Caretaker Cabinets in Belgium

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Caretaker Cabinets in Belgium This article from Politics of the Low Countries is published by Eleven international publishing and made available to anonieme bezoeker RESEARCH NOTE Caretaker Cabinets in Belgium A New Measurement and Typology Régis Dandoy & Lorenzo Terrière* Abstract Keywords: caretaker government, Belgium, cabinets, political crisis. Belgium is probably the world’s best known case of where caretaker gov‐ 1 Introduction ernments reside. Yet a clear scholarly definition and measurement of this Political scientists often use Belgium concept is missing. Based on a as an ideal case study for discussing detailed analysis of the Belgian fed‐ processes of government formation eral cabinets, this research note and of caretaker cabinets. Combined explores the main characteristics and with its complex multilevel institu‐ measures the length of the various tional architecture and its enduring caretaker periods. We find that Bel‐ regionalist tensions, these processes gium was governed for no less than have attracted much attention from 1,485 days by a caretaker govern‐ the international community. The var‐ ment between 2007 and 2020, which ious episodes of the lengthy federal equals more than four full calendar government formation even kept the years. This research note also pres‐ international media in suspense over ents a novel typology of caretaker the last decade. The fact that Belgium periods based on the institutional had a caretaker government through‐ and political practice within the Bel‐ out its successful EU presidency term gian legislative and executive in 2010 impressed many European branches. This typology can be used observers. to assess caretaker periods at other Caretaker periods mark the transi‐ levels of government as well as in tion between the termination of one other countries in order to improve government and the start of another. our understanding of the many ‘faces’ If the end of a cabinet and the kick-off that a caretaker government can take of a new one can be considered as gold on. mines for political scientists working on elections, executives and minister‐ * Régis Dandoy is professor in political science at the Universidad San Francisco de Quito in Ecuador and visiting research fellow and guest lecturer at the University of Brussels, Belgium. His main research interests include comparative politics, federalism, voting behaviour, election results, electronic and internet voting and election observation. Lorenzo Terrière is a PhD candidate and teaching assistant at Ghent University. His doctoral research is focused on how (regionalist) parties deal with the strategic issue of government participation. Politics of the Low Countries 2021 (3) 1 - doi: 10.5553/PLC/.000009 95 This article from Politics of the Low Countries is published by Eleven international publishing and made available to anonieme bezoeker Régis Dandoy & Lorenzo Terrière ial careers, the inter-bellum period did vious academic works and on a not receive the same research atten‐ detailed analysis of the Belgian care‐ tion. Literature on caretaker cabinets, taker cabinets between 2007 and in particular, is scarce (Boston, Levine, 2020. McLeay, Roberts & Schmidt, 1998; Courtenay Ryals & Golder, 2010; 2 Caretaker Cabinets: Definition Schleiter & Belu, 2015). Yet several and Characteristics scholarly works on caretaker govern‐ ments in Belgium have been published In order to prevent a void in political in prestigious journals, and it even decision making between two different constituted the core topic of an entire governments, countries have debate section of European Political Sci‐ implemented various procedural strat‐ ence back in 2012. These studies often egies aimed at bridging such a gap. In focused on the 2010-2011 political presidential regimes, for example, the stalemate and limited themselves to newly elected president does not take two main phenomena: (1) how can we up power immediately after the elec‐ explain these long periods of caretaker tions but rather enters into executive government and (2) how can we office a few weeks later. This period explain that the Belgian political varies from country to country. For system did not collapse – but actually instance, in the USA, Donald Trump did quite well – under a caretaker cabi‐ took the oath of office on 20 January net? 2017, i.e. no less than 73 days after the Despite these relevant academic presidential elections, and 32 days contributions with regard to caretaker after the actual vote of the electoral cabinets, there are no systematic data college. This time interval is deemed or studies available that demonstrate necessary to prepare for the transition the different ways in which such cabi‐ between the two administrations and nets diverge from others (Courtenay cabinets. On the other hand, in parlia‐ Ryals & Golder, 2010). Also, there have mentary regimes the new cabinet usu‐ been no thorough attempts to disen‐ ally takes power only after its investi‐ tangle the various kinds of caretaker ture vote in parliament. Yet this inves‐ periods. Consequently, authors have titure usually takes place a few days or used diverse definitions of what a care‐ even weeks after the elections. This taker government actually is. Further‐ custom affects both Westminster and more, there is no agreement on the consensus democracies but is more fre‐ exact moments when a caretaker quent in countries with proportional period begins and ends. Therefore, this representation (Boston et al., 1998). research note has two objectives. First, Moreover, there coexist subnational it explores the definition, characteris‐ variations of these caretaker conven‐ tics and how caretaker cabinets are tions, for example in Australia (Davis, best measured timewise. Second, it Ling, Scales & Wilkins, 2001; Tiernan provides a detailed typology of the dif‐ & Menzies, 2007). But, overall, it is ferent caretaker periods, a tool that this specific period in the lifetime of a will subsequently allow us to compare government, located in between the caretaker cabinets across time and space. Our assessment is based on pre‐ 96 doi: 10.5553/PLC/.000009 - Politics of the Low Countries 2021 (3) 1 This article from Politics of the Low Countries is published by Eleven international publishing and made available to anonieme bezoeker Caretaker Cabinets in Belgium former and the new cabinet, that is man, 2007; Larsson, 1994). Non-parti‐ called a ‘caretaker’ government.1 san transitory governments have also After its resignation or its removal been observed in Bangladesh, Bulgaria by parliament, a cabinet is supposed to and Italy and, to a lesser extent, in Fin‐ cease its activities immediately. The land and Portugal (Courtenay Ryals & reasoning is that the dismissed cabinet Golder, 2010; Hloušek & Kopeček, cannot take any further decisions or 2014; Magone, 2000; McDonnell & actions that would compromise the Valbruzzi, 2014; Zafarullah & Yeahia future responsibilities of the next cabi‐ Akhter, 2000). net. However, it is necessary to avoid a A second important characteristic complete absence of the executive of a caretaker government concerns power, as this could be detrimental to the limited scope and range of actions the country. Therefore, the resigning of the executive. According to Van or removed cabinet cannot immedi‐ Aelst and Louwerse (2014), it is a situ‐ ately leave office and instead needs to ation in which the active government remain in power until its successor is can do little more than handling ‘cur‐ appointed (Schleiter & Belu, 2015). rent affairs’. The government is only This is the first characteristic of a care‐ ‘taking care’ of the cabinet functions taker government, which ensures that and duties whose continuity seems there is continuity and that the coun‐ essential. The basic principles a care‐ try is never without a functioning taker government adheres to are two‐ executive. In that respect, some fold. First, the cabinet refrains from authors have described caretaker cabi‐ taking decisions that may burden the nets as fulfilling a ‘bridging role’ incoming government, whereby it between duly mandated governments restricts itself to preserving the ‘policy and have referred to them as ‘interim status quo’ (Boston et al., 1998; Davis governments’ (McDonnell & Valbruzzi, et al., 2001; Schleiter & Belu, 2015). 2014). Given that a change of government is In that sense, caretaker cabinets probably imminent, it is considered have to be distinguished from those inappropriate to bind the incoming cabinets that are specifically appointed government by committing to signifi‐ to bridge the transition between two cant new political initiatives. Second, cabinets or when their sole purpose is the caretaker cabinet does not under‐ to bring the country to (early) elec‐ take new political initiatives and sim‐ tions: these are considered as interim ply postpones all significant decisions or transitory cabinets.2 Many exam‐ until the new government takes over. ples of such transitory cabinets can be Depending on the country, the care‐ found in semi-presidential systems taker government can undertake and in Central Europe (Amorim Neto actions within a larger or smaller range & Strøm, 2006; Courtenay Ryals & of policies. Golder, 2010; Hloušek & Kopeček, Several scholars have outlined 2014; Muller-Rommel, Fettelschoss & additional characteristics. In their Harfst, 2004). In Sweden, the transi‐ works on minority governments, Her‐ tory cabinets are supposed to be apo‐ man and Pope (1973) remark that litical and non-partisan and are there‐ caretaker governments
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