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Nuclear “Pork” Revisited: Organizational Imperatives and Nuclear Weapon Program

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Nuclear “Pork” Revisited: Organizational Imperatives and Nuclear Weapon Program Abandonment by Simon Palamar A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Affairs. Carleton University Ottawa, Canada © 2016 Simon Palamar Abstract Since 1941 at least 30 countries have conducted nuclear weapon activities. Over two- thirds of those countries have abandoned their nuclear weapon activities as a matter of policy, making nuclear abandonment the dominant historical tendency. Understanding why countries abandon their nuclear weapon activities holds the promise of allowing policy makers to improve efforts to control the spread of nuclear arms around the world. This dissertation offers a novel explanation for nuclear abandonment. It draws from the literature about bureaucracy and foreign policy to argue that the narrow imperatives of the organizations that conduct nuclear weapon activities can actually make nuclear weapon program abandonment more – rather than less – likely. This stands in stark contrast to the conventional wisdom about bureaucratic imperatives and nuclear weapons, which is that bureaucratic organizations, such as nuclear science agencies and militaries, push governments to acquire nuclear arms. In contrast to that prevailing wisdom, this thesis explains why some of the organizations that governments have charged with executing national nuclear weapon policies face weak incentives to act as nuclear bomb lobbyists. Thus, bureaucratic or organizational imperatives do not only work in favour of nuclear proliferation. They can also work in favour of nuclear abandonment by contributing to a policy environment that makes nuclear abandonment more likely. While there are many explanations for why countries abandon their nuclear weapon activities, most explanations are only substantiated by small, non-random data samples. This dissertation offers a generalizable and probabilistic explanation for nuclear abandonment, and substantiates its theoretical claims with large-N multivariate regressions that use an original data set that covers approximately 670 country-year observations and that exploits natural variation in the types of organizations that have conducted nuclear weapon activities. The large-N empirics are supplemented with two case studies of nuclear weapon policy in Switzerland (1945-1988) and South Africa (1969-1993). ii Acknowledgements I would like to thank and acknowledge the contributions of several people. It must be said that I am indebted to Trevor Findlay for his wisdom, guidance, encouragement, patience and professionalism. This dissertation would not be complete if it were not for him, and there is no one I could replace him with. Thank you. Dane Rowlands provided me with invaluable guidance as well and always pushed me to refine the analysis in chapter four. I am confident that this thesis is better for it. Fen Osler Hampson has been a wonderful professional mentor and a very understanding and flexible boss over the last few years. Likewise, Brenda Woods has been the sort of colleague everyone hopes for, and who has always supported me in this endeavour. Jeffrey Knopf provided some great suggestions on an earlier version of the thesis, which have made their way into the final draft. I’d also like to thank Jeremy Littlewood for his kind words and constructive criticism, and Martin Malin and Brian Schmidt for their contributions to the late stages of this effort. Patricia Lacroix deserves special mention for shepherding me for several years and making sure I don’t wander too far afield. Karen Howard and Norean Shepherd have also always given me a hand navigating the bureaucracy at Carleton. I sincerely appreciate it. I’d like to thank Jean Daudelin (for his gentle encouragement) and David Long (for his firm encouragement). Eric Jardine and Stephanie Soiffer have been great and supportive friends throughout this process. Peter Loveridge has been an excellent study partner and has always been a willing academic sparring partner. My parents – Ann and Gary – and my brother Max are all that I could ask for. Ann and Gary encouraged me as a child to be curious, explore the world, and to always strive to be better. Thank you. Max, thank you for letting me bounce ideas and problems off your mind and know that I’m very proud of you. I would also like to thank Rosemary and Keith for their support throughout the last several years. Katharine is my lodestar who keeps me on the straight and narrow. I could not have done this without her and I cannot properly express my gratitude to her on this page. Finally, BFC, GS, and J are three fine fellows who all deserve a nod. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract........................................................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents........................................................................................................................................... iv List of Tables ................................................................................................................................................. vi List of Illustrations........................................................................................................................................ vii List of Appendices ........................................................................................................................................ vii List of Acronyms ......................................................................................................................................... viii 1 INTRODUCTION – WHY DO COUNTRIES END THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPON ACTIVITIES? 1 1.1 WHAT IS A NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAM? WHAT IS NUCLEAR ABANDONMENT? ............................... 4 1.1.1 Nuclear Weapon Activities and “Paper Studies” ........................................................................... 5 1.1.2 Nuclear Abandonment: Basic Data .............................................................................................. 10 1.2. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT NUCLEAR ABANDONMENT AND WHAT DOES THIS STUDY CONTRIBUTE? .................................................................................................................................................................. 13 1.3 THREE TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPON ORGANIZATIONS ...................................................................... 15 1.3.1 Defining “Government Organization” ......................................................................................... 15 1.3.2 Characterizing Nuclear Weapon Organizations ........................................................................... 18 1.4 CENTRAL ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................... 25 1.5 GOALS AND SCOPE .............................................................................................................................. 26 1.6 CORRELATION, CAUSATION, METHODS, AND NUCLEAR ABANDONMENT ........................................... 28 1.7 OUTLINE – WHAT IS TO COME ............................................................................................................ 31 2 LITERATURE REVIEW – WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT NUCLEAR ABANDONMENT? ... 34 2.1 NUCLEAR ABANDONMENT .................................................................................................................. 35 2.2 “TRADITIONAL” INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS EXPLANATIONS FOR NUCLEAR ABANDONMENT .......... 40 2.2.1 Security, Power and Realist Explanations ................................................................................... 42 2.2.2 Domestic Politics ......................................................................................................................... 52 2.2.3 Norms and Individual Psychology .............................................................................................. 56 2.2.4 Bureaucracies and Managers as Determinants of Nuclear Success and Failure ......................... 71 2.2.5 Other Theoretical Approaches .................................................................................................... 81 2.3 NUCLEAR ABANDONMENT AND EMPIRICAL METHODS: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES ..................... 84 2.4 A CATALOGUE OF NUCLEAR ABANDONMENT CAUSES ........................................................................ 91 3 ORGANIZATIONAL IMPERATIVES AND NUCLEAR ABANDONMENT ................................ 95 3.1 HOW DO ORGANIZATIONAL IMPERATIVES AFFECT POLICY MAKING? ............................................... 98 3.1.1 Nuclear Policy-Making: Ultimately an Executive Decision ...................................................... 101 3.1.2 Bureaucratic Interests and Nuclear Weapons ............................................................................ 104 3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL IMPERATIVES AND NUCLEAR ABANDONMENT .................................................... 108 3.3 A HYPOTHESIS ABOUT ORGANIZATIONAL IMPERATIVES AND NUCLEAR ABANDONMENT ................ 114 3.3.1 Nuclear Weapon Organizations ................................................................................................. 123 3.3.2 The Role of the Executive Branch ............................................................................................
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