White South Africa and Defence 1960-1968: Militarization, Threat Perceptions and Counter Strategies

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White South Africa and Defence 1960-1968: Militarization, Threat Perceptions and Counter Strategies Town The copyright of this thesis rests with the University of Cape Town. No quotation from it or information derivedCape from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of theof source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only. University WHITE SOUTH AFRICA AND DEFENCE 1960-1968: MILITARIZATION, THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND COUNTER STRATEGIES By RODNEY WARWICK wrwrod001 Town Dissertation/thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy Cape Department of ofHistorical Studies Faculty of Humanities University of Cape Town 2009 University This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, or other people has been attributed, and been cited and referenced. SIGNED DATE 2 Contents Abstract pages 3-4 Preface pages 5-8 List of Illustrations pages 9-10 Introduction pages 11-32 PART ONE: THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND COUNTER STRATEGIES Chapter 1: South African defence and political contexts during the early 1960s Town pages 33-83 Chapter 2: Commandant General Rudolf Hiemstra and senior SADF leadership pages 84-153 Cape Chapter 3: SADF threat perceptions: 1960of to 1966 pages 154-229 Chapter 4: SADF counter strategies by 1968 pages 230-286 PART TWO: THE MILITARIZATION OF WHITE SOUTH AFRICA Chapter 5: The SADF and Afrikaners pages 287-334 University Chapter 6: The SADF and English-speakers pages 335-404 Chapter 7: White South African mobilization for the SADF pages 405-443 Conclusion pages 444-468 List of Sources pages 469-494 Illustrations pages 495-506 3 Abstract This thesis is concerned with the militarization of white South African society in the 1960s. It argues that the military threat perceptions of the period were crucial in altering white views of the South African Defence Force (SADF) and reinforcing support for the National Party government. The military achieved enhanced public status within civil society as the state‟s supposed bulwark. A range of purported potential threats, both internal and external and regularly reported in the media, were investigated by the SADF in response to Afro-Asian bloc spokespersons calling for international military intervention against white South Africa to end apartheid. TownThe government tried to persuade voters that such dangers were authentic, so justifying increased military expenditure and support. The SADF plannedCape clandestine counter strategies, most particularly in the defence of Walvis Bayof in Namibia, upgrading obsolete air and other defences and connecting threats to potential aggressors, including India because of events in Katanga in the former Belgian Congo and the idea of an “African Army”, implausibly advancing on South Africa. The SADF widened conscription from a ballot system to all white male schoolUniversity leavers by 1968. World War Two issues influenced the attitudes of both the Afrikaans and English white communities to militarization in the 1960s. The SADF was important in bolstering white confidence and through deliberate public displays of military prowess, it helped to assert republican unity and “white nationalism” under Afrikaner leadership, though young males who were balloted applied in significant numbers for exemption on study or 4 professional grounds. The army also developed a reputation for ill-treating conscripts, something investigated in haste by the Minister of Defence concerned for the SADF‟s image amongst a community drawn increasingly more to materialism than patriotism. Paradoxically while the white public viewed “communism” or “communist-inspired” activities as its biggest “danger”, the SADF only partly organised its conventional warfare capacity, and such “threats” dissipated in favour of General Charles Fraser‟s theorising on revolutionary war, shifting SADF doctrine. Drawing on previously classified archival documentation, and numerous surviving Permanent Force officers from the era were interviewed, the thesis argues that the assumption of white South Africans in the 1960s that their survival required acquiescenceTown to insipient militarization and government racial policy, with the alternative subjection to possible Congo-type disintegration, shaped the SADF‟s public profile.Cape of University 5 Preface This doctoral dissertation has been a lengthy project that I first embarked upon by beginning research in earnest during January 2005. Virtually all of the subsequent archival visits, library work and writing, was fitted into school holidays between my history teaching duties at Bishops (Diocesan College) in Rondebosch, Cape Town. After four years, I have attempted to draw together the results of my efforts in discussing chosen aspects of the South African Defence Force and white South African society during the 1960s. As is proper when prefacing such a thesis, I would like to express my gratitude to the numerous people to whom I am in debt for theTown assistance I received from them in completing this work. Cape Heading the list must be my supervisor Associateof Professor Christopher Saunders of the University of Cape Town (UCT) Historical Studies Department, who has been a most patient and ever available reference for critical advice, expertise, encouragement and practical help. I am most grateful to him. As always, with a work of historical research, there are numerous archival and library staff to thank. I must make special mention of Steve de ArgrelaUniversity and Louisa Jooste of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) Visagie Street, Pretoria archives, who were always helpful during my visits; particularly in their ensuring documents were declassified speedily for my use. Mrs Esta Jones of the Archive for Contemporary Affairs at the University of Free State, Bloemfontein made timesaving arrangements for my obtaining the Fouché Papers. In London, my old friend Alistair McKechnie, formally of Cape Town, gave his time in 6 obtaining, copying and dispatching to me documentation from the Kew-based National Archives. Other archivists at the (Pretoria-based) National Archives, United Party archives at UNISA, the staff at the UCT African Studies Library, and the Cape Town branch of National Library of South Africa, all deserve a collective gesture of my sincere thanks. Janis Van Tonder, librarian at the Bishops Molteno Library allowed me the liberty of having out books stretching over extraordinary periods. Paul Mayers of the Bishops information technology staff generously gave of his time to assist in my correctly formatting the final examination draft. Commander „Mac‟ Bisset passed across to me some importantTown secondary source material and along with Major Tony Gordon, assisted in facilitating my interviewing several individuals pertinent to my research. Between 2004Cape and 2008, the Cape Town branch of the South African Military History Societyof granted me the opportunity to give three illustrated presentations on aspects of my dissertation. These were also most useful occasions to receive constructive comments and criticism from the Society‟s members. I also need to thank the management of my employer Bishops who authorized financial assistance for myUniversity student registration at UCT during the past four years. Bishops also assisted in covering some of the costs pertaining to my attendance at academic conferences, specifically the biennial Southern African Historical Society conference held at UCT in June 2005, where I delivered a paper entitled: The South African Military under Verwoerd: SADF Popularisation amongst the White Community, 1960-66. I also received financial assistance from Bishops to attend a military history conference at the 7 South African Military Academy in Saldanha during September 2006, where I gave a presentation on the “White and Black African Nationalism and the SADF, 1960-66”. The University of Stellenbosch History Department kindly granted me the opportunity in September 2006 to do a presentation on: “The SADF and White South Africa, 1960 to 1966”; allowing my testing some assertions before their history students and staff. Many other individuals assisted with the source gathering process by dispatching relevant material or putting me in touch with people whom I sought to interview. I could never record every deserving name, but I do hope this short summary is accepted as a sincere expression of my gratitude to all. Town Over the past four years, I communicated with a significant number of former SADF members. Some were ex-conscripts who had respondedCape to my press appeals. My thanks must be recorded to many that emailed ofor posted letters detailing their experiences. However particular gratitude should be expressed to those with whom I regularly communicated by telephone or email - former SADF Permanent Force and Citizen Force personnel who had been middle-ranking and junior officers during the 1960s. I must single out Lieutenant Generals Ian Gleeson and Jack Dutton, who not only spent significant time discussingUniversity their recollections of the period with me, but also dispatched written accounts. They also assisted in referring me to many of their former colleagues. Deserving also particular mention is General Magnus Malan; he and his wife invited me to visit at their home and his explanations of the period where most insightful. Rear Admiral Chris Bennett assisted with technical questions concerning the navy, as did 8 Brigadier
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