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Case 17-3481, Document 163-1, 07/09/2019, 2602804, Page1 of 23 17-3481-cv (L) Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. Tong 1 In the 2 United States Court of Appeals 3 For the Second Circuit 4 5 6 August Term 2018 7 8 No. 17-3481-cv; 17-3918-cv 9 10 TWEED-NEW HAVEN AIRPORT AUTHORITY, 11 12 Plaintiff-Appellant, 13 CITY OF NEW HAVEN, 14 15 Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellant, 16 17 v. 18 19 WILLIAM TONG, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of 20 Connecticut, 21 22 Defendant-Appellee.* 23 24 25 Appeal from the United States District Court 26 for the District of Connecticut 27 No. 15 Civ. 1731 (RAR), Robert A. Richardson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding. 28 (Argued: December 12, 2018; Decided: July 9, 2019) 29 30 Before: SACK, PARKER, and CHIN, Circuit Judges. 31 ____________ 32 * The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption as indicated above. 1 Case 17-3481, Document 163-1, 07/09/2019, 2602804, Page2 of 23 17-3481-cv (L) Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. Tong 1 Plaintiff-Appellant Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority (“Tweed”), 2 seeking to expand its primary runway, sued to invalidate a Connecticut statute 3 that had limited the runway’s length. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-120j(c). Tweed 4 contended that the statute was preempted by the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. 5 § 40101 et seq. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut 6 (Richardson, Magistrate Judge), concluded that (1) Tweed lacked standing; and (2) 7 assuming Tweed had standing, the Federal Aviation Act did not preempt the 8 statute. We disagree. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for entry of judgment 9 in favor of Tweed. 10 11 REVERSED and REMANDED. 12 13 Hugh I. Manke, John C. King, Christopher 14 A. Klepps, Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C., 15 Hartford, Ct., for plaintiff-appellant Tweed- 16 New Haven Airport Authority. 17 18 John Rose, Jr., Corporation Counsel, 19 New Haven Office of the Corporation 20 Counsel, New Haven, Ct., for intervenor 21 plaintiff-appellant Tweed-New Haven Airport 22 Authority. 23 24 Drew S. Graham, Assistant Attorney 25 General, Hartford, Ct., for defendant-appellee 26 William Tong, Attorney General of the State of 27 Connecticut. 28 29 30 31 32 2 Case 17-3481, Document 163-1, 07/09/2019, 2602804, Page3 of 23 17-3481-cv (L) Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. Tong 1 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Circuit Judge: 2 Tweed-New Haven Airport is located in the Town of East Haven and the 3 City of New Haven, Connecticut. The Airport is owned by the City of New 4 Haven and leased to and operated by Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority 5 (“Tweed”).1 Tweed sued the then Connecticut Attorney General George Jepsen in 6 his official capacity2 (the “State”), seeking a declaratory judgment that a 7 Connecticut statute (the “Runway Statute” or “Statute”) that limits the Airport’s 8 runway to its current length of 5,600 feet was invalid. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15- 9 120j(c). Tweed claimed that the Statute was preempted by federal laws governing 1 Tweed is “a body politic and corporate” created through legislation by the state of Connecticut. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-120i(a). While its originating statute describes Tweed as a “public instrumentality and political subdivision” of Connecticut, it “shall not be construed to be a department, institution or agency of the state.” Id. It has a fifteen-member board of directors, comprised of persons appointed by the mayor of New Haven, the mayor of East Haven, and the South Central Regional Council of Governments. Id. § 15-120i(b). If Tweed is terminated, its rights and property pass to the City of New Haven. Id. § 15- 120i(e). 2 Since the inception of the suit, the identity of the Connecticut Attorney General has changed from George Jepsen to William Tong. This change is reflected in the case caption. 3 Case 17-3481, Document 163-1, 07/09/2019, 2602804, Page4 of 23 17-3481-cv (L) Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. Tong 1 the regulation of air transportation, including the Federal Aviation Act 2 (“FAAct”), see 49 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq. 3 Following a bench trial in the United States District Court for the District of 4 Connecticut (Richardson, M.J.),3 the court concluded that Tweed lacked standing 5 to sue because its injury was not caused by the Statute and that, assuming Tweed 6 could establish standing, the Runway Statute was not preempted by the federal 7 laws to which Tweed cited. Because we conclude that Tweed has standing and 8 that the Runway Statute is preempted by the FAAct, we reverse.4 9 BACKGROUND 10 The Airport serves the New Haven area. It has a catchment area—the area 11 from which an airport expects to draw commercial air service passengers—in 12 excess of 1,000,000 people. The Airport’s primary runway, Runway 2/20, is 13 currently 5,600 feet long. The runway is one of the shortest commercial airport 14 runways in the country, and it is the shortest runway for an airport with a 3 The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge through the entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. 4 The salient facts are not in dispute and have been stipulated to by the parties. See Joint App’x 51-66. 4 Case 17-3481, Document 163-1, 07/09/2019, 2602804, Page5 of 23 17-3481-cv (L) Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. Tong 1 catchment area as large as Tweed’s area. The Airport’s catchment area is the 2 largest catchment area without nonstop flights to Orlando, and there are no 3 flights at the Airport to a number of East Coast cities such as Boston, Washington 4 D.C., and Atlanta. 5 In 2009, the Connecticut legislature, seeking to prevent the expansion of 6 Runway 2/20, passed the Runway Statute, which provides that “Runway 2-20 of 7 the airport shall not exceed the existing paved runway length of five thousand six 8 hundred linear feet.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-120j(c). The Runway Statute prevents 9 Tweed from extending Runway 2/20 past its current length. 10 The short length of the Airport’s runway has sharply limited the 11 availability of safe commercial air service at Tweed. The length of a runway has a 12 direct bearing on the weight load and passenger capacity that can be handled on 13 any given flight. For example, at the time of trial, American Airlines, the one 14 commercial airline providing service to and from the Airport, was unable to 15 safely fill its planes to capacity and was required, depending on the weather, to 16 leave between four and nine seats empty. 5 Case 17-3481, Document 163-1, 07/09/2019, 2602804, Page6 of 23 17-3481-cv (L) Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. Tong 1 Tweed has been unable to attract new airline services. Tweed has 2 contacted approximately ten different airlines and has been unable to convince 3 them to operate out of the Airport. One airline, Allegiant Air, LLC, began an 4 economic analysis of the feasibility of bringing additional flights to the Airport 5 but concluded it would be pointless to continue with the analysis unless the 6 runway were extended. 7 Lengthening the runway would allow for the safe use of larger aircraft, 8 allow flights with no seating restrictions, allow more passengers on each 9 airplane, and allow service to more destinations. It would also allow Tweed to 10 attract more carriers and expand the availability of safe air service for its 11 customers. 12 As required by the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), Tweed has 13 prepared a Master Plan for upgrading its airport, which includes extending the 14 runway.5 In 2002, the Master Plan—including the runway expansion—was 5A Master Plan is required by the FAA for each commercial airport within its jurisdiction, such as Tweed, and represents a blueprint for the long-term development goals of the airport’s facilities. 6 Case 17-3481, Document 163-1, 07/09/2019, 2602804, Page7 of 23 17-3481-cv (L) Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. Tong 1 approved by the FAA and by the State of Connecticut. However, in 2009, the 2 State changed its position and passed the Runway Statute. 3 Tweed, seeking to lengthen the runway, sued for prospective injunctive 4 relief, contending that federal law including the FAAct preempted the Runway 5 Statute. The City of New Haven intervened as an additional plaintiff. The State 6 moved to dismiss on several grounds, including that Tweed lacked Article III 7 standing, that, as a political subdivision of the State of Connecticut, Tweed could 8 not sue the State, and that the Runway Statute was not preempted. The District 9 Court denied the State’s motion. 10 At trial, the parties largely relied on a joint stipulation of facts. The District 11 Court ultimately concluded that (1) Tweed lacked standing to sue because it had 12 not shown an injury-in-fact and causation attributable to the Statute; and (2) even 13 if Tweed had standing, federal law (including the FAAct) did not preempt the 14 Runway Statute. See generally Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Jepsen, No. 15-cv- 15 01731, 2017 WL 4400751, 2017 LEXIS 162356 (D.