HIDDEN POWER JAMES COCKAYNE Hidden Power The Strategic Logic of Organized Crime A A Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Copyright © James Cockayne 2016 All rights reserved. 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ISBN: 9780190627331 Printed in India on acid-free paper For the two hidden powers behind this book, JMC and RAD CONTENTS Acknowledgments xv Abbreviations xvii List of Tables xix PART ONE A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO ORGANIZED CRIME 1.âIntroduction 3 Making sense of criminal power 5 Entering a gallery of mirrors 7 About this book 10 2.âThe Strategic Organization of Crime 15 What do we know about political-criminal interaction? 16 Criminal strategy and governmental power 20 Individual, network or organizational strategy? 27 Social bandits and primitive criminal strategy 30 Criminal capabilities 31 Coercion 32 Corruption 34 Communications 38 Command and control 40 Conclusion 44 PART TWO EPISODES IN CRIMINAL STRATEGY 3.âTammany: ‘How New York is Governed’, 1859–1920 47 New York’s government: machine made 51 vii CONTENTS Guardians of the Revolution 51 Gangs of New York 54 The ghost in the machine 56 Boss Tweed: Lord of the Rings 59 A quest for influence 59 Monarch of Manhattan 63 Downfall 67 Honest graft 73 Conclusion 79 4.âMafia Origins, 1859–1929 83 Origins 86 Profiting from transition 86 Organizing the Sicilian mafia 90 Mafia migration 94 The Black Hand 97 Modern Family 98 Illicit government 101 The Iron Prefect 104 Conclusion 107 5.âWar and Peace in the American Mafia, 1920–1941 109 War 111 Prohibition as a driver of innovation 111 Civil war in the American mafia 114 Mediation and betrayal 118 Peace 120 Five Families 120 Coup d’état 121 A new governmental approach 123 Consolidating power 127 Racketeering and union power 127 Gambling innovation and political finance 129 Fall of a czar 133 Playing kingmaker 133 Mobbing up 135 The Boy Scout 138 Conclusion 142 viii CONTENTS 6.âThe Underworld Project, 1941–1943 147 ‘This is a war’ 150 Enlisting the underworld 150 Regular guys 152 Lucky’s break 154 From watchdog to attack dog 158 Invading Italy 160 Local knowledge 160 Creating a fifth column 162 Release and exile 164 Conclusion 165 7.âGoverning Sicily, 1942–1968 169 ‘A bargain has been struck’ 170 Black market rents 170 ‘Wine and women and champagne’ 173 ‘Our good friends’ 176 Mafia separatism 178 Confrontation, accommodation or withdrawal? 178 The logic of mafia separatism 180 Seeking Great Power protection 182 Negotiating peace with the mafia 184 A bandit army 186 Settlement and betrayal 190 Negotiating Sicily’s transition 193 A Sicilian political machine 193 Wisdom of the Mob 196 The sack of Palermo 198 Conclusion 200 8.âThe Cuba Joint Venture, 1933–1958 203 Buying into Cuba 205 Rise of a strongman 205 The ‘Batista Palace Gang’ 208 Gangsterismo 211 A joint venture in government 214 The Havana Mob 214 Rebellion in the Mob 218 ix CONTENTS Revolution in Cuba 221 Conclusion 224 9.âThe Blue Caribbean Ocean, 1959–1983 227 ‘A gangland style killing’ 229 Accommodation or confrontation? 229 Internationalizing Murder, Inc. 231 Seeking protection 236 Subversion and its unintended consequences 237 What went wrong at the Bay of Pigs? 237 Learning from the Mob? 239 Cold War wildcard: the Missile Crisis 245 Did the magic button backfire? 249 The Bahamas and the birth of offshore capitalism 251 Invading Haiti 251 Casino capitalism 252 Ballots, not bullets 255 Epilogue: a city by the Atlantic 257 Conclusion 260 PART THREE THE MARKET FOR GOVERNMENT 10.âStrategic Criminal Positioning 267 The market for government 268 Intermediation: mafia logic 273 Autonomy: warlordism and gang rule 276 Merger: joint ventures 280 Strategic alliances 282 Terrorism as criminal positioning strategy 285 Relocation and blue ocean strategy 288 11.âInnovation, Disruption and Strategy beyond the State 291 Innovation and disruption 292 â Mexico: from narcocartels to narcocults 292 â The shifting sands of the Sahel 298 â The disruption of sovereignty 303 Implications 306 â War and strategy beyond the state 306 â Combating criminal governmentality 308 x CONTENTS â Managing criminal spoilers in peace and transition âprocesses 312 Envoi: the rise of criminal statecraft 321 Notes 325 References 417 Index 449 xi ‘In this episode … the pressure of a hidden power was felt…’ Michele Pantaleone* * Michele Pantaleone, The Mafia and Politics (London: Chatto & Windus, 1966), p. 190. xiii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This little expedition would not have found its way ‘there and back’ without a diverse set of supporters. I owe them all great thanks. The navigational guidance from two advisers at King’s College London, Professor Mats Berdal and Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, was cen- tral to my safe passage. Several bosses indulged and even encouraged my curiosity: at United Nations University, David Malone and Max Bond; at the Global Center for Cooperative Security, Alistair Millar. Comments on drafts from Louise Bosetti, Christopher Coker, Rachel Davis, John de Boer, Sebastian von Einsiedel, Antonio Giustozzi and Sonja Litz all helped send me in productive new directions. At Hurst, Michael Dwyer and Jon de Peyer provided invaluable support. Staff ta the New York Public Library, National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland, and the British National Archives, Kew, provided considerable assistance. Lori Birrell and Melinda Wallington at the University of Rochester deserve particular thanks. The entire undertaking depended upon the financial support of the Faculty of Social Science and Public Policy at King’s College London. A solo sailor also needs occasional visitors to his humble bark to provide moral support and an intellectual puff in his sails. I am grateful for such impetus to the following, some of whom may not fully appre- ciate the stimulation they provided: Enrique Desmond Arias, Sara Batmanglich, Ivan Briscoe, Mike Dziedzic, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Stefan Feller, Mervyn Frost, Peter Gastrow, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Alison Hawks, Camino Kavanagh, Walter Kemp, David Kennedy, David Kilcullen, Michael Miklaucic, Rachel Locke, Francesco Mancini, Zoe xv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Mentel, Rob Muggah, Tuesday Reitano, Mark Shaw and Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher. Were it not for two people in particular, however, I would long ago have given up on the whole expedition. My chief investor, JMC, gave me the means to set out in the first place, and the keel of faith that allowed me to hold my course. There was room for only one observer in the dinghy with me: RAD’s utter reliability, good humour, moral encouragement, helpful commentary and grace, throughout the voy- age, provided the wind in my sails. It is to those two hidden powers behind this enterprise that the result is dedicated. xvi ABBREVIATIONS AFHQ Allied Forces Headquarters AMG or AMGOT Allied Military Government of the Occupied Territories (Italy) AQIM Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb BANDES Banco de Desarrollo Económico y Social, Cuba CFRB Comando Forze Repressione Banditismo (Command Force for the Repression of Banditry) Church Committee US Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (94th Congress, 1975–76) CIA US Central Intelligence Agency DC Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democra ts, Italian political party) DCI US Director of Central Intelligence DEA US federal Drug Enforcement Administration EVIS Esercito Volontario per l’Indipendenza della Sicilia (Voluntary Army for the Indepen- dence of Sicily) FNLA Front national pour la libération de l’Azawad (Mali) FRD Frente Revolucionario Democrático (Demo- cratic Revolutionary Front, Cuban counter- revolutionary organization) xvii ABBREVIATIONS FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States. (See under US Department of State in ‘Published official documents and government memo- randa’, in the References section) G-3 Experimental Detachment G-3, cover name for Office of Strategic Services GIA Groupe Islamique Armé (Algeria) GSPC Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (the Maghreb and the Sahel) Islamic State al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham (a.k.a. the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)) JICA US Joint Intelligence Collecting