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Federal Security Service (Russia) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search This article may need to be rewritten entirely to comply with Wikipedia's quality standards. You can help. The discussion page may contain suggestions. (February 2013) The neutrality of this article is disputed. Relevant discussion may be found on the talk page. Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved. (February 2013) Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation 'Федеральная служба безопасности Российской Федерации' Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii Common name Federal Security Service Abbreviation FSB (ФСБ) Emblem of the Federal Security Service Agency overview Formed 12 April, 1995 Preceding agency KGB Employees around 200,000–300,000[1] Legal personality Governmental: Government agency Jurisdictional structure Federal agency Russia General nature Federal law enforcement Civilian agency Operational structure Headquarters Lubyanka Square, Moscow, Russia Website www.fsb.ru The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) (Russian: ФСБ, Федеральная служба безопасности Российской Федерации; Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii) is the main domestic security agency of the Russian Federation and the main successor agency of the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB). Its main responsibilities are counter-intelligence, internal and border security, counter-terrorism, and surveillance. Its headquarters are on Lubyanka Square, downtown Moscow. The direct predecessor of the FSB was the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK). On 12 April 1995, President Boris Yeltsin signed a law ordering a reorganisation of the FSK, which resulted in the creation of the FSB. In 2003, the FSB's responsibilities were widened with the integration of the Border Guard Service and a major part of the abolished Federal Agency of Government Communication and Information (FAPSI). The FSB was made subordinate to the Ministry of Justice by presidential decree on 9 March 2004.[2] The Director of FSB, since 2008, is Aleksandr Bortnikov. According to the federal law, the FSB is considered a military service just like the Armed Forces, MVD Internal Troops, FSO, SVR, FSKN and EMERCOM's civil defence.Contents [hide] 1 Overview 2 History 2.1 Initial reorganization of the KGB 2.2 Creation of the FSB 2.3 Role in the Second Chechen War 2.4 The Putin reforms 2.5 The fight against terrorism 2.6 Increased terrorism and expansion of the FSB's powers 3 Role 3.1 Counterintelligence 3.2 Counter-terrorism 3.3 Targeted killing 3.4 Border protection 3.5 Export control 3.6 Intimidation of foreign diplomats and journalists 4 Organization 4.1 Directors of the FSB 5 Criticism 6 See also 7 References 8 External links 8.1 Profiles [edit] Overview The FSB is responsible for internal security of the Russian state, counterespionage, and the fight against organized crime, terrorism, and drug smuggling. Since 2003, when the Federal Border Guards Service was incorporated to the FSB, it has also been responsible for overseeing border security.[1] The FSB is engaged mostly in domestic affairs, while espionage duties are responsibility of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. However, the FSB also includes the FAPSI agency, which conducts electronic surveillance abroad. All law enforcement and intelligence agencies in Russia work under the guidance of FSB, if needed.[1] The FSB combines functions and powers similar to those exercised by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Federal Protective Service, the Secret Service, the National Security Agency (NSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, United States Coast Guard, and Drug Enforcement Administration. The FSB employs about 66,200 uniformed staff, including about 4,000 special forces troops. It also employs about 160,000–200,000 border guards.[1] [edit] History [edit] Initial reorganization of the KGB The FSB headquarters at Lubyanka Square The Federal Security Service is one of the successor organisations of the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and following the attempted coup of 1991—in which some KGB units as well as the head Vladimir Kryuchkov played a major part—the KGB was dismantled and ceased to exist from November 1991.[3][4] In December 1991, two organisations were created from the remnants of the KGB: Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and Federal Counter-Intelligence Agency (FAPSI). In January 1992 another new institution, the Ministry of Security took over domestic and border security responsibilities.[5] Following the 1993 coup attempt against President Boris Yeltsin, the Ministry of Security was reorganized on 21 December 1993 into the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service (FSK). The FSK was headed by Sergei Stepashin. Before the start of the main military activities of the First Chechen War the FSK was responsible for the covert operations against the separatists led by Dzhokhar Dudayev.[1] [edit] Creation of the FSB FSB medal for "distinguished military service". The FSB had overall command of the federal forces in Chechnya in 2001–2003 In 1995, the FSK was renamed and reorganized into the Federal Security Service (FSB) by the Federal Law of 3 April 1995, "On the Organs of the Federal Security Service in the Russian Federation".[6] The FSB reforms were rounded out by decree No. 633, signed by Boris Yeltsin on 23 June 1995. The decree made the tasks of the FSB more specific, giving the FSB substantial rights to conduct cryptographic work, and described the powers of the FSB director. The number of deputy directors was increased to 8: 2 first deputies, 5 deputies responsible for departments and directorates and 1 deputy director heading the Moscow City and Moscow regional directorate. Yeltsin appointed Colonel-General Mikhail Ivanovich Barsukov as the new director of the FSB. In 1998 Yeltsin appointed as director of the FSB Vladimir Putin, a KGB veteran who would later succeed Yeltsin as federal president.[7] Putin was reluctant to take over the directorship, but once appointed conducted a thorough reorganisation, which included the dismissal of most of the FSB's top personnel.[1] Putin appointed Nikolai Patrushev as the head of FSB in 1999.[5] [edit] Role in the Second Chechen War Memorial service for FSB special forces servicemen who were killed in Chechnya in March 2000 After the main military offensive of the Second Chechen War ended and the separatists changed tactics to guerilla warfare, overall command of the federal forces in Chechnya was transferred from the military to the FSB in January 2001. While the army lacked technical means of tracking the guerilla groups, the FSB suffered from insufficient human intelligence due its inability to build networks of agents and informants. In the autumn of 2002, the separatists launched a massive campaign of terrorism against the Russian civilians, including the Dubrovka theatre attack. The inability of the federal forces to conduct efficient counter-terrorist operations led to the government to transfer the responsibility of "maintaining order" in Chechnya from the FSB to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) in July 2003.[8] [edit] The Putin reforms President Putin meeting with Director of FSB Nikolai Patrushev on 9 August 2000 After becoming President, Vladimir Putin launched a major reorganisation of the agency. First, the FSB was placed under direct control of the President by a decree issued on 17 May 2000.[5] Internal structure of the agency was reformed by a decree signed on 17 June 2000. In the resulting structure, the FSB was to have a director, a first deputy director and nine other deputy directors, including one state secretary and the chiefs of six departments: Economic Security Department, Counterintelligence Department, Organizational and Personnel Service, Department of activity provision, Department for Analysis, Forecasting and Strategic Planning, Department for Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight against Terrorism. In 2003, the agency's responsibilities were considerably widened. The Border Guard Service of Russia, with its staff of 210,000, was integrated to the FSB via a decree was signed on 11 March 2003. The merger was completed by 1 July 2003. In addition, The Federal Agency of Government Communication and Information (FAPSI) was abolished and the FSB was granted a major part of its functions, while other parts went to the Ministry of Defense.[5] Among the reasons for this strengthening of the FSB were enhanced need for security of after increased terror attacks against Russian civilians starting from the Moscow theater hostage crisis; the need to end the permanent infighting between the FSB, FAPSI and the Border Guards due to their overlapping functions and the need for more efficient response to migration, drug trafficking and illegal arms trading. It has also been pointed out, that the FSB was the only power base of the new president, and the restructuring therefore strengthened Putin's position (see Political groups under Vladimir Putin's presidency).[5] On 28 June 2004 in a speech to high-ranking FSB officers, Putin emphasized three major tasks of the agency: neutralizing foreign espionage, safeguarding economic and financial security of the country and combating organized crime.[5] In September 2006, the FSB was shaken by a major reshuffle, which, combined with some earlier reassignments (most remarkably, those of FSB Deputy
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