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The Belgian Presidency of the European Union an Assessment

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The Belgian Presidency of the European Union an Assessment Marco Telo The Belgian Presidency of the European Union An assessment Implementing the Treaty of Lisbon Does Europe need good administrators or innovative political leadership? It is too early to give a definitive evaluation of the Belgian presidency response to this issue. It is a question of knowing just how far the presidency went beyond that of playing the honest broker and took on the role of providing the necessary driving force required by the EU with regard to internal and external developments. It has been well recognised by the international press, Members of the European Parliament and the Commission that the Council of Ministers has performed well during the last six months. It has not just been the diplomatic team led by Olivier Chastel but also ministers under the acting government of Yves Leterme, especially Minister of Foreign Affairs, Steven Vanackere and ministers for the regions (responsible for decentralised issues) that have kept the institutional machinery well oiled and even achieved unexpected results. It was not, therefore, surprising that they were officially congratulated at a press conference on Monday, 20 December 2010, for the results obtained during the Belgian rotating presidency that ran from 1 July to 31 December 2010. It was not just the obvious professionalism of Belgian diplomats that was noteworthy but also the devotion and skill shown by all officials, including the impressive amount of time spent in consultation with other institutions and national governments. Overall, it was a question of allowing the Treaty of Lisbon to begin demonstrating its first fruits, one of which is a more understated role for the rotating presidency, especially in the area of external relations. In the new institutional order dominated by three personalities (the President of the European Council, former Belgian prime minister, Herman van Rompuy, the President of the European Commission, José Barroso, strengthened by parliamentary legitimacy and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Lady Catherine Ashton) and taking into account the co-decision powers that have accrued to the European Parliament as a result of the Lisbon treaty, experts have unanimously deemed the rotating presidency of the European Council to have been the loser. There is, however, still some significant room for initiative and the Belgian presidency, when chairing all the various special councils (foreign affairs council excepted) and COREPER meetings, was undeniably successful in being able to play the role of honest broker mediating between the Member States and institutions to create an atmosphere conducive to communication and compromise, especially in difficult areas such as how to tackle the economic crisis or agree the next European Union budget. Mario Telo, president of the Institute for European studies (IEE) of the Université Libre de Bruxelles during four years, is currently its vice‐president and in charge of international relations. He was professor at many universities in the Americas, East Asia and Europe. Mario Telo has written 21 books and about 100 scientific articles published in ten different languages. Among his recent books are: The EU: A Civilian Power?, Palgrave 2005; The EU and New Regionalism, Ashgate 2007; The EU and Global Governance, Routledge 2009 and International Relations. A European Perspective, Ashgate 2009. He was several times advisor to the EU Council Presidency, the EU Commission and the European Parliament. Of special note was the good work done by the General Affairs Council (GAC) that, along with Herman van Rompuy, ensured that the European Councils of 14 September, 28/29 October and 16/17 December were well prepared and the specialised horizontal councils (such as EU 2020) were properly coordinated. It has been demonstrated that it is absolutely vital to find a role for the prime minister of the country holding the rotating presidency, who, paradoxically, has no visible function during this period except to present the programme to the European Parliament and coordinate the presidency. One should remember that in the absence of the High Representative, it is the minister of foreign affairs of the rotating presidency country who will chair the Foreign Affairs Council. In addition, the new powers and competences of the European Parliament mean that it is vitally important that the two legislative institutions work together, as the controversy over the future EU budget has demonstrated. Belgium also paid due attention to the ‘trio programme’ that is designed to limit the negative internal and external consequences of a rotating presidency that changes every six months. The programme covers a period of 18 months (in the Belgian case a period that includes the Spanish and Hungarian presidencies).1 These three countries have worked well together and created a precedent that could well influence future trios. It would not be fair if one did not raise the issues that have been left for future presidencies. The success of Minister Melchior Wathelet in the negotiations on the EU budget after a number of set backs and threats from rich Member States (Germany, United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden who held sway at the 10 December Council) was the result of the willingness of the parliament (vote of 15 December) and the commission to cooperate. As the reasons for requesting an increased budget of between 2.9% and 5.9% are good ones there are a few clouds on the horizon as the EU will not be able to implement its new policy priorities due to lack of funds. The European External Action Service and international affairs in general, immigration policy and the Agenda 2020 programme for technological innovation will be affected. The European Parliament has obtained some modest additional funding and a promise that the next four rotating presidencies will guarantee its participation in the multi-annual budget negotiations. A full assessment of the Belgian presidency will therefore not be possible for some time. Policies to overcome the crisis The Belgian presidency had to deal with a most extraordinary situation given the length of the international economic crises and the worsening situation in the euro zone that, in the course of 2010 became a prime example of a sick world, described by Valery Giscard d’Estaing (20 December) as coming under attack from its constant enemy the ‘Anglo Saxon 1 An international conference held in Hanoi at the Vietnam Diplomatic Academy, 8 and 9 December 2010 compared this to the serious problems of discontinuity that face ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) presidencies. The conference was a joint initiative with representation from the (Belgian) rotating presidency, Ambassador Correman and Mr Peza the delegation of Wallonia/Brussels; Mr Mersch from the delegation of the European Commission (since 1 December the EEAS) and a representative from Institute of European Studies at the Free University of Brussels. It would appear that the ‘trio’ model of coordination is more adaptable to the needs of other regional organisations than the option of having all monitoring and coordination being done by an institution such as the Commission that does not exist outside the EU. financiers’. In such a situation the challenge was and remains one of making cuts. Good administration is simply not enough. There is a need for innovation in governance and the way the EU institutions function. During the Belgian presidency the EU advanced in four areas: A) Against international financial speculation that in 2007/8 triggered the international crisis: the complex agreement on financial supervision that was agreed in July 2010, obtained as a result of the work done by Minister Didier Reynders, who was able to reconcile the views of ECOFIN members, the commission and the parliament, does, despite its limits and weaknesses, permit better control of financial markets and allows for the removal of toxic financial products that endanger the whole system. Agencies have been created to control banks and insurers and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) that will come into operation in 2011 will control flaws in the financial system. The council and the parliament have finally approved a directive on the management of alternative investment (and hedge) funds. B) The need to go beyond the weak article 99 of the treaty to enable easier macroeconomic policy convergence: the agreement to a ‘European semester’ will involve Member States presenting their draft national budgets along with their programmes for structural reform to the council from 1 January 2011. Clearly the EU will not be able to require a Member State, especially a large one, to change its budget but the comparison of national budgets may well bring about improvements as, in their own interest, countries seek to follow best practice. We will see in the course of 2011 if this will bring positive results given that the asymmetric nature of the treaty causes divergence with its strong emphasis on monetary union and a weak approach to economic union. C) The reform of central economic governance (especially the Stability and Growth Pact of 1997, revised in 2005) required the creation of a council task force and the personal involvement of President van Rompuy, who has already spearheaded a move in favour of a central political role for the European Council in this very sensitive but vital area. In effect it means saving the euro from attacks by international speculators. The rotating presidency collaborated actively in this area. The European Council agreement in September was viewed two ways. It was impossible not to recognise that Germany had given in to a ‘stability mechanism’ fund (440 billion within the framework of a 750 billion global package, including the IMF contribution). In exchange, Germany received a minor reform of the treaty (simple revision of article 136 of the Lisbon treaty) that says the mechanism will only intervene if absolutely necessary for the preservation of the euro zone and that all financial assistance will be subject to strict conditionality.
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