Le Rassemblement Pour L'independance Nationale Author

Home , Marcel Chaput, Pierre Bourgault, Ralliement national

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ABSTRACT

Title: Le Rassemblement pour l'Independance Nationale

Author: Robert J. Keaton

Degree: Master of Arts

Date: April ,1969

This is a study of Quebec's major separatist political

force during the 1960's, le Rassemblement pour l'Independance

Nationale (RIN). It traces the origins of the RIN from its early

formation as a pressure group designed to awaken the French

Canadian population to the cause of independence through its brief

but significant period as a political party actually competing for

control of government within the legitimate political process.

This' study 1S also an attempt to analyze the formation and

content of the RIN's ideology as well as the strategies adopted to

realize its goals. Within this context, attention is focused upon

the various factions among the leadership and membership.

A particularly close examination 1S made of the party organ

ization in order to assess the degree to which the RIN succeeded in

its efforts toward democratization.

Finally, consideration is made of the RIN's impact upon

Quebec politics, especially during the 1966 Election, and to the

overall impact of separatism upon Federal politics. LE RASSEMBLEMENT POUR L'INDEPENDANCE NAT IONALE

Robert J. Keaton

A thesis submitted to the faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Department of Economics and Political Science McGill University Montreal

April, 1969

@) Robert J. Keaton 1969 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to point out that to the best of my knowledge this thesis is the first in-depth study of the RIN as a political party. As such, the task of researching all the necessary information was made manifoldly difficult. In this respect, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Professor

Saul Frankel of the Department of Economics and Political

Science who, as my advisor, displayed infinite patience and provided invaluable guidance to me in organizing my thoughts and material for this thesis.

I am also grateful for the kindness and cooperation extended to me by the staff of the French Canada Studies

Programme here at McGill during my long hours searching through their stacks and files. To Professor Maurice Pinard of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, I am indebted for access to some of his unpublished works and for discus~ sions with him out of which I derived useful ideas. I wish also to thank Andre d'Allemagne, founder and vice-president of the RIN for his "sympathie" and cooperation in sharing

ii with me his insights into the organization and personalities

of the party gained through long years of experience.

Finally, to my wife, Michele, goes my deepest thank

fulness for her love and understanding. More than anything

else, she has made me aware of and appreciate the "French

Canadian fact."

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... " i i

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER

I. FORMATION OF THE RIN AND ITS EARLY HISTORY.. 6

II. IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY ...... 20

III. PARTY ORGANIZATION...... 43

IV. IMPACT OF THE RIN UPON QUEBEC POLITICS. . .. 84

CONCLUSION-EPILOGUE ...... 105

LIST OF SEPARATIST GROUPS ...... 112

APPENDIX 113

ELECTORAL MAP OF GREATER MONTREAL ...... 122

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 123

iv INTRODUCTION

The Rassemblement pour l'Independance Nationale has been the subject of much attention and often severe criticism during its short but turbulent years on the political scene in Quebec. The separatist party was often castigated from left and right because of its ideological bent, or lack thereof, denounced by federalists for obvious reasons, and condemned by the public and politicians alike for its use of extreme and at times violent tactics in pursuing the cause of

Quebec independence. So far, little in the way of a serious study of the RIN has been made attempting to explain the variables operating within and without the party and to show how they worked to shape the development of the RIN and, in related ways, of the separatist movement at large.

This study is such an undertaking, albeit in a most modest way. It attempts to provide the historical setting of the recent separatist phenomenon in Quebec and to trace the growth of the RIN within that setting. It is, however, primarily concerned with the internal development of the party; that is to say, with the struggle within the organ- -2- ization to determine the leadership, the structure, the strategies and the ideology. Of course these developments were in many ways fashioned or influenced by events and conditions external to the party. When such was the case,

the analysis extends beyond the party per se into the wider political arena.

In a sense this is a case study of a political party which managed to dominate the separatist movement during one of Quebec's most intensive period of self-assertion. The origin of the RIN can be traced back to the very beginning of the "Quiet Revolution" and the ascendency of the reform minded Liberal Party. One of the most significant charac teristics of this particular separatist group was its opposi tion to the traditional French-Canadian way of life and its insistence upon a secularized and modernized society; a society not dominated by any "foreign" minority, as the separatists would argue.

The first and second Chapters of this study provide a chronological exposition and analysis of the RIN from its period as "un mouvement d'education publique", when the early leaders first captured the imagination of the French-Canadian public, through its drive to establish itself as a legitimate -3- political party in the 1966 Provincial Election, and finally into the party's "darker" days of 1968 by which time the movement had managed to sink to its lowest level of popularity and, ultimately, to its actual demise.

The main purpose of this analysis is basically to show that the RIN did not start out as a typical radical group bent upon disrupting the normal operations of the political system, at least within Quebec. Federalism to be sure was to be abolished, but the separatists of the RIN were content to achieve their goal by working within the established polit ical process; that is to say, by pressuring, through popular demand, the party in power to declare eventually Quebec's independence; and if this approach failed, to attempt capturing power themselves through the electoral process. Both endeavors, in the final analysis, proved frustrating to the separatists, and as it became more and more apparent to them that their efforts were having little effect, militancy and radicalism became the party's strategy.

The third Chapter deals extensively with the party organization. The purpose here is to determine to what extent party leaders succeeded in building what they considered to be a truly democratic party. It was, in the first place, in -4- reaction to the autocratic and demagogic leadership of the older separatist groups that the RIN was founded. In this section, an attempt is made to explain how party policies were formulated, how leaders were chosen, and to what extent the rank and file actually influenced the direction and strategies of the party. A look is taken also at the RIN's attempts to expand its base of support which was predomi nantly middle-class, to include the sought-after working class population.

The fourth Chapter is different in scope from the previous ones. Entitled, "Impact of the RIN Upon Quebec

Politics," it is concerned mainly with assessing the signi ficance of the separatist's activities in relation to the political life of Quebec. In other words, in what ways and to what extent did the presence of the RIN affect the polit ical behaviour of the two major parties, the mood of the electorate, both French-Canadian and English-Canadian, as well as the political relations between the Provincial and

Federal governments.

This Chapter, in a sense, goes beyond the case-study approach evident in the first three Chapters, only because the study would otherwise have been incomplete. Although it -5- attempts to relate the RIN to the general political system, it does not endeavor to offer a thorough explanation of the total impact of separatism upon Quebec or Canadian politics which would be an undertaking in itself. Its purpose is merely to provide a perspective of the "total setting"; and even at that the analysis is bound to be somewhat distorted due to its proximity to the events.

Finally, I would hope that the purpose of this thesis will have been served if it indeed provides the reader with an insight into the activities and behavior of a radical political group which first attemp-ts to work within the established political norms in order to win its way, and the circumstances that would motivate the group to use more militant strategies and tactics in order to succeed. A look inside and outside the party is necessary. CHAPTER I

FORMATION OF THE RIN AND ITS EARLY HISTORY

One clear, sunny afternoon in the summer of 1961, a long motorcade of some one hundred cars rolled to a momentary stop directly in front of the English-language McGill Univer sity in Montreal. Among the several curious by-standers observing the colorful signs and placards attached to the cars, which read: "Quebec libre" and "L'independance du Que- bee", one surprised person leaned over and innocently asked the rider in the front convertible: "Are you really serious?".

"Mais non~" said the respondant with a percipient smile on his face. The answer came from Andre d'Allemagne, one of the founders of the Rassemblement pour l'Independance Natio nale (RIN) , who was well aware that such would be the general reaction from English as well as French Canadians in Quebec towards his separatist movement, established one year earlier in September, 1960.

After all, such nationalist movements had by now become almost a part of the French-Canadian folklore and the

RIN represented just another in the long line of separatists' -7-

eruptions throughout the history of Quebec. Raoul Blanchard,

in tracing similar movements in the past, relates their appear-

ance to such events as the Rebellion of 1837, the Louis Riel

Affair of 1875, la guerre du Transvaal (the Boer War) and 1 the Conscription Crises of the First and Second World Wars.

Raymond and Albert Breton, in their study, also include the

wave of separatism generated by Paul Bouchard and his con 2 troversial paper, La Nation, between 1935 and 1939. And

just prior to the appearance of the RIN on the political scene,

two other separatist groups had already emerged; Raymond

Barbeau's 1 'Alliance Laurentienne (AL), and Raoul Roy's l'Ac

tion Socialiste pour l'Independance du Quebec (ASIQ).3

1 Raoul Blanchard, "Les mouvements d' independance au Canada fran~ais", in Revue des travaux de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques, No. 116, 1963, pp. 209-222. Also in Revue politique et parlementaire, No. 735, 1963, pp. 16-23. See also, Fernand Ouellet, "Les fondements historiques de l'op tion separatiste dans le Quebec", in Canadian Historical Review, vol. XLIII, no. 3, September, 1962. 2 Raymond Breton and Albert Breton in their article, "Le separatisme ou le respect du statu quo", attempt to draw a correlation between periods of separatism, canadianism, anti semitism, etc., and the rigidity of economic institutions. cite Libre, avril 1962, pp. 17-28. 3 Barbeau's group was formed around 1957, but the AL received little public attention until the publication of his book, J'ai choisi l'independance, in 1961. Roy's hard-line leftist group, ASIQ, was formed shortly before the RIN, in • 1960, but quickly collapsed from lack of support. -8-

Basically then, if the RIN was not seen as a novelty in the eyes of the public, it was equally considered as no real threat to the existing political structure and, as such, could be tolerated, if not even humoured. This attitude was to change quickly in the span of a few short years.

Why Separatism?

It is not the purpose of this paper to enter into an analysis of the socio-politico-economic conditions which give rise to the separatist phenomenon in Quebec. What I do wish to point out in this connection is that these environmental conditions at most tend to define vaguely the types of exper iences that people within the system can share in cornmon. It was the shared experience of "personal humiliation" that brought the two founders of the RINmgether in early 1960,

Andre d'Allemagne and Marcel Chaput. Both men had been civil servants for the Federal government in ottawa and both were convinced that the Canadian federal system made a mockery of the French-Canadian fact.

Unlike the intellectuals of Cite Libre, who were busy campaigning for social reform and a "better deal" under the existing constitutional structure, d'Allemagne and Chaput turned rather to independence as the only solution to the -9-

"inferior" conditions and what they felt was the dismal plight of their Quebec compatriots. D'Allemagne left his job as

Parliamentary translator in ottawa a few years before Chaput was dismissed from his post in the Defense Department in 1960.

He returned to Montreal, the kindling fire-bed of separatism, where he found work as a copywriter in a local advertising firm. At this time, d'Allemagne established his first contacts with the small separatist movement taking shape under the leadership of Raymond Barbeau whose review, La Laurentie, was slowly gaining popularity. When Barbeau finally established

1 'Alliance Laurentienne in 1957, separatists of all ideological leanings came together to promote the one concern they all shared -- independence. D'Allemagne was among them. "It was not for ideological reasons that I joined the AL," he stated; "I had none. It was clearly and simply for the cause of Quebec separatism. ,,4

L'Alliance Laurentienne reflected essentially the traditional values rooted in rural Quebec society. Its major concern was what Barbeau considered to be the oppressed condi- tion of the French-Canadian Catholics and his solution to this

4 Quotes of d'Allemagne were taken from an interview with this author. -10- oppression came in the form of a social corporatist and

Catholic state not to dissimilar from the system attempted 5 in Mussolini's Italy. What the separatist leader however failed to grasp in his espousals were the two major trends taking place at the time in Quebec, later described by socio- logist J.C. Falardeau as "secularization" and "socializa- , 6 tlon. "

Socialization was a response to a back-log of needed reforms neglected under the previous socially conservative regime of Maurice Duplessis. This regime, by neither assim- ilating the masses nor the intellectual elites, created a watershed of sentiment for reform to which the appeal of at least a modified form of socialism seemed the only alternative. As Falardeau rightly points out, the intellectuals of

Cite Libre to a great extent were the first to alert the previously passive classes of the population to these inferior conditions, setting the stage for the more emotional appeal

' of th e separat lStS. 7

5 Raymond Barbeau, J'ai choisi l'independance, Montreal, 1961, p. 31. 6 J.-C. Falardeau, "Elites traditionelles et elites nouvelles", in Recherches sociographigues, vol. VII, no. 1-2, 1966.

7 Ibid ., p. 140. -11-

Barbeau was part of the old generation, d'Allemagne, the new. The AL, by not being attuned to the needs and trends of the time was destined to dissolve. The major function it fulfilled, however, was to serve as a rallying point for the separatists from which a new movement could be launched. D'Allemagne took advantage of his time with the

AL to draw together intellectuals who shared similar objec tions to the religious and political orientation of Barbeau's group, and therefore to set the stage for a different approach to the issue of separatism.

From Right to Left to Left-of-Center

In the sense that d'Allemagne and his recent adherents had not yet articulated any real ideological alternative to

Barbeau's rightist Catholic-corporatism, they represented a negative movement. The idea of independence inself, accom panied by a feeling of needed social and economic reform was, however, enough to start them on the path of political activ ism. The only other choice open to them emerged later, in early 1960, with the formation of the leftist group l'Action

Socialiste pour l'Independance du Quebec, under the leader ship of Raoul Roy. The far-left doctrinaire stand taken by -12-

ASIQ through its publication La Revue Socialiste was evidently too radical for d'Allemagne and his followers who at most had only an academic awareness of the socialist line and were not

at all prepared to commit themselves to such a highly specu lative future.

While d'Allemagne was preparing the way for a new separatist group in Montreal, the controversial figure of

Marcel Chaput was attracting public attention as well as official displeasure in Ottawa. Chaput, although not aligned at this time with any formal separatist group, had recently picked up the banner of Quebec independence and was proudly waving it around the capital city much to the consternation of almost everyone there. In the process, he managed to attract a number of followers in the Quebec border city of

Hull, in Quebec City, and a few French-Canadian civil servants

in ottawa itself. By now, d'Allemagne was ready to establish a province-wide organization and so found it propitious to pay a series of visits to Chaput to discuss common areas of

interest. Mutual support between the twc was quickly estab lished and over the summer months of 1960 Chaput and d'Alle magne held several meetings to map out the strategy and goals of a new movement. -13-

Finally, on September 10, 1960, Chaput, d'Allemagne

and about thirty other intellectuals, including journalists,

copywriters, artists, teachers, civil servants, from Hull,

Quebec City and Montreal assembled in Montreal and announced

the formation of the Rassemblement pour l'Independance Natio-

nale (RIN). The first and almost exclusive goal of this new

separatist movement was simply Quebec independence. Its

strategy was to act as a pressure group or what they them-

selves refered to as "un mouvement d'education populaire".8

By publicizing what they felt were the inferior conditions

of French Canadians under Confederation, the RIN members believed that the masses would respond by pressuring the

existing political parties and the government into accepting

complete and unilateral withdrawal from Canada. This plan

of action called for the use of such techniques as newspaper

advertising, public assemblies, motor-cades, distribution of

pamphlets, and so on. One month later, in October, the RIN held its first Congress where some seventy followers gathered

to adopt a constitution and elect officers. D'Allemagne was

chosen president, and Chaput vice-president.

8Pierre Renaud, "L I histoire du R. I .N . "; a discourse given September 10, 1964, at the hall of La Fraternite des Policiers, in Montreal, on the fourth anniversary of the RIN, p. 1. -14-

Over the next six months, the RIN gained an amount of public attention through the mass media clearly dispro- portionate to its membership primarily because it was looked upon as an oddity on the political scene rather than as something to be taken very seriously. A passage in Thomas Sloan's book published in 1965, Quebec, the Not So Quiet Revolution, typified this attitude:

But its [the separatist movement) mainstream as it has developed into le Rassemblement pour l'Independance Nationale, is to a large extent composed of intelligent and idealistic French Canadians who, no matter how wrong they may be, defend their cause with dignity and sometimes even a sense of humour. 9

If little else, the RIN's unorthodox methods of pro- selytizing the cause of independence earned its leaders,

Chaput and d'Allemagne, frequent television and newspaper interviews. This was a radical departure from the "old-hat"

AL, and something more psychologically "pleasant" than the revolutionary calls of ASIQ which by this time was disap- pearing nearly as quickly as it had started for lack of organization and support. What seemed to make the RIN so effective in holding the spotlight of attention and spreading

9 Thomas Sloan, Quebec, the Not So Quiet Revolution, the Ryerson Press, Toronto, 1965, p. 83. -15- its influence as far as it did,was to a great extent the efficiency of its organization and the seriousness and imagination of its members. It appeared that the RIN was willing to work within the existing political system and content itself with the gradual transformation of public opinion.

Then came the dismissal of Chaput from the Department of National Defense in early 1961, and at nearly the same time, the publication of two important books ,10 one: by Barbeau and the other by Chaput, both of which became best-sellers in

Montreal. Chaput's popularity boosted him into the presidency of the RIN at its second Congress, held in October, and swelled the ranks of the movement. By this time, it was becoming apparent to the leadership of the RIN that the call for independence alone was not enough. "If independence, then what?" was the obvious question to which the RIN had yet to address itself. Chaput's book, although touching upon the basic social and economic issues that would eventually have to be dealt with, offered no solutions; it was more a collection of grievances than a programme of action.

What was needed now was an ideological orientation which

10Barbeau, Ope cit., and Marcel Chaput, Pourquoi je suis separatiste, Les Editions du Jour, Montreal, 1961. -16- would give the movement more clearly the character of a political party.

This then became the immediate concern of Chaput once in office. The RIN's executive arm, the Central Council, established a Political Committee to study the possibilities of transforming the movement into a political party. It did this by canvassing the views of its membership on a number of fundamental issues. The actual consideration of becoming a political party was evidence in itself that the RIN had abandoned its original strategy of pressuring the two older parties into accepting the cause of independence. In part, this disillusionment was brought about by the Liberal govern ment's denunciation of separatism and the reaction of the

RIN leadership to what appeared as a personal vendetta being waged against the separatist leaders by the Province's

Justice Minister, Claude Wagner. More realistically, though, the drive to become a political party seemed the only logical course open for those members of the RIN intent on winning eventually a share of power instead of simply playing out the limited role of a pressure group. For most members of the movement, it was not a question of whether, but of when to become a party. -17-

It was on this matter of timing that the first serious conflict occured within the movement. Chaput's impa- tient and aggressive style clashed with the more slow-going and cautious personality of d'Allemagne who felt that the movement lacked depth in leadership as well as in financial backing. In addition, d'Allemagne was not convinced that the public had had enough "education" or politicization on separatism. Thus, any premature transformation into a political party could only lead to failure.

GUy Pouliot, lawyer and RIN representative from the

Quebec City Region, voiced the recommendation of the Politi- cal Committee which was to wait until the spring of 1964 before taking the important step. He gave the following reasons:

1) The RIN was not yet sufficiently organized

2) They had not gained enough public support

3) The premature transformation would make the RIN run the risk of admitting undesirable members who could not be screened.ll

Pouliot, a product of the traditionally conservative Quebec

City area, was more concerned than anyone else about such

11 Le Devoir, December I, 1962. -18-

"undesirables" whom he described as followers of the various far-left clandestine organizations which were prone to the advocacy of violent tactics as an instrument for their cause.

Chaput, on the other hand, mistook the popularity of the movement for that of his own, insisted on electoral action; the lines within the movement were thus drawn.

The third RIN Congress, held in October of 1962, was faced with two major issues: 1) opting for immediate electoral action or remaining a movement for two more years, and,

2) having to overcome its image of a "non-ideological" group.

The majority of the membership voted for the proposals brought forth by the Political Committee, which included a Manifesto, but recommended against electoral action at this time. GUy

Pouliot was elected to replace Chaput as president. Two months later, Chaput, along with about one third of the RIN members split away to form what became known as the Parti

Republicain du Quebec (PRQ). Technically speaking, the PRQ became Quebec's first official separatist political party.

Such an "honour" though was short lived, for less than two years later the PRQ collapsed when Chaput's second hunger strike failed to bring in the needed finances to keep his party alive. -19-

Following Chaput's departure, the RIN was left with a badly weakened organization and considerable internal unrest. As much as half of the remaining members, although deciding against going along with the PRQ, nevertheless became inactive, adopting a wait-and-see attitude towards the leadership. The period between 1962 and 1964 represented a low ebb in the development of the RIN, with the leadership of separatism shifting to the PRQ and, to some extent, back to the AL.

Despite its Manifesto, which was a meager attempt to articulate a more coherent platform and give some semblance of an ideology, the RIN still lacked direction and purpose.

Thus faced with increasing defection, the decision was finally taken in Marchi 1963, one year earlier than the date proposed by the Political Committee, to transform officially the RIN from a pressure group into a political party. CHAPTER II

IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY

The RIN as a movement could not be characterized by

any clear ideological orientation beyond that of its nation

alistic endeavors. The movement's primary concern was simply

the quest for Queb~c independence and although its members

as individuals held certain ideas as to which direction social

and economic reform should take, the RIN as such tended to

operate mainly on pragmatic considerations. The infiltration

of hard-line leftists into the ranks of the RIN did not take place until 1963, following the breakup of ASIQ. This occurred

after the RIN had already been established as an organized political party with a formulated action programme.

The first intimation of the direction toward which the RIN was eventually to evolve ideologically can be found l in Chaput's book, Pourquoi je suis separatiste. The ideas

spelled out by Chaput, although not clearly identifiable with any set ideology, nevertheless earmarked the role of

Ipublished in 1961 -21- the state as a repository of powers for assuring the autonomy of the French-Canadian people, or, as he put it, to be

"maitres chez nous.,,2

Bourgault, during a speech at a public rally in 1962, 3 elaborated this sentiment in similar terms:

Pour qU'une partie de l'economie revienne aux mains des Canadiens-fran~ais, il faut que la nation puisse controler son commerce, ses rela tions exterieures, son credit, ses banques. Pour ce faire, il faut que l'Etat du Quebec soit souverain et libre d'agir dans le sens de ses interets.

And even the observations made by Pouliot at the 1962 Congress, that "there was 'an indissoluble connection between unemploy- ment, Anglo-American capitalism, and the (English) Canadian

Constitution",,4 represented little in the way of a political ideology beyond that of sovereignty itself, and nothing in the way of an action plan for the state once founded.

2 Chaput, Ope cit., p. 104.

3Pierre Bourgault, Revolution, RIN Press, (Montreal, 1962), p. 10.

4Quote taken from an article by Andre Maj or, "Arms in Hand," in Frank Scott and Michael Oliver, Quebec States Her Case, Macmillan of Canada, Toronto, 1964, p. 78. -22-

The RIN's first attempt to articulate any clear-cut

proposals for social and political reform was made with the

issuance of its Manifesto in late 1962. This document, how

ever, appeared to be limited essentially to the views of its

author, d'Allemagne, and lacked any real statement of prin

ciples or substantive theoretical foundation. What it

appeared to offer was simply a rejection of the traditional

values of the French-Canadian culture, a leaning towards

secularization, and an open but narrow denunciation of "out

side economic control" over Quebec society.

The apparent prominence given to the role of the state by the RIN throughout its declarations was undoubtedly influ

enced and reinforced by the very actions of the ruling Liberal

Party. Following the Election of 1962, Liberal leaders had wasted little time in nationalizing Quebec's hydro-electric

industry (Hydro-Quebec), setting up the Conseil d'Orientation

~conomique, organizing the Societe Generale de Financement,

as well as taking other measures designed to insure greater

control by the state over the economy. These actions evoked

a new and stronger feeling of national consciousness and were

readily interpreted by the separatists as a step toward greater

economic independence from "foreign" control. This, they felt, was bound to lead ultimately to total independence. -23-

The absence of a political ideology had its one advan

tage for the separatists; it enabled the divergent membership

a high degree of cohesion, especially during the movement's

formative period. As long as nationalism and independence,

per se, were the major concerns of the movement l and little

attention was given to the more substantive questions of what

form the "sovereign" state of Quebec would take, there was

little ground for disunity among the small membership.

After two years of involvement in the political arena, however, the RIN had already begun to realize that in order

to gain wider public appeal I the major social, political, and

economic issues would have to be dealt with. By doing so,

the RIN was essentially casting itself into the role of a

political party.

Consequently, as the movement began gaining strength

and the question of becoming a political party came to the

forefront, at least two major considerations arose which were

to reveal serious underlying strategic and ideological differ

ences of opinion: 1) How to structure the party so as to

carry forth the spirit of free expression, while at the same

time not getting bogged down like the two older parties; and

2) how to overcome the non-ideological image it had acquired -24- as a movement so as to attract a more significant portion 5 of the electorate.

As mentioned in the first Chapter, Chaput's departure from the RIN in 1962, along with nearly one third of the membership, was the first sign of any major internal conflict.

This was not however as serious as it first seemed since, when the PRQ collapsed two years later, most of Chaput's followers, as well as Chaput himself, returned quickly to the fold of the RIN which by now was gaining considerable strength on its own. This defection represented basically a difference of opinion over strategy or, more accurately, the timing of the strategy rather than a dispute of a more fundamental nature.

However, in August of 1964, the RIN underwent a far more serious disruption. Conservative members of the party, led by Quebec City physician Rene Jutras, were growing increasingly concerned over the party's adopted position vis- a-vis the Church and the State. Although this group continued to adhere to the traditional values of the Catholic Church in

5P~erre . 01"~v~er, II RIN 1968 : 1a mort d'un parti?", La Presse, March 27,1968. -25-

its relation to the Quebec government, this difference of

opinion was not at first sufficiently incompatible to cause a

split in the separatist movement. However, with the admis

sion of left-wing socialists led by AndreeFerretti and Luc

Racine in late 1963, the combination of a secular and "semi

socialist" party proved intolerable for the Jutras group

resulting in the party's second split. Jutras later formed

the highly conservative separatist party Ralliement National.

Two months later, Ferretti and her followers added further

to the disintegrating process by themselves splitting off

to join the Mouvement de Liberation Populaire (MLP) , another

leftist radical coalition attempt.

By the fall of 1964, the RIN had suffered defection

from the left as well as the right wing of the party member

ship. PRQ members had returned to bolster the largely moder

ate elements that remained, and despite the apparent numerical

loss of membership, the RIN emerged stronger than before as

a result of its new-found solidarity. Party cohesion was at

least temporarily established in time for the up-coming

Provincial elections.

The rise of Pierre Bourgault to the presidency of the

RIN, in October, 1964, marked a turning point in the develop- -26- ment of the separatist party. Emphasis quickly shifted from a strategy of simply demonstrating and exhorting the cause of independence to one of actually organizing the electoral machinery needed to carry a slate of candidates into competi tion for power. This was no easy task for a party lacking experience, finances and even a coherent platform. While

Bourgault set out on a province-wide campaign to attract public attention and money, a Political Committee was organ ized for the purpose of formulating and drawing together a series of resolutions that would serve as a campaign programme, providing the party with what it felt was a necessary ideolo gical orientation.

Relying very often on talent from outside party ranks, the Committee submitted to the RIN Congress of 1965, an extensive seventy-three page document containing some two hundred and twenty-eight resolutions designed to encompass a comprehensive programme of action for the proposed sovereign state of Quebec. As it stood, the party platform was an impressive and ambitious document which overshadowed in scope party platforms put forward by other political parties in

Quebec. -27-

The programme was based on four major concepts: planning, efficiency, democracy, and decentralization. There were resolutions that called for the nationalization of cer

tain basic industries, "rationalized" planning in the fields

of government, business, and labour, and the socialistic

distribution of goods and services. At the same time there was strong support for maintaining capitalist!methods of production. The programme called for free education at all

levels, including university, state-operated free nurseries,

and "equality" for women. It proposed measures concerning human rights, leisure, housing, employment, and so on. In

1966, the programme was expanded to include resolutions on

the "co- a dministration" of industry by labour and management.

This particular section of the programme was added as part of

the party's general attempt to attract wider support from the working class -- an obvious deficiency in the RIN's base of

support.

Certainly the most contentious element of the RIN programme were the policies it advo~ated with respect to language, education and immigration rights. The RIN maintained

that there should be but one official language in the Province

in business, education, work, and all other social aspects -28-

of life. It argued that the interests of the French-speaking majority of the population should prevail.

The party's immigration policy called for the admis

sion of only those who were French speaking or who would

agree to learn and use the French language in the Province.

It rejected what it considered a "colonial" situation in which a minority culture appeared stronger than that of the majority, in which immigrants tend to assimilate into the

English culture because of apparent economic advantages.

What made things even worse, according to the RIN, was that

the government of the majority actually encouraged this

assimilation by providing free education in the minority

language. In this way, language, education and immigration were tied together and formed the basis for the nationalism

of the RIN.

Apart from the issues discussed above, the programme

of the RIN was similar in many respects, to that of any number

of social-democratic parties. It tended to be highly prag matic, attempting to fuse some of the important elements of

capitalism, socialism and democracy in order to present the kind of party platform that would satisfy the needs of a

sovereign state of Quebec without implying radical revolutionary change. -29-

Despite the RIN's efforts to offer an alternative to the positions of the other major political parties in the

Province, it succeeded neither in gaining the confidence of capital interests, not in placating the "pure" socialists who constantly criticized the RIN's position as an untenable one.

A major source of ambiguity was the party's attempt to combine capitalist methods of production with socialist principles of distribution. The programme states that: "Le

RIN considere que la production economique et la distribution des richesses sont deux fonctions differentes, qui doivent etre dissociees. Le RIN rejette Ie principe selon lequel un certain systeme de production entraine automatiquement un certain systeme de distribution. ,,6

It was apparent that the RIN was attempting to have the best of both worlds without addressing itself to the fundamental differences between them. Nowhere did the party attempt to face up to the profit-rewards mechanism essential to capitalist methods of distribution and which has been traditionally relied upon to provide the incentive for

6 Le programme du RIN, p. 1. -30- choosing the most efficient methods of production. Further more, the relationship between employer and workers was not at all clear despite the party's several measures designed to improve the working conditions and general lot of the workers. One such measure stated that the party "encouragera la participation ouvriere aux profits et a la propriete des entreprises, parce qU'elle etablit un certain equilibre automatique entre les interets de l'entreprise et ceux des travailleurs.,,7 How this was to be done the party did not explain.

The RIN's position with respect to these two major parts of its programme reflected not so much naivete toward economics as much as an attempt to strike a balance between the leftist and rightist pressures within the party. The reluctance to move to a more consistently defined position one way or another reflected the party's fear on the one hand of scaring away what it realized was needed capital invest ment (hence, the RIN's adherence to capitalistic means of production) and, on the other, its desire to achieve a more equitable sharing of material rewards throughout society

(hence socialism in the distribution of goods and services) .

7 Ibid., p. 4. -31-

It was not, however, until 1966, and the return of the socialist group to the party following the collapse of the MLP, that the RIN had seriously considered adopting any resolutions dealing with the issues of production and distri bution or even employer-workers relations. These considera tions did not come to the forefront until after the 1966

Election. Between 1964 and 1966, the party enjoyed a period devoid of any serious factionalism within the ranks over ideological issues and instead was able to concentrate on a strategy centered around election campaigning.

In this election, the RIN succeeded in projecting itself as a serious and legitimate political party in a way no other strategy could have afforded. This was the first time in the history of separatist movements in Quebec that a political party advocating independence actually mustered a slate of candidates to contest seats in the assembly. Although the RIN won no seats, the party did achieve a real "victory" in the sense that it surpassed most expectations in terms of popular votes received (5.5%) compared with the RN (3.3%), thus establishing itself irt the forefront of the independence movement. In addition, Bourgault's own position as leader of the party was assured, the party gained a substantial num- -32- ber of new members, and the strategy of electoral action, in contrast to direct action, won the confidence of the member ship.

After the election, party leaders were faced with the problem of sustaining the forward momentum gained and keeping

separatism alive as a political issue. Moreover, a new plan of action was needed to expand the party's base of popular support from that almost exclusively of the middle class to the more numerous and still virtually unreachable working class. The latter had up to now expressed little sympathy

for separatism partly because of that voting class' charac teristically non-ideological orientation and perhaps more so out of a fear that Quebec's independence would only bring about economic hard times, the brunt of which would be felt by the workers themselves.

This strategy, aimed at the working class, was rein forced by the return of the extreme leftists in mid-summer of 1966. It was of course no coincidence; Ferretti and her followers had chosen such an opportune time to abandon the fading MLP in favor of a stronger organization which was seriously considering ways of making inroads into the "pro letariat." -33-

The problem facing the RIN was that it had made little impression amongst union leaders. On the contrarYt besides the official policies adopted by the unions about remaining free from any attachment to political parties in general t the

C.N.T.U.'s president t Marcel Pepin, representing the largest organized labour movement in Quebec, strongly denounced separatism as far back as 1961 (an understandable position for Pepin since he has sought continuously to extent his union organization across Canada). Other major unions in

Quebec had followed the same policYt leaving the RIN in a highly disadvantageous position. Moreover t the unions had denunciated the separatists' most lively issue t unilingualism t and instead indicated their support for a bilingual Quebec society.

Faced with such overwhelming resistance from union organizations, the RIN tactically decided to attack the

"credibility" of the union leaders. The separatists reasoned that by sowing sufficient doubt in the minds of the workers t while at the same time picking up their grievances t the party could build up its own image with the working class. This strategy entailed actually joining in with the workers during strikes against employers t dramatizing the demands of -34-

the strikers, and even providing limited financial assistance

to the workers' families.

So vigourously did party leaders carry out this new

strategy of attacking union leaders, that by September, 1966,

an open personal antagonism developed between Bourgault and

Pepin. This dispute not only caught the attention of the

public, but brought about heavy criticism of Bourgault from within the party. The membership's more conservative elements

questioned the efficacy of such a strategy and voiced their

disapproval over what they believed was Bourgault's arrogant

leadership. Bourgault's retort to party members indicated

the leadership's drift away from electoral pursuits to a more

militant direct action approach: 8

On a peur des batailles. Quand je me suis permis de critiquer les syndicats, certains se sont affoles. On a eu peur de perdre des votes. On a eu peur de dire des verites. Cela s'appelle de l'embourgeoisement. C'est comme ~a qu'un parti se sclerose.

Bourgault's remarks did little to allay the rising

concern of the party moderates over the growing influence

being exerted by the leftists who by now had managed to gain

8 La Presse, September 19, 1966. -35- control of the powerful Montreal branch, electing the zealous

Ferretti as its president.

Ferretti was a self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist militant whose major ambition was to transform the RIN into a party of the workers, something she and her cohorts had failed to do with the defunct ASIQ and the MLP. She criticized the separatists for their bourgeois tendencies and insisted that electoral strategy was not going to accomplish the goal of the separatist movement Quebec independence. Besides, the leftists argued, "true" independence had to be accompanied by social and economic revolution, which in their terms of reference, meant class revolution, or more accurately, the proletarian revolution. 9 This, then, should become the goal of the RIN.

To achieve this end, Ferretti insisted that direct action had to replace the electoral approach more familiar to the RIN membership. Not the direct action originally used by the RIN as a movement (i.e., motorcades, advertising, peaceful demonstration), but militant action which meant going into the streets, confrontation, and violence if necessary.

9L I Independance, September 12, 1966. This \Vas ',th,e """ party's official journal. -36-

The first phase of the new militant direct action was

organized in the Montreal chapter by Ferretti and her followers

in the form of "courses on political formation."lO The titles

of the courses indicate for themselves exactly what orienta-

tion the leftists had in mind: "problems of colonization/"

"propaganda and agitation," "stages of national struggle and

social struggle," "revolutionary action /" etc. These courses

proved popular among young members where apparently the appeal

to immediate action seemed more exciting than the slower/

more patient electoral process which was acceptable enough

to older party members.

The next major move by the RIN's left wing came during

the October Congress in 1966. The objective was to move the

ideological orientation of the party further left by adding

to the official programme a series of resolutions aimed at

attracting the labour class. The theme of the Congress was

"The RIN and the Workers" much to the dismay of the party's

bourgeois elements especially from the Quebec City area.

Militants were busy during the convention attempting to gain

delegate support from across the province.

10I b'd1. ., September 26, 1966. -37-

What emerged from the Congress fell short of the designs of the Ferretti group, but added clarity to the party's position on a number of issues concerning the working class.

Some nineteen resolutions were adopted dealing with more solid guarantees of workers and union rights, worker participation in economic planning, a profit-sharing plan for the workers, a scheme that would allow unions to check the internal audit ing of companies, as well as joint management rights for workers. The more encompassing proposals calling for a social ist system for "evenly distributing wealth among the population" and for a "mixed economic system" were dropped.ll

Generally speaking, the results of the Congress were indecisive and represented only a mild shift to the left; not enough to satisfy the demands of the militants, but enough to disturb the representatives from the conservative Quebec City region who did not fail to express their anxieties over the activities of their left-wing comrades from Montreal.

The new resolutions, coupled with the support given by the RIN to striking workers, particularly during the labour disputes at the Dominion Textile plant in St. Jean, and the

lIThe Montreal Star and Le Devoir, October 31, 1966. -38-

Dominion Ayers plant in Lachute were supposed to demonstrate the loyalty of the RIN toward labour and the hoped for results that workers would rally behind the separatists' cause. In terms of membership recruitment from this class, the strategy yielded no tangible results. More realistically, RIN leaders counted on a sympathy-vote at least from those workers involved in strikes which the separatists were actively supporting.

By now it was clear that a leadership struggle was developing between Ferretti, supported by the militant

Montreal chapter, and Bourgault, backed by party moderates and the "old party" leaders, who indeed advocated militancy but certainly not to the extent envisaged by the new radicals of the party. Ferretti's sudden rise to the powerful leader ship of the Montreal chapter, along with the demonstrated influence exerted at the October Congress, made Bourgault fully aware of the developing circumstances. He concluded that the only way to counter the thrust of the left-wing movement was to press for stronger executive control. At the same time, Bourgault recognized the conservative sentiment of delegates from the Quebec City region who were anxious to arrive at an entente with the still influential Ralliement

National under the leadership of Gilles Gregoire. While the -39-

RIN appeared to be moving more and more to the left, events seemed to dictate movement to the center where the disparate separatist forces could coalesce. Fran90is Aquin, in the summer of 1967, suddenly quit his affiliation with the

Liberal Party and became the first sitting separatist M.P. in the Quebec Parliament. It was also becoming increasingly apparent that Rene Levesque, former minister under the Lesage government, would soon join the ranks of the separatists as well. Several indications appeared favourable to the solid ifying of the various separatist groups on the basis of some sort of compromise over the major issues separating them.

In the light of these developments, Ferretti's moves within the RIN to push the party even further left into what would have amounted to an uncompromising position were regarded as dangerous and detrimental to the cause of inde pendence which, afterall, remained the separatists' major goal.

The strategy of the leftists at the Congress of October,

1967, on the other hand, was to wrest control from the party's

Executive Committee and place its powers in the hands of the

General Assembly where Ferretti's influence was becoming increas ingly evident and where she calculated her power base to be substantial. The appeal to the delegates was to be for more -40- revolutionary action and an annual budget that would support it.

To forestall Ferretti's strategy, Bourgault, just prior to the opening of the Congress, dramatically resigned from the presidency, along with other officers supporting him. His manoeuvre was designed to force Ferretti .and her followers into leadership contention which Bourgault thought would lead finally to their defeat at the hands of the

General Assembly. Bourgault then offered a nine-man slate of candidates, including himself as president, to face any contenders from the left. Ferretti wisely chose not to challenge Bourgault himself, and instead ran for the "national" vice-presidency.

What emerged from this highly militant convention was a partial stand-off between the two competing elements.

Bourgault was re-elected president, but Ferretti gained the vice-presidency as well as the support of certain key exec utives. Bourgault's attempt to gain more authority for the

Central council in determining strategy failed, as did his resolution calling for an eventual fusion with the RN. If anything, this Congress represented a mild victory for the left-wing forces and only served to sharpen the cleavages -41-

within the party over strategy, ideology, and leadership.

The situation for the separatists was further compli

cated by the resignation (or forced expulsion?) of Rene

Levesque from the Liberal Party in November of 1967. The

RIN's bid to gain the backing of this highly controversial

but popular political figure failed completely, nor did the

party succeed in persuading Aquin to join the ranks of the

separatist party. Instead, Levesque, fully aware of the

political force of his own popularity throughout the province,

and cautious enough to stay clear of the RIN which by now was acquiring the image of a "radical left" party, set out

to organize a "center" approach to the issue of separatism.

Within a short time, Ie Mouvement Souverainete-Association

(MSA) was launched under the leadership of the former Liberal minister much to the dismay of the RIN.

Meanwhile, the conflict within the RIN was rapidly

approaching a stormy climax. Ferretti, realizing the increased

chances of a merger between the RIN, the MSA, and the RN,

sought desparately to prevent it. She attacked the "person

ality cult" of Bourgault, clamoured for more immediate direct

action, condemned the "bourgeois" mentality of the party, and

even managed to pre-empt Bourgault's replies by holding her -42- own press conferences. Unable to consolidate his control over the leadership of his party, Bourgault called for a special session of the Central Council. In doing so, he was attempting to expel Ferretti from the party and seek author ity to hasten the RIN's merger with the MSA.

Bourgault's efforts were blocked by Ferretti supporters on the Council, forcing the RIN president to call a special session of the General Assembly for the end of March, 1968.

His tactics proved successful; Ferretti, along with radicals

Racine, Rufiage, and practically the entire militant left, split from the RIN before the General Assembly met. It was a victory for Bourgault, but too late in arriving. The public image of the party had already suffered irreparable damage as a result of the militant and sometimes violent tactics of the extreme leftists. By now, the leadership of the separatist movement had begun to shift rapidly to the dynamic personality of Levesque and his new organization, the MSA. CHAPTER III

PARTY ORGANIZATION

The evident disunity which plagued the RIN between

July, 1966 and March, 1968,1 can be attributed essentially to the differences in ideological orientation among the membership along with the bitter personality conflict which took place between Ferretti and Bourgault, as discussed in the previous Chapter. This analysis reveals the sources of party conflicts but it does not explain how, once such divisions surfaced, they were able to be resolved within the framework of the party structure.

For example, had the RIN been characterized by an autocratic leadership, such as Barbeau's l'Alliance Lauren- tienne, Chaput's PRQ, or even Gregoire's Ralliement National,

Ferretti's serious challenge to the party leadership could have been more readily handled and at an earlier date, before any real damage to the public image of the separatist group

lFollOwing the Provincial election and until the resig nation of Ferretti and her followers. -44- was incurred. As it was, this struggle became a prolonged affair as a consequence of the weak authority invested in the party's executive and by the very nature of the decentralized decision-making machinery. In fact, it wasn't until a special session of the general assembly had been called that this crucial issue was finally resolved.~' By:;;this time the entire affair had captured the attention of the

Montreal press which laid heavy stress upon the factionalism and disunity within the ranks of the separatist party by emphasizing the leadership of the party's most radical ele- 2 ments.

To understand more fully how the prolongation of this struggle was able to occur, we must analyze more closely the structural characteristics of the party's organization. In addition we must pay particular attention to some of the original ideals of the party founders who wished to introduce a "new" approach to party politics in Quebec.

In was, in the first place, d'Allemagne's personal experiences under the virtual one-man rule of Barbeau's AL that left the RIN founder with a personal distaste for

2See , for instance, articles published in the Montreal newspapers during the weeks immediately preceeding the special session of the RIN Congress in March, 1968. -45- authoritarian leadership. The structure of the AL was basic ally limited to a leader and his followers. Few ideas emerged from this group except those of Barbeau himself, and if any member didn't especially agree with his brand of separatism there was little place else to go except to join the extreme and loosely-knit circle of Quebec socialists.

D' Allemagne, and several other separatists, discon tented with the AL, agreed that if they were going to work for the cause of Quebec independence as a group, then it would have to be under different conditions; they wanted freer expression and more active participation. "This [democratic spirit] is what attracted so many followers, especially from the ranks of students, teachers, journalists," d'Allemagne pointed out; "It was a .political association different from any of the existing political parties in Quebec. ,,3

These principles were easily enough adhered to while the movement was simply limited to a campaign of "public education" and the structure of the RIN was just beginning to take shape. But by 1962, when chapters of the RIN had been established in such widely located urban areas as Hull,

3Taken from an interview. -46-

Quebec City, Trois-Rivieres, and several smaller ones, the membership had grown sufficiently large to encompass a wide range of political views, aside from the issue of independence.

The only issue in fact uniting these disparate groupings was independence; all other issues had yet to be raised, although by 1963 a special committee had been set up to draft the first party programme.

In 1963, when the RIN launched itself as a political party, the structure had already been substantially completed.

The new constitution established the chain of authority and organizational hierarchy. It reflected the basic "realities" of political life facing the separatist group; first, that there was little cohesion of opinion among the various chap ters of the organization, especially around social issues; second, that the success of the separatists' cause depended upon the militancy and direct action of members of the local level; and third, that any hopes of running an electoral campaign against the established political parties rested on the group's ability to provide strong leadership and direction from some sort of centralized party authority. These consid erations had somehow to be fitted in with the movement's expressed concern for maintaining free-expression and the -47- membership's desire for direct participation in the party's decision-making machinery.

Such purposes obviously resembled less the concerns of a revolutionary group than those of a reformed, or liber alized political party which accorded with the characteris tically middle-class phenomenon that the RIN was, despite its attempts to give the party programme a more proletarian orien tation. As such, it was interested in creating a party structure more in line with the aspirations of an electorally minded following willing to admit of wider divergencies of opinion over strategy and programme than perhaps the inten tions of a more organized and highly integrated radical group.

For these reasons, party organizers depended heavily upon the principle of decentralization of functions while at the Same time devising a rather intricate system of checks and balances for the channeling of authority upward in the direction of the "national" executive. The use of the term

"direction" here is not to imply that there was a central ization of authority in one office, such as the party leader or national committee of traditional parties. Rather, a close look at the party's organization reveals a great -48-

dispersion of power horizontally, at the national level through

the employment of a "parallel executive" (discussed later), and

vertically, starting with the general assembly at the top, and working its way down to the county organization. From this, it

appears that authority (i.e., decision-making power) was

structured from the bottom up rather than the other way around,

typical again of older political parties.

For purposes of analysis, the organization of the

RIN can be divided into three major parts: the General Assem bly; the National Executive; and the Regional and Sub-regional

organizations:

The General Assembly

The supreme authority of the RIN was vested in its

general assembly which met annually in the form of a "National"

Congress. Great emphasis was placed upon the general assem bly by party members as the major restraint over the ambitions

and conduct of party leaders. All party leaders, in fact, were compelled to campaign each year for re-election, thus placing them under the scrutiny of the membership at unusually

frequent intervals of time. By comparison, most major Cana

dian parties hold leadership conventions only when the time

comes for the party leaders to step down voluntarily of by -49- demand from the rank and file; some parties, though, have adopted the custom of holding leadership conventions every two or four years. 4

One of the two major functions performed by the general assembly was theclection of national officers. Each year, delegates from across the provincial organization assembled in

Montreal to select a "national" president, vice-president and seven directors, all of whom together formed the party's national Executive committee.

The general assembly, itself, was composed of voting- delegates and " observer-members." Observer-members were usually non-delegated party members who were permitted the priviledge of speaking at the assembly as well as participating in the convention's work-shops, both at the "national" and regional levels. The voting-delegation at the national level was made up of delegates, each representing one hundred dues- paying members, five members from each of the regional Exec- utive Committees, in addition to the nine members from the

4The New Democratic Party is the only major Canadian political party which holds leadership conventions as often as every two years. The new separatist party, le Parti Quebecois, has adopted the RIN's custom of annual conventions. -50- party's national Executive Committee.

Any member of the RIN was qualified to run for national office provided that he was a dues-paying member in good stand ing. Candidates for executive posts usually presented them selves as "free agents" rather than as part of a slate repre senting a particular region of faction of the party. However, since most of the party's membership came from the Montreal region, it was to be expected that the majority of candidates for office would do so as well.

In the case of past party leaders, though, this proved not to be a rigid rule; Chaput came from Hull, Pouliot from

Quebec City, d'Allemagne and Bourgault from Montreal. Also, the one attempt to present a single slate of candidates based on a factional dispute proved a failure. Bourgault's effort was blocked by the general assembly when it refused several of his hand-picked candidates and instead chose to elect his antagonist, Ferretti as vice-president, along with several of her supporters as national directors. The will of the general assembly prevailed against this attempt at elite domination.

The second major function performed by the general assembly was the consideration and adoption of resolutions -51- to the party's action programme. Here is perhaps the one area of party activity where membership participation meant the most insofar as influencing the direction of the party was concerned -- in addition, of course, to the election of party officials. Whereas in the case of most political parties which have party leaders more or less formulating their own strategies and tactics with the aid of a hand-picked team of advisors, although to some extent "morally" bound to adopt proposals from below, the RIN Executive Committee and party

President were constitutionally bound to carry out policies adopted by the general assembly. As far as the party programme was concerned, this posed no problem since the party was never in a position to actually carry-out any of its proposals.

Membership control over the Executive, however, was mitigated by virtue of the Committee's day-to-day decision-making author ity which necessarily establishes "unauthorized" directions and policies.

Resolutions presented to the general assembly ~ usually originated from two sources; the Political Committee and

County delegations. In both instances, all resolutions were first submitted during the three-day convention to work-shops set up to study, hammer out, and finally draft proposals for -52- presentation to the general assembly. These work-shops were often the site for airing, testing, and settling factional disputes among party members before they got to the floor.

Passage of resolutions was gained by simple-majority vote which, upon request by anyone member, could be taken by secret ballot. 5

Since few county delegations had access to the resources and expertise usually necessary for the preparation of important resolutions, the role of the Political Committee became central. Composed of some twenty-five specialists (professors, civil servants, lawyers, etc.), for the most part hand- picked by the Council, this committee was unquestionably the party's primary source of ideas and information. The RIN's first major programme, adopted in 1965, and comprising with two-hundred and twenty-eight resolutions, was almost entirely the work of the Political Committee. The Executive Committee made itself strongly felt through this group of experts.

Although the role of the Political Committee was significant, it was not exclusive. During the 1966 party

5For obvious reasons, this procedure was rarely ever resorted to. One such occasion, however, was in 1966 when a secret vote was taken on a resolution calling for the dismis sal of a party official. -53-

Congress, for instance, several proposals designed to shift the political orientation of the RIN away from middle-class preoccupations toward the problems of the working-class came

from outside the Committee, specifically from the Montreal delegation of Ferretti and her followers. Of the nineteen resolutions finally adopted by the general assembly, nine had been drawn up and submitted by this delegation. Furthermore,

two other resolutions calling for a socialist system of distribution of wealth among the population, originally turned down by the Political Committee, found their way to the floor of the general assembly only to be finally rejected by that 6 body.

At the same Congress, several proposals drawn up by the Political Committee, with the purpose of making more explicit the social-democratic character of the party, were tabled by the assembly for further study, which essentially

.. 7 meant re]ectlon.

A look at the 1967 Congress provides further evidence

in support of the contention that the general assembly care-

6The Montreal star, October 31, 1966.

7Le Devoir, October 31, 1966. -54-

fully managed to minimize unwanted elite-control. Party

president Bourgault, attempting to set the stage for an event

ual merger of the RIN with other separatist organizations,

sought passage of a controversial resolution calling for

immediate negotiations with the highly conservative Rallie ment National, led by Gregoire. In order to avoid humiliating

its own party leader, the general assembly effectively killed

the resolution by referring it back to the Central Council

for further consideration.8

Finally, in 1968, party founder d'Allemagne, wishing to mollify the party's rigid "lay-state" position, proposed a

resolution calling for "religious toleration." The over whelming defeat of his motion was a clear indication of just 9 how secular in orientation the membership had become.

with respect to these two functions then, (election

of officers, and legislative responsibilities) the general

assembly of the party demonstrated its supremacy. The effect

iveness of its constitutional authority was enhanced by the

frequency of party Congresses. In terms of actual power,

8Le Devoir, October 30, 1967.

9Le Devoir, April 16, 1968. -55

however, the assembly was less effective. Power to influence,

and power to make important decisions were not limited to

delegates meeting in annual sessions, but were expressed

throughout the party organization in the form of administra

tive, day-to-day business and activities.

The National Executive

One of the most interesting characteristics of the

RIN organization was the way in which checks and balances had

been set up not only to inhibit the concentration of power in

anyone location of the party, but also to provide overlapping

participation and representation from each successive level

of the organizational hierarchy, starting from the top and working its way downward. This vertical arrangement was

supplemented by a "parallel executive" which can be explained

as follows.

The party's highest authority between Congresses was

the Central Council. This Council was composed of the nine member National Executive Committee elected by the general

assembly, plus the regional presidents, the presidents of the

national committees (appointed by the Executive Committee) ,

and, in addition, four permanent voting delegates from the

Montreal region. The idea behind this arrangement was to -56- provide representation from the next lower organizational level, the Regions. However, the additional four permanent votes alloted Montreal members provided an obvious advantage in favour of the most heavily populated Montreal region. In other words, the Council tended to be more representative of the views of a particular faction of the party.

The Council's major function was to carry out the proposals and policies adopted by the general assembly. Deci sions reached by this body were taken on a simple-majority vote, except when a decision taken by the Executive Committee was referred back to the Council for reconsideration, in which case a two-thirds vote was required. However, since the Coun cil was generally convened only once every two months, and in the interval its authority was delegated to the Executive

Committee, the latter body became the focus of power, espe cially in the formulation of strategies and tactics.

Unlike the typical political party, whose activities are limited primarily to election campaigning, the separatist party was involved in a series of direct actions when the situation seemed appropriate, e.g., the St. Leonard school

crisis, workers I strikes, demonstrations. Most often, the

Committee functioned on a week-to-week basis, and in many -57- instances, on a day-to-day schedule, having to take decisions quickly without prior consultation with the more widely representative Central Council. The fact that the Council had the final authority in any decision was not very significant, since many decisions of importance were already faits accom- plis by the time the Council could be convened.

This was not always the case, however; many factional disputes among Committee members prevented that body from reaching a decision and were only settled through the actions lO of the Council. Also, the additional fact that the Council controlled party finances served to restrain the Committee from straying too far from the dictates of the higher authority.

Still, the authority of the Council was exercised more in a "watchdog" capacity than in a positive and creative manner. The responsibility of taking crucial and critical decisions ostensibly fell on the shoulders of the members of the Committee. Even at that, the heaviest burden of leadership (and hence, perhaps the real source of power) was brought to bear on the party leader, himself, who attracted the most

10 Refer, for instance, to the leadership struggle described in Chapter 3 -58- public attention. This was not so by virtue of any constituted authority, but for the practical reason that leaders of parties are generally expected to lead. The role, itself, places the occupant in a natural position of attention and is bound to elicit a high degree of allegience from party followers. In the case of an aggressive, outspoken individual like Bourgault, the role comprises an element of power that cannot be struc turally or even functionally defined. It is through the power of charisma that an aggressive leader builds up around him an aura of authority. The sensationalism attached to separatism adds further to this process, and when dynamic leaders such as Bourgault and Chaput emerge the office of party leader takes on that much more significance. Less forceful figures like d'Allemagne and Pouliot tend to reverse the process.

Nevertheless, the RIN president was still only a particular member of the elected Executive Committee which in turn was ultimately under the authority of the Central Council.

Together, the Committee and Council represented the most important concentration of actual decision-making power in the party organization, but not always the most effective. -59-

The Regional and Sub-Regional Organization

Most of the party's activities and involvement in political affairs occurred at the regional level. The RIN had divided the Province into seventeen administrative dis tricts but only managed to organize thirteen, some of which accounted for no more than a handful of followers. Each region held its own annual general assembly, composed, in the same manner as the national assembly, of voting-delegates and non-voting observer-members. The voting-delegation was made up of the five members of the regional Executive Commit tee and delegates, each representing twenty members from all counties in the region. A president and two vice-presidents were elected to form the regional Executive Committee along with two directors appointed by the Regional Council.

The "parallel executive" (i.e., the Executive Commit tee and the Council) with overlapping representation from the next lower level of the hierarchy characterized the regional level of the organization as well. Each regional Council was composed of five members of the Executive Committee, two representatives from each of the county Executive Committees, and two student representatives. -60-

Regional organizations were not, of course, of equal

importance. Aside from those of Montreal, Quebec City, and to some extent Hull, the party had not, in fact, managed to attract sufficient support to establish more than token representation throughout most of the Province. This was especially true of the rural areaSi a not very surprising thing given the fundamentally urban, middle-c~ass nature of the party which had little in common either in principle or in practical policies with the large rural electorate. For this reason, the separatist party could not claim to be a truly

"national" partYi nor for that matter could the Liberals and the National Union.

Even among the three most important regional organizations, when it came down to actual strategies and tactics 11 of direct action, there was seldom mutual agreement.

It was for purposes of encouraging active participation at the local level, then, that party leaders saw the wisdom in decentralizing the party structure and authority.

More than anything else, the structure tended to mirror the

llFor instance, Quebec City·s refusal of Ferretti's direct-action approach. See p. 36, Chapter 2. -61- existing divergencies of attitudes which appeared most clearly along regional lines. Besides, local leaders oftentimes held more sway over members than did the national executive. Over centralization would probably have created one of two condi tions; II immobilismeII or disintegration. For pragmatic reasons, therefore, decentralized authority appeared as the most logical solution.

The County

The County organization was set up along the lines of the Province's official electoral divisions (108). Each county organization held annual meetings to elect a president, two vice-presidents, and two directors, all of whom together with two additional directors elected by the county Council formed the county's Executive Committee. The organization's primary function was to carry-out policies and directives issued from the Regional organization as well as to organize and coordinate the activities of the Sections within its boundaries.

Again, we find the parallel-executive arrangement between the Committee and the Council. The Council was composed of the seven-member Executive Committee plus two representatives from the Executive Committees of each Section. -62- e· However, since it only met twice a year, its authority was

delegated to the Committee.

The Section

The smallest unit of the party organization was the

section which corresponded to the poll organizations of other

parties. Its membership varied from as few as five members

to as many as one hundred. Each section met annually to elect

an Executive Committee composed of a president, two vice

presidents and two directors. The Committee's major function

was to recruit new members and provide support for the

activities organized at higher levels, especially for grass

roots election campaigning.

Aside from its electoral duties, the role of the sec

tion became increasingly important as the party attempted to

further its activities among striking workers. The section

took on the responsibilities of maintaining close and continual

contact with the working-class electorate.

The rest of the party's organization consisted of a

number of administrative and strictly advisory committees

such as the Secretary General, the Internal Advisory Board,

the Strategy, Propaganda, and Finance Committees, and the -63-

.e Committee on International Affairs. This latter Committee

was set up to establish contacts with international organ-

izations with branch offices in Quebec; it operated mainly

in France. It functioned basically as a propaganda agency,

submitting articles for publication in foreign papers,

journals, and so forth. It also attempted to elicit contri-

butions, especially in France, to support the separatists'

ac t lVltles'" at h orne.12

Finally, the RIN, in an attempt to expand its base

of support among youth of pre-voting age (14-17), set up a

semi-autonomous organization called "les jeunesses rinistes."

This was an attempt by the party to provide a way of "pre-

indoctrinating" students who were approaching the Province's

eighteen-year old voting age requirement into the politics

of separatism. For the students, les jeunesses rinistes

was more of a social club, operating under its own budget and

organizing its own set of social events, such as parties,

dances, and so on. Most of these events, however, were care-

fully tied-in with the activities of the party, as were the

12 Although I was unable to discover the amounts of these contributions, I was let to believe them to be incon siderable. -64- many symbols used by the youth group designed to engender a feeling of loyalty and a sense of urgency for Quebec independence.

The RIN looked upon its youth organization as a long- term investment in future votes, but more importantly for immediate purposes, as a source of actual bodily support for the party's frequent protest rallies and demonstrations.

Les jeunesses rinistes, during its short duration, managed to attract nearly seven hundred followers, mainly in Montreal, before the party's dissolution. Given the emotional appeal of separatism most apparent among younger segments of the population, especially university students, the party's venture into the youth movement could have yielded perhaps 13 its greatest source of support.

l3The Province's legal voting age was not lowered to eithteen until 1964. This generation of voters has therefore had only one opportunity to make its impact on Quebec politics, (1966). This was the same year of the RIN's first and only electoral campaign. Les jeunesses rinistes was not established, however, until after the election and really never had the chance to see the results of its efforts. As a point of inter est, the next Provincial election will most likely be held in 1970 at which time the fourteen-year olds of 1966 will cast their first ballots. In terms of possible votes from the age bracket 14-17, who will be registered to vote in 1970, simple calculations reveal approximately 368,000 new French-Canadian voters from this category. This figure is based upon the 1966 census statistics which recorded approximately 460,000 people -65-

Membership

Membership figures had always been a source of mystery

for outside observers of the RIN. The problem lay in the fact

that the party, for reasons of inefficiency of secrecy -- one

cannot determine for certain which -- stopped recording these

figures in the latter years of its operation. Officially,

only dues-paying members were considered as official members,

and within that category the party at one time classified

members according to active or inactive. However, by 1968,

it appeared that RIN leaders considered its membership to

include non-dues-paying and dues-paying members alike; in other

words, even the party seemed to have only an approximate know-

ledge of its figures.

A safe estimate is that by 1968 the RIN membership

stood at around 14,000 14 of which perhaps 3,000 were active

in the Province in the age-bracket 14-17, (7.8% of the popula tion). Approximately 80% of the Province's population is recorded as "French Canadian" which therefore yields our figure 368,000. Which way the bulk of this vote will go is anybody's guess, but the Parti Quebecois may very well end up as the benefactor of the efforts made by les jeunesses rinistes. (Statistics taken from 1966 Census of Canada, "Population: Single Year of Age," cat. No. 92-611, vol. 1 [1-111 Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Ottawa.)

14Est'lmates were provl. de d me by party 0 ff'lCla. 1s. E- d ward Corbett, in his book, Quebec Confronts Canada, (1967) put the figure more conservatively at 10,000, whereas Pierre Oli vier, La Presse, mentioned that party-membership doubled bet ween 1966 and 1967 to a total of 13,000. The difference is not very significant. -66- in the way of participation in demonstrations and other party functions. A large segment of RIN members in 1968, before the demise of the party, had taken up membership in the MSA.

RIN leaders at that time discounted the importance of this apparent shift of allegience, since Levesque's group was still technically only a movement, not a party. Of the approXimately

14,000 members, about one-third were from the Montreal region, while the rest centered mostly around the Hull and Quebec city areas.

However, the significance of membership figures as a useful indicator of a party's political effectiveness, is a highly debatable point since, by tradition, mass-membership has not been a characteristic of either Canadian of American poI 1t1ca, '1 part1es.. 15 Th'1S wouId seem to h0 1d true for Queb ec politics as well. Thus, while the nature of separatism lends itself to some form of mass-movement, electoral support need not be considered in light of this, as social cleavages do not seem to be reflected in membership composition, even in the case of the RIN.

15This question has been most recently and thoroughly discussed by Leon Epstein, Political Parties in Western Demo cracies, Praeger, 1967, especially Chapter 5. The tradition of mass-membership parties in Europe is analyzed by Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1954. -67-

What is perhaps more important for our analysis is a

look at the actual membership composition of the RIN. Here,

again, little in the way of data is available as a result of

the lack of party records. However, one brief sample survey

was conducted by Le Devoir during the party's 1966 Congress

among fifty delegates out of the six hundred in attendance 16 which yielded the following results:

According to occupation

12 white-collar (e.g. sec 3 members of liberal profes retaries, office workers, sions cadres)

9 technicians 2 university professors

8 students (university) 2 union officers

6 teachers 2 housewives

5 civil servants 1 businessman

Of those polled, one-fifth belonged to unions. The predomi-

nance of the membership appeared to belong to what one might

call the "intellectual" professions, but according to party

officials, much less so than in previous years. The presence

of "blue-collar" workers was an indication that the party was

making some, if slight headway among this class of voters.

-e 16Le Devoir, November 1, 1966. -68-

However, the membership still remained heavily "white-collar."

The most conspicuous absence was among the rural element, or agricultural workers.

According to age

20-30 years: 29 or 58%

30-40 years: 14 or 28%

40-50 years: 4 or 8%

50-60 years: 2 or 4%

60-70 years: 1 or 2%

TOTAL 50 100%

The mean age appeared as 30 years, 6 months. It would be dangerous to extrapolate from these figures conclusions about the general membership, since this survey was taken at a party Congress composed of the party's most highly active members. Party leaders, themselves, estimated the mean age for total membership at between thirty-two and thirty-three; the militants between thirty and forty. They also noted the absence of people between the ages of forty-five and fifty five (the generation of the Depression) .

The RIN made special efforts to attract the support of people between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five whom -69- the party considered as possible holders of command positions in business. In addition, the separatists' drive to recruit members among the working-class failed to achieve its goal, although from the survey, some ground seemed to have been gained.

The few results provided by the survey showed a noticeable shift away from the party's earlier membership composition of mostly artists, civil servants, journalists, and students to the more widely based white-collar occupation groups. However, teachers, professors and students, when taken together (16/50), represent the largest source of support. The RIN remained fundamentally a middle-class phenomenon insofar as membership was concerned -- similar to other

Quebec political parties and Canadian parties in general.17

Party Revenues

Nearly all minor parties are faced with limited sources of revenue. The RIN in particular cou~d tap neither the resources of big business nor the unions, since both groups were highly unfavorable to the idea of separatism.

Furthermore, the RIN was not a popular movement in the sense

17Although the NDP draws its voting support heavily from the working-class, the party's direct membership is clearly middle-class. -70- of a large membership upon which the party could depend for substantial contributions. Yet, despite the lack of any significant base of financial support, the separatist organization managed to articulate its cause with suprising success.

It was also able to carry out an elaborate electoral campaign in 1966. Much of the party's success in publicizing the cause of independence was due to public curiosity, spurred on by mass media coverage,18 but also to the ingenuity of party organizers.

The party's propaganda machine was kept constantly busy sending out press releases, organizing press conferences, agitating on behalf of popular grievances and assuring adequate coverage of the party's numerous rallies and demonstrations. Publicity of this sort, when properly handled, costs little in terms of an actual outlay of money.

As to the total annual revenues of the RIN, little in the way of accurate figures were available; a problem not atypical of most political parties. A look at some of the resources at the disposal of the party, however, will provide

l8Many accusations were levelled against the CBC French language station in Montreal as being a "den" of separatists. Although no evidence to substantiate these charges have been brought forth, there is little doubt that many employees were indeed sympathetic with the separatists' cause. -71-

some approximate amounts. The RIN 1 apparently I relied almost exclusively upon dues collected from members. Annual member ship in the party cost seven dollars which, considering over

contributing of some members I yielded something in the vicin ity of $100,000 annually. This relatively small amount was barely enough to defray the costs of maintaining a party head quarters in Montreal, publishing party literature, and paying the annual salary of the president ($10,000).

The largest single expense for the party was the publication of its newspaper, l'Independance, on a bi-monthly basis. The journal was mainly financed by the sale of adver tising space to small merchants and from the collections received by "les amis de l'Independance" a committee set up to assure the continued operation of the party journal.

Similar to other parties, the RIN kept a list of

"special contributors" who could be depended upon to contrib ute from time to time amounts of fifty to a hundred dollars to support special activities undertaken by the party, such as the making of a film, mass-media advertising and especially, the running of an election campaign. The largest individual

contribution ever received by the party I according to officials, was $2,000 during the 1966 election campaign in which the party -72- ran a slate of seventy-three candidates at a reported cost of $100,000; a substantially small amount compared to the maJor. part'leSe 19

Whatever the total annual budget might have been for the RIN, it was certain that the party depended more upon volunteer help and originality of approach in maximizing the impact of its obviously limited resources.

Evaluation

Perhaps the best way of evaluating the RIN as a political party would be in terms of the principles originally laid down by party organizers in their attempt to establish what they considered to be a truly democratic structure -- free expression and active participation. Such ideals of course are completely compatible with the generally accepted notions of democracy but, for various reasons, have always seemed to be unattainable when constructing the vast organizational bureaucracy apparently necessary for the competitive operations of political parties.

19AcCording to the 129,000 votes received by the RIN in the 1966 election, that would amount to $1.29 per vote. Taking into account the element of a "diminishing return," compared to the major parties, the RIN got off amazingly cheaply. -73-

Before turning directly to the RIN organization,

though, it would be appropriate to first draw attention to

certain criticisms and observations made about parties in

general by what I would like to call "organization pessimists."

A foremost proponent of this school of thought is Robert

Michels who, in his book Political Parties, provides a des-

cription of organizational behavior and then of the tendencies

characteristic of all political parties. 20

According to Michels, the "masses" possess a general

"attitude" that makes them amenable to control from the top

of the organizational hierarchy. This attitude is character-

ized by either apathy or a plain unwillingness to participate

actively in policy-making, or simply a lack of the necessary

time and skill. These characteristics are reinforced by a

tendency on the part of leaders to strengthen their control

and autonomy by any available means. Aiding them in their

pursuit is a technical superiority on their part which arises

from the complexity of the organization. The end result of

this is that the respective positions of the leaders and the

led are in fact inverted. This loss of internal democracy,

20 Although Michels' analysis concentrates on the socialist parties, he concludes that such tendencies are characteristic of organizations in general. Political Parties, New York, 1959. -74- which finds the mass being controlled instead of controlling

the leaders occurs, according to Michels, while the party

retains a fa~ade of democracy.

Now, if what Michels and other "organization pessi

mists" say is true, we should be concerned as to whether or

not the organizational structure of a party makes any differ

ence with respect to who gains the ultimate control of the

party. Moreover, we should ask ourselves if membership

participation in any significant way actually affects this

control.

In the light of the intentions of RIN organizers and

the observations of Michels, what can be said about the

attempted democratization of our separatist political party?

The answer may be found by analyzing more carefully some of

the structural "checks and balances" built into the party

organization. Let us recall first of all the "parallel exec utive" set up at the county, regional, and national levels between the various Executive Committees and the Councils.

Here we see that the Council, which is the more broadly

representative of the two, serves to scrutinize the actions

of the Committee in its day-to-day responsibilities of decision making. Granted that the same committee members sit as members -75- of the Council as well, it must be noted that in each case the number of Council members representative of the next lower level in the hierarchy always exceeds the total number of

Committee members, thus providing an important element of accountability to the membership below. In addition, by virtue of the fact that the Council has the power to veto any Com- mittee decision, there can be an effective check against any encroachment that might be attempted by the executive elite; to wit: the leadership struggle between Bourgault and Fer- ' 21 rett1.

Probably the most important check on elite control, however, was provided for by the frequency of national Con- gresses where each year the party programme and policies were reviewed by the general assembly and all executive officers were required to stand for re-election. The effect of this was to create a degree of "election uncertainty" and thus encourage more leadership accountability to the rank and file.

It might appear that the great disadvantage of such a technique would be to provoke party instability inasmuch as the assurance of leadership continuity is important to a

21 See Chapter 2, pp. 35-36. -76-

-e party. This apparently did not present itself as a real prob

lem during the stay of the RIN. Instead, the advantage was

that the frequent assemblies provided opportunities for the

resolution of major conflicts within the ranksi again to wit:

the Bourgault-Ferretti case in 1967-68 and the Chaput case in

1963. The essential question remains as to whether or not

a party adopting such mechanisms ends up by diminishing its

effectiveness in terms of electoral competition which, after

all, is the raison d'etre of a political party. Since the

RIN competed only once in an election, the question unfortu

nately remains open. At any rate, the RIN seemed to have

gone further along the road of structural democratization than

have other Canadian political parties.

Yet another "control device" of the membership over

party direction lay in the RIN journal, l'Independance. A

glance at back issues of the paper reveals a considerable

amoung of open criticism by members of party programmes and

leaders, and even of the whole approach to separatism. L'In

dependance, though it contained its full share of party propa

ganda, published frequent in-depth analyses of contemporary

social, economic, and political problems in Quebec which more

often than not tended to support many of the grievances -77- accentuated by the separatists. The journal appeared not to have been in the hands of any single party faction, but remained quite independent and served to keep the members informed.

Furthermore, the militancy apparent among members at the regional levels of the organization (especially Montreal) , given the nature of the decentralized power structure, worked in favour of greater local control. Most of the party's activities depended upon the initiative and participation of members at the grass-roots level and for that reason a large amount of discretion was left in their hands. This power arrangement often posed serious problems for the overall maintenance of party unity, particularly in the light of the sharply different orientations in Montreal and Quebec.

Finally, control from the top was further weakened by the absence of "disciplinary tools" traditionally available to the major political parties in order to encourage loyalty.

Particularly lacking were the "incentive" material rewards.

Such devices as patronage, the appointment of obedient members to salaried and prestigious party posts, or even the expecta tion of running as a party candidate for election are often -78- enough sufficient cause for members not to step too far out of the line drawn from above. Since the RIN was very far from attaining power, whence come such resources, party leaders could not depend upon "pay-offs" of this sort to exact the discipline needed to support elite control. To say that RIN leaders would have utilized these control devices to get their way had they been in a position to do so is pure conjecture.

Nevertheless, Michels was probably correct in saying that all political parties tend to do so.

Having evaluated the structural features of the party organization insofar as they lend themselves to the limitation of elite control, we now turn to a consideration of its actual behavior. For despite elaborate mechanisms that might be built into a party organization to assure democracy, there remain those "natural tendencies" inherent in all forms of human organizations which to a major degree determine who controls whom.

One important characteristic of all organizations, according to the "iron law" theory, is that there is always an elite composed of the "most influential" members. This elite is generally more knowledgeable and experienced than the rest of the members, and because of this greater expertise -79- the tendency is for the elite to get its "own way" in the organization. So far, it should be noted, the characteristics described by Michels should not be interpreted as being necessarily undemocratic. What he has described are basically those characteristics inherent in any form of divi- sion of labour. The more skilled a person becomes by virtue of his specific function, the more he expects others less experienced to "take his word for it." The danger to democracy arises from the way in which the expert elite decides to get its way. Michels argues that the elite will use any means at its disposal, including manipulation.

Manipulative control by an elite, then, lS what under- mines the internal democracy of political parties. To what extent was this true of the RIN?

In the first place, the RIN did have an elite; that is to say, a small group of the most influential. It included members of the Executive Committee and Central Council out of which perhaps eig.ht were the "most" influential. 22 They were presumably the most experienced and knowledgeable and therefore found themselves in positions of leadership. Since leaders

22Accord'lng t 0 party 1ea der An d re" d'llA emagne. -80- are elected to lead, they naturally seek to have their posi tions and tactics accepted by the membership as being in the interest of the party as a whole.

The point here is that the probability of an elite, or an elite member, successfully manipulating the mass of

RIN party members for their particular ends was greatly reduced by the structural features described earlier. Attempts were made, admittedly, by a small number of members to "rail road" their position through the general membership, as in the case of Ferretti and her followers. But such attempts had little chance of success. Even Bourgault's manipulative attempt to have his handpicked slate of candidates elected proved a failure. These are only two examples, to be sure, but what they point out is that by the nature of the party's system of checks and balance, plus the high degree of active participation by a large number of members, manipulation by an elite was a highly venturesome undertaking with small chance of success.

However/ the RIN was beset by one particular problem which made the tendency toward oligarchic control more possible than might normally have been the case. There was an obvious lack of turn-over in leadership positions; most of the same -81- faces that appeared in the original movement in 1960, still held the party's key posts in 1968 when the RIN finally dis solved. The only real challenge to the leadership during the party's eight years of existence turned out to be the unsuc cessful coup of Ferretti and other left-wing radicals (although this group held down key posts for a few years in the Montreal regional Executive). Where then were the contenders?

The answer can best be given by considering the RIN in the general context of separatist movements in Quebec.

In terms of the "normal" life-span of separatist groups, the

RIN experienced probably one of the longest. After more than eight years of political struggle and attempting to build a base for eventual electoral victory, the party appeared to be no closer to achieving its goals than it had been two or even three years earlier. In short, the RIN was simply worn out. The party was unable, after several tries, to recruit any prominent political figures to its ranks, such as Levesque, Aquin, or even Gregoire. No professional politician, or any popular personage for that matter, dared attach himself to this separatist group which, by 1968, had sufficiently associated itself with public violence as to become a political liability for any aspiring politician.

In other words, the party lacked depth in leadership material. -82-

Actually, the party could not afford a turnover in its top party posts because of the potential loss of public attention surrounding people like Bourgault and Chaput. This is not a question of demagoguery; once a party leader manages to build up his own public image through his personality, political style, etc., the party stands to benefit from the publicity as well. This is not to imply a personality cult; after all, the RIN ousted Chaput who had been the separatists' biggest attraction in a long while. All political party leaders tend to be selected by members not only for their 23 ability and acumen, but as potential vote-getters as well.

Hence, unless someone from the ranks is capable of offering more to the party in terms of public appeal, there seems to be little reason to replace the present leader unless, of course, he is guilty of gross incompetence.

In addition, the separatist party possessed little in the way of material incentives for would-be leaders. The party president was the only salaried officer, and, aside from the party cause itself, there existed few ways in which to reward party workers for the heavy responsibilities associated with the offices.

23Thl,s l'S true even 0 f the 1ess dynamlc . partIdy ea ers as Robert Stanfield of the Federal P.C.s and Tommy Douglas of the NDP. -83-

Thus an elite provided the direction of the party.

It was a non-manipulative elite for the most part, but it failed to recruit new blood and seemed to lose elan. Leader ship recruitment is a problem in most political parties, and is was a particularly difficult one for the separatist RIN. CHAPTER IV

IMPACT OF THE RIN UPON QUEBEC POLITICS

The defeat of the Liberal Party in the 1966 Provin- cial election carne as a shock to nearly everyone concerned, including many National Union supporters. "How did it happen?" was the immediate reaction and voting analysts quickly set out to explain why. The presence for the first time of candidates from the Rassemblement pour l'Independance Nationale in seventy-three of the hundred and eight electoral counties, and the surprisingly "high" percentage of votes they received in some of them led many observers to conclude that they were a deciding factor in the Liberal defeat.

These initial observations were later corroborated by the findings of Professor Guy Bourassa in a study entitled,

"Le scrutin du 5 juin 1966 et les tiers partis,,,l and further supported by the studies of Professor Robert Boily and asso 2 ciates. Finally, Koula Mellos, in her analysis of the 1966

lunpublished work.

2unpublished work of Professors R. Boily, S. Carlos, and P. Guimond of l'Universite de Montreal, and V. Lemieux of l'Universite de Laval. -85-

general elections in Quebec, went as far as to say:

The impact of the minor parties of the election result was such as to have caused (emphasis mine) a U.N. victory and a Liberal defeat. The RIN succeeded (sic) in splitting the Liberal vote at a significant point for a Liberal loss, although not managing to get a single RIN candidate elected. 3

The onus of the narrow Liberal defeat was placed

squarely on the shoulders of the separatists who, themselves, must have found regalement over their new role as "David

striking down Goliath." The obvious question is whether or

not the Liberal Party would have suffered defeat even if the

RIN had not contested the election. A closer look at some

of Mellos' findings is necessary.4

To start with, Mellos states that: "The political

ideology and political action programme of the Rassemblement pour l'Independance Nationale bear a great resemblance to

that of the Liberal Party." 5 Then, it is shown that in each

3 Koula Mellos, The Quebec General Elections of 1966, Master's thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 1967.

4Mellos' material here is based upon the unpublished work of Professors Bourassa and Boily, Ope cit.

5 Mellos, Ope cit., pp. 153-154. -86- of twelve particular constituencies,6 all of which were lost by the Liberals, the combined Liberal-RIN vote exceeded the 7 combined UN_RN vote. It follows from this, according to these observers, that in all probability, the majority of the RIN votes would have swung in favor of the Liberals in the absence of the separatist party which, of course, would have reversed the outcome of the election. Such conclusions,

I will argue here, were perhaps too hastily drawn.

In the first place, can it be accurately assumed that the Jlpolitical ideology and action programme Jl of the RIN and the Liberal parties had any great resemblance at the time of the 1966 Quebec Provincial election? Was it not in the Jlimage Jl rather than in the ''substance'' that there seemed to be any similarity? Admittedly, compared to the traditionally conservative National Union party, both the RIN and the Liberals were "progressive" and were situated somewhere left of center.

However, by 1966, the old image of the NU was rapidly under- going change; the party's new leader, Daniel Johnson, was

6Bourget, Chauveau, Lafontaine, l'Assomption, Maison neuve, Papineau, Rouville, St-Henri, St-Hyacinthe, St-Maurice, Terrebonne, and Trois-Rivieres. JPid., pp. 155-157. Professor Bourassa, in his study, demonstrates this point for thirty-five constituencies. 7Given the parochial and traditional character of the RN, there seems little doubt that in the absence of the RN, these votes would have shifted to the NU, since there was no real alternative for them. -87-

seen as representative of the NU's progressive wing, having

associated himself in the past with other such "progressive"

party leaders as Jean-Jacques Bertrand, Paul Sauve, and even

Marcel Faribault. Johnson's book, Egalite ou Independance, published in 1965,8 just one year before the election, gave

the impression of a new, invigorated and highly nationalistic party which had somehow disassociated itself from the more unpleasant memories of Maurice Duplessis.

Substantively speaking, the election platforms of the

Liberals and the National Union parties bore as close a

resemblance to each other as one could find upon close analysis between the RIN and the Liberals. Both parties (the Liberals

and the NU) stated their favor for private enterprisei both were committed to making the French language a truly "national" languagei both had taken similar positions with respect to social security benefits, economic development, manpower and immigration policies, and so on.

The one seemingly major difference between the two older parties, on which the RIN and Liberals appeared more closely aligned, centered on the Province's education system.

8Daniel Johnson, Egalite ou Independance, Editions de L1Homme, Montreal, 1965. -88-

The NU appeared to endorse the existing "confessional" school system, whereas the Liberals seemed to be heading for secu larization (i.e., "non-confessional" schools).9 The RIN had unequivocally declared itself in support of non-confessional schools within a unified educational system based on the

French language alone.

The fact of the matter was that the positions of the

NU and the Liberals were far closer than between the Liberals and the RIN. The NU had stated its acceptance of the principle of confessional schools, but recognized the rights of "neutral" schools to obtain state support. The Liberals had stated their acceptance of the principle of neutral schools but recognized the rights of the majority to have confessional schools. The RIN was in a category all by itself, since Gre- goire's Ralliement National had totally rejected the concept 10 of neutral schools.

9 The Parent Commission was set up by the Liberal Government in 1962 to look into the conditions of education in Quebec. In its final report, recommendations were made to introduce "neutral" schools into the public school system. Report of the Royal Comnission of Enquiry on Education, Quebec, 1964-1966.

10See published party platforms of all four parties for 1966. -89-

Perhaps the platform positions were less important a

factor than the image projected by each party on this issue.

But even the images projected by both major parties with

respect to confessional schools were not sufficiently clear

so as to allow the electorate a clear-cut choice. The Liberals

did not come out and state that they would not allow the

confessional school system to continue, and neither did the

NU make clear its intentions with respect to the introduction

of neutral schools. Both parties spoke of "rights" and

"principles," but in the vaguest of terms. And to say that

the Liberal party's position was far closer to that of the RIN

rather than the NU, at least in the mind of the average voter,

would be to assume too much. The resemblance one way or

another was by no means all that clear.

As far as any other possible similarities between the

action programmes or even the political ideologies of the

RIN and the Liberals, ones that did not exist between the

Liberals and the NU, one might consider the party positions

with respect to the use of the state as a "force agissante,"

or instrument for social change. Here again, the NU of 1966

was far closer to the Liberals of 1966 (not, however, of

1962) than the latter was to the RIN. A close examination

of all three party platforms will, I believe, validate this observation. -90-

It would be wise at this point to ask ourselves

whether or not the similarities of party plarforms and ideol-

ogies are even relevant for an understanding of the voting

behavior in the 1966 Election, since Mellos, in her work,

after asserting the resemblance, discounts this factor alto- ll gether as a determinant in voting behavior in Quebec.

Instead, she uses the four characteristics, "ethnic, social

class, education, and income" as variables "leading to the

motivation in voting.,,12

with respect to these four factors, Mellos convincingly

demonstrates that as far as the constituencies on the island

of Montreal were concerned, the National Union tended to

IlThis position is one held by Lipset, Political Man, esp. Chapter 7, op. cit., and V.O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 4th ed., Cromwell, New York, 1958. According to this thesis, voters from the working-class or lower classes, are generally "non-rational" in their choice of parties; that is to say, they are not usually familiar or even at all interested in party platforms and ideologies, but vote rather, according to other determinants, such as family tradition, ethnic group affiliation, social class, etc. This argument is still being hotly debated, and even Key, before his death, in his unfinished work, The Responsible Electorate, appeared to be changing his mind about what has now become almost an axiomatic rule of the American (and Canadian) voter. with respect to this doubt, then, the above described "deter minants" might be more accurately regarded as "correlates" of voting behavior.

12Mellos, op. cit. The other variables disqualified by Mellos, based on the study of Professor Boily, are: stature of candidate, his oratorial style, and voter's feeling of his affinity with a particular party. p. 139, footnote 1. -91- gather most of its votes from those constituencies with a heavy majority of French Canadians who were generally of low education, low income, and low social standing, whereas the

Liberals drew more voting support among French Canadians of a high income, higher education, and a higher social stand- . 13 lng. But nowhere does Mellos tell us from what sort of electorate the RIN managed to draw its support. Given the r~latively small percentage of votes won by the separatist party (7.3% of the vote in the 73 seats contested), I would suggest such an electoral profile is virtually impossible to 14 make.

The whole argument that the Liberals would have received RIN votes in the absence of that party rests on two major premises: 1) The parties have similar platforms; and, 2) The socio-economic characteristics of the RIN membership are similar to the supporters of the Liberal Party (i.e., they are both middle-class, bourgeois parties). We have

13 . Ibl~, p. 148.

14It should be noted that Mellos was primarily con cerned with the RIN votes in the constituencies on the island of Montreal in many of which the separatists gained around 12% of the vote (the highest was in outremont at 18%). How ever, the RIN's average for the total 27 constituencies on the island was still insufficiently large for any sort of accurate profile. (See Appendix.) -92- dispensed with the first premise, for purposes of this argument; let us proceed to the second.

In this regard, it was generally recognized that the

RIN drew its membership support from the middle-class, professional, white-collar workers,lS although no thorough study has so far been conducted. This profile is similar to that of the Liberal party, hence, one would argue that both parties would presumably draw votes from basically the same electorate.

Going on this assumption, Mellos makes the point that the presence of RIN candidates in four key Montreal ridings,

Bourget, Maisonneuve, Lafontaine, and Papineau, "made the difference between a UN win and a Liberal 10ss.,,16

In these respective ridings, the RIN managed to get 17 9.8%, 12.3%, 11.1% and 10.3%. The profile of the electorates in all four ridings is that of heavily French Canadian, of the lower level of income, lower level of education, and lower social class, which correlates with constituencies that gave voting support to the NU. One can argue at this point

ISSee Chapter 3, pp. 67-68.

16Mellos, op. cit., p. 139.

1 7My ca 1 cu1·atlons In.t h e Appen dlX .s how 9 . 6,f'10, 1 2 • 2,f'10, 11.2% and 10.3% respectively. -93-

that the vote received by the RIN in these predominantly

lower-class districts actually carne from what little middle

class that exists there/ in effect/ cutting in on Liberal

support. This position, however, is highly tenuous; for

instance, we do not know with any degree of certainty who

voted for the RIN, particularly in these four ridings. More

over/ the RIN received similar percentages in middle-class

and upper-class ridings. In light of this, it would seem

that more substantial evidence is called for before general

izations regarding probable shifts in voting support between

the RIN and the Liberal party could be made.

Furthermore, there is reason enough to make a strong

case in the opposite direction; i.e., that a large percentage

of the RIN vote (conceiveably even a majority) in at least

these four key ridings would have gone to the NU rather than

the Liberals. This position/ although less popular, appears

more arguable when considered in light of the one factor not

considered in Mellos' or Boily's analysis (perhaps the most

important insofar as RIN voting support) -- party image with

respect to nationalism.

Mellos, herself, in attempting to explain the signifi e- cance of the "ethnic factor" states that "The ethnic factor -94-

lS more closely connected to the party image which was painted particularly during the campaign. The UN was the more nationalistic, the more 'French Canadian'; the Liberal Party remained 18 fairly moderate." The RIN, of course, was by far the most nationalistic.

I would further argue the hypothesis that those who voted for the RIN, in the majority of the cases, did so out of a feeling of nationalism, and not out of a concern so much for party manifesto, which Mellos, Boily, et al., dis- count in their studies as well. It may well be that the three factors, ethnic, socio-economic, and religious accounted for the voting support given the older parties, but not, I would contend, in the case of the RIN. Even if the RIN's position could be interpreted as simply, and for the most part, one of "protest," without the presence of the separatist party,

RIN supporters could have registered their protest either by voting for the NU or abstaining altogether. The argument presented here is, of course, without definitive evidence since little in the way of empirical work has been done so far. My purpose lS not to "prove" an opposite case but merely

18 bOd 1-2:-.:..' pp. 148-149. -95- to cast doubt on the prevailing interpretations drawn by

Mellos, Boily, Bourassa, et al., and to raise the possibility of deriving very different conclusions.

Accordingly, it would appear that there is as much

"evidence," or more accurately, "reason" to suspect the opposite conclusions arrived at by this general interpreta- tion. Reason, in this sense, is not hard proof, but, for that matter, neither are there adequate date available to

"prove" the other case. Perhaps the safest position to take toward the RIN "phenomenon" during the 1966 Election is to conclude that its effect on the outcome will remain uncertain until a more complete analysis of that vote is accomplished.

Despite the optimism generated among separatist circles at the outcome of the 1966 Election, the significance of electoral competition for the RIN was slight. At best, it was an experiment that achieved minimal results. The real

"victory" for the separatist group, though, came from its psychological impact as a third party advocating such a radical position. Strategists for the major parties could not but have wondered just where the popularity lay and to what extent. The separatists' appeal was difficult to gauge in spite of the findings of various opinion polls which provided -96-

a t mos ton 1y a cursory Vlew.0 f publlC.sen tlment. . 19 Given

the volatile nature and past history of French-Canadian nationalism, the RIN, small as it was, was nevertheless a force to be reckoned with.

The Liberal Party, however, did not appear particularly disturbed by the presence of a third-party threat, especially one of such dubious character. with what some observers later described as "euphoric bliss," the Liberals were content to fall back on their progressive record in office, and the popular images projected by such leaders as Lesage, Leves- que, Gerin-Lajoie, Aquin, Laporte, etc., who had succeeded in carrying the party to victory in the 1962 Election.

The National Union, on the other hand, was faced with an entirely different problem. The "old" NU drew upon the traditional nationalistic sentiment of the French-Canadian

19The results of a public opinion poll conducted in Quebec on the issue of separatism by the Social Research Group and published in MacLean's, November, 1963, showed only about 12% of the voting population in favour of separatism. A similar poll conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, published in the Montreal Star, November 23, 1968, showed 11% in favour. At the time of the Election, it was difficult to tell whether separatism had grown to as much as 25% as some people claimed or remained constant. (The com bined votes of the RIN and RN for the 1966 Election totalled only about 9%.) -97-

20 electorate, particularly in rural ridingsi the "new" NU, led by Johnson, was to do essentially the same thing only

in the context of what party leaders believed to be the new wave of nationalism. What this amounted to was to have at least one of the two major parties willing to gamble more on the kind of nationalism associated with the separatist movement.

To what extent the NU's strategy paid off in terms of votes is hazardous to say. The fact remains, though, that the National Union won office, whereas the Liberals did not, despite the unusu~l circumstance of the winning party receiving fewer popular votes than the losing party.

Once in office, the NU continued in an almost trifling way, to proceed along the lines of nationalism and separatism.

French President De Gaulle's lire-conquest" of French-Canada in the summer of 1967 confirmed reports that Quebec was establishing stronger ties with her "motherland" to the acclaim of separatists and the dismay of others. This now famous occasion see~ed to be curiously related to a series of later events such as the Quebec-Gabon-Paris foreign policy dispute

20 Herbert F. Quinn, The Union Nationale, University of Toronto Press, 1963, especially Chapter 7. -98- with ottawa, the controversial Brinco deal (involving the territorial implications of the Churchill Falls power develop ment), the government1s passive role in the St-Leonard school crisis and the highly "unorthodoxll display of Quebec Provin cial Police at the Federal-Provincial Conference held in ottawa in early 1967. These events, coupled with the rise to prominence within the government of such outspoken IInation alist" leaders as Jean-Noel Tremblay, and Jean-Guy Cardinal seemed to confirm the opinion that the RIN was perhaps on the right track afterall; only the NU got to office first. How- ever, such an impression is false if taken too seriously.

The argument presented here is only to show that the separatist party in many ways, mostly intangible, "impressed" NU strate gists to such an extent that party leaders perceived an electoral advantage out of a change in image; one more directly associated with the nationalistic and even separatist appeals of the RIN.

Thus the real impact of the RIN was felt not so much as a result of its activities as a political party as from its actions as a pressure group, or, more descriptively, as a

"clarion ll of nationalism. What distinguished the RIN from nearly all previous nationalist movements was its determined -99- drive for Quebec independence on a programme of secularization and mOdernization. Independence speaks for itself. Yet, it was not even the secularism of the party which attracted so much attention among the French Canadians, because the movement in this direction was already well under way through the efforts of the Montreal-based Mouvement laIc de la langue fran- c;aise.

Still one could not even say that it was simply its nationalism that won the RIN the popularity it achieved.

The Ralliement National was perhaps even more nationalistic but in the traditional sense. The RIN, by comparison, was characteristically a left-wing nationalist movement that

functioned as an outlet for the emotional and intellectual pursuits of a secularized and urbanized new mass of French

Canadians. By "new mass," I am referring to the products of

the post-war generation of French-Canadians who enjoyed greater prosperity than their predecessors who were more educated,

and urbanized, and who eventually became increasingly critical of the traditional role played by the Catholic Church in

the affairs of the State.

If the RIN was fundamentally a movement of "modern-

izing" nationalism, it could also be seen as a "symptom" of -100- e· a far greater malaise of a French-Canadian society threatened by extinction in the midst of a predominantly English-speaking

world whose cultural influence was expanding more rapidly

than ever before across the frontiers of Quebec by waY of

industrialization and commercialization. In short, it was

a "symbol" of a people's deeply rooted concern for national

"survival," that the RIN managed to realize its greatest

impact on Quebec politics.

But the impact did not stop there. The increasing

intensification of French-Canadian nationalism was brought

to bear upon the policies and direction of the Canadian

Federal government as well. The resurgence of the appeal to

separatism became a truly national issue under the Pearson

government as early as 1963 when the Royal Commission on

Bilingualism and Biculturalism was set up to examine the

growing constitutional crisis between Quebec and the rest of

Canada. After a year and a half of extensive research, inves-

tigation and hearings, the Commission stated with a sense of

alarm that the Federal structure was indeed in a serious state

of a ffalrs,. a11 ud'lng to th e separatlst.p h enomenon In.Que b ec. 21

21A Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilin gualism and Biculturalism, ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1965. The previous major attempt to look into the French-Canadian "pro blem" was undertaken by Lord Durham, under the aus.pices of the British Privy Council in 1838. Report on the Affairs of British North America. -101-

within a short while, an attempt was underway to

"bilingualize" the federal civil service along the lines recommended by the Commission. Then in 1966, the Federal-

Provincial Committee on Constitutional Affairs was established with the purpose of looking into the question of devising a new constitutional arrangement more compatible with the interests of each Province, with special focus on the particular problems of Quebec. Moreover, committees, at both federal and provincial levels, were formed to investigate the possibility and desirability of legislation dealing with bilingualism in the Provinces. While most of these measures were designed to respond to the pressures of rising French-

Canadian nationalism, they often turned out to serve as ammunition for Quebec government leaders to demand even more, especially with respect to fiscal powers. 22

Finally, the election-sweep of Pierre Elliot-Trudeau and the Liberal Party in 1968 was viewed by many as Canada's answer to Quebec nationalism and a direct reproach to the separatists. That Trudeau was looked upon as "the man to handle the separatists" was no secret; his unflinching stand

22Early speeches by several Quebec political leaders to this effect appear in Scott and Oliver, Quebec States Her Case, op. cit. -102- in the face of violence at the St-Jean-Baptiste parade the night before the federal election appeared to reinforce this faith.

None of these events, to be sure, can be considered as direct outgrowths of the RIN's activities as a political party. But they can be seen as related to the growing sen timent toward separatism apparent in Quebec. Such sentiment would certainly not have been so significant if the RIN, or some other similar organization had not been present to articulate French-Canadian nationalism into political demands as part of a programme of independence. The RIN skillfully agitated for the grievances of separatists while the two major provincial parties carefully exploited the nationalist feelings in general in their dealings with officials from ottawa.

Clearly, then, the impact of the RIN came not as a result of its activities as a political party as much as from its role as a pressure group. It succeeded in mobilizing an important, although not large, segment of the urban popula tion, especially among the younger age groups, if not in direct support of the activities of the party, at least in general sympathy with the cause of separatism. It managed to aggregate the demands of certain segments of the popula- -103- tion and to articulate them in the form of a coherent programme for change.

Thus the RIN failed as a political party. It did not achieve any direct hold on political power nor did it gain the support of any powerful group such as unions, businesses, politicians, church groups, etc. When it returned to the strategy of direct action following the 1966 Election, the party lacked a concerted programme for mass appeal and instead began drifting more and more to actions, sometimes, violent, that tended to bring out the extremist elements of the party.

As long as the major parties continued to remain ambiguous on the issue of separatism, the RIN experienced all the more frustration since it was unable to polarize public opinion in its favour.

The RIN became either directly involved or implicated in such events as the Seven-Up dispute, the Saint-Jean

Baptiste Day violence, the bombing of the La Grenade factory and several other incidences of violence.

Violence within a short time became the new image of the party. Although most of it was perpetrated by only a small radical minority of the membership, party leaders were unable to prevent the apparent drift in that direction. The -104- immediate effect was to turn several thousands of the more moderate members toward the then recently formed MSA whose leader, Rene Levesque, wasted no time in condemning the activities of the RIN. It also awakened the fear on the part of the vast majority of French Canadians toward separatism in general but especially the RIN's brand.

Thus, in its attempts to apply its strategy of direct action in order to expand the base of party support, the RIN became the victim of its own radicalism. When the party finally collapsed in October, 1968, the migration to Leves que's new political party, le Parti Quebecois was slight; the exodus was nearly already complete. CONCLUSION-EPILOGUE

On October 26, 1968, the RIN held its final party

Congress for the sole purpose of dissolution. Separatism did not die, only the leadership for the cause of Quebec independence shifted to the recently formed Parti Quebecois under the dynamic personality of Rene Levesque. The merger of the Ralliement National, led by eX-Creditiste Gilles

Gregoire, and the Mouvement Souverainete-Association, the creation of Levesque, came after six months of reconciling ideological differences of opinion. The RIN reluctantly conceded its long-held position of leadership.

Was such an event to be expected? In retrospect, the answer should be yes. First of all, it was becoming increasingly clear that, for a number of reasons, the RIN by

1968 was losing ground in its long drive to mobilize further public support for its cause. In addition to such factors as the lack of depth in party leadership and the apparent endorsement of federalism given by the Quebec electorate in the

1968 Election (interpreted, whether erroneously or not, as a rejection of separatism), the RIN had lost a great deal of ground as a result of its alleged association with a series -106- of violent occurrences which took place within the period of two years between 1966 and 1968. Furthermore, the splits within the party which ultimately erupted in the form of a leadership struggle between Bourgault and Ferretti in the spring of 1968, left the RIN organization impaired and serious ly weakened both in the eyes of the public and those of the party membership.

Precisely at the time the RIN was experiencing this internal trouble, Rene Levesque emerged with what turned out to be a more moderate and apparently more convincing approach to the issue of separatism. For instance, the RIN had called for absolute independence of Quebec from the rest of Canada, the MSA was advocating an economic association in the form of a North American "common market." Where the RIN had continually refused to recognize the education and linguistic rights of the powerful English-speaking minority, particu larly in Montreal, the MSA was willing to maintain these rights. Where the RIN demanded a sudden and severe change in the immigration policy of Quebec, the MSA adopted a gradualist approach.

still another important difference in the position taken by both groups was on the issue of neutral schools. -107-

The RIN rejected confessional school systems altogether,

whereas the MSA adopted the position of allowing for neutral

and confessional schools thus extending its appeal to encom

pass both the more secular urban population and the traditional,

church-oriented rural communities. Perhaps most important

of all was the MSA's strong criticism and rejection of violence

by its public attack on the extreme tactics employed by RIN

members.

In fact, the MSA capitalized quickly on the disrup

tions taking place within the RIN and presented itself as a

more credible, responsible and experienced political associa

tion that was far more capable of leading Quebec into inde

pendence than the more youthful, inexperienced RIN. After

all, the MSA was staffed by tried and "hard" politicians such

as Levesque, Aquin, and Gregoire; the RIN had no such creden

tials, and seemed unlikely to ever attract any reputable

political figures into its ranks.

Furthermore, the MSA had deliberately ignored any

idea of permitting a merger with the RIN, being fully aware

of the fading image of Quebec's oldest separatist party. On

two occasions during the six months between the MSA'a forma

·e tion and its transformation into a political party, RIN -108- leaders attempted to negotiate a merger and they were flatly rebuffed each time.

On the other hand, Levesque found it more politically sound to seek an alliance with the right-wing RN, instead of the left-wing RIN. The rationale was simply this: the RNwould provide a rural, more traditional base of support, while

Levesque, himself, would pick up the urban areas. Besides, it was becoming increasingly clear that the RIN was on the decline, and there was no good reason for jeopardizing the new image of the MSA by even associating with an already stigmatized "extremist" group, especially when the chances were great that such refusal to cooperate would in itself precipitate the final collapse of the RIN.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, thousands of RIN members shifted their allegiance to Levesque's group almost immediately upon its formation. RIN leaders shrugged off the importance of this cross-over by arguing that since the MSA at that time was not yet a political party, the dual membership represented no real threat to the RIN. However, it was more than evident to both Levesque and Bourgault that when the

"moment of truth" arrived, the RIN would emerge the loser by a few thousand members. -109-

That moment arrived on October 13, in Montreal when

thousands of MSA followers gathered, RIN members among them,

to adopt a programme of action and declare the formation of

the Parti Quebecois, Quebec's newest political party. RIN

leaders now were faced with the decision whether or not their party would continue to exist and compete with the far stronger

PQ, revert back to the role of a pressure group, or disband

the organization completely and rally round the new standard bearer of independence.

Thus the party's Congress was called to determine

the fate of the organization. RIN President Bourgault, party

stalwart d'Allemagne, along with the rest of the Executive had decided beforehand that dissolution was the only reason

able course open if separatist forces were to be kept from disintegrating.

The final Congress was held not in the noisy and

exhuberant atmosphere of times past when delegates from across

the Province jammed the auditoriums to lash out at their critics and wave the banner of separatism, but instead in a mood of dejection and resignation over the decision they were fully aware had to be taken. One last effort was made by the indomitable Marcel Chaput to forestall total dissolu- -110- tion by having the party revert back to its original role as a pressure group. This proved to be nothing more than a nostalgic gesture towards salvaging the remains of a lost cause.

The only real hope of keeping at L:~ast the "spirit" of the RIN alive lay in the membership's ability to infiltrate into the new separatist party and make its (i.e., the RIN's) position felt. This motion offered little in the way of consolation for the party faithfu~, many of whom had been with the RIN from the very beginning. The idea of RIN infiltration, though, was enough to raise eyebrows in the Parti Quebecois, especially among these former members of Gregoire's Rallie- ment National.

So, on October 26, after two days of lengthy but heartless debate over the Executive's proposal, the membership of the RIN voted itself out of one party and headed for another.

Where does that place the separatist movement in the context of Quebec politics today? The answer is of course complex. Certainly behind the images of Levesque, Aquin, Gre- goire, and even Bourgault, the separatist movement has never been more united. Moreover, the relatively moderate platform -111- of the PQ stands in great contrast to the more radical one of the RIN which at that managed to receive 5.5% of the total electorate vote.

Whatever the outcome of these events may be, one thing may be safely said: the Parti Quebecois represents the kind of threat to the major provincial parties that the RIN was never quite capable of becoming. Its moderate position can appeal to a larger mass which remained out of reach of the

RIN; its resources and leadership are vastly greater, and its rejection of violence and extremisms makes it a more viable political force than the RIN proved to be after the 1966

Provincial Election. Finally, the Parti Quebecois has thus

far not permitted into its ranks the far-left elements of the separatist movement that proved so fatal to the RIN. Perhaps the RIN's own brand of party democracy left the way open for

its eventual demise.*

*On March 19, 1969, the RIN announced that it had bequeathed its party archives to la Bibliotheque Nationale in Montreal. LIST OF SEPARATIST GROUPS

AL Alliance Laurentienne

ALQ Armee de Liberation du Quebec

AS Action Socialiste pour l'Independance

CI Chevaliers de l'Independance

CIS Comite pour l'Independance Socialiste

FLP Front de Liberation Populaire

FLQ Front de Liberation Quebecois

FRI Front Republicain de l'Independance

GAP Groupe dlAction Populaire

JP Jeunes Patriotes

LOS Ligue Ouvriere Socialiste

MLP Mouvement de Liberation Populaire

MSA Mouvement Souverainete-Association

PQ Parti Quebecois

PRQ Parti Republicain de Quebec

PSQ Parti Socialiste de Quebec

RIN Rassemblement pour 1 I Independance Nationale

RN Ralliement National

RN Regroupement National

RQ Revolution Quebecoise APPENDIX

A. Partial Results of the 1966 Quebec Provincial Election1

Valid Votes RIN's Riding Cast Share Percentage

Abitibi-East 31,695 1,434 4.52%

Abitibi-west 13,339 318 2.38%

Ahuntsic 28,898 4,195 14.52%

Argenteuil 15,015 245 1.63%

Arthabaska 22,734 591 2.60%

Bagot 11,509 163 1.42%

Beauce * * *

Beauharnois 26,341 984 3.74%

Bellechasse * * * Berthier * * * Bonaventure * * *

Bourassa 30,031 4,420 14.72%

Bourget 28,569 2,754 9.64%

1 Figures based on results of the Chief Returning Officer: Elections 1966.

* (Seats not contested by the RIN) -114-

Valid Votes ----RIN's Riding Cast Share Percentage

Brome * * * Chambly 31,703 3,895 12.29%

Champlain * * * Charlevoix * * *

Chateauguay 19,227 727 3.78%

Chauveau 36,843 1,921 5.21%

Chicoutimi * * *

D'Arcy McGee 27,281 895 3.28%

Two Mountains 17,866 821 4.60%

Dorchester * * * Dorion 22,403 2,184 9.75%

Drummond * * * Dubuc * * * Duplessis 13,969 4,392 31.44%

Fabre 34,056 4,363 12.81%

Frontenac 13,232 155 1.17%

Gaspe-Nord 10,272 136 1.32%

Gaspe-Sud * * * Gatineau 22,061 1,117 5.06%

Gouin 27,294 3,507 12.85%

Hull 21,218 2,222 10.47%

Huntington * * * -115-

-----Valid Votes ---RIN'S Riding Cast Share Percentage

Iberville 8,896 431 4.84%

~ Iles-de-la- Madeleine * * * Jacques-Cartier 26,762 1,808 6.76%

Jeanne-Mance 32,192 4,271 13.27%

Jean-Talon 26,786 1,384 5.17%

Joliette 22,317 1,423 6.38%

Jonquiere 25,496 916 3.59%

Kamouraska * * *

Labelle 11,813 536 4.54%

Lac-Saint-Jean * * * Lafontaine 30,239 3,374 11.16%

L'Assomption 21,232 1,443 6.80%

Laurier 26,519 2,131 8.04%

Laval 34,727 3,131 9.02%

Laviolette 22,306 1,559 6.99%

Levis 28,515 843 2.96%

Limoilou 33,314 1,234 3.70%

L'Islet * * * Lotbiniere * * * Louis-Hebert 34,293 2,991 8.72%

Maisonneuve 28,246 3,457 12.24% -116-

Valid Votes RIN's • Riding Cast Share Percentage Marguerite- Bourgeoys 23,501 1,297 5.52%

Maskinonge * * * Matane * * * Matapedia 12,674 220 1.74%

Megantic * * * Mercier 26,562 3,115 11.73%

Missisquoi 14,623 390 2.67%

Montcalm 9,756 168 1.72%

Montmagny * * * Montmorency 26,086 1,423 5.46%

Napierville- Laprairie * * * Nicolet * * * Notre-Dame-de- Grace 25,598 949 3.71%

01ier 25,494 3,366 13.20%

Outremont 25,393 3,218 12.67%

Papineau 24,252 2,504 10.32%

Pontiac * * * Portneuf 26,345 613 2.33%

Richelieu 24,796 1,221 4.92%

Richmond * * * -117-

Valid Votes RIN's Riding Cast Share Percentage

Rimouski 23,952 504 2.10%

Riviere-du-Loup * * * Robert Baldwin 36,582 900 2.46%

Roberva1 * * * Rouvi11e 13,048 687 5.27%

Rouyn-Noranda 17,047 694 4.07

Saguenay * * * Sainte-Anne 17,091 747 4.07%

Sainte-Marie 21,254 1,930 9.08%

Saint-Henri 25,134 3,034 12.07%

Saint-Hyacinthe 23,510 1,544 6.57%

Saint-Jacques 19,749 1,834 9.29%

Saint-Jean 18,887 780 4.13%

Saint-Laurent 31,414 3,151 10.03%

Saint-Louis 15,330 1,646 10.74%

Saint-Maurice 29,802 3,256 10.93%

Saint-Sauveur 25,092 730 2.91%

Shefford 27,097 1,061 3.92%

Sherbrooke 39,742 1,495 3.77%

Stanstead * * * Taillon 22,343 4,097 18;34% -118-

.- Valid Votes RIN's Riding Cast Share Percentage

Terniscamingue * * * Terniscouata * * * Terrebonne 52,063 4,227 8.12%

Trois-Rivieres 31,371 1,692 5.34%

Vaudreui1-Sou1anges 20,913 494 2.36%

Vercheres 20,900 1,348 6.45%

Verdun 28,948 1,198 4.14%

Westrnount 25,650 1,141 4.45%

Yarnaska * * *

Totals 2,324,829 129,045 5.55% -119-

B. Constituencies of Greater Montreal

Valid Votes RIN's Riding Cast Share Percentage

Ahuntsic 28,898 4,195 14.52%

Bourassa 30,031 4,420 14.72%

Bourget 28,569 2,754 9.64%

Chambly 31,703 3,895 12.29%

D'Arcy McGee 27 ,281 895 3.28%

Dorion 22,403 2,184 9.75%

Fabre 34,056 4,363 12.81%

Gouin 27,294 3,507 12.85%

Jacques-Cartier 26,762 1,808 6.76%

Jeanne-Mance 32,192 4,271 13.27%

Lafontaine 30,239 3,374 11.16%

Laurier 26,519 2,131 8.04%

Laval 34,727 3,131 9.02%

Maisonneuve 28,246 3/457 12.24%

Marguerite- Bourgeoys 23,501 1,297 5.52%

Mercier 26,562 3,115 11.73%

Notre-Dame-de- Grace 25,598 949 3.71%

Olier 25,494 3,366 13.20%

Outremont 25,393 3,218 12.67% -120-

Valid Votes RIN's Riding Cast Share Percentage

Robert Baldwin 36,582 900 2.46%

Sainte-A.nne 17,091 747 4.07%

Saint-Henri 25,134 3,034 12.07%

Saint-Jacques 19,749 1,834 9.29%

Saint-Laurent 31,414 3,151 10.03%

Saint-Louis 15,330 1,646 10,74%

Sainte-Marie 21,254 1,930 9.08%

Taillon 22,343 4,097 18.34%

Vaudreui1- Sou1anges 20,913 494 2.36%

Verdun 28,948 1,198 4.14% westmount 25,650 1,141 4.45%

Totals 799,876 76,502 9.56% -121-

C. Supplementary Information

1. Six highest constituency support for the RIN:

Ahuntsic 14.52%

Bourassa 14.72%

Duplessis~ 31.44%

Jeanne-Mance 13.27%

Olier 13.20%

Taillon 18.34%

* (Contested by party leader Pierre Bourgault)

2. RIN candidates received 5% or less of the vote in 32 constituencies, and in 18 constituencies they managed 10% and above.

3. Percentage of total registered vote for all 108 cons stituencies:

129,045 - 4.00% 3,222,302 - Percentage of total valid votes for all 108 constit uencies:

129,045 5.55% 2,324,829

Percentage of total valid votes in the 73 constituencies contested:

129,045 7.32% 1,762,208 = -1'2'l- R\W VOTE \W G-REATER l'\oWTREttL.

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BOOKS

Barbeau, Raymond, J'ai choisi l'Independance, Montreal, 1961.

Bernard, Michel, Le Quebec change de visage, Plon, Paris, 1964.

Bouchard, Paul, La Province de Quebec sous l'Union Nationale, Quebec, 1956.

Boulet, Gilles, Nationalisme et separatisme, Editions du Bien Public, Trois-Rivieres, 1962.

Chaput, Marcel, Pourquoi je suis separatiste, Les Editions du Jour, Montreal, 1961.

Corbett, Edward, Quebec Confronts Canada, John Hopkins Press, Toronto, 1967.

Dagenais, Andre, Revolution 'qU Quebec, Editions Renaud-Bray, Montreal, 1964.

Desbarats, Peter, The State of Quebec, MCClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1965.

Deutsch, Karl, The Nerves of Government, The Free Press, New York, 1966.

Dube, Rodolphe (pseudonyme, Fran~ois Hertel), Du separatisme ~ebecois, Editions de la Diaspora fran~aise, Paris, 1964.

Durham, Lord, Report on the Affairs of British North America, edited by Sir C.P. Lucas, Oxford, 1912.

Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties, London, 1955.

Epstein, Leon, Political Parties in Western Democracies, Prae ger, New York, 1967. -124-

Grant, Douglas, Quebec Today, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1960.

Johnson, Daniel, Egalite ou Independance, Editions Renais sance, Montreal, 1965.

Laporte, Pierre, Le vrai visa~ de Duplessis, Les Editions de 1 'Homme, Montreal, 1960.

Levesque, Rene, Option Quebec, Les Editions de 1 'Homme, Montreal, 1968.

Lipset, Seymore, The Political Man, Doubleday and Company, New York, 1960.

Meisel, John, Papers on the 1962 Elections, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1964.

Michels, Robert, Political Parties, Dover Publications, New York, 1959.

Morin, Wilfrid, L'independance du Quebec, Montreal, 1960.

Myers, Hugh Bingham, The Quebec Revolution, Harvest House, Montreal, 1964.

Quinn, Herbert F., The Union Nationale, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1963.

Rioux, Marcel, French-Canadian Society, McClelland, Toronto, 1964.

Sanouillet, Michel, Le S~aratisme quebecois et nous, Editions nouvelles,fran~aises, Toronto, 1962.

Savoie, Claude, La veritable histoire du FLQ, Editions du jour, Montreal, 1963.

Scott, Frank, and Oliver, Michael, Quebec States Her Case, Macmillan of Canada, Toronto, 1964.

Sloan, Thomas, Quebec, the Not So Quiet Revolution, the Ryerson Press, Toronto, 1965.

Thorburn, Thomas, Party Politics in Canada, Prentice Hall of Canada Ltd., Toronto, 1961. -125-

ARTICLES

Bamber, J. and Martin, L., "Une Minorite influente favorise l'independance du Quebec," in le Magazine Maclean, III, pp. 23-26.

Blanchard, R., "Les mouvements d I independance au Canada Fran c;ais," in Revue des travaux de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques, 116, pp. 209-222, or in Revue Eolitique et parlementaire, 735, pp. 16-23, 1963.

Boily, R., Paper read at St. Laurent Kiwanis Club, 1966.

Bourassa, Guy, "Les nouvelles el i tes quebecoises," in les Nou veaux Quebecois, Rapport du 3e Congres des Affaires Canadiennes, Presses de l'Universite Laval, Quebec, 1964, pp. 29-40.

Bourgault, Laurendeau, "The Dialogue of two Generations," J...n Exchange, November, 1961.

Breton, Raymond, and Breton, Albert, "Le separatisme ou le res pect du statu quo," in cite Libre, April, 1962.

Dion, Leon, "Consideration sur le separatisme, " in Le Devoir, 25 novembre, 1961.

Dostaler, Gilles, "Le RIN: un parti de gauche?," Parti-Pris, IV, 1967.

Dumais, Marcel, "Les classes sociales au Quebec," in Parti Pris, III, 1965, pp. 42-63.

Dumont, Fernand, "La representation ideologique des classes au Canada franc;ais," in Recherches sociographi9;.ues, VI, 1965, pp. 9-22.

Falardeau, J.-C., "Elites traditionnelles et elites nouvelles," in Recherches sociographiques, VII, 1-2, 1966, pp. 131 145.

Garique, P., "Separatism in Canada," in New Society, II, 1963, pp. 9-10. -126-

Groulx, Lionel, "Une vraie doctrine de vie pour notre nation," in 1 'Action Nationale, LIV, 1964, pp. 113-119.

Kwavnick, D., "The Roots of French Canadian Discontent," in C.J.E.P.S., XXXI, 1965, pp. 509-523.

LaPierre, Laurier, "Le Separatism and French Canadians," in 8anadian Forum, January, 1962.

Lemieux, V., "La structure des parties politiques," in Cite Libre, 81, 1965, pp. 17-22.

Mellos, Koula, The Quebec General Election of 1966, thesis, McGill University, 1967.

Morin, Jacques-Yvan, Liberte nationale et federalisme, thesis, Universite de Montreal, 1965.

Newman, Peter, "A Blueprint for the Republic of Quebec," In MacLean's, April 22, 1961.

Numero special sur le separatisme, Cite Libre, XIII, 1962, pp. 1-29.

Olivier, Pierre, "RIN 1968: la mort d'un parti?" , in La Presse, 27, 28, 29 mars 1968.

Ouellet, Fernand, "Le Nationalisme Canadien-fran<;;ais de ses origines a l'insurrection de 1837," in Canadian Historical Review, XLV, no. 4, December, 1964, p. 277.

OUellet, Fernand, "Les Fondements historiques de l'option separatiste dans le Quebec," in Canadian Historical Review, XLII, no. 3, September, 1962.

Pinard, M., Lemieux, V., Boily, R. and Cliche, P., Study of the Quebec General Election 1956-66, in preparation.

Taylor, Charles, "Nationalism and the Political Intelligentsia: A Case Study," in Queen's Quarterly, LXXII, pp. 150 168. -127-

NEWSPAPERS

Le Devoir, Montreal.

La Presse, Montreal.

Montreal Star, Montreal.

Gazette, Montreal.

Montreal-Matin, Montreal.

Maintenant, Montreal.

REPORTS AND GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

A Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Queen's Printer, Ottawa, February I, 1965.

Report of the Chief Returning Officer: Election 1966 (Quebec).

Report of the Royal Commission of Bilingualism and Bicultur alism, Book I, Queen's Printer, Ottawa, October 8, 1967.

Report of the Royal Commission of Enquiry on Education, Vols. I, II, III, Quebec, 1962. (Parent Report).

PARTY PUBLICATIONS

The Political Action Programme of the Liberal Party (1966) .

The Political Action Programme of the Union Nationale (1966) .

The Political Action Programme of the Rassemblement pour l'Independance (1966) .

The Political Action Programme of the Ralliement National (1966) .

The Constitution of the Rassemblement pour l'Independance Nationa1e.

L'Independance (Journal of the RIN).