Afghan Narcotrafficking The State of Afghanistan’s Borders Afghan Narcotrafficking The State of Afghanistan’s Borders

Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking

April 2015

Principal Author:

George Gavrilis Visiting Scholar, Institute for Religion, Culture and Public Life (IRCPL), Columbia University Author of The Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries

Contributors:

Vladimir Ivanov Director, Branch in the Russian Federation, EastWest Institute

Marlene Laruelle Research Professor of International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University Director, Central Asia Program, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University

Austin Long Assistant Professor, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University

David Mansfield Independent Consultant

Ivan Safranchuk Associate Professor, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) Editor in Chief, Great Game: Politics, Business, Security in Central Asia

Konstantin Sorokin Adviser, Department of Education and Science, International Training and Methodology Centre for Financial Monitoring (ITMCFM) Adviser, State Civil Service of the Russian Federation, Third Class

Ekaterina Stepanova Head, Peace and Conflict Studies Unit, Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)

Project Director:

David Firestein Perot Fellow and Vice President, Strategic Trust-Building Initiative and Track 2 Diplomacy, EastWest Institute

Expert Group Coordinators:

Vladimir Ivanov Director, Branch in the Russian Federation, EastWest Institute

Euhwa Tran Program Associate, Strategic Trust-Building Initiative, EastWest Institute _

This publication was made possible in part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author and contributors. the state of afghanistan’s borders 5

Affairs Cory Welt Cory on our work. David Johnson David Ilnur Batyrshin Georgy Zazulin Georgy Kimberly Marten Acknowledgements to sustain the entire project. project. the entire sustain to publication process for this report. this report. for process publication Russian Representative, European Cities Against Drugs Drugs Against Cities European Representative, Russian New York, whose generous support enabled this report and continues and continues support enabled this report generous whose York, New Associate Professor at the Chair of Conflictology, St. Petersburg University University Petersburg St. Conflictology, at the Chair of Professor Associate stakeholders who took the time to share with us their thoughts and feedback and feedback us their thoughts with share the time to took who stakeholders group who generously offered his/her expertise to this project and to the many many to the and to this project expertise his/her offered who generously group We would especially like to thank the following working group members for their their for members group working thank the following to like especially would We Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University Washington The George Affairs, International of Elliott School Studies, Building Initiative, for his indispensable assistance in managing the research and in managing the research assistance his indispensable for Building Initiative, Response Fund and the Kathryn Davis Peace Initiative for their sponsorship of this of their sponsorship for Initiative Peace Davis and the Kathryn Fund Response We would also like to express our profound gratitude to the following individuals at the following to gratitude our profound express to like also would We Nell Crumbley, Hadi Khan, Nadia Mansoor, Jessica Meredith, Caitlin Vaka, Erilia Wu Wu Erilia Vaka, Caitlin Meredith, Jessica Nadia Mansoor, Khan, Hadi Nell Crumbley, Finally, we wish to convey our deep thanks to our financial sponsors who made this our financial sponsors to our deep thanks convey wish to we Finally, invaluable early input during the process of conceptualizing and drafting this report: this report: and drafting conceptualizing of input during the process early invaluable and Cathy Zhu. In particular, special thanks go to Andi Zhou, of EWI’s Strategic Trust- Strategic EWI’s of Zhou, Andi to go special thanks In particular, Zhu. and Cathy experts and officials in Russia, the United States, Afghanistan and other key regional key and other Afghanistan States, the United Russia, and officials in experts EWI who provided critical note-taking, editorial and research support: Joel Alexander, Alexander, Joel support: and research editorial note-taking, critical who provided EWI Ann Whitney Olin Professor of Political Science, Barnard College, Columbia University Columbia College, Barnard Science, Political of Olin Professor Whitney Ann Former Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Enforcement and Law Narcotics International for State of Secretary Assistant Former report. Above all else, our most heartfelt gratitude goes to the Carnegie Corporation of of the Carnegie Corporation to goes gratitude heartfelt our most all else, Above report. Head, Research Center, Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation (FSKN) Federation the Russian of Service Control Drug Federal Center, Research Head, report and project possible. Our sincere appreciation goes to the John B. Hurford Rapid Rapid Hurford John B. the to goes appreciation sincere Our possible. and project report We at the EastWest Institute (EWI) are deeply indebted to every member of the working the working member of every to indebted deeply are (EWI) Institute at the EastWest We Associate Director and Research Professor, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Eurasian and Russian European, for Institute Professor, Research and Director Associate s order s b n’ sta ni e of a fgh a t he stat

6 the state of afghanistan’s borders 7 8 14 21 16 18 10 37 25 23 26 20 30 ontents c Tajikistan’s Border with Afghanistan with Border Tajikistan’s Afghanistan with Border Uzbekistan’s Afghanistan with Border Turkmenistan’s Conclusion and Recommendations Conclusion Endnotes Acronyms Introduction The Shaky Architecture of Afghanistan’s Borders Afghanistan’s of Architecture The Shaky Management Border Afghan and on Counternarcotics Cooperation U.S.-Russia Alone at It Going Afghanistan: with and the Border Iran Line with the Durand The Problem Afghanistan: with Border Pakistan’s Trade: and the Drug Neighbors Asian Central Afghanistan’s Approaches Three Countries, Three Introduction

Regional ef- forts to assist Afghanistan are flounder- ing, and the international number of ministers, ambassadors lateral efforts against the cultivation of poppy community and special representatives from Af- and trafficking of Afghan opiates and heroin. Aghanistan and its neighboring countries The members of the working group recognize still struggles gathered to discuss how to enhance regional that much remains to be done if Afghanistan’s to fight the cooperation at an informal ministerial-level borders are to be strengthened on all sides to meeting on the outskirts of Paris in Decem- better respond to the trafficking of narcotics. growing ber 2008. Kai Eide, then the United Nations cultivation and secretary general’s special representative on In Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Afghanistan, said that regional cooperation Assessment, the working group compre- trafficking of had been slow to materialize and that there hensively outlined the threats Afghan heroin opium. was a great need to identify initiatives that poses to Russia, the United States and the were attainable and of a “win-win” nature. broader international community. Among Officials from the Central Asian Republics, other findings, the report noted that efforts Iran, Pakistan, Russia, the United States and to interdict narcotics along Afghanistan’s other countries shared their thoughts on how borders have fallen far below their potential. to better cooperate at the regional level and In Afghan Narcotrafficking: Post-2014 Sce- agreed to follow up on a number of critical narios, working group members presented issues. Headlining the list was the desire to future scenarios for the security, economic s work more closely to strengthen border po- and political environment in Afghanistan lice and counternarcotics efforts. and the consequences for the fight against

order Afghan opiates and heroin. Concurrent with Over six years after the Paris meeting, re- these efforts, members of the working group s b

n’ gional efforts to assist Afghanistan are floun- held multiple discussions on the state of bor- dering, and the international community still der management along Afghanistan’s fron-

sta struggles to fight the growing cultivation and tiers and outlined cooperative efforts Russia ni trafficking of opium. As David Mansfield, a and the United States can undertake to assist leading development expert on Afghanistan, counternarcotics initiatives at Afghanistan’s explains, “Policymakers seem to have lost borders. all appetite for talking about the production and trade of opium in Afghanistan. While This follow-up report has two aims. First, it the discussion has thankfully moved past assesses the state of border management the lengthy communiques of earlier inter- along Afghanistan’s boundaries. It focuses on national conferences on Afghanistan, where the border control efforts of Afghanistan and issues were laid out like a shopping list with its neighbors—Iran, Pakistan, and three Cen- e of a fgh a t he stat little sense of priority, little has emerged in its tral Asian countries to the north.2 Although place.”1 the problem of Afghan opiates and heroin ul- 8 timately requires a comprehensive approach, Since 2011, the EastWest Institute (EWI) has the working group recognizes that border convened a number of meetings of the Joint management is an important dimension of U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Nar- counternarcotics strategy and is one that has cotrafficking to discuss ways to construc- not received its fair share of attention and tively and jointly enhance bilateral and multi- resources. The second aim of this report is -

the state of afghanistan’s borders 9 It may be It may for possible and Russian to officials U.S. channels keep - communica of tion open over Afghanistan, their insulate on-the-ground working on relationship counternarcot a keep and ics, of form limited security cooperation in at least alive principle. - - The work The 10 ing group does not expect that future U.S.- Russian cooperation over Afghanistan somehow mend otherwise will bruised relations; the rather, group believes in a more modest It and may be Russian for possible approach. - communica of channels keep to officials U.S. insulate their on- Afghanistan, tion open over the-ground working relationship on counter security of form a limited and keep narcotics, in principle. at least alive cooperation Even this modest cooperation requires that joint effortsU.S.-Russian treadcarefully and avoid each other’s geopolitical sensitivities. is Nowhere this more important than in - Cen tral Asia, particularly in states like Tajikistan, maintain and States the United Russia where a sizeable diplomatic presence and at times pursue Adifferent interests. concluding sec- and cautions these out lays report this in tion makes recommendations on what and the United Russia States can do cooperatively to meet the challenges Afghanistan’s on points exit various the of along narcotrafficking boundaries. the working group has the weathered - broad er - deterioration rela in Moscow-Washington tions, even as the Ukraine crisis has brought bilateral relations to an all-time low. Indeed, the rupture over Russian and Ukraine U.S. towards has affected the willingness policies to cooperate over Afghanistan. Afghanistan was supposed to be one of the key issues on the agenda of the cancelled Sochi G8 the Sum- in opposition great remains there and mit, Defense of Department U.S. to Congress U.S. purchases of Russian helicopters on behalf of Afghan armed forces that would provide tactical air support and potentially assist in traffic. illicit cross-border fighting 6 - - , , - Afghani The ability of 5 Afghanistan’s Afghanistan’s Border 4 Progress also Progress remains insuf 3 8 The spirit of cooperation within cooperation of spirit The 9 World Drug Report 2014 and Russia loses 3 to 5 percent of its 7 Afghan border authorities to deter traffickers traffickers deter to authorities border Afghan - stake international unless decline further will security and border sustained pledge holders Russia’s As a result, 2014. beyond assistance are there Currently, intensify. will crisis heroin 1.7 million opiate users in Russia, making up 68 percent of the country’s drug addicts. sors sors seized by Afghan forces. Police Police (ABP) does not live up to its - interdic tion potential and in 2013 precur and drugs total the accounted of percent 4 mere for a ficientto preventthe importingof precursor used are that anhydride, acetic like chemicals, to process opium into heroin, despite - note worthy seizures by Afghanistan’s authorities in recent years along the country’s frontier regions with Pakistan. Since the inception of the EWI working group group the Since the of working inception EWI in 2011, its members have determined that, on interest compelling and clear a … is “There up stepping in sides U.S. and Russian the both cooperation on drug control in Afghanistan beyond.” and The market value of Afghan heroin circulating circulating heroin Afghan of value market The in Russia is estimated to be a staggering $6 billion, GDP GDP to narcotics, equivalent to the national budget. health The task at hand is According urgent. to the United Nations Office Drugs on (UNODC) and Crime to to propose attainable measures that Russia the combat to take can States United the and trafficking narcoticsof along borders the of Afghanistan. stan accounts for 80 percent of global opium global of 80 percent for accounts stan production and 74 percent opiates of percent 90 over of production; opium global illicit produced in Afghanistan are trafficked out of the country. The Shaky Architecture of Afghanistan’s Borders

Afghanistan’s border guards are stretched very thin, par- ticularly along or much of its history, the Afghan state the lead in training border police and cus- the borders of had a border guard in name only. War- toms authorities at Afghanistan’s ports of en- Central Asian Flords and authorities in frontier areas set try. In 2007, the UNODC launched the Rain- up their own modes of border control, collect- bow Initiative, a series of strategies designed states to the ing customs duties and policing stretches of to deal with growing trafficking problems that north. frontier as they saw fit.11 The flexible and lo- Afghanistan and its neighbors faced along cal approach to border control in the country their mutual borders.13 The Rainbow Initiative was largely a function of its political geogra- built upon UNODC’s much older legacy of en- phy; Afghanistan’s various regions and fron- gagement and assistance to Afghanistan and tier territories had stronger links historically the region, bringing much-needed interna- to the territories of neighboring states than tional attention to Afghanistan’s anemic bor- to one another. Their economic activity and der controls. By 2009, aid to Afghanistan’s social exchange depended on relatively un- borders increased markedly as the United

s hindered cross-border exchange, a factor States took a lead role in training Afghan that contributed to the weakness of the cen- Border Police and in funding state-of-the-art, tral state in Afghanistan and impeded the de- well-equipped border crossings along the

order velopment of a well-functioning border guard border with Pakistan and the Central Asian at the national level. Republics.14 s b n’ In the 1970s and 1980s during the Soviet The increase in border management assis- sta intervention, Afghan officials set up a mili- tance was an admission on two counts: first, ni tary-style border guard with Moscow’s help. the country was woefully unprepared to man- Afghanistan’s Soviet-style border control age its borders; and second, international do- appeared centralized, orderly and functional nors had previously approached the issue in on the surface, but in reality it thinly papered a scattershot way. One International Security over the system of security, tolls and regula- Assistance Force (ISAF) official working in a tions that local strongmen and warlords had Provincial Reconstruction Team in Mazar-e put in place, and these practices were revived Sharif explained that there was little point in during the Afghan civil war in the 1990s.12 training Afghan Border Police on how to inter- cept drugs because they had no training in e of a fgh a t he stat After the ouster of the Taliban, the multilater- arrest methods or firearms use, and the con- al state-building effort in the country neglect- sequences would be disastrous if smugglers 10 ed border assistance, preferring to focus on started shooting at them.15 building up state authority and infrastructure in core territories. Border aid arrived belat- The aid that has come since 2009 was thus edly, only as the security situation in Afghani- an attempt to provide a full gamut of training stan deteriorated. EU-member countries, and infrastructure to improve border man- particularly Germany and Italy, initially took agement. The United States and the Europe- the state of afghanistan’s borders 11 21 Center Center Source: Source: for Naval Naval for Analyses 20 1.5 2.1 1.8 1.3 1.0 4.5 2.9 sq. km sq. ABP ABP per 50 - - 700 3,700 4,000 15,500 23,900 150 1,150 1,700 1,600 4,600 10,900 15,500 Number of forces of Number authorized ABP authorized Current Current number of 137 744 923 1,206 3,023 2,430 5,453 Length of of Length border (km) border 19 border border where Afghanistan’s border guards are in more ample their supply, numbers fall short relative to their - counterparts; Afghani stan stations fewer guards than do Pakistan, bor common their along Uzbekistan and Iran ders. Despite Despite the abundance of assistance in - re cent years, a 2013 assessment by the Department U.S. of Defense Inspector found General that the ABP had achieved very ited lim- progress in building up its The capacity. assessment notes that the come better at coordinating ABP their work with had be- coalition forces in Afghanistan and that the professional development of improved recruits along particular had stretches of bor der (especially the north). It also discovered to services border of in the capacity progress process goods and people and to work with Joint Command at Border their counterparts Centers along (JBCCs) the border with - Paki in this report. later which is discussed stan, the assessment made However, it clear that, on the eve of the of drawdown and U.S. ISAF forces, Afghanistan’s border greatly lacking in many The ABP key factors. police were cooperated little with the army, even when 17 17 As Figure 2 shows, 18 Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan Turkmenistan They have also built border crossings crossings border built also have They Other borders Pakistan Type of border security force security border of Type ABP headquarters staff headquarters ABP points crossing and border at airports ABP Police Customs Afghan below) breakdown (see Police Border Afghan “Green” police customs and border Total Total "Green" Afghan Border Police Border Afghan "Green" Total Figure 1: Current Afghan National Security Forces border and customs security forces, by type by forces, security customs and border Forces National Security Afghan 1: Current Figure 16 Figure 2: “Green” Afghan Border Police by adjacent country adjacent by Police Border Afghan “Green” 2: Figure Afghanistan’s Afghanistan’s border guards are stretched very thin, particularly along the borders Central Asian of states to the north. Along the of number average the Tajikistan, with border border police on patrol is just one for every kilometer of Even border. along stretches of Despite Despite the international ABP are considered to assistance, be understaffed and the The under-resourced. country currently has 23,900 border police, a small proportion of National Afghan of number total 382,000 the Security Forces (ANSF). Current estimates indicate police border that located are 4,000 the well from away at border. headquarters, and barracks for Afghan authorities who staff staff who authorities Afghan for barracks and the borders, with particularly ample funding border. Afghan-Tajik the for Approximately 15,500 are posted to positions positions to posted are 15,500 Approximately border—sections along “green” the so-called ports official between in fall that border the of is people and goods of crossing where entry of generally not permitted. - comprehen more funded both have Union an Police Border Afghan for modules training sive that have increased the professionalism and functionality of a large number of border au- they obstacles logistical the despite thorities, faced. Drug Metric Tons Kilograms Opium 77.45 77,449.83 Heroin 5.31 5,310.25 Morphine 8.36 8,360.03 Hash 63.66 63,662.06 Chemicals 69.11 69,107.44 Alcohol 29.85 29,845.88 Amphetamine 0.02 15.69 Total 253.75 253,751.18

Figure 3: Drug Seizures by Afghan Forces in 2013 Figure 4: Seizures by Afghan Forces in 2013 by Drug Type

Source: dealing with major cross-border threats such In the face of this highly volatile and discour- Government as armed insurgents or traffickers. They aging situation, the United States and a num- of the Islamic Republic of faced funding and procurement shortfalls, ber of other international actors continue to Afghanistan23 and some remote border posts had gone up sponsor training and infrastructure for Af- to five months without resupply. Many re- ghan Border Police to enhance their capacity cruits had not undergone formal intelligence and professionalism.27 training, which is essential to dealing with clandestine cross-border threats and orga- Targeting capacity gaps is only part of the nized crime.22 Given these shortfalls, it is not problem. Even if Afghanistan’s border man- surprising that ABP accounted for only 4 agement institutions improve their ability to percent of drug seizures by Afghan security interdict, it is not clear that Afghan authori- s forces in 2013. (See Figures 3 and 4.) ties have the willingness to do so. Provincial officials and warlords have been implicated Presently, Afghanistan’s border authorities in the drug trade. Key posts in the police and order remain highly fragmented, and their ability to customs services along export routes have

s b manage the border depends on the quality of traditionally been bought and sold for im- n’ provincial leadership rather than the author- mense sums, and some border commanders

sta ity of officials at the Ministry of Interior in Ka- are multimillionaires. Corruption within the

ni bul. Thanks to strong provincial leadership, Afghan Border Police and Afghan Customs Herat and Kunar provinces—respectively Police (ACP) remains a huge problem with no adjoining Iran and Pakistan—have borders solution in sight.28 As one recent investigative that are relatively well run and stable. By con- report found: trast, Farah province’s border authorities are struggling and are outgunned by well-armed In many border provinces government of- drug convoys that tear across the border into ficials and their networks have facilitated Iran.24 The international borders of Badghis the trafficking of narcotic drugs from -Af and Faryab provinces with Turkmenistan are ghanistan. Many claim that the involve-

e of a fgh a t he stat in particularly poor shape; dwindling num- ment of senior government officials in the bers of border police were unable to deter drugs is more serious than the Taliban’s 12 attackers who burned down their posts.25 In own connection with drug cultivation Kandahar, border and security services play and production. Many respondents con- up their counterinsurgency efforts while tak- firmed that most of the officials who are ing active part in illicit cross-border trade.26 deeply involved in illicit drugs in key bor- (See Figure 5.) der provinces are attached to the Afghan- istan Border Police, Afghanistan Customs Drug Metric Tons Kilograms Opium 77.45 77,449.83 Heroin 5.31 5,310.25 Morphine 8.36 8,360.03 Hash 63.66 63,662.06 Chemicals 69.11 69,107.44 Alcohol 29.85 29,845.88 Amphetamine 0.02 15.69 Total 253.75 253,751.18 t he stata e of a fgh

Figure 5: Map of Afghanistan’s Provinces

Department and provincial police head- member David Mansfield notes that along Source: quarters.29 some of Afghanistan’s borders, illicit trade University of Texas Libraries has become more fragmented and less con- ni

A UNODC official admitted on the eve of -Af trolled by large-scale traffickers, as locals find sta ghanistan’s 2014 presidential elections that it lucrative to engage in smaller-scale smug- “political will for anti-drug initiatives is weak gling across the country’s borders. n’ among members of the Afghan elite, many of s b

whom have become increasingly dependent President Ashraf Ghani faces a tough task order on the proceeds of drugs as foreign funding ahead in suppressing narcotrafficking along dries up.”30 Official collusion with drug- traf Afghanistan’s borders. His administration fickers, however, is but one factor enabling the will have to tackle the lagging capacity and s drug trade. Another key driver is the role that pernicious corruption affecting the country’s drugs play in the country’s political economy. border management officials and those who 13 The cultivation, processing and export of opi- oversee them; it will also have to develop a ates help monetize the Afghan economy and strategy of border management that takes provide livelihood for a significant segment into account the constantly changing nature of the population. Local, frontier populations of smuggling and the illicit economy. and civilians from various walks of life can also be part of this illicit trade. Working group U.S.-Russia Cooperation on Counternarcotics Although Rus- and Afghan Border sia is happy to share intel- ligence and Management lend its drug control experts and officials to outside operations, it draws the line at military involvement in efore the onset of the crisis in their re- eration Samshit, as it was known, was mostly security lations in 2014, Russia and the United a Russian-Afghan endeavor but was backed operations. BStates had increasingly cooperated to up by intelligence from U.S. sources.33 confront the narcotics problem in Afghani- stan. For example, Russia has trained Afghan Such cooperation had been slow in getting off security officers and counternarcotics police the ground and did not reach its full potential, as part of a multilateral initiative that also in- even before the onset of the deeper crisis in s volves the United States, NATO, Central Asian U.S.-Russia relations. First, the operations states and Pakistan, and it has donated small were slow to develop because of a deep-seat- arms and munitions to Afghan law enforce- ed disagreement that took place in 2008 and order ment. In October 2010, Russian drug police 2009 between the United States and Russia

s b officers took part in an operation alongside on how to tackle the drugs problem. Russia n’ the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration favored a more intensive approach—a com- (DEA) that involved raids on four laboratories bination of opium eradication in conjunction sta

ni near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, result- with interdiction efforts inside Afghanistan ing in the seizure of approximately $60 mil- and the destruction of laboratories. The Unit- lion of opium and heroin.31 ed States wanted to focus on interdiction of drugs—a lighter-touch approach that was in- According to official data from the Federal tended to reserve manpower and resources Drug Control Service of the Russian Federa- to fight the insurgency without aggravating tion (FSKN), such cooperative operations segments of the Afghan population who were continued through 2012, yielding a total of profiting from the cultivation of opium. seven FSKN-DEA operations in the country.

e of a fgh a t he stat These operations resulted in seizures of 2.5 The October 2010 raids were the product of tons of opiates, 3.5 tons of hashish, 1.5 tons of a compromise that involved a degree of lim- 14 morphine and 5.5 tons of precursors—along ited intervention inside Afghanistan, target- with the destruction of 10 drug laboratories.32 ing drug smugglers and processing labora- In May 2013, more drug laboratories were tories, without going after Afghan peasants destroyed in the northern province of Bada- or international criminal networks. This was khshan, a key transit point for drugs headed the first operational instance where Russia into Central Asia and onwards to Russia. Op- and the United States made gestures of com- -

the state of afghanistan’s borders 15 Given Russia’s Russia’s Given CSTO’s the and to reluctance - a secu have presence rity Afghan on the the side of the border, States United to will have ways find other expand to cooperation with Russia of on matters counternarcot border and ics management Afghanistan. in - - 37

36 Given Russia’s Given and Russia’s reluctance the to CSTO’s have a security presence on the Afghan side of the the border, United States will have to find other ways expand to cooperation with Russia on matters of counternarcotics and Towards Afghanistan. in management border outlines report this of remainder the end, that the state of border management and - coun ternarcotics initiatives along the borders of Afghanistan, focusing on Iran, - Pakistan, Ta - con It Turkmenistan. and Uzbekistan jikistan, cludes with a discussion of what Russia and the fight the can do United States to improve borders. at these narcotics against ment or security operations in Afghanistan are ruled out—and will remain so after 2014. The taboo extends to the Collective Security a Russia-led - (CSTO), Organization se Treaty curity Secretary-General bloc…CSTO Nikolai Bordyuzha has formally excluded any such noting involvement, that ‘this option has not even been and will discussed, hopefully, nev er be.’” Bordyuzha Bordyuzha has reiterated this position, ex plaining that CSTO prefers to “it side of as the border Tajik on the presence reinforce its is a position of our member states that they held operations the in involved get not should Afghanistan.” of on the territory ------Such - opposi 35 34 A second factor that slowed the development development the slowed that factor second A of cooperation was opposition on the part of Afghanistan’s ruling elite. Afghanistan’s for mer president Hamid Karzai had not an been enthusiastic supporter of counternarcotics operations in U.S.-Russian Afghanistan. Following the October 2010 made operation, his he opposition public. promise towards their respective approaches approaches respective their towards promise to counternarcotics. This compromise may have been easier to facilitate given the - lim ited scale of Russian participation; as some Russian working group members noted, the operation was substantively a observ DEA-Afghan FSKN sent Russia which to operation ers. Last, Russia places certain limits on its direct on limits certain direct its places Russia Last, engagement with Afghanistan by virtue the Soviet of experience there. Although - Rus sia is happy to share intelligence its and drug control lend experts and officials to out tion slowed down the operations as Russian and officialsU.S. had to engage in- time-con suming discussions and concessions to Kar proceeding. before zai side operations, it draws the line at military involvement in security As operations. work ing group member Ekaterina Stepanova ex plains, “Any direct Russian military - involve Iran and the Border Iran spends nearly one with Afghanistan: billion dollars annually on counternarcot- Going at It Alone ics efforts, and 3,000 troops of Iran’s conscript army n comparison to Afghanistan’s other neigh- Notwithstanding the country’s tendencies bors, Iran’s counternarcotics efforts are towards unilateral border control efforts, Ira- are deployed Ithe most intensive by far. According to the nian officials have a history of cooperation to assist UNODC’s latest available data, Iran account- with UNODC. Iran was one of the first states ed for 68 percent of the opium and heroin to raise the alarm several years ago when border guards seized by Afghanistan and its six bordering counternarcotics efforts stumbled in - Af in counter- states in 2012.38 By comparison, Afghanistan ghanistan. Although Iranian authorities were and Pakistan respectively seized 23 percent quick to fault NATO and the U.S. presence in trafficking and 7 percent.39 (See Figure 6.) Afghanistan for failing to stop the opium tide, work along the they also reserved plenty of blame for Af- These results come with a steep price. Iran ghanistan’s political class. In past years, Ira- frontier with spends nearly one billion dollars annually on nian officials frequently complained to United Afghanistan counternarcotics efforts, and 3,000 troops Nations representatives that Afghan officials of Iran’s conscript army are deployed to as- failed to follow up when they proposed coop- and Pakistan. sist border guards in counter-trafficking work erative border control and counternarcotics along the frontier with Afghanistan and Paki- efforts.45 stan. In addition to the sizeable police and

s military power deployed to the border, Iran In 2007 under the auspices of UNODC, Teh- has constructed substantial physical impedi- ran agreed to take part in a counternarcotics ments to prevent smugglers from crossing action plan that was dedicated to fostering

order the border. The 936-kilometer-long Afghan- more intense cooperation across Iran, Af- istan-Iran boundary is lined with 400 kilo- ghanistan and Pakistan. The plan included s b

n’ meters of embankments, 800 kilometers of joint training, the adoption of compatible deep canals, 39 kilometers of concrete walls telecommunications equipment, intelligence

sta and barriers and 140 kilometers of barbed cooperation and the creation of pilot liaison ni wire fencing.41 In February 2014, a senior offices at key border crossings.46 Iranian diplomat speaking at the EastWest Institute explained that the country has lost In 2014, the UNODC’s sub-program on Illicit nearly 4,000 law enforcement officers in the Trafficking and Border Control for Iran enu- drug war in over three decades.42 merated key developments along the coun- try’s borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Heroin is defined as a major security threat These included putting drug-detecting dogs in Iran. It is estimated that 31 percent of Af- into service and training customs officials in ghanistan’s exported heroin crosses the bor- interdiction practices. Under the auspices e of a fgh a t he stat der into Iran, and growing proportions of the of the Trilateral Initiative with Pakistan and trade remain in the country for domestic con- Afghanistan, two border liaison offices were 16 sumption. Iran’s response has been to imple- established in the Iranian sites of Taybad and ment intensive and heavy-handed counter- Mirjaveh near the Islam Qala-Zaranj crossing narcotics efforts,43 and these have changed along the Afghanistan-Iran border as well as the calculus of criminal transnational net- on the Taftan crossing with Pakistan.47 works who find it easier to ship drugs across the Afghan-Pakistani border.44 the state of afghanistan’s borders 17 40 Online on Drugs and on Drugs Nations Office Nations Office Source: United United Source: Crime Statistics Crime Statistics - - - - If 49 the country’s decades of counternarcotics policies are an indication, the Rouhani gov ernment is likely to continue the prosecuting country’s war against narcotics and traffick way. in much the same ers Figure 6: Opium and Heroin Seizures, 2012 Seizures, and Heroin 6: Opium Figure can work together with the U.S.” with the U.S.” together work can explore To the possibility of U.S.-Russia-Iran EWI is holding cooperation, counternarcotics expert workshops in Such 2015. cooperation will not be easy by any means. Russian and Iranian officials are motivated cooperate to by their common and serious public health problem due to Afghan opiates and heroin. But it is unlikely that Russia will harness its amicable diplomatic relations with in Tehran order to act as a go-between for idea the the United Moreover, time. present the at States of cooperating with Iran on counternarcot ics—nuclear and other disputes aside—does not enjoy unanimous support in the United States. As one member of the “international pressed, counternarcotics - working co group ex operation with Iran is complex since it - sanc tions an unjust and corrupt judicial system which deteriorated during presidency.” Iran Ahmadinejad’s routinely dishes death out penalty the to individuals caught facturing, manu- trafficking, possessing trading or opium, heroin and other drugs, psychotropic and 81 percent of executions in the country in 2011 were for drug-related offenses. - - - This - coopera 48 The opening of channels of communication with Iran and the election of President Has- op- the States United the affords Rouhani san Iran with directly more cooperate to portunity on counternarcotics efforts. It is worth mentioning that Iran will continue to play an active role in the fight againstAf ghan opiates and heroin for the foreseeable The future. Iran-Afghanistan Comprehensive Security Cooperation Agreement signed last year may be helpful for enhanced counter narcotics cooperation at the bilateral If level. counternarcotics cooperation between Iran and Afghanistan increases, Iranian officials may be more confident in allowingever-larg er volumes of Afghan and exports, licit trade will boost the Afghan economy and promote alternatives to the cultivation and - process ing of opium. Iran is already a major transit the facilitating transit exports, Afghan for hub of Afghan licit goods across its borders and onwards to the port at Chabahar for export to lucrative markets in India and the Middle East. tion may be welcomed cautiously by Iranian officials. As seniora Iranian diplomat stated in 2014 February at an EWI “So meeting, far, there has not been any official U.S.-Iran co- operation on the and matter, no coalition to deal with this has been we’ve created. been However, working directly stan, with which has been working so - Afghani with NATO, we have been working indirectly with NATO on this…. I think this is one issue where we Pakistan’s Border with Afghanistan: The Problem

The unsettled with the Durand Line status of the Afghanistan- Pakistan boundary, or the Durand he 2,430-kilometer-long Afghanistan- The border’s difficult geography is one of Line, as it is Pakistan border poses particularly several factors that make it difficult for- Af Tdifficult obstacles in the fight against ghanistan’s and Pakistan’s border and coun- commonly drug trafficking. In the north, the bound- ternarcotics officials to stem the flow of illicit called, im- ary is mountainous and riddled with unoffi- substances. Compounding factors include cial crossings that number in the hundreds the unsettled status of the boundary, lin- pedes deeper when the winter snows melt; in the south, the gering mistrust between Afghanistan’s and counternarcot- boundary stretches across remote arid terri- Pakistan’s political elite and military forces tory and abuts some of Afghanistan’s most and the much greater priority that Pakistan ics cooperation active poppy-growing provinces. places on counterinsurgency operations over across the two counternarcotics. A 2014 report on the state of Afghanistan’s countries. national security forces by the Center for Na- The unsettled status of the Afghanistan- val Analyses underscores the constraints this Pakistan boundary, or the Durand Line, as it geography places on interdiction: is commonly called, impedes deeper coun- ternarcotics cooperation across the two

s Afghan and Pakistani forces [respective- countries: “When Pakistan became an inde- ly] man hundreds of posts spread across pendent state in 1947, it declared the line its more than 1,500 miles of border, many international border with Afghanistan. Suc-

order of them in remote and isolated locations cessive Afghan governments over the next in the mountains. Simply manning, pro- sixty years rejected this position, even though s b

n’ tecting, and resupplying these positions some of Afghanistan’s actions have consti- puts an enormous burden on both secu- tuted de facto recognition of the line.”51 sta rity forces….Most illicit men and mate- ni rial are interdicted far from the border on The frontier-like qualities of the Durand Line their way to central locations. Pakistan’s are usually blamed for enabling the insur- Frontier Corps conducts some mobile gency and allowing the Taliban to move unim- operations close to the border, yet forces peded across both states. These very same on both sides remain fixed largely in static qualities have allowed the opium and heroin positions. Most of these posts lie along trade to flourish.52 UNODC reports that Paki- recognized crossing points, yet there are stan is the destination and transit country hundreds of other small roads and don- for approximately 40 percent of Afghan opi- key trails that bypass these positions. ates and that opiate processing takes place e of a fgh a t he stat When passing within the line of sight of in small, mobile laboratories on both sides 53 18 border posts, especially on the Afghan of the border. And despite its long history side, it is common for insurgents and of participation with UNODC initiatives, Paki- smugglers to put harassing fire on these stan is the world’s highest volume transit cor- positions in order to fix border forces in ridor for opiates and cannabis and, along with their positions. Intimidation and bribery India, is the main source of acetic anhydride, are also common methods for limiting in- a precursor necessary to process opium into terdiction.50 heroin.54 the state of afghanistan’s borders 19 The lagging The lagging interdiction along efforts - Afghani the stan-Pakistan al- have border greater lowed of quantities travel to drugs Pakistan into and onwards Middle the to Europe East, Africa and the south from and towards the China from north.

------60 Such 59 May May 2013, a conflictover adisputed border in resulting open post spiraled out of control, fire acrossAfghan and Pakistani border au- thorities with ABP taking casualties. Intercepting opiates, heroin and precursors is precursors and heroin opiates, Intercepting fight the to compared when task secondary a against insurgents. As working group mem- ber Ekaterina Stepanova notes, Pakistan’s approach is not all that approach the United different Af States took towards from the andterrorists ghanistan—fighting insurgents narcotics. the fight against over priority took The lagging interdiction effortsAfghanistan-Pakistan along border the have - Paki into travel to drugs of allowed quantities greater stan and to the onwards Middle Europe East, China the from south Africa and and towards from the Although north. the transit of these opiates and heroin may not threat to pose Russia currently, it a is important direct to note that it may do so in the future. Afghan heroin is beginning to permeate the Chinese market by way of Pakistan, including in the western province of Xinjiang, which borders Central Asia. Any successful counternarcot ics efforts alongAfghanistan’s northern bor der with Asia Central may be in vain if future and Asia Central access to able are traffickers the Russian Federation via more circuitous and China. Pakistan through routes incidents often ended with mediation by ISAF ISAF by mediation with ended often incidents military officials, and it is unclear if the cur along the border prevailing calm of state rent will remain for long after with- coalition force drawal. Given the atmosphere and history described it above, is hard to see how Afghanistan and Pakistan can meaningfully cooperate across future. the in narcotics interdict to border the Although officialsU.S. expandedgreat effort crossings border the equipping and funding in at Torkham and Wesh-Chaman and encour to services border Pakistani and Afghan aged interact, these Joint Border Command - Cen ters are the only locations along the border regularly. interact sides the two where At the same time, durable cooperation goes beyond increasing border management - ca pacity and settling political along differences the It border. also requires harmonizing pri- chief priority along the - Du Pakistan’s orities. counter but counternarcotics not is Line rand insurgency and fighting violentextremism. ------In 58 These dy 57 56 Despite major up- 55 Torkham Torkham Station border crossing is pri- marily a “Trade Facilitation Centre” that merely monitors trade between - Afghani drug smug Therefore, and stan Pakistan. gling prevention is not a priority crossing. at Containers, the trucks or vehicles traveling to or from Afghanistan through Torkham are not thoroughly searched. UNODC experts observed that customs officials often stamped and signed cargo receipts and allowed trucks and - contain ers to cross the border to Pakistan with- the Moreover, checks. any conducting out crossing is not equipped with the - neces sary equipment to check for cargo drugs and none of the staff has to beenconduct such inspections. trained Although a drug detection kit has been provided by UNODC for use at the crossing, it is not use. to being put apparently At At the military level, the present state of the Durand Line is emblematic ized of potential the of bilateral - unreal relations. Neither government accepts the right of the to other pursue insurgents and the and border, many smugglers border incidents have over escalated into skirmishes that have caused casualties. In 2012, Afghan officials accused Af into rockets of hundreds firing of Pakistan namics namics fuel the smuggling economy and dis- stop to workingfrom harder officials courage it. casualties. civilian causing territory, ghan Making matters more difficult for drug inter diction along the border is the deep distrust that has prevailed for decades between Af ghan and Pakistani officials economic and and strategic pervades issues. At the - eco nomic Afghanistan’s level, landlocked status and high Pakistan’s tariff policies encourage smuggling, promote corruption among - offi cials along the border and breed feelings of dependency and economic injustice among Afghan exporters and officials. Narcotics Narcotics and precursors are difficult to in- the given terdict huge number - of daily cross ings—estimated at take over place across the Durand Line at official 100,000—which and unofficialcrossings. grades grades funded by the United States at official Torkham the Wesh-Chamanand border official of ports entry of three crossings—two into Pakistan from Afghanistan—border and inter improved not have authorities customs diction rates. According to a UNODC report: to According diction rates. Afghanistan’s Central Asian Neighbors and

Given recent spikes in the Drug Trade: Three Afghan opium production, the volume of Countries, Three drugs is likely to grow, with Approaches traffickers making use of upgrades in the road, rail and air sys- pproximately 25 percent of Afghani- responding enhancement in the law enforce- stan’s exported heroin is trafficked ment capacity to combat the illegal trade in tems of the across the borders of its three Central narcotics at dry ports, seaports and border A 62 Central Asian Asian neighbors—Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and control points.” Even licit economic and Turkmenistan.61 This minority share punches development initiatives can work to the ben- Republics. above its weight when it comes to economic efit of narcotics smuggling. The U.S.-funded and geopolitical impact. Traffickers made an bridge at Nizhniy Pyanj on the Afghan-Tajik estimated $1.4 billion in net profit from heroin border has expanded trade links between in Central Asia in 2009, a staggering amount Afghanistan and Tajikistan, but it has also be- s relative to the region’s economy and more come a vehicle for traffickers to move larger so for smaller states like Tajikistan, whose quantities of drugs. The Russia-led Customs

order GDP since 2009 has ranged from $7 billion to Union, intended to facilitate trade between $8.5 billion. Among the many negative con- the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and s b

n’ sequences of trafficking across Central Asia Belarus by decreasing border controls and is corruption, as the scale of drug profits en- simplifying customs procedures, will also

sta tices Central Asian officials at many levels— complicate the fight against the drug trade. ni including law enforcement, customs officials With Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan gearing up for and border guards who are tempted by lucra- entry to the Customs Union in the short- to tive bribes to look the other way—to enable medium-term, the importance of interdicting and protect the drug trade. Moreover, the drugs at Afghanistan’s borders will only grow vast majority of northbound heroin winds up more critical.63 in Russia, where it severely strains the federa- tion’s public health system and law enforce- This section focuses on the three Central ment resources. Asian states that share a border Afghani- stan—Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmeni- e of a fgh a t he stat Given recent spikes in Afghan opium produc- stan. As will be seen, the borders are more tion, the volume of drugs is likely to grow, different than they are similar. The states take 20 with traffickers making use of upgrades in different approaches to guarding their- bor the road, rail and air systems of the Central ders, display different levels of participation Asian Republics. A UNODC report notes that in multilateral border control and counternar- the volume of trade between Afghanistan and cotics initiatives and have varying degrees of Central Asia has risen substantially over the political will to fight the drug trade. The one past decade but that “there has been no cor- key similarity is that all three of Afghanistan’s the state of afghanistan’s borders 21 65 Online on Drugs and on Drugs Nations Office Nations Office Source: United United Source: Crime Statistics Crime Statistics - - - These These 68 but its remoteness remoteness its but 66 67 According to According some narcotics traf observers, most country’s the of one become has ficking as to much equivalent as resources, lucrative 30 percent of the country’s GDP and involv ing a substantial amount of official collusion by government elites and authorities in the customs and border, police services. bound for destinations in the Russian - The eration. border region is Fed often described as ruggedly remote, difficult to monitor and infrastructure, in lacking may be overstated. A decade A of international may be overstated. assistance to both sides of the border increased licit has and illicit trade with - Afghani stan enabled by a flurryof road- and bridge- along bazaars and common building projects the Pyanj By River. consequence, the nature evolving. is constantly trade cross-border of As David Mansfieldexplains about aparticu- pri- “The Badakhshan, in border of stretch lar mary goods being smuggled across the bor der are opium, heroin, charas and cigarettes and ‘wine’ and Afghanistan to from Tajikistan Much Afghanistan. to Tajikistan from weapons of the smuggling takes place at night and in- volves local people smuggling goods across the river via small boats and inner It tubes. is as much as take can boat small that reported 100 kilograms of drugs, those transporting goods by inner tube (from a truck) up to 10 kilograms.”

- 64 Figure 7: Opium and Heroin Seizures in Afghanistan’s Central Asian Border States, 2007-2012 States, Border Asian Central Afghanistan’s in Seizures and Heroin Opium 7: Figure ajikistan’s Border northern neighbors are operating below their below operating are northern neighbors potential when it comes to deterring traffick ing at - Despite modest their increas borders. es in seizures by some states the in trend is overall years, a reduction in drug particular UNODC seizures. notes that reported heroin seizures by Central Asian authorities at and within 5,291 their from kilo- dropped borders grams in 2008 to 1,810 kilograms in 2011. with Afghanistan border 1,207-kilometer-long with Tajikistan’s opiates of the primary conduit is Afghanistan T Russia Russia and the United States are well placed to work together to strengthen the borders - of Afghani Asian that the states face Central stan and improve their interdiction rates. To gaps, capacity address to have will they so, do corruption and political will as problems, de- scribed in the sections below on each of the three republics that border Afghanistan. At the same time, Moscow and Washington will have to be wary of each other’s geopolitical sensitivities in Central and South Asia most and especially in main Tajikistan—the - con duit for drugs headed onwards to Russia via the Northern Route. (See (See Figure 7 for overall drug seizure trends states.) border Asian Central Afghanistan’s in trafficking dynamics are sobering and persist equipment, renovates facilities for use by despite more than two decades of border DCA mobile units, and funds a DCA liaison security assistance from Russia, the United office in northern Afghanistan that conducts States and the broader international com- joint operations with Afghans.”70 This fund- Unfortunately, munity. ing has improved the quality of infrastructure the coopera- and training at key facilities, such as the DCA In the wake of its independence in 1992, Tajik- district office at Ishkashim on the Afghan-Ta- tive spirit that istan agreed to maintain Russian troop con- jik border, which interacts with a liaison office prevailed in tingents along its border with Afghanistan. that the U.S. DEA and Tajik DCA jointly oper- These border guards played a key role in seal- ate in Taloqan in Afghanistan. previous years ing off the border when Afghanistan’s civil may increas- war heated up in the 1990s, and they main- Russia and the Russian-led CSTO play an im- tained and expanded facilities such as border portant role in matters of border security and ingly be barracks. As multilateral and western assis- counternarcotics in Tajikistan. At the 2013 coming under tance to Tajikistan increased over the years, CSTO summit in Sochi, officials promised to the final Russian operational guards left the deliver aid to help Tajikistan reinforce its bor- strain as the country in 2005. In the absence of their Rus- der with Afghanistan. This aid includes sur- United States sian counterparts, Tajikistan’s border ser- veillance and signaling equipment as well as vices soon struggled to maintain infrastruc- the construction of new border posts. Russia and Russia are ture and equipment and to adequately staff is also involved in training Tajik border officers at loggerheads the more difficult stretches of border. For the and hosts Central Asian cadets at the border next 10 years, western donors and multilat- college in Moscow. over how to eral institutions tried to pick up the slack. reinforce the Most importantly, Russia is an essential Tajikistan is now the biggest recipient of bor- member of a coordinating body that in- Afghan-Tajik der aid in Central Asia, with Russia, the Unit- cludes all border-aid donors to Tajikistan. border. ed States, European Union, United Nations The Borders International Group (BIG), as Development Program (UNDP), Organiza- the coordination mechanism is known, al- tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe lows border management stakeholders to (OSCE) and International Organization on Mi- meet approximately 10 times a year in order gration (IOM) playing important roles.69 Along to present projects and monitor progress. the Tajik side of the border with Afghanistan, The BIG mechanism prevents the countries the United States has bankrolled the cre- and international organizations that dole out

s ation of border crossings, customs facilities border aid from needlessly duplicating their and barracks for border services. The United efforts. BIG also plays a critical role ensuring States, in coordination with the EU-funded that Russia’s geopolitical sensitivities in Tajik-

order Border Management Program for Central istan are taken into consideration. As a result Asia (BOMCA), funded the construction and of their participation in BIG, Russian repre- s b

n’ overhaul of 15 outposts on Tajikistan’s border sentatives have been supportive of interna- with Afghanistan, and it is estimated that an- tional border assistance to Tajikistan, includ- sta other 20 may be needed to adequately house ing aid sponsored by the United States. As a ni guards. In recent years, border aid sponsors former EU ambassador who was part of BIG turned their attention to the training needs explained, “Russia always gave consistent of Tajik border and customs officials, and Du- support and, at our meetings, the secretary shanbe now hosts several training facilities would often just cut and paste the Russian funded and supported by the international statement from the prior meeting.”71 community. Before the Ukraine crisis, Rus- sian and U.S. officials had worked together to Unfortunately, the cooperative spirit that pre- craft a curriculum at one of the training cen- vailed in previous years may increasingly be ters. coming under strain as the United States and e of a fgh a t he stat Russia are at loggerheads over how to rein- Tajikistan also hosts the largest U.S. Depart- force the Afghan-Tajik border. Russia desires 22 ment of State Bureau of International Nar- expanded bilateral military cooperation with cotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) Tajikistan, and this has included an offer to program in Central Asia, which supports Ta- once again dispatch Russian guards to Ta- jikistan’s Drug Control Agency (DCA). The jikistan.72 This offer was opposed in 2012 and INL project in Tajikistan “supplements sala- 2013 by U.S. officials who pressed instead ries for DCA personnel, provides training and for a continued multilateral approach that - the state of afghanistan’s borders 23 Despite its its Despite - coun resolute ternarcotics stance, is Uzbekistan on lukewarm international counternarcot initiatives, ics particularly when they training require - and institution that al reforms authori- Uzbek consider ties an exclusive - national secu purview. rity - - - - 76 76

80 Instead, Instead, 79 At the same time, there 77 78 fair share fair to share the guard and border argue that this compels Uzbekistan to police the der bor aggressively to make up for the deficit. Uzbekistan’s Uzbekistan’s overall border control strategy may not be a model for the region to follow. The strategy is costly focusing and selective, while interdiction and enforcement on mostly neglecting other aspects of drug control and counternarcotics. While Uzbek seize a authorities much higher proportion of estimated Despite its resolute counternarcotics stance, Despite stance, its counternarcotics resolute Uzbekistan is lukewarm counternarcotics on international initiatives, when they require training and institutional particularly reforms that Uzbek authorities consider an purview. security national exclusive These These unilateral measures include border of aof number official closure definite the in- and officialscrossings, Tajik and civil society point out that this the impedes organizations cut off populations local who of are livelihood from markets, jobs and family on the other border. the side of Traffickingnetworks increasinglynow trains to smuggle use heroin from Central Asia’s border regions onwards to Russia. More - re cent changing have seizures revealed tactics to move heroin, such as packaging it on inside shipments concrete and aluminum cotton, cargo trains moving from through Tajikistan Uzbekistan. In June 2012, eight kilograms of heroin were reportedly discovered in - Tash kent on a train transiting from Dushanbe to Moscow; the heroin had been stashed in liquefiedgas a tank. Uzbek Uzbek authorities prefer to engage in bilat that the allow arrangements cooperative eral country maximum flexibility and few - obliga tions, and they are more likely to take when part the assistance comes in the and equipment transfers. technology form of is evidence that Uzbek authorities are luding at - col some level with trafficking. As not ed by the Embassy U.S. in in Tashkent 2010, sustained a to obstacles principal the of “One counternarcotics strategy is the presence of numerous corrupt officialsthroughout counternarcotics Salaries system. the of law en- and low, very generally are officers forcement and customs of accounts anecdotal are there officialsborder supplementing their incomes by accepting bribes to ignore narcotics - ship ments. It is likely that some government of ficialsare involved with narcotics trafficking organizations.” - - - - 74 Although crossings Although along crossings 73 Uzbek authorities complain 75 At this time, Russia At and this Russia the time, United States do not speak with a coordinated voice when it comes to and counternarcotics border - secu will The tension that prevails Tajikistan. in rity do little to push officialsTajik to make more and counter security border of the generous would dilute Russia’s role. According to work to According role. Russia’s dilute would ing group member Ivan Safranchuk, Russia saw U.S. opposition as an attempt Moscow’s to influence Tajikistan. in limit - compro A mise was eventually reached that the OSCE will coordinate key issues of border security, but the episode does not bode future for well U.S.-Russian counternarcotics cooperation Tajikistan. in to and receiving are they assistance narcotics take a less permissive approach to the traf fickingnetworks that only transit will problem trafficking The theirterritory. and borders Tajikistan once particularly future, the in grow If (EEU). Union Economic Eurasian the enters does Tajikistan not increase its capacity and willingness to fight thedrug trade before its borders become the EEU’s external bound- ary, then the results will be dire for the - Rus sian Federation’s war on drugs. In this - sce to very insist are likely officials Russian nario, on Tajiki- exerting more direct influenceover Afghanistan. with border stan’s that Tajik that Tajik border authorities do not do their Traffickers bringAfghan opiatesTraffickers into Uzbeki- stan along the less well-guarded Tajik-Uzbek border, and UNODC reports Uzbekistan’s heroin indicate seizures along this that bor der are higher than those along or near the Afghan border. Uzbekistan’s Uzbekistan’s border security measures are at their most intense along the 137-kilometer border with Afghanistan, where a series mines and armed heavily - sol electric fences, of diers keep watch. Uzbekistan’s Border Uzbekistan’s with Afghanistan this border have been open to the Northern Distribution Network, which supplied forces and the ISAF U.S. mission in Afghanistan, they have generally been closed to the - pas working As people. and goods Afghan of sage group member Ivan Safranchuk notes, effective an is this regime border restrictive highly deterrent to traffickers, but also it hampers the ability of Afghanistan to export goods to and beyond. Asia in Central markets The United States and Russia may have an opportunity to work together trafficked narcotics than neighboring Tajiki- consequences of narcotrafficking along this to encourage stan and Turkmenistan, seizure statistics do border are currently greater for Iran and Eu- Uzbekistan not always provide a clear picture on the effi- rope than for the Russian Federation. Sec- cacy of Uzbek efforts. Although Uzbekistan’s ond, Turkmenistan’s border control policies to modify its heroin seizures rose an appreciable 25 per- are in line with its flexible and neutral ap- strategy of cent in 2010,81 these seizures dropped pre- proach to Afghanistan. Turkmen officials have cipitously in 2012.82 It remains unclear if the engaged with Afghanistan’s key political play- closure so decline in seizures is attributable to growing ers across the border—both incumbents and that its border collusion, more effective smuggling tactics or insurgents. Although this approach leads to a if it is a sign that border controls are dissuad- more flexible and open economic border, the management ing traffickers from smuggling across Uzbeki- downside is that the border has enabled the system stan’s borders. Furthermore, closed borders growth of trafficking via the Balkan Route. imply a lost opportunity for Afghan business increasingly and exports at a time of great fragility for Af- Between 1992 and 1999, Turkmenistan’s bor- incorporates ghanistan’s economy. ders with Iran and Afghanistan were jointly guarded by Turkmen and Russian border risk manage- The United States and Russia may have an guard contingents. This was not a unique ar- ment and opportunity to work together to encourage rangement; Russia maintained similar opera- Uzbekistan to modify its strategy of closure tional contingents along Uzbekistan’s and Ta- smart detec- so that its border management system in- jikistan’s borders with Afghanistan in order to tion principles. creasingly incorporates risk management protect what was until recently the external and smart detection principles. One way may border of the Soviet Union. Turkmen authori- be to offer a much more expanded array of ties—particularly then President Saparmurat technical and equipment assistance on the Niyazov and his circle of advisers—became

s condition that Uzbek authorities take part in confident that proximity to Afghanistan was more training and revamp their border con- as much an opportunity as it was a threat, trol strategy as necessary. However, if the and they pressured Moscow to reduce its order security situation in Afghanistan continues to border guards. Russia incrementally reduced

s b erode, Uzbekistan will double-down on what its 3,000-strong border guard force in Turk- n’ it knows best—a policy of closure—and one menistan, and the final 200 guards were re- that seems to give better results in stemming moved in late 1999. Niyazov believed that sta

ni the flow of drugs. while the USSR and Russia may have faced problems with Afghanistan, an independent Turkmenistan could safely do business with Turkmenistan’s Border any and all Afghan authorities.84 At the same with Afghanistan time, narcotrafficking across Turkmenistan had increased with indications that state offi- Turkmenistan is an exceptional case when cials were colluding to protect and profit from it comes to Afghanistan and the trafficking trafficking.85 of narcotics. First, it is a minor player in the

e of a fgh a t he stat Northern Route but a major hub for the so- Turkmenistan’s economic and political influ- called Balkan route. As EWI’s Joint Threat ence in Afghanistan grew during the Karzai 24 Assessment notes, “Thanks to its unique po- administration. As Sébastien Peyrouse notes, sition and sizeable borders with both Afghan- Turkmenistan became “an important part- istan and Iran, Turkmenistan has evolved as ner for the Afghan border regions of Herat, an important subsidiary branch of the major Badghis, Faryab and Jowzjan, and offers sub- westward trafficking corridor from Afghani- stantial financial and technical assistance stan to Iran and onwards [to Europe].”83 The to the Turkmen minorities in Afghanistan.”86 - the state of afghanistan’s borders 25 Despite Despite Turkmenistan’s public more counternarcot posture, ics international officials and aid border sponsors that complain Turkmenistan - partici still only pates in cosmetically international programs. ------92 The upside is 93 UN officialshave of 91 90 ten ten noted authorities that continue Turkmen to keep their distance, failing to respond to official letters, showingnot and events cancelling even meetings with in- program at up ternational border management - representa or warning. without reason tives that Washington and Moscow may find them find may Moscow and Washington that assist to opportunity an of more having selves and security border to improve Turkmenistan border. the along efforts counternarcotics Turkmenistan’s policies Afghanistan towards Turkmenistan’s and the common border are currently being tested. By 2013, the security situation along officials Turkmen the severely. eroded border deployed their channels of communication with the Karzai administration, and warlords to insurgents restore a semblance of sta toappear stumbled, These efforts have bility. leading authorities Turkmen to reinforce the border with additional If guards. the security bound the along erode to continues situation will ary, Turkmenistan have to reevaluate its border security policies and the first part of 2015 indicates that Turkmenistan may moving towards a be policy of closure, not un like neighboring Uzbekistan. provinces provinces do not achieve good results, I am warning that they will face consequences. If meeting even action, decisive take not do you your cotton or grain harvest quotas will not you.” excuse Despite Turkmenistan’s more public - coun ternarcotics posture, international officials and border aid sponsors complain that Turk menistan still participates only cosmetically in international programs. Turkmen - authori ties have been generally reluctant part in sustained with joint training exercises to take Afghan authorities. In one extended meeting with U.S. military officials 2010, in head the State of Border Turkmenistan’s Services de- clined to participate in joint citing exercises, authorities. Afghan of weakness appalling the Instead, he pressed U.S. officials scanners as such equipment, high-tech to deliver more and long-range optics. ------87 88 89 By By 2010, Turkmenistan’s media was - parad ing apprehended drug smugglers on programs, and news President Berdimuhamedow put provincial officials on notice improve to “Ifefforts: counternarcotics theof governors Russia Russia and the United States had contribut ed training and technical assistance to Turk - con border and counternarcotics menistan’s trol agencies, and Russian and U.S. officials in 2010 discussed how they might enhance cooperation Turkmenistan’scoun- to benefit ternarcotics capacity. In February 2010, the DEA’s chief of operations met with FSKN’s deputy director in Moscow to brief FSKN on that noted and Turkmenistan in operations its the Drug newly Control established Turkmen as- international in need was more of Agency sistance. narcotics narcotics policies saw some nominal chang es under President hamedow, who Gurbanguly succeeded Niyazov after the - Berdimu Turkmenistan 2008, In 2006. in death latter’s and UNODC agreed to the Turkmen Border Initiative, designed to address the threat of drug trafficking along bordersthe ghanistan The and goals of Iran. the initiative Af with included establishing a drug control agency, increasing interception rates through mobile units along borders and strengthening inter agency and cross-border cooperation with Afghanistan and Iran. The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs praised Turkmenistan in 2008, saying the country “has taken a - lead issue.” the in addressing ing role Turkmenistan’s border security and counter Turkmenistan’s Turkmenistan’s Turkmenistan’s self-professed principle of international neutrality allowed it to engage with both the government in Kabul and the When forces Taliban got Taliban. uncomfort ably close to the border with authorities Turkmenistan used Turkmen their lines in 2007, of Talibandialogue food, clothing to offer the into further move to vehicles their for gas and Afghanistan and away from the management. frontier—a border of form creative Conclusion and Recommendations

Improving the fghanistan’s opium economy and ex- instability and militancy into Central Asia in ability of Af- ports are undoubtedly a source of the years ahead. As working group member ghanistan and Agrave and mutual concern for the Rus- Ekaterina Stepanova notes, the main impli- sian Federation and the United States. For cations of the withdrawal of U.S. forces for its neighbors Russia, Afghan heroin has created a domes- Russia “are not in Afghanistan, but in Central to interdict tic addiction crisis with worrying effects on Asia,”95 especially in states like Kyrgyzstan public health and law enforcement. For the and Tajikistan.96 Accordingly, Moscow strong- drugs at their United States, the growing drug trade threat- ly prefers a division of labor where Russia borders is of ens to upend more than a decade of costly in- takes the lead in Central Asia while the United vestment in Afghanistan’s state and society, States doubles up its counternarcotics ef- mutual benefit a concern that centrally features in a Decem- forts in Afghanistan, which Russia considers to Moscow and ber 2014 report of the U.S. Senate Caucus on geopolitically part of South Asia. International Narcotics Control.94 As such, Washington. improving the ability of Afghanistan and its The United States is unlikely to agree outright neighbors to interdict drugs at their borders to such a division of labor. Even as American is of mutual benefit to Moscow and Washing- foreign policy pivots to East Asia, the United ton. States has strategic interests in Central Asia, and policymakers in Washington will not limit Yet, cooperation between the United States their ability to respond to future global se- and Russia may not come easily even when curity threats that may emerge in or around confronting a common threat. Fallout from Afghanistan. As working group member Mar- the Ukraine crisis has damaged the bilateral lene Laruelle notes, the basis of U.S. foreign s relationship to an extent that will take years policy in the region is to offer the Central to repair. The quality of communications be- Asian states enough room to maneuver and tween Russian and U.S. officials has deterio- maintain strategic autonomy from Moscow, order rated sharply, making it difficult to cooperate autonomy that allows the United States to s b over common aversions such as Afghan opi- preserve its own influence.97 n’ ates and heroin. Indeed, complicating any

sta cooperation is the reality that the U.S. gov- These geopolitical considerations do not

ni ernment’s list of sanctioned Russian citizens preclude cooperation over counternarcotics includes FSKN head Viktor Ivanov, a key offi- and border control. But any cooperation to cial in the fight against narcotrafficking. Any improve the functioning and interdiction ca- future cooperation over Afghanistan will take pacity of the borders around Afghanistan will place against a diplomatic backdrop that can- require taking such sensitivities into account. not be undone.

This period of heightened diplomatic and Recommendations geopolitical sensitivities makes U.S.-Rus-

e of a fgh a t he stat What can Russia and the United States do sian cooperation in Central Asia particularly cooperatively to fight narcotrafficking at- Af thorny. As several Russian members of the ghanistan’s borders? Mindful of the other- 26 working group pointed out, Russia is wary of wise difficult period in U.S.-Russia relations, any attempt by the United States to use coun- the working group proposes the following ternarcotics as a pretext for an expanded se- recommendations as a way for Russian and curity presence in Central Asia. This wariness U.S. policymakers to further cooperate jointly is on par with Russia’s desire to avoid an in- and durably to strengthen the borders around creased inflow of narcotics or a spill-over of Afghanistan against the drug trade. the state of afghanistan’s borders 27 - - makers should makers encourage Afghanistan integrate to counternar Russian and Russian policy U.S. and cotics anti-corruption aggressively - the coun into emerging try’s control border strategy.

- - 99 a source of dispute and escalation between Kabul and Islamabad. This is not conducive cooperation to and cross-border makes joint counternarcotics operations at the difficult. border settled A boundary and Wash- butdifficultMoscowprocess, and long-term a is ington should not lose any call opportunity for Afghanistan to and Pakistan to ally mutu- recognize and affix their frontier. Previ- ous attempts at political resolution failed in part because they did not international stakeholders or material - incen involve enough Russia and the United States Together, tives. may have sufficient heft opento a dialogue towards resolution. A pledge to expand bor der security assistance can further Afghanistan nudge and Pakistan into dialogue. Russia Russia should also use its greatly improved relations with Pakistan to cajole the country to do more on the along the border. particularly counternarcotics front, Speak with a common voice in of counternarcotics matters and border security in Central and South Asia that and Central Asian officials live demand up to the obligations of the counternarcotics and border management assistance that they have received. Central Asian - states, like Ta jikistan, have adeptly collected from assistance the United States playing and one against the Russia, they Yet other. have often narcot of interdiction the in strides few made ics or in fighting official collusion along their borders. Washington and - Asian lead to Central Moscow their messages convey should ers in a coordinated fashion. In the case Tajikistan, they of should relentlessly pressure stance concerted more a take to officials Tajik in fighting trafficking. Work together to improve borders stretches that do of not function well. - Wash ington and Moscow can call on to Tajikistan allow Russia to make a greater contribution to officialshelp Tajik strengthen their side of - - - The Durand The Durand Encourage Afghanistan to cooperate more more cooperate to Afghanistan Encourage actively with Iran to improve interdiction Although along the Afghan-Iranian border. fight against has an mounted impressive Iran the stem to enough not is it counternarcotics, massive opium and heroin tide that moves across Iran towards Europe and across the Caspian Sea to the Commonwealth dependent States of (CIS). The In- United States does not have a relationship with the Iranian government or law enforcement counter Push Afghanistan and Pakistan to final- the their of status frontier. ize Push Push Afghanistan’s government proactive, not reactive, when to it comes to be counternarcotics strategy and initiatives. priorities national his revised Ghani President to after include the counternarcotics London Coun- step. first a only is this but Conference, ternarcotics must be infused into all and tives, no Afghan initia- ministry should adopt a possible its out spelling first without program implications for The counternarcotics. same goes for future U.S. and Russian assistance to Afghanistan.98 More Russian specifically, and policymakers U.S. should encourage Af ghanistan to integrate counternarcotics and anti-corruption aggressively into the - coun strategy. control border emerging try’s parts as the Russian Federation and officials can encourage U.S. Nonetheless, FSKN do. Afghan officials to deepen their cooperation with their Iranian counterparts common the along interdiction in and role greater play a dis- States United the years, many For border. - partic cooperation, Afghan-Iranian couraged in were funds and initiatives U.S. ularly where Afghan for easier it made that position a play, officials to neglect truly deep counternarcot ics cooperation with Iran. Joint U.S.-Russian calls for enhanced Afghan-Iranian - coopera - Afghan encouraging in way long a go can tion pick up the slack. to istan Line remains formally unrecognized and is the border with Uzbekistan, whether by pro- reality, the United States would have to be viding mentors for border guard contingents, invited to full membership. In previous years, ramping up training or simply providing more FSKN officials made statements of support technical and operational equipment. This in that regard, but in the current diplomatic may reduce drug trafficking along that- bor environment there is likely to be little politi- der and build on the cooperative spirit of the cal support in Moscow to upgrade the United Borders International Group in Dushanbe. States from its observer position. Russian and It would also benefit security along the Tajik side of the Uzbek border and allow the United Jointly expand multilateral training of U.S. officials States to ask Uzbekistan to reconsider its Central Asian and Afghan border police, should agree policy of closure and militarization. customs authorities and counternarcotics officers. Before the crisis in their relations, to not let the At the same time, U.S. and Russian officials Russia and the United States set a quiet prec- bilateral crisis must come up with common standards by edent of working together, albeit in a limited which to measure improvements in border fashion, to train Central Asian border officials. in their rela- management and interdiction rates along Joint U.S.-Russian training initiatives have tions affect key stretches of border, like the Afghan-Tajik reached limited numbers of border authori- border. Making the OSCE the key coordinat- ties and could be expanded extensively. While cooperation ing body for border control assistance in capacity and training gaps will not resolve the across their Tajikistan may have been an expedient com- political impediments identified in this report, promise, but the United States and Russia such training programs will send an impor- agencies in the should be open to changing the method and tant signal that the international community field in Cen- substance of security assistance if the coun- is not abandoning Afghanistan and its Central try does not achieve desired results against Asian neighbors to their own devices in mat- tral and South narcotics trafficking. This means that U.S. ters of border control and counternarcotics. Asia. officials should be, at least in principle, cau- tiously open to Russia playing a greater role Deepen formal and informal cooperation along Tajikistan’s borders in the future. across the FSKN and DEA field offices in Afghanistan and Central Asia. In order to Establish joint positions on counternar- mount a better counternarcotics fight along cotics and border control at international Afghanistan’s borders, FSKN and DEA must bodies where these issues are discussed, interact more with one another formally and such as the Central Asian Regional Informa- informally. Russian and U.S. officials should

s tion and Coordination Centre (CARICC), agree to not let the bilateral crisis in their re- whose purpose is to facilitate information lations affect cooperation across their agen- exchange and coordination of operational cies in the field in Central and South Asia,

order activities in Central Asia’s law enforcement even if such cooperation remains limited and agencies, including those in customs, border informal for the short term. s b

n’ services and drug control. For this to become sta ni e of a fgh a t he stat

28 the state of afghanistan’s borders 29 Afghan policemen keep watch watch keep policemen Afghan border in Hairatan on the railway northern in Balkh province, town 2014. 4, Nov. Afghanistan, ENDNotes

1 David Mansfield and Paul Fishstein, “Eyes Wide Shut: Counter-Narcotics in Transition” (Ka- bul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, September 2013), 2. 2 Although Afghanistan shares a 76-kilometer-long boundary with China, this report does not include an assessment of that border. The Afghanistan-China border is remote, mountainous and virtually impassable for much of the year. Small quantities of opiates are moved across the border during the short period when the snows are melting. Afghan opiates and heroin are trafficked in much larger quantities to China via Pakistan and Tajikistan, and Chinese precur- sor chemicals that are used to refine opium into heroin make their way into Afghanistan over the same routes. 3 This is an increase from the previous year when UNODC reported that Afghanistan ac- counted for 74 percent of global illicit opium production. See UNODC, World Drug Report 2013 (United Nations Publication, 2013). EWI’s Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment noted that as much as 92 percent of opiates were being trafficked out of the country. 4 Afghan authorities reported in 2012 and 2013 that over 10,000 liters of acetic anhydrate were seized in provinces adjoining the border with Pakistan and in Kabul. 5 By comparison, Afghanistan’s counternarcotics police accounted for 89 percent and na- tional police for 7 percent of total drug seizures in Afghanistan in 2013. These figures were provided to EWI by Afghan officials. 6 Ekaterina Stepanova et al., Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment, Joint U.S.- Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking (New York: EastWest Institute, 2013), 13. s 7 Stepanova et al., Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment, 30. 8 This point was made by Nikolai Patrushev, the chief of Russia’s Security Council. See “Drug Use Losses Equal Health Budget,” RIA Novosti, February 25, 2013. order 9 Stepanova et al., Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment, 9.

s b 10 The purchase has hit opposition in Congress despite its backing by the U.S. Pentagon. n’ See “Dunford urges Congress to approve Russian helicopter deal for Afghan air force,” Stars

sta and Stripes, July 17, 2014, http://www.stripes.com/news/us/dunford-urges-congress-to-ap-

ni prove-russian-helicopter-deal-for-afghan-air-force-1.293927. 11 On the role of warlords in the Afghan political economy—licit or otherwise—see Dipali Muk- hopadhyay, Warlords, Strongman Governors, and State Building in Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Jonathan Goodhand, “Frontier Wars: The Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” Journal of Agrarian Change 5 (2005): 191-216; Kimberly Marten, “Warlordism in Comparative Perspective,” International Security 31 (2007): 41-73; and Barnett Rubin, “Sav- ing Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs 86 (2007): 57-78. 12 On Afghanistan’s provincial political and security dynamics in the Soviet and other periods, see Antonio Giustozzi, Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan (New York: Colum-

e of a fgh a t he stat bia University Press, 2009). 13 The Rainbow Initiative is rooted in the Paris Pact, a multilateral counternarcotics effort 30 initiated in 2003. 14 One example of this aid was the Focused Border Development Program, which was a train- ing operation for Afghan Border Police. This program was funded by the United States and run by the Combined Security Transition Command in Afghanistan (CSTC-A). The U.S. De- partment of Defense and Homeland Security also bankrolled Joint Border Command Centers (JBCCs) along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to enable authorities and security officials the state of afghanistan’s borders 31 - - In- The Assess- Indepen- (Alexandria: Center (Alexandria: for Naval , 27, 99-100. 27, , , 100-102. , , 100-102. , Independent Assessment Independent Assessment Independent Assessment , 106. , , November 8, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/world/asia/pow 2014, 8, November , (Alexandria: Department of Defense Inspector General, 2013), 47. 2013), General, Inspector Defense of Department (Alexandria: Analyses, 2014), 100. 100. 2014), Analyses, et al., 18 Schroden 23 These figures were provided to EWI by Afghan officials. Afghan by EWI to provided were figures These 23 suffered have agents drug control Iranian where the of this border is one area Reportedly, 24 losses. heavy 25 According to an international development or both. or traffickers insurgents official were if the attackers it is not clear who member, group working provided this information to a Their and Enemies,” Taliban in Chief Fear Puts Afghan Police “Powerful 26 Walsh, Declan from from both countries to manage migration and trade and filter outsecurity like threats insur smugglers. narcotics and gents 15 The author with George conversation Gavrilis’s the Deputy Commander of the Provincial 2009. March Sharif, Mazar-e Team, Reconstruction 16 One hurdle in training Afghan Border Police concerned transportation logistics. As road trainees had hand-in-hand quality deteriorated to in with be border provinces security, flown into Kabul. The flights required the UnitedStates costs. the transportation for pay and European find aircrafts to and training countries sponsoring the give 17 another To number for Afghanistan comparison, has more Kabul-based national - se See and 23,900). 26,000 country (respectively the police for entire than border forces curity an (ANSF) National report extensive on mandated Afghanistan’s Security Forces by the U.S. and Congress written by the Center for Analyses Naval (CNA): Jonathan Schroden et al., 20 “Green” 20 border “Green” security missions are conducted in a 50-kilometer zone adjacent to the et al., Schroden See border. dent Assessment New York Times dependent Assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces ment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts toTrain, Equip, and Advise the Afghan Border erful-afghan-police-chief-puts-fear-in-taliban-and-their-enemies-.html?_r=0. - Afghan the along checkpoints border at looking is State of Department States United The 27 istan-Tajikistan border, the border, Afghanistan-Turkmenistan the Afghanistan-Uzbekistan border as well as and along crossings Wesh-Chaman the the Torkham Afghanistan-Pakistan border to better understand what is working at these border checkpoints and how to - facili cooperation tate that cross-border can trade increased generate flows in thisregion. Border crossings with Iran are presently not on the list of projects being studied for infrastructure improvements. 28 On corruption and appointments along drug see “The routes, George Good Gavrilis, and 22 An extensive report on the ABP was conducted by the Inspector the notes that report General only gaps, of 75 On intelligence-training of States Department of Defense. the United the 450 commu- andofficers intelligence officers the non-commissioned compriseABP who nity had been properly trained. See Department U.S. of Defense Inspector General, 19 As the CNA “ISAF personnelexaminedreport finds, satellite imageryof theAfghanistan- Pakistan border and estimated that the Pakistani side had et al., Schroden approximately 1.5 From to 2 planning at was that time.” Afghanistan as times posts border many as 21 Schroden et al., et al., 21 Schroden Police Bad News about Afghan Opium,” CFR Expert Brief, February 10, 2010. Comments about the Ministry of Interior and border commanders amassing great wealth were made to the author in February 2014 by a European official who served in close proximity to the ministry over a three-year period. On corruption among customs and border services, also see U.S. Depart- ment of Defense Inspector General, Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts. The assessment notes that Afghanistan’s Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Interior have joint responsibility over the Afghan Customs Police (ACP), with Interior having key oversight responsibility. In reality, the division of labor does not function well. Many positions in the cus- toms services were filled with border police who have little requisite training and oversight. This has promoted corruption. According to the assessment, “An ACP customs officer at the Torkham customs yard was recently relieved of his duties for allegedly skimming more than $20,000 in customs revenue each week for himself and others.” From U.S. Department of De- fense Inspector General, Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts, 27. 29 Najibullah Gulabzoi, “The Narco-State of Afghanistan: Deconstructing the Nexus between Drug Trafficking and National Security,” The Diplomat, February 12, 2015. 30 Ernesto Londoño, “As US Withdraws from Afghanistan, Poppy Trade It Spent Billions Fight- ing Flourishes,” The Washington Post, November 3, 2013. EWI’s Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment noted that—despite assertions to the contrary by journalists and some policymakers—the Taliban controls a minority share of the opiate and drug trade. A re- cent U.S. government-funded assessment is more open-ended on the matter, stating, “Some argue that the drug trade is a major driver of the insurgency, especially in the south. There is, however, no consensus on the degree to which this is the case, or on whether the ANSF could in any capacity significantly alter this dynamic.” From Schroden et al., Independent Assess- ment, 44. 31 Also taking part in the raid was the U.S. Department of Defense, NATO and Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior. FSKN head Viktor Ivanov noted that “this is the first operation in Afghani- stan in which Russian drug police officers took part,” but stressed that Russian officers were there in agreement with Afghanistan and not as a military unit. Despite this, the participation of Russian agents in the high-profile raid hit raw nerves in Afghanistan. Afghan officials criti- cized their presence, alleging that they were unaware of Russian participation. From Matthew Chance and Paul Armstrong, “Russian Anti-Drug Chief Applauds Afghan Heroin Haul,” CNN. com, October 30, 2010; and Joshua Partlow, “Karzai Condemns Russian Involvement in Af- ghan Drug Bust,” The Washington Post, October 30, 2010.

s 32 “12-14 декабря 2012 года проходил визит председателя Государственного антинаркотического комитета, директора ФСКН России Виктора Иванова в США,” Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation, December 14, 2014, http://fskn.gov.ru/includes/periodics/events_

order all/2012/1214/113521704/detail.shtml. 33 “Russia, US Help Destroy More Drug Laboratories in Afghanistan (part 3),” Interfax, May s b

n’ 30, 2013, http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?pg=7&id=420089. 34 Working group member Ivan Safranchuk notes that it may be more accurate to call the sta October 2010 operation a U.S. operation with Russian/FSKN participation, rather than a fully ni joint one. 35 There were at least two reasons for Karzai’s opposition. First, the operations disrupted the drug laboratories and routes run by key Afghan players with political clout. Second, the operations did not sit well with large segments of the Afghan population who disliked seeing two powers with a legacy of invading and intervening in Afghanistan banding together to chase down Afghans—criminals or otherwise. 36 Ekaterina Stepanova, “Russia’s Concerns Relating to Afghanistan and the Broader Region in the Context of the US/NATO Withdrawal,” CIDOB Policy Research Project, June 2013, 6. 37 “CSTO Forces Deployed along Tajik-Afghan Border to Be Reinforced in 2014,” Voice of Rus- e of a fgh a t he stat sia, November 14, 2013. 38 It should be noted that Iran’s official statistics differentiate between seizures of opium, 32 heroin and morphine base. For the sake of streamlined illustration, opium and heroin seizure statistics are presented here in combined form. 39 Statistics show that Iran accounts for the highest rate of opium and heroin seizures glob- ally. According to the UNODC’s World Drug Report 2013, Iran accounted for 80 percent of global opium seizures and 30 percent of heroin seizures in 2011. See “Iran Deserving More Int’l Support in Anti-Drug Campaign,” UNODC (from Fars News Agency), December 1, 2014, the state of afghanistan’s borders 33 - - - World , November 1, 2007. 1, November , , EastWest Institute, 2001. 2001. Institute, EastWest , , 211- 212. 211- , The American Interest indicates that Iran’s aggressive counternarcotics ef Recognizing the Durand Line , , (UNODC, 2012), 53. It is important to note that Iran’s border policing Misuse of Licit Trade for Opiate Trafficking in Western and Central Asia: Independent Assessment - regis region the in countries other although that noting worth also is It 33. , World Drug Report 2013 A Threat Assessment http://www.unodc.org/islamicrepublicofiran/en/iran-deserving-more-intl-support-in-anti- drug-campaign.html. https://data.unodc.org. Online, Crime Statistics 40 UNODC 41 Iran has particularly fortified the borders in the areaof IslamQala andZaranj, according the UNODC report: Drug Report 2013 51 On the history of the Durand Line, its political consequences and The Hollings In- for Center the need to resolve its and Consequences Future,” “The Line: Durand History, see status, see Also 2007. Dialogue, ternational 52 Ronald Neumann, “Borderline Insanity,” Insanity,” “Borderline Neumann, 52 Ronald 53 UNODC, http://www.unodc.org/pakistan/en/country-profile. “Pakistan Country Profile,” html. In- for Bureau State of Department U.S. Report,” Strategy Control Narcotics “International 54 tered substantial interdiction falls, Iran’s seizure tered rates substantial remain Iran’s high interdiction falls, and drops in the - interdic tion rate have been far smaller than in Central Asia. See UNODC Statistics Online, https:// data.unodc.org. Nations. at the United experience member’s group on a working 45 Based 2007. UNODC, a National Challenge,” to Solution Regional A Strategy: “UNODC Rainbow 46 - http://www.unodc.org/islamicrepublico UNODC, 2011-2014,” Program “UNODC Country 47 firan/en/country-programme-sub-prog1.html. 26, on September event Society Asia on the at issue an made remarks Rouhani 48 President the of principle “The stated, Rouhani Firestein, David EWI’s by question a to response In 2013. and region entire the to threat serious a poses it that is Afghanistan from flow that drugs illicit regional and organizations international with cooperating always been have we And world. the and organizations, we’re in the group of countries on this issue [trying] to curtail it. If a gov ernment wants to help, truly, there are different ways of helping in this process. The help first of helpingways in this different process. are there truly, ernment to wants help, comes from inside Afghanistan The itself. governments that can, must, inside Afghanistan, halt the production of illicit drugs. And therefore there is no clear program in this area, but at the same time, we are in a continual cooperative relationship with the different countries on this And issue. you know it’s also an internal issue a for Annually, us. group of our border the fighting of result a as killed are and martyrs become and lives their lose always has guards phenomenon of the transfer of From Hassan illicit “Video: Rouhani, drugs.” Iran’s President and remarks (presentation, Nuclear Issue,” in Resolving ‘Sooner the Better’ Asia Society Tells 2013). 26, September NY, York, New Iran, of President Rouhani, Hassan Dr. by discussion 49 According to Human Rights “In Watch: 2011, Iran executed at least 600 people, second only to China. Eighty-one percent of these executions were for drug-related crimes, includ- ing for to personal According Amnesty use. International, in of 2009, the 389 - executions re 166—almost corded, 43 In drug-related. about percent—were 2010, 68 percent of all - execu of for the drug-related 253 by the tions known organization—172 executions—were recorded From “Iran:offenses.” Donors Should Reassess Anti-Drug Human Funding,” Rights Watch, August 21, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/21/iran-donors-should-reassess-anti- drug-funding. et al., 50 Schroden efforts are notsolely directed atcountering the drug The trade. country’s perceived border security threats include illegal migration from Afghanistan, banditry cross-border as well as into narcotics seized some converts Iran that noting worth also is It terrorism. and insurgency pharmaceuticals. 42 UNODC indicate that sources the officialscountry has in lost the3,700 fight against nar cotics. See “Drug Trafficking And Border Control Situation Analysis,” UNODC, accessed Janu- accessed UNODC, Analysis,” Situation Control And Border Trafficking “Drug See cotics. - ary 29, 2014, http://www.unodc.org/islamicrepublicofiran/drug-trafficking-and-border-con trol.html. The to drug traffickers. sentences include doling out death efforts counternarcotics 43 Iran’s punishment is often carried out by hanging. In a recent officialsinstance, No decidedSays not Minister “Iran to re- See attempt. hanging first the survived who trafficker convicted a hang 2013. 23, October Jazeera, Al Convict,” Re-Hang Need to 44 UNODC’s forts forts are causing traffickers to rethink the routes theyhave been using. See UNODC, ternational Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2014, http://www.state.gov/docu- ments/organization/222881.pdf. 55 According to the World Trade Organization, half of Afghanistan’s exports in 2012 moved across the Durand Line, destined for markets in Pakistan and other countries. This large vol- ume of trade also complicates narcotics and precursor interdiction, as illicit material can be smuggled inside shipments of otherwise licit goods. See UNODC, Misuse of Licit Trade, 28. 56 UNODC, Misuse of Licit Trade, 29. 57 Reports show that as much as 70 percent of potential border revenue may be lost due to corruption. Following a site visit to Torkham and Wesh-Chaman, a U.S. Department of Defense team of expert evaluators noted that “the two largest and busiest border crossings in Afghani- stan…generate the majority of the country’s approximately $1 billion in customs revenue. Co- alition advisors at Torkham and Wesh-Chaman agreed that two to three times the amount of customs revenue actually collected for the Afghan government was probably lost to corrup- tion.” From U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General, Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts, 26. 58 Hafizullah Gardesh, “Afghans Say Pakistan behind Cross-border Fire,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting-Afghanistan, July 11, 2012, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/afghans-say- pakistan-behind-cross-border-fire. 59 Schroden et al., Independent Assessment, 216. 60 According to Schroden et al., Independent Assessment, 209: “Pakistan has deployed an estimated 158,000 soldiers (including Frontier Corps forces and army) to the tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan. The army has conducted large-scale counterinsurgency opera- tions in the region since 2009, with smaller operations dating back to 2002. Before 2002, the Pakistani army had never deployed forces to the tribal areas. According to the Pakistani military, more than 5,000 soldiers have died in these operations and many more have been wounded.” 61 “Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia,” UNODC, May 2012, http:// www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Afghanistan_northern_route_2012_ web.pdf. 62 UNODC, Misuse of Licit Trade, 9. 63 The Customs Union promotes trade but may also inadvertently facilitate smuggling. Con- sider the case of Kazakhstan: under current procedures, goods entering Kazakhstan for on- wards transit to other countries undergo a single check at the external border of the Customs

s Union. They are generally checked again when they reach their final destination within the Customs Union and not, as was customarily the case, at the Russian border. The reduction of border checks makes it appealing to traffickers to hide drugs in licit cargo on Transports Inter-

order nationaux Routiers [International Road Transport] (TIR) trucks and other modes of transport. In the event that Tajikistan joins the Customs Union, Tajik authorities will become the main line s b

n’ of defense for member states against the narcotics trade. 64 UNODC, Misuse of Licit Trade, 14. sta 65 UNODC Statistics Online, https://data.unodc.org. ni 66 Some of Tajikistan’s border regions are well connected to Dushanbe, in particular the crossing at Nizhniy Pyanj, which is serviced by an upgraded road network. But much of the border of Tajikistan’s autonomous Gorno-Badakhshan region remains logistically and politi- cally distant from Dushanbe; indeed, much of Tajikistan’s and Afghanistan’s eastern border regions are better connected to one another than to their respective national capitals. 67 Statement based on working group member David Mansfield’s comments at the EWI March 2015 Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking meeting. In a debrief on Ishkeshem and Shignan, two border towns located in Badakhshan on the Afghan side of the border with Tajikistan, Mansfield explains that the common bazaar is said to have made it e of a fgh a t he stat easier for independent smugglers without links to officials on either side of the border to oper- ate, facilitating communication across the border. Consequently, narcotrafficking has become 34 a more populist activity and may be slipping out of the hands of large-scale narcotraffickers, at least along this particular stretch of border. 68 As a report on international border control assistance to Central Asia notes, “The transit of Afghan opiates across Tajikistan is a lucrative business….It monetizes the Tajik economy and rivals the economic impact of other sectors and industries….The Tajik border services are a crucial part of the equation and are, as a number of international and Tajik officials and experts the state of afghanistan’s borders 35 - - ,” ,” ] 39, ] 39, (New , 28. , “Глава “Глава ФСКН одобрил The Dynamics of Interstate Большая Игра: политика, бизнес, , April 21, 2012. 21, April , ,” RIA May Novosti, ,” 5, 2011, http://ria. The Economist Great Game: politics, business, security in Central Asia [

, 114. At the same time, the 2008 events were a - At the sign were the same that 2008 time, events Presi 114. , - August 2011, 3, http://www.avesta.tj/9188-tadzhiki Avesta.tj, ,” , 113. , Turkmenistan: Strategies of Power, Dilemmas of Development Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment Turkmenistan Turkmenistan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chapter 5. chapter 2010), Press, University Cambridge York: (New , March/April 2014; and “Addicted,” “Addicted,” and 2014; March/April , maintain, part of the conduit that allows drugs access and protected passage into Tajik - terri part maintain, of the conduit that Tajik into allows drugs and access passage protected and Asia’s Border Woes “Central George the Gavrilis, From Impact of International - As tory.” May Also “The Open 2012, see 38. John Narcostate,” Society Foundations, Kucera, sistance,” York: M.E. York: Sharpe, 2011), 113. Indeed, the spectacular firefights that took place in Ashgabat traffick drug cross-border that signs were observers, some to according 2008, September in ers were colluding with Theofficials. high-techweapons andfirepower at the disposal of the embattled traffickers suggests that “they would nothave been able toaccumulate so much military equipment in the center of the capital without the support of people in high places.” Peyrouse, From no. 6 (2014). no. authorities appear presidency not 85 to been have during Turkmen very proactive Niyazov’s in cooperating substantively with international counternarcotics initiatives, possibly a - con sequence of alleged collusion with the drug trade at the very highest levels Sébastien of politics. See Peyrouse, безопасность в Центральной Азии Politico 74 As noted by one working group member who conducted field research in Uzbekistan. in research field member who conducted group one working by noted As 74 http://heroin2011.dbroca. Database, Seizure Online Pact, AOTP/Paris the see seizures, On 75 uz/map_ids. 76 Uzbek example, For authorities threatened to permanently close a Woes.” number Border of Asia’s crossings “Central Gavrilis, See reasons. these for precisely border Tajik along the 77 Reported by Pact, AOTP/Paris Online Seizure Database, http://heroin2011.dbroca.uz/ map_ids. State of Department U.S. (INCSR),” Report Strategy Control Narcotics International “2010 78 - http://uzbeki 2010, 1, March Affairs, Enforcement Law and Narcotics International of Bureau stan.usembassy.gov/incsr_2010.html. 79 The 2013 INL budget request for Uzbekistan $8 million. was In over just was approximately contrast, $743,000. Tajikistan for budget INL’s Woes.” Border Asia’s “Central 80 Gavrilis, 81 “Central Asia Key to Afghanistan Heroin Smuggling – Eurasianet.org, May UNODC,” 18, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65425. 2012, and 262 in 2011, 622 kilograms to in 2010, kilograms 1,004 from dropped seizures 82 Heroin in 2012. kilograms et al., 83 Stepanova Boundaries dent Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow was taking a less permissive stance towards the than his predecessor. trade drug 86 Peyrouse, [Foreign [Foreign вызов афганский и нейтралитет Туркменистана: политика “Внешняя Safranchuk, Ivan 84 challenge],” Afghan the and Neutrality Turkmenistan: of policy 69 Gavrilis, “Central Asia’s Border Woes.” Woes.” Border Asia’s “Central Gavrilis, 69 Department of State of Bureau Inter U.S. 2013,” and Budget “Program Guide: Year 70 Fiscal 187. Affairs, Enforcement and Law Narcotics national 38. Woes,” Border Asia’s “Central 71 Gavrilis, control including border military cooperation, Tajik-Russian on extending discussions For 72 cooperation and the return of Russian border guards, see Таджикистан “ и Россия: граница в обмен на миграцию трудовую stan-i-rossiya-granica-v-obmen-na-trudovuyu-migraciyu.html; and идею вернуть российских пограничников в Таджикистан on agreement on the information Russian-Tajik For ru/antidrugs/20110505/371118860.html. but (as cooperation without guards of border a border the extending of result Russian return “ФЕДЕРАЛЬНЫЙ in September see 2011), visit Tajikistan to then Dmitry Medvedev’s President ЗАКОН ВОПРОСАМ ОТ ПОГРАНИЧНЫМ ПО 28 ФЕВРАЛЯ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВЕ 2012 О Г. N ТАДЖИКИСТАН 12-ФЗ РЕСПУБЛИКОЙ И “О ФЕДЕРАЦИЕЙ РАТИФИКАЦИИ СОГЛАШЕНИЯ МЕЖДУ РОССИЙСКОЙ http://www.garant.ru/hotlaw/federal/383992/. 2012, 1, March Garant, of policies and region, the in aggressive most the are practices control border Uzbekistan’s 73 the just not borders, Uzbekistan’s of all along rule the generally are restrictiveness and closure Gavrilis, George see dynamics, these On Afghanistan. with border 87 George Gavrilis, “Why Regional Solutions Won’t Help Afghanistan: The Myth of Neighborly Harmony,” Foreign Affairs, October 18, 2011. 88 UNODC, “Caspian Sea and Turkmen Border Initiatives” (work in progress), UNODC Re- gional Office for Central Asia, November 2008, 2. 89 Among the proposals put forward by U.S. officials was one calling for FSKN to provide as- sistance in joint NATO-Russian training for the Turkmen Drug Control Agency. See “Cablegate: Dea Chief of Operations Thomas Harrigan’s Meeting With [sic],” Scoop Independent News, February 10, 2010, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL1002/S00215.htm. 90 “Cablegate: Turkmenistan: Women Increasingly Involved In [sic],” Scoop Independent News, February 10, 2010, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL1002/S00531/cablegate-turk- menistan-women-increasingly-involved-in.htm. Later that year, a border commander was ar- rested for allegedly taking part in the drug trade. His colleagues maintained that he paid for equipment out of his own pocket and that his office looked like a five-star business office. This suggests that official collusion continued, although it is difficult to ascertain how high up in government circles the collusion runs. See “Cablegate: Turkmenistan: Commander Arrest- ed For [sic],” Scoop Independent News, August 13, 2009, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/ WL0908/S01659/cablegate-turkmenistan-commander-arrested-for.htm. 91 U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM’s) counternarcotics program had already outfitted the State Border Services with radio equipment. 92 As explained to a working group member by a high-level UNDP official familiar with issues of border management in Central Asia. 93 Bruce Pannier, “Turkmenistan’s New Afghan Border Policy,” Radio Free Europe Radio Lib- erty, October 10, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/turkmenistan-afghanistan-border-poli- cy/26631200.html. 94 “Future U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan,” A Report by the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, 113th Congress, 2nd session (December 2014). 95 Stepanova, “Russia’s Concerns,” 8. 96 Marlene Laruelle, a working group member, explains in a co-authored policy memo that “Russia seems to be abandoning its previous doctrine of exerting general regional influence in favor of pursuing more focused influence and integration with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.” From Alexander Cooley and Marlene Laruelle, “The Changing Logic of Russian Strategy in Central Asia: From Privileged Sphere to Divide and Rule,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 261, July 2013, 2.

s 97 On the broader dilemmas of Russian and U.S. geopolitical dynamics in the region, also see Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

order 98 The U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control has previously elaborated this recommendation to U.S. policymakers. It states: “Because of the drug trade’s significant im- s b

n’ pact on so many facets of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, all U.S. assistance should incorpo- rate a counternarcotics assessment. This assessment should consider how assistance will sta impact or can contribute to counterdrug efforts, thereby incorporating counternarcotics ef- ni forts into the overall U.S. strategy for Afghanistan.” 99 On this issue, the former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann wrote: “The U.S. government should therefore lead a new effort at political resolution. Only the United States can leverage the necessary influence and incentives to broker a solution that will nec- essarily involve major pain for each protagonist. It will not be easy, for shaping a stable solu- tion will require the participation of several parties beyond the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Iran and Russia, because each has interests in a solution and each can act to spoil one; and the European Union and the United Nations, to smooth U.S.-Russian-Iranian sensi- tivities, to underwrite the necessary guarantees, and to augment the financial incentives to e of a fgh a t he stat induce compromise. Whatever the role of others, however, it is clear that the United States will have to make the most expensive and politically difficult commitments to get Afghanistan 36 and Pakistan to make their own difficult choices. All this will take years to accomplish, and still more years to protect.” From Neumann, “Borderline Insanity.” the state of afghanistan’s borders 37 cronyms A Afghan Border Police Border Afghan Police Customs Afghan Forces National Security Afghan Group International Borders Asia Central for Program Management Border Combating for Centre and Coordination Information Regional Asian Central Precursors Their and Substances Psychotropic Drugs, of Narcotic Trafficking Command Central States United Independent States of Commonwealth Analyses Naval for Center Afghanistan in Command Transition Security Combined Organization Treaty Security Collective Tajikistan Agency, Control Drug USA Administration, Enforcement Drug Union Economic Eurasian Institute EastWest Federation Russian Circulation, on Narcotics Control for Service Federal Eight of Group Product Domestic Gross Report Strategy Control Narcotics International and Law Narcotics International of Bureau State of Department U.S. Affairs Enforcement on Migration Organization International Afghanistan in Force Assistance Security International Center Command Joint Border Organization Treaty Atlantic North in Europe Cooperation and Security for Organization Transport] Road [International Routiers Internationaux Transports Program Nations Development United and Crime Drugs on Nations Office United

ACP ANSF BIG BOMCA CARICC CENTCOM CIS CNA CSTC-A CSTO DCA DEA EEU EWI FSKN G8 GDP INCSR INL IOM ISAF JBCC NATO OSCE TIR UNDP UNODC ABP EWI Board of Directors

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Previous Reports

Afghan Narcotrafficking: Post-2014 Scenarios

February 2015

http://www.ewi.info/idea/ post-2014-scenarios-afghan-narcotrafficking

ДокладAfghan 2013—1 Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment

April 2013

In English: http://www.ewi.info/idea/ afghan-narcotrafficking-joint-threat-assessment

In Russian: http://www.ewi.info/idea/ afghan-narcotrafficking-joint-threat-assessment-russian-edition the state of afghanistan’s borders 41 Copyright © 2015 EastWest Institute ISBN: 978-0-9861751-2-1 On the cover: Afghan border policemen display 86 kilograms of hashish captured during an operation in Nangarhar province, east Afghanistan, March 26, 2015. Photos: Reporters/AP

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The EastWest Institute seeks to make the world a safer place by addressing the seemingly intractable problems that threaten regional and global stability. Founded in 1980, EWI is an international, non-partisan organization with offices in New York, Brussels, Moscow and Washington. EWI’s track record has made it a global go-to place for building trust, influencing policies and delivering solutions. _

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