR are the acting employees of MFA, who work less than 5 years, potential candidates for filling vacant posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PMR and also students of faculties of political science, law, journalism, economics or other spheres that are somehow related with politics in a loose sense.
Some of the PMR’s MFA officers were the members of the Council of Young Diplomats of the PMR.