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Arhivele Sfera Politicii STELIAN TĂNASE EDITORIAL Lavinia Stan, Diane Vancea 2008 ALEGERI ŞI Sfera SCHIMBARE POLITICĂ Alexandru Radu Dan Pavel Adrian Cioroianu Politicii Daniel Buti REVISTĂ DE ŞTIINŢE POLITICE ŞI DE TEORIE POLITICĂ Irina Bujder EDITATĂ DE FUNDAŢIA SOCIETATEA CIVILĂ Ioana Paverman Adrian Spirchez SEMN DE ÎNTREBARE Interviu cu Caterine Durandin Interviu cu Michael Shafir ARHIVA Stelian Tănase ESEU Cecilia Tohăneanu Amanda Bosovcki POLITICĂ EXTERNĂ Irina Zamfirescu Iulia Serafimescu, [Daumier 1808-1879, Honore] SFERA POLITICII • Numărul 131-132 2009 Octavian Manea RECENZII Adrian Grama Virgil Iordache Nicolae Drăguşin George Vişan NUMĂRUL 131-132 2008 ANUL XVII Alegeri şi schimbare politică ISSN: 1221-6720 2009 Sfera Politicii este prima revistă EDITORIAL BOARD de ştiinţă şi teorie politică apărută Călin Anastasiu în România, după căderea comunismului. Revista apare fără Daniel Chirot întrerupere din 1992. Dennis Deletant Sfera Politicii a jucat şi joacă un rol important în difuzarea principalelor Anneli Ute Gabanyi teme de ştiinţă şi teorie politică Gail Kligman şi în constituirea şi dezvoltarea unei reflecţii politologice viabile Vladimir Tismăneanu în peisajul ştiinţific şi cultural din G. M. Tamas România. Sfera Politicii pune la îndemâna cercetătorilor, a oamenilor politici DIRECTOR şi a publicului, analize, comentarii Stelian Tănase şi studii de specialitate, realizate pe baza paradigmelor teoretice şi metodologice ale ştiinţei şi teoriei REDACTOR ŞEF politice actuale. Romulus Brâncoveanu Sfera Politicii îşi face o misiune din contribuţia la consolidarea şi dezvoltarea societăţii democratice şi SECRETAR GENERAL DE REDACŢIE de piaţă în România. Şerban Drăgulin REDACŢIE Alexandru Radu Cecilia Tohăneanu Ana Bulai Daniel Buti Ioana Paverman Nicolae Draguşin Marius Braşovean Revistă editată de: TEHNOREDACTOR Liviu Stoica Fundaţia Societatea Civilă [email protected] [email protected] Apare lunar http://www.sferapoliticii.ro Sfera Politicii NUMĂRUL 131-132, ANUL XVII, ianuarie-februarie 2009 Editorial Alegerile parlamentare din 2008: Vin vechi în sticle noi .....................................................3 Lavinia Stan, Diane Vancea 2008 Alegeri şi schimbare politică Reformă sau experiment electoral? ....................................................................................14 Alexandru Radu Noul Sistem. Cercetare asupra noilor tendinţe din sistemul de partide şi sistemul politic din România postcomunistă .....................................................................................22 Dan Pavel Un guvern improbabil, imposibil şi ultra-majoritar ...........................................................29 Adrian Cioroianu Alegerile parlamentare 2008 ..............................................................................................36 Daniel Buti Schimbarea politică şi schimbarea administrativă .............................................................42 Irina Bujder Noua guvernare şi repersonalizarea puterii ......................................................................48 Ioana Paverman Trădarea generoşilor – note despre social democraţia românească.................................55 Adrian Spirchez Semn de întrebare ........................................................................................................60 Arhiva Arhivele „Sfera Polticii” .......................................................................................................63 Stelian Tănase Eseu Lege şi moralitate..................................................................................................................71 Cecilia Tohăneanu Administraţia publică din România între europenizare şi rezistenţă la schimbare .........76 Amanda Bosovcki Politică externă Schimbarea strict nominală a mandatului prezidenţial rus.............................................. 89 Irina Zamfirescu Schimbarea numită Obama ............................................................................................... 103 Iulia Serafimescu, Octavian Manea Recenzii Ce fel de stat este Uniunea Europeană?............................................................................ 111 Adrian Grama Pentru un decizionism altruist ............................................................................................114 Virgil Iordache Despre imigraţie, islamism şi relevanţa politică a confuziei semantice ...........................118 Nicolae Drăguşin Problema puterii americane la începutul secolului 21 ......................................................123 George Vişan Index de autori ..............................................................................................................127 Editorial Alegerile parlamentare din 2008: Vin vechi în sticle noi LAVINIA STAN şi DIANE VANCEA a 30 noiembrie 2008, Româ- Lnia a organizat cel de-al şa- selea scrutin general după căderea regimului comunist. Deşi dez- baterile din campania electorală nu au In the 2008 parliamentary privit provocările majore ale acestei ţări elections, Romania for the first şi, asemeni alegerilor anterioare, preşe- time used a variant of the dintele în exerciţiu a dominat toţi can- majoritarian system to translate didaţii electorali, aceste alegeri au fost votes into seats. Despite hopes importante din alte puncte de vedere. that the new electoral system will Dacă până în 2004 alegerile parlamen- facilitate significant elite changes tare au fost organizate împreună cu and correct for the shortcomings cele prezidenţiale, acum, pentru prima of the previously-used dată, electoratul a votat doar candidaţii proportional representation, the pentru Parlament, alegerile prezidenţi- majoritarian system ale fiind programate pentru 2009. Dacă („uninominal”, as it is called in până în 2004 România a folosit repre- Romania) proved to have more zentarea proporţională, acum, pentru disadvantages than advantages. prima dată, a pus în practică sistemul This article discusses the changes „uninominal”1. Dacă alegerile din 1996, brought about by the new 2000 şi 2004 au permis alternarea pute- electoral system, the election rii, acum s-a anticipat că învingătorii results for the Chamber of alegerilor anterioare, Partidul Demo- Deputies and the Senate, and the crat Liberal (PD-L) şi Partidul Naţional formation of the new coalition Liberal (PNL) din defuncta Alianţă pen- cabinet. tru Dreptate şi Adevăr (DA), vor păstra puterea. Dacă până în 2004 regula ne- scrisă a fost ca preşedintele să-l numeas- 1 Pentru simplitate vom denumi noul sis- tem electoral românesc „uninominal”, deşi nu se comportă ca uninominalele altor ţări şi este foarte similar reprezentării pro por- ţionale anterioare. El a mai introdus un Keywords: nivel de calcul matematic şi a permis elec- toratului să voteze persoane, nu partide. 2008 Romanian parliamentary elections, Însă aşa cum demonstrăm, partidele încă majoritarian system, proportional determină votul într-o mai mare masură representation, elite change decât persoanele. Sfera Politicii 131-132 3 că ca premier pe liderul partidului/coaliţiei câştigătoare, acum, pentru prima dată, preşedintele a anunţat că va desemna persoana pe care o va dori, indiferent de re- zultatul voturilor (desigur, dacă nici un partid nu va obţine o majoritate absolută). În plus, acestea au fost primele alegeri generale organizate după aderarea Români- ei la Uniunea Europeană (UE) şi în care numeroasa diasporă românească a desemnat doi senatori şi patru deputaţi. Schimbările electorale Constituţia din 1991 identifică România drept o republică semi-prezidenţială în care preşedintele este ales direct de către electorat pentru maximum două man- date de câte patru ani1. Membrii Parlamentului bicameral au fost aleşi printr-un sis- tem electoral de reprezentare proporţională cu liste de partid închise şi prag electo- ral naţional de 5%. Pentru minorităţile etnice care nu puteau obţine reprezentare parlamentară au fost rezervate mandate de deputaţi (la început 15, apoi 18), excep- ţie făcând comunitatea maghiară, care a putut trece pragul naţional în toate scruti- nurile post-communiste. Acest sistem electoral îi făcea pe candidaţii aleşi dependenţi de conducerea partidului, de voinţa şi capriciul căreia depindea includerea lor pe listele electorale, mai mult decât de circumscripţia electorală. Deputaţii şi senatorii au promovat mai des problemele naţionale decât problemele comunităţilor locale, susţinând propu- neri legislative în virtutea disciplinei de partid, chiar şi atunci când acestea nu erau benefice circumscripţiilor lor. Sistemul a permis unor personaje dubioase (oameni de afaceri implicaţi în privatizări la limita legii, politicieni corupţi şi foşti securişti) să câştige imunitate parlamentară. Liderii de partide, la rândul lor, au format clientele extinse controlând includerile pe liste, în timp ce „persoane care meritau să se afle pe liste au fost adesea înlocuite cu rudele, prietenii şi clienţii liderilor de partid”2. Cum accentul cădea pe partidele politice, adesea electorii nu ştiau numele candida- ţilor incluşi pe liste în poziţii eligibile. Acest lucru a dus la apatie electorală generală şi lipsă de încredere în Parlament. După 2004, puterea liberală şi democrată a lansat reforme electorale pentru reînnoirea elitei politice. Primii 15 ani de tranziţie au evidenţiat deficitul democratic al României: elite politice preocupate de interesele lor personale mai mult decât de binele comun; politicieni care au migrat fără jenă de la un partid la altul, traversând linii ideologice şi politice numai pentru a-şi prelungi carierele politice; corupţie şi clientelism
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