Controversy As the Impetus for Enlightened Practice of Knowledge

CONTROVERSY AS THE IMPETUS FOR ENLIGHTENED PRACTICE OF KNOWLEDGE

Rainer Godel

“Thus, our conflict with the free thinkers is not a mere theoretical dispute, a war over full space or empty space in which the one who is in error remains as virtuous as before and the one who is right does not take a course that is closer to virtue. It is a war between good and evil, between the bliss of the world and its distress.”1 Albrecht von Haller used this martial language in 1751, at the climax of his dispute with Julien Offray de La Mettrie, in order to argue polemically against the libertines. Haller describes the dispute as a conflict that takes place on two levels: the “theoretical” level, where they argue about God’s existence, and the level of “morality”, with practical consequences for human behaviour. He maintains that both levels of this dispute are immediately connected. To him, it is not only an issue that freethinkers deny God’s existence, but also that lack of faith affects real, everyday life. These connections between different areas are the central point of the argument made in the present article. Connections between areas that are capable of producing “evidence” in completely different ways and of different scope are one of the core features of a “controversy” identified by recent research on controversies.

What Is a Controversy?

Researchers have recently drawn on the concept of controversy developed by Marcelo Dascal.2 Dascal distinguishes three ideal types of polemical

1 “Es ist also unser Streit mit den Freygeistern nicht eine blosse theoretische Zwistig- keit, ein Krieg über den vollen und leeren Raum, wobey der irrende eben so rechtschaffen bleiben kan, und der rechthabende keinen näheren Weg zur Tugend erwählt. Es ist ein Krieg zwischen dem Guten und Bösen, zwischen dem Glücke der Welt und ihrem Elende.” Albrecht von Haller, ‘Vorrede des Uebersetzers’, in [Johann Heinrich Samuel Formey], Prü- fung der Secte die an allem zweifelt, mit einer Vorrede des Herrn von Haller (Göttingen 1751), 7–55: 53. 2 Cf. Marcelo Dascal, ‘Types of Polemics and Types of Polemical Moves’, in Svĕtla Čmejrková et al. (eds.), Dialoganalyse VI. Referate der 6. Arbeitstagung Prag 1996. Dialogue Analysis VI. Proceedings of the 6th Conference Prague 1996 (Tübingen 1998), part 1, 15–33; Carlos Spoerhase, ‘Kontroversen: Zur Formenlehre eines epistemischen Genres’, in Ralf

© RAINER GODEL, 2013 | doi:10.1163/9789004243910_019 This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.Rainer Godel - 9789004243910 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 03:10:20PM via free access 414 rainer godel exchange: discussion, dispute, and controversy.3 The starting point for this differentiation is the pragma-linguistic critique of speech act theory: Communication does not regularly lead to understanding, but pursues goals that are not necessarily rational with means that are not necessarily rational either. Discussions are, according to Dascal, polemical exchanges whose object is a well-circumscribed topic. They aim at true solutions, consisting of the elimination of mistakes concerning the definition or explanation of the object, which are admitted by both sides. On the other side of the scale, there is, according to Dascal, the “dispute”. Here, at no point do the contenders accept the definition of the problem as grounded in some mistake. “Rather, it is rooted in differences of attitude, feelings, or preferences.”4 Disputes do not have a solution; the contenders aim to win the polemical exchange, not to find the truth. Controversies stand in the middle between discussions and disputes, for they can begin with a concrete problem that could actually lead to a “true” solution, but they soon broaden to far-reaching problems and basic divergencies. Controversies deal not only with contrary attitudes and preferences—just like disputes—but also with divergencies concerning the methods to gain knowledge. In controversies, the contenders gather arguments from widely differing epistemological positions without distin- guishing between logical or rational arguments and, on the other hand, meanings, hypotheses, and attitudes. They mirror a broad range of facts and goals, of judgements and methods, and aim to convince the other and / or the public, rather than to solve a problem.5 Controversies concern

Klausnitzer and Carlos Spoerhase (eds.), Kontroversen in der Literaturtheorie / Literatur- theorie in der Kontroverse (Bern et al. 2007), 49–92. Spoerhase narrows the concept of controversy to academic controversies only. This does not seem helpful for analyzing his- torical controversies, especially in periods when one cannot distinguish exactly between academic and non-academic knowledge. On academic/scientific controversies, see Peter Machamer, Marcello Pera and Aristides Baltas (eds.), Scientific Controversies (New York et al. 2000) and especially on Leibniz’s ars disputandi Marcelo Dascal, ‘Introductory Essay’, in id. (ed.), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The Art of Controversies (Dordrecht 2008), xix–lxxii. 3 On parallels to Aristotle, see Aristoteles, ‘Topik’, transl. by Eugen Rolfes, in Aristoteles, Philosophische Schriften in sechs Bänden (Hamburg 1995), vol. 2, 100a 18–101a 5. Dascal’s differentiation is based upon the assumption of “Idealtypen” sensu Max Weber. Cf. Dascal 1996 (note 2), 22ff. 4 Ibid., 21. 5 Ibid., 22; Spoerhase 2007 (note 2), 70. Such forms of polemical exchange were char- acteristic of the early Enlightenment yet. See Frank Grunert, ‘“Händel mit Herrn Hector Gottfried Masio”. Zur Pragmatik des Streits in den Kontroversen mit dem Kopenhagener Hofprediger’, in Ursula Goldenbaum (ed.), Appell an das Publikum. Die öffentliche Debatte in der deutschen Aufklärung, 1687–1796 (Berlin 2004), vol. 1, 119–174: 166ff.

Rainer Godel - 9789004243910 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 03:10:20PM via free access controversy as the impetus for practice of knowledge 415 areas in which systematic, standardized knowledge rarely seems possible, areas in which inter-disciplinary and personal hierarchies are question- able, areas in which traditionally arranged forms of exchange are being changed, foiled or even dissolved, areas in which presenting an argument, or representing oneself, takes on significant importance. Controversies can hardly be integrated in a traditional history of scientific progress when “progress” is understood as a process of expanding knowledge on the basis of methods leading towards certainty. Controversies deal with areas of applicability for hypotheses. Thus, they contribute somewhat indirectly to the expansion of knowledge, but only along lines of the reservation expressed by Georg Christoph Lichtenberg: “Could this not be different?”6 Nevertheless—or perhaps even therefore—it is argued here that it is the form of a controversy that becomes the impetus for enlightened practice of knowledge. This article will attempt to demonstrate that two polemical exchanges Albrecht Haller had were controversies of this sort, and that they were not (scientific) discussions dealing with and clarifying a scientific topic only.7 There is also another aspect to these controversies: Enlightenment can hardly be attributed only to certain individuals. Some people who appear to represent enlightened avant-garde thinking at one point may at another point in a controversy appear to be narrow-minded preservers of ancient traditions.8

6 See Albrecht Schöne, Aufklärung aus dem Geist der Experimentalphysik Lichtenberg- sche Konjunktive (München 1982), 122. This is how Schöne paraphrases the abbreviation “?L.” which Lichtenberg often uses in his comments on Johann Christian Polycarp Erxle- ben’s Anfangsgründe der Naturlehre. Erxleben also highlights the importance of hypotheses for physics. Cf. Andreas Kleinert, ‘Physik zwischen Aufklärung und Romantik. Die “Anfangsgründe der Naturlehre” von Erxleben und Lichtenberg’, in Bernhard Fabian, Wil- helm Schmidt-Biggemann and Rudolf Vierhaus (eds.), Deutschlands kulturelle Entfaltung. Die Neubestimmung des Menschen (München 1980), 99–113: 102. 7 See Hubert Steinke, ‘Der Patron im Netz. Die Rolle des Briefwechsels in wissenschaftli- chen Kontroversen’, in Martin Stuber, Stefan Hächler and Luc Lienhard (eds.), Hallers Netz. Ein europäischer Gelehrtenbriefwechsel zur Zeit der Aufklärung (Basel 2005), 441–462. 8 Wolfgang Proß, ‘Haller und die Aufklärung’, in Hubert Steinke, Urs Boschung and Wolfgang Proß (eds.), Albrecht von Haller. Leben—Werk—Epoche (Göttingen 2008), 415– 458: 420 points out that Haller did not always take up the most advanced positions of his time in every area.

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Albrecht Haller versus Georg Daniel Coschwitz

Let us first analyse the controversy Haller had with the Halle anato- mist Georg Daniel Coschwitz from 1724 to 1729. As regards content, the polemical exchange was ignited by Coschwitz, who maintained that he had detected a new saliva channel in the human tongue. Johann Georg Duvernoy, Professor of anatomy in Tübingen, along with his young student Albrecht Haller, tried to refute Coschwitz. Haller himself added more objections in his dissertation. Coschwitz once more defended his argument in another treatise, but he was wrong in the end. What Coschwitz thought to be a saliva channel was just the antrum of a venule.9 On 26 July 1726, Albrecht Haller, a seventeen-year old student of medicine on an educational journey, arrived at Halle to call on several profes- sors at Friedrichs University. Haller was well aware of the reputation of the most important German university of the early Enlightenment. He wrote in his diary after arriving in Halle that it was the “most prestigious university of Germany”.10 His first path in Halle led him to see Georg Daniel Coschwitz, the 47-year-old founder of the theatrum anatomicum in Halle, whose supposed findings Haller had publicly disputed in Tübingen

9 Georg Daniel Coschwitz, Ductus salivalis novus, per glandulas maxillares, sublin- guales, linguamque excurrens, cum vasis lympathicis variis communicans, et in lingua locum excretionis habens. Nuperrime detectus, et publice adjectis figuris Æneis exhibitus â Georgio, Daniel Coschw., Med. Doct. Ejusdemque in Alma Fridericiana Halensi Prof. Publ. Ordin. et Potentiss. Poruss. Regis per Comitatum Mansfeldens: et apud Palatinos Halenses Pysico (Halle 1724); Johann Georg Duvernoy and Albrecht Haller, Viri Clarissimi Georgii Daniel Coschw., Prof. Halens. Ductum Salivalem Novum, per Glandulas Maxillares, sublin- guales, Linguamque excurrentem, &c. cum figuris Æneis. Gratioso Facultatis Medicæ consen- sio Disquisitioni Anatomicæ submittunt, Præses Johannes Georgius Du Vernoi, Med. D. & in Univ. Tubingensi Prof. Publ. & Respondens Albertus Haller, Helveto-Bernas (Tübingen 1725); Albrecht Haller, Dissertatio inauguralis sistens experimenta et dubia circa ductum salivalem novum Coschwizianum quam pro gradu Doctoratus Eruditorum Examini submittit Albertus Haller, Helveto-Bernas (Leiden 1727); Georg Daniel Coschwitz, Ductus salivalis novus, pluri- bus observationibus illustratus confirmatusque, simulatque a contradictionibus vindicatus et liberatus sev continuatio observationum circa hoc negotium hactenus institutarum cum necessaria brevique responsione ad disquisitionem Do. du Vernoi atque Halleri (Halle 1729). On the aspects concerning the history of medicine, see Heinz Balmer, Albrecht von Haller (Bern 1977), 9ff. and at length Thomas Breitbach, Albrecht Haller und der Coschwizsche Speichelgang. Die Entlarvung einer Fehlentdeckung, dissertation in medicine, University of Bern, 1991, especially 58ff. For the following, see also Rainer Godel, ‘Anatomische Evidenz. Die Debatte zwischen Albecht Haller und Georg Daniel Coschwitz’, in Tanja van Hoorn and Yvonne Wübben (eds.), “Allerhand nützliche Versuche”. Empirische Wissenskultur in Halle und Göttingen (1720–1750) (Hannover 2009), 41–63. 10 “vornehmste Hohe Schule von Teutschland”. Albrecht Haller, Tagebücher seiner Reisen nach Deutschland, Holland und England 1723–1727, ed. by Ludwig Hirzel (Leipzig 1883), 75.

Rainer Godel - 9789004243910 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 03:10:20PM via free access controversy as the impetus for practice of knowledge 417 the year before. Haller, in his diary, reached a distinct verdict: Coschwitz’s lecture on physiology contained nothing but “well-known topics, with some pranks”.11 “He does not really have a concept of what is happening in Europe in anatomicis, and he does not seem to have read enough.”12 This verdict by a seventeen-year old student may sound rather presumptuous, but the enlightened attitude is clearly visible: The hierarchy in effect for his contemporaries does not apply to Haller. He even criticizes Christian Thomasius and Friedrich Hoffmann in his diary. The young student Haller took the liberty of arguing eye-to-eye with renowned researchers. For him, empirical evidence was more important than the prejudice of authority, the praeiudicium auctoritatis. For Haller, empirical evidence, and not the traditional reputation of well-known researchers, legitimized scholarship. This was one of the core differences between Haller and Coschwitz: the question of how scholarship can be legitimized. Let us take a brief look at the starting-point of this controversy, the 1724 book by Coschwitz. Coschwitz, in an elaborate foreword, justifies his method. He begins by quoting a Latin proverb: “Diem a die doceri.”13 This proverb, Coschwitz argued, also applies to scientific progress. According to Coschwitz, one needs to transfer well-established knowledge to other areas in which one does not yet have sufficient knowledge at one’s disposal. But the researcher is also obliged to gather new empirical evidence in these areas. Thus, Coschwitz tried to preserve the value of tradition alongside the new empirical research. In this context, he quoted the dichotomy of microcosm and macrocosm that had been revived by Paracelsus and used by Coschwitz’s teacher, Georg Ernst Stahl. Coschwitz transferred this metaphorically to the detailed research that still had to be done in anatomy.14 The Halle professor of anatomy claimed that there were two different areas of knowledge: one in which reliable

11 “nichts als bekannte Sachen, mit einigen Poßen”. Ibid., 77f. 12 “Er hat keinen rechten Begrif von dem, was in Europa in anatomicis vorgeht, scheint auch nicht genung gelesen zu haben.” Ibid., 76. 13 “Each day learns from the day before it.” Coschwitz 1724 (note 9), 3. This phrase or similar ones were common proverbs in the Middle Ages and in the early modern period. See Proverbia sententiaeque latinitatis medii ac recentioris aevi. Nova series. Lateinische Sprichwörter und Sentenzen des Mittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit in alphabetischer Anor- dnung. Neue Reihe, ed. by Paul Gerhard Schmidt (Göttingen 1982), part 7, A–G: 583, no. 36267 and Proverbia sententiaeque latinitatis medii aevi, ed. by Hans Walther (Göttingen 1963), part 1, A–E: 733, no. 5946. 14 On Stahl’s method of teaching, see Sergio Moravia, ‘From Homme Machine to Homme Sensible: Changing Eighteenth-Century Models of Man’s Image’, Journal of the History of Ideas 39 (1978), 45–60: 49ff.

Rainer Godel - 9789004243910 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 03:10:20PM via free access 418 rainer godel knowledge already exists because of tradition—and this knowledge needs to be acknowledged—and one where further research is useful, following on what is already known. But Coschwitz by no means dispensed with empirical research and with its expanded and detailed representation. Meticulously, he recounted how he scrutinized the tongue of a drowned female child murderer on 9 December 1723.15 In this case, the contemporary debate about the morality of women’s autopsies did not have an impact on Coschwitz.16 Besides this autopsy, Coschwitz referred to animal dissections, and he made a point of naming witnesses. All together, Coschwitz used two strategies to legitimize his research: The methodological frame of the foreword allowed for integration of the empirical evidence from the researcher’s observations into a traditional model of science. Duvernoy’s and Haller’s answer in Haller’s valedictory address, which was held in Tübingen in 1725, stresses more explicitly the conditions of the possibility of empirical evidence and criticizes Coschwitz for disre- garding them. Coschwitz is criticized because he analyzed the body of a person who was not in good health (before her death). The woman had had a struma.17 At the same time, Duvernoy and Haller maintained it was an old and well-established tradition to work with healthy bodies only. Duvernoy and Haller not only criticized Coschwitz’s approach,18 but also undermined the arguments with which Coschwitz had tried to connect empirical research and traditional lore. Now, Coschwitz’s methodological plea for and with tradition seemed to contrast with the empirical approach he used himself. Haller’s dissertatio inauguralis (1727) eventually offered more and more adequate empirical research. This was not least of all due to the fact that Haller argued that Coschwitz had used only one human body in order to create his hypothesis and to posit a new finding.19 Haller was careful to explain the conditions of an experiment that produces evidence. In particular, he referred to the quantity, quality, and processes of sections and injections, for which he used the most advanced preparation techniques.

15 See Coschwitz 1724 (note 9), 7ff. 16 See Friedrich Hoffmann, Kurtzer und eigentlicher Entwurff Von Dem Nutzen der Anat- omie in Erkäntniß Gottes und seiner selbsten bey einer Anatomischen Untersuchung Eines weiblichen Cörpers (Halle, s.a.). 17 Duvernoy and Haller 1725 (note 9), 6. 18 For other issues, see Breitbach 1991 (note 9), 35. 19 See Hubert Steinke, ‘Anatomie und Physiologie’, in Steinke, Boschung and Proß 2008 (note 8), 226–254: 228.

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Haller was concerned with Coschwitz’s arguments in detail, and he tried to document, step by step, that Coschwitz did not work properly in accordance with the conditions of empirical research. But reference to empirical evidence reaches its limits in this controversy. When Haller saw Coschwitz in Halle, the professor showed him the anatomical preparations he had kept from his experiments. Haller, in his diary, related that he and Coschwitz both looked closely at the baboon’s tongue Coschwitz showed him. But Haller did not see what Coschwitz believed he saw: “there is no arch to be seen”.20 Coschwitz, in his 1724 book, had notably often referred to his being an eye witness and to the evidence of individual observation.21 When describing his autopsies, Coschwitz frequently uses the verb “videre”, often in first person singular past tense, without alluding to the question of whether the senses might delude or whether the conclusions he drew were hermeneutically certain.22 Haller, however, would not exclude later that the picture generated in the human mind can differ from the one that is generated through the process of perception in a mechanical way.23 But what can be done in this case? What can be done when two observ- ers, standing in front of an object at the same time and at the same place, do not agree on the question of whether something that one of them maintains he sees and the other maintains he does not see really exists? Nota bene: this is not about a conclusion but about the object itself, in which Haller does not see an “arch”. What can be done if it is not possible to have a scientific discussion since both contenders refer to propositions of normative validity? What can be done when both contenders cite independent observations made by other scientists in order to back their posi- tion? Coschwitz cited Kulmus and Budeus, while Haller cited Abraham Vater in the first place, followed by other anatomists.

20 “da ist kein Bogen zu sehen.” Haller 1883 (note 10), 76. 21 On contemporary criticism of the evidence of the sensual, and above all visual perception, see Ulrike Zeuch, Die Umkehr der Sinneshierarchie. Herder und die Aufwertung des Tastsinns seit der Frühen Neuzeit (Tübingen 2000), 71ff. On criteria of evidence in the early modern period, see Ian Maclean, Logic, Signs and Nature in the Renaissance. The Case of the Learned Medicine (Cambridge 2002), 196ff. 22 See Coschwitz’s detailed report on the experiments, including exact time and place of the experiments: Coschwitz 1724 (note 9), 7ff. 23 Albrecht von Haller, Grundriß der Physiologie für Vorlesungen. Nach der vierten latein- ischen . . . Ausgabe aufs neue übersetzt, und mit Anmerkungen versehen durch Herrn Hofrath Sömmering in Mainz, mit einigen Anmerkungen begleitet und besorgt von P.F. Meckel (Berlin 1788), § 548, 416. Cf. Walter Emil Philipp Beyer, Albrecht von Haller (1708–1777) und der Vorgang des Sehens, dissertation, University of Bonn, 1983, 347.

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Both contenders affirmed their good conduct. In the final passage of his 1727 dissertation, Haller credited himself with a motivation that cannot be called into question. He pretended to have acted “with a sincere love for truth”.24 On the other hand, he assumed that Coschwitz was emotionally involved. He advised him that it would be better to accept the results that Haller had reported, “not sorely”, and that he should conduct further debates—if he intended to conduct them at all—“without bitterness”.25 Even famous men were sometimes obsessed with errors. Haller was trying to legitimize his attack on a colleague’s authority by admonishing him to scientific evidence, calmness, and logic. But Coschwitz, in his reply, claimed that it was only Haller who had breached what was known as the code of behaviour of a good scientist. When Haller visited him in Halle, Coschwitz argued, he did not explain that he was the one who was the respondent in the Tübingen disputation against Coschwitz’s findings. Haller is even said not to have mentioned in the conversation they had in Halle in 1726 that he did not agree with Coschwitz. Coschwitz contrasted Haller’s conduct with his own “honesty”, “sincerity”, and “integrity”.26 He blamed Haller for representing himself as a noninvolved, private person. Haller is said to have “given the appear- ance of Helvetian faithfulness”,27 misinterpreting everything Coschwitz told him to the disadvantage of Coschwitz, but also to have consciously related falsely. This, according to Coschwitz, was unfair and dishonest.28 And: Someone who has proved himself dishonest in personal encounters can in no case claim to be considered honest on scientific topics. Accord- ing to Coschwitz, a good scientist must have trustworthiness—“fidelitas”— and must prove this by accurate work. This is one of the methodological premises Coschwitz states already in his 1724 text.29 Personal integrity only vouches, in the end, for the reliability of the observations someone professes to have made. These arguments were not completely new to Haller. Duvernoy, already in his message of congratulations which, according to the pattern of disputations in early modern times, enthusiastically praised Haller’s research, pointed out to Haller the dangers that threaten when someone

24 “ex sincero veritatis amore”. Haller 1727 (note 9), 91. 25 “non aegre”—“absque amarore”. Ibid. 26 “honestas”, “sinceritas”, “integritas”. Coschwitz 1729 (note 9), 32. 27 “sub fidei helveticae”. Ibid. 28 “Haud enim sincere mecum agit, . . . quando . . . contra veritatem refert . . .” Ibid. 29 Cf. Coschwitz 1724 (note 9), 6ff.

Rainer Godel - 9789004243910 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 03:10:20PM via free access controversy as the impetus for practice of knowledge 421 deviates from common forms of scientific discussion. Duvernoy prepared his student for several aspects of academic life, in which one needs to face attacks if one lacks “suavitas”, “agreeableness” in his writings. The only way to deal with these, is, according to Duvernoy, to submerge oneself in “such a dangereous sea”, to prepare oneself soundly, to act in a well- adjusted manner, to research precisely and continuously, and to wait for success and acknowledgment patiently.30 The exchange between Haller and Coschwitz proved to be more than just a discussion about a saliva channel. The core aspects of the controversy concerned central elements of the enlightened practice of knowledge, topics that cannot be resolved through a discussion intended to lead to an ultimate truth. For whether self-attribution or attribution by others is the case is no longer a question of scientific evidence.

Albrecht Haller versus Julien Offray de La Mettrie

As regards the history of science, the starting point of the controversy between Haller and Julien Offray de La Mettrie was a serious conflict about the authorship, interpretation, and consequences of Haller’s dis- tinction between irritability and sensibility.31 But the extensive debate goes far beyond this. The present article will be restricted to one core aspect: By contrast with what Haller wanted and definitively intended, the controversy affected the possibility of knowledge in areas that cannot lead to definite scientific truth. At the beginning of this controversy is a translation: From 1743 on, La Mettrie translated Boerhaave’s lectures on physiology into French, and he added some comments of his own.32 The template for this translation was the Latin edition, edited and annotated by Haller.33 In some passages of the French edition, it is not clear whether the comments are Haller’s or

30 Cf. Duvernoy and Haller 1725 (note 9), 22. 31 On this controversy, see Hubert Steinke, Irritating Experiments. Haller’s Concept and the European Controversy on Irritability and Sensibility, 1750–90 (Amsterdam and New York 2005), 7 and especially 194ff. on the physiological aspects of this debate. 32 Hermann Boerhaave, Institutions de Médicine. 2nd edition, avec un commentaire. Par M. de La Mettrie (Paris 1743–1750), 8 vols. 33 Hermann Boerhaave, Praelectiones adacemicae in proprias institutiones rei medicae editit et notas addidit Albertus Haller (Göttingen 1739–1744), 7 vols.

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La Mettrie’s.34 Haller was alarmed. Not completely without reason, he sensed plagiarism—a severe aberration from normal scientific conduct.35 One brief remark must be made concerning the contents of this controversy: Haller’s thesis of the irritability of the muscles, which he developed at length in an independent publication later, expatiated throughout the scientific community, not least through La Mettrie’s translation. In Boerhaave’s “Praelectiones academicae in proprias institutiones”,36 Haller, in a comment, mentioned this theory of irritability for the first time. La Mettrie adopted this passage, but he did not indicate that this is Haller’s comment.37 Moreover, La Mettrie quoted several other researchers such as Nicolas Steno, Thomas Willis, and Alfonso Borelli who had been work- ing on this topic—names that Haller did not mention.38 However, La Mettrie’s “Histoire naturelle de l’âme” (1745) escalated the controversy. For now the Breton, in Haller’s view, had not only deviated from common scientific practice but also spread scepticism and doubt about the truth of the faith on which Haller’s theses were based. In his response, Haller took up an argument Coschwitz had used against him 18 years earlier: Someone who lacks virtue and decency cannot be a good scientist. Haller wrote a review of La Mettrie’s “Histoire naturelle”. After scrupulously itemizing all the passages La Mettrie is said to have plagia- rized, Haller drew the conclusion: “After (sic) so much theft, it is easy to see how much is lacking in the inner strength of the freethinker.”39 Haller not only criticizes La Mettrie for being sceptical about the truth of faith. La Mettrie forfeits his reputation as a scientist completely, according to Haller, by aspersively associating others—Boerhaave and Haller—with libertine ideas.40 Moreover, Haller considered the existence and the work

34 Wellman argues that the comments by Haller and La Mettrie differ “in both style and substance. La Mettrie did not simply replicate a disjointed series of Latin footnotes. Instead he provided a connected commentary written in French in a conversational style . . .” Kath- leen Wellman, La Mettrie. Medicine, Philosophy, and Enlightenment (Durham 1992), 107. 35 See also Birgit Christensen, Ironie und Skepsis. Das offene Wissenschafts- und Weltver- ständnis bei Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Würzburg 1996), 151ff.; Steinke 2005 (note 31), 194. 36 Boerhaave 1739–1744 (note 33), II: 429. 37 See Christensen 1996 (note 35), 152. 38 Ibid., 152ff. 39 “Nach einer solchen Menge von Diebstählen sieht man leicht, wie schlecht die innre Stärke des Freydenkers ist.” Albrecht von Haller, [Rezension von Julien Offray de La Mettrie Histoire naturelle de l’Âme], Göttingische Zeitungen von Gelehrten Sachen (1747), 413–415: 414. 40 On freethinking in Germany, see Günter Gawlick, ‘Freidenker’, in Werner Schneiders (ed.), Lexikon der Aufklärung. Deutschland und Europa (München 1995), 130–132, and recent research on radical Enlightenment: Martin Mulsow, Moderne aus dem Untergrund.

Rainer Godel - 9789004243910 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 03:10:20PM via free access controversy as the impetus for practice of knowledge 423 of God as a basic postulate for the anchoring of natural science in God’s will.41 Haller became aware of a danger—the suspicion of atheism—and he tried to do everything to avoid raising this suspicion.42 In his review on La Mettrie, we can find a sentence in which all the issues culminate: “The author misuses the comments of the well-meaning Boerhaave, whose Christianity has a firm basis, and, in particular, Mr. Haller’s interpreta- tions of those comments. The author has evidently merely copied many pages, without any mention of the source from which he took them.”43 Haller finds himself in a predicament. He must claim that he is the author of many passages in La Mettrie’s translation, but that he is not the author of exactly those passages in which La Mettrie expresses free-thinking consequences. Moreover, La Mettrie develops his materialist arguments on the basis of an extensive (and defective) interpretation of Haller’s theory of irritability. The issues of this controversy are no longer the scientific correctness of La Mettrie’s arguments and scientific progress. Although Haller will later criticize La Mettrie for not doing experiments of his own,44 La Mettrie’s results, according to Haller, did not need to be a subject for discussion in any event: that “the human being is nothing more than an animal—a kind of monkey”45 does not even need to be discussed. Haller stresses common, good human conduct—it is forbidden to plagiarize, by which he

Radikale Frühaufklärung in Deutschland (Hamburg 2002); Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlight- enment. Philosophy and the Making of Modernity (Oxford 2001); id., Enlightenment Con- tested. Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670–1752 (Oxford 2006); and, recently, Kay Zenker, Libertas philosophandi. Zur Theorie und Praxis der Denkfreiheit in der deutschen Aufklärung, dissertation, University of Münster, 2010. 41 See Steinke 2005 (note 31), 11. 42 On theological objections that led to the ban on the book, see Claudia Becker, ‘Ein- leitung’, in Julien Offray de La Mettrie, L’homme machine. Die Maschine Mensch, transl. and ed. by Claudia Becker (Hamburg 1990), VII–XVIII: VIIIf.; Haller 1747 (note 39), 413. 43 “Der V. mißbraucht dabey des wohlmeinenden und in seinem Christenthum bey- des ernsthaften und gründlichen Boerhaave Anmerkungen, und ins besondere des Herrn Hallers Auslegung derselben von welchen er sichtbarlich viele Seiten bloß abgeschrieben hat, ohne der Quelle im geringsten zu erwehnen, woraus er geschöpfet hat.” Haller 1747 (note 38), 413. Knabe rightly points to the fact that the critique of La Mettrie does not begin with what he calls “sachliche Gründe”, but by critizing La Mettrie for his lack of faith. See Peter-Eckhard Knabe, Die Rezeption der französischen Aufklärung in den Göttingischen Gelehrten Anzeigen (Frankfurt/M. 1978), 127. 44 See Albrecht von Haller, Abhandlung des Herrn von Haller von den empfindlichen und reizbaren Teilen des menschlichen Leibes (Leipzig 1756), 39; Ursula Pia Jauch, Jenseits der Maschine. Philosophie, Ironie und Ästhetik bei Julien Offray de La Mettrie, 1709–1751 (München 1998), 273. 45 “der Mensch nichts als ein Thier, und eine Art von Affen sey”. Haller 1747 (note 39), 415.

Rainer Godel - 9789004243910 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 03:10:20PM via free access 424 rainer godel accentuates scientific validity—and it is forbidden to misuse arguments. And Haller stresses the Christian faith, which cannot be disputed. La Mettrie, in his answer, provocatively returns to Haller’s allegation of plagiarism.46 By dedicating his essay “L’homme machine” to Haller of all people, he represented himself as a close friend and student of Haller. On the other hand, he designed this dedication to be a distinct rejection of the habits of academic discourse and, at the same time, a work in praise of Haller the poet—and not the scientist. La Mettrie begins with the ambig- uous sentence: “This is by no means a dedication. You rise very much above all eulogies I could deliver to you, and I know of nothing so useless and boring as an academic treatise.”47 Whereas the beginning of the sentence follows the rhetorical pattern that prescribes “delight as expected” for a eulogy,48 a pattern that feigns a teacher-student-relation, the second half of the sentence turns out to be an affront to Haller the academic by denying the usefulness and entertainment value of all academic texts (including his own). In what follows, La Mettrie maintains that Haller is an expert in a completely different area: the “voluptuousness of the study”, the “volupté de l’Etude”.49 In semantic terms, this is the implicit assumption of a dual pleasure, both erotic and intellectual. La Mettrie also refers to the “pleasure” he assumes he had when writing this treatise. Insidiously, La Met- trie refers to Haller himself at this point and namely his poems, which not infrequently use the same metaphors to evoke erotic or intellectual pleasure. “What is stirring in my breast? / Is it astonishment? is it lust? / Mild drives of silent muses, / Don’t I feel you in my chest?”50 With ironic allusions to this and to similar passages in Haller’s poems, La Mettrie leaves the field of purely scientific discourse. This would not be so unusual for a

46 On this kind of argumentation by La Mettrie, see Knabe 1978 (note 43), 147. Jauch argues that La Mettrie was not interested in polemics but in differentiation. See Jauch 1998 (note 44), 263ff. 47 “Ce n’est point ici une Dédicace; vous êtes fort au-dessus de tous les Eloges que je pourrois vous donner; et je ne connois rien de si inutile, ni de si fade, si ce n’est un Dis- cours Académique.” La Mettrie 1990 (note 42), 6. 48 See Manfred Beetz, ‘Vom erwartungsgemäßen Entzücken des Einführungsredners’, Rhetorik 4 (1985), 29–45. 49 See La Mettrie 1990 (note 42), 7. 50 “Was reget sich in meinem Busen? / Ist es Verwundrung? ist es Lust? / Gelinde Triebe stiller Musen, / Fühl ich euch nicht in meiner Brust?” This quote is an extract from Haller’s eulogy to the grand opening of the University of Göttingen. Albrecht von Haller, ‘Ueber das Einweihungs-Fest der Göttingischen hohen Schule. 1737’, in id., Versuch Schweizerischer Gedichte (reprint of eleventh edn. Bern 1777, Zürich, Hildesheim and New York 2006), 231, verses 1–4.

Rainer Godel - 9789004243910 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 03:10:20PM via free access controversy as the impetus for practice of knowledge 425 dedication if La Mettrie did not connect this deviation from the standard with the pretension that both he and Haller shared a common interest in speculative philosophy particularly, which is said to be the only science to evoke these feelings.51 A stronger contrast to what Ursula Pia Jauch calls Haller’s “reductive rationalism” can hardly be imagined.52 Whereas for Haller, physiology and anatomy are the relevant “sciences of human nature”, as P.F. Meckel records,53 for La Mettrie philosophical medicine precedes all other disciplines in the hierarchy of the sciences, because it enables human beings to know and to heal the “whole person”.54 Thus, a basic difference between Haller and La Mettrie consists in the ranking of academic disciplines and extra-academic knowledge. This is no “Conflict of the Faculties”; rather there is a conflict about areas of knowledge and its methods. As regards this form of anthropological knowledge, La Mettrie declares other criteria for evidence to be in effect. He argues within an area of truth that is not final: “If the consequences the author draws [on this matter] are dangerous, one should recall that they are based upon nothing more than a hypothesis.”55 The need for hypotheses and the multiplicity of truth are due to the object of his analysis, to the “nature of humankind”. In the “Discours Préliminaire” enlightenment seems to be impossible since anthropological conditions obtain: Prejudices from childhood days may never be destroyed.56 In this anthropological area, one does not need to confine oneself to pure speculation; judgements are possible, albeit contingent ones. After the core thesis “The human being is a machine”, La Mettrie gives a methodological explanation: “The human being is a machine composed in a way that makes it impossible to envisage a clear idea of it in the beginning.”57 La Mettrie proclaims a method that does not relate to speculation in the area of ignorance, but that uses empirically ascertained results in order to expand from there into hypotheses about the nature of human beings.

51 “De toutes les Attractions de la Nature, la plus forte, du moins pour moi, comme pour vous, cher H., c’est celle de la Philosophie.” La Mettrie 1990 (note 42), 8. 52 See Jauch 1998 (note 44), 255. 53 “Lehre von der Natur des Menschen”, cf. P.F. Meckel, ‘Vorrede’, in Haller 1788 (note 23), V. 54 See Christensen 1996 (note 35), 139. 55 “Si les conséquences, que l’Auteur en tire, sont dangereuses, qu’on se souvienne qu’elles n’ont qu’une Hypothèse pour fondement.” La Mettrie 1990 (note 42), 4. 56 See Jauch 1998 (note 44), 265. 57 “L’Homme est une Machine si composée, qu’il est impossible de s’en faire d’abord une idée claire . . .” La Mettrie 1990 (note 42), 26.

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While going through the organs, one needs to “unravel the mind”, in order to achieve the “highest degree of probability” in judgements on the nature of human beings.58 La Mettrie makes a plea for drawing epistemological—or better: epistemo-practical—consequences from insight into the limits of the human cognitive faculty, the diverging accessibility of different areas of knowledge, and the fact that they also differ in allowing truth in the end. La Mettrie makes a plea—if an anachronism may be allowed—for the humanities, but for a methodologically based kind of humanities. “Break the chain of your prejudices, arm yourself with the torch of experience, and you will honour nature as it deserves rather than drawing conclusions from the ignorance in which nature has left you.”59 In this area of ignorance or uncertain knowledge, truth is always bound to the possibility of error, about which one needs to argue publicly: “It is not enough that a savant does research on nature and on truth; he must dare to articulate it for the benefit of the small number of those who are willing and able to think.”60 “L’homme machine” ends with the famous invitation to controversies: “Here is my system, or rather the truth if I do not err. . . . Now, argue who wants to.”61 Haller, on the other hand, does not at all consider hypotheses illegiti- mate. In the Buffon preface “Über den Nutzen der Hypothesen” [On the usefulness of hypotheses], he stresses the use of competing hypotheses in relation to scientific progress. If nothing else, they are said to have a psychological value because they incite researchers to compete for glory and honour.62 Thus, controversies result from anthropological conditions: They stem from the natural pride and the quest for glory that affect every human being. But there are also intrinsic scientific reasons for hypotheses: In his “Elementa physiologiæ corporis humani”, Haller states that

58 See ibid., 27. 59 “Brisez la chaîne de vos préjugés; armez-vous du flambeau de l’Expérience, et vous ferez à la Nature l’Honneur qu’elle merite; au lieu de rien conclure à son désavantage, de l’ignorance, où elle vous a laissés.” Ibid., 132. 60 Ibid., 20. 61 “Voilà mon Systême, ou plutôt la Vérité, si je ne me trompe fort. . . . Dispute à présent qui voudra!” Ibid., 138. On the function of arguments in La Mettrie, see Christensen 1996 (note 35), 13ff. 62 See also Proß 2008 (note 8), 428; Albrecht von Haller, ‘Vorrede zum ersten Theile der allgemeinen “Historie der Natur” [über den Nutzen der Hypothesen; 1750]’, in id., Samm lung kleiner Hallerischer Schriften (second edn., Bern 1772), 3 vols., I: 50 and 68ff. Cf. also Otto Sonntag and Hubert Steinke, ‘Der Forscher und Gelehrte’, in Steinke, Boschung and Proß 2008 (note 8), 317–346: 339.

Rainer Godel - 9789004243910 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 03:10:20PM via free access controversy as the impetus for practice of knowledge 427 he now, when dealing with the inner senses, needs to enter the “realm of hypotheses and conjectures”.63 This is not inconvenient: Especially in the pre-psychological “Seelenlehre” of the late Enlightenment, hypotheses were accepted as an important instrument for generating knowledge. Justus Christian Hennings, in his “Geschichte von den Seelen der Men- schen und Thiere”, writes: “To put it in one word, the ‘Seelenlehre’ is the right chair and residence for hypotheses.”64 But the seminal difference between Haller and La Mettrie lies in the question of where the limits of truth and science are. Truth generated by reason only, which is at work when hypotheses are formulated, is, according to Haller, always subordinate to truth generated by experience.65 Evi- dence achieved by the “knife” or the “microscope” is always superior to “speculations”.66 “The correct method of searching for truth” is to dispense with what Haller calls “romances”—fabricated stories—and, instead, accu- mulate empirical observation.67 When our ideas, since they come from our perception, converge with the things themselves, we have caught the truth.68 This may seem like a rather simplistic epistemological model: For Haller, enlightenment means achieving truth in all the areas that can be the object of empirical research. Hypotheses only fill in “the blanks of

63 “regnum hypothesium & conjecturarum”. Albrecht von Haller, Elementa physiologiæ corporis humani. Tomus quintus. Sensus externi interni (Lausannae 1763), 529. See also Steinke 2005 (note 31), 197. 64 “Mit einem Worte, die Seelenlehre ist der rechte Sitz und Residenz der Hypothesen.” Justus Christian Hennings, Geschichte von den Seelen der Menschen und Thiere (Leipzig 1777), XV. 65 See Richard Toellner, Albrecht von Haller. Über die Einheit im Denken des letzten Uni- versalgelehrten (Wiesbaden 1971), 115ff. Haller’s epistemology shares some aspects with the anthropological discourse without retracing it towards the direction of probabilism. On Haller’s epistemology, see Rainer Godel, Vorurteil—Anthropologie—Literatur. Der Voru- rteilsdiskurs als Modus der Selbstaufklärung im 18. Jahrhundert (Tübingen 2007), 246. 66 See Albrecht von Haller, Von den empfindlichen und reizbaren Teilen des menschlichen Körpers, ed. by Karl Sudhoff (first edn. Leipzig 1756, Leipzig 1922), 13. Cf. Christensen 1996 (note 35), 138; Proß 2008 (note 8), 428ff. 67 Albrecht von Haller, ‘Physiologie’, in Supplément à l’Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire Rai- sonné des Sciences (Amsterdam 1777), vol. 4, 349. See also Lutz Danneberg, Die Anatomie des Text-Körpers und Natur-Körpers. Das Lesen im liber naturalis und supernaturalis (Berlin and New York 2003), 70. 68 “Verum dicimus nos tenere, quando ideae nostrae cum rebus ipsis conveniunt, quarum ex perceptione natae sunt.” Haller 1763 (note 53), 562.

Rainer Godel - 9789004243910 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 03:10:20PM via free access 428 rainer godel truth”.69 They are the instruments that can lead one to truth in the areas where truth has not yet been found.70 Thus, at the centre of the controversy between Haller and La Mettrie, there is a methodological debate about the question of whether and how knowledge is possible in areas where the experience of the researcher does not suffice to arrive at true evidence. At the centre of the controversy, there is the question of whether it is legitimate to cross the border towards such “extra-scientific” areas that require other forms of knowledge or ignorance when driven by sceptical doubts and hypotheses. Is it allowed to formulate hypotheses in areas which are not “scientific”, but in which truths—truths of faith—seem to be evident? Consistently, Haller later answers this question in his theological writings.71 The controversy is about crossing borders. La Mettrie ironically represents Haller as someone who crosses borders. In the German version of La Mettrie’s Kunst, Wollust zu empfinden (1751), La Mettrie adds another dedication to Haller. He addresses Haller as the teacher who taught him lust: “This name alone is, for the expert, the epitome of the art of love and voluptuousness.”72 La Mettrie is trying to make Haller implausible, as Haller is said not to follow the truth of faith and morality in his own life. Therefore, La Mettrie argues that Haller’s plea for excluding these truths from the process of research is not convincing.73 The controversy has become a controversy over cred- ibility where probabilities are negotiated.74

69 “Lüken (sic) des Wahren”. Albrecht von Haller, ‘Vorrede zum Ersten Theile der allgemeinen Historie der Natur’, in Sammlung kleiner Hallerischer Schriften (second edn., Bern 1772), part 1, 72. Cf. Toellner 1971 (note 65), 116ff. 70 See ibid., 60. 71 See Steinke 2005 (note 31), 196. 72 “Dieser Name allein ist dem Kundigen der Inbegriff von Liebeskunst und Wollust.” Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Die Kunst, Wollust zu empfinden, ed. by Bernd A. Laska (Nürn- berg 1987), 5. La Mettrie refers above all to Haller’s Ode an Doris. 73 On the controversy on Haller’s assumed double moral standard, see Jauch 1998 (note 44), 258. 74 The controversy has not yet come to an end. Due to the restricted length of this paper, I cannot deal with the following texts in detail. In Le petit homme à longue queue (1751), La Mettrie intensifies his polemics against the assumed immorality of Haller. Haller himself appealed to Maupertuis, the president of the Prussian academy, in order to silence La Mettrie. Cf. Haller 1772 (note 69), part 1, 317–341. After La Mettrie’s untimely death, Haller ceased the controversy. See also Christoph Siegrist, Albrecht von Haller (Stuttgart 1967), 12; Karl S. Guthke, ‘Haller, La Mettrie und die anonyme Schrift “L’homme plus que machine”’, in id., Wege zur Literatur. Studien zur deutschen Dichtungs- und Geistesge schichte (Bern and München 1967), 9–15.

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Controversy as the Impetus of Enlightened Practice of Knowledge

Let us briefly recapitulate the core aspects of both controversies presented in this article:

1. Both controversies deal with issues that are not axiomatically evident. They are not in accordance with what contemporaries would expect to be “normal” science, since they re-define the scope and the instruments of trustworthiness. This forces the contenders in every case to substantiate and negotiate about why they are trustworthy agents of science.75 The controversies are about how to legitimize norms and deviations from the norms. 2. Both controversies consist to a considerable extent of persuasive arguments that do not necessarily have to be logically consistent, conclu- sive, or true. Many communicative strategies aim to make readers believe that an argument is true and cannot be denied. Dascal calls such arguments, following Schopenhauer—and indirectly also Aristotle— “strategems”.76 They aim to represent a person and an argument with regard to the expectation of the recipients. 3. Both controversies digress from the form of scientific discussion that was well-established at that time. They vary the form of academic conduct and use non-scientific genres (La Mettrie, for example, makes extensive use of the satire) in order to convince the audience and/or the other. 4. Both controversies distinguish themselves by levelling the hierarchical pyramid that was common at that time. In both controversies, one of the contenders makes a claim to debate eye-to-eye with someone who actually outranks him. This may also apply to overturning the hierarchy of scientific areas and disciplines. This tendency, by the way, complies with the eventful history of the concept of “Kontroverse” that makes its way from the rhetorical to the juridical, the theological, and, finally to all disciplines.

75 Shapin uses the concept of “trustworthy agents” in a more concrete sense. See Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth. Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago and London 1994), xxv, 3ff., 11 and 22ff. 76 See Dascal 1998 (note 2), 25ff.

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Along with the increase in certain knowledge in the Enlightenment, unclear areas and ignorance expanded.77 The growth of knowledge opened up areas of non-knowledge where knowledge could not be easily organized or where contingency had to be accepted as inevitable. These spaces in between become the issue and the point of attack for all the enlightened endeavours seeking knowledge and truth. But these in-between spaces determine enlightenment itself. Without prejudices, enlightenment loses its drive, as Moses Mendelssohn argues.78 By the end of the eighteenth century, at the latest, contemporaries stressed that enlightenment was a process. Enlightenment could no longer be understood as the accumu- lation of rational, propositional knowledge, but had to be considered as a process of negotiation and of controversies that needed to learn how to integrate opposition. Johann Christoph Greiling, in 1795, for example, declined all one-sided definitions of enlightenment.79 “Nichtwissen”, “ignorance”, “bêtise”, “Schwärmerei”, “préjugés”, “Konjekturen” are not just the names for the Enlightenment’s opposites; they also name the guideposts that gave the Enlightenment its specific profile. Enlightenment cannot be constructed as a purely rational endeavour, since it is always subject to the anthropological conditions (including the human ignorance) that limit and—at the same time—spur on our cognition. Enlightenment negoti- ates probabilities in controversies. The rivalry of standpoints is fertile, not an issue.80 In these kinds of enlightened controversies, the contenders not only deal with knowledge that can lead to truth. Such controversies not only deal with the order of things, they deal with the order of ignorance. In this process, it is not the normal standard, not the disciplinal pattern,

77 See Hans Adler and Rainer Godel, ‘Einleitung. Formen des Nichtwissens im Zeitalter des Fragens’, in Hans Adler and Rainer Godel (eds.), Formen des Nichtwissens der Aufklä- rung (München 2010), 9–19; Proß 2008 (note 8), 415; Wolfgang Riedel, ‘Erster Psychologis- mus. Umbau des Seelenbegriffs in der deutschen Spätaufklärung’, in Jörn Garber and Heinz Thoma (eds.), Zwischen Empirisierung und Konstruktionsleistung. Anthropologie im 18. Jahrhundert (Tübingen 2004), 1–17. 78 See Moses Mendelssohn, ‘Öffentlicher und Privatgebrauch der Vernunft’, in id., Gesammelte Schriften. Jubiläumsausgabe, vol. 8: Schriften zum Judentum (Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt 1983), part 2, 225–229: 227. 79 Johann Christoph Greiling, Ideen zu einer künftigen Theorie der allgemeinen prac- tischen Aufklärung (Leipzig 1795), 4ff. One may also recall Ernst Cassirer’s proposal to understand the Enlightenment as taking the form of a theoretical controversy. See Ernst Cassirer, Die Philosophie der Aufklärung (Hamburg 1998), XIII. 80 See Proß 2008 (note 8), 417; see also Panajotis Kondylis, Die Aufklärung im Rahmen des neuzeitlichen Rationalismus (Stuttgart 1981), 56ff. Thomasius, by the way, narrows the limits of reasonable controversies because he prefers them to remain within the area in which truth and deceit can still be separated. See Grunert 2004 (note 5), 167.

Rainer Godel - 9789004243910 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 03:10:20PM via free access controversy as the impetus for practice of knowledge 431 that constitutes Enlightenment—it is the aberration.81 Enlightenment is a process of debates on the conditions of the possibility of enlightenment. On this note, controversies such as the two presented in this article become the impetus of enlightenment. The era of the Enlightenment was not just an era of answers; it was an era of questions.82

81 See Jauch 1998 (note 44), 16f. 82 Claudia Brodsky uses the phrase “Zeitalter der Fragen” in a radio interview with Deutschlandfunk, “Studiozeit”, 28 August 2008.

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