Chapter 2 A Nation and an Idea

Scholars of international relations face a frustrating existence. Reducing the diplomatic behavior of entire nations to a model based on a set of measur- able variables sooner or later encounters the problem of accounting for that least measurable of national characteristics, that of identity. Identity has been often discussed and much studied but it is not particularly easy to reduce to a clear set of statements, because observational difficulties and biases easily intrude into any such qualitative descriptions of nations. In fact, historically the descriptions of national identity were fraught with generalizations which bordered on the mundane and were at times little more than race-based opin- ions attributing particular characteristics to entire national groups, with little or scientific backing. But these opinions were not necessarily valueless; at least they attempted, however inaccurately, to create a picture of the culture and way of thinking of a nation, and that goal should be maintained even if we look for better ways to achieve it. In studying the behavior of a particular nation in a particular time, we may base our analysis on the rational considerations of the moment, but we also need to consider the history of the particular issue, the history of the nation and how that has influenced its perspective on that crisis, and that nation’s identity, which creates the vision that its leaders and servants have of the crisis. References to that national identity in the past sometimes tended to gloss over how perspectives could also be shaped by class and other parameters, especially important here as the diplomats were mostly from a very different background than the “average” person of their home countries. This is interesting to the historian because the ideal of a nation as superseding its classes is a relatively recent phenomenon. Which complicates the analysis further, because the class identity would also have impacted how diplomats analyzed certain issues. The low countries have a history that is at once long and short. Both have populations which can trace their presence there in terms of millenia, but their sovereign and constitutional histories are much shorter. This is particu- larly true of Belgium, which has been a geographic political entity since the early 17th century but whose existence as a sovereign state goes back no further than 1830. The Netherlands’ political history can be traced to the 1560s, but it did not assume its modern form until 1814, somewhat unusually changing from a republic to a constitutional monarchy. The border conflicts between the two

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004331563_003 18 chapter 2 regions/countries are traceable to agreements and disagreements between counties and duchies as early as the 14th century, but their modern form was already in place in the early 17th century, so that the question of the Belgian border antedates Belgian sovereignty. In other words, the issues that would be fought over at Versailles, influenced by the politics of national identity, long precede the formation of either of the low countries’ national identities. So the low countries inherited their situation, albeit in a very changed environment. At the time of their initial formations, Spain was the greatest power in northwestern Europe; Belgian sovereignty occurred during a period of French dominance; but by World War I Germany was the military giant of the continent. The situation changed more rapidly than the way of thinking. The catastrophe of the Great War did change the foreign outlook of both low countries, but their differing national characters would still influence how their diplomats handled the issues at Versailles, in terms of technique as well as actual positions. But it is far easier to make that broad generalization than it is to analyze exactly how identity influenced action. At least in the case of the Netherlands, the identity was more easy to perceive; the ethnicity and language of the coun- try were mostly uniform, contributing to a highly unified outlook during the Versailles crisis. The Netherlands could never have considered the Belgian idea of swapping Dutch territory for that of Germany. That would have meant giv- ing away Dutch citizens but also accepting a German population that would have created a highly disharmonious element (not to mention a permanently hostile powerful neighbor). There were certainly major divisions in the Dutch body politic, particularly along religious lines, but the latter played no role in 1919. If Protestant politicians were loathe to give away any land to the Belgians, their Catholic counterparts faced losing some of the most Roman Catholic ter- ritory of the entire Netherlands, and therefore their own power base. And the Christian parties were finding much in common anyway. Yet if the Netherlands was a country with a comparatively straightforward identity, Belgium was the opposite. What is Belgium? There is a Belgium. It is more than a geographical location, Yves Leterme’s famous comment not- withstanding.1 How old its identity is is controversial, but it certainly has one, notwithstanding current scholarship deeming it “a failed nation.”2 However,

1 Leterme, Minister-President of Flanders (2004–2007) and Prime Minister (2008–2011), once described his country as an “accident of history” only united by the monarchy, the “national football team, and certain brands of beer.” Daily Telegraph, 19 August 2006. He said this while leader of Flanders. His comment reflects the continuing tensions within Belgium. 2 Abbenhuis, Age of Neutrals, 8.