Controversy As the Impetus for Enlightened Practice of Knowledge
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CONTROVERSY AS THE IMPETUS FOR ENLIGHTENED PRACTICE OF KNOWLEDGE Rainer Godel “Thus, our conflict with the free thinkers is not a mere theoretical dis- pute, a war over full space or empty space in which the one who is in error remains as virtuous as before and the one who is right does not take a course that is closer to virtue. It is a war between good and evil, between the bliss of the world and its distress.”1 Albrecht von Haller used this martial language in 1751, at the climax of his dispute with Julien Offray de La Mettrie, in order to argue polemically against the libertines. Haller describes the dispute as a conflict that takes place on two levels: the “the- oretical” level, where they argue about God’s existence, and the level of “morality”, with practical consequences for human behaviour. He main- tains that both levels of this dispute are immediately connected. To him, it is not only an issue that freethinkers deny God’s existence, but also that lack of faith affects real, everyday life. These connections between differ- ent areas are the central point of the argument made in the present arti- cle. Connections between areas that are capable of producing “evidence” in completely different ways and of different scope are one of the core features of a “controversy” identified by recent research on controversies. What Is a Controversy? Researchers have recently drawn on the concept of controversy developed by Marcelo Dascal.2 Dascal distinguishes three ideal types of polemical 1 “Es ist also unser Streit mit den Freygeistern nicht eine blosse theoretische Zwistig- keit, ein Krieg über den vollen und leeren Raum, wobey der irrende eben so rechtschaffen bleiben kan, und der rechthabende keinen näheren Weg zur Tugend erwählt. Es ist ein Krieg zwischen dem Guten und Bösen, zwischen dem Glücke der Welt und ihrem Elende.” Albrecht von Haller, ‘Vorrede des Uebersetzers’, in [Johann Heinrich Samuel Formey], Prü- fung der Secte die an allem zweifelt, mit einer Vorrede des Herrn von Haller (Göttingen 1751), 7–55: 53. 2 Cf. Marcelo Dascal, ‘Types of Polemics and Types of Polemical Moves’, in Svĕtla Čmejrková et al. (eds.), Dialoganalyse VI. Referate der 6. Arbeitstagung Prag 1996. Dialogue Analysis VI. Proceedings of the 6th Conference Prague 1996 (Tübingen 1998), part 1, 15–33; Carlos Spoerhase, ‘Kontroversen: Zur Formenlehre eines epistemischen Genres’, in Ralf © RAINER GODEL, 2013 | doi:10.1163/9789004243910_019 This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.Rainer Godel - 9789004243910 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 03:10:20PM via free access 414 rainer godel exchange: discussion, dispute, and controversy.3 The starting point for this differentiation is the pragma-linguistic critique of speech act theory: Communication does not regularly lead to understanding, but pursues goals that are not necessarily rational with means that are not necessarily rational either. Discussions are, according to Dascal, polemical exchanges whose object is a well-circumscribed topic. They aim at true solutions, consisting of the elimination of mistakes concerning the definition or explanation of the object, which are admitted by both sides. On the other side of the scale, there is, according to Dascal, the “dispute”. Here, at no point do the contenders accept the definition of the problem as grounded in some mistake. “Rather, it is rooted in differences of attitude, feelings, or preferences.”4 Disputes do not have a solution; the contenders aim to win the polemical exchange, not to find the truth. Controversies stand in the middle between discussions and disputes, for they can begin with a concrete problem that could actually lead to a “true” solution, but they soon broaden to far-reaching problems and basic divergencies. Controversies deal not only with contrary attitudes and preferences—just like disputes—but also with divergencies concerning the methods to gain knowledge. In controversies, the contenders gather arguments from widely differing epistemological positions without distin- guishing between logical or rational arguments and, on the other hand, meanings, hypotheses, and attitudes. They mirror a broad range of facts and goals, of judgements and methods, and aim to convince the other and / or the public, rather than to solve a problem.5 Controversies concern Klausnitzer and Carlos Spoerhase (eds.), Kontroversen in der Literaturtheorie / Literatur- theorie in der Kontroverse (Bern et al. 2007), 49–92. Spoerhase narrows the concept of controversy to academic controversies only. This does not seem helpful for analyzing his- torical controversies, especially in periods when one cannot distinguish exactly between academic and non-academic knowledge. On academic/scientific controversies, see Peter Machamer, Marcello Pera and Aristides Baltas (eds.), Scientific Controversies (New York et al. 2000) and especially on Leibniz’s ars disputandi Marcelo Dascal, ‘Introductory Essay’, in id. (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies (Dordrecht 2008), xix–lxxii. 3 On parallels to Aristotle, see Aristoteles, ‘Topik’, transl. by Eugen Rolfes, in Aristoteles, Philosophische Schriften in sechs Bänden (Hamburg 1995), vol. 2, 100a 18–101a 5. Dascal’s differentiation is based upon the assumption of “Idealtypen” sensu Max Weber. Cf. Dascal 1996 (note 2), 22ff. 4 Ibid., 21. 5 Ibid., 22; Spoerhase 2007 (note 2), 70. Such forms of polemical exchange were char- acteristic of the early Enlightenment yet. See Frank Grunert, ‘“Händel mit Herrn Hector Gottfried Masio”. Zur Pragmatik des Streits in den Kontroversen mit dem Kopenhagener Hofprediger’, in Ursula Goldenbaum (ed.), Appell an das Publikum. Die öffentliche Debatte in der deutschen Aufklärung, 1687–1796 (Berlin 2004), vol. 1, 119–174: 166ff. Rainer Godel - 9789004243910 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 03:10:20PM via free access controversy as the impetus for practice of knowledge 415 areas in which systematic, standardized knowledge rarely seems possible, areas in which inter-disciplinary and personal hierarchies are question- able, areas in which traditionally arranged forms of exchange are being changed, foiled or even dissolved, areas in which presenting an argument, or representing oneself, takes on significant importance. Controversies can hardly be integrated in a traditional history of scientific progress when “progress” is understood as a process of expanding knowledge on the basis of methods leading towards certainty. Controversies deal with areas of applicability for hypotheses. Thus, they contribute somewhat indirectly to the expansion of knowledge, but only along lines of the reservation expressed by Georg Christoph Lichtenberg: “Could this not be different?”6 Nevertheless—or perhaps even therefore—it is argued here that it is the form of a controversy that becomes the impetus for enlightened practice of knowledge. This article will attempt to demonstrate that two polemical exchanges Albrecht Haller had were controversies of this sort, and that they were not (scientific) discussions dealing with and clarifying a scientific topic only.7 There is also another aspect to these controversies: Enlightenment can hardly be attributed only to certain individuals. Some people who appear to represent enlightened avant-garde thinking at one point may at another point in a controversy appear to be narrow-minded preservers of ancient traditions.8 6 See Albrecht Schöne, Aufklärung aus dem Geist der Experimentalphysik Lichtenberg- sche Konjunktive (München 1982), 122. This is how Schöne paraphrases the abbreviation “?L.” which Lichtenberg often uses in his comments on Johann Christian Polycarp Erxle- ben’s Anfangsgründe der Naturlehre. Erxleben also highlights the importance of hypoth- eses for physics. Cf. Andreas Kleinert, ‘Physik zwischen Aufklärung und Romantik. Die “Anfangsgründe der Naturlehre” von Erxleben und Lichtenberg’, in Bernhard Fabian, Wil- helm Schmidt-Biggemann and Rudolf Vierhaus (eds.), Deutschlands kulturelle Entfaltung. Die Neubestimmung des Menschen (München 1980), 99–113: 102. 7 See Hubert Steinke, ‘Der Patron im Netz. Die Rolle des Briefwechsels in wissenschaftli- chen Kontroversen’, in Martin Stuber, Stefan Hächler and Luc Lienhard (eds.), Hallers Netz. Ein europäischer Gelehrtenbriefwechsel zur Zeit der Aufklärung (Basel 2005), 441–462. 8 Wolfgang Proß, ‘Haller und die Aufklärung’, in Hubert Steinke, Urs Boschung and Wolfgang Proß (eds.), Albrecht von Haller. Leben—Werk—Epoche (Göttingen 2008), 415– 458: 420 points out that Haller did not always take up the most advanced positions of his time in every area. Rainer Godel - 9789004243910 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 03:10:20PM via free access 416 rainer godel Albrecht Haller versus Georg Daniel Coschwitz Let us first analyse the controversy Haller had with the Halle anato- mist Georg Daniel Coschwitz from 1724 to 1729. As regards content, the polemical exchange was ignited by Coschwitz, who maintained that he had detected a new saliva channel in the human tongue. Johann Georg Duvernoy, Professor of anatomy in Tübingen, along with his young stu- dent Albrecht Haller, tried to refute Coschwitz. Haller himself added more objections in his dissertation. Coschwitz once more defended his argu- ment in another treatise, but he was wrong in the end. What Coschwitz thought to be a saliva channel was just the antrum of a venule.9 On 26 July 1726, Albrecht Haller, a seventeen-year old student of medi- cine on an educational journey, arrived at Halle to call on several