The following materials are provided to clarify the critically important information surrounding the FCC April 2020 “Ligado” L-band order and implications for U.S. 5G.
Table of Contents
TAB 1: Honorable Dan S. Goldin Letter to FCC Chairman/Commissioners, 4 September 2020 (2 pages)
TAB 2: Letter to SASC Chairman Inhofe, 19 August 2020 (2 pages)
TAB 3: Letter to Secretary of Defense Esper, 21 August 2020 (2 pages)
TAB 4: L-Band (Ligado) Claims & Answers Document, compiled April - September 2020 (11 pages) • Detailed reference that factually repudiates the inaccurate claims against L-Band/FCC/Ligado
TAB 5: C-Band + L-Band White Paper dated 18 May (updated August) 2020 (2 pages) A. C+L Innovation to Accelerate 5G Diagram (1 page) • Outlines the viability of “C+L” to greatly accelerate U.S. 5G deployment across America
TAB 6: GPS Related FOIA Requests Summary & Status, 24 August 2020 (6 pages) • Highlights the lack of transparency and progress from DoD-NTIA on numerous key FOIAs
TAB 7: Dan Goldin Op-Eds A. “Keep 5G Safe From Chinese Domination” (Wall Street Journal) (3 pages) B. “Recalculating: GPS, L-band and the Pentagon’s Untenable Position on 5G” (C4ISR) (3 pages) C. “A Wake Up Call on GPS” (Aviation Week) (1 Page)
TAB 8: FCC Ligado Order (April 2020) Key Points Reference (1 page)
Dear Chairman Pai & FCC Commissioners, 8 September 2020
I am writing about the brilliant and courageous L-Band (“Ligado”) decision you made in April 2020. Since November 2019, I have conducted extensive research, alongside a team of renowned experts in telecommunications and PNT/GPS, into the entire record of the Ligado proposal. Our team concluded precisely what your world-class spectrum experts independently concluded: The Ligado proposal will boost the development of U.S. 5G and IoT applications while, at the same time protecting GPS. The FCC’s 5-0 vote helps advance American technological leadership in the world in 5G related innovation like AI, PNT, robotics, quantum, autonomous vehicles, and more. These technologies will not only drive the industries of the future, but they will also generate massive, likely unprecedented economic growth.
Yet at the urging of DoD, the SASC and HASC have attacked the FCC decision with damaging amendments to the upcoming National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) based on the entirely faulty premise of GPS interference. The HASC’s amendment from Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH) is the most egregious and must be removed above all else. In outrageous fashion it bans private companies from doing any business with DoD if they choose to develop 5G using the FCC-approved L-Band frequencies. The “Turner” amendment would essentially give DoD veto power over the FCC, severely undermine the FCC’s authority, discredit the FCC’s ability to lead internationally, and it would undercut private sector confidence in U.S. spectrum management—dissuading U.S. 5G innovation.
I led NASA for ten years (1992-2001) under three Presidents. I oversaw the successful launch of the Space Shuttle 61 times and the redesign and construction of the International Space Station (ISS), with no loss of human life. During this period, I testified 60 times in Congress and have provided supporting information to more than 25 hearings from my various roles in the private sector. I have never seen an amendment like this Turner amendment—so blatant in its overreach and yet so disconnected from facts verified through testing that are readily available with a minimal amount of staff diligence.
I have done all I can as a citizen for the past 10 months (with no compensation and no affiliation with Ligado) to highlight and advance this critical issue for America. I published four op-eds or articles, communicated in person and/or by phone with nearly all key stakeholders in the White House, NEC, OSTP, NSC, Commerce (including NTIA), State, DoD, with several members of the GPS/PNT community (members of the PNT EXCOM and/or PNT Advisory Board), and with over 100 Members of the House and Senate (including the leadership of the SASC, HASC, and House/Senate Commerce Committees). I cannot work on this issue indefinitely and need those “in the arena” to protect and implement the FCC order now.
Further, I have never seen such an attack on an independent agency's fact-based decision as DoD has launched against the FCC, which has been carried forward errantly by the SASC and HASC. I am not the only one concerned about the level of influence the DoD seems to have in this case. An open letter to the SASC and HASC, published on 19 May and signed by over 30 organizations and experts, stated: “The federal government spent years consolidating its approach to spectrum policy to avoid the exact predicament in which the FCC’s decisions would be challenged by other federal agencies. This effort by federal agencies to undermine the authority vested in the FCC by Congress should be reversed, not encouraged.” The letter offers several compelling reasons DoD (and the Turner contracting amendment) must not succeed against the lawful, legitimate, scientifically-valid L-Band decision:1 • The FCC is “an independent agency directly controlled by Congress, that has acquired unparalleled engineering expertise in wireless technologies which has allowed the United States to dominate the global wireless economy for more than two decades.” • “Federal law (and more than two decades of federal practice) makes clear the process by which federal agencies work with the FCC to construct a uniform, coherent federal policy.” • “When those processes are not followed—as the Chair and Ranking Member of the House Energy & Commerce Committee recently observed—'the interests of the United States suffer and our international leadership on spectrum matters are compromised.’” • “The private sector must have certainty that the FCC has final say over spectrum issues so that innovation in wireless technologies can be seen as good investments that won’t be undone.” If the L-Band order is weakened it will give China a win in 5G and enormous economic, technological, military, and geopolitical advantages for decades. Beyond national security, millions of U.S. jobs and
1 Points from open letter to SASC and HASC 15 May 2020, signed Dr. Roslyn Layton and 30 organizations and tech policy experts. massive economic growth from 5G-led innovation will be delayed or lost. Yet at the urging of DoD, the SASC and HASC have attacked the FCC decision with damaging amendments to the upcoming National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) based on the entirely faulty premise of GPS interference. The HASC’s amendment from Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH) is the most egregious and must be removed above all else. In outrageous fashion it bans private companies from doing any business with DoD if they choose to develop 5G using the FCC-approved L-Band frequencies. The “Turner” amendment would essentially give DoD veto power over the FCC, severely undermine the FCC’s authority, discredit the FCC’s ability to lead internationally, and it would undercut private sector confidence in U.S. spectrum management— dissuading U.S. 5G innovation. There are numerous Members of Congress who agree strongly the Turner amendment must be removed, but many of them say they have received calls from very senior members of DoD reminding them that they have other important relationships with DoD in their home states that might be jeopardized if they support Ligado. Is this the same DoD I have worked with for the past 50 years?
As you know, the next few years will determine whether the U.S. or China is the dominant 5G nation in the world. This particular 35-40MHz of L-Band spectrum—when combined with C-Band—will accelerate the deployment of full, nationwide U.S. 5G/IoT by 3-5 critical years or more, enabling integrated 5G across urban, suburban, and rural America by 2024. No other spectrum combination does this, period. All Americans should care about this. These conclusions were not only powerfully affirmed by the FCC’s rigorous 74-page order, but they were also confirmed more recently (June-July 2020) by the disclosure of multiple internal emails between DoD, the NTIA, and other parties. Even DoD spectrum experts know the FCC order is sound and will protect GPS (I detail some troubling indicators that DoD is suppressing dissent in the enclosed documents, see my letter to Secretary Esper).
DoD just announced a plan to share 100MHz of mid-band spectrum (3.45GHz-3.55GHz) for deployment (ambitiously) in the second half of 2022. This 100MHz is a positive step, but it is not unencumbered spectrum, rather it must be shared with various DoD demands. Further, like all non-L-Band options, it requires construction of hundreds of thousands of new cell sites over five years or more for nationwide 5G. This much delayed deployment timeline—without L-Band—would give China an insurmountable 5G lead and dominance in 5G tech. Only L-Band (+ C-Band) allows U.S. 5G by 2024. L-Band is the game- changer in our race with China. Recent reports and analysis on L-Band from industry research heavyweights Newstreet, LightShed, Cowen, and MITRE affirm the critical importance of C+L.
Please review the enclosed information: • Top claims against the FCC’s L-Band decision, including several made during the 6 May 2020 SASC hearing, followed by detailed information refuting each claim. I believe any opponent of Ligado who reads it once will come away with a starkly different perspective. • Recent letters to Senator Inhofe and Secretary of Defense Esper clearly outlining the facts and stakes. • A short white paper outlining the importance and viability of the “C+L” spectrum solution to U.S. 5G • A summary of my extensive FOIA requests over many months, none of which have been fulfilled. • Three op-eds I authored in the WSJ, C4ISR, and Aviation Week respectively on these issues.
The FCC’s list of accomplishments to bring much-needed connectivity and innovation to rural (and all) geographic areas in America—while removing regulatory impediments—is too extensive to list. Like the historic rural electrification efforts 100 years ago and, more recently, efforts to bring broadband to Americans from coast-to-coast, the deployment of 5G in America by 2024 is a strategic and economic imperative that will both protect and transform the country. Without exaggeration, L-Band is the key. Opposition to the FCC’s L-Band order must finally stop; it is legal, scientifically valid, and strategically necessary. It can help ensure that America is the 5G innovation hub of the world and that we not only fully recover from the COVID-19 crisis economically, but we also grow and prosper from this transformational 5G technology. Thank you and the Commission for your leadership. I can speak with you anytime.
In Service,
Honorable Daniel S. Goldin NASA Administrator (1992-2001) 19 August 2020 Dear Chairman Inhofe:
I hope you, your loved ones, and to the greatest extent your constituents are safe and well. I respect your distinguished service to our country and dedicated leadership of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
I led NASA for ten years (1992-2001) under three Presidents and testified 60 times in Congress. I also oversaw the successful launch of the Space Shuttle 61 times and the redesign and construction of the International Space Station (ISS). Despite navigating these challenges, I am struggling to get past your staff to speak with you! While I am clearly on the losing end of that battle, it means they are doing a great job of helping you focus on your top priorities. I believe this letter addresses one of your top priorities.
I am writing about the FCC’s April 2020 decision on Ligado; please hear me out. I have no affiliation with Ligado nor am I compensated in any way. I have simply committed myself over the past 10 months to helping our nation achieve full, stand-alone 5G by 2024 and win the 5G race against China. I firmly believe Ligado’s L-Band plays an indispensable role in this national goal. It has been rigorously verified that the L- band proposal will not harm GPS. I know you are firmly on the record as opposing the FCC’s decision. In parallel, DoD’s and the GPS community’s opposition have been relentless. I have worked with DoD and advocated for GPS often over the past 50 years. In this case, they are wrong—and I can prove it if you’ll let me. Too much is at stake for America’s future not to speak very directly about this.
In 58 years working on science, technology, and U.S. national security, I have never seen an issue of such importance so beset by misinformation as this Ligado issue. Since November 2019, I have devoted nearly all of my professional time and effort to help our country accelerate progress in 5G. I worked intensely with a world-class team of experts in telecommunications, signals processing, and position-navigation- and-timing to study the decade-long Ligado proposal to create a ground-based 5G network. It is sound.
As you know, Ligado prevailed in a 5-0 vote by FCC Commissioners, a decision that was based on extensive analysis by the FCC’s world-class scientists and engineers over many years. The rigorous NASCTN testing—which received a “Gold Medal” award from the Department of Commerce—was developed and monitored by a U.S. government team, including DoD-CIO spectrum experts (who have explicitly stated there is no GPS interference from Ligado, then were silenced). As the GAO recently confirmed, this FCC process was not done hastily nor did it circumvent the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). It was a thorough analysis and valid conclusion based entirely on facts. Given the FCC process was proper, transparent, and inclusive—not “done in secret” as claimed in SASC testimony on 06 May—the unanimous and bipartisan FCC vote is legitimate, even unassailable. Yet, the immense benefits L-Band provides to 5G may never be realized unless the facts rise to the top now. Our team independently found: • Ligado’s proposal does not cause harmful GPS interference. Reports to the contrary are based on incomplete information. Plus, the 23MHz guard band and “kill switch” are the ultimate safeguards. • The FCC’s scientific decision will significantly benefit U.S. 5G, IoT, and help counter China’s aggressive 5G ambitions—while creating massive U.S. economic growth and accompanying jobs. • L-Band (combined with C-Band/CBRS) enables full 5G across urban and rural areas 3-5 years sooner. • Extensive world-class U.S. government testing proved this unequivocally, and recently-released internal DoD-CIO and NTIA email correspondence confirms it. This warrants attention. • The FCC decision carefully followed the appropriate procedures over many years in an inclusive and transparent manner. It is all in the record. DoD was fully engaged (and accommodated) at every step. • Most important, Ligado’s “L-Band” proposal will enable the U.S. to achieve full 5G by 2024, which is key to becoming the world’s center of gravity for 5G innovation. No other spectrum option achieves this, including the 100MHz of mid-band spectrum DoD just announced will be made available for 5G.
I am reaching out now because we face a defining moment as the NDAA heads to “conference committee.” Can we please speak by phone soonest? The SASC’s and HASC’s debilitating amendments in the NDAA will delay and perhaps nullify the impact of L-Band on U.S. 5G. If this occurs, America’s national and economic security will suffer dire consequences. I am prepared to present the merits of both sides of the issue, while at the same time guaranteeing GPS is protected. No one fights harder and with more conviction than you do, but on this particular issue DoD and others have promulgated misinformation. Respectfully, your opposition to Ligado’s L-Band is well-intentioned, but unnecessary.
The next three years will determine whether the U.S. or China is the dominant 5G nation in the world, with all of the national security, economic, and geopolitical advantages that follow. China has already deployed 600MHz of mid-band spectrum for 5G, with 400MHz more in the pipeline. The U.S. can and must be the world’s hub of 5G technology and related innovation in AI, PNT, robotics, quantum, unmanned systems, and more. These technologies will not only drive the industries of the future, but they will also generate massive, likely unprecedented economic growth. But we must agree to move L-Band forward.
Notably, on 23 May 2018, Senator Marco Rubio delivered a 25-minute speech on the floor of the Senate about Communist China’s plan to “dominate the future” that is reminiscent of George Kennan’s 1946 long telegram on the Soviets and containment. Senator Rubio warned that when the history of the 21st century is written, historians will say we allowed China to “cheat and steal its way to dominance” because “policymakers were too busy arguing with each other” to prevent it. This is happening right now, but not only with spectrum and 5G. China has recently surpassed GPS in PNT with BeiDou. China started deployment of BeiDou-3 satellites in 2015 and commenced worldwide operations in June 2020. GPS embarked on its equivalent phase 3 program in 1997, launched three GPS III satellites and is on pace to complete the program 37 years later, in 2034. This makes both 5G and PNT major national security and economic vulnerabilities. We are letting this happen as we argue over knowable, scientific facts.
Bottom line: Opposition to the FCC’s L-Band order must finally stop; the order is legal, scientifically valid, and strategically necessary. Attorney General Barr, who leads U.S. “Team Telecom,” has endorsed the FCC’s decision (as has Secretary Pompeo). As far back as February, Barr stated: “Our economic future is at stake. We have to bear in mind in making these spectrum decisions that, given the narrow window we face, the risk of losing the 5G struggle with China should vastly outweigh all other considerations.” If we lose the technological high ground to China in a few years, we will look back on whether we made the strategic or the bureaucratic choice on Ligado. I believe you personally can bring an end to the dispute. Trust the FCC.
I have attached a document that outlines the top claims against the FCC’s L-Band decision, including several made during the 6 May 2020 SASC hearing, followed by detailed information refuting each claim. I believe if you read it once, carefully, you will come away with a starkly different perspective. I understand there has been a great deal of vocal opposition to the Ligado order. However, I submit it is all based on the same faulty premise of GPS interference from essentially one source. Opposition letters from multiple organizations, DoD press briefings, and various op-eds cannot stand against facts forthrightly presented.
Finally, I want to appeal to your unwavering commitment to human rights. If we delay our ability to compete with China in 5G—which opposing Ligado will unequivocally do—we will inadvertently enable China to establish an irreversible 5G ecosystem around the world, giving them very powerful economic and geopolitical leverage. As you know, China surveils its people, harvests organs, and routinely oppresses and imprisons people of faith. The more China influences the world, the more human rights will recede. China simply cannot win in 5G. U.S. 5G and GPS can move ahead in an integrated way that includes L-Band; if unforeseen GPS interference emerges (it won’t), the FCC may revoke the license.
We worked together for a decade in the 1990s to improve the reliability and quality of flight for general aviation, to build the ISS, and to ensure the U.S. leads in space flight. I am certain we—and the FCC, DoD, PNT/GPS, and NTIA—can work together now to rapidly deploy 5G by 2024, while still protecting GPS. Chairman, please bring this “arguing with each other” to a close, and help get U.S. 5G aligned vs. China.
Thank you for your consideration of this letter, and of my request to speak with you as soon as possible.
In Service,
Honorable Daniel S. Goldin NASA Administrator (1992-2001)
21 August 2020 Dear Secretary Esper:
I hope you and your loved ones are safe and well. I thank you for your distinguished service to America.
I am writing about the FCC’s April 2020 decision on Ligado. Please hear me out. I have no affiliation with Ligado nor am I compensated in any way. I have simply committed myself over the past 10 months to helping our nation more rapidly achieve full, stand-alone 5G by 2024 to win the 5G race against China. The U.S. can and must be the world’s hub of 5G technology and related innovation in AI, PNT, robotics, quantum, unmanned systems, and more. These technologies will not only drive the industries of the future, they will generate massive, likely unprecedented economic growth.
I firmly believe Ligado’s L-Band spectrum is indispensable to this national goal. It is the only spectrum that enables the U.S. to achieve 5G by 2024, and the next three years will determine whether the U.S. or China dominates in 5G, with all of the national security, economic, and geopolitical advantages that follow. No other spectrum allocation plan will achieve 5G by 2024, including the important 100MHz recently designated by DoD for mid-band 5G utilization. I can outline all of this in short phone call.
The timing and conditions of your tenure as the Secretary of Defense are among the most consequential in decades given our high stakes competition with China. I have already personally met with the DoD CTO, CIO, J6, two DoD-CIO spectrum leads, and several others. I have communicated my findings to CJCS General Milley, VCJCS General Hyten, former USAF Chief of Staff General Goldfein, and numerous other interagency stakeholders. Again, I would appreciate a chance to forthrightly present both sides of the issue to you to demonstrate why I am certain L-Band is essential to 5G—and that GPS is protected.
Unfortunately, my experience over the past 10 months has shown not everyone is taking a fact-based, “strategic” view of the way ahead. Some are advancing narrow agendas at the expense of U.S. leadership in 5G. Over this period, I have encountered some troubling indictors that may be worthy of consideration: • When I met with the leaders of DoD-CIO/DoD-CTO in February 2020. They could not substantiate DoD’s GPS interference claims; they referred me outside of DoD to the PNT Advisory Board. • Recently released DoD emails show DoD-CIO’s 5G experts know there is no harmful GPS interference. • Two DoD-CIO spectrum experts who supported FCC’s conclusions have been silenced on the matter. • DoD suspended the spectrum expert whose email in April 2020 revealed DoD has no factual basis for opposing Ligado (although the civil servant did not release the email himself). Two key quotations: o “The unanimous, bipartisan vote by the FCC is...proof to any who are truly informed or were honest assessors of the engineering and regulatory soundness of this final determination.” o “DoD and Air Force senior executives and military officers have disparaged or tried to fire or marginalize me”…for “merely insisting upon full and fair due diligence analyses and reporting about all of the pertinent technical and regulatory data.” • The DoD-CIO promptly confiscated this expert’s computer/badge and threatened him with charges. • DoD’s lead spectrum expert (different individual) who was present for the “Gold Medal” NASCTN testing stated in February 2020 to me and multiple colleagues: “This was my test. There is no interference problem [with GPS], only a bureaucracy problem. You’ve got 4-star generals involved.” • Based on recent FOIA-obtained emails, as recently as 2019, the NTIA under Mr. David Redl was preparing to recommend approval of the Ligado proposal to the FCC with DoD-CIO concurrence until a senior member of Dept. of Commerce (a known GPS advocate) intervened, and pushed out Redl. • Since then, the NTIA has claimed “unanimous” Executive Branch opposition to Ligado, ignoring that the same Executive Branch agencies comprising the NTIA (under David Redl) were prepared to support Ligado in 2019. Also, AG Barr and Secretary Pompeo publicly supported the L-Band order. • Perhaps notable (perhaps not): Within a week of the DoD-CIO internal email revelations (confirming no GPS interference from the Ligado proposal), DoD’s CTO and Deputy—the Pentagon leads for 5G and fierce GPS advocates—simultaneously announced their resignations.
In 58 years working on science, technology, and U.S. national security, I have never seen an issue of such importance so beset by misinformation as this Ligado issue. Since November 2019, I have worked intensely with a world-class team of experts in telecommunications, signals processing, and position- navigation-and-timing to carefully study the decade-long Ligado request to modify its mobile satellite service license to create a ground-based 5G network. As you know, Ligado prevailed in a 5-0 vote by FCC Commissioners, a decision that was based on extensive analysis by the FCC’s world-class scientists and engineers over many years. The rigorous NASCTN testing—which received a “Gold Medal” award from the Department of Commerce—was developed and monitored by a U.S. government team, including DoD- CIO spectrum experts. Incidentally, the FCC’s 74-page report (with 444 footnotes) confirmed the research my team and I had completed independently a month earlier.
I know you are firmly on the record as opposing the FCC’s decision—DoD’s and the PNT/GPS community’s opposition have been relentless. But in this case, the PNT/GPS community is incorrect, and the counsel they have provided by your chief advisors on spectrum, 5G and GPS related issues is based on incomplete information. Mr. Secretary, forgive my directness, but I believe you have been ill-served by your advisors on this critical issue. There is too much is at stake for America’s future not to speak frankly.
As the GAO recently confirmed, this FCC process was not done hastily nor did it circumvent the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). It was a thorough analysis and sound conclusion based entirely on facts. Given the FCC process was proper, transparent, and inclusive—not “done in secret” as claimed in SASC testimony on 06 May and repeated often afterward—the unanimous and bipartisan FCC vote is legitimate, even unassailable. Yet, the fierce opposition to it launched by DoD in April persists, manifested in the SASC’s and HASC’s debilitating NDAA amendments which could delay and potentially nullify the powerful benefits of L-Band on U.S. 5G—unless facts rise to the top. Your advocacy for GPS is well intentioned, but it is based off of misinformation provided to you and by extension to the Congress. If these amendments are passed in the NDAA, they will endanger U.S. national and economic security.
Bottom line: We are inflicting risk on ourselves unnecessarily. While there has been a great deal of vocal opposition to the Ligado order, I submit it is all based on the same faulty premise of GPS interference from essentially the same source projecting its views into DoD, the interagency (in part), and Congress. Opposition to the FCC’s L-Band order must finally stop; the FCC order is legal, scientifically valid, and strategically necessary. The Ligado proposal has the ultimate safeguards—a massive 23MHz guard band and “kill switch.” If unforeseen GPS interference emerges (it won’t), the FCC may revoke the license.
I have attached a detailed document (“Claims & Answers”) that outlines the top claims against the FCC’s L- Band decision, including several made during the DoD-only 06 May 2020 SASC hearing, followed by detailed information refuting each claim. Mr. Secretary, I believe if you read it once, carefully, you will come away with a starkly different perspective. If so, you will be able to assure Senators Inhofe, Reed, and others that GPS (which all agree is essential to our security and economy) is protected as we move ahead with L-Band for 5G. The DoD CIO and CTO offices can focus on strengthening and modernizing our GPS system, while finding synergies with 5G-related technologies to ensure U.S. PNT/GPS (recently surpassed by China’s BeiDou) once again leads its competitors. You personally could help bring an end to years and years of debate and delay on 5G at a time when it is most critical for the U.S. to be aligned against China.
As a citizen, I have done nearly everything I can to clarify this issue. This includes more than a hundred meetings and calls with key stakeholders, four published pieces, a primetime TV appearance to highlight the 5G China threat, and ten months of tireless (unpaid) efforts—which, admittedly, feels much longer since I’m not as young as I used to be. Mr. Secretary, I need your help. Thank you for your consideration of this letter, and of my request to speak with you as soon as possible. I am available anytime.
In Service,
Honorable Daniel S. Goldin NASA Administrator (1992-2001) (858)-353-3545 / [email protected] FCC Decision on L-Band (Ligado) Reference Information (Compiled from April to September 2020)
This following material comprehensively demonstrates the FCC Ligado decision is scientifically valid, does not cause harmful GPS interference, adhered to proper policy processes, and boosts U.S. 5G/IoT vs. China.
Approval: After years of analysis and open dialogue, FCC Chairman Pai circulated the L-Band “Ligado” proposal on Thursday 16 April, with a public press release the same day. Commissioners voted 5-0, and the formal order was published Wednesday 22 April (74-page public report, 444 footnotes). The FCC stated Ligado will “make more efficient use of underused spectrum and promote the deployment of 5G” with “stringent conditions to prevent harmful [GPS] interference.”
Opposition: The GPS/PNT community (primarily in DoD) have undertaken a widespread information effort to challenge the FCC through the SASC and HASC, claiming harmful GPS interference. While DoD did not prevail on science and engineering grounds, it is now seeking to severely limit implementation of the FCC decision through NDAA amendments (most egregious is the ‘Turner’ contracting amendment from the HASC).
Validation: The FCC and other stakeholders continue to present factual information validating the FCC decision. This information is readily verifiable. The FCC has also testified in Congress compellingly multiple times in recent weeks, and recently-released emails from DoD experts and leaders in Pentagon spectrum management have confirmed that Ligado does not endanger GPS (see Part III below).
From a DoD-CIO Spectrum Expert’s Email Correspondence, April 2020: “The unanimous, bipartisan vote by the FCC is...proof to any who are truly informed or were honest assessors of the engineering and regulatory soundness of this final determination...DoD [is] increasingly and embarrassingly out of touch with reality and legality if it persists in public protestations against this FCC decision...As I forecast so many times to DoD leaders—the FCC has finally, deservedly, unanimously publicly repudiated them.” This corroborates the [NASCTN] testing that verified no harmful GPS interference.”
From FCC Chairman Pai’s Letter to HASC Chairman Smith (D-WA ), May 2020: “Protecting the national security and safety of the American people is a critical priority for me...That is why the decision adopted by the Commission with respect to the L-Band proceeding included strict conditions to ensure that GPS operations continue to be protected from harmful interference.”
From FCC Chairman Pai’s response to Senator Mike Lee (R-UT), June 2020: “The [FCC] has never before applied this metric [1dBC/N0—the basis for DoD’s GPS interference claims] for determinations of harmful interference to adjacent bands…Adoption of such a standard for adjacent band operations could have a profound, negative impact on wireless communications...[and] would undermine the Commission’s ability to promote efficient use of spectrum, and effectively prohibit wireless communications as they stand today in many bands. It would impede, if not implode, the [FCC’s] ability to reallocate new spectrum to 5G and other next-generation services...[for] millions of American wireless consumers, this metric would be devastating.”
Senator Lee (R-UT), Senate Commerce Committee (June 2020): “When going up against an issue the FCC has addressed over a decade, with great scientific expertise on an issue of great national importance... [DoD] darn well better come to the argument armed with something other than the catch phrase ‘national security,’ or ‘trust us’...’I can't tell you why I think this, because it's classified, but trust us national security dictates that we not do this.’ That's wrong, they know it’s wrong, and we can't let them get away with it.”
Chairman Pai on DoD’s opportunities to weigh in (Pai letter to Chairman Smith, 26 May 2020): “It is indisputable that the Department of Defense was provided with numerous opportunities over nearly a decade to provide the Commission with any relevant evidence it wished to submit.”
Chairman Pai testified to the Senate Commerce Committee (June 2020): “We’ve had a very open door. This process has gone on long enough. We made a decision based solely on the facts and the law. I will defend this decision before any forum in Congress or around the country.”
DoD Spectrum Sharing (August 2020): DoD just announced a plan to share 100MHz of mid-band spectrum (3.45GHz-3.55GHz) for deployment (ambitiously) in the second half of 2022. This 100MHz is a positive step, but it is not unencumbered spectrum, rather it must be shared with various DoD demands. Further, like all non- L-Band options, it requires construction of hundreds of thousands of new cell sites over five years or more for nationwide 5G. This much delayed deployment timeline (if without L-Band) will give China an insurmountable 5G lead and dominance in 5G tech. Only L-Band (+ C-Band) allows U.S. 5G by 2024.
3rd Party Validation: The value of C+ L, and the importance of L-band to US 5G have been confirmed by multiple experts/stakeholders including Nokia, Erickson, Samsung, MITRE, Newstreet, LightShed, Cowen, etc.
This document factually refutes the following claims to assist stakeholders and decisionmakers on the issue:
Claim 1: Ligado will "cripple” and “imperil" DoD GPS capabilities (as SecDef stated) Claim 2: The FCC decision on Ligado circumvented the normal process & was not transparent Claim 3: FCC got this decision wrong, and DoD/SASC/HASC should pursue options to oppose Claim 4: The tests showing no harmful GPS interference were “Ligado-funded” and not trustworthy Claim 5: L-Band proposed by Ligado will “not provide a meaningful benefit to 5G capability in the U.S.” Claim 6: The China threat in 5G is overblown, and the Ligado proposal is just not worth the risk Claim 7: DoD’s widespread lobbying against FCC/Ligado and the 06 May SASC hearing helps clarify this issue Claim 8: DoD now states there is a classified justification for blocking Ligado and/or continued delay Claim 9: Ligado/L-Band is really driven by investors who want to “flip” the spectrum for profit Claim 10: The DOD/NTIA submission of 22 May makes the case for 1dBC/N0, warranting reconsideration1
Important July-August 2020 Update: The “top ten” claims on the succeeding pages with detailed, factual refutations for each, offer clarity to this highly contested issue. However, below are some recent activities worthy of consideration and engagement:
HASC Subcommittee Members’ Letter to Chairman Pai and Response: On 11 June 2020, Representatives Jim Cooper, Michael Turner, and Elise Stefanik wrote a letter to the FCC Chairman Ajit Pai raising potential concerns about the legitimacy of the FCC’s Ligado Order (DA/FCC 20-48, IB Docket No. 11-109 and IB Docket No. 12-340). All concerns were soundly refuted in Chairman Pai’s response dated 24 August 2020. Chairman Pai made the following statements and notable points, among others: • “Thank you for your letter regarding the Commission's unanimous, bipartisan Order and Authorization permitting Ligado Networks LLC to deploy a low-power terrestrial nationwide network in support of 5G and Internet of Things services.” • “Despite the clear and lengthy order the Commission adopted, there appears to be substantial confusion…the Commission's decision was based on its longstanding definition of ‘harmful interference’ codified in the Commission's rules [Section 2.1, 1984] which is the very same definition of "harmful interference" used by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration…and based on the definition adopted by the International Telecommunications Union.” • “In short, your suggestion that the Commission ‘ignored the concerns of GPS and other satellite user communities’ is simply incorrect.” • “The Commission relied…heavily on the National Advanced Spectrum and Communications Test Network [NASCTN] report, which demonstrated that the fears of widespread harmful interference claimed by some were flat-out false. And I would remind you that the [NASCTN] is a multi-agency-chartered partnership that seeks to provide a “neutral forum” for testing, modeling, and analysis necessary to inform spectrum policy and regulations and was created in 2015 through a joint effort involving the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautical and Space Administration, the National Science Foundation, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.” • “According to its charter, the organization’s purpose is to ‘improve opportunities for successful spectrum sharing through accurate, reliable, and unbiased measurements and analyses.’ In other words, that report is about as independent as you get.”
July-August 2020 Update (continued): The following activities paint a concerning picture regarding DoD’s approach to this important policy issue: • Multiple DoD spectrum experts who agree with the FCC (no harmful GPS interference) have been silenced • DoD-CIO (Deasy) and Undersecretary CTO (Griffin) made multiple incorrect statements to the SASC • DoD claims the FCC decision was done “in secret” and without the normal “back-and-forth”—which are easily verified in the record to be completely false. APA was followed. • Internal DoD emails continue to come to light confirming this, and confirming no GPS interference • The DoD-CIO (one of the two main presenters at the SASC hearing) suspended the career civil-servant who authored the April 2020 email (quoted above), confiscated his computer and badge, and threatened
1 See FCC Chairman Pai quotations (from a letter to the Senate) in the bullets of Claim 10 on consequences of applying 1dBC/N0 him with charges (for simply stating facts about Ligado and GPS in a congratulatory internal email he sent after the FCC’s decision). This civil servant is reportedly one year away from his retirement pension • Undersecretary/CTO Griffin, the other lead presenter for the 6 May SASC hearing, announced his departure simultaneously with his Deputy (Lisa Porter), both of whom were leads for 5G for DoD • Based on POLITICO FOIA-obtained emails, as recently as 2019, the NTIA was preparing to recommend approval of the Ligado proposal to the FCC with DoD-CIO concurrence until a more senior member of the Department of Commerce (Earl Comstock, a known GPS advocate) intervened and pushed Redl out • Despite the above revelations, combined with a unanimous 5-0 decision from the FCC—which the FCC Chairman and Commissioners have defended in multiple venues on the Hill (see quotations on page 1 and throughout this document)—the SASC and HASC have attacked the FCC decision via the NDAA: o Senator Inhofe and Rep. Turner have introduced NDAA amendments intended to: 1) Prohibit the use of DoD funds to comply with the FCC’s independent decision; and 2) require a lengthy review of the testing—which was analyzed for years—further delaying use of Ligado’s spectrum for U.S. 5G / IoT o Most egregious is Representative Turner’s amendment which indirectly targets the FCC’s independent decision-making authority, shifting it to DoD. DoD already presented its many claims for full FCC consideration over many years, and then presented widespread misinformation to the SASC in a pressure campaign that has spread to the HASC and led to this very Turner amendment. This circle of undue influence is blatant overreach, now punishing other private companies. It reads: ▪ “The Secretary of Defense may not enter into a contract, or extend or renew a contract, with an entity that engages in commercial terrestrial operations using the 1525–1559 megahertz band or the 1626.5–1660.5 megahertz band unless the Secretary has certified to the congressional defense committees that such operations do not cause harmful interference to a Global Positioning System device of the Department of Defense. • These efforts by the SASC and HASC are well-intentioned but not based on accurate information; they unnecessarily harm the L-Band decision, undermine the FCC’s independent authority on spectrum, and raise concerns over Senate / House Commerce Committees’ jurisdiction over the FCC • Please consider the above in the context of these recent quotations from experts / observers: o “Few, if any [“incumbents” using adjacent spectrum], go as far as the GPS community in arguing that the noise floor outside of their bands should also be within their rights to control—effectively claiming ownership of a much wider band than that which they were allocated, subverting all norms on efficient spectrum management.” GPS Interference Fears Are Today’s Y2K, Says Former UK Spectrum Director by Dr. William Webb (May 8, 2020 on Forbes.com) o “Understand: GPS has its own dedicated bandwidth but previously failed to design its equipment against interference. Over the past decade, Ligado has worked to accommodate its prospective neighbors—by lowering its proposed power level, by setting up guard bands. Under a long review and testing conducted with other federal agencies, the FCC found the concessions sufficient. Judging from an internal email, the Pentagon has long been hearing the same from its own in-house expert.” The Pentagon Is a 900 Pound Crybaby, Columnist Holman Jenkins, Wall Street Journal, May 15, 2020 o “Chairman Pai and the FCC executed their statutory authority, conducted a thorough process that invited all parties to comment, examined all evidence presented, reviewed thousands of hours of testing, and delivered a thoughtful and responsible order that promotes and protects America’s economic and national security as well as GPS.” FCC Unanimously Approved Ligado’s Hard Fought 5G Request by Dr. Roslyn Layton, Forbes Senior Contributor, April 24, 2020 • In short, DoD’s interference claims are based on incomplete information—and could delay U.S. 5G unnecessarily, playing into China’s 5G ambitions and harming U.S. national security and the economy. • As Chairman Pai testified to Senate Commerce Committee (June 2020): “We’ve had a very open door. This process has gone on long enough. We made a decision based solely on the facts and the law. I will defend this decision before any forum in Congress or around the country.”
Claim 1: Ligado will "cripple” and “imperil" DoD GPS capabilities (as SecDef stated) ● The Ligado L-Band proposal will not harm GPS, and the testing record proves this conclusively ● 5000 hours of testing, including 1700 hours at a USG/DoD co-sponsored “NASCTN” facility settles this ● The SASC asked about this 2017 test many times in the hearing since, if true, it would prove no GPS harm ● At the SASC hearing, the DoD CIO Deasy stated inaccurately that because Ligado had changed its business plan back to a mobile satellite plan, the NASCTN test was invalid, and could not be used in this case ● This misstatement is the most consequential of many incorrect statements at the 06 May SASC hearing o Ligado has had a license to operate its satellite network for 3 decades; the CIO and DoD know this o The record shows Ligado has been pursuing a ground-based “terrestrial” service since 2004 o Chairman Pai: “Ligado and its predecessor companies” have been “authorized to deploy terrestrially since 2004” (Letter to HASC Chairman Smith, 26 May 2020) o The 2017 testing was designed specifically for terrestrial service; the title of the test itself reflects that ● NOTE: Senator Lee (R-UT) at Senate Commerce Hearing (June 2020): “Did NASCTN study the impact of LTE [ground] signals in Ligado’s spectrum on GPS devices?” Chairman Pai: “They did, yes.” ● The DoD-CIO misrepresented this most consequential, factual, well-known information to SASC o Had the CIO replied forthrightly “Yes, the DoD’s spectrum expert (sitting behind me) urged Ligado through the CRADA program (see claim 4) to use our facility, and after 1700 hours the results presented by NIST (top U.S. testing agency) compellingly showed no harmful interference to GPS”—DoD’s position opposing Ligado and the FCC would have unraveled completely in the SASC o To avoid this outcome, the DoD CIO misrepresented the well-known facts about the NASCTN testing o Misstating the purpose and conclusions of the test misled the SASC and all observers o CIO/DoD’s spectrum expert repeated the misstatement at a Pentagon press briefing afterward o The spectrum expert later acknowledged DoD CIO’s statements (about NASCTN test) were wrong, they knew it & would correct in the record—there has been no public correction; the SASC remains misled ● From POLITICO (29 June 2020), internal communications show that former NTIA chief David Redl “hashed out with senior aides details of a recommendation letter [for Ligado approval] to the FCC in early 2019…[and] drafted conditions they thought the FCC should impose before signing off on Ligado’s bid.” o Further, POLITICO: “Existence of these alternative draft recommendations could undercut the Executive Branch’s [NTIA’] refrain that there’s unanimous administration opposition to Ligado (a point already transparently untrue given public disagreements among top Cabinet officials).” ● In 2016, Ligado came to “co-existence” agreements with the FAA and with the GPS manufacturers ● They gave up 10MHz of spectrum for an overly-protective 23MHz guard band & reduced power by 99.3% ● The 23 MHz guard band between Ligado terrestrial operations and the GPS band is one of the largest ever created; guard bands are typically 2-5 MHz; 23 MHz is roughly the spectrum needed for 4 TV stations ● As Pai stated (12 June) the guard band “provides significant protection for high-precision receivers using spectrally efficient antennas and enables them to coexist with Ligado’s terrestrial, low power network.” ● If the Ligado signal—equal to a 10W light bulb 23 MHz away—would cripple GPS, the GPS system is not a national security strength; it is a huge vulnerability that requires greater oversight and accountability ● In the SASC hearing, the DoD CTO, Dr. Griffin, insisted the Ligado signal would overwhelm the received GPS signal like “trying to hear rustling leaves through the sound of 100 jets taking off simultaneously” ● Griffin also said the analogous “10W light bulb” would render the Hubble Space telescope inoperable ● These analogies fall apart when one understands the 23MHz guard band: it is more analogous to say rustling leaves can be heard because they are 23 miles from the jets, or the light bulb is 23 miles from the telescope ● NOTE: DoD-CIO Official (April 2020 email): o “DoD GPS by doctrine and design operates majorly on its own military L2 signal far, far away at 1227 MHz, and also but only in minor part with the other civil L1 C/A signal far enough away at 1575 MHz.” o “The DoD and U.S. military have not significantly relied upon the legacy GPS L1 signal at 1559 MHz [which DoD claims will be harmed by Ligado’s signal 23 MHz away] for years; in now starkly obvious retrospect the DoD…probably [should] never have waged any federal regulatory battles over the Ligado matters, certainly not since 2015 or 2016.” ● To be clear: the FCC determined Ligado will not interfere even if the DoD relied on GPS L1 at 1559 MHz ● Chairman Pai, to the Senate Commerce Committee (June 2020) on Ligado’s 23 MHz guard band: “For context, in the 600 MHz incentive auction, we created a 3-MHz wide guard band to protect wireless companies from full power broadcasters. We're talking about a [Ligado] guard band here that is almost eight times as large to protect against the L1 signal, let alone the L2 [which] is actually 300 megahertz away.” ● Senator Lee (R-UT) the Senate Commerce Committee (June 2020): “If the military in fact operates on the L2 signal and not the L1 signal then is interference from the Ligado bands even possible?” Chairman Pai: “We don't believe it is likely, but to be sure, that's why we imposed those very strict conditions…to make sure that we protected high precision receivers and others…and that is why I'm very confident going forward we've made a decision that is based much more on sound engineering as opposed to some of the fear mongering that we've heard.” ● DoD’s misstatements & selective presentation of facts are contrary to the rigor and ethics Congress requires
Claim 2: The FCC decision on Ligado circumvented the normal process & was not transparent ● The FCC conducted a deliberate process inclusive of all agencies ● Commissioner Brendan Carr: “After a thorough and multi-year review, the FCC’s professional staff of engineers and other experts determined that we can advance America’s 5G leadership and protect GPS… It is not a decision that anyone at the FCC took lightly. Indeed, the proceeding had been pending at the FCC for roughly 17 years and benefited from multiple rounds of reviews, tests, and coordination efforts.” ● NOTE: For DoD to claim the FCC decision is wrong despite a vote of 5-0 after years of careful analysis and a detailed 74-page report (444 footnotes), DoD must also call into question the decision making process ● Therefore, DoD claims the FCC decision harms GPS and managed to circumvent normal review/procedure ● DoD witnesses made this claim during the SASC hearing—suggesting a “surprise” decision by the FCC ● The timeline below demonstrates the total inaccuracy of these claims: DoD was engaged at every stage ● In reality, the FCC followed the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) rulemaking process precisely ● This L-Band spectrum is likely the most scrutinized in FCC history by both government agencies and media ● In processing Ligado’s 2015 application (modifying its license with dramatically reduced power levels), the FCC was open and transparent; all documents were on the record and available to any interested party ● Chairman Pai on DoD’s opportunities to weigh in (from Pai letter to Chairman Smith, 26 May 2020): o “It is indisputable that the Department of Defense was provided with numerous opportunities over nearly a decade to provide the Commission with any relevant evidence it wished to submit” o “The Department of Defense had actual possession of the draft that the FCC was poised to adopt—and thus an opportunity to comment on it—for almost half a year before the FCC finally adopted it.” o “Moreover, prior to the Commission’s decision in this matter, I personally spoke with Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering Michael Griffin, and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering Lisa Porter to ensure that the Department had every possible opportunity to make its case to the Commission.” ● Timeline 2011-2019: o 2011: The FCC created a Technical Working Group to address concerns raised by federal agencies, including DoD, about the alleged impacts on GPS of Ligado’s proposed network o Over the next two years, the FCC received comments four separate times related to Ligado’s proposal o DEC 2015: The revised Ligado application was filed at the FCC o APR-JUL 2016: Public comment period; JUN-JUL 2018: Another public comment period ▪ Over these periods, stakeholders/interested parties filed over 100 comments in FCC’s public docket o EARLY 2019: NTIA, under David Redl, prepared a recommendation for the FCC to approve Ligado. At the time, this position was supported by the DoD-CIO Office, NTIA, and FCC (which FCC Commissioner Michael O’Reilly testified 16 June 2020 to the Senate Commerce Committee) ▪ The NTIA’s action was blocked by a more senior GPS advocate in the Department of Commerce o OCT 2019: FCC shares draft order with federal agencies, including DoD, starting the IRAC review o NOV 2019: IRAC process underway; DoD sends an unsubstantiated letter to NTIA/FCC ▪ And released the letter publicly o DEC 2019: Chairman Pai testifies to Congress that his decision is pending following IRAC o DEC 2019: DoD informs the FCC that it has additional information it wants to submit into the public record; the FCC pauses work on the Ligado application until March 2020 accommodating DoD ▪ The DoD submitted another document with concerns that the FCC thoroughly considered ● Timeline 2020 (reflecting DoD’s continual engagement): o JAN 2020: Pai tells Congress he is working diligently to issue a final decision (based “on the science”) o 14 FEB: DoD/Air Force submits a letter on Ligado to the NTIA for the FCC o 12 MAR: DoD CTO (Griffin) and CIO (Deasy) submit a letter on Ligado to NTIA for FCC o 24 MAR: DoD Deputy Secretary (Norquist) submits a letter to NTIA for FCC o 09 APR: DoD provides extensive information to DefenseNews objecting to the pending Ligado decision o 10 APR: C4ISR.net publishes: FCC to Approve Spectrum Plan that Pentagon Claims will Harm GPS o 10 APR: NTIA submits a packet of DoD information to the FCC and informs DoD of this action o 12 APR: Ligado submits a letter to the FCC public docket with concerns about the DoD/NTIA packet o 13 APR: DoD CIO speaks to reporters to state that DoD opposes “the Ligado licensing request” and that “active conversations” are ongoing with Secretary Esper and Vice CJCS General Hyten o 16-22 APR 2020: FCC presents, announces, considers, and unanimously approves the Ligado order ▪ Thursday 16 APR: FCC circulates the Ligado order to Commissioners to vote, with press release ▪ NOTE: As part of its governing process, each Commissioner is allowed to vote at any time after an item is circulated by the FCC Chair—a voting window could last days or weeks ▪ Within 72 hours all 5 Commissioners vote to approve the Ligado order ▪ Monday 20 APR: FCC announces unanimous approval of the order ▪ Wednesday 22 APR: FCC publicly releases the text of the approved Ligado order o 06 MAY: DoD claims at the SASC hearing on Ligado (without FCC or Ligado personnel present to address DoD claims) these entirely inaccurate statements about the collaborative FCC process: ▪ DoD CIO Deasy: “The process is [normally] one of give-and-take. Public and agencies have chance to weigh in. This is all agencies, not just the DoD. That give-and-take period has not taken place” ▪ SEN Inhofe: “[The FCC] waited until the whole world was distracted by COVID…unannounced to the public, in total secrecy on a weekend” to circulate and approve the Ligado order ▪ SEN Reed: “Had the FCC followed what is the norm — to publish a proposed rulemaking under the APA [Administrative Procedure Act]—that would have given every stakeholder the opportunity to comment on the mitigation proposals…” ● Chairman Pai: “The fact that another agency does not like the end result in this proceeding says nothing whatsoever about the process the FCC followed—a process that was both completely consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act and far, far more generous (not to mention far, far more delayed) than any other proceeding of which I am aware. And it certainly does not diminish the soundness of the technical analysis of the Ligado Order, which was the result of years of work by the FCC’s excellent career staff’s evaluating test results, compiling information in the record, and ultimately writing a thorough order for the Commission’s consideration.” (Pai letter to HASC Chairman Smith, 26 May 2020) ● Supporting statements from both Republican and Democratic FCC Commissioners cited the “thorough,” “painstaking,” “multi-year,” “expert technical analysis” by the engineering staff and spectrum experts ● The FCC made the Ligado decision based on science, 5G/IoT, and U.S. economic/national security interests
Claim 3: FCC got this decision wrong, and DoD/SASC/HASC should pursue options to oppose Ligado ● No, doing so would actually be counterproductive to national security and economic growth from 5G ● The FCC had access to all testing over the last decade; their conclusion is sound, based on the record ● The FCC is the independent U.S. agency that determines spectrum policy. After years of analysis by their world-class engineers, the FCC determined L-Band is a safe, important piece of mid-band spectrum for 5G o Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel: “I support the expert technical & legal analysis done by Commission staff…My vote to concur in this proceeding expresses accord with the conclusions of the Order and Authorization…[but] I chose to concur because this proceeding has exposed a fault line in the nation’s spectrum decision-making. On issues of 5G, this Administration has had difficulty achieving a whole-of-government approach on how best to free up critical spectrum or protect sensitive government uses of spectrum. Going forward, our wireless leadership will be best served if federal agencies can work together to extend the reach of advanced telecommunications in this country” o Commissioner Carr: “I stand by the FCC staff’s expert and detailed analysis and our decision” ● DoD has mischaracterized that the FCC decision on Ligado allows the shared use of spectrum between Ligado and GPS; as Chairman Pai clarified: “The Commission’s L-band decision does not authorize any spectrum sharing between Ligado and GPS. In fact, spectrum in this band has been licensed to Ligado and predecessor companies for over 30 years…Any implication that the Commission has authorized Ligado to ‘share’ spectrum that is currently allocated to GPS is incorrect. GPS has no right to operate in the spectrum in question, so there is nothing for Ligado to share.” ● The requirements of Section 1698 of the NDAA for FY 2017, codified at section 343 of the Communications Act, are specifically addressed in the Ligado Order, which fully complies o Paragraphs 129-130 of the Ligado Order explain that concerns regarding widespread harmful interference to GPS devices were “effectively resolved based on the parameters of Ligado’s amended modification applications, the test/data analyses presented in the record, and the conditions imposed in this Order and Authorization, which address any identified potential harmful interference concerns...” ● DoD CTO at SASC hearing incorrectly stated the FCC endorsed 1dB C/N0 as a standard in the early 2000s ● FCC Order: In 2002, the FCC applied 1dBC/N0 inside the GPS band, not outside and also stated that even in-band this application was “extremely conservative…[and] unique to [this] proceeding and will not be considered as a basis for determining standards for other radio frequency devices” (Order paragraph 51) ● FCC Order: “The commission has not applied this metric (1 dB) as the determinant of harmful interference caused by emissions falling within the GPS band nor has the [FCC] used this…for GPS receivers that are particularly susceptible to interference substantially outside the GPS band” (50) ● FCC Order: “After examining the record on testing, including the methodologies used for purposes of protecting GPS devices from potential harmful interference, we conclude that our evaluation of the receiver test data presented in the record will rely on performance-based metrics, and not on testing based on application of a 1dB C/N0 degradation as a measure employed by [the DoT ABC Test], as this does not assess and is not directly correlated with harmful interference.” (47) ● Chairman Pai at the Senate Commerce hearing (June 2020): “The Department of Defense and others are advancing a certain standard that is called the ‘1 dB’ standard. The metric is not even adjusted for measuring harmful interference, and to take [1 dB] seriously would wipe out wireless communications as we know them. [J]ust through natural occurrences you can see a 1 dB change in any type of device’s operation. So, put aside the 1 dB ‘standard’ which the FCC has never embraced [and] NTIA itself has rejected.” ● Notably, DoD CTO Griffin acknowledged that the DoT ABC test he and DoD rely upon to claim GPS interference “did not assess [GPS] receiver performance”—the FCC strongly agrees, stating in its order the “DoT test did not examine whether actual performance of the receiver was affected” (39) ● Further, the FCC found “that there are important deficiencies in the DoT report” (54) and describes how testing 80 receivers simultaneously as a batch in a “semi-anechoic chamber” is problematic (See Figure 1) o FCC “strongly disagrees” that using “the worst performing receivers” to test for interference is appropriate or scientifically valid (57) o Further, the DoT report relies on the GPS receivers “not capable of accurately and reliably discerning a 1dB” change in background noise (59) makes this test “not appropriate” (58) o The FCC states “the application of 1dB would conflict with our precedent and assume harmful interference even when harmful interference has been disproven” (58) ● The Ligado decision aligns with scientific information which was fully considered and approved by the FCC
Claim 4: The tests showing no harmful GPS interference were “Ligado-funded” and not trustworthy ● False—and a serious mischaracterization of the careful execution and reliability of this testing ● The 1700 hours (NASCTN test noted above) were performed at the request and direction of senior DoD personnel in Chief information Officer (CIO) Office and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA— the Information Technology organization of the DOD)—with DoD personnel involvement in all aspects of the test from beginning to end ● As FCC Chairman Pai explained in his 12 June 2020 letter to Senator Mike Lee (R-UT): “NASCTN is a multi-agency-chartered partnership that seeks to provide a ‘neutral forum’ for testing modeling and analysis necessary to inform spectrum policy and regulations” ● Chairman Pai continued: “NASCTN was created in 2015 as a joint effort involving the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), NTIA, DOD, NASA, the National Science Foundation, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)…to improve opportunities for successful spectrum sharing through accurate, reliable, and unbiased measurements and analyses.” ● NASCTN was administered by DoD (and Department of Commerce/DoC) to provide “rigorously scientific and unbiased measurements and analyses” in technical spectrum matters. DoD maintained awareness and oversight of the test of Ligado’s proposal; DoD even provided comments during the process; See Figure 1 o A DoD-CIO spectrum expert described NASCTN as “his test” and that it showed no interference o NASCTN won a Department of Commerce “Gold Medal” Award in 2017 for this breakthrough testing ● The test was conducted under a U.S. Government Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) defined as a “formal written agreement between one or more Federal laboratories and one or more non-Federal parties…toward the conduct of specified research or development efforts that are consistent with the missions of the bureau” ● Under this very normal mechanism, Ligado helped to sponsor the test which it did not control or administer ● The test plan was created independently by NIST, published, widely reviewed by industry, government and associated organizations (like the National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Advisory Board/PNT AB)—and recommendations were received and appropriately incorporated into the test plan o NASCTN test “metrology” was set by NIST with review & input from over 100 other stakeholders including PNT AB, GPS manufacturers, and the 13 Executive Branch agencies that support NTIA ● The test was conducted independent of Ligado, and it integrated the inputs of the GPS community ● Ligado was not allowed to submit any metrology suggestions ● Yet, a letter from the Secretary of Defense (prepared by DoD CIO office) was submitted to SASC (06 May) stating this nationally-recognized U.S. government test was a “Ligado” test and not reliable ● Expert assistance was provided by Fort Huachuca (DOD Electronic Proving Grounds) on plans/execution ● DoD’s lead spectrum expert present for the testing stated afterward: “There is no [Ligado] interference problem [with GPS], only a bureaucracy problem. You’ve got 4-star generals involved” ● This NASCTN testing is reliable and conclusive, but the DoD spectrum expert was told to ignore the test o This is the same test referenced in Claim 1 above that was misrepresented by DoD to the SASC ● In the press conference after the 06 May SASC hearing, DoD spectrum expert Fred Moorfield, stated “I don’t believe additional testing or analysis is required; this has been studied over a 10-year period” ● NOTE: Another DoD-CIO Official wrote in April 2020 that “DoD and Air Force senior executives and military officers have disparaged or tried to fire or marginalize” him…for “merely insisting upon full and fair due diligence analyses and reporting about all of the pertinent technical and regulatory data.” ● See Figure 1 (last page) for comparison of NASCTN and the DoT ABC test in question
Claim 5: L-Band proposed by Ligado will “not provide a meaningful benefit to 5G capability in the U.S.” ● L-Band is the lynch pin to full U.S. 5G within 2-3 years, unlocking economic growth and countering China ● There is no faster path to U.S. 5G than L-Band, and DoD spectrum sharing in the 3GHz does not affect this ● L-Band (combined with C-Band) increases cell site coverage 5x, reduces build-out & 5G timeline by 6 years ● Ligado‘s L-Band makes stand-alone U.S. 5G possible by 2024, meeting U.S. policy objectives ● Without L-Band, C-Band alone takes 7-10 years to build nationwide, stand-alone 5G (urban & rural) o C-Band alone requires auctioning & clearing, constructing ~320K new cell sites, obtaining permits, and constructing the base stations—expected to take a decade to complete o Rather than needing ~320K new cell sites, U.S. can utilize 80K existing cell sites for 5G with L-Band ● Waiting 7-10 years (without L-Band) gives China an insurmountable lead in 5G and global leverage ● Secretary Pompeo & AG Barr understand the China threat, 5G & spectrum—and support the FCC ● NOTE: FCC asked DoD to share spectrum in the 3GHz range; this initiative is unrelated to the Ligado issue o This cannot be framed as a “tradeoff” between Ligado & 3GHz spectrum (i.e., 01 May Secretary Esper letter to SASC suggests Ligado should be stopped, and sharing 3GHz spectrum is a solution to U.S. 5G) o The 3GHz range spectrum must still be paired with L-Band for it to be useful for 5G by 2024 o DoD’s 3GHz spectrum has the same deployment challenges as a “C-Band alone” option, and “sharing” means it will not be the free and clear “greenfield” spectrum—which is needed for rapid U.S. 5G ● DoD CTO at the SASC hearing incorrectly said that Ligado is not critical for 5G, and misstated that Ligado represents only 3.5% of the sub 6GHz spectrum “in use today” o Ratio used by opponents of the FCC is 10MHz / 350MHz (Ligado’s lower downlink / C-Band + CBRS) o Ligado has 35MHz (with path to 40MHz) so it’s 40MHz / 350MHz = 11%, but % is not the point o L-band at 1.6GHz vs C-Band/CBRS at 3.5-3.9GHz is not apples to apples comparison; L-Band in a supplemental uplink (SUL) use-case gives a 5G coverage multiplier of 4-6x (per above) o In reality, the U.S. does not have any full 5G today, which is why deploying L-Band is so critical o The best solution is “C+L” and if L-Band is not deployed now, we will lose the 5G race to China o China has its three national carriers rapidly rolling out nationwide 5G, with 150-200Mil users by year end; the U.S. will likely have no nationwide full 5G users by the end of this year ● At a recent State Department led 5G Roundtable with industry (21 May 2020), Attorney General Barr stated: “In order to jumpstart U.S. 5G, the FCC recently approved Ligado’s network in the L-Band that will support 5G and IoT services. This action was necessary and should greatly reduce the cost and time it will take to deploy 5G throughout the country” ● Chairman Pai in his 26 May 2020 letter to HASC Chairman Smith: “Our 5G FAST [Facilitate America's Superiority in 5G Technology] Plan emphasizes the importance of making more spectrum available for commercial use-it is a blueprint for the future-and our staff is constantly working to find more ways to maximize efficient use of spectrum for commercial use. Our work on the L-Band is part of this effort” ● Chairman Pai at the Senate Commerce hearing (June 2020) when asked if U.S. 5G will succeed without Ligado’s spectrum: “This is the argument…in every single [spectrum] band you'll find some federal agency or stakeholder saying ‘I'm completely in favor of American leadership in 5G just not in this band.’ If we were to take this objection seriously this country would never go anywhere, and that's part of the reason why we've done the hard work based on engineering, focusing on the facts, to promote American leadership and protect those incumbent interests. Otherwise we'd still be stuck in the starting blocks while China and South Korea and Europe and other countries, other regions, just race ahead of us.” ● And as the former CTO of Nokia recently stated (Hossein Moiin Op-Ed, 4G Changed the World and Speaks to Huge Opportunities in 5G, 09 June 2020): o “Amazingly, due to the propagation characteristics…the coupling of C+L Bands yields a network grid” for nationwide 5G comparable to China, which will be as impactful to 5G as AWS-3 was to 4G o “The innovative use of L-Band spectrum…[will] ensure America’s 5G superiority, reduce the serious consequences of Chinese 5G dominance and, over time, provide an alternative to Huawei globally.” o And C+L will “accelerate the deployment of 5G by many years” and will also “help diminish the digital divide by allowing for faster time to deployment in rural areas”
Claim 6: The China threat in 5G is overblown, and the Ligado proposal is just not worth the risk ● China is far ahead in 5G—the U.S. allocating and deploying spectrum is key to catching up and winning o American success in 4G is an example of the even greater 5G potential for trillions of dollars in business opportunities and millions of high paying U.S. jobs it will generate ● We must rapidly identify and deploy L-Band and all available spectrum to advance 5G, not “horsetrade” ● Huawei and ZTE o In less than a decade, Huawei and ZTE have increased their global market share from negligible to a leading 40% through support from the Chinese government, IP theft, coercion & innovation o In less than a decade, Huawei and ZTE have increased their global market share from negligible to a leading 40% through support from the Chinese government, IP theft, coercion & innovation o Huawei has grown global revenue from $28B in 2009 to 122B in 2019 o Today Huawei and ZTE provide 42% of the world's global telecommunications equipment o By mid-decade they are projected to provide 70% or even more of all such equipment globally o With market dominance, China could conceivably have global access to all voice, digital, IoT traffic ● China is rapidly deploying mid-band spectrum and racing to embed their 5G infrastructure globally—even using the COVID-19 crisis to gain leverage and coerce nations to accept Huawei ● China has already deployed ~600MHz of mid-band spectrum with 150-200 Mil “real 5G” users expected at end of 2020 (600 Mil by end of 2021) vs. sparse U.S. mmWave “hotspots” and low-band 4G LTE look- alikes (lacking full characteristics of real standalone 5G) ● China will have 600K 5G cell sites by year’s end and 1.2Mil by end of 2021 (10-20x more than the U.S.) ● China has committed to spending $400B over the next 5 years on 5G ● Since 2015, China has outspent the US by over $10B per year in 5G infrastructure spending ● 5G development is a crucial part of Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” and “Made in China 2025” ● China's Beidou equivalent of GPS has 43 satellites in orbit with many having superior jamming resistance ● A 5G ecosystem embedded with Chinese components will place command & control of US (and global) telecommunications, innovation in AI, IoT & semiconductor supply chain security at grave risk ● If China maintains its lead, it will likely gain insurmountable economic, political, military advantages ● As AG Barr said: “In making these spectrum decisions…given the narrow window we face, the risk of losing the 5G struggle with China should vastly outweigh all other considerations” ● NOTE: DoD-CIO Official (April 2020, supporting the FCC/Ligado): o “Ready to deploy, innovative 5G IoT and PS [Public Safety] infrastructure and services are simply too important to the U.S. economy, our citizens, and businesses and civil agencies [to] be obstructed by closed-minded bureaucrat[s]…So many U.S. businesses and tens of millions of our fellow citizens are unemployed and vitally need to climb back from the COVID shutdown.” o The Ligado revised lower power levels for narrowband 5G IoT and Public Safety applications proposed a very feasible, timely and astute industry market shift: particularly advantageous [when] combined with Ligado’s existing satellite assets and operating experience.” ● Chinese dominance in 5G means more leverage to influence the world, surveil, steal IP & coerce nations dependent on China’s technology—and leading to further erosion of basic human rights, religious freedom ● Incorrect claims that L-Band harms GPS/national security endangers national security by enabling China
Claim 7: DoD’s widespread lobbying against FCC/Ligado & 06 May SASC hearing clarifies this issue ● No—there was no representation from the FCC, independent experts, supporters, or the company itself o Several questions asked by SASC Members about the merits of the FCC decision went unanswered ● Much information presented at the hearing was highly inaccurate and, in several instances, outright false ● The SASC assembled a hearing with participants from one viewpoint – DoD and GPS/PNT advocates ● Yet the FCC process was scientific & inclusive, accepting inputs and analysis from all stakeholders ● The U.S. has a deliberate spectrum policy process to avoid the exact situation in which the FCC’s independent, final decisions would come under attack by other federal agencies ● Under Chairman Pai, the FCC has reinvigorated its role as an independent agency o We now have approximately one-fifth of the most valuable spectrum delegated to private competitors o We can only benefit from the opening up of a greater portion of our spectrum to proven innovators ● As AG Barr stated at a recent meeting with U.S. CTOs: “Treating 5G as a national security issue means using stringent conditions to mitigate concerns like those raised by DoD in this instance, rather than allowing such concerns to operate as a veto on deploying critical 5G resources.” ● Criticism that Ligado used lobbyists to advance its interests is misplaced; overcoming DoD’s inaccurate claims, lobbying, and vast public pressure—even with fact-based information—is extremely hard ● Facts, science, and national interests all align to support the FCC decision ● With the FCC Commissioners’ 5-0 vote, we should not doubt this Ligado decision at DoD’s pressuring ● Chairman Pai & FCC should be lauded for their leadership and focus on facts and science—enabling public- private collaboration to unleash U.S. innovation, and by extension protecting U.S. national interests
Claim 8: DoD now states there is a classified justification for blocking Ligado and/or continued delay ● FCC Chairman Pai has stated publicly that at no time did DoD attempt to discuss with him the existence of classified 2018 testing data, nor suggest “that such a briefing was necessary” o DoD had continual opportunity to do so, having regular communications directly with Chairman Pai ● DoD also never entered results from such testing into the record, despite the existence of procedures in place for filing classified materials with the FCC—procedures other agencies have routinely followed ● DoD had multiple opportunities to submit such classified testing data, for example: o In 2018 alongside the submission of the DOT adjacent band compatibility test o In 2019 in response to the FCC’s draft decision granting Ligado’s application o In March 2020, when the Commerce Department’s NTIA filed another DoD memorandum ● Most important: If there was DoD classified information that would have been pertinent to the scientific and engineering analysis prior to the Ligado decision, DoD would have certainly introduced it in that phase ● Raising issues of a classified nature now seems intended to delay and discredit the FCC Ligado decision ● Chairman Pai: “[P]rior to the Commission’s decision in this matter, I personally spoke with Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering Michael Griffin, and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering Lisa Porter to ensure that the Department had every possible opportunity to make its case to the Commission.” (to HASC Chairman Smith, 26 May 2020)
Claim 9: Ligado/L-Band is really driven by investors who want to “flip” the spectrum for profit ● No—there is a clear and urgent national security and economic motivation for FCC support of Ligado ● Ligado’s ability to simply “flip” the spectrum given the embedded “kill switch” provision built into the order is highly unlikely o FCC’s stringent conditions require that Ligado must maintain continuity for compliance ● Ligado has raised 100Mil in new investments “to build mission critical 5G and IoT networks” since the FCC’s unanimous approval, further guarding against any “flip” scenario: this is money coming in vs. out o This funding demonstrates significant commitment from investors to help Ligado advance American competitiveness in the race to 5G, spur economic recovery, and protect and secure American lives ● Board Members backgrounds indicate “builders” in telecommunications who are in it for the long game o Ivan Seidenberg – Ran Verizon (CEO 2000-2011, and spent over four decades in telecommunications) o Tim Donahue – Ran Nextel and later Sprint (CEO) o Doug Smith CEO – 25 years at Sprint/Nextel; as CTO he built the wireless network ● Chairman Pai in his letter to HASC Chairman Smith (26 May): “The FCC has an important job to do with regard to connectivity generally and 5G specifically—we must position ourselves as a global leader in innovation, technology, and the spectrum resources to support these efforts”
Claim 10: The DOD/NTIA submission 22 May makes the case for 1dBC/N0, warranting reconsideration ● The FCC states repeatedly and unequivocally that applying “1 dB” out-of-band would be “devastating” to U.S. spectrum management and the wireless industry; the Commission has never and will never do so ● NOTE: Chairman Pai’s recent letter to Senator Mike Lee (R-UT) who asked: “Is 1 dB a standard metric that the [FCC] has used previously for determinations of harmful interference to adjacent bands?”: o Chairman Pai: “No. The Commission has never before applied this metric for determinations of harmful interference to adjacent bands. Similarly, the International Telecommunications Union has not recommended that a 1 dB interference protection criteria be used to set emissions levels to protect against harmful interference in adjacent bands.” o “Adoption of such a standard [1dbC/N0] for adjacent band operations could have a profound, negative impact on wireless communications…use of this metric would undermine the Commission’s ability to promote efficient use of spectrum and effectively prohibit wireless communications as they stand today in many bands. It would impede, if not implode, the Commission’s ability to reallocate new spectrum to 5G and other next-generation services.” o “It would reduce incentives for incumbents to design spectrally efficient receivers. And [for] millions of American wireless consumers, this metric would be devastating, forestalling the introduction of advanced wireless services and disincentivizing development of the new wireless devices.” ● 1dB has never been used out-of-band, and had the FCC chosen to set a 1dB standard, that would have been the first time the world has ever seen such an overly conservative standard our-of-band o Setting this unprecedented standard out-of-band would also cause the FCC to revoke the licenses of all the major carriers as their 4G service is all based on spectrum (AWS) that would not adhere ● The claim that the Ligado Order relies on a “new and unproven harmful interference metric” is totally false ● FCC’s long-standing definition: Harmful interference is “endangers the functioning of a radio navigation service or seriously degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a radio communication service” ● The Ligado/L-Band proposal approved unanimously by the FCC does not interfere with GPS—as the testing record clearly shows—and will boost U.S. 5G/IoT while also meeting the GPS in-band 1 dB metric ● Opposing FCC on the grounds of GPS interference and other claims above is unsupportable by facts, as Chairman Pai testified to Senate Commerce Committee (June 2020): o “This issue has been pending for over a decade. In 2003 the FCC granted terrestrial authority to companies like Ligado to use Spectrum on the ground. In 2010 this [Ligado] issue was first brought up. For the last 10 years, the agency been trying to figure out what the technical rules should be.” o “Based on the engineering and the facts in the record, the FCC decided to approve with stringent conditions. A 99.3% reduction in power levels to 9.8 watts. A 23 MHz guard band carved out of Ligado’s own spectrum, even though it is GPS bleeding over into Ligado’s spectrum. A stop buzzer to ensure that any deployments that are occurring or have occurred will not interference to GPS. All of these conditions were imposed because we wanted to balance the necessary interest and allow the company to move forward as the FCC had granted authority to do 17 years ago, [while] preserving GPS from harmful interference.” o “Based on the facts in the record, we made a decision that was shared with federal agencies well over a half a year ago to enable them to give feedback to us based on the facts they saw in the record. We’ve had a very open door. This process has gone on long enough. We made a decision based solely on the facts and the law. I will defend this decision before any forum in Congress or around the country.”
Overall: Ligado’s proposal, approved by the FCC 5-0, does not cause harmful GPS interference, and the FCC decision carefully followed the appropriate administrative processes over many years. The FCC made a sound scientific decision that will significantly benefit U.S. 5G, IoT, and help us counter China’s aggressive global 5G ambitions. This L-Band achieves full 5G by 2024. The 100MHz of spectrum recently shared by DoD will not allow for U.S. 5G by 2024. This 100MHz is a positive step, but it is not unencumbered spectrum, rather it must be shared with various DoD demands. Again, like all non-L-Band options, it requires construction of hundreds of thousands of new cell sites over five years or more for nationwide 5G. This much delayed deployment timeline (if without L-Band) will give China an insurmountable 5G lead and dominance in 5G tech. Only L- Band (+ C-Band) allows U.S. 5G by 2024. DoD lobbying on the Hill, throughout the Executive Branch, and in the media is inappropriate and obscuring the facts. Those who take DoD’s claims at face value, causing opposition to the FCC decision have received incomplete information—and delay U.S. 5G unnecessarily. This plays into China’s hands and harms U.S. national security and the economy. The FCC is a credible, independent agency whose decision must stand. I can discuss this issue in depth at any time.
In Service,
Honorable Daniel S. Goldin NASA Administrator (1992-2001)
Figure 1 (See Claims 1 & 4 Above)
18 May (Updated August) 2020 “When it comes to 5G and America’s security, we can’t afford to take a risk and hope for the best.” –FCC Chairman Pai US Spectrum Allocation: “C+L” Rapid 5G Deployment Solution Reference
Introduction: China is rapidly deploying mid-band spectrum, racing to embed their 5G infrastructure everywhere. The US must accelerate 5G spectrum allocation to close this deployment gap not just for national security, but also for the massive US economic growth potential. The solution includes accelerating the C-Band public auction coupled with L-Band (Ligado) for terrestrial use (C+L). This will unlock the other key elements of a comprehensive US 5G strategy and enable full US 5G by 2024.
Problem: The US is losing the 5G race to China, which will cause dire national security & economic consequences. • Spectrum Deployment: China is rapidly deploying greenfield mid-band spectrum o China has deployed 600MHz of 5G mid-band (U.S. has deployed ZERO mid-band spectrum for 5G) o China will have 600K 5G cell sites by year’s end and 1.2Mil by end of 2021 (10-20x more than the U.S.) o China will have 150-200Mil “real 5G” users in 2020 (600Mil by end of 2021) vs. sparse U.S. mmWave “hotspots” and low-band 4G LTE look-alikes (lacking full characteristics of real standalone 5G) o First mover advantage is huge as China will set the standards and embed their 5G ecosystem globally (massive security threat) • R&D: China has committed to spending $400B over the next 5 years on 5G o Since 2015, China has outspent the US by over $10B per year in 5G infrastructure spending o 5G development is a crucial part of Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” and “Made in China 2025” Industrial Internet implementations with its “real 5G” infrastructure o With R&D and aggressive deployment, China’s domestic equipment manufacturers can flourish, establishing global dominance in 5G “placement and access” through first-mover advantage • Domestic Equipment Manufacturers: Huawei and ZTE o In less than a decade, Huawei and ZTE have increased their global market share from negligible to a leading 40% through support from the Chinese government, IP theft, coercion & innovation o Huawei has grown global revenue from $28B in 2009 to 122B in 2019 o China secures networks, critical industries, communications via domestic ownership of 5G equipment • The Result: Chinese chips and products are embedded everywhere with tangible consequences: o With their base of customers and 5G leadership, Chinese network equipment and device suppliers are in position to increase their 5G share to well over 50% across the world, dominating the end-markets o A 5G ecosystem embedded with Chinese components will place command & control of US (and global) telecommunications, innovation in AI, IoT & semiconductor supply chain security at grave risk
Spectrum Solution: Allocation is the decisive first step comprised of two parts: 1) Deployment and 2) Innovation. 1. 5G Spectrum Deployment: Where Does the US Stand Today? • mmWave: So far, the US has focused almost solely on high frequency mmWave (above 24GHz). o mmWave is high capacity but very limited in coverage (mobility) given severe propagation challenges o mmWave will require the deployment of millions of small cell sites at $25,000-$75,000 per site o Given propagation limits, mmWave only supplements real 5G networks in dense urban environments o mmWave is great for capacity if the device can access a small cell without any obstacles (buildings, trees, cars, light posts, people, rain, etc.) • China is deploying real standalone 5G using mid-band greenfield spectrum (sweet spot for coverage + capacity), and will use mmWave sporadically for dense urban cities • Dynamic Spectrum Sharing (DSS): Can’t Carriers Use 4G Spectrum for 5G? o Fresh “greenfield” spectrum is needed for “real standalone” 5G networks o Pulling 4G spectrum off existing carrier networks will have a 20%-30% 4G capacity drop (infeasible) o Sharing 4G spectrum with 5G will look like 4G LTE; i.e., given the 4G back-end, it will lack critical 5G characteristics such as 100x faster speeds and ultra-low-latency (not real, full 5G) o The 4G to 5G transition will have a decade long transition; carriers don’t accept the 4G customer experience degradation, and therefore have a desperate need for fresh “greenfield” 5G spectrum o Ligado is important greenfield spectrum in the mid-band (lower mid-band) to be used with C-band • DoD Spectrum Sharing (update August 2020): Although DoD’s recent announcement to share 100MHz of mid-band spectrum (3.45GHz-3.55GHz) for deployment in the second half of 2022 is a step in the right direction, it requires construction of hundreds of thousands of new cell sites over five years or more for nationwide 5G. This deployment timeline (if without L-Band) will give China an insurmountable 5G lead. 18 May (Updated August) 2020 • C-Band Auction: Isn’t C-band Alone the Answer for a “Real 5G” Mid-Band Network? o Given China’s lead in 5G, the C-Band auction must be accelerated – but that’s not even enough o At 3.7-4.0GHz, C-Band’s greenfield upper mid-band spectrum would ultimately work for 5G over time o However, C-Band (3.0-4.0GHz) propagation (wave signal) is shorter than L-Band and does not travel far ▪ Many hundreds of thousands of new macro towers would need to be constructed (~300-400K) ▪ This would most likely take over a decade to deploy and be extremely expensive ▪ ~300-400K new towers would cost around $40B in capital expenditures ▪ Annual operating expenses of ~300-400K new towers is approximately $5B per year ▪ L-Band (+ C-Band) is the only way to avoid the need for many hundreds of thousands of new cell sites o There are 3 slices of “C-Band” between 3.0-4.0GHz that will be used for 5G: ▪ Upper C-Band (3.7-4.0)- that the US fought over for many months about proceeds to the Treasury ▪ Middle C-Band called CBRS (3.55-3.7GHz) that has power restrictions, usage “sharing” restrictions and zoning restrictions that make it NOT nationwide as the DoD will get its priority access ▪ That leaves the 3.0-3.55 lower C-Band that the DoD has been claiming they will share but realistically is years away and the restrictions will be the same as CBRS which prevents it from being a true 5G solution (DoD sharing this spectrum will not eliminate the need for L-Band) o A “C-Band alone” deployment cannot satisfy the US policy mandate of being 5G ready by 2024, and most likely puts the US close to 2030 before a real 5G network is in operation nationally ▪ We simply do not have this much time to deploy US 5G in a viable, competitive way o This is why L-Band is so important and in fact the lynchpin to rapid US 5G
2. 5G Spectrum Innovation: C+L is critical to Close the Gap vs. China and Be 5G Ready by 2024 • Supplemental Uplink (SUL) for 5G: What are the advantages of C + L? o L-Band’s superior propagation allows for a much greater cell radius when paired with C-Band in a key technology innovation developed for 5G called supplemental uplink (SUL) o There is a dramatic reduction in required cell sites using L-Band lower mid-band spectrum (1.6GHz) for uplink and C-Band upper mid-band spectrum (3.7-4.0GHz) for downlink o C-Band’s higher frequency only takes the signal so far from the cell tower; what actually determines the radius is the uplink (i.e. return link, the ability for the handset to talk back to the tower) o Because coverage radius is limited to the power of the device, the uplink drives coverage radius, and with L-Band’s better propagation, 4-6x the coverage radius can be achieved per cell site o Therefore, C+L will reduce the number of required cell towers from ~300-400K to 80K, most of which already exist (existing infrastructure in place today for 4G) taking years off of the US 5G timeline o Also, due to the deployment savings of C+L, the auction price of C-Band is likely to reap far greater proceeds to the US Treasury (much higher final auction price) • L-Band opponents say that Ligado’s L-Band is not critical for 5G, and that Ligado represents only 3.5% of the FCC-identified spectrum for 5G; this is false (see above the impact on 5G). Further: o Opponents are incorrect, their ratio is 10MHz / 350MHz (Ligado’s lower downlink / C-Band + CBRS) ▪ Ligado has 35MHz (with path to 40MHz) so it’s 40MHz / 350MHz = 11%, but % is not the point ▪ L-band at 1.6GHz vs C-Band/CBRS at 3.5-3.9GHz is not apples to apples comparison; L-Band in a supplemental uplink (SUL) use-case gives a 5G coverage multiplier of 4-6x (per above) • A C+L deployment only uses Ligado’s 25-30MHz of Uplink, which operates at 2/10ths of a watt and is 41MHz/60MHz away from the GPS band which is uncontested by the DoD and the GPS community o Ligado’s downlink at 9.8watts, 27MHz away from GPS (a massive 23MHz guard band from GNSS) is the DoD concern; this will be used for very different 4G & 5G targeted use cases & won’t harm GPS Overall: Combining mid-band spectrum in the 1-2 GHz (Ligado) and C-Band (3.7-4.0GHz) will provide a much- accelerated and cost-efficient full, standalone 5G solution by 2024 consistent with US policy guidance. • Ericsson, Nokia, Samsung, MITRE, Newstreet, LightShed, Cowen and others (updated August 2020) have conducted technical studies which confirm the important impact of C+L on 5G. • C-Band provides large swaths of spectrum for incredibly fast 5G speeds while Ligado’s L-Band spectrum provides signal coverage extension 4-6x beyond C-Band alone, with 50x better inside-building penetration • Rapid deployment onto ~80K existing cell sites (vs. building, permitting 300-400K new sites) saves years • An L-Band driven solution (with C-Band) enables US 5G by 2024; delaying L-Band enables China 5G
There is no substitute for L-Band; it is the only unique greenfield, unencumbered spectrum that can “turbo charge” upper C-Band and jump-start full 5G in America by 2024 C + L Spectrum Band Innovation: Accelerate US 5G Deployment (by 3-5 years)
C-Band Coverage – Only C + L-Band Coverage (4.25 to 5.7 times area covered)
C-Band Only Radius C-Band + L-Band Radius
Source: C+L Study by TeleWorld Solutions (owned by Samsung) 4 September 2020 2020 FOIA Request Summary – Call for Accountability Honorable Daniel S. Goldin Introduction:
America is at a critical crossroads for development and deployment of 5G. This FOIA requested information is critical to the U.S. achieving stand-alone 5G by 2024 (through the deployment of L-Band spectrum)— consistent with the FCC’s recent April 2020 unanimous ruling—to compete and win against China. Unfortunately, at every turn DoD and NTIA have delayed my requests for FOIA information with regards to internal deliberations and testing. There has seldom been an issue of more importance on which transparency of the facts and science must play a key role. My goal is to bring those facts out into the open so decision makers in Congress and the Executive Branch agencies can chart the best course for the U.S.
The below requested information is intended to assess whether the PNT/GPS community (including the Department of Defense (DoD)) has been not been compliant in operating the GPS system consistent with its legal authorization. My attempts to bring this information to light are intended to enable fact-based policy decisions going forward regarding America’s economic and national security interests, particularly related to spectrum, 5G and GPS.
I have received no information that I have requested from the moment I started submitting these FOIAs on 6 June 2020. Multiple FOIA clerks have indicated they are prepared to provide me with information but have not received authorization from their leadership. Moreover, internal communications from DoD have recently come out showing that experts do not believe L-Band spectrum causes harmful GPS interference, but also that leaders within the Department have silenced dissent. Similarly, DoD and NTIA have delayed my requests (submitted as a private citizen), and I have been charged exorbitant commercial rates as high as $17,000 per request. I raise this issue so that there will be proper oversight from Congress consistent with the spirit of FOIA, and resolution of these requests immediately.1 Summary
Between June 6, 2020 and June 8, 2020 Daniel S. Goldin submitted 16 FOIA requests to the following five (5) agencies: NTIA, Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff, Army, Navy and Air Force. As of August 26, 2020, fee letters have been received for only 4 of the 16 requests, of which 3 are being processed (DOC- NTIA-2020-001387, DOC-NTIA-2020-001386, DOC-NTIA-2020-001385) at a total cost of $6,702. The fee letter for the 4th FOIA request (DOC-NTIA-2020-001384) requires a $17,704 payment, even after appealing as a non-commercial requestor, which for an average American citizen is unaffordable. All other requests have not returned any progress on information. Detail Category 1
What was requested: Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver and Satellite Spectrum Certifications— particularly the bandwidths and interference rejection-related technical parameters.
To whom the request was made: NTIA, Joint Staff, Army, Navy and Air Force. This request was made to multiple organizations since it is not clear who is authorized to release this information, Each Military Department processes its spectrum certification requests through the Joint Staff to NTIA approval.
1 Additional detailed information about the timing, communication, status, and personnel involved for each FOIA request is readily available. I seek resolution immediately because the information will impact near-term decisions. 1
Why this information was requested: Verify what bandwidth GPS receivers are certified to operate across and assess their certified interference rejection levels. Verify the bandwidth GPS satellites are certified to transmit.
Expected outcome once the information is received: The hypothesis is that 1) GPS receivers are not certified to receive signals below 1559 MHz. 2) GPS satellites are not certified to transmit signals below 1559 MHz. Therefore, GPS receivers that experience interference from signals below 1559 MHz are not operating in accordance with the spectrum certification, especially when GPS satellites are not certified to transmit signal below 1559 MHz.
When it was requested: June 8, 2020
Status: NTIA requested $17,704 to provide the information. Navy said to ask the Army or NTIA. Army did not respond. Air Force referred to their legal office. OSD still evaluating
Reference (Tracking #): NTIA DOC-NTIA-2020-001384; Department of Defense (OSD/JS) 20-F-1159; Army (Did not respond); Navy DON-NAVY-2020-008820; Air Force (AFSPC) 2020-03217-F
Category 2
What was requested: GPS satellite registrations submitted by the United States to the International Telecommunication Union.
To whom the request was made: NTIA, Air Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff. ITU satellite registrations are processed through NTIA. It’s not clear which agency can release the information.
Why this information was requested: Verify the GPS satellite transmission bandwidth requested by the United States and compare that with what is published in the ITU database.
Expected outcome once the information is received: The hypothesis is that the US did not request a GPS Bandwidth greater than the Radionavigation Satellite Service (RNSS) allocation. None of the current GPS satellite registrations have emission designators that go lower that 1559 MHz. If a GPS receiver tries to use a signal outside GPS ITU-registered emission designator bandwidth, that operation is not recognized, nor protected by the ITU.
When it was requested: June 8, 2020
Status: The Air Force claimed the information was publicly available from the ITU which charges a $75K membership fee. The request was for what was submitted to the ITU, not what was approved. Paid $2862 to NTIA and awaiting documents.
Reference (Tracking #): NTIA DOC-NTIA-2020-001385; Air Force (AFSPC) 2020-03218-F; Department of Defense (OSD/JS) 20-F-1160
Category 3
What was requested: Data collected on emissions from its systems into the 1559-1610 MHz band as required by NTIA’s Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency Management, paragraph 10.8.9 and Annex M.2.1.6.
To whom the request was made: NTIA, Joint Staff, Army, Navy and Air Force. This request was made to multiple organizations since it is not clear who is authorized to release this information. Each Military
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Department processes its spectrum certification requests which includes this emission data through the Joint Staff to NTIA approval.
Why this information was requested: Rather than establishing a “hard limit” to define harmful interference to GPS, such as the 1 dB C/No criteria, NTIA chose to monitor emissions into the band by Federal systems. In its January 2009 Edition of the 2008 Edition of the Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency Management, NTIA established the requirement to collect information on emissions into the GPS frequency band. The data could provide valuable, real world information as to GPS interference tolerance.
Expected outcome once the information is received: It’s quite possible that the 1 dB C/No criteria has been exceeded many times over in the past decade—by Federal Systems, alone.
When it was requested: June 8, 2020
Status: Paid $3,696 to NTIA to release the information. Waiting for information.
Reference (Tracking #): NTIA DOC-NTIA-2020-001385; Department of Defense (OSD/JS) 20-F-1161; Army (Did not respond); Navy DON-NAVY-2020-008959; Air Force (AFSPC) 2020-03219-F
Category 4
What was requested: Copies of all waivers processed in accordance with CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 6130.01, CJCS Master Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Plan (MPNTP) as stipulated in DoD Instruction 4650.08, Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) and Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR), December 27, 2018, paragraph 1.2.d, where a DoD component or platform is reliant on civil, commercial, or foreign sources as the primary means of obtaining PNT information for combat, combat support, or combat service support operations.
To whom the request was made: Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff
Why this information was requested: DoD has claimed that it uses civil or commercial GPS receivers in combat, combat support, or combat service support operations that would be subject to interference from Ligado. In order to use civil or commercial GPS receivers for most military operations, a formal waiver is required. It’s important to verify that DoD is following its own processes and procedures when using civil or commercial GPS receivers. It’s also important to understand how extensive the alleged interference might be by assessing the number of waived civil and commercial GPS receivers DoD is using combat, combat support, or combat service support operations.
Expected outcome once the information is received: 1) DoD has waived very few civil and commercial GPS receivers and the amount of impact of alleged interference is greatly over stated for combat, combat support, or combat service support operations 2) DoD is not following its own internal procedures and properly assessing the risk of using non-military GPS receivers in military operations.
When it was requested: June 8, 2020
Status: Waiting for DoD to release the documents
Reference (Tracking #): Department of Defense (OSD/JS) 20-F-1163
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Category 5
What was requested: Copies of all NAVWAR compliance determinations as stipulated in DoD Instruction 4650.08, Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) and Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR), December 27, 2018, paragraph 1.2.e, where a DoD component or platform uses of civil, commercial, or foreign sources to obtain PNT information for non-combat operations.
To whom the request was made: Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff
Why this information was requested: DoD has claimed that it uses civil or commercial GPS receivers in non- combat test and training operations that would be subject to interference from Ligado. In order to use civil or commercial GPS receivers for non-combat operations, a Navwar compliance determination is required. It’s important to verify that DoD is following its own processes and procedures when using civil or commercial GPS receivers. It’s also important to understand how extensive the alleged interference might be by assessing the number Navwar-compliant civil and commercial GPS receivers DoD is using test and training operations.
Expected outcome once the information is received: 1) DoD has made very few Navwar compliance determinations for civil and commercial GPS receivers and the amount of impact of alleged interference is greatly over stated for test and training operations 2) DoD is not following its own internal procedures and properly assessing the risk of using non-military GPS receivers in military test and training operations. 3) DoD has set a very low bar in terms of Navwar compliance determination.
When it was requested: June 8, 2020
Status: Waiting for DoD to release the documents.
Reference (Tracking #): Department of Defense (OSD/JS) 20-F-1164
Category 6
What was requested: IRAC Doc. 37187/1 (July 27, 2009), IRAC Doc. 36545/1 (July 16, 2008) and IRAC Doc. 36545/1 (July 16, 2008) with all attachments cited on page 8 of the May 22, 2020, Petition for Reconsideration or Clarification of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, signed by Kathy Smith, Chief Counsel, NTIA
To whom the request was made: NTIA
Why this information was requested: These three IRAC documents were cited very selectively and lead one to believe they were cited out of context. They are central to definition of the approved transmission bandwidth of the GPS satellite as well as the government stipulated out-of-band interference requirements on government GPS receivers. These IRAC documents were requested to provide further detail on the inputs that drove the request for reconsideration of the FCC Ligado decision by the Department of Defense, which should have had substantiation by the IRAC technical focus group. If they exist, official minutes or at minimum draft minutes of the IRAC technical focus group meetings are requested.
Expected outcome once the information is received: Confirmation that the approved transmission bandwidth for GPS III satellites was reduced from 30 to 24 MHz. This would imply the commensurate bandwidth for a GPS receiver is also 24 MHz and that out-of-band emissions are only defined within the approved receiver bandwidth which falls with 1559-1610 MHz
When it was requested: June 6, 2020
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Status: Waiting for NTIA to release the documents
Reference (Tracking #): NTIA DOC-NTIA-2020-001387
Category 7
Preface: In its May 22, 2020 Petition for Reconsideration concerning Ligado IB Docket Nos. 11-109 and 12- 340 filed with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) by Kathy Smith, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) failed to include any substantiation of its technical claims of harmful interference to the Global Positioning System (GPS). Instead it made technical assertions based on the individual professional opinion of Mr. Edward Drocella, an NTIA employee who led of the activities of a Technical Focus Group (TFG) within the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC). These unsubstantiated assertions proceed from yet unreleased information created by a government entity which should clearly fall with the scope of the Administrative Procedures Act, Title 5 United States Code Section 552 pertaining to a government ruling in the public interest.
If NTIA had relevant, substantive analyses and/or technical proof of its GPS interference claims based on the work of the IRAC TFG, it would be logical for the agency to submit them for public review and comment. Since there is no record of that occurring, it is the utmost importance to bring this information to the forefront publicly. Otherwise, one can only surmise that no such information exists, making NTIA’s assertions baseless. Without providing a technical basis for its claims, NTIA’s petition at this stage of the process has no actionable merit while expending the time, effort and resources of the other stakeholders in the process—including the American people.
The purpose of this FOIA request is to obtain documented information regarding the IRAC TFG to assess the veracity of NTIA’s technical claims, and to constructively inform decision making on related issues that will ultimately affect most, if not all, Americans. It is important to have an unambiguous understanding and documented record of the IRAC TFG’s conclusions, recommendations and outputs since the IRAC TFG plays such a central role in Mr. Drocella’s declaration (and NTIA’s case against Ligado). It is entirely inappropriate that this vital information was not disclosed by NTIA as a part of its analysis previously.
Primary Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request: I request the final report of the IRAC TFG indicating the basis for the NTIA’s claims of GPS interference from the Ligado proposal. Where a final, formal report may not exist, I request the draft report. Additionally, please see below (Supporting FOIA Requests) for related information requested to ensure the necessary information is made available for proper consideration.
Notably, there are reports that the IRAC TFG as a whole, or perhaps numerous participants and members, concluded that there was no technical basis or merit to claim Ligado interference to GPS. This makes this request even more urgent. Transparency in public service is the very foundation of FOIA.
Supporting FOIA Requests: I respectfully request the following supporting documents from the TFG within the IRAC led by Mr. Edward Drocella, discussed in Mr. Drocella’s May 22, 2020 declaration attached to the Petition for Reconsideration or Clarification of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, filed with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) dated May 22, 2020 and signed by Kathy Smith, Chief Counsel. Please note, the below requests refer to an assortment of supporting information and/or outputs that will help support and clarify the basis (or potentially lack thereof) for NTIA’s technical GPS-interference claims in question. Not all types of items requested below may exist in this particular instance. If a specific document requested (e.g., meeting summary, minutes, formal report) was not generated, please continue to apply the multitiered requests below to identify what does exist and fulfill it accordingly:
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• IRAC TFG membership list to include government agencies, agency representatives, and contractor representatives; • IRAC TFG charter, dates of establishment and date of termination (Mr. Drocella’s declaration did not specify the time frame of the IRAC TFG); • Dates, minutes and attendance lists from IRAC TFG meetings and telecons during, but not limited to, the December 2016 through October 2017 time period; • Interim and final recommendations, output documents, analyses, reports, compilations and/or assessments generated by the IRAC TFG; and • Specific IRAC TFG documentation that supports the following statements in Mr. Drocella’s declaration: o Analysis or report that demonstrates the base station and user equipment analysis results (i.e., required separation distances) would not significantly change when a 1 dB, 3 dB, or 5 dB C/N0 degradation criterion was applied to the measurement data collected from high precision (HP) and General Location/Navigation (GLN) receivers. o Analysis or report that demonstrates that the distance separations to avoid potential degradation in C/N0 for all GPS receivers from a single base station in the 1526-1536 MHz band are approximately 10 kilometers for an EIRP of 32 dBW/10 MHz, and between 1 to 2 kilometers for an EIRP of 10 dBW/10 MHz (or 40 dBm/10MHz). o Analysis or report that demonstrates an aggregate micro urban base station deployment with an EIRP of 10 dBW/10 MHz, 64 percent of measured HP receivers and 13 percent of measured GLN receivers within a cell would be expected to experience a 1 dB C/N0 degradation (as reported by the receiver). o Analysis or report that demonstrates a 1 dB C/N0 degradation is more likely to occur when the filtered GPS receiver bandwidth extends outside of the RNSS allocation. o Analysis or report that demonstrates the potential degradations in C/N0 do not appear to be the expected result of base station and user equipment “out-of-band emissions” in the 1559-1610 MHz RNSS band. o Analysis or report that demonstrates impacts to most HP and GLN devices would appear to be more likely when receiver bandwidth extends outside RNSS allocation. o Analysis or report that demonstrates external antenna filter selectivity would be a contributing factor to the interference power level that causes degradations in C/N0. o Analysis or report that demonstrates the mean value of position error does not reflect the expected real interference performance impact to GPS receivers.
When it was requested: August 26, 2020
Status: Waiting for NTIA to release the documents
Reference (Tracking #): DOC-NTIA-2020-001826
Conclusion: The above information will be indispensable for making strategic decisions on 5G, which of great consequence for national security—and decisions which should be made based upon facts and science. Transparency is essential, and I seek this information immediately, so that key decision-makers in the Executive and Legislative Branches are properly informed about time-sensitive 5G and GPS related issues.
In Service,
Honorable Daniel S. Goldin NASA Administrator (1992-2001)
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2/7/2020 Keep 5G Safe From Chinese Domination - WSJ
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/keep-5g-safe-from-chinese-domination-11580342112
OPINION | COMMENTARY Keep 5G Safe From Chinese Domination The FCC has a draft plan that would cut through bureaucratic obstacles to allocating new spectrum.
By Daniel Goldin Jan. 29, 2020 6 55 pm ET
The U.S. has long led the world in telecommunicati ons, but it has fallen behind, and badly, in developing fifth- generation, or 5G technology. China is racing to deploy 5G around the world President Trump and FCC chairman Ajit Pai in the White House, April 12, 2019. with huge PHOTO: NICHOLAS KAMM AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE GETTY IMAGES discounts and coercive methods. Telecommunications placement and access, coupled with Chinese security and payment systems in many countries, translate into economic and political influence, even control.
The nation that dominates 5G will reap economic, military and political advantages for decades. If America fails to close the gap, the consequences will be dire. Some of the most important obstacles are bureaucratic—but they’ll be lifted if the Federal Communications Commission approves a draft proposal that now awaits action.
I’ve dedicated my professional life to science and technology in support of U.S. national security. Recently, in an unpaid private capacity, I’ve worked closely on solutions with telecom
https://www.wsj.com/articles/keep-5g-safe-from-chinese-domination-11580342112 1/3 2/7/2020 Keep 5G Safe From Chinese Domination - WSJ executives, technical experts and senior government leaders. The greatest technical obstacle is the lack of available frequency spectrum for U.S. wireless carriers to deploy. If the U.S. remains on its current spectrum-allocation timeline, it won’t have 5G soon enough to protect American interests. Even when suitable spectrum is identified, it must be cleared and auctioned for use, and towers and other hardware must be put in place over many years. Time is critical.
Last year I began to research allocation and deployment options, in particular midband spectrum, which will be the core backbone of 5G networks. The U.S. has deployed no midband for 5G, whereas China has deployed 200 megahertz and is in the process of deploying another 500 megahertz. A subset of midband called C-band is a critical part of the 5G solution, but the C-band auction may slip into 2021 and full deployment may take until 2030—far too late to establish American 5G leadership.
But there’s a viable solution: an innovation that combines lower midband spectrum, or L-band, with C-band to accelerate 5G deployment by many years. This “C+L” approach would reduce the number of towers required from around 400,000 to 80,000, most of which already exist—and would therefore enable a full, stand-alone U.S. 5G network by 2024.
When combined with other foundational elements of a 5G strategy, this option could help provide other nations with a viable alternative to Huawei, as U.S. leaders encourage allies and partners not to jeopardize their security and political independence from Chinese Communist influence by adopting Chinese 5G.
The strongest objections to C+L have come from those, including at the Defense and Commerce departments, who worry that this application of L-band frequency may create harmful interference to Global Positioning System receivers. “GPS is fundamental to the nation’s economy, national security, and continued technological leadership,” the National Telecommunications and Information Administration argued in a December letter to FCC Chairman Ajit Pai. That’s true, but C+L doesn’t put GPS at risk. I have studied the L-Band record, and more than 5,000 hours of testing has shown there is no harmful interference to GPS.
This isn’t a technology problem; it’s a bureaucracy problem. Bureaucracy provides predictability and stability, but it can also inhibit strategic leadership and risk-taking. If innovators are overly focused on their own programs, they can gradually become averse to innovation. Ironically, if we do not accelerate the deployment of U.S. 5G now, we risk the very economic, national security and technological leadership we endeavor to protect.
U.S. leadership in this next-generation wireless technology will have a monumental impact on U.S. national security and its economy. America can both ensure the protection of GPS and more rapidly deploy 5G through C+L—a decisive step toward true competition in 5G. The FCC has a draft order. All it needs to do is launch it. https://www.wsj.com/articles/keep-5g-safe-from-chinese-domination-11580342112 2/3 2/7/2020 Keep 5G Safe From Chinese Domination - WSJ Mr. Goldin served as administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1992-2001.
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/keep-5g-safe-from-chinese-domination-11580342112 3/3 Recalculating: GPS, L-band and the Pentagon’s untenable position on 5G
Daniel S. Goldin,
Opinion, C4ISRNET, Apr 24, 2020
Last week, Ajit Pai, the chairman of the Federal Communication Commission, submitted the L- band Ligado spectrum proposal for approval, which, he said, will “make more efficient use of underused spectrum and promote the deployment of 5G” with “stringent conditions to prevent harmful [GPS] interference.” All five FCC commissioners voted to affirm the proposal, which was formally published in a 70-page report. L-band is a critical piece of spectrum that will help accelerate the deployment of U.S. 5G so we can compete and ultimately win against China. The Department of Defense argues that use of the L-band (as Ligado proposes) will interfere with GPS, which is essential to our military and economy. The FCC’s final order concludes that the testing upon which the DoD and other opponents based their GPS interference claims was invalid. L-band opponents’ interference measurement (termed 1dB C/No) is “inappropriate” and “there is no connection presented in the technical studies” that prove this measure of interference “relates to performance-based metrics” of a GPS receiver. In short, the FCC said there is no harmful GPS interference, and opponents have been using a flawed methodology and an invalid test with which the FCC “strongly disagree[s].” The FCC’s recent report is not the first time the Ligado proposal was determined to cause no GPS interference. In early 2019, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration under David Redl reviewed the Ligado proposal carefully — along with the 20 government agencies that comprise the review body — and determined there is no interference. The NTIA then wrote a recommendation for approval and, before it could get to the FCC, it was blocked, eventually leading to Redl’s dismissal. Further, over 5,000 hours of testing, including 1,500 hours at a high-tech U.S./DoD-sponsored and designed facility (performed by the world-recognized standard-in-testing National Institute of Standards and Technology scientists and engineers), proved no harmful GPS interference. Afterward, a DoD expert who monitored and confirmed the testing results told me “there is no interference problem, only a bureaucracy problem.” Yet DoD has continued to blitz the executive and legislative branches, galvanizing opposition with a compelling plea: Ligado hurts GPS, which endangers military operations and will harm the economy. Powerful. But factually wrong. And if wrong, why is Defense Secretary Mark Esper continuing to lobby against the FCC? The FCC is an independent agency. The Communications Act of 1934 charged the FCC with regulating communications for important reasons, including “for the purpose of national defense.” So why is the DoD employing principles of war — offensive operations to mass upon and seize the objective — toward the demise of Ligado’s proposal and, perhaps implicitly, Ligado itself? Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee are weighing in on the DoD’s behalf. They have been presented partial, one-sided information. Mr. Esper is a capable, reform-minded defense secretary who has brought much-needed change to the Pentagon. But he has also been advancing one-sided recommendations from his senior staff for GPS issues, some with longstanding connections to the highly influential Position, Navigation, and Timing Advisory Board — which enjoys a level of influence akin to a special interest group within the U.S. government. A reading of the defense secretary’s November 2019 letter to the NTIA reveals that even the DoD was never really sure about its own GPS interference claims, stating merely there are “too many unknowns,” the “risks are far too great,” testing shows “potential for” disruption and the Ligado system “could have a significant negative impact.” Yet, once the Ligado proposal was presented for approval on April 15 — with no new testing or analysis since November — DoD leadership tweeted that Ligado’s signal “would needlessly imperil” DoD capabilities that use GPS, and risk “crippling our GPS networks.” If taken at face value, this means the DoD has spent over $50 billion over 45 years on a military GPS system that is so fragile it can be rendered useless by a 10-watt transmitter (a refrigerator light bulb) operating 23 MHz away. If true, this would represent one of the most egregious mismanagements of taxpayer dollars in federal procurement history. The pandemic has shown that China is coercing nations in need of medical assistance to adopt Chinese 5G infrastructure. Coercion from Chinese dominance in 5G would be worse. Agencies like the FCC and NTIA are in the national security arena now. As Attorney General William Barr stated in February, “we have to move decisively to auction the C-band and bring resolution on the L-band. Our economic future is at stake. We have to bear in mind in making these spectrum decisions that, given the narrow window we face, the risk of losing the 5G struggle with China should vastly outweigh all other considerations.” It is time for bold, forward-looking leadership and a wartime mindset. Chairman Pai deserves credit for setting this example. His courageous decision, coupled with support from the FCC commissioners and the strong statements of support from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Barr, signals a new determination to win the 5G race. L-band spectrum will enable other key elements of the U.S. 5G strategy and private sector innovation faster than any other option. It also demonstrates that a science-based approach to technology and policy is critical, otherwise we will grind to a near halt on every major decision — like this one — to China’s benefit. America is truly “exceptional,” and the envy of every political system the world over, because our system is anchored on the rule of law and institutions that allow stakeholders’ competing interests to be adjudicated. All parties have had many years to make their cases. The FCC’s world-class scientists and engineers have come to a conclusion. The DoD has no new information; it just does not like the result. After all the internal policy battles are fought, there is only one constituency that matters: The American people and their national and economic security, consistent with U.S. policy objectives grounded in facts. This is why we must embrace this scientifically sound and strategically wise decision by the FCC and move forward, guided by another more apt principle of war: unity of effort. Daniel S. Goldin led NASA for 10 years under three presidents (1992-2001) and has more than 30 years of experience in scientific, commercial, and national security communications research and development. VIEWPOINT
A Wake-Up Call on GPS By Daniel S. Goldin
or the past nine months, I have worked with world- ■ There are now 24 M-Code-capable satellites on orbit class experts to study a longstanding request from but no compatible receivers. Further, eight of 24 M-Code FLigado Networks to create a ground-based 5G satellites have been in orbit for 11-15 years, well beyond network using L-band spectrum. We found that L-band their 7.5-year design life. Some will fail or be retired be- paired with C-band will accelerate the deployment of U.S. fore they are ever used for military operations. 5G and help counter China’s 5G ambitions without causing Meanwhile, China started deployment of BeiDou-3 sat- harmful interference to GPS. The testing record ellites in 2015 and has launched 30 satellites in proves it and is further corroborated by the five years, enabling worldwide operations in recent release of internal statements from June. GPS embarked on its phase 3 pro- Pentagon spectrum experts. gram in 1997, launched three GPS III On April 20, the U.S. FCC an- satellites and hopes to complete the nounced approval of Ligado’s appli- program by 2034. cation to use the L-band spectrum A 40-year span from problem between 1 and 2 GHz for a terres- identification to problem solution trial 5G network providing cellular is unacceptable and requires an and internet-of-things data services. examination of the legacy power But Pentagon GPS advocates have structures behind such mismanage- enlisted the help of the Senate and ment. The PNT Advisory Board is House Armed Services committees to composed of seasoned members of the include amendments to the fiscal 2021 de- GPS community serving before and after fense authorization bills that would empower the senior U.S. leaders they advise come and the Defense Department to undermine the FCC’s go. What is the purpose of an advisory board with unanimous, bipartisan decision on Ligado. If the respec- such continuity if not to help decision-makers avoid the tive Commerce committees do not assert jurisdiction negligence described above? over the FCC and blunt these amendments, this overt Decision-makers deserve complete information. The power move by the Pentagon could be complete. Pentagon’s top leaders put the country first without regard While military bureaucracy claims it is committed to for bureaucratic agendas. However, their advisors on PNT/ protecting GPS, it has neglected serious risks for decades. GPS have provided them with incomplete information, Excessive cost, timeline overruns and claiming Ligado is a problem and GPS improperly filtered GPS receivers are is not, when the opposite is true. In my tolerated, while the Pentagon maligns 58 years working on science, technol- Ligado’s harmless 9.8-watt signal (a I HAVE NEVER SEEN ogy and U.S. national security, I have power level set by the FAA with a never seen an issue of such impor- huge 23 MHz guard band) as a grave AN ISSUE OF SUCH tance so beset by misinformation as risk. Ironically, the Pentagon’s pre- the Ligado case—nor have I seen such occupation with Ligado may be what IMPORTANCE SO BESET complacency in a program as vitally finally brings proper attention to GPS important as GPS. mismanagement. The truth is the sys- Such challenges will define how we tem has been vulnerable for a long BY MISINFORMATION as a nation respond to the increasingly time, endangering the troops who de- common technology and national se- pend upon it. Congress has attempted AS THE LIGADO CASE. curity decisions ahead. Either we will to hold the Defense Department and grind to a near-halt debating facts to the Position, Navigation, and Timing advance internal agendas, or we will (PNT) community accountable, but GPS stakeholders have make evidence-based policy decisions to counter formida- resisted. How bad is it? Consider: ble threats to our national security and economy. I have con- ■ In 1996, then-Vice President Al Gore announced a plan fidence that the leaders of the Defense Department and our to modernize GPS. In 1997, the Defense Department be- Armed Services committees—when presented with whole gan developing a jam-resistant military satellite signal information on critical issues like Ligado, 5G and GPS— called M-Code, with the support of Congress and the will discern the best way forward to protect our nation. c president. After 23 years, the program is still 15 years from completion. Daniel S. Goldin is an engineer who served as NASA adminis- ■ President Donald Trump’s fiscal 2020 budget directs trator under three U.S. presidents from 1992 to 2001. He has no the Pentagon to transition approximately one million mili- financial affiliation with Ligado Networks. tary GPS receivers to M-Code military receivers, but this will not occur until 2035 at the earliest—the one million Digital Extra For more detail, read Goldin’s in-depth analysis
U.S. GOVERNMENT M-Code chips necessary have not been made yet. at: AviationWeek.com/GPSFix
66 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY/JULY 13-26, 2020 AviationWeek.com/AWST
Key Takeaways from the FCC Order Published 22 April 2020: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-20-48A1.pdf
SUBJECT: FCC UNANIMOUSLY APPROVES LIGADO’S APPLICATION TO FACILITATE 5G AND IOT SERVICES (Conditions Will Protect Incumbents from Harmful Interference)
WASHINGTON, April 20, 2020 (Announced)—Today, the Federal Communications Commission announced that it has approved with conditions Ligado’s application to deploy a low-power terrestrial nationwide network in the L-Band that will primarily support 5G and Internet of Things services. The order approving Ligado’s application was adopted without dissent and will promote more efficient and effective use of our nation’s spectrum resources and ensure that adjacent band operations, including the Global Positioning System (GPS), are protected from harmful interference.
Findings 1) Ligado’s future 5G service will NOT harm GPS. 2) The FCC derived this conclusion from studying 3 tests (RAA, NASCTN & DoT’s ABC test) that were done from 2016 – 2017, exceeding 5000 hours of testing. 3) FCC deemed the RAA and NASCTN tests scientifically valid, using performance-based metrics (position and timing) to evaluate and assess whether Ligado’s system would impact GPS. Conclusion: NO GPS INTERFERENCE. 4) FCC deemed the DOT ABC Test as scientifically invalid, which did not measure harmful interference. DOD opposition (and other Executive Branch opposition) is based off this test. 5) From the FCC order, describing this flawed test/methodology (paragraph number): • DOT test “does not examine performance of devices in providing position accuracy” (36) • “DOT test did not examine whether actual performance of the receiver was affected” (39) • DOT test “does not assess / is not directly correlated with harmful interference” (47) and therefore “does not directly address whether there would be and harmful interference” (48) • DOT testing for “a small rise in background noise (1dB), however undesirable, does not by itself constitute harm to a service” (49) • “Commission has not applied this (DOT metric called 1dB) as the determinant of harmful interference” OR “used this metric to offer interference protection to GPS receivers”, furthermore the FCC has “not used 1dB C/No degradation metric as the basis for establishing the technical limits for adjacent band operations to protect GPS” nor had any parties previously raised the need to establish criteria like this before (50) • “Use of a 1dB metric for protecting GPS receivers from interference would be inappropriate” & – 2dB variations happen even in the absence of Ligado’s signal (52). Also, C/No “is not traceable to any known standard” (53) • FCC finds “that there are important deficiencies in the DOT report” (54) and describes how testing 80 receivers simultaneously as a batch in a “semi-anechoic chamber” is problematic & the FCC “strongly disagrees” that using “the worst performing receivers” to test for interference is appropriate or scientifically valid (57) • The fact that the DOT report relies on the GPS receivers “not capable of accurately and reliably discerning a 1dB” change in background noise (59) makes this test “not appropriate” • (58) – FCC states “the application of 1dB would conflict with our precedent and assume harmful interference even when harmful interference has been disproven”
Decision. “After examining the record on testing, including the methodologies used for purposes of protecting GPS devices from potential harmful interference, we conclude that our evaluation of the receiver test data presented in the record will rely on performance-based metrics, and not on testing based on application of a 1 dB C/N0 degradation as a measure employed by certain of the technical studies before us, as this does not assess and is not directly correlated with harmful interference.” (47)