Call For An End to All Military Cooperation with South Africa

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Alternative title Notes and Documents - United Nations Centre Against ApartheidNo. 18/73 Author/Creator United Nations Centre against Apartheid Publisher Department of Political and Security Council Affairs Date 1973-10-00 Resource type Reports Language English Subject Coverage (spatial) South Africa Coverage (temporal) 1963 - 1973 Source Northwestern University Libraries Description Statement by the Chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid, H.E. Mr. Edwin Ogebe Ogbu, on 24 September 1973. Report by the Special Committee on Apartheid to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the military build-up and the implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa. Rapporteur: Dr. Barakat Ahmad. Annex: Review of developments concerning the military build-upin South Africa. Format extent 15 page(s) (length/size)

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http://www.aluka.org 1o 13 NOTES NO. I

1o 13 NOTES NO. I j 1 21974 CALL F0IR AN 3WD TO ALL -,ILI_ CI, l COOPEIATIO.r SCIThI AICA Statement by the Chair.an of the Special Committee on artheid, H.E. Er. Edw.in Ogebe OCbu, on 24 September 1973 'Report by the Special Committee on Aprtheid to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the military build-up and the imp leentation of the arms embargo against South Africa, Raiporteur: Dr. Barakat Ahmad Annex: Review of developments concerning the military build-up in South Africa L ote: On 2 October 1973, -the United Nations Special Committee on Artheid adopted a secial report drawing particular attention to the need for full implementation of provisions of Security Council resolution 282 (1970) on the arms embargo. The Special Coririttee recommended further that in the light of recent developments, the Security Council call on all States: (a) to refrain from transferring to South Africa advanced technology or information which can be utilized for military purposes; and (b) to refrain from importing military supplies. This issue contains the text of the report and a note by the Rapporteur of the Special Comnittee reviewing the relevant developments, and a statement by the Chairman of the Special Committee stressing the importance of the strict implementation of the arms embargot, *All material in these notes and documents may be freely reprinted. Acknowledgement, together with a copy of the publication containing the reprint, would be appreciated. 73-2354

STAT1,214T BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL CO,2AITTE.I0E ON APARTIT-EID, H.E. M. EDWIN OGEBE OGBU, ON 2A SEPDIBER 1973 .A thousand explanations will not convince us of the propriety of supplying military equipment to the South African regime in contravention of the very clear resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Mhe South African regime is a racist regime oppressing the great majority of the people of the country. It is a criminal regime engaged in inhumian acts against the African population, as everyone can see from the recent killing of minerorkers at Carletonville. It is an aggressive regime which continues in illegal occupation of Na-bmibia (a territory, for which the United Nations has a special and sacred responsibility); which has sent forces into Zimbabwe to support the racist clique and suppress the African people engaged in a legitimate struggle for freedom; which has assisted the Portuguese in the colonial wars; and which has threatened independent African States like the United Republic of Tanzania and the Republic of Zambia. The United Nations decided ten years ago on an arms embargo. a,,ainht this regime. There are, and there can be, no exceptions to this embargo wrhich is the minimum and first step which, should be taken by Governments opposed to anartheid. oe cannot ignore military cooperation ,rith the South African regime even if it is said to be for "defence". ! hat that regime seeks to defend is the oppression of the African people - and any assistance to that regime constitutes direct or indirect complicity in that oppression. ilitay cooperation with that regime makes it arrogant. It has threatened the United Nations that it would resist by force any attempts to end its illegal occupation of Nanibia. It has recently even threatened Lesotho for suggesting United Nations partlcipation in the investigation of the killinris o-2 Lesotho nationals who were working in the mines in South Africa. Military cooperation also involves the development of vested interests in the countries which supply arms - vested interests which use their influence against international action against apartheid. The position of the Special Committee can only be what it has alTays been - support for the strictest implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa without any exceptions or reservations.

REPORT BY THE SPECIAL CO1,1ITTEE ON APARTHEID TO THE SECURITY COI.FCIL AND THE GENERAL ASS MBLY ON THE MILITARY BUILD-UP AND TE IMPLE4ENTATION OF THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, RAPPORTEJR: DR. BARAKAT AEW4AD In the discharge of its mandate constantly to review all aspects of the ,policies of apartheid in South Africa and its international repercussions and to report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly or the Security Council or both, the Special Committee on Apartheid has decided to make this special report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the recent developments concerning the military build-up in South Africa and the implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa. It has taken this step in view of the grave new developments in South Africa, and southern Africa as a whole, which require the serious consideration of the Security Council and of all Member States, and the urgent need to secure full compliance with the arms embargo against South Africa in order to avert an escalation of conflicts in the area. The Special Committee recalls that in resolution 311 (1972), adopted in Addis Ababa on 4 February 1972, the Security Council decided, "as a matter of urgency, to examine methods of resolving the present situation arising out of the policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa". Such an examination has become imperative in view of the serious aggravation of the situation in South Africa and in southern Africa as a whole. On 5 June 1972, the Special Committee drew the attention of the Security Council and the General Assembly to a number of developments concerning the military build-up in South Africa (A/8689) 1/ and drew attention to reports indicating serious violations of the arms embargo. It suggested further action by the Security Council, including specific measures to ban the transfer to South Africa of advanced technology and scientific military information which can be used for the manufacture of arms, military vehicles and ammunition. l/ Also circulated as a Security Council document under the symbol S/10680.

Since then, as the review of recent developments annexed to this report indicates, there has been a serious acceleration of military build-up in South Africa. The military budget has been substantially increased and the South African Air Force is acquiring a large number of aircraft, some of which will eventually be assembled or manufactured in South Africa. It appears that some States have ignored the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly in agreeing to supply these aircraft to South Africa. The Special Committee wishes to reiterate that there is no exception and there can be no exception to the arms embargo against South Africa, which is a minimum step required of all States which are genuinely opposed to the oppression of the black people in the name of apartheid and which are committed to the principles of the United Nations Charter with regard to the situation in southern Africa. In. particular, there can be no valid distinction between the supply of sophisticated weapons described as intended for external defence, and the supply of small arms supposedly for internal repression. The rapid expansion of the military establishment in South Africa, and the continued military collaboration by other States with SoutA Africa, have taken place during a period characterized by a further aggravation of the situation in the country. During the past year, there have been massive strikes by tens of thousands of black workers of South Africa against starvation wages and the denial of all trade union rights. The Government and employers made some temporary concessions, but the African workers continue to be denied trade union rights. Tension has continued to increase and the killing of 11 African mineworkers (including five nationals of Lesotho and two nationals of Botswana), and the wounding of many others, at Carletonville on 11 September reflect the gravity of the situation in the country. The South African Government has continued to ignore repeated demands by the Security Council since 1963 to end repression against opponents of apartheid. It has, during the past year, taken drastic repressive action against student leaders, churchmen and others. The South African Government has not only continued illegally to occupy the Territory of Namibia but has proceeded forcibly to move its inhabitants from their homes and to establish "Bantustans". It has resorted to brutal repression against the Namibian people in order to suppress their legitimate resistance to the illegal occupation. The Special Committee fully shares the concern expressed by the United Nations Council for Namibia over the grave situation and its call for effective action to oblige the South African r6gime to withdraw from the Territory.

The South African Government has continued, as noted by the becurltY Council in resolution 320 (1972), its "open and persistent refusal ... to implement .sanctions against the illegal r6gime in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)". In open violation of Security Council resolutions 277 (1970), 326 (1973) and 328 (1973), it has refused to withdraw its military and armed forces from Southern Rhodesia. The Security Council has recognized, in resolution 328 (1973), that this defiance constituted "a serious challenge to the authority of the Security Council". Meanwhile, the military and other co-operation within the "unholy alliance" linking the South African Government, the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonial authorities - has developed further. This co-operation, directed against the struggles of the peoples of the Territories for freedom and independence, and constituting a threat to the security of independent African States which support the African peoples in their legitimate struggles is, above all, a challenge to the authority and prestige of the United Nations. In the' light of the growing conflicts in the colonial territories adjacent to South Africa and the brutal methods to which racist and colonial authorities have resorted, the military build-up in South Africa constitutes a particularly grave menace to peace. The Special Committee, therefore, considers it of great urgency that the Security Council should take decisive steps,' under Chs ter VII of the Charter, to secure full implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa as laid down in its resolutions 181 (1963), 182 (1963), 191 (1964), 282 (1970) and 311 (1972). The Special Committee urges that the Security Council decide that the situation in South Africa constitutes a threat to the peace in terms of Chapter VII of the Charter. As the International Conference of Experts for the Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa, stated in the programme of action (A/9061, annex, para. 59): "hThe policy-of apartheid, which is a crime against humanity, a flagrant violation of the principles of the United Nations and a massive and ruthless denial of human rights, constitutes a threat to peace. It amounts to a serious and grave threat to the peace and security of Africa and the world and requires urgent action by the Security Council under Chapter VII of tIe Charter of the United Nations because of the following: "(a) South Africa's central role in helping to maintain and perpetuate colonial and racist rule in southern Africa; "(b) Its continued illegal occupation of the international Territory of Namibia; "(c) Its deliberate and systematic violation of international mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia; "(d) The illegal intervention of its armed units in defence of the racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia;

"(e) Its military intervention in Angola and Mozambique; "(f) Its acts of aggression against independent African States; "(g) It military build-up and threatening posture towards the rest of the continent." In the view of the Special Committee, there can be no doubt as to the fact that the policies and actions of the South African regime constitute a threat to international peace and security. There is no reason for further hesitation in defining the situation as a threat to the peace under Chapter VII of the Charter except for the unwillingness of certain Powers to take action and make the necessary sacrifices in the interests of peace and freedom. The Special Committee recalls that, in resolution 311 (1972), the Security Council had expressed its grave concern over the aggravation of the situation in South Africa which, it noted has seriously disturbed international peace and security in southern Africa. The Council had declared its conviction that urgent measures must be taken to secure implementation of its resolutions and thereby promote a solution of the grave situation in South Africa and southern Africa. It called upon all States to observe strictly the arms embargo against South Africa. In this connexion, the Special Committee draws particular attention to the need for full implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 282 (1970) on the arms embargo. It recommends further that, in the light of recent developments, the Security Council call upon all States: (a) To refrain from trensferring to South Africa advanced technology or information which can be utilized for military purposes; (b) To refrain from importing military supplies manufactured by, or in collaboration with, South Africa, such as the Cactus anti-aircraft missile. The Special Committee also recommends the following relevant proposals in paragraphs 67-69 of the programme of action highlighted by the International Conference of Experts for the Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa for serious consideration: The Simonstown Agreements between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and South Africa should be terminated and no military arrangements should be made by any State with South Africa. The international arms embargo should be fully implemented by all States, and the Security Council should expose those States which violate it, especially France, and secure their compliance. The Security Council should take further action to prevent the importation of arms from South Africa by other States. The Security Council should also examine all other forms of military co-operation with South Africa and take appropriate action. International and national trade union movements and other organizations should take action to prevent the production of arms and other military equipment for their supply to South Africa. Annex R EV17- OF D.EVLOPMo171S CONCERNING THE MILITARY BUILD-UP .ii -sourir !ICA Introduction The acceleration of the military build-up in South Africa in the past year, which is reviewed in this. paper, may be seen in the context of the White Paper on Defence publjgihed-by the South African Department of Defence in April 1973. In the preface to the White Paper, the Minister of Defence, Mr. P. W. Botha, indicated the purpose of the military build-up by describing the alleged threat to South Africa as follows: The threats against us are rooted in and nurtured by the currents of the times in which we live, and they reach far beyond our borders. The RSA is part of the modern world, and, as such, involuntarily involved in the prevailing international struggle for power. Furthermore, as a result of the relative check-mate obtaining between the super powers in the sphere of nuclear weapons, we find ourselves in a position of increasing stratcgic importance in that struggle. Like the rest of the free world, the RSA is a target for international communism and its cohorts - leftist activists, exaggerated humanism, permissiveness, materialism, and related ideologies. In addition, the RSA has been singled out as a special target for the byproducts of their ideologies, such as black racialism, exaggerated individual freedom, one-man-one-vote slogan, and a host of other slogans 6mployed against us on a basis of double standards. Nor can the Western powers control these movements: in the United Nations they are ensnared by the'application of their own one-man-one-vote slogan - to such an extent that they even failed to persuade that body to adopt a resolution condemning international terrorism. Because the RSA holds a position of strategic importance, these ideological attacks on the RSA are progressively being converted into more tangible action in the form of sanctions, boycotts, isolation, demonstrations and the like ... Geographically the RSA is a part of the third world; inthe military and ctiltural spheres it is a captive ally of the West, and ideologically a direct obstacle in the path of communism. 1/ Stating that South Africa had no territorial ambitions, he added: Our military posture primarily is defensive and not offensive and we have no intention of engaging in an arms race with any other State or States. We are, however, fully aware of the fact that passive defence alone is inadequate' and we are therefore obliged to maintain a significant retaliatory and interdictory capability. The state of stability and order in neighbouring countries has a direct bearing on the security of the RSA. Consequently, should requests for assistance be made by those countries, such requests will be considered by the Government who will react in accordance with the means available and the applicable provisions of international law. S i/ The Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, 1973, p. 1. In the view of the Government, the RSA's survival is closely interwoven with the future of the present free world. Consequently, the measures instituted for our defence are designed constantly also to assist in promoting the security of the free world in general. 2/ The White Paper recalled the departmental strategic policy of the Defence Force. The first aspect of this policy is as follows: .The Defence Force must at all times be able to assist the South African Police in preserving internal order. 3/ The plans of the Defence Force thus include the building-up of means for "retaliation" against other States, intervention in neighbouring territories and preservation of the apartheid system. As repeatedly emphasized by the Special Committee, any distinction between internal repression and external defence or between defensive and offensive weapons, with regard to the arms embargo against the South African Government, has little validity in the light of the official policy of the South African Government. General The defence budget of South Africa was increased from R 335,336,000 in 1972/73 to a record of R 447,022,000 in 1973/74. If the functions carried out on behalf of the Defence Department by other bodies like ARMSCOR, Public Works and Community Development are included, the estimate for defence was R 481,164,000 in 1973/74, compared to R 347,936,000 for 1972/73. 4/ The budget is now well over 10 times that in 1960, the year of the Sharpeville massacre, when the South African Government began its military build-up. There has been a considerable increase in the strength of the armed forces during recent years. The Institute of Strategic Studies, London, in its publication, The Military Balance, 1972/73, increased the estimate of South Africa's armed forces to 109,300, as against an estimate of 44,250 in the edition for 1970/71.A spokesman for the Institute was reported to have stated that this latest figure "is considerably nearer the truth". 5/ A s.ignificant development in the past year was the announcement late in 1972 that a voluntary military service system, would be instituted for the Coloured people. A South African Cape Corps Service Battalion would be created and would if Ibid., p. 3. 3/ Ibid., para. 9. 4/ Ibid., para. 22. A substantial part of the increase is reportedly due to the expected delivery of Mirage F-1 aircraft during 1973-74. 5/ The Star (Johannesburg), weekly airmail edition, 16 September 1972. provide military training to Coloured youths for a period of 12 months. 6/ The first batch of 130 Coloured volunteers, between the ages of 18 and 21, began training at the Cape Corps Training Centre at Faure, Cape Province, in January 1973. 7/ The trainees can later join the permanent force and can become officers in the armed forces. 8/ It was announced in April 1973 that a service battalion similar to that for the Coloured people was being planned for Indians. 9/ Parallel with the expansion of the armed forces and the acquisition of military equipment, a number of military installations have been built or expanded. The Communications Centre and Maritime Operational Headquarters of South Africa, bilt at a cost of R 14 million at Silvermine, near Cape Town, was officially opened in March 1973 by Prime Minister Vorster. The guests at the ceremony included three admirals from France, the United Kingdom and Portugal, and a captain from Iran. i10/ A new Propulsion Laboratory of the National Institute of Defence Research (of CSIR), designed primarily for the development of rocket motors for the missile programmes of the South African Defence Fqrce, was opened at Somerset West, Cape Province, in April 1973. l/ The Minister of Defence announced in September 1972 that the gymnasium of the South African Navy at Saldanha Bay would be expanded within the next few years at a cost of R 6 million to provide training for about 1,000 men. 12/ The Deputy Minister of Defence, Mr. J. W. Rall, disclosed in September 1973 that the Department of Defence proposed to build several large airfields around the Republic. 13/ The college established at George in 1971 for the training of women in civil 6/ South African Digest (Pretoria), 4 August and 20 October 1972. 7/, and Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 17 January 1973. The training centre was officially opened in May 1973. South African Digest, Pretoria, 25 May 1973. 8/ The Star (Johannesburg), weekly airmail edition, 28 July 1973. 9/ White Paper on Defence, op. cit., para. 49. 10/ South African Digest (Pretoria), 6 April 1973, and The Star (Johannesburg), 8 March 1973. The Headquarters include a modern communications centre which was built by six overseas contractors - five of which are well represented in the electronics field in South Africa, and AEG Telefunken of West Germany. The Star (Johannesburg), 8 March 1973. l/ South African Digest (Pretoria), 6 April 1973. 12/ Ibid., 20 October 1972. 13/ South African Digest (Pretoria), 7 September 1973.

-9- defence is due to be expanded and the establishment of a second college is under consideration. 14/ A significant development in relation to the military build-up in South Africa is the reported perfection in South Africa of a new method for enriching uranium which can be usedfor the production of weapons. The newly-created Uranium Enrichment Corporation is spending more than R 550 million on a large-scale, factory at Velindaba. 15/ I Import' of arms The White Paper on Defence, 1973, stated that the Department of Defence had continued to replace obsolete equipment with ever more expensive capital equipment and to acquire more sophisticated equipment for current activities. The capital expenditure on equipment for the three financial years 1969/70 to 1972/73 amounted to R 534,150,000, divided as follows: (a) Radio, radar, and other electrotechnical equipment R 75,141,000 (b) Guided weapons 23,166,000 (c) Ammunition 85,422,000 (d) Vehicles and mobility equipment 29,477,000 (e) Combat vehicles 43,070,300 (f) Weapons 34,592,000 (g) Aircraft 190,072,000 (h) Vessels 53,214,000 16/ Alarge part of this expenditure was presumably for the import of equipment. The South African press reported that the delivery of Mirage F-1 interceptor-strike aircraft, 5) of which were ordered in France in 1972, would begin in 1973. It was described as a highly manoeuvrable, all-weather aircraft, with a speed of mach 2.-2, which can be used in air-to-air battles, as well as ground attacks. It can carry bombs, rockets or the air-to-air Matra 530 missile. 17/ The press also reported that the delivery of the seven Wasp helicopters L4/ White Paper on Defence, op. cit., para. 47. 15/ House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 24 May 1973, col. 7447. o 16/ White Paper on Defence, op. cit., para. 20. 17/ The F-1 will be initially assembled in South Africa, but later it will be manufactured under licence. The Star (Johannesburg), 14 April 1973; Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 16 April.1973.

-lO- 0- ordered by South Africa from Westland Helicopters, Ltd., of the United Kingdom would, take place in 1973. 18/ Recent press reports indicate further that the purchase of a squadron of Hawker Siddeley Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft from the United Kingdom is under active consideration by the South African Government. 19/ The Johannesburg Star (weekly airmail edition) reported on 15 September 1973, quoting Air Enthusiast and Flight International, that the South African Air Force would receive 200 aircraft from the beginning of next year. Sixteen Mirage F1CZ all-weather interceptor aircraft would be delivered early next year. They would be followed by 32 Mirage FIAZ ground-attack. fighters: South Africa's Atlas Aircraft Corporation would contribute some components to these aircraft and would possibly undertake final assembly of some of these Mirages. According to Air Enthusiast the delivery to the South African Air Force from Italy of the first of 20 Aermacchi MB 326 K trainers - an improved version of the Impala aircraft made in South Africa under licence - is imminent. These will be made entirely in Italy but the South African Air Force had ordered more than 100 and 'preparations were being made to phase this model on to the Impala assembly line in South Africa. South Africa would also obtain 40 Aermacchi AM3C aircraft for the Army Air Corps reconnaissance section. 20/ Manufacture of arms The South African Government has continued to claim great advances in the local manufacture of arms, ammunition and military equipment and vehicles. Professor H. J. Samuels, president of the Armaments Board, announced in November 1972 that South Africa was manufacturing 80 per cent of its arms. 21/ He stated in an interview in December, that 70 per cent of the Republic's expenditure for the purchase of arms went to ARMSCOR's seven wholly-owned 18/ The Star (Johannesburg), 5 September 1973. 19/ Ibid., weekly airmail edition, 2 June 1973; Daily Telegraph (London), 25 June 1973. 20/ That the acquisition of aircraft is not entirely for defensive purposes is indicated by a report in the Johannesburg Star of 24 October 1972 on a weapon competition 6f the South African Air Force in which the Mirage, Buccaneer and Impala aircraft participated. The competition included simulated napalm bomb attacks during which the fighters approached the targets at between 300 and 500 knots, flying at 16 metres above the ground. (Note: In a letter dated 1 October 1973, the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations, informed the Special Committee that Aermacchi had not granted any licences to South African firms for the manufacture of the Aermacchi AM3C.) 21. The Star, Johannesburg, weekly airmail edition, 18 November 1972. I I...

-11- subsidiaries in South Africa and to private industry. Private contractors earned " R 135 million in 1971/72 for manufacturing defence items and would earn twice that amount in 1972/73. _,/ The White Paper on Defence stated: During the period under review, good progress was made towards achieving the ideal of'self-sufficiency. The RSA needs no armaments from abroad for her internal protection. 23/ It reported that great progress had been made in the manufacture of ammunition, aircraft bombs and non-guided aircraft rockets. The Eland armoured cars are almost wholly manufactured in South Africa. Progress had also been made in the manufacture of telecommunications equipment and a variety of miscellaneous items. A number of weapons such as a 90 mm anti-tank gun, a semi-automatic rifle, mortars and sub-machine guns were being produced in South Africa. 24/ Development work on a vehicle for tracking down and destroying land mines had been undertaken. 25/ Progress appears to be particularly rapid in the manufacture of aircraft for military purposes. It may be recalled that the Atlas Aircraft Corporation had been founded in 1964 for the manufacture of aircraft. Its production programme had then been focused on the Impala training aircraft. The local content had been raised by the end of 1972 to a stage where only the most sophisticated components had to be obtained from abroad. 26/ The White Paper on Defence, 1973, stated that the local manufacture of a more advanced version of the Impala aircraft, which would be fitted with a considerably more powerful engine, would shortly become a reality. Preparations were also being made for the develoment and eventual local manufacture of a light military aircraft.. 27/ 22/ Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 8 December 1972. The Armaments Board was established in 1964 as an autonomous body for the procurement of arms. ARMSCOR was established in 1968 to control local manufacture and procurement of arms. 23/ White Paper on Defence, op. cit., para. 17. 24/ Ibid., .paras. 91-103. The Minister of Defence announced in October 1972 that the commandos would be issued with the new semi-automatic R3 rifle manufactured in South Africa which would provide them with additional firing power. The Star ' (Johannesburg), 10 October 1972. ?5/ White Paper on Defence, op. cit., para. 99. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 17 January 1973. 26/ White Paper on Defence, op. cit., para. 97. 27/ Ibid., para. 98.

-12-_ Press reports in August 1972 indicated that South Africa would manufacture Aermaechi AM 3C aircraft, a three-seat monoplane developed in Italy, which can be used for forward air control, observation, transport, and low-level tactical support of ground forces. It can carry machine-guns, rockets or bombs. South African official spokesmen declined to confirm the report. 28/ The Atlas Aircraft Corporation was also reported to be gearing itself to produce the single-seater Mirage F-1 aircraft by 1977. South African technicians and engineers were reported to be training abroad for the project. 29_/ Professor H. J. Samuels, president of the Armaments Board, was reported to have claimed in April 1973: In a short time we have been able to make Atlas one of the most modern aircraft factories in the world. 30/ On 18, August 1972, the Minister of Defence, Mr. P. W. Botha, opened a military base to uard the Atlas Aircraft Corporation's works at Kempton Park. He announced that access to the factory would be restricted. 31/ The question of the establishment of a. naval shipbuilding industry in South Africa is meanwhile under examination. 32/ Local development of an air-to-air midsile has continued. The commissioning of the Cactus ground-to-air missile system, developed jointly by South Africa and France, reportedly was "taking place as planned". 33/ The South African Government has indicated that the production of arms and ammunition had reached such a stage that South Africa was able to export to other countries. The close connexion between the defence industry in South Africa and private investors deserves special notice in connexion with the local manufacture of arms. 28/ Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 2 August 1972. According to the MilitaryBalance, 1972-1973 (Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1972), South Africa signed an agreement in the second half of 1971 for the import from Italy of 40 Aermacchi AM 3C light transport aircraft. 29/ South African Digest (Pretoria), 20 April 1973. 30/ Ibid. 31/ The Star (Johannesburg), 19 August 1972. 32/ White Paper on Defence, op. ., para. 104. A commission had been appointed in 1972 to consider this matter. The establishment of this Commission was linked with press reports that South Africa had placed an order in Portugal for six missile-carrying corvettes and that the possibility of building parts for those ships in South Africa was being considered. 33/ Ibid., para. 102.

-15 Prominent industrialists and financiers are members of the subsidiaries of ARMSCO which manufacture defence supplies. Private industry is reported to have obtained contracts of about R 70 million in 1972/73 for the Defence Department. 34/ After interviews with the Minister of Defence, the Financial Mail indicated that the electronics and engineering industries were of particular importance. 35/ Admiral H. H. Biermann, Commandant-General of the South African Defence Force, opened an exhibition of communicationsequipment by Racal Electronics in August 1972 and praised the company for its supplies and consultant services to the Defence Force. 36/ Export of arms Of particular importance in this connexion are the efforts to export the Cactus anti-aircraft missile system. Press reports have indicated that the missile would be manufactured in the United States under licence from France. The decision was reported to have been reached at a meeting between the Defence Secretaries of the United States and France in October 1972. 37/ The Financial Mail, Johannesburg, reported on 8 December 1972, after an interview with the Minister of Defence, that South Africa had obtained a number of fairly big orders from foreign countries for locally made arms. Military co-operation with other States During the period under review, there has been continued co-operation between South Africa and the United Kingdom unde? the Simonstown Agreements, especially, as regards joint naval exercises. "Sanex 2", an air-sea exercise with the participation of the combined forces of the South African Navy and the Royal Navy, took place along the southern Cape coastline between 14 and 20 August 1972. 'Two South African vessels - the frigate SAS President Steyn and the submarine j Hobhouse - and three Royal Navy vessels - the frigates HMS Dionede and HMS Rothsay and the Royal Fleet auxiliary ship Tideflow - took part in the exercise. It was reported that several further combined exercises would take place in the next few months. 38/ 34/ Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 8 December 1972. 35/ Ibid. 36/ South African Digest (Pretoria), 24 August 1973. 37/ X-Ray (London), December 1972. 38/ The Star (Johannesburg), 10 August 1972.

The Commander-in-Chief of the British Navy, Admiral Sir Edward Ashmore, visited South Africa in November 1972, as the guest of the South African Defence Force. 39/ Joint naval exercises by British and South African navies were held again in July 1973. The Royal Navy task force - consisting of three frigates, two supply ships and the nuclear submarine Dreadnought - was larger than that deployed in previous years. In a press conference held on his flagship HMS Tiger, the Cqmmander of the Royal Navy task force, Admiral R. P. Clayton, was reported to have foreshadowed a larger deployment of British warships on the Cape route, and closer co-operation between the Royal Navy and the South African Navy in terms of the Simons-town Agreements "in order to maintain the balance of power in the Indian Ocean". 40/ The South African Government has continued to increase military collaboration with the illegal r6gime in Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonial authorities in Angola and Mozambique. The South African Minister of Defence, Mr. P. W. Botha, and the Commandant-General, Admiral Hugo Biermann, held secret defence talks in Salisbury in October 1972. i/ Recent press, reports indicated that Rhodesian light infantry officers were waging a recruiting drive for anti-guerrila fighters among servicemen at South Africa's military camps. Attractive conditions were being offered"to the recruits including complete or partial substitution for compulsory military training in South Africa. 42/ 39/ Ibid., 25 November 1972. 40/ South African Digest (Pretoria), 20 July 1973. 41/ Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 30 October 1972. 42/ Ibid., 2 March 1973.