VIOLENCE in QUEBEC J.1Cgil1 University

Home , Jean Marchand, Pierre Bourgault, Quebec Liberal Party

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VIOLENCE IN QUEBEC J.1cGil1 University

A SUGG·ZS'l'ElJ l'TLAr·[:i:\'JœiL Fœ'!. 'l'lD:!; S'I'UDY OF' PE~{CEP'.rIO.l-IS OF VIOLENCE iUJD ITS APPLICATION '1'0 TiIE ~m.ITnJGS OF prEmlE Tli.UDEAU Alm PIElITŒ VALLIEEES

A thesis submitted ta the facuIt.i' of Gra.d.uate 3tu(ies and. ~1.esearch in partic:.1 fuIfiIIment ai.' the requ:i..rements for the d.egl'ee of Easter ai.' I..rts in the depaytment of Political Science.

l"lontr e0.1, '~ue be c

De cembel', 1971

@) Paul Tetrault 1972 "

ABSTRACT

Author: PAUL TETRAULT

Title of Thesis: A SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF PERCEPTIONS OF VIOLENCE AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE WRITINGS OF PIERRE TRUDEAU AND PIERRE VALLIERES.

Department: POLITICAL SCIENCE

Degree: MASTER OF ARTS

Summa!:'y':

The first part of this paper presents a framework

for the study of perceptions of violence. It is bel ieved that most pol itical thinkers concern themselves with four basic issues when

discussing violence; the definition of the concept, the reasons

for its existence, the effects it has on normal social relations

and its justification as a political tool. These four categories

are explicated in the first part of the paper, and the views of::...-

different social and political thinkers are examined in the context

of this framework.

ln the second part, this framework is applied to

the writings of Pierre Trudeau and Pierre Vall i~res. It is shown

how their views on violence reflect the worldview of a liberal

(Trudeau) and a revolutionary (Valli~res). ...

A SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF PERCEPTIONS OF VIOLENCE AND I.TS APPLICATION TO THE WRITINGS OF PIERRE TRUDEAU AND PIERRE VALLIERES.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ...... ', ~ ......

PART 1 A Framework For The Study of Perceptions of Vi 0-1 ence...... • . . . • ...... 6

PART Il Application Of This Framework to the Writlngs of Pt·erre Trudeau and Pierre Val! i~res •• •••••• • 57

CONCLUS ION •••••••••••••••••••• ., •••••••••••••••••••• 0 •••• • 95

BIBLIQGRAPHY •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 100 • ~. f' ','

ln October 1970, Pierre Laporte, Minister of Immigration and

Manpower was killed by members of the F. L. Q., thus ending a period of over one hundred years during which Quebec (and Canada) had not experienced pol itical assasination. This form of violence, of course,

is not new to world pol itics. ln the past ten or twenty years, most of the countries in the western world have witnessed the emergence of

assasination and kidnappings as forms of pol itical action.

The October events in Quebec engendered a great deal of dis-

cussion on the ethics and attributes of violence. What seemed apparent,

hO\'Vever, was that the word "violence" had different connotations for

different people. Because, in ideological terms, Quebec had become a 1 pluralist society since 1960 , there has arisen a multitude of ways

of looking at the world and thus of looking at violence.

ln order to define what is meant by a "plural ist society "in ideological terms" the meaning of ideology must be expl icated. The ideology of a group is its description of its relationship to the structure of society and also its proposais for action in that society. "A plural ist society in ideological terms" means that there are a number (plural ity) of groups with different worldviews (ideologies) that are vying for the attention of the whole society. To say, aS M. Rioux does, (L'Evolution des Ideologies au Ouebec, Revue de L'Institut de Sociologie #1, 1968, passim) that until 1950, Quebec society was dominated by one ideology, is not to say that there were not i"ndividual strains of 1 iberalism from 1840 to 1950. The key word is individual, for, if over a period of time, distinct groups had adopted a 1 iberal ideology, then it would be unfair to speak of a conservationist monolitheism. Rioux then goes on to show that since 1960 one can speak of a plurality of different groups espousing a multitude of worldviews. It is in this sense that pluralist society is used in the Quebec contexte -,

Michel Chartrand and Pierre Vall i~res view the phenomenon of violence in a different fashion from Pierre Trudeau and Gerard ~el letier.

ln fact, one might say that their views are so totally divergent as to make conditions of dialogue difficult.

The purpose of this paper is firstly to present a possible

framework for the study of perceptions of violence and, secondly, to

apply this framework in the analysis of perceptions of two groups of

Quebec pol itical figures represented by Pierre Trudeau and Pierre Val li~res.

This essay is not oriented, in inquiry, to current understandings of

political analysis. It will not seek to dei ineate causes for the

appearance of violence or to subject the concept of violence to empirical

val idity, rather it wi Il examine different perceptions' of violence in

Quebec. In the first section, it wi Il be my intention to develop a

conceptual framework for the study of the way people perceive violence.

Thus, it wi 1 1 become possible to examine and compare the different notions

of violence within a framework of given categories. In the development

of this framework, the ideas of wei I-known social and pol itical thinkers

will be examined to il lustrate what aspects of violence can be fitted

into each category. There are no pretensions, however, to an exhaustive

study of the role of violence in the history of political theory. The

examples chosen will serve an illustrative purpose. It should be

emphasized that these categories were drawn as an aid in the study of

different people's perceptions of violence, they are not categories of

violence per se. Moreover, they may not be exhaustive, but, it is hoped '\

that l"hey wi l' serve to cali attention to some sai ient aspects of the problem. Despite the existence of various definitfons of this concept, definitions which have been historically derived, there exists no agreement as to what exactly constitutes violence, no consensus in the real world as to what particular acts :an be called violent. Thus, the first category of perceptions of violence would be: what acts or phenomena are understood by the particular thinker to constitute violence? For example, many followers of the Marxist tradition see violence existing where liberals and conservatives do nota Franz Fanon's view that colonization constituted an act of violence was certainly not universally shared in France in the 1950's.

The second category relates closely to the first. If different thinkers have dlfferent understandings as to what constitutes violence, they also have different understandings as to why violence emerges. The second category, then, would be: what reasons does a particular thinker give for the emergence of violence? A third classification would be: what does a particular thinker perceive the social effects of violence to be? For example, some thinkers talk of the empirical effects of violence; so many

people kil led, so much property damaged, etc a others mention the effects of violence on society. Thus, Sorel believes that violence

will help polarize class conflict, still others consider that the existence

of violence is detrimental to politics Cpolitics in the classical ~--I

sense of that word, i.e., the activity of the~, free intercourse and discussion between citizens). This is particularly Arendt's view as articulated in the Human Condition. The fourth area of consideration would be: when does a particu!ar thinker bel ieve that it is permissibl~ for an individual or an institution to be violent? For some thinkers, this is merely an ethical problem, for others it becomes both an ethical and a factical problem. It has been the common denominator of most serious thinkers to consider violence as detrimental to the possibilities of human fulfillment. Rarely do political thinkers prescribe

violence in vacuo, rather, violence becomes permissible only under

certain social conditions (exploitation by one class of another, industrialization of an underdeveloped country, expulsion of

colonial ism). Historically, liberal thinkers have permitted acts of

violence against governments which were not considered legitimate, that is equally true of revolutionâïy thinkers, they differ, of course, on what they consider constitutes legitimacy. These categories are not completely independent one from the

other. What a thinker considers to be the social effects of violence will be dependent on what he considers violence to be. Moreover, the way different thinkers perceive the phenomenon of violence is wholly dependent on their worldview. 5

Before embarking on a presentation of the possible categories of violence, this section will treat briefly the aforementioned epistemological problem. A man's notion of violence cannot be treated in isolation, ~ut must be viewed as an integral part of a global worldview. The second part of this paper will treat two different notions of violence in Quebec politics. The first, held by members of the Liberal party elite, will be examined with an emphasis on the writings and speeches of Pierre E. Trudeau. The

second, held by certain counter-elites who hold to a Marxist or

a Marxist Revisionist ideology, will b~ analyzed, especially in the

light of the writings of Pierre Valli~res. In both cases, the

\Neltanschauung (worldview) of these men will be examined and their

different views on violence wi 1 1 be explicated, using the four part

conceptual framework developed in the first section.

Within each category, an effort will be made to relate the

notion of violence to the general Weltanschauu~ of the individual concerned. At the same time, similarities and differences between

these thinkers and other thinkers, some less modern and topical, wi Il

be pointed out. 6

Violence, like any social phenomenon, do es not exist outside human perception and definition. Indeed, the word itself is not

just a description of coercion, but also a normative statement about those employing it. Given this state of affairs, it becomes obvious that an understanding of a thinker's perceptions·of violence requires

an appreciation of the process by which men percefve and define

reality. ln recent years, different scholars have been examining the

relationships between subject and object and considering the importance of the individual's worldview in his perception of IIreality". Feware prepared to make the simple subject/object dichotomy so common to

discourses on social phenomena such as violence. For instance, in their

seminal work on the sociology of knowledge, Berger and Luckmanl emphasize the extent to which legitimating mechanisms have a cognitive, as wei 1 aS a normative, element since they serve to explain the institutional order by ascribing cognitive validity to its objectivated meanings. Under

such circumstances, reality is less a disembodied absolute than a social

construction resulting from what Berger and luckman describe

Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman - The Social Construction of Reality, New York, Doubleday and Company Inc., Anchor Books Edition, 1967. • I~"

as a three-fold dialectical process comprising externalization, objectlvation and internalization. 2

An appreciation of the problems Inherent in the relationship between observer and object, be it social or physical, is not limited to sociologists.

E. H. Carr3 in his essay What is History? argues that the traditional subject/object dichotomy to which many British historians, influenced by the empiricist strain in British philosophy, cl ing, is fallacious. In fact, history is filtered through the subjective consciousness of the individual and the selection and Interpretation of data is an important part of that subjective process. Thus in the nineteenth century, British historians did not consciouslY espouse a phi losophy of history:

2 A discussion of these terms is presented in Berger and Luckman, Ch. 2, Society as Objective Reality.

Internalization - process by which the objectivated social world is retrojected into consciousness in the course of socialization.

Objectivation - process by which the social world is experienced as an objective reality which antedates a man's birth, remains after he dies and in the Interim, rests largely impervious to his existence.

Externalization - the process by which man projects his own meaning into reality and thereby creates the world into which he externalizes himself.

3 E. H. Carr, What is History?, (Middlesex, England, Penguin Books, 1970) · ,.i'

••. not because they believed history had no meaning, but because they believed that its meaning was impl icit and self-evident. The liberal nineteenth century view of history had a close affinity with the economic doctrine of laissez-faire, also the product of a serene and confident out look on the world. Let everyone get on with the ~articular job, and the hidden hand would take care of the unlversal harmony.4

ln contrast, George Clark has said of the twentieth century historians:

Th~y expect their work to be superceded again and again. They consider the knowledge of the past has come down through one or more human minds, has been processed by them, and therefore cannot consist of elemental and impersonal atoms which nothing can alter. 5

The complexity of ~he subject/object relationship is not limited to social observations, but is true also for the study of inanimate objects. Traditionally scientific textbooks have considered the development of science to be an incremental accumulation of knowledge. A process by which the application of past knowledge to present problems led to a cumulative expansion in the corpus of scientific data. However, Kuhn 6 in his well-known essay The Structure of Scjentific Revolutions presents a different explanation for the evolution of science.

4 ~, P. 20

5 Ibid, P. 7 6 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1970. 9

We shall note that the early developmental stages of most sciences have been characterized by continuai competition between a number of distinct views of nature, each partially derived from and ail roughly compatible with, the dictates of scientific observation and method. What differentiated these schools was not one or another failure of method they were ail scientific - but what we shall come to cali their incommensurable ways of seeing the world and of practicing science in it. 7

Hence, a scientist's interpretation of scientific data and even the kind of data he examines is determined by the scientific paradigm within which he works. The foregoing is an attempt to demonstrate by the use of examples that the complexity of the relationship between observer and object is not unique to the study of violence, but, is, in fact, inherent in the problem of acquiring knowledge. That is not to say that an individual's views on violence are a simple mechanical extension of his socio-economic status, rather that they are the result of an complex dialectical interaction between the material world and the realm of ideas. The resulting subjective orientation will determine the individual's views on such matters as the nature of man, the foundations of legitimate government, and the ethical

1 imits of the exercise of power, ail of which will help to mould

his view of violence. A clear example of the relationship between a thinker's

worldview and his notion of violence is given by Wol in, who points

out that, by and large, ancient and medieval thinkers viewed man and

7 - Ibid, P. 7 · ,.1

society as endowed with Inherent natural structures and hence:

They shied away from prescribing powerful measures for the reform of an old and established society, so great was their fear of injuring its; Inherent structure. 8

Although, both Plato and Augustine at one time or another justified the use of violence to induce belief, at other times they both: ••• vacillated on the issue because they were firmly convinced that any exercise of violence constituted a threat to the Inherent structure of man and that any sustained program of violence risked reducing man to a dehumanized and brutal ized condition. 9

The rise to prominence of Machiavel li and Hobbes saw the demise of the idea of an Inherent structure natural to both man and society.

Instead, both man and society were viewed as fit subjects for manipulation and violence became a proper tool to that end. In

Woi in's words:

They sought instead to treat it as a measured application of force, the study of which should aspire to be a precise science and the actual exerclse of which should be dn the hands of men of cool and calculating temperament. 1

8 Sheldon Woi in, Violence in the Western Political Tradition in Hartogs & Artzt, Violence Causes and Solutions, New York, Dell, 1970, P. 40 - 41.

9 ~, P. 39 la Ibid, P. 37 Il

It wi 1 1 remain an underlying contention of this paper that the theory of knowledge which posits a subject/object dichotomy is no more applicable to the study of violence than it is to the study of history or science. In fact, a scholar's views on violence may

be considered a microcosm of his global Weltanschauung. With this in mind, the balance of the first part will be devoted to the

explication of the four-part framework for the study of perceptions of violence mentioned in the introduction.

The first question to be asked in the study of perceptions

of violence, is, logical Iy enough: what acts or phenomena are

understood by the thinker in question to constitute violence?

Like many abstract nouns, violence has meant different things

to different people at different times in history. This divergence

has existed despite the fact that the word itself has very definite

etymological roots. It is derived from two Latin words - "violenta"

which ineant "vehemence", a passionate, uncontrollable force, the

opposite of a calculated exertion of power, and the verb "v iolare" which carried the additional notion of exceeding some norme · '."

Moreover, an ancient and enduring meaning of the word is that of a force working to pervert (rather than divert) some object, natural or human from its "natural ll course of development or from the way it would otherwise express i tse 1 f. 1 1

The Oxford English dictionary has given three basic meanings to the word. Firstly, it is the exercise of physical force, so as to inflict injury on or cause damage to person or property. Secondly, it has been defined as undue restraint applied to some natural process so as to prevent its free development or exercise; traces of this meaning are evident in the statement IIThis interpretation does violence to the text. 1I which implies that the meaning usually associated with a given passage, which we might cali its proper meaning, has been perverted, that is, injured or prevented from communicating its proper meaning. Thirdly, it means a great force, severity or vehemence, the intensity of some condition or influence, thus, "The inflamatory complaints, particularly of pneumonia, have revived with particular violence." A great many of the people who have reflected on violence throughout the course of history, have been partial to one aspect of the definition - that aspect Which emphasized the use of physical

force and which saw violence as an overt manifestation of the des-

truction of people and property. In the modern period, this trend

Il - Ibid, P. 36. 13

is best exemplified in +he work of a whole school of American social scientists. Since the appearance of Eckstein's Internai War 12 in 1964, they have produced a number of studies on violence and revolution which purport to be "behavioural studies", influenced by recent methodological trends in the social sciences. Prior to this time, behavioural scholars had been interested primarily in such issues as bargaining consensus and structural renewal, ail problems which ·reflected the general calm of the American polit Y during the fifties. During the sixties, however, the growth of protest movements and their subsequent rejection of more traditional modes of political action led these men to the realization that the study of violence could not be ignored. The mere realization of the importance of this problem, however, did n6t solve the difficulties inherent in its analysis. In fact, the methodological exigences of the behavioural sciences made it extremely difficult to deal with the prob!em ln the rigorous manner expected of the scientist, principally because the word "violence" has certain abstract conno-

tations. The definitional prob!em was subsequently dealt with by

assigning to violence attributes which were amenable to study by

behaviouràl ist methods. Thus, violence became "the most direct and

severe form of physical power" 16nd pol itical violence consisted of

12 Harry Eckstein, Internai War, New York, MacMillan & Co., 1964

13 H. L. Nieburg, Pol itical Violence, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1969, P. 12 , \

lIacts of disruption, destruction or injury".14 ln most of these studies, violence was considered to be "an overt physical manifestation of destruction against property or persons" and even the

National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence defined violence simply aS "the 1"hreat or use of force that results or is

intended to result in the injury or forcible restraint or intimi- dation of persons or the destruction of the forcible seizure of propert y". 15 Within This framework, of course, "violence" becan.e visible, measurable and even quantifiable. Yet the definition still posed

problems, because violence so defined does not occur with the regularity of elections, nor does it manifest itself uniformly; its basic nature

is different from the phenomena usually examined by behavioural

social scientists. Nevertheless, this dimension of violence does

provide a base for study by these scholars, a more abstract approach

could not be expected for it is difficult to deal with complex

abstract concepts with methods of inquiry based on experimentation

in controlled situations, field work and survey analysis. It is,

in fact, impossible.

14 Ibid, P. 13

15 Progress Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Preventions of Violence, P. 3. The Chairman was ---- D. M. Eisenhower and the Progress Report was realized in January, 1969. ",.. ' ./

This notion of violence, as overt and physical destruction is not limited to behavioural scholars. Indeed, it is the most widely accepted approach to violence in the w~stern world. Sheldon Wolin, hardly a behaviouralist, assumes this definition when he talks of the dimunition of violence in the modern civil ized world due to the application of law: Centuries of exposure to law and order have bred habits of civil ity, obviating the need for crude applications of coercion. The very extension of civilization has come to be identified with the progressive abolition of violence, or more accurately, with the substitution of various forms of authority, such as the law, the political authority of a parliament or the decision of a judicial tribunal. However, experience teaches that each of these authorities, no matter how benign or democratic, is capable of dropping its stately and measured demeanor when it feels threatened; it will lash out at its critics, enemies or tormentors in an unexpected display of force and violence. 16

The Marxists and Marxist Revisionists use this definii" ion when they speak of the necessity for revolutionary violence. For what is revolutionary violence if not overt attacks on the property and persons of the rUling class? To insure the success of the

revolution, Lenin talks of the proletariat "taking up arms". Sartre speaks of the colonized peoples driving out the Europeans with violence. The native cures himself of colonial neurosis by thrusting out the settler through force of arms. 17

16 - S. Woi ln, Violence in the Western Pol itical Tradition, p. 24

17 J. P. Sartre, Introduction to Wretched of the Earth, New York, Grove Press. 1968, P. 21. " "1•• '

Recently, however, several authors have attempted to give the word violence a wider meaning by focusing on a different part of the definition already mentioned. For these thinkers, violence takes on a broader connotation and is defined in terms of undue restraint applied to some natural process so as to prevent its free development. The notion of violation is introduced; violence violates the natural development of a human being. For example, R. D. Laing writes as follows: Violence attempts to constrain the other's freedom, to force him to act in the way we desire, but with ultimate lack of concern, with indifference to the other's own existence. 18

These thinkers do not deny that violence as defined by the behaviouralists, constitutes violence, but rather they insist that this is only one dimension of the question. A mUltidimensional

~pproach, they believe, would recognize that there are forces,

besides the overt, physical ones, which pervert the free development of man. These forces are covert and insidious, they eat away at man's

psyche, preventing his full "epanouissment". This factor has been recognized by Jacques El luI who writes: The competition that goes with the much touted system of free enterprise is, in a word, an economic war to the knife,

18 R. D. Laing, Pofjtjcs of Exoerience, New York, Bal lantyne Books, 1967, P. 58. '\

an exercise of sheer violence that the war has not been able to regulate ••• is ostensible legality as a cover for actual violence. And this masked violence is found at aIl levels of society. Economie relations, class relations, are relations of violence, nothing else ••• The violence done by the superior may be physical. •• it may be psychological or . spiritual, as when the superior makes use of morality and even of Christianity to inculcate submission and a servile attitude ••• Communism's propaganda methods are psychological violence ••• And, indeed, no hi9rarchy can maintain itself without using such violence.

~obert Paul Woolf in an article in the Journal of Philosophy makes much the same point as Ellul: It is common, but l think wrong-headed, to restrict the term "violence" to uses of force that involve bodily inter ference or the direct infliction of physical injury ••• Physically tearing a man's wallet from his pocket is "violent," but swindling him out of the same amount of money is not ••• the distinction is not sufficiently sharp to be of any analytical use, and, it usually serves the ideological purpose of ruling out, as immoral or politically illegitimate, the onl;y' ins~t)UIDent of power that is available to certain social classes. This view of violence has been widely adopted by members of the New Left. Unemployment, hunger, substandard living conditions, economic exploitation are aIl considered to be manifestations of violence. Since the general political and economic system of bourgeois liberal democracy legitimizes these forms of violence,

19 - J. Ellul, Violence - A Christian Perspective, New York, Seaburg Press, 1969, P. 86.

20 R. P. i'1oo1f, "On Violence," Journal of Philosoph;r, Vol. LXVI, #19, Oct. 2, 1969, P. 606. 18

the New Left has accused the system itself of being violent. Such legitimation, it is argued, is necessary since the system's maintenance is dependent on the continuing existence of these forms

of violence. It would be a mistake, however, to believe that it is only just recently that the civil ized veneer of bourgeois society had been scraped away and violence unmasked. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels,

as early as 1848, spoke out against the violent changes wrought by the avênement of the bourgeoisie. Wherever the bourgeoisie has risen to power, it has destroyed ail feudal, patriarchial and idyll ic relation ships. It has ruthlessly torn asunder the mot ley feudal \ ties that bound men to their natural superiors ••• for exploitation, veiled by religious and pol itical illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exp loi tat ion. 21 Furthermore - It compels ail the nations under pain of extinction, to adopt the capitalist mode of production. It constrains them to accept what is called civilization, to become bourgeois themselves. 22

Uni ike Wolin, these men (Woolf, Ellul, Marx, New Left) do not believe that modern society is characterized by a lessening of

21 Karl Marx, F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto, with an introduction by Harold Laski, New York, Vintage Books, 1967, P. 135. 22 Ibid, p. 137. 19

violence, rather they feel that violence has taken different shapes, its application has become more sophisticated. Indeed, modern twentieth century society may be the most violent in history- and yet its violence has taken forms which are not usua1ly considered to be

violent. Its violence has become institutionalized and legitimized. An example of these two divergent approaches can be seen in the literature on urban violence and terror. Recently, there have been, in the U.S.A., a plethora of studies on urban violence undertaken by American political scientists.23 These studies have focused on riots, robberies, suicides and property damage, aIl examples of violence which overtly attack man's physical being. The alternative

approach has been taken by Henri Lefebvre, a French Harxist, who, in his La Vie Quotidienne dans le Monde Moderne sees violence manifesting itself in the urban housing policies.

Le manque du logement a fait partie du terrorisme. Il a fait peser sur la jeunesse (et pas seulement sur elle) une menace. La politique du logement exige encore d'un vaste groupe social qui se recrute surtout dans la jeune~~e, celle du proletariat et classes moyennes inferieures ••••

23 - For example, Blair Justice, Violence in the City. 24 - Henri Lefebvre, La Vie Quot.idienne dans le Monde Moderne, Paris, Gallimard, P. 282. 20

. "

This form of violence is less direct and more covert than those mentioned previously~ but must nevertheless be considered. A second important problem which must be considered in this first section is the relationship between the state and violence. Although it will be impossible to discuss this problem fully due to the nature of this paper, it is necessary to note here that sorne thinkers consider the state to be exercising force or coercion rather than violence, even when it perpetr.ates acts which they would consider violent if perpetnated by other members of society. This distinction can be made, it is argued, because the state is acting under law and therefore legitimately. This legitimacy gives use to a clear cut distinction between violence and force, thereby avoiding the perjorative connotations of the word violence. As A. P. D'Entr~ves puts it:

We have to decide whether and in what sense "power" can be distinguished from "force" to ascertain how the fact of using force according to law changes the quality of force itself and pr~sents us with an entirely different picture of human relations. 25 This view has been opposed by Sheldon Woi in (among others)

who has wr i tten: lt has been and remains one of the abiding concerns of the Western Political Theorist to weave ingenious veils of euphemisms to conceal the ugly fact of violence. At other times, he has talked too sonorously of authority, justice

25 A. P. D'Entr~ves, The Notion of the State, Oxford, Clarendon, 1 967, P. 1 1O. and ~ as though these honorific expressions alone could transform coercion into simple restraint ••• That the application of violence is regarded as abnormal represents a significant achievement of Western political tradition, yet if it is accepted too casually, it may lead to a neglect of the primordial fact that the hard core of power is violence and to exercise power ~s often to bring violence to bear on someone else's pers on or possessions. 26

This quotation is very much in the Harxian tradition, for it was he who saw the stat,e as an instrument of oppression in the hands of the ruling class. Political power then became equated with the organ-

ization of violence. Of course, this notion of political power is hotly debated by both Marxists and liberals with the end result still in doubt. In the preceding pages, the ideas of various thinkers

have been examined to determine how'th~y'dealt with the definitional problems of violence. It is evident that there is no across the board agreement on this issuej violence, like democracJ, freedom, and justice is an elusive concept.

The second area of consideration of a thinker's perceptions of violence concerns his views on the sources or causes of violence. To give examples from the history of political thought is a difficult task, for a great number of explanations have been proferred as to the

26 - S. 'iiolin, Politics of Vision, Boston, l.ittle, Brown & Co., 1';;'60, P. 220. -\

source of violence in ail its different forms: terrorism, systemic violence, armed revolutionary violence. Moreover, many modern thinkers refer to the roots of violence or social conflict rather than its causes because of the difficulty of offering a causal explanation. None- theless, many men have undertaken this task and the results range from the biological theories of Lorenz to the functional arguments of Dahrendorf and Coser. This section, however, will be confined to the ideas of various pol itical thinkers. At a very basic level, there are two competing theories as to the nature of society from which ail theories about the origins of violence spring. These might best be called the consensus and conflict approaches. The conflict theory assumes that because of scarcity (of goods, power, etc.) conflict between classes and individuals in endemic to hierarchical society and that order is imposed

by sorne men on others and maintained by coercion. For Hobbes, the state of nature was a state of violence because men want more out of their environment than they Can possibly get. If any two men desire the same thing which, nevertheless, they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies and in the way to their end ••• endeavour to destroy or subdue one another. 27

27 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), Part I, Chapter XIII, quoted in Chambers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1966, P. 16. " '.' .,

The Hobbsian solution, of course, was to rationalize society by forming astate which would control men effectively and minimize violence.

Marx and Engels believed that all histor~r up to the capitalist period was a history characterized by necessity, by scarcity, but while

the y saw the spector of necessity lurking in history, they also saw history as the story of men trying to overcome this scarcity. Violence in the form of enslavement of peoples occurred because at given historical moments, with limited means of production, it was the only vJay that sorne men were able to overcome scarcity.

C'est un fait établi que l'humanit~ a commencé par l'animal et qu'elle a donc eu besoin de moyens barbares, presque animaux pour se dépérir de la barbarie ••• tant que le travail hum~ était encore si peu productif qu'il ne fournissait que peu d'excedent au dela des moyens de subsistance necessaire, l'accroissement des forces productives, l'extension du trafic, le developpement du l'etat et du droit, la fondation de l'art et de la science n'ét~~ent possible que grace à une division renforcée du travail. Support for the idea that violence is a result of the ubiquitous presence of scarcity in history is not confined to Marxists, bu t is also found in the work of such diverse thinkers as Hannah Arendt and Jean-Paul sartre.29

28 - F. Engels, Le Rôle de la "Violence dans L'Histoire, Paris, Editions Sociales, P. 35. 29 - Hannah Arendt discussed violence and necessity in the chapter on the Social Question in On Revolution, p. 53-110. J.P. Sartre writes of violence and. rareté in Book II, Du Groupe à L'Histoire in La Critique de la Raison Diale'ctigue, P. 632-755. A good summary of his position can be found in Laing & Cooper's Reason and Violence, "Tavistock Publications, 1964, especially in the last chapter. -\

There exists in the writings of ail of these thinkers one basic underlying assumption; namely, that the existence of violence is natural to ail organized societies. Some of these theorists see the presence of violence as having social utility but this will be discussed in more detai 1 in the next section.

The opposite conception of society to that posited by the conflict hypothesis is provided by the consensus theory of violence which posits social harmony as the nonm and sees violence as a temporary aberration.

ln Johnson's words, this approach: ••• rejects the view that the structur.e of society is main tained chiefly by the coercion of the many for the benefit of the few. Instead, it stresses that society is a moral communi ty, a co 1 1ect i vi ty of peop 1e who share cert a i n definitions of the situation (called values) which legitimize the inequal ities of social organization and cause people to accept them as mora.lly justified. 30

The father of this school of thought, often described as the structural-functional approach, is Talcott Parsons, who, of course, has influenced many contemporary American political scientists. Very briefly, this approach posits the need for certain functions (i.e., integration, socialization) to be performed in a society if it is to perpetuate itself. These functions are performed by different structures

30 Chambers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., P. 20. 25

which take different forms depending on the society. Society is generally in equil ibrium because the performance of these functions have become routinized. Violence in this approach occurs when certain of the functions are not performed dueto structural breakdown such as lack of integration or inadequate social ization.

By positing the fundamental harmony of society, this theory makes the observer blind to the possibil ity of covert or systemic violence. By the very definition, su ch things as regularized systemic oppression, (unemployment, structural poverty, malnutrition, etc.) cannot exist since harmony.prevai Is and, hence, discussions of violence focus on the violence employed by the disposed in an effort to ameliorate their condition. On another level, there exists a whole literature which attempts to explain the emergence of revolutionary violence. Before considering this 1 iterature, however, it might be wise to mention two current explanations common in the non-academic world which might best be characterized as intuitive or emotive theories. The first, popular with beseiged governments everywhere, has been termed the riff-raff, or Red theory by Nieburg3lthough it is more popularly I

31 H. L. Nieburg, Pol itical VIolence, passim. " · ( ..'

explanation, invoked to explain phenomena as diverse as the American Civil Rights movement and the recent protests'of Poiish shipyard workers, lays the blame on small conspiratorial groups which infiltrate otherwise happy and contented collectivities and incite the moderate majority with campaigns based on non-existent grievances.

The popularity of this explanation with elites is under- standable since it absolves them of responsibil ity and offers a simple

solution, namely removal of the agitators, to eliminate violence. The second intuitive theory is less than universal, being most common in the United States. It is summed up in H. Rap Brown's famous phrase "violence is as American as cherry pie". It is not really an explanation of violence so much as a refusai to admit that violence requires an explanation. This theory views violence as the norm of American political culture since to quote Nieburg: It is held that the nation's history is saturated with blood and violence, in the conquest, first of the Indian, then of t he front i er •••32 Lacking either a psychological or sociological basis, the above explanation, uni ike those that follow, lack academic respectability. Perhaps the oldest of the academic explanations is the relative deprivation theory whose ancient lineage can be traced back to Aristotle.

32 lb id, P. 21 27

There are some who stir up sedition because their minds are fi lied by a passion for equality, which arises from their thinking that they have the worst of the bargain in spite of being the equals of those who get the best of the bargain. There are others who do it because their minds are filled with a passion for inequa!ity (i.e., superiorityl which arises from their"conceiving that they get no advantage over others although they are really more than equal to others. 33

The same theme was later taken up by De Toqueville in an effort to explain the French Revolution. Revolution do es not always come when things are going from bad to worse. 1t occurs most often when a nat ion has accepted, and indeed, has given no sign of even having noticed the most crushing laws, rejects them a~ '1e very moment when their weight is most lightened. The regime that is destroyed by a revolution is almost always better than the one preceding it, and experience te aches us that usually the most dangerous time for a bad government is when i t at temp ts to reform i tse 1f. 34

The idea basic to both of the above, is that the roots of violence are to be found not iry the actual conditions under which the violent actors live, but in the divergence which exists between these social conditions and the collective or individual expectations of these actors. This theory has also been taken up by many modern writers on revolution. For instance, Crane Brinton in the Anatomy of Revo 1ut ion argues that the four "great" revol ut ions (Br it ish,

33 Aristotle, The Pol itics, Notes and Translation by E. Barber, New York, Oxford University Press, 1962, P. 207. 34 A. De Toquevi Ile in Introduction to the Oeuvres Il, l, 222-223 quoted in Revolution Yearbook for the American Society of Legal and Pol itical Philosophy edited by Carl J. Friedrich, New York, Atherton Press, 1967, P. 119. 28

French, American, Russian) occurred during a momentary depression after a long period of prosperity. Another contemporary writer, James Davies, foc uses on this same theme in his article on the

J-Curve. The J-Curve is this: revolution is most likely to take place when a prolonged period of rising expectancies and rising gratifications is followed by a short period of sharp reversai, during which the gap between expectations and gratifications quickly widens and becomes intolerable. The frustrations that develop When it is intense and widespread seek out lets in violent action. 35

The assumption common to these various thinkers is that violence is a product of individual or group frustration resulting from the gap between expectations and gratifications. Frustration leads to rage which finds an outlet in violence. Theories of this kind are open to abuse and overstatement since they are posited in very general terms. If taken or offered too literally, they imply a degree of inevita~i 1 ity more appropriate to the physical than the social world. This ignores the whole realm of existential choice and negates any possibil ity of moral agency on the part of the individual actor. In addition, it must be remembered that relative deprivation is neither a sufficient nor a necessary cause of revolutionary violence. A violent act is sel dom, if ever, a single-faceted event. It may be partly a reaction of

35 J. C. Davies, The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebell ion in Graham & Carr, A History of Violence in America, New York, Bantam Books, 1969, P.690. · (~.'

rage to certain social conditions, but it can involve deliberation on the part of the actor. The notion of violence as involving a certain deliberation on the part of the political actor is very evident in the writings of Machiavel 1 i. Machiavel 1 i recognized that violence was not merely the result of the passions of men, but that it was, in many cases a calculated applied force, a tool which could be used by man to shape and create his environment. He did not view it as a regular procedure, but as something to be used judiciously under extraordinary circumstances, such as reforming old institutions:

As to reforming these institutions ail at once, when their defects have become manifest to everybody, that also is most difficult, for to do this, ordinary means wi Il not suffice ••• Therefore, it becomes necessary to resort to extraordinary means such as violence and arms, and above ail things, to make oneself master of the state and to dispose of it at wi Il. 36

The notion of violence as a tool available for the use of the conscious pol itical actor seekïng to control his environment, is the cornerstone of the writings of Lenin, Sorel and Fanon. These thinkers aIl believed that violence could be a useful instrument for social change •. The social effects of violence will be elaborated in the next section, but, it must be borne in mind that the use of violence as

36 Machiavelli, N., The Discourses, Bk. l, Ch. XVII l, P. 170-171. 30

a tool for change impl ies the ability of the political actor to control its use, te turn it "on and off", so to speak. The util itarian notion of violence implies a completely different relationship between the political actor and violence from the one expounded in the relative deprivation theory. In the former, the political actor exercises a certain amount of control over his environment and uses violence aS a tool in the exercise of this control; in the latter, the political actor is powerless and his activit·, is not action but reaction to external stimui i.

The second area of consideration of a thinker's perceptions of violence, is, then, his views on the causes or roots of violence. These views wi Il obviously depend on what he is attempting to explain,

i.e., on his definition of violence. Moreover, they will usually reflect his general method of analyzing social change. · '."

The third facet of a thinker's perceptions of violence is his view of its effect on normal social patterns, on change, on stabil ity, on democracy. This area of consideration is both vast and complex since it is inextricably bound up with a thinker's perception of the causes of violence and its justification. Violence can be viewed as an innovating force, enhancing the possibil ity of change and even revolution in a particular society. Or it can be seen to inhibit dialogue between conflicting groups. Sorne have considered violence to have a purifying, cathartic effect on the personality of the violent actor while others have argued that he is frequently subject to psychic disorders as a consequence of his actions.

The ~ere fact, of course, that violence could be considered a potential tool for innovation presumes a certain notion of the nature of man and society. As we mentioned earlier in the paper,

prior to Machiavel 1 i and especially in Greek and Christian thought,

it was held that both man and society possessed an inherent natural

structure which prevented the prescription of violence as a tool

for change. Beginning with Machiavel 1 i, however, and continuing through the 1 iberals and the later revolutionaries, it was believed

that both man and society could be shaped and manipulated ~nd violence became a means for doing so. 32

Both Machiavelli and Marx believed that violence would necessarily accompany the founding of new regimes, for it Was thought that no old regime would wither away, but must be compelled by force to do so.

For Marx, however, the existence of violence was imminent in the historical dialectic and would only be innovative when the society was ready for revolution. 37 It was left to Sorel and Fanon to prescribe violence as a means of bringing society to that stage. Georges Sorel felt compel led to prescribe the use of violence

for a number of reasonsj firstly, the contradictions in bourgeois

capitalist society which would eventually manifest themselves,

according to Marx, and which would lead ineluctably to revolution,

had not appeared. On the contrary, Sorel perceived a lessening

of class confl ict in Western Europe brought about by the relative

amelioration in the worker's condition and the rise of a reformist

social ist movement. This movement had been only too will ing to immerse

itself in the pari iamentary game and the result was the appearance

of what Sorel cal led the "democratic marsh". In this "marsh"

class warfare was replaced by compromise on the part of both

37 Marx's position on violence will be treated more fully in the next section. 33

bourgeois and proletariat representatives. The constructive energy and moral fervour generated by intense class conflict was swept away to be replaced by the lukewarm air of conciliation. Moreover, Sorel did not believe that Marx's constructs were scientifically based, but,

rather, that their value lay in their mythic quality~ i.e., on their ability to move men to action. However, if reality discorded too much from these constructs, then even their mythic quality would

vanish.

The primary eHect of proletarian violence, then, in the form of a general strike, would be to recreate, or bring to light, the inherent conflict of capitalist society. It would serve to

drag both the working class and the middle class from their lethargy, for it was only in a polarized society, where the working class was

opposed by an energetic, dynamic propertied class, could the historical dialectic be fulfilled • ••• proletariat violence confines employers to their role of producers and tends to restore the separation of the classes, just when they seemed on the point of intermingling in the democratic marsh. 38 and ••• the dangers which threaten the future of the world may be avoided, if the proletariat hold with obstinancy to revolutionary idees, so as to realize as much as possible Marx's conception. Everything may be saved, if the prole tariat,"by their use of violence, manage to establish the division into classes, and to restore to the middle classes some of its former energy. 39

38 Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, London, Coll ier ," MacMi Il an, 1950, p. 92. 39 Ibid, P. 98 · '."

Sorel, however, did not feel that the general strike was imminent, but that its possibility served as a myth for the members of the working class. It was this myth, re-enacted and lived in the minds of the proletariat which would act as a catalyst in the class struggle. 40

Fifty years later, Franz Fanon advocated the use of violence

in colonial Africa, not only as a means to dispel the colonial powers,

but also as therapy for the individual colonized native. The act of violence committed by the native became the therapy to psychic

disorder brought on by colonialism.

40 It should be noted here that there is a controversy as to whether Sorel prescribed violence merely for the sake of violence. Modern American analysts such as 1. l. Horowitz, in his Reason and the Rise of Revolution, and Hannah Arendt in On Violence, believed this to be so. The opposing point of view has been taken by Fernand Rossignol, in his Pour Connattre Georges Sorel, who has said in paraphrasing Sorel

Celui qui a compris toute la valeur de l 'heroisme et sait vivre heroiquement ne s'archarne pas sur l'ennemi vaincu, la violence ne sera jamais aimée ni pratiquée pour elle-m~me. (P. 236) Georges Sorel himself has said in his Reflections on Violence 1 have never had that admiration for creative hatred which Jaures has devoted to it; 1 do not feel the same indulgence towards the guillotine as he does; 1 have a horror of any measure which strikes the vanquished under a judicial disguise. War carried on in broad daylight, without hypocritical attenuation f,or the purpose of ruining an irreconci lable enemy, exc'tudes ail the abominations which dishonoured the middle class revolutions of the 18th Century. (P. 275) · (."

The appearance of the settler has meant in the terms of syncretism~ the death of the aboriginal society~ cultural lethargy and the petrification of individuals. For the native~ life can only ~ring up again out of the rattling corpse of the settler. 1

and

At the level of the individual~ violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction~ it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect. 42

Fanon~ the psychiatrist~ prescribes violence as a remedy to an existential problem. Although Fanon considered himself a

Marxist~ and although he uses Marxist concepts, his idea of the role of violence differs radically from that of Marx. If Marx deemed violence a historical, objective~ necessity, he never viewed it in the existential ~ subjectiveterms that Fanon employed. 43 Fanon, it would seem, was influenced by Sartre, who believed that if the slave were to overcome the master-slave relationship, he must kiil the master •

••• for in the first few days of the revoit, Vou must kill; to shoot down a European is to kil 1 two birds with one stone, to destroy the oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time; there remain a dead man and a free man. 44

41 Franz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, p. 93 42 Ibid, P. 94.

43 1 am indebted to D. Caute for this idea. See his book On Fanon, London, Fontana, 1970.

44 J. P. Sartre, Preface to Wretched of the Earth, p. 22 36

Fanon, however, did not merely view violence as a cathartic force acting on the individual Aigerian. This socio-psychological role of violence was to be supplemented by its political role. But, it was only after the colonized man had been emancipated from his complexes qua colonized man, that he could turn his energies to the reconstruction of colonial institutions. Violence, at this second stage, would act as a unifying force, for each man who had committed an act of violence would be ineluctably implicated. The practice of violence binds them together as a whole, since each individual forms a violent link in the great chain, a part of the great organization of violence which has surged upward in reaction to the settler's violence in the beginningo ••

The mobil ization of the masses, when it arises out of a war of liberation, introduces into each man's consciousness the ideas of a common cause, of a national destiny and of a collective history. In the same way, the second phase, that of the building up of the nation, is helped on by the existence of this cement which has been mixed with blocd and anger. 45

Not ail thinkers writing on violenc,e have examined its innovative possibilities. Jacques Ellul and Hannah Arendt are prime examples of distinguished thinkers who view the presence of violence

in society as detrimental to the proper functioning of that society. Even Fanon, who wrote so extensively of these possibilities, was exposed to people, who, having committed acts of violence were suffering from various psychological disorders. These disorders

45 Franz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, P. 93 37

were documented in the later chapters of the Wretched of the Earth and told of people who had tortured natives or who had planted bombs and who could not live with the memory of the human suffering they had caused. Fanon seems to imply that man has an innate repulsion to doing violence to his fellow man no matter his political beliefs or his cultural background. In fact, this repuision is often

irreconcilable with his pol itical beliefs, i.e., a revolutionary who deems it necessary to liquidate an objective enemy (in his

framework) is also aware that in doing so he is 1 iquidating a

fellow man. It is this impossibility of reconciling the strong political

belief with the innate feeling of revulsion, the sense of evi 1 which accompanies the violent act which leads to disorders of the psychie.

Jacques Ellul believes that violence has historically

engendered more violence and that societies that are born in bloodshed can never overcome their beginnings despite their strivings for

justice and equality. The effect of violence on society is that

it gives birth to a certain ethic of action, an ethic which justifies

continuing violence and which can never be dispelled. Thus, every violent revolution has given birth to a violent society even when the

revolution has claimed that it will overcome violence. 38

And the Marxist idealists are simply naive when they believe that, once a reactionary government has been overthrown by violence, a just & peaceful regime will be established. Castro rules only by violence, Nasser and Boumedienne, 1 i kewi se. 46

On the micro-Ievel, violence acts on the individual man, it changes his very nature, he becomes consumed with. hatred and this hatred is passed on from generation to generation.

Men, according to Ellul, become accustomed to the use of violence, it becomes an acceptable tool for change and manipulation and once having entered the realm of the possible and the acceptable, it never leaves, but continues to haunt the actions of even thcsa who wish to construct a non-violent society.

Hann~h Arendt has also written of the nefarious effects of the presence of violence in society, especially in regards to its effects on politics, taken in the classical sense. Pol.itics or political activity is undertaken by people living in a community (polis) who dispensed from the everyday concerns of economic production,. are able to partake in discussions on such non-economic notions as freedom and justice. The essence of politics 'is speech,

that is, the ability of men to engage in fruitful dialogue on these matters. Violence is essential Iy speechless, because it emanates

from the man so overcome with rage and frustration that dialogue with

his fellow man becomes impossible. The subsequent presence of violence in the pol is makes it impossible for the normal political activities

46 Jacques El lui, Violence, A Christian Perspective, p. 94 ',' ,

to unfold because political speech and violent speechlessness come into conflict. On another level, Arendt has shown how violence, in the form of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, has destroyed the abi lit Y of a whole nation, the Czech nation, to act politically. This incompatibility of politics and violence is a theme which has also been taken up by Maurice Duverger in his The Idea of

Politics. One of the attributes of "politics" is that it tries to substitute peaceful means of combat for more violent ones, thereby providing a possible framework for concil iation of opposing groups who

understand the rules of the game. Violence does away with these

tacitly agreed upon rules. It- ••• renders the struggle insoluble, it fosters hatred and a spirit of vengeance, which makes the initial confl ict worse. 47

Thus, in this section, violence has been seen, on one hand, as a demystifying creative force which breeds class solidarity, and, on the other, aS a destructive force which engenders disorder and destroys politics. Another aspect of a thinker's perceptions of violence wi 1 1 be his position on this issue. 48

47 Maurice Duverger, The Idea of Pol itics, London, Methuen, 1966, p. 167 • 48 ln the preceding pages the writings of two thinkers have been examined concerning the potential role of violence as a tool for change. It is obvious that many people were left out that could have been included, such as fascist thought and modern Marxist and Marxist Revisionist thought. Other people who have done interesting work include R. Dahrendorf and H. Coser who have discussed the functions of conflict which is a more general term than violence. H. Coser has written an article specifically on the functions of violence in Hartogs + Artz - Violence, Causes and Solutions. • 1•• '

The fourth area of consideration of a thinker's perceptions of violence wi Il be: when does he consider the use of violence as a political tool to be justifiable?

It is the mark of most serious pol itical" and social thinkers to denounce the application of violence in vacuo, that is to say, without ulterior political motivation.

There are, however, differing opinions as to when, under what conditions the use of violence may be justifiable. Sorne thinkers

believe that it is never justifiable, others feel that it may be used

in opposition"to an illegitimate government, while still others are

of the opinion that it may be employed to overcome existing systemlc

injustice.

It is my intention to briefly examine the views of Jacques Ellul, a Christian sociologist, then to look at locke's right of revolution and finally to consider the position of 19th and 20th Century Marxist and Marxist Revisionists on this issue.

While many people speak of the Christian attitude on violence,

it must be made clear that there is not one Christian position, but many,

ail of which claim to be the true Christian position because of the

specifie biblical sources upon which their analysis is based.Further

more, most of these positions are merely modern re-interpretations of

stands which have been taken many times in the past by different

Christian thinkers. 41

According to Jacques El lui in his recent On Violence - A

Christian Perspective, there are three basic Christian positions regarding the justification of violence. The first is a compromise which sees violence as justified under certain conditions and which is historically derived from an Interpretation of the bible which ascribed divine origin to the pol itical authorities. Since the state is ordained by God, its violence must be seen in a different light from a violence of the individual pol itical actor. This position was upheld by Christians anxious to establish a Modus Vivendi between two institutions, the church and the state, which, because of global appeals to individual loyalties, were basically antagonistic.

The logical extension of this attitude towards violence led to the definition of the Just War. The church realized that to deny the state the right to go to war was to condemn it to extinction. But the state is ordained by God, therefore it must have the right to wage war.49 Of course, not ail wars were just wars, certain conditions

had to be fulfil led in order to so qualify, war had to be the last resort, it had te be undertaken for a good cause, etc., but, neverthe-

less, the conviction was born that violence in the cause of the good

is justifiable.

49 - J. Ellul, Violence - A Christian Perspective, P. 5 42

The second position is one which attempts to justify the use of violence by Christians. Especially significant is Thomas Aquinas's statement that when a poor person, out of need, steals, he is not committing a sin and should not be punished by the Church. The bread he stole was due him from the rich man ••• This analysis of Aquinas was to be one of the arguments regularly cited to justify violence. 50

Some 20th Century Christians have used this argument aS a justification for a defence of the poor by violence. The defence of the poor has a very long Christian tradition; Jesus Christ was poor, the poor were to inherit the earth, etc. Unfortunately, these Christians confused justice and social ism.

Christians today are once more convinced that justice is the preeminent value, the value that transcends ail others. But they conceive of justice in the sense of inequality, in a social sense, as requiring a more equitable division of consumers' goods. And this makes violence necessary. 51

The espousal of socialism by some Christians (especially

European Christians) has been the result of the association of capltalism with evi 1 and the refusai of people to remain passive in the face of

evi 1. But the espousing of social ism makes violence necessary for it is only by violence that the defence of the poor can be really assured.

The root of this pro-violent position 1 ies in a number of different conceptions of Christianity:

50 Ibid, P. 18

51 Ibid, P. 39 43

••• for one group, Christianity is a revolutionary force; for a second group there is a theology of revolution; for a third, Christianity has been fused into the revolution which has become a value in itself.52 The underlying assumption behind ail those who prone violence is that it is the dut Y of the Christian to enter into the world and to contribute what he can, as a Christian, to the defence

of the poor and oppressed who collectively embody Jesus Christ in the

modern era. The third approach mentioned in El lui 's book and the one he personal Iy supports, is the non-violent approach. In other words,

El lul~ as a Christian, bel ieves that violence can ~ be justified.

Jesus carried the commandment "Thou shalt not kil 1" to the extreme limit and in his persan manifested non-violence and even non-resistance to evi 1. When he was arrested, he neither al lowed Peter to defeng him nor cal led the "twelve legion of angels" to his aide 3

El lui bel ieves that the Christian must take a realistic position with regards to violence, that is, he must be aware that violence exists everywhere, in different forms, i.e., economic and psychological as weil aS physical, that violence is inherent in the

human condition, that man is violent out of necessity, i.e., when he

is unable to overcome his humanness, when he is not free from necessity.

52 1b id, p. 43

53 44

But to have true freedom is to escape necessity, or, rather, to be free to struggle against necessity. Therefore, 1 say that only one 1 ine of action is open to the Christian who is free in Christ. He must struggle against violence precisely because, apart from Christ, violence is the form that human relations normally and necessari Iy take.54

Thus, violence is very ~uch of and in this world, but the true Christian is trying to overcome the necessity of this world. Thus, for example, the Christian must never use violence even as a last resort, for a last resort must be an appeal to God in the form of prayer. Moreover, Christians, as men, may adhere to a secular ideology such as socialism, which may advocate violence, but they must never justify this adherence by claiming that socialism is the embodiment of Christian ideals, for socialism deals with the production and distri- but ion of worldly goods and Christianity must not be reduced to that. John Locke's right of revolution automatically comes to mind when discussing the justification of violence as a political tool

in the liberal framework. Of course, the phrase "the right of revolution ll

may be too strong and perhaps it should read I/right of resistance",

nevertheless, Locke does justify the use of violence against the state

under certain conditions. This Lockean right of revolution is closely related to the whole notion of legitimate government; revolution becomes justifiable in this framework, only when the state loses legitimacy, i.e., breaks the contract it has undertaken with its citizens at foundation.

54 45

To understand the notion of legitimacY1 however, one must be famillar with the genesls of the state. The state was founded by men who, free and equal in the state of nature, consented to join with others in a communfty for common safety. Sy doing so, they - ••• give up ail the power necessary to the ends for which they unite into society to the majority of the community.55

The chief end becomes the protection of what Locke called property, i.e., lives, liberties, and estates; its establishment was necessary because -

ln the state of nature, there are severa 1 things wanting • .•• there wants an established known law ••• ••• there wants a known and Indifferent judge with authority to determine ail differences according to the established law. • •• there wants power to back and support the sentence when right and give it due execution. 56 The state was founded then to protect the rights of man as they existed in the state of nature; it did not create rights, moreover, it had certain boundaries placed on its field of action; it could not tax without consent, etc. Men fulfilled their contractual obligations

by obeying the state and owing it allegiance. When the government breached the contract between itself

and the people, when it acted contrary to the interests of the majority, when it taxed without consent, the contractual ties were broken.

55 John Locke, Two Tr~atises of Civil Government & Introduction, London, Hafner, 1947, P. 170.

56 ~, P. 183. 46

Whenever the legislators endeavour to take away and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people who are thereupon absolved from any further obedience, and are left to the IIcornmon refuge which God has provided for ail men against force and violence." 57

And - Whosoever uses force without right, as everyone does in society, who does it without law, puts himself into astate of war with those against who he 50 uses it, and in that state, ail former ties are cance/led, ail other rights cease and everyone has the right to defend himself and resist the aggressor. 58

The ruler has deviated from reason, from the law and entered the realm of beasts; he may be opposed by force and violence and, eventually, be destroyed, the same manner as any other noxious creature. The justification of the resort to violence lies in the Law of Nature which the government has breached. As R. Poul in has stated La résistance est parfois légitime et légale, conforme a la loi. Mais comme Il ne s'agit pas d'inscrire dans la constitution le droit du peuple ~ résister au pouvoir suprame, il faut entendre par là une légitimité plus haute, qui rel~ve de la conformité à la loi de nature elle-mame. 59 Lest we be misled, however, John Locke was not advocating nor

57 Ibid, P. 233

58 Ibid, P. 208

59 R. Poul in, La Politique Morale de John Locke, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1960, P. 231. 47

anticipating frequent revolution; a revolution should take place only if the conditions of the people would be ameliorated by this revolution. Having briefly examined the Christian and Lockean justifications of violence, it becomes imperative to look at revolutionary thought on this subject. The revolutionary thinkers of the 19th and 20th Centuries raised somewhat different questions from the Christian and Liberal

thinkers in rega~ds to the justification of violence. Since the Marxist philosophy of history does not actually judge history, does not consider it in terms of good or evil, the Christian dilemma was not raised. The

Lockean argument that violence was justified in opposition to an illegit

imate authority bears a similarity to the revolutionary position, but of course, their criteria of legitimate authority differ dramatically.

ln fact, before 1917, .the revolutionaries considered ail governments to be i Ilegitimate representatives of the bourgeoisie 60wh ich, over a period of two hundred years, went from a revolutionary force in historical terms to a reactionary one. A government was considered legitimate if it Was controlled by the historically progressive class - the proletariat. The revolutionaries considered the use of violence to be justified if it served the interests of the historically progressive

60 Except the Paris Commune. .,

social forces, i.e., if ft helped fulfill the aims of the socialist revolution which was the logical culmination of history. la tache essentielle du marxisme sera donc de chercher une violence qui se dépasse vers l'avenir humain ••• le ruse, le mensonge, le sang versé, la dictature sont justifiés s'ils rendent possible le pouvoir du proletariat et dans cette mesure seulement. 61

Thus, we see the distinction made between progressive and reactionary violence. Revolutionary violence is justifiable simply because it is progressive.

Social ism is opposed to violence against nations. That is indisputable. But Socialism is opposed to violence against men in general. Apart from Christian-anarchists and Toistoyans, however, no one has yet drawn the conclu~jon from this that socialism is opposed to revolutionary violence. Hence, to talk about "violence" in general, without examining the conditions which distinguish reactionary from revolutionary violence, means being a philistine who renounces revolution ••• The same holds true of violence against nations, but that does not prevent socialists from befng in favour of a revolutionary war. The class character of the war - that is the fundamental question which confronts the socialist. 62

While there has been general agreement among Marxists that violence is justifiable if it helps to bring about revolution, there

has r~en wide disagreement as to exactly when the use of violence aids the revolutionary process. Such people as Marx, lenin, Trotsky,

Kautsky, Sorel and Fanon have ail justified their position on violence

61 Maurice Merleau Pont y, Humanisme et Terreur, Paris, Gallimard, 1947, P. XIV

62 V. 1. len.in, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, Moscow, International, 1967, P. 78. · (~.' .,

by claiming that it was the revolutionary position and yet one can perceive marked differences in their justifications. Marx, for example, saw that violence would accompany the transferring of political power; just as the passage from feudalism to capitalism was violent, so the passage from capitalism to socialism would be violent. The different momenta of primitive accumulation distribute themselves, now, more or less in chronological order, particularly over Spain, Holland, Portugal, France ànd England. In England at the end of the 17th Century, they arrive at a systematic combination, embracing the colonies, the modern mode of taxation and the protectionist system. These methods depend in part on brute force, e.g., the colonial system. But they ail employ the power of the State to hasten, hothouse fashion, the process of trans formation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode and to shorten the transition. Force is the mfd-wife of every old society pregnant with a new one. 63

This is not to say that Marx justified ail violence committed in the name of the proletariat. Violence was justified when it was

perpetrated by an organized working class movement and when the material conditions had been created which would necessitate the abolition of the bourgeois mode of production. ln fact, Marx believed that it was possible for the proletariat to revoit prematurely before the material conditions of bourgeois society had been fully developed.

63 K. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, Moscow, progress Publ ishers, 1965, p. 751 · '. ~

If the proletariat brings down the domination of the bourgeoisie, its victory wi Il be merely ephemeral, only a moment in the service of the bourgeoisie (just like anno 1794) so long as within the process of history, within its movement, those material conditions have not been created that make necessary the abolition of the bourgeois mode of production and theref2re, the definitive fall of the political bourgeois domination. 6

Furthermore, Marx severely condemned the whole tradition of

Jacobin and Blanquist terror as a means of bringing about the revolution. This condemnation was not based on moral grounds, rather

it arose because terrorism ran against the tenants of the Marxist dialectic. The socialist revolution would growout of the contradictions of capitalist society; of course, the revolution itself, would have as

its agent the violence of an organized working class, but civil society would be brought to the brink of revolution, not through terror, but through the normal unfolding of the contradictions of capitalist society.

To advocate acts of terror by small groups as a means of

"radicalizing" civi 1 society would be a case of unjustifiable violence,

for it would involve a subjective attempt by political meansto hasten the development of social conditions conducive to the revolution. It

is the replacement of a materialist interpretation of revolution by an idealist one where human will becomes more important than objective

soc i a 1 rea 1 i t Y•

64 K. Marx, Deutsche Brusseler 'Zeitung, Il November, Werke 10, 338-39, Quoted in S. Avineri, the Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969, P. 191 • • ,.• 1 ...

As Marx said in 1850 in speaking of the terrorists - It is self-evident that these conspirators do not limit themselves to the mere task of organizing the proletariat, not at ail. Theil" business lies in precisely in trying to pre-empt the developing revolutionary process, drive it artificially to crisis, to create a revolution ex nihilo, to make a revolution without the conditions for a revolution. For them, the only necessary condition is an adequate organi zation of their conspiracy. They are the alchemists of the revolution and they share ail the wooly mindedness, follies and idees fines of the former alchemists. 65

Lenin's position was similar to Marx in that its justification depended on the circumstances. Lenin, however, was an active revolutionary leader attempting to overthrow the ruling class of a country with a high potential for revolution. Consequently, acts of violence were judged in 1 ight of their contribution to specifie revolutionary strategy. Violence and terror were justified if they complimented the strategy of the party and if they could be integrated into the activities of a highly organized working class organization. On nous propose aujourd'hui la terreur non point comme l'une des operations d'une armée combatante, operation étroitement ratachée et articulée ~ tout le syst~me de lutte, mais comme un moyen d'attaque isolé, indépendent de toute armée et se suffisant de lui-rn@me. D'ailleurs ~ défaut d'une organisation revolutionnaire centrale et avec les organisations locales faibles, la terreur ne saurait @tre autre chose. C'est bien pourquoi nous declarons résolument que dans les circonstances actuelles, 1a terreur est une arme' inopportune, inopérante, qui détourne les combattants les plus actifs de leurs tache véritable et la plus importante pour tout le mouvement, et qui désorganise non pas les forces gouvern mentales, mais les forces révolutionnaires. 66

65 K. Marx, Werke VI " P. 273. Quoted in Avineri, p. 201. 66 Lenin, Par ou Commencer Oeuvres, Tome S, May 1901; Feb. 1902, pp. 15-16. · ,.. '

Revolutionar;,{ acts of violence cornrnj_tted in isolation when the working class organization was weak could not be justified because the

't1Torking class would incur the wrath of the bourgeois state at a time

'1Then it was unable to defend itself properly. Acts of violence 'ivere

"permissible" when il:;ttegrated into the i'lorking class struggle. At this point the organization of the working class \1Tould be developed and the \-Torkers would be encouraged to take up arms themselves •

For tJIarx and Lenin, then, acts of violence must be integrated into the global revolutionary struggle. Later revolutionaries such as Sorel and Fanon could justify violence under different circumstances because, as we have seen, they believed that acts of violence might themselves accelerate the social contradictions necessary for the revolution and the subsequent overthrow 0:'Ï the boureoisregime.

67 By grouping Fanon and Sorel together, it is not suggested that these two thinkers share exactly the same views on violence. Both, it is true, revise Narx, but, despite this important similarity, there do exist basic differences. Fanon analj'se scientifiquement les condition existantes, alors que Sorel place le m~~he au centre de sa theorie. Ces differ ences se déoluisent directement de leurs conceptions même de la violence. Pour Sorel, la violence est une constante naturelle et instinctive de la nature humaine dont il ne faut pas empecher l'explosion ••• Fanon, en révanche, analyse la violence dans son contexte historique et economique, comme une réalité dériv~e et meditis~e par le processus d'exploitation du colonialisme. Pour lui, la violence ne se limite pas au moment ou elle explose spontanément, mais se differencie socialement, de par son interpretation consciente du boulverse ment révolutionnaire des structures de la société. - R. Zehar, L'Oeuvre de Fanon, Paris, Maspero, 1970, p. 93. 53

These are. of course. justifications for revol ut ionary violence when it involves the taking of pol itical power. After 1917. in the Soviet Union, representatives of the proletariat did take power and yet the early history of the Soviet Republic was marked by violence. The historical necessity of the conquering of politic~1 power by the proletariat could no longer be the principal justification because power had been won. Of course, it now had to be consolfdated and continuing violence in the form of purges could be justified because of the dangers of a counter-revolution. Marx had envisaged the necessity of a dictatorship of the proletariat for a transitional period between capital ism and social ism because the revolution wou/d be ob/iged to de fend itse/f against c/ass enemies. There is certain/y no doubt that in the twenties there did exist "objective" c/ass enemies such as the Ku/aks, whose liquidation cou/d be justified. yet, there were a/so purges against men who were certainly not C'/ear-cut enemies of the revolution, in fpct, many of them CBuharin, Zinoniev} had participated themselves in the October Revo 1ut i on. Of course, the safeguarding of the revofution continued to be the justification of the executions, but it was evident that Bukarin et al did not oppose the revofution in the same way the Kulaks did.

67 For a somewhat similar opinion on the relationship between Ccont'd) the two, see D. Caute, ~, for an opposing view see Zolberg A. Franz Fanon. A Gospel for the Damned, Encounter, Nov. 1966 and Hannah Arendt, On Violence, passim. 54

They did, however, disagree with party policy and, because it was the party and no longer the proletariat which embodied the revolution, a threat to party unit y became a threat to the unit y of the revolution. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty points out in his Humanisme et Terreur, it became justifiable in the revolutionary framework to liquidate the objective enemies of the revolution, but at sorne point, these "objective" enemies were so designated by an individual political actor and thus became, in a very real sense, subjective political enemies. It Was true that the revolutionaries believed that - On ne peut pas dépasser la violence qU'en créant du nouveau ~ travers la violence. 68 and thus the justification for these executions became their historical necessity. There does remain one question, however, which has been posed by many revolutionaries in the western world: Is this revolution heading in a direction which wi 1 1 enable it to "dépasse la violence" or has it institutionalized violence in the same fashion as many western liberal democracies. To quote Merleau-Ponty

la seule question qU'il reste ~ poser apr~s cela, c'est si Boukharine est vraiement mort pour une révolution et pour une nouvelle humanité. 69

68 M. Merleau-Ponty, Humanisme et Terreur, P. 37

69 .lJll.2 , P. XXX ','

ln the preceding pages, 1 have attempted to outline a possible framework for the study of perceptions of violence. For il lustrative purposes, the writings of various political and social thinkers have been examlned and fitted into the applicable categories.

Four principal categories or areas of consideration of a thinker's perceptions of violence have emerged. The first treats the acts or phenomena which a thinker judges to be violent; the second examines his views on the causes or roots of violence; the third considers his ideas on the consequences of the presence of violence on normal socieral relations and the fourth deals with his justification of the

use of violence as a political tool. The categories themselves, are probably not ail inclusive,

nor are they mutual Iy exclusive for there is a certain amount of overlap

and interdependence bui It into most frameworks of this sort. Moreover,

the use of categories to capture perceptions of such an abstract concept

does violence to these perceptions because they must be "fitted" into the

categories even when the fit'is tenuous. Nonetheless, the framework

does provide a possibility for a comparative study and in the final

analysis, the ?ategories must be considered ideal types, analytical constructs which wi Il serve as heuristic devices for this study. The next section of this paper will be devoted to the

application of this framework in the Quebec context. The perceptions 56

of violence of two groups of Quebec notables, the French Canadian

Federal cabinet mlnis~ers, as represented by Pierre Trudeau and the

F. L. Q. as represented by Pierre Val li~res, will be examined using the four different categories as the unit of analysis. ."/

The second part of this paper will be devoted to a study of the perceptions of violence of two groups of Quebec thinkers: Pierre Trudeau and the French Canadian members of his cabinet, and

Pierre Vall i~res and He F. L. Q. in general. 1 These two groups of men have been chosen because their notions of violence have been much in view since the October crisis, moreover, they represent two points on the political spectrum around which a great manyQuebecers have gravitated. It is my intention to compare these two divergent conceptions of violence using the four part framework developed in the first section of this paper; at the same time, 1 will attempt to integrate their ideas with those expressed in the first section. As was shown in the beginning of this paper, the study of

a thinker's perceptions of violence cannot be undertaken without first examining his worldview. His views on violence much like his

views on freedom, justice, democracy and other abstract "political"

concept~, are merely parts of a more general overview of man and

society.

1 will refer to Trudeau and Valli~res throughout the section and most of the sources cited will be from their writings and speeches. At times, however, 1 wi Il drawon the writings of Jean Marchand and Gerard Pelletier and on unpublished F. L. Q. documents. 58

/n order, then, to better understand both Trudeau's and

Val/i~res' notions of violence, it becomes important to briefly situate the place of their thought in Quebec history; i.e., how and why did their worldviews emerge in Quebec and what pattern did they take? For most of its history, Quebec has been dominated by one ide%gy, one overriding definition of the functioning of society and man's place in it. This ide%gy, the Conservationist ide%gy,.2 took root in Quebec after the defeat of the French Canadian petite bourgeoisie at the hands of the British urban middle class in 1837. 3 The subsequent discrediting of this petite bourgeoisie and its libera/ ideology and the assimilationist overtones of the Durham

Report in /839 facilitated the rise to dominance of the clergy and their particular wor/dview. The main preoccupation of this e/ite became the conservation of their culture and language from "foreign" (British) assimi lation. As Q/ iver wrote in 1956-

2 Marcel Rioux, L'Evolution de J'Ideologie au Quebec, passim.

3 There is much debate between historians as to the ideology and sociological make-up of the Patriots in 1837. Sorne (Rioux, Bergeron) feel that this group represented the liberal strand in 19th century Quebec. others (Metcalfe, Que//et) believe that they were a group ofsmall professiona/s trying to protect their interests and in no way could they be described as . 1 i beral • · ,.t' .. ,,'

Nationalism has been the matrix which gives the essential form to pol itics. Significant movements are nationalist primarily; radicalism, Marxism or reaction are only secondary characteristics.4

During the first period of conservationist monopoly from

1840 to 1870, Quebec Was basically a static society; there Was 1 ittle social mobil ity. In Quebec, migration between the country and the city was smal 1 and new social elites did not emerge because the economic structures remained static. Between 1870 and 1921, however, Quebec experienced great urban migration. Eighty percent rural in

1871, it is half·urban fort y years later.5 . Moreover, between 1910 and 1950, Quebec bagan to industrialize and the number of employees

in the manufacturing industry increased dramatically. Meanwhi le, a new

urban middle class arose to service this new industrial society.

Nonetheless, ideology in Quebec remained relatively monol ithic ail during

this period despite the many structural changes. There is often

a lag between objective reality (structural conditions) and a group's

prise de consciençe that their relationship with the system of economic

production has changed.

After the war, however, a new liberal ideology, articulated

by a number of Montreal intellectuals and trade unionists did emerge. Rioux calls it the rattrapage ideology, its principal spokesmen were

Trudeau and Pelletier and it was a strong advocate of economic and political

4 Michael 01 iver, Social and Pol itical Thought of French Canadian Nationalists, 1920 - 40, McGil1 Doctoral Thesis, 1956, P. 7., Unpubl ished~ 5 Marcel Rioux, La Question du Quebec, Paris, Seghers, 1971 p. 85. 60

1 iberalism. It did not believe that Quebec's destiny lay in the pre- servation of a rural, catholic society, but, rather, it saw the need for Quebec to catch up (rattraper) with the rest of North America by emulating it both in the economic and political sphere. The ideology was liberal and not socialist because it was inspired and directed by the middle class; working class conditions became an important issue only insofar as the oppression of the worker ran against the tenants of bourgeois ideology. Between 1955 and 1968, Quebec passed through another period of rapid change. The civil service almost trebled in number, the provincial government expended seven times more money in 1968 than it did in 1955, the three major unions (C.S.N., F.L.Q., C.E.Q.) expanded greatly and began to redefine their position in Quebec society. The Ministry of Education was formed and great emphasis was placed on the development of a modern educational system. ln the beginning of the sixties, accompanying these mutations, a new ideology emerged in Quebec. Mr. Rioux calls it the participationist ideology.

En termes hégéliens, on pourrait voir dans la premj~re ideologie (conservationisme) une periode d'affirmation, dans la deuxi~e la négation de la premi~re et dans la troisi~me la négation de la négation. 6

6 - Marcel Riou~, L'Evolution de "'deologie au Quebec, p. 117. · ,.i ...

The ideology was articulated by a young generation of journalists, artists, professors, civil servants and trade union leaders. like the Conservationists, they valued the uniqueness of

French Canadian language and culture, but they believed that the

French Canadians must take their place in an urban society. Rather than a style of rattrapage or copying the American or Canadian model, they saw the possibil ity of developing a new society in

Quebec, one in which the population would participate in building.

While the idea of a participation became the common denom-

inator for these newly emerging forces in Quebec society, it could not bind together the prcfound differences of opinion which began to

develop between the Quebe~ois petite bourgeoisie, which founded the

R. 1. N. and Parti Quebeçois; and a group of intellectual and trade unionists who adopted a Marx.ist ideology. Even among the latter group, factions began to emerge, but these were principally differences

as to revolutionary strategy. Pierre Valli~res as weil as other

members of the F. L. Q. and Parti Pris had been influenced by Pierre Trudeau and Cité Libre during the "grande noirceur" of the

Duplessis era. Trudeau et Pelletier ne pouvait croire que la jeunesse qU'ils avaient influencée de 1950 ~ 1960, était devenue séparatiste. C'étaient comme s'ils avaient accouché d'un monstre. 7

7 Pierre Vall i~res, N~gres Blancs d'Ameri~, Montreal, Parti Pris, 1968, P. 295. 62

However~ under the influence of Marx~ Mao~ Guevera and Fanon, they began to see the weakness of the liberal solution to

Quebec's underdevelopment. Moreover, they now saw Quebec history in a different fashion~ 1 iking the province to a colony which had to be decolonized; their notions of the state, of legitimacy, of democracy, of the very nature of man and society came to differ with Trudeau's notions. It is not surprising then, that this new pluralism of the sixties would engender radically different perceptions of the phenomenon of violence. The remainder of this section will be devoted to an examination of Trudeau's and Valli~res perceptions of vrolence and will attempt to demonstrate that these perceptions reflect a general divergence in ideology.

What acts or phenomena are considered by Trudeau and Valli~res to be violent? ln what context is the word violence used? This. is an important area of consideration, for the word "violence" is widely used to denote only a single mode of political action - the F. L. Q. kidnappings and bombings. Suddenly, the media and the population have discovered that violence plays a large part in Quebec politics, that Quebec is a violent society, even if it has become so only recently. Moreover, a whole set of mythsBhave been involved to explain

8 Daniel Latouche~"Violence in Quebec~ Canadian Dimension January, 1971. ~\

and describe violence in the Quebec context. The most important of these is the definition of violence itself in su ch a fashion that it is used only to describe brutal, overt phenomena aimed at the destruction of property and persons. A large part of Quebec society views violence in these terms and, yet, there is also another view of violence which sees it occuring on a daily basis as part of the normal

working of Quebec society. These two different notions of violence have given rise to a great deal of mlsunderstanding, for in many

cases, people are using the same word to refer to different phenomena.

Moreover, it is interesting to note that the division on the social question in Quebec, between those supporting a rejuvenated capitalism

and those opting for a form of social ism, can also be found in the

debate on violence. The most well-known advocates of these respective

positions are Pierre Trudeau and Pierre Vall i~res.

Trudeau has written on violence aS early as 1957, when he commented on the possible use of violence as a tool for change.

J'ai écrit, en tête de l'article incriminé, que je n'aimais pas la violence. Puisqu'il faut ~ettre les points sur les "i's'I J'ajouterai même qu'elle me r~pugne. 9 ln this article and in speeches he has given since the

October crisis, the word violence has been used to describe political assasinations, kidnappings, and bombings. This is not to say, however, that Trudeau completely ignores other definitions of violence, definitions which see violence existing in ordinary, systemic power

9 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Cheminement de la Pol itigue, Montreal, Editions du Jour, 1970, P. 71. ",'

relationships. As an accomplished social scientist, he is aware that the word has come to have a number of different connotations. Awareness of these differences was demonstrated by Jean Marchand in the followi ng speech: La violence existe dans toute société peu importe son degré de perfection; violence entre 1 'état, son lourd apparei 1 administratif et les citoyens; violence des majorités contre minorités; violence entre les pius riches, les moins riches, et les plus pauvres. Violence dans la concurrence industri~lle et commerciale; violence entre les forts et les faibles, les gros et les petits, les patrons et les ouvriers, les syndiqués et les non-syndiqués. IO

Of course, by suggesting that violence exists inevitably in ail modern societies principally because that society is modern and thus susceptible to certain tensions and pressures, it becomes possible to absolve that society of blame for its violence. If every society is violent, then no society is particularly violent and the word loses its perjorative meaning. Moreover, although Marchand talks of

"systemic violencell or ilia violence circonstanciel le", he never explains how this type of violence is manifest in Quebec society, his discussion of this violence remains on a theoretical level. This enables him to construct a heirarchy of violence, one which distinguishes between those forms of violence which cannot be done away with because they are inherent in modern society, and those forms of physical violence which must be done away with because they are the work of a group of

marginal men who are unable to be integrated into the democratic process.

10 Jean Marchand, Speech before the Quebec Liberal Party, Feb. 7, 1971, unpublished, P.3 66

A year earlier in- his review Revolution Quebeçoise Vall i~res wrote of the hidden violence bui It into the capitalist system.

Ceux qui ont toujours eu recours a la violence (légale ou pas) pour opprimer les masses travai lieuses sont aussi ceux qui dénouncent avec le plus de vigeur l'usage de la violence. Mais la violence qU'ils incriminent et qU'ils rejettent# c'est justement cel le qu'uti lisent les opprimés et les exploités pour leur resister (gr~ves# manifestations publiques# protestations democratiques. Par contre, ils portent aux nues le genre de violence qu'ils exercent sur les masses travailleuses (Iegislation ouvri~re restrictive# limitation du droit de gr~ve chantage au moyen de l'argent, congédiements sommaires, conspiration du silence autour de leurs manoeuvres d'exploitation, etc.) 13

ln the F. L. Q. underground literature# this notion of systemic violence is also in evidence:

Les Anglais et les federalistes uti lisent contre nous une forme de violence injurieuse, cruelle et inhumaine. Leur violence est un chantage odieux qui existe depuis que nous avons été conquis par leurs armes. Depuis ce temps, les Anglais# les Exploiteurs# les Federalistes ont tenté de nous assimiler. Ils ont tenté de nous enlever nos droits# notre culture# nos traditions, nos richesses# notre langue. Aujourd'hui ils tentent encore de nous noyer dans leur monde anglo-saxon. Les Anglais essaient de faire disparaître le peuple quebeçois de la surface de la terre. Ca c'est de la v io 1ence. 14

This extract from La Victoire makes it clear that the violation

of the natural development of the Quebec people constitutes# for the F. L. Q., a form of violence far more odious than the overt violence in reaction to it.

13 Pierre Val li~res, Revolution Quebeçois~ Vol. #3, November, 1964, P. 3. 14 Anonymous # La Vi cto ire # Vo 1. #1 # November 1967, p. 2,. · ,.i "-,;'

Evidement, cette violence (la violence circonstancielle) peut ~tre plus ou moins aigue suivant I~s sociétés et le degré de liberté relative que chacun permet. Mais il y a violence et violence. sr comme on veut vous la faire croire la violence morale ou ce que j'appelle la violence circonstancielle est une justification en soi de la violence physique, y compris le meurtre politique, nous sommes vraiment dans un engrenage infernal gui ne s'arretera qU'avec la destruction totale de la société. Il

Normally though, the word violence for the Liberal Minister denotes the bombings, kidnappings, and political murder in Quebec society. Marchand's speech is the only occasion where an alternative definition is considered, thus, it is hardly surprising that this definition has not found its way into current liberal par lance.

Vallières and the F. L. Q. in general consider violence to be omnipresent in Quebec society. In his autobiography, Vall ières paints a grim picture of ilia quotidienté" in lower working class Montreal where the tension of people struggling for privacy and even for survival engenders a certain savagery, a certain barbarity in every day relations. Dans cet univers de violence ou les enfants rêvaient d'incendies gigantesques, d'agorgeurs de femme, de meurtriers terribles et de voleurs de bébés, frequenter l'école était une distraction pour le moins ennuyante. 12

12 Pierre Vallières, Nègres Blancs d'Amerigue, P. 118 67

Despite the emphasis by Val li~res and the F. L. Q. on systemic, institutional violence in Quebec? they are weil aware that

bombings and kidnappings also are a real form of violence. However p in opposition to Trudeau and Marchand? they do not consider there to be a quai itative difference between systemic and overt violence.

Hence? one can speak of bombings and strike-breaking in the same breath since both constitute forms of violence.

The differences between Trudeau and Val li~res have arisen for two basic reasons. Firstly? they have different interpretations of Quebec history. For Valli~res? Quebec has been a colony of England? Canada and the United States for the past two hundred years. The notion. of colonization and the need for decolonization is a very important

aspect of Valli~res thought and in this he has been strongly influenced

by such third world thinkers as Franz Fanon and Che Guevara. A colonial situation is one of permanent violence and it is in this

light that Valli~res views the history of the Quebec people. L'asservissement (du peuple Quebegois) qui est le resultat d'un long processes de violence et qui ne cessera que par la violence organisée des exploités des n~gres blancs du Quebec comme des n~gres du monde entier. 15

ln speaking of the differential of wealth between bourgeois

and proletariat? Valli~res introduces the idea of violence as a long term historical phenomenon.

15 - Pierre Valli~res, N~9res Blancs d'Amerigue, P. 287 68

••• que ce n'est pas une question de compétence et encore moins d'intelligence, mais essentiellement une question de privileges inégalement répartis, de pouvoirs injustement acquis par des si~cles de violence ou les plus faibles étaient toujours impitoyablement ecrosés par les plus forts. 16

Pierre Trudeau has never used such language (n~gres blancs, cOlonisation) in hismany analysis of Quebec history. He does, of course, on many occasions note the backwardness of the society in most areas of human endeavour, economics, politlcs and science, but he generally blames the indigenous Qetite bourgeoisie for this state of affairs.

The solution for Trudeau, ther~fore, lies not in expelling the foreign colonizer, since one does not exist, but in the Quebec people themselves, who will make their own destiny by diligence and hard work. Because of this view of Quebec history, Trudeau do es not consider that violence has played an important role in the development of the province.

ln fact, he considers it a modern phenomenon, one which Canadiens have not tolerated historically and which they will not abide in the future.

The F. L. Q. has sown the seeds of its own destruction. It has revealed that it has no mandate but terror, no policies but violence and no solutions but murder. Savagery is alien to Canadians, it will always be, for collectively we wi Il not tolerate it. 17 The second reason for the difference in the perceptions of violence of these two thinkers is their divergence on the economic and social question. Vall ières has, since 1964, adopted many of the

16 Ibid, P. 167

17 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Notes for a Statement by the Prime Minister, Saturday, October 18th, 1970, Unpublished, P. 6 69

Marxist critiques of capitalist production and has condemned a system of values which accorded a higher place to profit than to man and where there existed:

••• (une) échange par lequel les choses1~eviennent les personnes et les personnes les choses.

Thus, for Vallières, violence takes the form of unemployment which robs man of his natural right to '\"lork, to create. It also manifests itself in "legislation ouvrière restricive, congediement sommaire, etc." Trudeau, of course, does not consider these particular economic relations violent because they are normal in the proper daily functioning of capitalism, and indeed necessary for its survival. Despite the fact that Trudeau was once considered a "socialist" because oi' his association with the Quebec Trade Unions in the i'amous Asbestos strD

mainstream of neo-classical Ke~nsian analysis. Nowhere is this more

apparent than in a 1954 Cite Libre article entitled Fluctuations

Economi~ues et Hethods de Stabilisation which called for the application

oi' standard Ke~nsian fiscal and monetary policies. There is no mention of planning, nationalization or an;)' other mechanism remotely connected with socialism. Trudeau also has a distinctly non-socialist love for business:

18 Ivr. Merleau-Ponty, quoted by Pierre Vallières in Nègres Blancs d'Amerigue, P. 284. 70

One cannot help but regard business and ail its ramifications aS one of the most important aspects of human achievement. 19

Recently, of course, he has tried to put his economic princip les into practice in an effort to lower the high rate of inflation which has been a feature of the Canadian and Western economies generally in the past few years. These pol icies are, however, deemed violent by Vall i~res though considered necessary by Trudeau for economic stabi lit Y and affluence.

Trudeau and Vall i~res, then, hold different views as to what constitutes violence in Quebec society and when it occurs. For Trudeau the concept "violence" designates acts which cause damage to persons and/or property, it is a phenomenon which is brutal and sudden and it is only recently that it has been a factor in Quebec politics.

Vall i~res, on the other hand, considers the history of Quebec to be a history of violence; for him, the concept denotes not just the physically explosive forms of violence, but also the more insidious, sophisticated forms which characterize capitalist economic relationships.

These two definitions are so dramatically divergent as to make any public debate on the place of violence in Quebec society difficult,

if not impossible.

19 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Notes for Remarks bv the Prime Minister Liberal Party Dinner, Montreal, Feb. 21, 1971, Unpublished, P. 10. · '0 t'

Having considered their definitions of violence, it is now necessary to examine the explanations offered for its existence by Trudeau and Vall ières. The violence in question is, for Trudeau, only revolutionary violence, whi le Vall ières attempts to ex~lain both revolutionary violence and the systematic violence bui It into Quebec society. In this, as in other areas, their explanations reflect their general method of analysis and understanding of societal change and evolution. Hence, in examining their explanations for the existence of violence, some of the following questions regarding their own methods should be answered.

What role do ideas play in effecting change?

Are changes in the pol itical/social/cultural superstructures merely the result of change in the economic substructure?

Does the pol itical actor wi Il his own destiny or is his every act determined by his class position?

Ail of Trudeau's analysis of history and contemporary society

has been strongly influenced by Christian thought and its voluntaristic

strain. Despite Trudeau's training in the social sciences, he rarely explains developments in Quebec society in terms which would be fami 1 iar

to a modern sociologist. Trudeau considers man directly responsible

for his own fate - if an individual or a community has the desire to accomplish something, it can be done. Thus, the French Canadian must

take complete responsibility for the lack of financial and technical expertise in his society. ",.. '

ln high finance and industry, few of our French speaking compatriotes are to be found at decision making levels or in management posts, fewer still are found in the ranks of ownership. These fields, are, however, open to anyone possessing determtnation, a high degree of competence and creat ive ab i 1 i ty. 20

This statement seems to imply that French Canadians could become members of the Quebec financial elite if they so desired; that

~ plays a more important role than sociological fa~tors such as elite recruitment patterns and socialization in determining the make-up of the elites. This voluntaristic strain permeates Trudeau's thought; for instance, when he speculates on the future of Quebec in

Canada: And with a degree of industrial maturity that promises to glve it the most brill iant of futures. This is what could happen, but on two conditions. a) First, the French Canadian must really want it, they must abandon their role of oppressed nation. 21 or again

On a spiritual level, Quebec must assert itself as a province

that fosters moralA intellectual, artistic, scientific and techn i ca 1 va 1ues. 24 or when speaking of the French Canadian outside of Quebec -

As for French minorities in other provinces, they can only have a future if Ouebec establishes itself as a strong, progressive force within confederation. 23

20 Pierre El Ilot Trudeau, Notes for Remarks by the Prime Minister Liberal Party Dinner, p. 10

21 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Fe(:leral ism and the French Canadian, Toronto, MacMillan, 1968, P. 31

22 1J2.i!:!, p. 34

23 !J2l.s!, P. 22 73

Consistent with this approac,",., one of the major explanations advanced by Trudeau to explain the existence of I~evolutionary violence in Quebec is voluntarlstic in tone. Revolutionary violence exists because certai.n people have decided that it is necessary.

The phenomenon of violence is one which is known by most industrial societies. Peoele decide things must change faster than they are changing. They decide that they know better than the vast majority of people what is good for them, so they wi 1 1 impose it upon them by dynamite and bombs and selective kidnapping and so on. 24

Of course, Trudeau does not attribute violence to ordinary people. Revolutionary violence and terror spring from warped, demented minds from forces which have not been able to accept the evolutionary workings of democratic society.

would say, let us not be overly complexed, let us not have too strong a guilt complex about what's happening in Quebec being the result of what we did. What is haeeening in Ouebeç~ 1 am thinking of the terror is the result of regressive m;nds,people who are bringing civil ization back many hundreds of thousands of years to a period which preceeded the establishment of liberty in our institutions, to a period when, as 1 said, magic and superstition and terror were the values on which society stumbled forward. 25

It Is evident in the language used by Trudeau to describe the

F. L. Q. and other Quebec revolutionary groups, that he considers neither

their tactics nor their goals as justified~ legitimate or even sane. He

24 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Transcript of the Prime Minister's Remarks on the CBS Programme - 60 minutes, December 8, 1970, Unpublished, P. 2

25 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Transcript of Ouest ions and Answers at the Prime Mfnister's Accountability Session, Liberal Party Convention, Ottawa, November 20, 1970, Unpublished, P. 3. -.\

often speaks of "regressive mfnds" of "throwbacks, obsolete dark vestiges of prehistoric animais" and fringe groups. The pol itical impl ications of an analysis founded on voluntarism are considerable and they effect both short and long-run policy planning. First in the short-run since violence is assumed to be the result of decisions made by autonomous minds possessing freewill, any program designed to expel violence from the body pol itic emphasizes the crushing of individuals or small groups.

Over time the closely allied influence of idealism makes itself felt.

Thus, long-run policy is dominated by the need to change the value structure of the society. For instance, in response to the question,

Do Vou see a clear connection between poverty, inabil ity to get employment and urban guerilla warfare, kidnapping, social radicalism? Trudeau has responded

There is no clear connection in a causal sense because there has been, in the past, much more poverty ••• But there is certainlY a rising in our societies, and especially in our youth, a rejection of many of the values in which societies in the past have operated, the materialistic values, the values of more and faster and so on, and this rejection, if it isn't replaced by a new set of values in which there will be a consensus around which a new consensus wi Il be built if it isn't replaced, then there wi Il be the causal relationshlps Vou mentioned ••• But my answer to Vou is not to do more to erase' the blight of unemployment or poverty ••• we should find a new set of values which will recreate or correct the disenchantment in our society and this is more important than having better police work or having the statistics on unemployment a bit more favourable. 26

26 Pierre EII fot Trudeau, liA Conversation with the Prime Minister", December 31st, 1970, Unpubl ished, p. 4-6. Conversation between Pierre EII iot Trudeau and Tom Gould for CBC Television. · ,."

Despite the persistence of the voluntaristic strain in Trudeau's writings, it would be erroneous to suggest that he admits of no other possible reasons for the emergence of revolutionary

violence. Both he and Gerard Pelletier l in their speeches and writings, mention social conditions as a possible source of violence. Trudeau, however, never attr-ibutes the emergence of revolutionary violence merely to poverty; instead he contends that the divergence between expectations and real ity created by modern consumer societies is the principal source of tensions which result in revolutionary violence.

Any society which creates expectations for itself which cannot be fi lied, is a society which is heading for violence but one of the most urgent concerns of this government has been to make sure that the gaps between expectation and fulfi liment doesn't widen to the extent that dissatisfaction becomes so rife that people blow up .the society. 27

This is, of course l an explanation similar to the one put forth original Iy by Aristotle and subsequently by de Toqueville. It is not, however, the sole social explanation offered byTrudeau.

Such recourse to violence is certainly the most disquieting l the most serious phenomenon in modern society, be it in - Europe or in North America in the United States or in Canada. Where does the explanation lie? Perhaps we find it in the accelerated development that 1 just mentioned. The result has been an outburst of energy and an emerge'1'ice of val ues for which no immediate use or out let has been found. And it may weil be that a solution for the phenomenon of violence lies only in acthorough democratisation of ail our institutions and social structures. 28

27 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Transcript of Questions and Answers at Prime Minister's Accountability Session, P. 14 28 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Notes for Remarks by the Prime Minister, Liberal Party Dinner, p. 2 76

ln this statement, Trudeau is invoking a critique of modern industrial society which has been most fUlly developed by the New Left in the United States. The lack of opportunity for the common man to participate in decisions which concern his "guotidientéll leads to

frustration. Since there is no institutional out let for these

frustrations, violence remains as the sole means to overcome his

powerlessness. Unfortunately, however, when Trudeau discusses the

societal causes of violence, he remains on a somewhat abstract plane, he do es not apply his theoretical conclusions directly to the Quebec

situation, but pre fers to speak of modern societies in general. Moreover, nowhere, to my knowledge, does he suggest that the prevailing

economic conditions, such aS the high rate of unemployment could have been a contributing factor to the emergence of revolutionary violence

in Quebec society.

Val 1 i~res' ideas concerning the sources of violence in Quebec society differ dramatically from those of Trudeau, principally because

his global method differs from Trudeau's. Vall i~res could not attribute

the existence of revolutionary violence to "regressive minds" or to

people who decide, as it were, in a vacuum, to be violent. Vall i~res

is not an idealist, revolution and violence do not come from men's minds,

people do not decide ta destroy a society by violence in isolation from

the material forces working ta influence this decision. Having since 1964,

according to his autobiography, espoused the Marxist method, Valli~res ...

must explain both systemic,.and revolutionary violence in materialist terms. This means that the explanation for the causes of violence no longer centers on the will or volonté of a group of men to be violent, but on the contradictions of capitalist production and on the alienation of capitallst society which engender in man's consciousness the will to violence. Thus, in explaining systemic vi 01 ence or "1 a viol ence soc i a 1e", Va Iii ~res pro fer's a Marx i st explanation.

La violence sociale resulte de l'exploitation de l'homme par l 'homme. Dans un regime comme le notre, elle est l'instrument par lequel les oppresseurs renforcent et elargissent le pouvoir de leur domination. 29

This "violence socialell is Inherent in the capitalist system,

its presence, in the form of anti-strike leglslation, etc. p is necessary for the proper functioning of the capitalist economic system. It

rises inevitably from the laws of this system, because if these economic relations are to perpetuate themselves, they must be reinforced

by violence. Thus individual capitalists perpetrate acts of violence, because, aS capitalists, they are obi iged to do so; moreover, they usually do not interpret these acts as acts of violence.

Vall i~res aiso attempts to explain the rise of revolutionary

violence in Quebec since 1960, a violence which has ta~en the form of

strikes, large demonstrations and university occupations. This violence is considered to be the spontaneous reaction of different groups of

Quebecois to the legal, systemic violence perpetrated by the anglophone

exploiters. Moreover, Vall i~res believes that this violence will increase

29 Pierre Va Iii ~res, Des MatraQues pour 1 a Re i ne, in Revo 1ut ion Quebecoise, Vol. 1, #3, November 1964, P. 5, • {ot'

rather than diminish as the Quebec people become more and more conscious of their oppression. La violence spontanée de plus en plus feroce du peuple? en particulier des cultivateurs? des ouvriers et des jeunes? est la réponse qu'appel le et qu'obtient la violence systematiquement pratiquée depuis des si~cles, par des classes diri"eantes minoritaires.

Cette violence ne peut qU'aumenter avec la conscience qU'ont aujourd'hui des masses enti~res d'@tre privées injustement de la propriété de leurs moyens de production? ainsi que de la richesse produite? de la culture etc.? et d·~tre maintenues dans l'esclavage au nom de la democratie? de la democratie de la libre entreprise et de l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme. 30

Unlike Trudeau, Valli~res do es not believe that this revolutionary violence can be dissipated by piecemeal reform? since revolutionary violence is a product of the contradictions of capitalist

society, it will only disappear when that society has evolved. La violence révolutionnaire? depuis qu'elle a surgie au Quebec, hante l'insomnie des classes dirigeantes (americaine, canadienne anglaise et quebecoise) qui cherchent par tous les moyens a l'écraser ou du moins a la discrediter. Mais cette violence étant le produit des contradictions m@me du systeme colonial et capitaliste, el le ne peut se resorber quVavec la disparition du systeme lui-m@me. 31

30 Pierre Valli~resp N~gres Blancs d'Amerigue, P. 321

31 ~, P. 371 · (~.' "

-,\

The third part of this section will examine the effects of F. L. Q. violence on normal social relations in Quebec as perceived by both Trudeau and Vall i~res. How did this violence influence the quality of democracy in the province? What effect did it have on class conflict? Does revolutionary violence inhibit or encourage change?

The consequences of F. L. Q. violence for Trudeau were twofold; flrstly, it redirected the energies of the Quebec elite from

its fundamental task, that of solving Quebec's social and political problems. Secondly, it violated the democratic consensus by obliging

a liberal, democratic state to resort to il liberal measures.

Valli~res, on the other hand, considers that revolutionary violence has

a demystifying effect on the normal social relations in Quebec, this

violence brings to 1 ight the conflicts and contradictions of capitalist

society, contradictions which are masked by certain, informai processes,

such as the media and pol itical socialization. For Trudeau, the Quebec question has always been: how can

Quebec take its place in the family of prosperous, liberal, democratic societies? How can it cast off two centuries of backwardness and

authoritarianism to become a modern, efficient society where civi 1 1 iber ties are respected and where the working class receives its Just due of

national production? His solution, as has been pointed out, 1 ies in the 80

emulation of the efficient, technocratie American society. By rational izing production and distribution in Quebec, the indigenous, progressive el ites will have contributed to the wei 1 being of the working class they claim to care for. Historically, as Trudeau is fond of pointing out, Quebec intellectuali have abdicated from their responsib- ilities as generators of social change by retreating into the worship of a reactionary nationalism. In two articles which appeared in Cité Libre in the early sixties~2he berates the new generation of young nationalists for seeking to escape from its responsibi 1 ities in much

the same manner. National ism becomes an obscuring tactic of the petite bourgeoisie intel lectuals who succeed in channelling energies

away from the real problems of the society. 33

Trudeau believes that, like nationalism, the violence of the F. L. Q. diverts attention from the province's real social problems.

To quote Gerard Pelletier:

QU'on le veuil le, ou non, le F. L. Q. et ses sympathisants ont reussi a déloger momentanément ces priorités (chomage) au profit des questions relatives a la sécurité interieure et a l'efficacite pol ici~re. Un des gains les plus importants de la propagande felquiste a été de faire croire que grace ~ la violence, le F. L. Q. avait reussi ~ mettre enfin les vraies priorités sur la table alors qU'en réalité il a destrait l'opinion publ ique de ces priorités. Et qui pis est, il a décanalisé les energies réformistes d'un gouvernement qui venait a peine d'entamer son mandat. 34

32 La Nouvel le Trahison des Clercs, Cité Libre, April 1962, and Séparatisme la Contre-Révolution, Cité Libre, May 1964

33 It Is interesting to note that Val li~res critique of Quebec petite bourgeoisie is quite similar to Trudeau's. 34 Gerard Pelletier, Crise D'Octobre, Editions du Jour, Montreal, 1971, P. 35. 81

Once again members of the Quebec petite bourgeoisie had turned attention away from social injustice? and the working class became the principal victim of revolutionary violence.

The events of the past two weeks have done nothing to help us solve Quebec's economic and social problems. The wave of terrorism has made them worse? at the expense of everyone? but especial Iy of the wage earner. 35

Violence also obliges a democratic state to take certain measures

which are in fundamental opposition to the principles of democracy.

Trudeau places a high value on 1 iberal democracy and on many occasions

extols its virtues as a method of government. It is democracy which allows for a certain freedom of choice and which protects the fundamental

liberties of speech and religion necessary for the development of man. At the same time? democracy is a fragile order? for it obliges its citizens to limlt its expressions of dissent to institutional channels.

ln order for democracy to survive? there must be a general consensus

that change wi Il come about in an evolutionary fashion. The democratic

state wi Il tolerate ail expressions of peaceful tlissent which emanate

from different groups? however if these groups resort to violence,

they are breaking the fundamental rules upon which democracy is based.

The liberal? democratic state, 1 ike any other state? must protect itself

against forces which threaten by illegal means to destroy its very

existence. Consequently, Trudeau believes that the violent activities of the F. L. Q. will oblige the Canadian state to take extraordinary

measures:

35 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Remarks of the Prime Minister on the Radio-Canada T.V. Programme IILa Pol itigue Federale", Unpubl ished? P.3. .,

Under the threat of violence last October, our democratic soc i et y became tense, and in order to de fend, i tseJ f . and. the liberty for which it stands, it was forced to place limits upon the exercise of certain freedoms. 36

Trudeau proceeds to blame the F. L. Q. for any violation of democracy to which his government would have to resort. Thus, the

War Measures Act, considered "dangerous and un-democratic" by Trudeau

is the natural response of any state to the type of violence advocated

by the F. L. Q. Moreover, Trudeau foresees other measures which may

have to be taken in order to defend democratic institutions; speaking

of the possibil ity of identity cards he has said: We are perhaps moving into a kind of world, where, if the forces of violence are seriously attempting to destroy our society, we may have to go for such ill iberal and distasteful measures as this. 37

Traditionally. of course, Trudeau has been opposed to any type of identification card, and although he is still opposed in

principle, the possibi lit Y of such an implementatlon is not ruled out.

Recently, the Prime Minister has speculated on the likelihood of other

i Il iberal measures which the government would introduce as the result

of the violence which threatens Canadian society. It is possible that if the challenge of violence of urban guerrillas increases, that we wi Il have to use more sophisticated police methods which is a regrettable thing. But they will have to be set up. For instance, in 1961, a policy was affirmed and then re-affirmed, 1 believe in 1963 or 1964, that there would be no police surveillance of University

36 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Notes for Remarks by the Prime Minister Liberal Party Dinner, Montreal, February 2lst, 1971, P. 4.

37 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Transcript of Questions and Answers at Prime Minister's Accountabil ity Session. p. 9. -,

Campuses and so in, in the name of freedom of thought and the freedom of teaching, and so on. And it was at this time a good decision. But it is apparent that if the revolutions and the revolts are going to begin on campuses, it is apparent that if the instigators of violent dissent are going to find their natural mil ieu there, that there can be no more exception for the intellectual part of the community in the name of academic freedom, than there can be for you and me in the name of any other freedom. 38

If Trudeau is forced merely to react to the presence of violence, the same is not true of Vall i~res or the F. L. Q. Violence becomes a tool for revolutionary change and its effects are considered beneficial. Violence acts as an agent of demystification, it tears the mask from 1 iberaJ democratic social relations, it exposes the hypocrite who preaches democracy, but, who, in times of stress, enacts i Iliberai measures. If F. L. Q. agitation and violence leads to regressive steps on the part of the authorities, this is advantageous for the revolutionary movement, for now the regression of the system becomes open and undisguised. Au plan de l'action dans J'immédiat, il faut poursuivrè et amplifier l'agitation, la propagan-de, la contestation permanente ~ tous les niveaux de la vie sociale, pour ~ la fois devoiler, démasquer, démystifier et affaiblir toujours d'avantage les rouages du systeme qui emprisonne les travai 1 leurs et les étudiants dans un esclavage étouffant. 39 Revolutionary violence obi iges Trudeau to take measures which he feels distorts democracy; for Vall i~res, democracy shows its true

face under the prodding of revolutionary violence.

38 Transcr;pt of Prime Mjnjster's remarks on the ces Programme 60 Minutes, December 8th, 1970, Unpubl ished, P. 3. Just recently, of course, the federal government did establish a special anti-terrorist police force. 39 Strategie Revolutionaire et Role de l'Avant-Garde, Unpubl ished F. L. Q. document, P. 5 ,-"t!.

Moreover, Vall i~res feels that violence of the F. L. Q., by bringing to 1 ight the contradictions of Quebec society, wi Il accelerate la Prise de Conscience of the Quebec working class and help it develop a certain c/ass consciousness. Valli~res rea/izes that this violence has merely a political significance, tha~, of itse/f, it does not directly threaten the economic structures of the society. El les (les bombes du F. L. Q.) ont pour but de radicaliser l'agitation sociale et de favoriser le developpement d'une conscience de classe agissante chez les exploités. Leur contenu pour le moment est politique bien qu'explosif. El les ne tendent pas a ébranler directement les bases économiques du syst~me ~rs à radicaliser les conflicts engendrés par les contradictions du syst~me lui-m@me. 40

Violence becomes a means of heightening class antagonisms, it played a political role, becoming the catalyst of the revolution as weil as being the actual instrument of revolutionary chang~. Les enlevements d'Octobre sont servi de révalateurs pour nombre de citoyens. Les evenements ont révelé leurs propres aspirations qU'ils n'osaient formuler bien qU'ilS ignoraient. Beaucoup de gens se sont sentis plus determiner ~ faire l 'indépendence et ~ vouloir transformer radicalement qu'ils ne croyaient leur-m0mes. 41 There is no doubt that this notion of violence as a tool for revolutionary change owes more to Sorel and Fanon than to Marx. Unlike

Fanon, however, Va"i~res do es t'lot attribute to violence powers of

40 Ibid, P. 7

41 La Patrie, July 18th, 1971, Interview with Pierre Vall i~res. ','

purification. Nowhere in his work is there evidence that he believes violence will cleanse the individual Quebecer of his colonial pasto The Sartrean notion of the oppressed colonial recreating himself through violence, is absent. For Valli~res, violence is a tool for mobilizing a whole class, but it does not have a cathartic effect on

the individual actor.

Nor do es Vall i~r~s view violence as a "magic wand" or a

IIcure-all" to Quebec's problems.

La violence populaire ne conduit pas automatiquement au renversement de "ordre établi et peut m3me @tre un facteur supplémentaire d'aliénation politique; et cela pour des gen~rations entieres d'individus. 42

Vall i~res looks at violence quite coldly; it is one

of many tools at the disposai of the committed revolutionary but it

does not have mystical powers. In conclusion, Valli~res believes that

vi 0 1ence wi Il br i ng to 1 i ght the fundament ale 1ass con fi i ct wh i ch rn_lI,st

exist in capitalist society; Trudeau and Pelletier do not believe

that capitalist society, by its nature, necessitates such a confl ict.

42 Pierre Val li~res, N~gres Blancs D'Amerigue. P. 319. 86

" ,

When does,a particular thinker justify the exercise of violence as a political tool? This is the fourth area of consideration of a thinker's perceptions of violence. Like most political thinkers,

Trudeau and Val li~res have, at one time, expressed a distaste for violence per se; on other occasions, however, the use of violence by different political actors has been justified by these men. Trudeau's position is very close to the traditional liberal opinion expressed by John Locke: "Violence against the state can only be justified when it is used against illegitimate authority." It becomes important then to examine Trudeau's notion of legitimacy in order to better comprehend his proscription of F. L. Q. violence. Valli~res considers ail authority in Quebec to be illegitimate and, therefore, is able to defend the use of violence under different circumstances.

He justifies the violenc~ of the F. L. Q. because he believes that this

violence will aid the cause of tne revolution in Quebec. Trudeau's views on the justification of violence against the authority of the state are to be found in a series of articles he

wrote for Vrai magazine in 1957-58; they have subsequently been published

under the title ~ Cheminement ,de la Pol itigue. Here the comments concern such concepts as authority, democracy and violence. '-"/

La premi~re question à poser et presque la seule est la suivante: d'ou vient qU'un homme a autorité sur ses semblables. 43

ln responding to this question~ Trudeau considers and rejects many explanations proferred in Quebec at that time. Authority does not emanate from Gad or from natural law, but ois the result of an impl icit contract between governed and governors. The governed consent to obey

and, thus~ the state's authority emanates directly from the people. Since the goal of people banded together in civil society

is "le plus grand bonheur de tous et ce bonheur ne s'obtient qU'en

rendant justice a chacun",44 the state must endeavour to satisfy the

needs of the majority of citizens. The form of government proposed

by Trudeau is a democracy rather than a monarchy or a dlctatorship

because it can.best guarantee rule by the majority and individual

civil liberties. Insofar as it fulfil Is the need of the population, the government is exercising legitimate authority and it can expect

the obedience of its citizens. But, for Trudeau, the dut Y to obey a legitimate authority is meaningless if this dut Y is not accompanied

by the right to revoit against tyranny. If the individu~1 has the dut Y to obey legitimate authority, he also has the dut Y to overthrow the tyrant.

43 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Cheminement de la Politique, p. 21

44 Ibid, P. 133 88

C'est donc un devoir pour les citoyens de s'Interroger leur conscience sur la qualité de l'ordre social qui les lie et ~e l'autorité pol itique qU'ils acceptent. Si cet ordre est pourri et si cette autorité est perverse, c'est un devoir pour les citoyens d'obeir ~ leur conscience plutôt qu'~ l'autorité. Et si le seul moyen sur de rétablir un ordre juste, c'est de faire la révolution contre l'autorité tyrannique et illégale, eh bien! Il faut la faire. 45 Trudeau also quotes Chanoine Fernand Boil lot - Lorsque le gouvernement est illégitime et ty,·annique, chaque particulier peut le detruire par la violence ••• le tyran fait la guerre (injuste) a chaque particulier, chacun a le droit de le'tuer. 46 Trudeau notes, however, that this violence is only justifiable under exceptional circumstances, and that normally societies have introduced mechanisms which enable the citizen to combat unjust laws through legal, peaceful means. He then proceeds to demonstrate'how the Quebec society of his time do es not meet up to democratic standards.

Elections are tainted because the church equates voting for an opposition party with mortal sin, pol itical leaders are corrupt and govern outside the law, the Prime Minister is a dictator who believes his authority emanates more from-God than from the people. The logical extension of these arguments is that the sovereignty of the Quebec people has been perverted and that its tyrannical ruling elite must be overthrown by violence. And yet, Trudeau does not advocate

45 Ibid, P. 40 46 Ibid, P. 37 89

revolution in Quebec; revolution and violence remain theoretical possibilities which are categorical Iy rejected by Trudeau in the

Quebec contexte Tout que nous aurons la liberté de parole et des élections libres, je trouve puerils et irresponsables ceux qui veulent nous tirer de nos maux politiques par la violence. 47

Trudeau reasons in the fol lowing manner: it is true that in Quebec the contract between ruler and ruled has been unilaterally broken by the ruler, nevertheless, violence is not advocated in this instance, elections do exist and, however tainted, it is possible to replace the government. What is suggested is that the quality of democracy be improved and a real contract be restored between governors and governed. Fourteen years later, Trudeau firmly believes that this contract exists in Quebec, and in Canada as a Whole, and, while there remain real grievances, democracy flourishes. It becomes unjustifiable, then, to resort to violence to bring about change.

We have a democratic society where, if the people are disenchanted with the speed with which a government is correcting the injustice, they can throw it out by the electoral process and they can put in a better group. They can run themselves for parliament, aS happened to me a few years ago, when a fter years 0 f cr i tic i z i ng the governmen t, 1 decided 1 would try and do it myself. And 1 find that 1 can't perform magic any more than the other people. But the important thing is that we use the democratif ï'nstitutions

47 - 1b id, p. 78. -,.'

at our disposai in order to accelerate the pace of change. But those who would use these very real grievances, not to bring in changes and improvements by way of law, but who want to do it by bl~ckmail and assasination obviously can't be tolerated in our societies. 48

Because Vall i~res considers the state to be the instrument of oppression of the ruling bourgeois class, he does not view its authority a~ legitimatej this authority is derived, not from a contract freely made between ruler and ruled, but from force. Moreover, for

Valli~res, liberal democracy merely legitimates this rule by force.

Violence becomes justifiable, if, at a givenmoment, it is the most efficient tool for the overthrow of the bourgeois state.

Vall i~res believes that the exercise of violence is a necessary

tactic in Quebec at the present time for two reasons. Firstly, Quebec

is a cOJony of Anglophone North America and the principal dut Y of the revolutionary movement is to decolonize it. Decolonization, however, is a/ways a violent phenomenon because the colonizer "only loosens its

hold when the knife is at its throat ... 49 Colonization is not a thinking machine, nor a body endorsed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yièld when confronted with greater violence. 50

This theme of Fanon can be found in abundance in Valli~res' autobiography and in unpublished F. L. Q. writings.

48 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Interview with the Prime Minister of Canada with Mrs. Anita Malik. Ail India Radio Television Programme, January 12th, 1971, Unpublished.

49 Franz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, P. 61.

50 lb i d, P. 61. '1.

Nous ne pourrions batir la paix que le jour ou la violence révolutionnaire armée et consciente. contrera celle que -les capitalistes, colonialistes, et imperialistes, que les exploiteurs du peuple exercent quotidiennement. 51

Violence wi Il only disappear and be overcome when confronted with greater violence. The non-violent classless society will be-the result of the confrontation of these two forces. This quot8:t:}onrà~$t~lies

armed l oraanized proletariat violence and the eventual necessity of this type of viol.ence has been recognized by ail members of the radical

left. But the F. L. Q. violence is not organized, armed·violenae, it

is the clandestine violence of a few individuals and, if it is approved

by Val 1 i~res, and denounced by other members of the left, 1t is because

they disagree on the revolutionary tactic which is best suited for Quebec

at the present time.

Valli~res considers this clandestine violence necessary because

it is the most important tool available to educate and politicize the working class as to the necessity of the overthrow of bourgeois

society. In his analysis of Quebec society, Valli~res has demonstrated that the objective conditions (exploitation of the people) necessary

for a revolution are present.

51 Pierre Vall i~res, N~gres Blancs d'Amerjgue, P. 385 "1•• ' '"

La situation se prefera bientSt ~ un soulevement armé; toutes les conditions seront rassemblées. 52

It is the subjective conditions (the readiness of the people to revoit) which are lacking. The Quebec people are afraid, they have been exploited for so long that they are submissive. The F. L. Q. violence made people aware that anything was possible, that a group of French Canadians could terrorize the whole of Engl ish Canada. The violence

•.• made people realize that the situation wasn't hopeless, tnat even a very few militants could make everything Jump.53

This idea is consistent with Valli~res' theory of revolution, for he has always emphasized the role of man in the making of the revolution; revolution does not come about natural Iy as he points out

in a virulent critique of Soviet Marxism. A mesure que le marxisme exagera nia force de determinisme" historique, du développement autonome des forces productives et placera la revolution dans les choses, construisant ainsi un socialisme scientifique, il s'alienera IlÎi-m~me, se laissera enfermer dans la réification qu'il avait percue et denouncée dans la société capital iste pour finallement cautionner toutes les initiatives du Parti quand le marxisme aura pris le pouvoir. 54

Val 1 i~res is aware that violence is not the only tool available to the revolutionary who wishes to accelerate the consciousness of

52 Pierre Val l i~res, N~ores Blancs d'AmerjQue, P. 385 53 Interview with Charles Gagnon .in the Montreal Gàzette, Saturday, September 4th, 1971, P. 7.

54 Pierre Vall i~res, Nèores Blancs d'AmeriQue, P. 275. 93

the working class. It is important that there be an organization to channel the spontaneous discontent of this class into revolutionary action. But the organization of the proletariat is only a second step in a threefold strategy which the F. L. Q. extols and it will only be successful when popular discontent has been stirred by F. L. Q. violence.

Arrive un moment ôu, la col~re étant generalisée, l'organisation des exploités sur une vaste échelle devient possible et s'impose de fait. 55

ln fact, the F. L. Q. defines itself and its organlzation in terms of violence.

Le F. L. Q. c'est la violence organisée du peuple contre les exploiteurs. 56

To define one's organization in this framework is very much outside the Marxist tradition, for as has been pointed out, Marx never defined the Communist Party in terms of violence. Moreover, it is also anti-Marxist to advocate the use of violence when this violence

is not the violence of an organized masS of workers, but of a small group

ll of "romantics • 57 For many of the left-wing critics, this was the major fault of the F. L. Q.; acts of violence must always be accompanied by attempts at organizing the working class. The terrorist activity

of the F. L. Q. was unjustified because it gave the bourgeoisie the opportunity to crush the working class movement before it became organized.

55 Strategie Révolutionnaire et le Role de l'Avant Garde, P. 2 56 La Cognée, June 30th, 1966.

57 Jean-Marc Piotte, Autocrit-cque de Parti Pris, ln Parti Pris, Vol. 2, No. 1, Sept. 1964, P. 36-44, passim. 94

Quel est le resu!tat prévisible d'une action qui dissocie dans un premier temps le travail d'agitation du travail systématique d'organisation considere comme impossible? Ce resultat est tr~s net; il fournit ~ la bourgeoisie et a son état une étape préparatoire de répression accrue en vue de mieux faire face au travail d'organisation qui doit suivre dans une deuxi~me étape. 58 There are indications at the present that the strategy of the

F. L. Q. is changing in this direction. Both Valli~res and Gagnon have recently stated that a strong working class organization is the next priority for the revolutionary movement. 59 Gagnon has even said that violence is no longer justified in Quebec at the present time because it would hinder the development of this organization. A continuation of the actions we have seen until now would have very negative effects. 60

ln an interview in the Gazette, Gagnon has been paraphrased as follows:

Further violence at this point could create havoc, but it would achieve few political results and it could antagonize the very workers whose support is being recruited. What's more, the events of October showed that the reaction of the authorities can be devastating for both the actual participants and the radical movement in general. 61

At the time of writing (September, 1971) Pierre Vall i~res

has gone underground rather than appear at a conspiracy trial. It is

difficult to'determine whether he is in agreement with Gagnon or note

Suffice it to say that the debate on the left concerning the necessity and the justification of violence has not been resolved. 62

58 Roch Denis, ln Ouebec occupé, Parti Pris, Montreal, 1971, P. 176 59 Gagnon in the Montreal Gazette (see footnote 51) Vall i~res in an interview in La Patrie, July 18th, 1971. 60 Gagnon in the Gazette (see footnote 51 ) 61 Gagnon in the Gazette (see foot note 51 ) 62 ln a letter to the Devoir on December 13, 1971, Vall i~res, 1 ike Gagnon, rejects the use of violence, at the present time. Vall i~res also sees the necessity of the building of a mass party and feels that unorganized, revolutionary violence wi II be detrimental to thi~_ aime ._,

It is principal Iy in the last twenty years that Quebec has been privy to any debate on concepts such as democracy, authority and violence. In fact, the first modern debate on violence in thls province probably occurred in 1958 between Trudeau, writing in Vrai magazine and Father Richard Ares, whose articles appeared in Relations. 1 Recently, of course, the subject has been one of great interest and if only two views of violence have been discussed in this paper, it is not because they represent the whole spectrum of opinion in the province. Different political and social groups have pronounced on the subject and the plurality of their views is merely a reflection of the complexity of Quebec society. The left has been divided; sorne reject violence because, at

the moment, it is not the proper revolutionary tactic, others, like Paul CI iche of Frap reject ail forms of violence, insisting on the

necessity for change through the electoral process. This moderate

left has also virulently criticized the violence of the system. Claude Ryan of the Devoir has severely attacked the violence of the F. L. Q., but has accused Trudeau of overreacting to it and thus helping

to perpetuate an atmosphere detrimental to dialogue. There have also been many groups in the province who have condemned the violence of the F. L. Q. at the same time supporting the steps taken by Trudeau in reaction to this violence.

Trudeau's argument, reprinted from Vrai magazine in Cheminement de la Politique, passim. Richard Ares' position can be found in Relations, Apri 1, 1958. 96

ln studying Trudeau and Valli~res and their perceptions of violence~ an attempt has been made to focus on representatives of the two principal combating forces. It is evident, however~ that it is extremely difficult to compare such dramatically opposing views. They begin with different assumptions and judge violence according to different

value systems. As M. Marleau Pont y has pointed out: Elle (la discussion sur la violence) ne consiste pas a rechercher~ si le communisme respecte les regles de la pensée 1 ib~rale~ il est trop evident qu'il ne le fait pas, mais si la violence qu'il exerce est révolutionnaire et capable de créer entre les hommes des rapports humains. 2 ln order to overcome the difficulty of comparison, an attempt was made in the first part to develop a framework for the study of different perceptions of violence. It was believed that most thinkers concerned themselves with four basic issues when discussing violence; the definition of the concept, the reasons for its existence, the effects it had on normal social relations and its justification as a political tool. The four categories were explicated in the first part of the paper, and the views of different social and political thinkers were examined in the context of this framework. It is obvious, of course,

that only a small sample of the many thousands of people who had

~Kitten could be considered. Moreover, the four areas of consideration are probably not ail inclusive, nor are they mutually exclusive, for

2 M. Merleau-Ponty, Humanisme Et Terreur, p. Xll1 .'1('

although there is a fundéJTlental distinction between the third and fourth. categories, they are often very closely related. Furthermore, the use of categories to explain such an abstract concept as violence limits

the possibil Ity of analysis because one is obliged to fit a thinker's perceptions of violence into these categories, even when the fit is often tenuous.

The advantages of employing categories, of coul~se, is that it

affords possibll ities of comparison which might be difficult otherwise.

The categories themselves are neutral, in that they are equally applic

able to a conservative and to a radical. One of the basic ideas developed in the first part of the paper is that a thinker's perceptions of violence were merely a reflection of his global worldview. This is especially evident in any comparison

between Trudeau and Valli~res where even their definitions of the concept have been influenced by ideology. Trudeau rejects the validity

of Valli~res' claim that the system breeds a violence which is qualitati vely undistinguishable from armed terror simply because these systemic relationships in his frame of reference are not violent. Furthermore, their views on the causes, effects and justification of violence ail reflect the basic differences of method of analysis and global overview which exist between a liberal and a revolutionary. The second important point to note is that Trudeau's analysis

of the causes of violence in' Quebec is fraught with major policy

implications. Since he attributes violence to small groups of '1

"regressive minds", it is natural that he would emphasize certain police action to immobil ize these people. The War Measures Act and the recent creation of the anti-terrorist squad are examples of this. If his speeches are any indication, there exists the possibility of the creation of a special police force which would infiltrate the universities to counter the development of the revolutionary movement in these institutions. 3 It is this reaction to violence which has been

considered i Il iberal by many intellectuals in both Engl ish Canada and

Quebec. Thirdly, it is interesting to note the differences of opinion

which have arisen on the revolutionary left with regards to the justification of the use of violence. None of the revolutionaries judge

violence in terms of good and evi 1 in the moralistic fashion which Trudeau employs. Rather, violence is a toot, neutral by definition,

which must be used in the proper time and place. Vall i~res justi fies the use of violence in Quebec because he believes that violence wi Il raise the working Class consciousness and eventual Iy give birth to the mass organization needed to overthrow the bourgeoisie. This strategy has been very mu ch disputed and only history can judge whether it has been justified in the revolutionary framework. Suffice it to say,

however, that although Val li~res considers himself in the Marxist-

Leninist tradition, this notion of violence is very anti-Marxist.

3 Pierre El Ifot Trudeau, Transcript of Prime Minister's Remark~ On the CBS Programme, 60 minutes, December 8, 1970, Unpublished, P. 3 ','

-'1

There is no doubt that the evolution of Quebec from a relatively monolithic society to a pluralist society, in ideological terms, has raised the level of discussion on a number of different

issues. In the past t~, years, the new political liberalism and the availability of the mass media has enabled many sectors of society.

hitherto si lent, to express themselves on the quai ity·of the democracy and of the society in which they live. The recent debate on violence is a reflection of this new pluralism and yet it is also a signal of the changes taking place in the quality of discussion. The Quiet Revolution was the symbol je announcement of the death of the conservationist monopoly, although this death actually had

t aken place ten years ear 1 i er • The new pl ur al j.sm wh i ch arose, was one in wh i ch the ground ru 1es for .debate were known and respected; and

although discussion was heated, it remained on an academic level. Pierre Bourgault has pointed out that as late as the middle sixties, Pierre Trudeau could defend federalism at the Université de Montréal

and go dancing that very evening with separatist friends at the Rose Rouge. This distinction between a man's ideas and the man as a person no longer exists; this has been especially evident since the October Crisis of 1970 when people were emprisoned for their ideas.

The current debate on violence reflects this qualitative change; it

has become, in many ways, a collection of diatribes. .' ;."

100

BIBLIOGRAPHY PART 1 Violence as a Theme in Philosophy and The Social Sciences

Amiot, Miche 1 La Violence dans le Monde Actuel, Desclée, DeBrouwer, 1968

Arendt, Hannah The Human Condition, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958

On Revo 1ut ion, New York, Vi ki ng Press, 1963

On Violence, New York, Harcourt & Brace, 1969

Av i ner i, Sh 1omo Social and Politicai Tnouaht of Karl Marx, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968

Berger, Peter The Social Construction of Reality, New York, Luckman, Thomas Doubleday & Co., 1967

Bienen, Kenneth Violence and Social Change, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968

Carr, Edmund H. What is History, Middlesex, PenguinBooks, 1970

Caute, David Fanon, London, Fontana, 1970 Champagne, Maurice La Violence Au Pouvoir, Montreal, Editions du Jour, 1971 Debra'y, Reg is Revolution in the Revolution, New York, Grove Press, 1967

D'Entr~ves, Alexandre P. The Notion of the State, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967

Doesteyevsky, Feodor The Possessed,

Duverger, .Maurice The Idea of Politics London, Methuen, 1967

Eckstein, Harry Interna! War, New York, MacMillan & Co., 1964

E Il u 1, Jacques Violence, A Christian Perspective, New York, Seaburg, 1969.

Engels, Frederich Le Role de la Violence dans l'Histoire, Paris, Edition Soc i ale, 1969

Fanon, Franz Black Skin Whjte Masks, New York, Grove Press, 1967

Wretched of the Earth, New York, Grave Press, 1968 101

:f;'riedrich 7 Carl J. .t-~evolution, IJe~J York, Atherton Press 1967

Gurr, Ted Hobert 'vIlly Ben l:.ebe 1 , Princeton, Princeton UniversitJ Press, 1970

Gurr, Ted Hobert & Gr8.ham 7 11. :Ll. The l-iistor i of Violence in America, NevoJ York 7 Bantam Books, 1969

Hartogs, Henatus & Artz, Eric Violence, Causes and Solutions, New York, Dell, 1970

Johnson, Chambers Revolutionary Change, Boston, Little, Broifm & Co., 1966

Justice, Blair Violence in the Citf! Texas Christian Universits Press, 1969 hautsky-, Karl The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, Ann Arbour, University of IVlichigan Press, 196L~

1(oestler, Arthur Darkness at Noon, Hiddlesex, Penguin Books, 1965

l\uhn, Thomas The Stnlcture of Scientii'ic l1evolution, Chicago University- of Chicago Press, 1970

Laing, H. D. Politics oi' Exnerience, New York, Ball&ntJne Books, 1967

Laing, R. D. & Cooper, D. Heason and Violence, London, Tavistock, 1964

Lefebvre, Henri Le Bonde Moderne et la Vie Quotidiem1e, Paris, Gallimard, 1968

Leiden, Karl Politics of Violence, Englewood Heig~ts, Prentice Hall, 1968 Lenin, V. State and Revolution, Selected· ii'Iorks, Hoscow, 1966

Locke, John ~JO Treatises of Civil Government, LonQon, Bafner, 1947

Hachiavelli, i~. The Prince

The Discourses

l'1acPherson, C. B. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963 ".'

102

Marcuse, Herbert One Djmensional Man, Boston, Beacon, 1964 Five Lectures, Boston, Beacon, 1967

Marx, Karl Civil War in France, Moscow, progress, 1971 Capital, Vol. l, Moscow, progress, 1967 Communist Manifesto, New York, Vintage Books, 1967

Merleau Pont y , Maurice Humanisme et Terreur, Gallimard, Paris, !947 Moore, Barrington & Woolf, Robert PaUl The Critical Spirit, Boston, Beacon Press, 1967

Nieburg, K. Po! itical Violence The Behavioureal Process', New YOr-'-k, St~ Martin's Press, 1969 Poul in, Robert La Politique Morale de John Locke, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1960. Rossignol, Fernand Pour Mieux Connattre Sorel, Paris, Bordas, 1968

Sartre, Jean, Paul Critique de la Raison Dialectique, Paris, Gall imard, 1960 Sorel, Georges Reflections on Violence, London, Collier Books, 1950

Trotsky, Leon Terrorism and Communism, London, 1921

Tucker, Robert The Marxian Revolutionary Idea,New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1969

Wolin, Sheldon Politics of Vision p Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1960 Woolf, Robert PaUl Moore, Barrington Marcu~e, Herbert Critique of Pure Tolerance Zehar, Renat L'Oeuvre de Fanon, Paris, Mospeio, 1970 ARTICLES

Geut, B. Justifying Violence, Journal of Philosophy, October, 1969

Walter, E. V. Power and Violence, American Political Science Review, June 1964. · i."

103

Woolf, Robert Paul On Violence, Journal of Philosophy, October 1969 UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

Tucker, Gerry Machiavel 1; and Fanon, M. A. Thesis, McGil 1 .. /

104

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PART Il Violence in the Work of Trudeau and Va!li~res.

=BOOKS

Mor~, Gustaf Terror in Quebec, Toronto, Clarke, Irwin, 1970

Pelletier, Gerard Crise D'Octobre, Montreal, Editions du Jour, 1971

Rioux, Marcel La Ouest ion du Quebec, Paris, Seghers, 1971

Savoie, Claude La Vraie Histoire du F. ~, Montreal, La Patrie, 1963 Trudeau, Pierre E. Cheminement de la Pol itigue, Montreal, Editions du Jour, 1970 Federalism and the French Canadians, Toronto, MacMfllan & Co., 1968

La Gr~ve de L'Amiante, Montreal, Editions du Jour, 1970

Vall i~res,· Pierre N~9res Blancs d'Amerigue, Montreal, Parti Pris, 1968

En Coll aborat ion Quebec Occupé, Montreal, Parti Pris, 1971"

ARTICLES

Culcane, Claire et al Interview wi th Pierre Vall i~res, Georg.i,a ...Strai ght, JUly 23 - 27, 1971

Crevier , Gilles Interview with Pierre Valli~res, La Patrie, Ju 1y 18, 197 1 • Denis, Roch Racine, Luc La Conjuncture Politique Queb~oise Depuis 1960, Socialisme Vol. 21-22, 1971

La Touche, Daniel Po! itical Violence ln Perspective, Canadian Dimension Vol. 7, *5 & 6, p. 42 - 46

Piotte, Jean-Marc Autocritique de Parti Pris, in Parti Pris, Vol. 2, No. 1, Sept. 1964, p. 36 - 44. Radwanski, Georges Interview with Charles Gagnon, The Gazette, Sept. 4, 1971, P. 7

Trudeau, Pierre E. Fluctuations Economiques et Methode de Stabilisation, Cité Libre, *9, March 1954, p. 31 37

Aoropos de Domination EconomJLqQg, Cité Libre *20, May 1958, P. 10 - 25 \ 1

105

Trudeau, Pierre E. Un Manifeste Democratique, Cité Libre '#22, Oct. 1958 P. 1 - 31 Trudeau,. Pierre E. et al . Pour Une Pol itigue Functionnelle, Cité Libre 1964,

Valli~res, Pierre Des Matraques Pour la Reine, Revolution Quebeçoise, Vo 1. l '#3, November 1964

Pour un Ouebec Libre, Revolution Q~~beçolse, Vol. l '#8 Apri 1 1965

Le Nationalisme Ouebeçois et la Classe Ouvri~re, Revolution Quebeçoi~e, Vol. l '#1, Sept. 1964 Le Re le Ne et les Travailleurs, Vol. 1'#4, December 1964

UNPUBLISHED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS

Marchand, Jean Discours au Congr~s du Federation Liberale du Ouebec, Quebec, Febru ary 7,. 197 1 Trudeau, Pierre E. Notes for Remarks by the Prime Min'ster. Liberal Party Dinner, Montreal, February 21, 1971

A Conversation with the Prime Minister, and interview with Tom Gould of C. B. C. - December 31, 1971 Notes for a Statement by the Prime Minister, Sunday, October 18, 1970 Interview with the Prime Minister of Canada, Ail India Radio, Television Programme, January 12, 1971

Interview with the Right Honorable Pierre EII iot Trudeau. Prime Minister of Canada, Encounter, November 5, 1970 Notes for the Prime Mjnister's Remarks at Ste Georges de Beauce, June 1969 Notes for a National Broadcast by the Prime Minister Friday, October 16, 1970

Broadcast of Interview witb prime Mjnjster by Larry Zolf on "Week-End", C. B. C. Television Network at close of Liberal Party Conference .... '.

106

Trudeau, Pierre E. Transcript of Prime Ministerls Remarks on the C. B. Se Programme, 60 minutes, December 8, 1970 Transcript of Questions and Answers at Prime Ministerls Accountabi lit Y Session, Liberai Party Convention, Ottawa, November 20, 1970 Transcript of Prime Ministerls Remarks to T. V. Reporters, Oct. 13, 1970 Transcript of an Interview wjth the Prime Minister on Format 6Q

Remarks by the Prime Minister on the Radio Canada Television Programme. La Pol itigue Federale Turner, John "Freedom Under Hair" and the Response to Violence Notes for an address by the Honorable J. N. Turner, to the Lawyer's Club, Osgoode Hal'; Toronto, Ontario March 1 " 197 1 • F. L. o. UNDERGROUND LITERATURE Note: At this time (August, 1971) it is difficult, if not impossible to obtain F. L. Q. documentation. Most of it has been requisitioned by civil authorities. La Cognée #:7 Mar. 1964 La Cognée Vol.1 #:6 Feb. 1966 La Cognée Vol.1 '#6 Mar. 1966 La Cognée Vo 1. 1'#15 June 1966 La Cognée Unknown 1966-67 La Cognée Unknown June 1968

La Victoire Vo 1.1 '#1 Nov. 1967 La Victoire Vol •. III '#3 Mar. 1969 Strategie RéVOlutionnaire et Raie de L'Avant Garde - Unsigned Document