AFRICI\. vol 20 0 no3° 1990 ISSN 0256-2804 Reg. No. 61 /00002108 ) 0 1 0 2

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0 Prof P Smit (Chairman), Prof PANel (Deputy 2 Chairman), Prof W J Breytenbach, Prof J A Heyns, d e Hon Justice V G Hiemstra, Mr W B Holtes, Prof D A t Publications a Kotze, Dr D C Krogh, Sir Richard Luyt, Prof G d

( Africa Insight Maasdorp, Prof A C Nkabinde, Dr P S Rautenbach, r Country surveys e Mr D Sole, Prof L T Taljaard, Prof H J van Aswegen, h

s Research communications

i Prof N J van der Merwe. l Occasional papers b u Maps and statistics P Africa Institute Bulletin (members only) e

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y Assistant Director: P W Esterhuysen b Secretary: B C Fisher d e t Chief Researchers: Dr Simon Baynham n Dr Denis Venter a r g e c n e c i l r e d n u

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an independent publication which promotes insight into the process of change in Africa. R11,30 (R10,OO + R1,30).

Cover by William Steyn

Comment Post-apartheid South Africa and Africa - Dr Erich Leistner 138

Political economy The Comorian comitragedy: Final curtain on Abdallahism? - Dr Denis Venter 141

Development .. Political transition, development and the role of civil society - Mark Swilling 151

Language ) 0

1 Namibia's new language policy - Prof August D de V Cluver 161 0 2

d e - t Elections a d (

The implementation of the 1988/89 district assembly (local government) r

e elections in Ghana - Joseph R A Ayee 169 h s i l b

u Foreign policy P

e

h Changing the guard: South African foreign policy into the 1990s - Dr Greg Mills and Dr Simon Baynham 176 t

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e Nationalization t n

a Nationalization: Lessons from Southern Africa - Sam Kongwa 189 r g Adequate economic prosperity as a prerequisite for political stability in a post-apartheid South Africa: e c The relevance of the nationalization/privatization debate - Ronnie M J van Wyk 194 n e c i l

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e Africa monitor d

n - Jenny Macgregor 197 u

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... d o r p e R Comment ______..

Post-apartheid South Africa and Africa

Dr Erich Leistner, Director of the Africa Institute, looks at the reasons why South Africa and Southern Africa should continue to occupy a place in the thoughts of the leaders of the industrialized nations.

Towards the end of October 1990, a Australia and New Zealand racial vio­ senior German politicians of their fear prominent British political scientist, Dr lence between the majorities of their that within, say, ten years, millions of Christopher Coker, delivered a paper at citizens and people of colour is not hungry and destitute Africans might the Africa Institute's Conference on unfamiliar. Confrontations between seek refuge in Western Europe, not to the subject, "Southern Africa towards Germans and Turkish Gastarbeiter fall mention the prospect of a massive the year 2000." In it he expressed the into a similar pattern. inflow of Soviet citizens should the .. view that for the West, "Southern These tensions and conflicts are USSR succumb to anarchy. Africa's meaning largely derives from symptoms of "North-South" problems. Not all European leaders anticipate

South) Africa," and that once apartheid Amid the euphoria over the ending of such a gloomy future, but universal dis­ 0 has1 been dismantled, "Southern Africa the Cold War between the West and the illusionment and pessimism concerning 0 2 will cease to be meaningful.'" Soviet bloc, the ominous income and developments in Africa prevail in d

e This seems to me to be overstating welfare gap between the industrialized Europe and in other industrial coun­ t - thea case: notwithstanding the demise of "North" and the predominantly poor tries. African leaders, in tum, are d (

apartheid, there is every likelihood that "South" had faded temporarily from apprehensive that much Western aid, r thee world will be less and less able to Western consciousness. Iraq's occupa­ virtually the only aid they can hope for, h ignores the consequences of worsening tion of Kuwait and the concomitant will increasingly be diverted to Eastern i l

povertyb and frustration in Africa, much manifestations of militant Islamic fun­ Europe. More and more the flow of ofu Asia and elsewhere. As a microcosm damentalism throughout the Arab funds to Africa, currently about $10 P

ofe the world at large, South Africa mir­ world have since shattered the illusion billion a year, will be subject to condi­ h rorst the so-called "North-South" situa­ of global harmony and peace. Earlier tions regarding the use of funds, the

tion:y the vast discrepancies of wealth fears of a confrontation between the recipients' economic policies and their b

andd privilege largely along racial and few rich countries of the "North" and observance of human rights and demo­ e ethnict lines, and the tensions arising the many poor of the "South" have cratic practices. n

froma these divisions. South Africa, been suddenly revived. The many assurances of European r g

with its institutionalized racial discrim­ At present such fears are particularly leaders, notably those of countries such e

ination,c offered itself as a symbol (and acute in Germany, which, in recent as France, Britain and Germany, that n

scapegoat)e for these unresolved global years, apart from Turkish and other Europe has a special responsibility c i

issues.l These issues will not vanish guest-workers, has had to accommodate towards Africa, should not be dis­ withr the symbol. hundreds of thousands of ethnic missed as mere rhetoric, however, even e

d Those predicting the imminent Germans from the Soviet Union and though that sense of responsibility sure­ n

"marginalization"u of South and East European countries, as well as vast ly is not a foremost national priority.

Southerny Africa appear to overlook that numbers of asylum-seekers from Over the past few years Western a

somew countries' condemnation of Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia, bring­ thinking on Southern Africa and South e apartheidt was clearly influenced by ing the total of foreigners there to at Africa's role in the region has reflected a

concernG about the potential impact that least 4,63 million. Apart from causing a growing awareness that the whole of

t

raciale strife in South Africa might have serious administrative and psychologi­ Southern Africa is bound to follow the n oni their own populations. US govern­ cal problems, this development is same economic and political path as the b

menta spokesmen have explicitly con­ increasingly viewed in tandem with rest of the continent, unless a strong S firmed this. For the USA, Britain, black Africa's apparently unstoppable and expanding South African economy y b

France, the Netherlands, Sweden, slide into chaos. I recently learned from helps to stimulate and sustain the d e c u

d .. 138o Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 r p e R - ______Comment

region. Until recently, any South fairly substantial traditional interests - countries combined, excluding Tanzania African involvement in the provision of mainly commercial but also political­ - there would be a real risk that it materials, finance or manpower in in South Africa and other countries of would pursue its own national interest at regional projects financed by the the region, of Britain, Germany and the expense of the weaker countries, European Community, the World Bank Portugal (Italy is a newcomer), there is thereby creating ill will and undermining and various other agencies was assidu­ no obvious reason why these countries the objectives of regional co-operation. ously blocked. Today, the World Bank should write off Southern Africa the That this is no idle speculation is is co-operating closely with South moment apartheid is well and truly suggested by the role of Zimbabwe Africa's Southern African Development buried. On the other hand, these coun­ within the SADCC, where it is by far Bank in respect of the Lesotho tries would presumably soon wash their the industrially most advanced member Highlands Water Project, and is financ­ hands of the region if a tyrannical and where its attitude is sometimes ing projects such as the rehabilitation regime with ruinous economic policies resented. Even now there are signs of and modernization by the South were to be established in Pretoria. apprehension among SADCC members African Electricity Supply Commission In a nutshell, this means that South that the predominantly black govern­ of the Maputo power station. Africa can count on attracting a fair ment of a future South Africa might be The changing attitudes within the deal of West European economic and less accommodating than the present European Community were highlighted political support if it succeeds in nego­ white one - which is clearly more by the visit to South Africa in tiating a political order promising constrained to prove to the world that it OctoberlNovember 1990 of a high-level domestic stability for the foreseeable is not the bully it is widely alleged to delegation from Acoda, the Brussels­ future, and pursuing economic policies be. A country like Lesotho, which based International Association for guided by market forces and favouring depends on migrant labour earnings in Cooperation and Development in private enterprise and investment. If South Africa for approximately half its Southern Africa, which included Mr these, admittedly difficult, conditions GNP, is particularly vulnerable to deci­ Leo Tindemans, a former Belgian Prime are fulfilled, South Africa and its sions taken in Pretoria. Some Basotho Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs neighbours again stand to attract a cer­ therefore even advocate becoming part and currently Vice-President of the tain amount of Western investment. of South Africa. African, Caribbean and Pacific Taken as a whole, as an investment All these issues need careful '" Countries/European Community (ACP/ prospect Southern Africa may be less thought. In particular, South Africa EC) Assembly. attractive than countries such as should not unthinkingly jump at pro­ At the opening of Acoda's first Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the for­ posals to join the SADCC and the PTA )

South0 African office in Johannesburg, mer East Germany. These three have a once this becomes possible - associate 1

the0 delegates confirmed their convic­ long tradition of industrialization and membership of the SADCC might well 2 tion, and that of many of their peers, technological sophistication, together be an appropriate first step. The basic d e

- thatt sanctions against South Africa hurt with skilled and disciplined work­ SADCC concept is sensible and nota only that country's black population forces. While Southern Africa cannot deserves to be explored further: a joint d ( but also the economies of neighbouring match these advantages, its mineral, search for solutions to shared problems; r countries.e They also expressed the firm agricultural, forestry and marine co-ordination of economic policies as h s

beliefi that South Africa has a crucial resources, and its as yet largely far as possible and without seriously l

roleb to play if these countries are to untapped internal markets and its abrogating national sovereignty; no u

haveP any hope of progress and stability infrastructural requirements, do offer integration of production, trade and fac­

overe time. Acoda is to promote many opportunities for profitable oper­ tor movements - except, perhaps, as a h t European private and official invest­ ations - given appropriate government goal for the distant future. y

mentb in the region, using to the full policies. In other words, the institutional

Southd African managerial, technical While developments inside South framework for future economic co­ e t

andn other expertise. Africa are of critical significance for operation in Southern Africa must not a

r Yet another fact speaks against the the region, careful consideration needs try to emulate the model developed in g marginalization hypothesis with respect to be given to the institutional frame­ the EC for the specific conditions of e toc Southern Africa: the appreciable out­ work within which a post-apartheid Western Europe. It should rather seek n

sidee economic support received by the South Africa is to interact with its to build on the concept of the SADCC c i l

member countries of the Southern neighbours, that is, assuming democrat­ and of the Southern African Regional r

Africane Development Co-ordination ic and market-oriented South African Commission for the Utilization and d

Conferencen (SADCC) since its estab­ policies. Conservation of the Soil (Sarccus), u

lishment in 1980. To some extent, of The suggestion is frequently heard which predates the SADCC by about y

course,a this assistance served to demon­ that South Africa should become a full two decades and has been a model of

stratew support for the SADCC coun­ member of the SADCC and/or the beneficial technical intraregional co­ e t

tries'a "struggle against apartheid" - Preferential Trade Area in Eastern and operation largely unaffected by politi­ G

thus obviating their insistence upon Southern Africa (PTA). It is an open cal concerns. Altogether new t

moree stringent anti-South African sanc­ question, however, whether immediate institutions for regional co-operation n tionsi by the West. It was also meant to and full membership should be contem­ may well be called for. b

promotea these countries' development plated. Given South Africa's economic Bearing in mind that Africa's fore­ S

andy to lessen their economic depen­ pre-eminence - its GDP at present is most partner in trade, investment and b dence on South Africa. Yet, given the about three times that of the SADCC aid, the European Community, is moving d e c u

.. d Africao Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 139 r p e R Comment ______- towards a unified market as from 1993, development grouping which could in Endnote it is high time that a beginning be made time include a growing number of other Christopher Coker, "On this side of in Southern Africa to form a regional African states. beyond: Experiencing Southern Africa in the year 2000", (roneoed), p 20. A revised version of this paper will appear in Africa Insight, vol 20, no 4, 1991.

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o Africa Insight, vo120, no 3, 1990

140r p e R ______Political economy Ir­ I

The Comorian comitragedy: Final curtain on Abdallahism?

Dr Denis Venter, Chief Researcher at the Africa Institute, looks at the circum­ stances surrounding the death of the Comoros President Abdallah and at the prospects facing the island republic's new government.

The Comoros, named "al-komr" or After colonizing Mayotte in the of the islands - the others being "the moon" because of the sometimes 1840s to take advantage of its- good Anjouan and Moheli - which consti­ lunar-type landscape of the islands, lie anchorage, France extended its influ­ tute the Federal Islamic Republic of the in the ancient "bahr-el-zanj" - the ence to the other three islands during the Comoros.3 "sea of the blacks". The archipelago of second half of the nineteenth century. Although broadly similar in culture, .. four islands Grande Comore, Finally the archipelago was formally language and politics, the inhabitants of Anjouan, Moheli, and Mayotte - annexed in 1904, to become a rather Mayotte - the Mahorais - have been slants north-west to south-east across sleepy corner of the French Empire. ruled by France since 1843, some sixty

the) Mozambique Channel, like a series Indeed, the Comoros islands have sel­ years longer than their Comorian coun­ 0

of1 stepping stones between the East dom drawn much of the world's atten­ terparts. The principal political party, 0 2

African coastline and the northern tion. Events have passed them by in the the Creole-led Mouvement Populaire d

shorese of Madagascar. Expeditions way modern-day supertankers pass each Mahorais (MPM), has lobbied hard for

- t

froma the Persian Gulf first visited other in the night in the Mozambique departement status such as that of d

Grande( Comore in the tenth century, Channel - unacknowledged and unrec­ Reunion and has so effectively mobi­

r

Polynesianse voyaging to Madagascar ognized. Comorians seem to live out­ lized public opinion that whenever h

toucheds the islands in the twelfth cen­ side time - almost like the most France conducts a referendum on the i l

tury,b but blacks from Madagascar and famous inhabitant of their waters, the island's future - as it is committed to

Shirazu Arab migrants first settled the coelacanth.2 doing - only a handful of Mahorais P

Comorose in AD 933. Portuguese navi­ In no other Indian Ocean island voters are likely to dissent from the h

gatorst first sighted the archipelago group is there such a concentration of party's francophile line. Over the years,

aroundy 1500 and soon afterwards the colourful Islamic civilization and a series of French leaders have traded b

Frenchd and British strove to achieve Moorish architecture: minarets, mos­ the promise of departement status to e

politicalt influence and dominance in ques, old forts, ancient Arab towns, and the island's power-brokers in exchange n

thea islands. Warring sultans caused dhow ports proclaim the islands' his­ for short-term electoral gains, but no r

inter-islandg strife and pirates used the toric links with the Arabian Gulf. The government has been able to buy back

e

baysc and lagoons of Anjouan and Comorian people are a blend of Arab, or entirely shrug off its pledge of inte­ n

Mohelie as lairs from which to prey on African, Malay-Polynesian and gration with France. Mayotte therefore c

richly-ladeni East Indiamen in the Malagasy, and they profess the Islamic l continues to be a collectivite territorial

1600s.r Commanding a vital gateway, faith - the Comoros are one of Islam's particuliere, represented in the National e

thed Comoros were frequented by southernmost strongholds and over 90 Assembly in Paris by a deputy and a n

seaborneu powers venturing halfway per cent of the population are Sunni senator who participate fully in French 4 roundy the world to garner the treasutes Muslim. They speak Comorian - a politics. a

ofw the Orient.' dialect of kiSwahili, the Arabic-based e

t lingua franca of East Africa - and, a The stormy islands:

G naturally, have also been strongly influ­

Thist article was originally written for Annee enced by the French in matters of cus­ Recent history Africainee 1989, published by the Centre n

i tom and language. Dominated by the After voting against independence in a d'etude d' Afrique Noire de Bordeaux in co­ b

operationa with the Centre de - Recherche et 2 361 metre volcanic crater of Mount referendum in 1958, the Comoros S d'etude sur Ie Pays de I' Afrique Orientale de Karthala overlooking the capital islands received a measure of self-rule y

Pau,b France. Moroni, Grande Comore is the largest in 1961. In 1974 a fresh referendum

d e c u

Africad Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 o 141

- r p e R Political economy - was held in which a strong overall coup attempt against President Mathieu islands. He was charismatic in a clown­ majority of voters (96 per cent) on the Kerekou of Benin in 1977. Denard had ish sort of way, and had considerable three islands of Grande Com ore, already enjoyed a long career of soldier­ charm and style - dressing in loud, Anjouan and Moheli opted for autono­ ing in Africa and elsewhere: Indo-China, colourfully embroidered Islamic long my, while a substantial majority (64 per Algeria, Katanga, Biafra, Yemen, Libya, coats and turbans, as well as in Western cent) on the fourth island, Mayotte, cast Kurdistan, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire and attire. But he remained a merchant, their ballots in favour of remaining Angola. Then, in 1978, he was contract­ using politics to advance his business associated with France - Mayotte is ed to overthrow Soilih and reinstall interests. Among the first measures he mainly Christian, and is still governed Abdallah. In the following decade took immediately after his return to as a French overseas territory. The Denard gradually consolidated his power was one to re-acquire his ensuing row with Paris ended with power over the islands, assembling a monopoly of rice importation. He knew Grande Comore, Anjouan and Moheli hard-core group of fellow mercenaries that many Comorians strongly objected unilaterally declaring their indepen­ around him in the Garde Presidentielle. to his highly personal mix of business dence on 6 July 1975.5 They set themselves up in lucrative busi­ and politics, and that he was hated for Barely three weeks later, the newly ness ventures and became an influential his immense wealth and for his auto­ proclaimed "moderate" president of the force in local Comorian politics - cratic style of government; but he could Comoros, Ahmed Abdallah Abdere­ Denard himself becoming the eminence never stand any permanent opposition. mane, was toppled in a French-inspired grise, the proverbial power behind the And so he operated always on new bal­ coup d' etat and forced into exile in throne. ances, trying to create new structures France. The coup-leaders employed a But friction between the 300 to 500 conducive to stability. Yesterday's band of mercenaries led by Bob local guards (the Commando Noir) and friends were today's enemies and vice Denard, and installed a young populist their white mercenary commanders versa. II He therefore built up an exten­ leader, Ali Soilih, as president. Soilih flared into open mutiny in March 1985 sive apparatus of patronage and by dis­ soon turned out to be a radical socialist and was one cause of a bungled coup pensing favours tried to compensate for - in fact, a revolutionary zealot and bid in November 1987. Moreover, in his prohibition of any kind of political rabid ideologue - who ruined an 1984 the mercenaries were accused of freedom. It is almost impossible to already impoverished economy with his channelling South African arms ship­ assess how much popular support he precipitate imposition of socialist ments through Moroni to the rebel really enjoyed, but it seems fair to say .. "reconstruction".6 He embarked on a Resistencia N acional M or;ambicana that strong family ties and a deeply per­ series of iconoclastic reforms: through (Renamo) forces in Mozambique; and sonal power-base confined his support brute) force he tried to smash traditional in 1987 there were reports of arms find­ mainly to Anjouan island. Indeed, his 0 social1 structures, attempted to wean the ing their way to Iran by the same route. clear favouritism towards Anjouan cre­ 0 2

people away from Islamic practices and Over the years, the continued pres­ ated a situation in which the island fed­ d

force-feede them socialism, and - as a ence of the mercenaries opened a deep eration constantly threatened to

t -

symbolica act of radically breaking with rift between President Abdallah and the disintegrate. And although Abdallah d the( past - destroyed the government local populace, particularly after the still derived some prestige from being

r

archives.e His highly personalized, attempted rebellions of 1985 and 1987, the father of independence, his inability h eccentrics dictatorship and Maoist-style both of which were violently sup­ to resolve the mercenary question made i

l 9

reignb of terror lasted for three years, as pressed on Denard's orders. Constant him highly unpopular among young lesu jeunesses revolutionnaires enforced rumours of coup plots and an abiding Comorians in particular, who saw the P

hise socialist programme with a zeal and sometimes justifiable fear of a presence of the mercenaries as an insult h reminiscentt of China's cultural revolu­ Putsch being hatched either somewhere to national sovereignty.12

tion.y 7 Its end came when the former in the islands or from abroad, reflected b

coloniald power had had enough of revo­ the fragile nature of the state's security.

e South African and French lutionaryt chaos. Starved of French aid, The presidential guard remained the n strategic interests thea economy disintegrated and the principal security apparatus of the state r regimeg collapsed. History turned full and the president's growing depen­ The "Perfume Isles" - so named for

e

circlec when Denard and his commando dence upon it as his first line of defence their wealth of scented plants: ylang­ ofn thirty-odd men staged a mercenary eventuaIly led some observers to con­ ylang, jasmin, cassia, tuberose, rock e c invasioni of the Comoros on 13 May clude that he had become a virtual

l alyssum - have for centuries been the

1978r and restored Ahmed Abdallah to hostage of his own security force. The target of someone's strategic design. e powerd - probably the only successful core of the problem in the Comoros From the early 1980s onwards, the n mercenaryu coup carried out in the name was that the country was being run very political fortunes of the Comoros

ofy pro-Western democracy. Mercenaries· much as a village with a handful of became closely tied to South Africa a

fromw Madagascar had historically tough men in charge. 10 and France - both have extensive eco­ e servedt Comorian warlords; now more President Abdallah enjoyed a mea­ nomic and military interests in the a

mercenariesG had arrived to take a hand sure of popular support for the first few islands and the Indian Ocean region -

t

ine shaping Comorian destiny.8 years after his restoration. Like the sul­ as well as to the handful of white mer­ n

i After helping to install Soilih in 1975, tans of old, as president he held court cenaries who commanded the presiden­ b 13

Denarda had left the islands for three under a mango tree in the courtyard of tial guard. S years to embark on other African his residence, talking animatedly with The Comoros islands offered a y b escapades. One of these was the bungled village notables from all over the strategically important foothold for d e c u

d ..

142o Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 r p e R Political economy

South Africa and therefore came within at Itsandra on Grande Comore island, it A considerable degree of self-govern­ the ambit of Pretoria's diplomatic and could track not only maritime move­ ment was given to each of the three strategic initiatives. South African ments in the strategic waterway but islands, but the constitution was Airways has landing rights and refu­ also African National Congress (ANC) amended in 1982 to give greater elling facilities at Moroni, a potential operations in neighbouring Tanzania. 16 authority to the central government. staging post for flights to the Near East It was also alleged that Renamo train­ The president was restricted to two six­ and Asia. And under Abdallah, South ing camps were set up in the Comoros, year terms of office but, with his man­ Africa's influence in the Comoros grew co-ordinated by Denard's mercenaries date due to expire in 1990, from 1988 tremendously. Pretoria invested heavily and controlled by South Africa; and onwards Abdallah embarked on a cam­ in road construction, pilot projects in that, under the personal supervision of paign to alter the constitution. housing (using volcanic ash for the Denard, Moroni long served as a stag­ Despite federal ambitions, the manufacturing of bricks), the building ing post for South African arms traffic islands are profoundly insular in out­ of schools, medical services (including to Iran, particularly during the height of look. The bulk of new investment and clinics) and the running of a 1 300 acre the Iran-Iraq conflict. 17 Although large­ job creation has been on Abdallah's experimental farm - the source of ly surreptitious until around 1986, home island of Anjouan, and demon­ adaptable agricultural technology. South African investment in presiden­ strated an inability over the years to co­ South African aid to the Comoros since tial security through financial and other operate at cabinet level with the leaders 1980 is estimated to total about US$50 assistance to the presidential guard also of Grande Comore, who formed an million, and in the last few years the earned it an influential role in unofficial opposition as a result. A South African government - through Comorian affairs. And, apart from the pledge to introduce democratic proce­ the Credit Guarantee Corporation - strategic and military value of having a dures in the 1987 legislative elections has underwritten loans of some US$25 presence in the Comoros, South Africa was not honoured. In every presidential million for tourist development at was able to exploit the potential of the and legislative election, the government Galawa and Itsandra. 14 islands as an entrep6t in sanctions-bust­ announced mandates of 98 per cent or But all this technical and other assis­ ing trade and, at the same time, develop more, but the Abdallah administration tance from South Africa, which main­ a small but growing market for South was widely accused of political repres­ tains a trade mission in Moroni, was of African exports. 18 sion, financial mismanagement and cor­ an "unofficial nature" and very low­ France's presence in the Comoros, ruption - which included large-scale key, since for obvious reasons the however, still dwarfs that of South electoral fraud. 2o Comorian regime did not wish to flaunt Africa. France is the islands' main trad­ Preserving his business fortune intact )

its0 relations with Pretoria. South ing partner and biggest bilateral aid was not the least of the motives pro­ 1

Africa's0 developmental role therefore donor, providing around US$25 million pelling President Abdallah into seeking 2 received little, if any, public attention a year in development aid. Paris sec­ a third term - a term that could only d e

- insidet the archipelago. However, it is onds nearly 130 technocrats to run the perpetuate rivalry between Paris and equallya understandable that the South civil service - the postal, water, elec­ Pretoria, the random viciousness of d ( Africans wanted some tangible benefits tricity, and customs services are all Denard's presidential guard, the vexa­ r frome their extensive aid to the headed by Frenchmen - and donates tions of opposition groups at home and h s

Comoros,i and felt strongly that rela­ cash to meet the budget deficit, police abroad and the possibility of violent l

tionshipsb should be based on recipro­ officers to assist the gendarmerie, and overthrow. Through Establissements u

cityP and overlapping interests. But, some 27 military experts to advise the Abdallah et Fils (EAF), Ahmed

ironically,e in striving to appear the fledgling defence force. A Franco­ Abdallah controlled the largest of the h t engine of development and trying to Comorian defence pact provides the Comoros' three private trading compa­ y b

soften its odious international image, final safety net. The independence of nies. Along with business rivals Amine d

Pretoriae found itself in the middle of a the islands is therefore a rather strange Kalfane and Mohamed Ahmed, EAF t

publicn relations nightmare, having to one, especially in view of reported dominated the marketing of the a

propr up an unsavoury and unpopular plans for a French naval base in the archipelago's chief exports of vanilla, g paramilitary regime. IS Comoros and an air base on Mayotte. cloves, copra and, to a lesser extent, e c South Africa's interest in the strate­ But United States-Soviet military dis­ ylang-y1ang - products with a turnover n e

gicallyc placed Comoros islands has engagement is causing renewed of US$20 million in a favourable year. i l

given rise to much speculation. It was demands for the demilitarization of the Most imported foodstuffs, building r

suggestede that Pretoria's activity there Indian Ocean, as France's role as the materials and consumer goods - a d

wasn determined by the proximity of the region's gendarme is increasingly com­ large proportion of the Comoros' total u

archipelago to Frontline States such as ing under threat. 19 imports, estimated at US$52,5 million y

Mozambiquea and Tanzania. As a listen­ in 1988 - also passed through EAF's

w 21

inge post, the Comoros straddle an warehouses and supermarkets.

t Seeking the life presidency:

importanta international shipping lane Despite a spirited campaign by

G The demise of Abdallah - supertankers using the Cape route in opposition leaders, emerging from t

supplyinge Persian Gulf oil to Europe The 1978 constitution of the Comoros enforced silence or exile for the first n andi the United States all sail through proclaims Islam the state religion; the time in years, in a referendum held on 5 b

thea Mozambique Channel - and after state nevertheless remains secular in November 1989 Abdallah easily won S

Southy Africa built and manned a practice and has eschewed the funda­ approval by a 92,5 per cent vote for a b sophisticated radio monitoring facility mentalism of some of its Gulf sponsors. key constitutional change, which d e c u

.. d Africao Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990

r 143 p e R Political economy ______- removed the rule limiting any individu­ monopolize the miniscule and belea­ finally confront Denard. Under pressure al to two six-year terms as president. guered economy of the Comoros. He from opposition groups as well as from This opened the way for him to run for held major shares in the banking sector, France, he had been toying with the idea a third six-year term of office. But his import businesses, agricultural enter­ of distancing himself from Denard and tight control of the political scene - prises, and the tourist industry. It was replacing the mercenaries with a private exemplified by official toleration of this that eventually contributed to the French security firm. Some sources opposition activity only in the few souring of his relations with France and claim that on the evening of 26 months before voting took place, and South Africa. More importantly, the November Denard and a colleague, compounded by the fact that the cam­ presence of Denard in the Comoros had Commandant Marques (real name, paign and polling were marred by become an embarrassment to his tacit Dominique Malacrino), became in­ widespread violence and electoral supporters abroad. Furthermore, volved in a dispute with Abdallah over irregularities for which government Abdallah felt he was fast losing all French demands that the mercenaries supporters were chiefly responsible - power to the presidential guard, which vacate the islands. The argument must have undermined the referen­ brutally suppressed the widespread became heated, and Marques allegedly dum's validity as an indication of sup­ opposition to his regime.23 shot Abdallah and his aide-de-camp. A port for his regime. In opposition Abdallah knew that French goodwill, whole series of clearly transparent mea­ circles the poll was seen as a device to and thus aid money, would be crucial if sures was then taken to cover up these allow Abdallah to phase out the last he was to cover the 1990 budget deficit unforeseen developments - actions vestiges of the original Comorian fed­ and clear the way for an IMF agreement that compounded the crisis. eral structure and move towards ever and debt rescheduling. The changing Whatever the reality of Abdallah's greater concentration and centralization mood in Pretoria was also pushing him death, it does not appear to have been of power at the top. As a result, the towards a break with Denard. South part of an attempted coup.25 Be that as political atmosphere became extremely African President F W de Klerk and the it may: finally a successful power grab tense. Pressure on Abdallah now more liberal foreign policy team led by rocked this Indian Ocean island chain. increased rapidly, despite his victory. Foreign Minister Pik Botha were acting Although Abdallah's assassination can That the referendum result was ques­ decisively to break the influence of the be viewed as an isolated incident, the tionable made him even more vulnera­ "securocrats" - the security establish­ subsequent attempts at a cover-up esca­ ble to French demands for the ment which had exercised such a deter­ lated into a mercenary take-over of the democratization of the political system; mining hold on policy under former islands via the presidential guard. In the and, in addition, Paris continued to urge President P W Botha and provided the next few days attacks were launched on ) the0 replacement of Denard's mercenar­ backbone of support and funding for the police headquarters and army bar­ 1 ies0 by a more orthodox French security Denard. Abdallah also had both long­ racks at Moroni, the regular army was 2 force. 22 standing allies and strong critics within disarmed, and the presidential guard d .. e

t Denard was highly unpopular with Mitterrand's administration. Neverthe­ took up strategic positions at govern­

a 26

thed French government not only less, a broad consensus crystallized that ment buildings and key installations. ( because of his reputed close association r the Comorian president's referendum withe the Direction Cenerale de la victory would not be seriously ques­ h

s The aftermath: Denard Suretei Exterieure (the DGSE, France's l tioned and that he would be pushed into overseasb secret service - seen as a further democratization of the domestic dethroned u bastionP of right-wingers, many in place political scene and a break with Both France and South Africa immedi­ sincee the days of Charles de Gaulle and Denard. The outcome of a military ately condemned the assassination of h t Georges Pompidou), but also his rather research study on the security forces in Abdallah; but it took them more than a y b

embarrassing exploits over the years - the islands merely strengthened week to come out strongly against mer­ d

note least of which was his attempt to France's resolve that the presidential cenary control of the islands. They t

overthrown the president of Benin. It is guard should be absorbed into the regu­ viewed with deep concern the spectacle a

unlikelyr he could have remained in the lar Forces Armees Comoriennes; and of modem-day pirates taking an inde­ g Comoros without his Gaullist connec­ South Africa agreed that Denard and pendent state hostage and holding it to e tionsc in the French secret service or his his men should vacate the islands by ransom.27 In the first public admission n

e 24

membershipc in the right-wing Clan des the end of December 1989. that Pretoria had been financing the elite i l

Cabonais, the club of mercenaries and It was the referendum early in presidential guard at the direct request r legionnairese who based themselves in November, which confirmed Abdallah of Abdallah, on 4 December South d

Gabon.n When, in 1981, new French in power, that apparently precipitated African Foreign Minister Botha u President Fran~ois Mitterrand vowed to the president's final disaster. Although announced the suspension of all assis­ y rida the Comoros of the mercenaries, Denard generally kept a relatively low tance to the guard and of other co-oper­ w however,e other backers had to be found. profile, all the evidence indicates that he ation with the Comoros pending a t

Southa Africa, eager to spread its influ­ wielded most of the real power in the resolution of the conflict. South Africa G ence and gain a strategic foothold in the islands. Abdallah, without much popu­ wanted "the immediate departure of all t Indiane Ocean, stepped in at about this lar support, needed Denard and his mer­ expatriate elements who obviously do n i

timeb to fund the presidential guard, set cenaries to keep him in power. In recent not enjoy the support of the majority" of upa by Denard ostensibly to protect S times, however, Abdallah seemed to the Comorian people, and would assist

Ahmedy Abdallah. But there was also have gained some popularity, and this in "all efforts aimed at allowing the peo­ b another side to Denard: the desire to may have been the inspiration for him to ple of the Comoros to decide their own d e c u d o

144r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 - p e R ______Political economy

future in a peaceful and democratic of Pretoria's representative to that of the ground rules for presidential elec­ manner". Similarly, the French foreign consul. (South Africa has had a diplo­ tions. He had to accept the fact that ministry expressed its concern that "an matic representative in the islands for Abdallah's death had brought a politi­ armed group is playing a role incompat­ several years, but until this he lacked cal era to an end and that he had no ible with the normal functioning of the any formal status, officially heading choice but to bring opposition groups state", and declared that it would not what was known as a "trade office".) in from the cold. Suddenly the political permit the Comorian people to be Nevertheless, South Africa was com­ scene was wide open and Moroni depri ved of their legitimate rights.28 prehensively outmanoeuvred by the bustling with feverish political activity, On 15 December Denard finally French during negotiations to remove as the "saliva war" hotted up. capitulated, after trying for nearly three Denard and his fellow mercenaries. The Numerous political parties were weeks to withstand increasing interna­ result was that while South Africa was formed or revived as opponents of the tional isolation and pressure and grow­ left holding Denard and had to fly out old regime returned from exile or ing domestic turmoil as South Africa most of his "wild geese", the French emerged into the open. and France co-ordinated diplomatic and were left holding the Comoros.30 Most political groups, hoping for other moves to rid the Comoros of the For his part, Denard may well have time to re-establish themselves locally mercenaries once and for all. Control been justified in seeing himself as a after the end of Abdallah's repressive over the islands now passed to a French casualty of South Africa's changed regime, tried in vain to persuade Djohar military contingent flown in from policies under the De Klerk govern­ to form a provisional, inter-party gov­ neighbouring French-ruled Mayotte. ment, which was no longer interested in ernment of national unity to rule for up Although the idea of French military propping up any outfit, regardless of to two years before multi-candidate intervention had been firmly resisted by reputation, in exchange for friendship presidential elections. But Djohar was Paris, there was never really much in Africa. More directly, however, it concerned that political life might chance that the Mitterrand administra­ was the incompetence, undisciplined degenerate into squabbling among tion would tolerate the continued pres­ nature and self-indulgent violence of many small groups, and fail to produce ence of mercenaries in the Comoros. the mercenaries which eventually led to strong movements which could com­ This would have been a major reverse Abdallah's death and the resultant cri­ mand and mobilize national support if for a country which had always prided sis. Denard and his men failed to real­ they won elections. He was therefore itself on its firm support for French ize that their kind of security service anxious to hold presidential elections as allies in Africa. Comorian interim was no longer appropriate in an Africa soon as possible to provide for future President Said Mohamed Djohar - where old power struggles had been political stability. A stable government )

who,0 as president of the Supreme replaced by more fundamental battles with a proper mandate would also be in 1

Court,0 succeeded Abdallah when he for economic survival and financially a better position to negotiate with for­ 2 was assassinated - was effectively viable government. 31

d eign donors and chart a course to eco­ e

callingt on such support when he asked It is not without irony that the appar­ nomic recovery. Stringent austerity a

Franced to intervene and to provide mili­ ent new climate of political tolerance measures would be needed to satisfy (

taryr assistance to restore the country's and co-operation in the Comoros may the demands of the International e

security,h in line with the Franco­ be the one valuable legacy bequeathed Monetary Fund (1M F) for structural s i

Comorianl defence treaty.29 to the islands by Denard's mercenary adjustment in the economy, and it b After Denard's humiliating depar­ actIvItIes. While Comorians were would be much easier for a president u P

ture, Paris felt obliged to assume deeply divided in their attitudes to recently endorsed by the electorate to e

responsibilityh for security and sent 140 Abdallah, there was almost universal carry these through.33 t men from the Regiment Parachutiste revulsion at his brutal slaying. They will The two-round presidential elections, y b

d'Infanterie de Marine and 90 marine miss him with mixed feelings - they initially scheduled for 18 and 25 d

commandose from the warship faubert. loathed his money-grabbing antics but February 1990, were seen as marking an t

Theyn were joined by some 50 officers delighted in his flamboyance. Perhaps indisputable and essential turning-point a

andr instructors from the Detachement more than anything, they will miss his in the politics of the archipelago. For g d' Assistance Militaire et d'Instruction, very direct, almost primitive style of

e the first time there would be really whoc were to remain for two years to communication. But the brief rule by democratic elections, with eight candi­ n e

reorganizec and train the Comorian the mercenaries united the Comorian dates vying for the highest office in the i l

armed forces. The reorganization of people in resentment, and the enforced country. Interim President Said r

locale security forces was undertaken to departure of les soldats perdus - lost Mohamed Djohar, seventy years old, the d

avoidn the risk of creating another "army soldiers who sought misdirected adven­ former head of the Supreme Court and u within an army", such as the presiden­ ture - created a new sense of hope and backed by the governing Union y

tiala guard had come to be. expectation for the future. 32 Como rienne pour Ie Progres (UCP) as w

e The Comorian government thanked well as by Paris and Pretoria, struck a t Southa Africa for its efforts in helping to The Djohar administration: decisive blow in the run-up to the elec­ G

resolve the crisis following Abdallah's tions when he announced that, if elect­ t

assassinatione and to finally release the Return to mUlti-party ed, he would abolish the import-export n islandsi from the mercenary strangle­ democracy? monopoly which had been in the hands b

hold.a Relations between the two coun­ Denard's departure cleared the way for of the Ahmed Abdallah, Amine S

triesy have since been enhanced by Djohar to re-establish effective consti­ Kalfane, and Mohamed Ahmed families b Moroni's decision to upgrade the status tutional government and to lay down since 1978. The other contenders for the d e c u

.. d Africao Insight, vo120, no 3, 1990

r 145 p e R Political economy ______- presidency were 51-year-old Prince Mohamed Ali Mbalia - 2,56 per cent. comeback - Ojohar having shrewdly Said Ali Kemal, a former ambassador to The choice for the second round on adopted the slogan "continuity and France, grandson of the last sultan of 11 March was narrowed down to that change" during the presidential election Grande Comore, and founder of the between Mohamed Taki and Said campaign. The government team, Chuma party; 51-year-old Ali Mroudjae Mohamed Ojohar. Abbas Ojoussouf apparently just a transitional adminis­ of the Union pour une Republique (MOP), Mohamed Hassanaly (FP) and tration until a new constitution. has been Democratique aux Comores (UROC), a Mohamed Ali Mbalia (Pasoco) pledged drawn up and a general election called, former prime minister and minister of their support to Mohamed Taki seemed to be the product of an awk­ foreign affairs, but of humble social ori­ (UNOC), while Said Ali Kemal ward political mixture of the different gins; 48-year-old Abbas Ojoussouf of (Chuma), Ali Mroudjae (UROC) and factions which lent their support to the Mouvement pour la Democratie et Ie Mouzaoir Abdallah (also UROC, but Ojohar in the second ballot of the Progres (MOP), an ex-defence minister not an election candidate) decided to March presidential elections. 38 and a wealthy businessman; 54-year-old back Said Mohamed Ojohar (UCP).36 The present Comorian constitution Mohamed Taki, leader of the Union Ojohar emerged victorious from the and laws still effectively render the Nationale pour la Democratie aux run-off election - gaining 55,06 per country a one-party state, but Ojohar Comores (UNOC), a former president of cent of the vote to Taki's 44,54 per cent. has tolerated a de facto multi-party sys­ the Federal Assembly and living in self­ The new president faced a number of tem since he came to power in imposed exile in Paris; Mohamed Ali problems. While the goodwill of for­ November 1989. Outlining his new Mbalia of the Parti Socialiste des eign donors and neighbouring countries government's programme after the Comores (Pasoco); Mohamed - glad to see the ending of the disas­ March presidential elections, he Hassanaly of the Front Populaire (FP); trous interlude of mercenary rule - promised to revise the constitution and and Moustapha Said Cheikh of the seemed assured; there was no guarantee restore de jure multi-party democracy Front Democratique (FO). The latter is of domestic calm. The run-up to the before holding further elections. He a well-known Marxist, but otherwise election has seen the emergence of a also announced that there would be there were no apparent ideological dif­ plethora of parties, some representing tighter control of public expenditure, an ferences between the candidates.34 purely local interests. It would take independent commission to investigate The democratic process started time for the system to achieve a stable state finances and institute economic inauspiciously. Political violence and balance of organized groups, built reforms, a reshaping of the education attempts at electoral fraud led to the around ideology or policies rather than system, and a resumption of negotia­ postponement of the February presiden­ personalities. The new head of state tions with the IMF and World Bank on ) tial0 elections, which were rescheduled would also have to reconcile the inter­ a package of loans to underpin a struc­ 1 for0 March. 35 ests of the individual islands, particu­ tural adjustment programme. 2

d Under the Abdallah regime, opposi­ larly the fears of Anjouan that it would Ojohar's government seems deter­ e tiont parties - whether operating clan­ now be neglected following the demise mined, through dialogue and consulta­ - a

destinelyd inside the Comoros or based of Ahmed Abdallah, and the pressure tion, to achieve the democratization of (

overseasr in Paris - almost always from inhabitants of Grande Com ore for political life - by establishing a multi­ e

reflectedh narrow constituencies, fre­ a greater share of development funds party system and promoting respect for s i quentlyl tied to the boundaries of old and political influence. basic human freedoms - and to effect b

sultanatesu or simply crystallizing Such tensions may well resurface if the rehabilitation of economic and P around former political favourites. In fresh parliamentary elections are held financial life - by eradicating corrup­ e

bothh cases, the main objective of these soon. The president could well find that tion and preventing the embezzlement t factions and their leaders was to jockey he does not have a federal assembly of public funds. 39 y b for the position of president whenever prepared to give him full support, or d

thate office should fall vacant. Shifting even an assembly dominated by a sin­ t Can structural adjustment allegiancesn reflect another tendency of gle party. However, there are signs that

a save a deteriorating dissidentr groups in the Comoros: the some politicians are prepared to coa­ g economy?

easee with which political platforms suc­ lesce around the presidential (and later c also parliamentary) winner, and this cumbn to short-term coalitions. Today, the Comoros are in economic e

c The first round of the rescheduled could help to create a sense of unity, and financial chaos: indeed, the legacy i l presidential elections on 4 March even if it is mainly motivated by hopes of fifteen years of instability and r provede an ideal testing ground for these of a share in power.37 neglect is an economic nightmare. The d assumptions.n With eight candidates With the formation of a new govern­ prospects for the future look even more u competing, and with 60 per cent of eli­ ment on 22 March, Ojohar would have

y bleak, given the country's few natural giblea voters casting their ballots, the fol­ liked to mark a complete break with resources, limited infrastructure, a w lowinge results were officially recorded: former President Abdallah's team. Not minimal industrial base, and the pre­ t

Mohameda Taki - 24,35 per cent; one minister in the last Abdallah cabi­ carious hold on traditional export mar­ G Said Mohamed Ojohar - 23,07 per cent; net survived the reshuffle, and none of t kets. Manufacturing development is Saide Ali Kemal- 13,71 per cent; the official advisers of the former head n limited and consists largely of export­ i

Abbasb Ojoussouf - 13,57 per cent; of state was taken up in the administra­ oriented activities, such as vanilla-pro­ a

MoustaphaS Said Cheikh - 9,12 per cent; tion. Instead, some of Abdallah's for­ cessing (vanilla being the main export

Aliy Mroudjae - 9,03 per cent; mer mmlsters, having split from his crop), and handicrafts. The archipelago b Mohamed Hassanaly - 4,56 per cent; government in recent years, staged a d has an unexploited fishing potential, e c u

d .. o

146r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Political economy

mainly tuna, and the authorities have even the sales of vanilla - which completely overhauled as one of the undertaken a two-year development brings in 70 per cent of foreign­ first steps in a structural adjustment scheme to build the necessary infra­ exchange earnings - collapsed in the programme. Corruption and fraud structure for a fishing industry. face of strong competition from meant the government collected less Agriculture, however, is the major eco­ Indonesia. Shipments fell to 63,3 than half the 1987 revenue target - nomic activity, contributing at least 40 tonnes in 1987, from 257,5 tonnes in sufficient to meet only one-third of per cent of the islands' small gross 1986, reducing earnings to US$4,24 recurrent expenditure. In 1989, again, national product (GNP) while provid­ million. Exports of vanilla recovered to revenue from customs tariffs fell short ing employment to some 80 per cent of 220 tonnes in 1988, but the decline of by some 60 per cent on estimates. the labour force as well as being the the Comoros' market share is likely to Wastage and mismanagement, coupled principal source of export earnings. continue as Indonesia - a newcomer to with state corruption at all levels and a But, generally, agriculture stagnates at this specialist trade - refines its pro­ hijacking of the economy by the politi­ the subsistence level.4o duct quality. cians, do not bode well for the country. Because of low crop yields, 'domestic Although exports of the Comoros In fact, it now seems as if kleptocracy food production falls well short of main agricultural products (vanilla, - government by theft - has become annual population growth - which cloves, and ylang-ylang) have risen systemic in the Comoros, as in so many stands at a staggering 3,3 per cent per from US$II,36 million in 1987 to parts of the African mainland.44 year - necessitating the importation of US$20,76 million in 1988, imports Besides increasing the prices of over half the Comoros' food require­ have remained more or less the same basic foodstuffs there is little room for ments, notably rice. In the islands the for those years at some US$52 million. the government to manoeuvre, other "rice question" is of paramount impor­ Despite the improvement in the export than through civil service reforms. In a tance. With 450 people per cultivable figures, the huge trade deficit will total population of some 409 000, about square kilometre, the archipelago is one therefore upset an already burdensome 8 000 adolescents leave school every of the most densely populated countries debt-repayment schedule. Although the year, only to become unemployed. To in the world. Although rice is grown on total seems paltry by mainland stan­ compound matters, about 60 per cent of about one-third of the cultivable land, dards, servicing of the islands' debts of the population are less than 20 years the Comoros currently imports more US$187,7 million accounted for 65 per old; and at the beginning of the 1989 than twice as much as it produces, cent of export revenue in 1987.42 school year it was estimated that some chiefly from Thailand and Pakistan. Ahmed Abdallah was openly hostile 49 per cent of children between the Rice imports peaked at 38 000 tonnes to the World Bank's proposals for struc­ ages of 12 and 14 did not even attend )

in0 1987 - accounting for nearly 28 per tural adjustment, perceiving that the school. With so few alternatives, people 1

cent0 of total imports by value. There radical fiscal reforms that lay at the seeking work have swollen the ranks of 2

hasd subsequently been an improvement centre of the programme would further the administration, so that today there e

butt it is estimated that the deficit will erode his support, cramp his seigneurial is one civil servant for every 45 a

rised to 80 000 tonnes by the end of the style and ultimately dismantle the Comorians - making the government (

1990s,r an amount that cannot be met by regime which had allowed his business the largest single employer, with a total e

eitherh export growth (in other products) interests and those of his proteges to of some 8 000 staff members. Officials s i

orl an accelerated programme of cultiva­ flourish. His death has removed a major tend to be poorly educated and also tion.b Nevertheless, the availability of obstacle to the liberalization of the badly motivated, partly because empty u P

rice at affordable prices is important Comoros' quasi-feudal economy and state coffers mean that they are paid e

politicallyh in a country where per capita the implementation of a tough struc­ only irregularly, and often not at all for t gross domestic product (GDP) is only tural adjustment programme. Yet even long periods. Naturally, the IMF and y b

US$240, while government salaries his last administration had no choice the World Bank are asking for a reduc­ d

averagee US$160 a month.41 but to accept the need for adjustment tion of some 1 700 posts in the short t

n As cultivable land is limited, many measures to correct a deteriorating eco­ term, chiefly through premature retire­ a

ofr the better soils are devoted to export nomic situation. The 1989 budget ment or streamlining. Although g

cash-crope production, mostly under already signalled the government's deplorable, given that government ser­ c vice offers the only employment oppor­ expatriaten estate management. As has intentions to cut public spending, partly e

beenc indicated, the Comorian economy by reducing the number of civil ser­ tunity to the middle class, this is put i l is essentially agricultural, and the vants, and to increase tax revenues in a into perspective by noting that it also r

majore export crops are vanilla, cloves, bid to attract multilateral funding.43 consumes close to 60 per cent of recur­ d 45 ylang-ylang,n and copra. The price of Additional measures proposed by the rent expenditure. u cloves has collapsed to one-seventh of World Bank with a view to cutting Provisions dealing with the social y

whata it was in 1985, copra has been hit government expenditure included the aspects of the IMF structural adjust­ w

bye substitutes on the market, and ylang­ closure, privatization or reorganization ment programme for the Comoros are t

ylanga suffers from erratic prices. Only of parastatals, more rigorous tax collec­ designed to cushion the popUlation G vanilla has maintained some profitabili­ tion - with a warning that peasant from the impact of any stringent mea­ t ty,e because of regional agreements farmers and share-croppers may sures, the most drastic effect being on n i

betweenb Comorian producers and their become eligible for the first time - the prices of basic foodstuffs such as a

counterpartsS in Madagascar and and increased duties on imported rice, meat and sugar. Implicit in the

Reuniony which have helped to stabilize luxury goods. This points to the fact World Bank's recommendations on the b both production levels and prices. But that the customs service will have to be issue is the recognition that food self- d e c u

.. d o

Africar Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 147 p e R Political economy ______•

sufficiency - an important strand of France has hinted that its indispens­ programme - notably higher food the 1983-90 development strategy for able injections of budgetary aid would prices and public sector retrenchment the Comoros - is no longer a realistic depend upon an IMF agreement. In - are likely to depress living stan­ target. A substantial increase in food 1988 the budget deficit stood at 7 per­ dards without an influx of supplemen­ prices is central to the easing of the cent of total GDP but a policy of volun­ tary financial support. Both institutions heavy import bill, but the Bank is also tary restraint reduced it to 3,5 percent have already offered to provide loans asking (in addition to a reduction in the of GDP in 1989. However, neither fig­ to rescue the economy from debt civil service, higher import taxes, more ure takes account of ad hoc budgetary arrears and to support agriculture. But rigorous tax and customs-duty collec­ assistance from France, usually in the the economy will continue to remain tion, and an enlargement of the tax form of unpaid salaries. Paris has tradi­ heavily dependent on foreign aid and base) for an end to the existing market­ tionally helped to bridge the budget vulnerable to fluctuating prices for its ing arrangements for vanilla. deficit, with annual aid of around main export crops, vanilla, cloves, and Providing 80 per cent of the islands' US$5,2 million, but in 1989 it refused ylang-ylang. In fact, the islands have exports and 70 per cent of government to raise its budgetary assistance or little but the tourist industry to rely on. revenue, vanilla is an area of special advance the disbursement schedule However, the tourist potential of the sensitivity. The World Bank is commit­ until there had been substantial archipelago is rather limited, since its ted to export-led growth, first through progress towards an adjustment pro­ volcanic islands have few sand beach­ the removal of constraints and, second, gramme. Thus budgetary subventions es. Even with new revenues from through the diversification into and have played an important role in cover­ tourism, the Comoros will remain one promotion of new export crops such as ing large fiscal deficits, while addition­ of the poorest countries in the world. cardamom, cinnamon, black pepper, al French aid funds have helped to South Africa's strategic foothold and fruit (especially mangoes and lychees), offset a weak external account aggra­ commercial interests in the Comoros and exotic flowers for air shipment to vated by the recent depressed markets now appear at risk following a virtual markets in Europe and the Middle East. for Comorian exports. In fact, the take-over by France of the islands. To meet the first criterion, exporters biggest dose of financial support comes Though South African commercial pen­ will enjoy a 35 per cent reduction in from the French Fonds d' Aide et de etration of the archipelago's economy export taxes as well as the abolition of Cooperation, which extends some will probably continue, possibly on a levies. But, given the negligible US$17 million annually. France, there­ smaller scale, the influence-garnering demand for cloves and coprah, and the fore, remains the primary economic aid projects that cost South Africa mil­ fierce undercutting that has character­ partner of the Comoros.48 lions of rand may be discontinued as ) ized0 the vanilla trade over the last few the French re-assert themselves. French 1 years,0 there are distinct limitations to efforts at preventing South African 2 Conclusion •

exportd growth. Markets are contracting, domination of the tourist industry in the

e 46 whatevert the price. Ancient Polynesians, pirates, planters, islands - the South African Sun a

d In exchange for compliance with slavers, Malagasy warlords, colonial International group recently pulled out (

theser measures, the IMF has offered a imperialists and post-Congo mercenar­ because of political instability, social e

US$7,2h million transitional loan to ies - all have been players in the unrest and unfavourable economic con­ s i

coverl the social costs of adjustment, relentless tale of brutality and high ditions - is symbolic of a broader bat­ whileb the World Bank has pledged adventure that is Comorian history. tle for influence: Paris is clearly u P

US$6,6 million to agricultural support. The new leadership in the Djohar concerned that while French business e

Ofh greater value, however, is the Administration will face an insecure loses interest in the Comoros, the South t prospect of a return to an orthodox rela­ future - if the Comoros' past is any­ Africans are only too willing to step in. y b tionship with traditional donors, most thing to go by. Indeed, the legacy of As the state with most influence in the d

ofe whom had been angered by the twelve years of autocratic rule by south-west Indian Ocean area, France t

Abdallahn government's odd house­ Abdallah and the mercenary strangle­ has recently also moved to counter a a keepingr methods and the excesses of hold on Comoran society is a political growing economic threat from coun­ g the presidential guard. This could clear e vacuum and an economic nightmare. tries in Asia (notably Japan, Malaysia, thec way for rescheduling of the The implementation of a structural and India) and the Middle East, as well n e

Comoros'c external debt, of which the adjustment programme, delayed by the as from Australia. i l bulk is owed to Arab sources, an easing turmoil following Abdallah's assassi­ Recent events in the Comoros high­ r ofe the country's severe debt-servicing nation and the ensuing presidential light the importance of Mayotte and d costs,n and an influx of bilateral funds. elections, will be a priority for the new how well the French can put it to use to u Total foreign debt amounted to US$198 Comorian government, although politi­ protect their interests in the Indian y milliona in 1989, according to cally hazardous. The goal is to rein in Ocean. And a massive French develop­ w

Organizatione for Economic Co-opera­ the budget deficit over the next three ment programme for the island makes t tiona and Development (OECD) figures years through a mixture of spending the possibility of reintegration with the G

-t a heavy burden for a nation of cuts, improved revenue collection, and rest of the archipelago ever more 409e 000 people with a GDP of some

n better management of public enterpris­ remote. In addition to major invest­ i

US$160b million a year. Total foreign es. Although the Djohar Adminis­ ments in a deepwater port, public hous­ a

investmentS amounted to around US$7 tration is close to achieving IMF and ing and infrastructure, and an

milliony in 1988 but was 80 per cent World Bank support for its adjustment international airport, far-reaching b financed by external aid. 47 d measures, the social effects of the reforms in land and labour laws are e c u

d .. o

148r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Political economy

planned. These developments will raise 4, no 2, 1989, P 14; Sunday Times and, in the Comoros, Mustapha Mahdjou) the living standards of Mahorais even (Johannesburg), 16 April 1989; and has been described as "charismatic, clever, further above those of Comorians. But Business Day (Johannesburg), 28 highly intelligent, manipulative, meglo­ Mayotte's peculiar status poses a con­ November 1989. manical - and totally ruthless": The 3 African Connexion, vol 4, no 2, 1989, Times (London), 1 December 1989; and stant problem for France, which is reg­ Saturday Star, 9 December 1989. ularly rebuked in international and P 14; and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Madagascar, Comoros, Country 10 EIU, op cit, P 33; Le Monde (Paris), 25 regional forums for its role on the Profile, 1989-90, London: EIU, 1990, pp November 1989; and Sunday Star, 17 island - a motion on the order paper of 2,32 and 36. December 1989. the 44th Session of the United Nations 4 EIU, op cit, pp 35 and 36. 11 EIU, op cit, p 33; and The Independent General Assembly again called for an 5 P Sidler, "Poverty and dependence on the (London), 29 November, 1989. end to the occupation of Mayotte and Comoros", Swiss Review of World Affairs, 12 EIU, op cit, p 33; and idem, Madagascar, other French island possessions in the vol 39, no 6, September 1989, p 28; and Mauritius, Seychelles, Comoros: Country Business Day, 28 November 1989. After south-west Indian Ocean. Mayotte also Report, no 1, 1990, London: EIU, 1990 colonizing the Comoros in the early 1900s, remains the most important foreign­ P 45. policy issue for the Comoros and rela­ the French ruled the islands from Dzaoudzi, the capital of Mayotte - 13 The Citizen, 8 February 1989; Saturday tions with France are therefore already annexed in 1843. French settlers Star, 2 December 1989; and Sunday Star, somewhat strained. The position taken had married local women over the years 17 December 1989. in Moroni is that Mayotte belongs to and a tiny but vocal Creole community 14 "The Comoros connection", Africa Report, had come into existence. When in 1962 the the Comoros whether the island's vol 34, no I, January-February 1989, p 49; president of the new self-governing inhabitants like it or not, since the orig­ Africa Report, vol 34, no 6, November­ authority, Said Mohamed Cheikh, moved inal referendum held on all four islands December 1989, p 5; The Citizen, 8 the capital to Moroni on Grande Comore, yielded a clear overall majority in February 1989; and Saturday Star, 2 there was an uproar of protest from the December 1989. See also Financial Times favour of independence from France. Mouvement Populaire Mahorais (MPM). (London), 13 January 1989; International Moreover, it is felt in the Comorian So when Ahmed Abdallah declared the Herald Tribune (London), 5 December capital that whatever the French invest islands independent of France in 1975 to 1989; and Sunday Times, 10 June 1990. in their tiny tropical territory is some­ foil French designs on Mayotte and take how being withheld from the republic the wind out of the sails of the more radi­ 15 Africa Report, vol 34, no 1, January­ as a whole. cal opposition parties, Mayotte seized the February 1989, p 49; D Baum, "Comoros: opportunity to whip up separatist senti­ South African showpiece?", New African, French influence, especially over the ment and promptly stated that it would no 257, February 1989, p 18; P Sidler, op Comorian security forces now being

) remain French. Paris thus found a conve­ cit, p 28; Sunday Times, 16 April 1989;

reshaped0 by French military advisers, nient and secure niche to slip into: A and Saturday Star, 2 December 1989. 1

will0 be much greater than under Yahya, op cit, p 15.

2 16 P Sidler, op cit, p 28; EIU, Madagascar, Abdallah. But Paris will have to be 6 The Citizen (Johannesburg), 8 February d Comoros, ... op cit, P 33; Sunday Star, 17 e

carefult not to overplay its public influ­ 1989; and Saturday Star, 2 December 1989 December 1989; and Weekly Mail a (Johannesburg), 21 December 1989. enced on the new regime if it is to avoid 7 P Sidler, op cit, p 28; "Comoros: Paradise ( being labelled "neo-colonialist". Lost for a mercenary", Africa Report, vol r 17 D Kendo, "Comores: L'Ordre Mercenaire", Relationse with South Africa are likely 34, no 6, November-December 1989, p 5; h Jeune Afrique, nos 1511/1512, 18 and 25

s and A Hartley, "Comoros: Paradise Lost", i December 1989), p 13. tol revert to a much more orthodox trad­ Africa Report, vol 35, no I, March-April ingb and diplomatic relationship. This u 1990, p 38. 18 EIU, Madagascar, Comoros, ... op cit, pp

willP suit the new leadership in Pretoria, 8 The Citizen, 8 February 1989; Business 33 and 36; The Citizen, 8 February 1989; whiche co-operated closely with France and 21 December 1989. h Day, 28 November 1989; and Saturday Weekly Mail, t in ousting Denard. Ties with the major, y Star, 2 December 1989. 19 EIU, Madagascar, Comoros, ... op cit, P b conservative Arab aid donors in the 9 EIU, op cit, p 34; "Comoros: Denard 36; Africa Events, vol 6, no I, January d

Gulfe should also improve: relations dethroned", Africa Events, vol 6, no 1, 1990, p 7; The Citizen, 8 February 1989; t

strainedn by suspicions that the Comoros January 1990, p 7; Sunday Times, 16 April Le Monde, 25 November 1989; and

a Business Day, 7 December 1989. becamer a conduit for South African 1989; and Sunday Star (Johannesburg), 17 g arms exports to Iran during the Gulf December 1989. Bob Denard was born in e 20 EIU, Madagascar, Comoros, ... op cit, P War.c But, in the final analysis, the com­ Laspasse in southern France in 1929, the 34; and The Star, 28 November 1989. n son of an official in the French equivalent e

plexc situation in present-day Comoros 21 "The Comoros: A slight hiccup in struc­ i of the Colonial Office that administered l is the creation of both France and South the then extensive French colonial empire. tural adjustment", Market South East, vol r

Africae - and the two bear the primary He attended the French Naval School of 4, no 3, March 1990, pp 10 and 11. d

responsibilityn for the sorry state of Mechanics before joining the French 22 EIU, Madagascar, Mauritius, ... op cit, pp u affairs in these tragic islands. Army. After fighting in the war in Indo­ 40 and 41. y China, he left the army to enlist in the a 23 Ibid, P 42; A Rajab, "Comoros: Case for

w Moroccan police force. When the Algerian e

t independence conflict erupted, he rushed OAU intervention", Africa Analysis, no

Notesa and references headlong into it, reportedly ending up in 87,8 December 1989, p 4; and A Hartley, G "The Comoros", African Connexion, vol 4, the shadowy world of the rebel French op cit, pp 38-39. t

e no 2, 1989, P 14; and Saturday Star army units (the infamous OAS) fighting

n 24 EIU, Madagascar, Mauritius, ... op cit, pp i (Johannesburg), 2 December 1989. the De Gaulle government. From there it b 41-42; and A Hartley, op cit, p 39.

2 a A Yahya, "Confounded Comoros: What is was but a short step into the world of the S holding back the Comoros struggle against mercenary, selling his undoubted skills. 25 Africa Report, vol 34, no 6, November­ y

b dependency?", Africa Events, vol 6, no 3, Denard (sometimes using aliases such as December 1989, p 5; and Le Monde, 9

d March 1990, p 15; African Connexion, vol Gilbert Bourgeaud, Colonel Jean Maurin November 1989. e c u

.. d

Africao Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 r 149 p e R Political economy ______

26 Le Monde, 9 November 1989; and The 34 EIU, Madagascar, Mauritius, ... op cit, pp P 36; A Hartley, op cit, p 40; and Abecor, Times, 1 December 1989. 14, 44 and 45; "Comoros Islands: Radical Indian Ocean Islands: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles, 27 A Rajab, op cit, p 4; and A Hartley, op cit, political change?", Indian Ocean Abecor Country Report, April 1990, p 1 p 40. Newsletter, no 417, 10 February 1990, p 5; and "Comoros: Taki takes the lead", 28 International Herald Tribune, 5 December 41 Africa Economic Digest, vol 10, no 3, 20- Africa Economic Digest, vol 11, no 7, 26 January 1989, p 4; Market South East, 1989; and The Independent, 11 December 19-25 February 1990, p 7. 1989. vol4, no 3, March 1990, p 12; and Abecor, 35 A Yahya, op cit, p 15; and "Comoros op cit, p 1. 29 EIU, Madagascar, Comoros, ... op cit, pp Islands: Djohar versus Taki", Indian Ocean 42 Africa Economic Digest, vol 10, no 3, 20- 43 and 44; The Times, 5 and 14 December Newsletter, no 421, 10 March 1990, p 5. 1989; The Star, 14 and 15 December 1989; 26 January 1989, p 4; M Kazi, op cit, p 36; and Sunday Star, 17 December 1989. To 36 EIU, Madagascar, Comoros, ... op cit, pp EIU, Madagascar, Mauritius, ... op cit, pile on the pressure in the days before 34 and 35; and Indian Ocean Newsletter, appendix 6; and Abecor, op cit, p 1. Denard's fall, an impressive naval task no 421,10 March 1990, p 5. 43 Market South East, vol 4, no 3, March force was assembled in the area; four war­ 37 EIU, Madagascar, Mauritius, ... op cit, P 1990, pp 10 and 11; and Abecor, op cit, pI. ships lay just over the horizon off Moroni, 13' and "Comoros Islands: Contested win 44 Africa Economic Digest, vol 10, no 3, 20- while more paratroopers and naval com­ fo; Djohar", Indian Ocean Newsletter, no 26 January 1989, p 4; "Comoros: IMF to mandos, six Transall transport aircraft and 422, 17 March 1990, p 6). the rescue", Africa Analysis, no 89, 19 five Puma helicopters stayed in reserve on 38 "Comoros Islands: New team", Indian January 1990, p 11; and M Kazi, op cit, p Mayotte. Ocean Newsletter, no 424,31 March 1990, 36 30 "Comoros: The stormy islands", Africa pp 1 and 3; "Comoros: New team, old 45 Africa Economic Digest, vol 10, no 3, 20- Events, vol 6, no 2, February 1990, p 14; faces", Africa Economic Digest, vol 11, 26 January 1989, p 4; P Sidler, op cit, "Comoros: Farewell to Bob Denard", no 13,2-8 April, 1990, P 6; and Le Monde, p 28; Market South East, vol 4, no 3, Indian Ocean Newsletter, no 411, 23 29 March 1990. March 1990, p 11; and Le Monde, 25 December 1989, p 4; The Times, 5 39 "Comoros Islands: Djohar's programme November 1989. December 1989; Sunday Star, 17 speech", Indian Ocean Newsletter, no 429, December 1989; The Star, 20 December 46 Africa Economic Digest, vol 10, no 3, 20- 5 May 1990, p 5; "Comoros: Djohar joins 1989; and Agence France Presse (Paris), 26 January 1989, p 4; M Kazi, op cit, p 36; democracy bandwagon", Africa Economic 20 December 1989. and Market South East, vol 4, no 3, March Digest, vol 11, no 18, 7-13 May 1990, p 1990, p 11. 31 EIU, Madagascar, Mauritius, ... op cit, P 16; and "Comoran president pledges com­ 47 M Kazi, op cit, p 35; Market South East, 44; and "Of bats and dogs", The mitment to reforms", BBC Summary of vol 4, no 3, March 1990, p 11; and Abecor, Economist, vol 313, no 7633, 16-22 World Broadcasts, Third Series, no 0764, op cit, p 1. December 1989, p 55. 15 May 1990, p B/3. 48 Africa Economic Digest, vol 10, no 3, 20- 32) EIU, Madagascar, Mauritius, ... op cit, P 40 "Comoros: Edging closer to an IMF agree­ 0 46; A Hartley, op cit, pp 38 and 40; and 26 January 1989, p 4; M Kazi, op cit, pp 1 ment", Africa Economic Digest, vol 10, no Market South East, 0 The Independent, 29 November, 1989. 35 and 36; vol 4, no 3,

2 3, 20-26 January 1989, p 4; P Sidler, op

March 1990, p 11; and Abecor, op cit, pI.

33d EIU, Madagascar, Mauritius, ... op cit, pp cit, p 28; M Kazi, "Comoros: New govern­ e

t 40, 44 and 45-46; and Africa Events, vol 6, ment will implement IMF reforms", a no 2, February 1990, p 14. African Business, no 138, February 1990, d (

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150r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Development

Political transition, development and the role of civi I society

Mark Swilling, of the Centre for Policy Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, looks at the development debate emerging from behind the current political negotiations in South Africa, and argues for a non-statist, community-based development strategy.

Introduction implies that we know what the needs and a short assessment of the available The political transition process that are and we have the resources to domestic resources for (primarily began on 2 February 1990 is proceed­ address these needs, but we have a urban) development; the future of civil ing on its predictably unplanned and social structure, economic system, society and its role in development; and

uncertain) way. Nelson Mandela is cor­ bureaucratic apparatus and political a possible role for external donor agen­ 0

rect1 to argue that it is not yet irre­ culture that will fundamentally obstruct cies in development. versible.0 Nevertheless, there is no of resources into projects

2 the flow

doubtd that the old rules of the game no capable of addressing basic needs in a e Transition: Beyond reform longert apply and the pieces on the way that will have a structural impact a

politicald chessboard have moved into during the transitional and post­ and revolution (

endgamer positions. However, as it apartheid era. The survival into the The South African lexicon is always e becomesh ever easier to predict what the post-apartheid era of the current the best weather-vane of political s i finall moves are going to be as the bureaucratic machinery, combined with change. This is why we should take b

majoru players resolve the fundamental the administrative incapacity of a future very seriously what South Africans P

constitutional questions of state power majority government - because of the mean these days when they talk about e newh questions have already begun to past exclusion of the majority from the "transition". It is a word used repeated­ t

loomy large. These revolve, in essence, skills of governance - will mean that, ly in the Harare Declaration and by the b around the nature of development. despite ANC policy commitments to National Party (NP). In township d

e It is arguable that even before real the contrary, the state will not be able to streets, comrades use it; television t

constitutionaln negotiations begin, the become an "instrument for develop­ commentators use it. The words a majorr players have already played their ment" in less than a decade and maybe "reform" and "revolution" have disap­ g

politicale and economic cards and even two decades. peared from the language of political c

revealedn that there are no fundamental The policy question that emerges leadership. Instead, a new language of e differencesc when it comes to citizen­ from this argument is obvious. Given legitimacy is being created and used i l ship and the nature of the nation-state, the limitations the state will face in r every day. This provides a sign of the ande property rights and the economic dealing with these blockages, where times. d

rolen of the state. must resources be deployed to empow­ To be more precise, "non-revolution­ u The critical and seemingly unsolv­ y er those involved in development at the ary regime transitions" - to use

ablea problem that all the players grassroots level to identify, obtain and Schmitter et aI's terms - refer to those w

involvede in the transition are beginning manage resources in an effective and processes of political change that have t

toa face with fear and trepidation is the efficient manner? occurred in Southern Europe, Latin G

problemt of development. In essence Proceeding from this basic policy America, Eastern Europe (and are now e

thisn boils down to a single question: question, the rest of this article will beginning in South East Asia and i

Whatb must be done to match the attempt to provide a brief analysis of Africa) whereby societies previously a

resourcesS available for development the nature of the transition, the basic dominated by authoritarian regimes

withy the basic needs that must be met? positions of the major players and some underwent a transition to democracy b

d Although simple, this question cuts future scenarios. It will also attempt an without going through a revolution. e

toc the root of the apartheid legacy. It overview of the development debate; Until very recently, it was accepted u d o

Africar Insight, vol 20, no 3,1990 151 p e R Oeve/opment ______

wisdom among South Africans that and minds of South Africans for the and subjective terms. "people in power do not voluntarily "new South Africa". In essence they are • Conflict resolution in south-western give up their power". This is why a creating the new non-racial middle Africa: independence in Namibia, negotiated settlement was thought to be class culture a future democratic state is military defeat in southern Angola impossible, leaving only the alterna­ going to require so desperately. To this and moves towards "national recon­ tives of revolution from below for those extent they run the risk of reinforcing a ciliation" in Angola and Mozam­ wanting power and reform from above more radical working class politics bique redefined South Africa's for those wishing to retain it (while with a socialist political project. As the regional role. simultaneously pretending to want to Latin Americans found out during the • Economic crisis: before his resigna­ surrender it). period after World War II, this would tion as Governor of the Reserve Clearly, South Africans were wrong be the logical consequence of imposing Bank in 1989, Gerhard de Kock and have now admitted this. Instead, a formal political democracy on one of baldly stated that no economic solu­ we are going through a transition driv­ the most unequal societies in the world. tion would be found until there was en by one primary dynamic: the regime It is worth taking a close look at how a political resolution of the constitu­ incumbents and the interests they repre­ the NP government arrived where it is tional question. This was the cue for sent are now genuinely committed to a today. It began its fifth decade in power the rise of the "econocrats" into process of fundamental change, and the with a strategy fundamentally different dominant positions in the corridors regime opponents believe them. The from those pursued by the P W Botha of power. critical issue now is no longer whether administration; and yet it was a product • Continuation of resistance and the fundamental change will happen, but of the contradictions of previous strate­ failure of the State of Emergency: on whose terms. The incumbents reck­ gies. State strategy during the 1979- although the Emergency broke on that their interests will be served in 1990 period can be summarized as national co-ordination, the churches the final outcome because they think follows: and unions were catapulted into the they can retain control of the pace and • 1979-1985: total strategy - some forefront of opposition, and resis­ terms of change. The regime opponents urban reforms, labour relations tance continued at the local level, acknowledge they were caught off reforms, tricameralism and region­ especially with the rent boycotts. guard, but have a better than good alization. But bantustans, influx The turning point, however, was the chance of gammg the InItlatlve. control and disenfranchisement of detainees' hunger-strike in February Consequently, both the regime incum­ the majority remained. 1989, when P W Botha was conva­ bents and their opponents have con­ lescing after his stroke and so was

) • 1985-1986: beyond total strategy cluded0 that they have more to lose by towards transition - led by the not present to overrule a liberal cabi­ 1 resisting0 the transition dynamic than by verligte technocrats in the state, net decision to release the detainees. 2

tryingd to determine its nature, terms influx control was dropped, bantu­ • Intra-state conflicts: the enormous e andt direction. stans acknowledged as non-viable, power concentrated within the a

d The peripheral players who play a failure of tricameralism acknow­ Office of the State President and the (

crucialr role are those on the far left and ledged, citizenship restored and use P W Botha made of this power, e

farh right who have rejected the terms of local government changed to combined with the dominance of the s i thel transition altogether. Both, howev­ include Africans at local level. "securocrats", resulted in severe and er,b ensure that the centre players bitter conflicts between the NP and u • 1986-1990: "WHAM" ("winning­ P become increasingly committed to the hearts-and-minds") introduced with the "securocrats", with the former e

transition,h knowing that to back out the declaration of the State of rallying around De Klerk in a bid to t would mean losing substantial ground Emergency in mid-1986 - urban re-establish its power. The result y b to the anti-transition forces. For every upgrading, new constitution needed, was the reassertion of the NP's will d

persone who joins the right wing, anoth­ negotiations, and so on, but all to govern as a party, in contrast with t

ern ounce of pressure is place on the NP without the ANC and with the extra­ its role under Botha. a tor settle. For every new recruit to the parliamentary movement in jail. • Unreliability of the security forces: g

PAC,e the ANC becomes increasingly Although F W de Klerk's personality the Rockman Affair brought focus c

dependentn on a settlement. is an important factor in the shaping of to bear upon a police force increas­ e

c The far right and far left are not the the post-P W Botha NP, the local, ingly dependent on non-white per­ i l only important peripheral players. regional and international context of his sonnel, who could not be relied r Theree are also the "transition mission­ accession to power must be regarded as upon always to obey orders to use d aries".n At the centre of one of South being far more significant. The com­ force, and on the role of right u Africa's biggest growth industries, bined effect of the following seven crit­ wingers who tended to exceed y thesea are the people with huge ical factors must be taken into account: instructions. w resourcese who go around converting the • Changes in the world balance of • The liberalization of business: slow­ t massesa to transition. In schools, facto­ power: perestroika, global super­ ly and grudgingly, South African G

ries,t neighbourhood meetings, industri­ power co-operation, the collapse of business began to perceive its own e

aln bargaining meetings, local-level Eastern Europe, Thatcher's inter­ interests through the ideological i negotiationsb and in an endless and ventionist role and the assertive mists, as the consequences of delay­ a

mind-bogglingS number of seminars, pro-settlement stance in Africa all ing the inevitable moved from the

workshops,y conferences and congress­ redefined South Africa's position in "opportunities" list to the "threats" b

es,d these people are preparing the hearts the world system in both objective list in their SWOT analyses. e c u d o

152r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3,1990 p e R ______Development

The NP's constitutional strategy • a political prediction based on the common voter's roll; since P W Botha's political demise can success of the DTA in Namibia that • a mixed economy; be divided into two periods. Between an NP-centred multiracial coalition • protection of fundamental rights and July 1989 and March 1990 its constitu­ of minorities would have more than freedoms through a justiciable Bill tional policy was based, in essence, on one third of the representatives in of Rights; "group rights." During this period the the lower house or, alternatively, the • a separation of powers, including an NP envisaged the enfranchisement of ANC-centred coalition of majorities independent and non-racial judicia­ South African citi~ens in a new united would not have two thirds; ry entrusted with the task of uphold­ South African nation-state via their vol­ • a weak executive and even weaker ing the rule of law and the untary membership of a particular head of state; principles of the constitution. "group" or "non-group". This would • a justiciable Bill of Rights that In reality, the ANC's top leadership have resulted in a multicameral legisla­ would protect property rights, above will not get its own way. This leader­ ture representative of all those citizens all else; ship will have to contend with an array who chose to be represented as groups • maximum devolution of power, cou­ of social forces within its ambit with a and a chamber for those who wanted to pled to decentralization and delega­ far more radical agenda. The unions be contracted out of group classifica­ tion where required. and civic associations in particular will tion. Decision-making would then have This neat but complex constitutional not remain quiescent in the face of what occurred according to the principle of strategy is non-racial and even formally may be perceived as too great a com­ "concurrent majorities" - the majority democratic. In reality, it would leave promise at national level. parties in each chamber would have to existing power relations largely intact To complete this section, it may be reach consensus. Whereas "group because it would prevent the majority worth listing five possible scenarios to rights" were protected in the constitu­ from removing the linchpins of the help comprehend what may happen tion in this way, it was envisaged that a existing structure of privilege and over the next five to ten years. Bill of Rights could then be enacted power: property rights; the civil ser­ Transformation: this is the ideal sub­ that would protect individual rights, vice; the security forces; the market; scribed to by the ANC and its allies and backed up by an independent judiciary. the Reserve Bank; and the integrity of boils down to a smooth linear process, This constitutional scheme fell apart the currency, loan commitments and which must start with the creation of an because no matter how far the NP financial system. "interim government" to supervise the twisted the English language, the bot­ In short, by accepting non-racialism transition, including the convening of a tom-line in this scenario was the reten­ and democracy in name, the NP's strat­ constituent assembly to adopt the new )

tion0 of a "group" concept in the law. It egy aims to achieve the same as many constitution. Because it is purposefully 1

was0 realized that an alternative system establishment forces are trying to do in conceived as a threat to the sovereignty 2 was required. The breakthrough came other spheres: urbanization (Urban of the existing state and the NP's deter­ d e

whent the NP suddenly discovered that Foundation policy), the workplace, mination to maintain control of the a

democracyd is a package deal including small business, land, local government, terms of transition, this model is widely ( an "electoral system" and that such sys­ job creation and housing. Without supported at a grassroots level. r temse can be manipulated to incorporate implying the existence of an establish­ Grand coalition: this represents the h s

I i option preferred by the left of the NP I endlessl complexities to suit those who ment conspiracy, the aim of all these makeb the rules. And so the 1990 NP initiatives can best be described as and right wing of the ANC. A compro­ u

P "deracialized apartheid", that is to say mise between the NP's multi-racial

constitutional strategy comes without "groupe rights", multicameralism and radical deracialization on terms that cabinet idea and the ANC's interim h t "concurrent majorities". Instead, the leave the decisions about power and government, this would be a grand y b

buzz-words are "minorities", "protec­ economic resources largely in the hands coalition of pro-"new South Africa" d

tions",e "proportional representation" of the class that makes these decisions forces constituted into some sort of t

andn "federalism". at the moment. This class, however, supraparliamentary council of state or a

r The NP has accepted that the will be deracialized. constitutional chamber. This body g "majority should rule". However, it Will the ANC be forced into accept­ would adopt a constitution and, follow­ e alsoc argues that "minorities" need to be ing this scenario? If it remains as weak­ ing a referendum of those "presently n e

"protectedc from the abuse of power" by ly organized as it is at present, the represented in parliament", the existing i l

the majority. What this amounts to is: answer is that it probably will accept it parliament would adopt it and by r

•e a bicameral parliament with an in some modified form. At the moment so doing dissolve itself. The first gen­ d

n upper house elected on a one-per­ its constitutional principles as summa­ eral election would then take place u son-one-vote basis; rized by Albie Sachs do not fundamen­ and the new system be initiated. y

•a a lower house elected on the basis tally contradict the NP approach. These The existing executive - albeit with w

e of proportional representation; are: some black leaders in the cabinet - t

•a a constitutional proviso that laws • equal rights for all South African would remain the supervisor of the G

must be passed by both chambers; citizens irrespective of race, colour, transition. t •e a proviso that either a two-thirds gender or creed; Regression: if De Klerk were to lose n i his nerve and sufficient NP MPs were

b majority in the lower house must • a government accountable at all lev­

a pass the bill or else one third (or els to the people through periodic to resign in marginal seats to pave the S

y less) of that house is entitled to a and free elections based on the prin­ way for a general election of by-elec­ b veto; ciples of universal suffrage on a tions, the CP would have a chance of d e c u

.. d

Africao Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 r 153 p e R Deve0pment ______

mounting a regression strategy during • one-person-one-vote in a unitary relates to the relationship between the dying moments of the old order. If electoral system; growth and redistribution and by what this were coupled to an armed strategy, • proportional representation; means this link should be facilitated. it could prove more successful than the • bicameralism; Four basic positions in the current "new South Africa" optimists would • a hybrid presidential system; debate can be identified: growth for like to imagine. If, however, the right • a Bill of Rights; redistribution; growth with redistribu­ wing split into hard core extremists • an independent judiciary; tion; growth through redistribution; committed to terrorism and a CP-led • devolution/decentralization of some redistribution is growth. mainstream committed to coming to the sort; The first position reflects a free mar­ negotiating table, then this option • settlement by negotiation; ket perspective, which presumes that would fall away. • political pluralism; resources for development can only be Revolution: a revolutionary strategy • protection of cultural values and generated as a by-product of growth. It is by no means dead in the ranks of the rights; argues that the more wealth there is, the union movement and among the youth • nation-building; more will trickle down. The policy pri­ organizations, civic associations and • preservation of traditional liberal ority, therefore, should be growth. left-wing parties. Riding a wave of pop­ rights and liberties such as associa­ The second approach is the ular uprisings, which could be triggered tion, expression and habeas corpus. Keynesian orientation of organizations by white "fascist" forces linked to On economic policy, they are agreed such as the Urban Foundation, black vigilante terrorism, the revolu­ on: Independent Development Trust (IDT) tionaries might be able to convince the • retention of the market mechanism; and possibly even the Development leadership to forego negotiations in • no unnecessary nationalization Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA). It order to give the revolutionary forces a beyond the preservation of the emphasizes the need for linking redis­ chance to strike for power. In this sce­ existing public sector; tributionist development policies chan­ nario, an interim government would • redistribution of some kind; nelled through the financial system to only be useful to the extent that it • economic growth through produc­ growth strategies. The argument is that would constrain the security forces tion, not financial speculation; growth is impossible without creating prior to a revolutionary bid for power. • a role for foreign investment; the socio-economic conditions within In other words, "dual power" would be • a link between inward industrializa- consumption that are necessary for a stepping-stone to "seizure of power". tion and the export sector; growth within production. Permanent stalemate: if no major • technological upgrading; The third position reflects the ANC ) stakeholder0 or coalition of stakeholders • job creation; view. In essence, this argues that redis­ 1 managed0 to secure the combined coer­ • a unionized labour force; tributionist strategies within both pro­ 2 cive, organizational and political • a Keynesian approach to consump­ duction and consumption constitute an d e resourcest to seize the strategic initiative tion; integral part of a growth model, and not decisivelya within the next year, we d • taxation as a major tool for redistri­ simply a primer for growth. In other ( could be looking at a prolonged stale­ bution; words, redistribution will break the r mate.e In this scenario, nothing would restrictions and biases in the economic

h • regulation through economic as s move,i while under everyone's feet the system that currently impoverish the

l opposed to political instruments; economyb declined, morale disintegrat­ • urban-centred growth that is bal­ majority and stunt growth. u ed,P investment evaporated and the anced with rural development; The final position equates redistribu­ societye polarized. • the state as an instrument for devel­ tion with growth because it is premised h t Although it is too early to predict opment. on the view that there is a large white­ y withb any degree of certainty which of When it comes to development, the controlled cake that simply needs to be thesed scenarios is the most likely, cur­ redivided for development to be e agreement between the major stake­ t

rentn indications are that the grand coali­ holders begins to break down. This is achieved. a

tionr is the most probable, even though partly related to interests, but also to If we ignore the first and fourth posi­ g it has severely negative consequences the underdeveloped state of the devel­ tions for the moment, the key debate is e forc development. It is to this aspect that opment debate at the moment. between positions two and three. In n wee should now tum. Where there is broad agreement, it is essence, the former envisages: c i l

on the ideas that: • massive redirection of resources r

e • development should be focused on into rural and urban development; Politics,d economic policy

n basic needs; • a role for the state limited to regu­ u and the development debate • quality of life is critical for econom­ lating the fiscal system in a y

It a is arguable that with the exception of ic growth; favourable way and intervening to w somee minor (albeit difficult) problems • the state has a role to play; provide goods the private sector t ona the margins of the debate, the major • the non-profit NGO sector has a cannot; G stakeholders are in broad agreement role; • a dominant role for the private sec­ t whene it comes to constitutional and • the private sector has a role. tor, in particular the financial insti­ n i

economicb policy principles. How these various components fit tutions, and the large corporations;

a On constitutional policy, they agree together, however, is much less clear.

S • a role for communities, but only as

on:y Given the link between inequality and bodies to be consulted; b • a single, united South Africa; development, the core of the problem • an important regulatory role for d e c u d

o Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 154r p e R ______Devewpment

local government; effects of apartheid, and actively pro­ development. This bias can be defend­ • job creation and productivity moting the empowerment of all our ed, however, on the grounds that South increases at the expense of union peoples." Africa's towns and cities will be power; In a paper delivered at the confer­ where: the most significant concentra­ • resources exploitation; ence, the infrastructural priorities were tions of population without basic ser­ • debt financing; identified as education, health, housing, vices will emerge; the most rapid • dependence on international mar­ water, electricity, communications, and increases in productivity should occur; kets, technology and loan finance. transport. These were the priorities that the economy will be linked to the The growth through redistribution were more or less confirmed in the international economy; and efficiency position has a different emphasis. It ANC's recent draft economic discus­ and cost effectiveness with respect to envisages: sion paper. the allocation of land, services and • massive deployment of resources It is significant, however, that housing will critically affect the health for development via the state and empowerment was identified as such a of the overall economic system. private sector; high priority. The ANC economic dis­ The following discussion omits com­ • a leading role for the state via the cussion paper argues that "the success pletely any mention of the large slice of fiscal, legal and development sys­ of a national development strategy the national budget currently spent on tems; depends to a considerable extent on education, transport, communications • an important but regulated role for development of our human resources." and health. the private sector; The Harare workshop and subse­ Very rough estimates of the total • democratization of economic deci­ quent workshops that have culminated resources that could be generated annu­ sion-making; in draft policy positions on the econo­ ally for urban development can be bro­ • a central role for the industrial rela­ my, local government, health, education ken down (see Table 1). tions system and trade unions in and land have not, however, gone much If we assume that 200 000 homes particular; beyond rather superficial statements of need to be built annually for the next • a leading and central role for com­ principle. Instead, an empirical assess­ ten years and an average per unit cost munity-based development agencies ment of existing domestic resources is of the land, services and house struc­ in the non-profit NGO sector; required, which includes an analysis of ture as R25 000, then we will require • key regulatory role for local govern­ the blockages that prevent these R5 billion annually. From the above ment over the urban system in order resources from being deployed to meet figures, we can conclude that even to ensure community empowerment basic needs. within the existing apartheid-structured )

0 through participation; fiscal and urban system, and excluding 1

•0 environmental preservation; the money that will flow into the coun­ 2 • local self-reliance; Existing development try from foreign aid agencies and d

e resources and blockages

•t development of the domestic market; donors, there are sufficient resources on a The growth through redistribution Because of the author's personal expe­ an annual basis to meet our needs. d ( position attaches a high degree of rience and expertise, the following dis­ The figures given in Table 1 have r importancee to the role of civil society cussion focuses exclusively on urban been confirmed recently by both the h s

ini development for three main reasons: l

theb limitations the constitutional settle­ u

mentP is going to place on the state's Table 1

rolee in development; the existing struc­ h

t Home loan finance - private: Urban Foundation R250m ture of the state apparatus, which is y Banks and building societies RI000m b

going to prevent it from being used as SA Housing Trust (SAHT)

d RlOOm

ane effective development tool until

t Pension and provident funds R200m

affirmativen action programmes have Special funds R50m a

takenr their course; and the lessons from

g Company contributions R20m development experiences in the devel­ e opingc world. R1620m n

e If, however, this critical role for civil c i

l State funds for housing and development: State budget R660m

society in the growth through redistri­

r IDT RI000m butione position is hampered by the d RI660m

incapacitiesn and organizational defi­ u

ciencies that currently exist in this sec­ y Finance for upgrading: All Regional Services Councils Rl500m tor,a then those who favour the growth

throughw redistribution position will find DBSA R500m e t SAHT R400m

themselvesa adopting the growth with G

redistribution position by default. This R2400m t

ise why an ANC-organized workshop on

n Total: R5680m fundingi policy held in Harare in May b

1990a identified the two immediate

S (Note: the above figures exclude the resources available in the Capital

goalsy of "development work" as "pro­ Development Funds and Consolidated Loans Funds of the white Local b viding infrastructure to overcome the Authorities.) d e c u

.. d

Africao Insight, vol 20, no 3,1990 155 r p e R Devewpment ______

state and financial institutions. On • low wages and structural unemploy­ October. It also underlies the formation Tuesday 6 October 1990, Minister Kriel ment; of the muscular Civics Association of released a statement in which he • the weak community structures, the Southern Transvaal (CAST) and claimed that "[t]he total amount to be which on the whole are incapable of similar regional CIVIC federations, generated for black urban development handling development projects; which will eventually coalesce into a by both the public and private sectors in • the absence of a large-scale commu­ national civic federation to be, in the current financial year is expected to nity-controlled non-profit develop­ Thozamile Botha's words, "indepen­ amount to more than R6 billion." ment sector. dent from the state and autonomous In a confidential document prepared Given the earlier prediction that the from political parties." for the financial institutions by a South African political transition is Although many within the democrat­ University of the Witwatersrand profes­ going to result in a historical compro­ ic movement would question this, there sor, it was demonstrated that R5 billion mise that will place substantial consti­ is little doubt in this author's mind that could be generated annually for devel­ tutionallimitations on the state's role in the foundations for a well organized, opment over the next 12 years if the the economy, and given that the exist­ innovative, committed and decentral­ state's housing subsidy formula was ing bureaucracy will not be replaced ized civil society are already in place. modified to favour the poor, if Group overnight, it may be concluded that the The fundamental pillars of this civil Areas legislation was scrapped and if types of bureaucratic and economic society are: trade unions; civic associa­ the regulations governing the use of constraints and blockages referred to tions; the churches; the emerging devel­ prescribed assets could be amended to above will not be rapidly removed by opment NGOs; the organized favour property development. the existing or future state. progressive professionals; major fund­ There are fundamental structural From a development perspective the ing and development agencies such as problems that will have to be over­ only major and fundamental change Kagiso Trust (KT) and possible the IDT; come, however, if we are to deploy our that the transition will bring about is the service organizations; and educa­ resources in a way that achieves our the creation of a legitimate state. tional organizations and institutions. objective of matching resources with Whether the local tier of this state helps Social movements rooted in civil needs. These include: reinforce the existing coalition of inter­ society exist when a socially significant • the limited capacity of the construc­ ests that dominates the development network of associations, organizations tion industry because of its structure process, or whether it becomes the ral­ and institutions exist at the base of the and profitability constraints; lying point for a new progressive devel­ society that are: independent of the opment alliance will be heavily state and political parties; not depen­ • ) the constraining supply effects of

0 the cartelized building materials dependent on the capacities that will dent on the for-profit sector for 1

0 industry; exist in civil society. If resources in the resources and support; capable of orga­ 2

• d extraordinarily high interest rates "new South Africa" are concentrated in nizing the poor and articulating their e

t (capital costs may constitute up to the state and traditional for-profit pri­ grievances; capable of negotiating with a

d two-thirds of the cost of a house); vate sector, then the chances of this mandates on behalf of their constituen­ (

• r the control of loan finance enjoyed progressive development alliance cies with the state, parties, business, e

h by both private and para statal finan­ emerging will be very small indeed. If, development agencies and donors; and s i

l cial institutions which can only filter however, a robust creative independent in a position to deliver their members b

u limited resources into the communi­ non-profit NGO development sector and supporters into a negotiated deal or P

ties through conventional lending can be consolidated within civil society, programme. e

h instruments and mechanisms; then the chances are good that enough The emergence of this conception of t • the racially biased structure of pressure will build up outside the state civil society within South African y b

financial services; and private corporate sector to ensure political culture has implications for d

• e land speculation; that the system is constantly pressur­ both democracy and development. For t

• n the skewed, racially structured, inef­ ized into making resources available to democracy, it means an acceptance of a

r ficient, bureaucratic and cumber­ agencies accountable to the communi­ pluralism, a non-monopolistic role for g

e some state administrations that ties, and not to the political process or the state in the polity, and that demo­ c determine housing policy and allo­ for-profit sector. cracy entails at most the institutional­ n e

c cate resources; ization of uncertainty instead of the i l • inadequate land availability caused statist imposition of certainty. r

e by the Group Areas and Land Acts; The development role of civil For development, this notion implies d

• n the undemocratic and racial struc­ society that South Africa will probably join the u ture of local government, which One of the most remarkable and sur­ international trend towards NGO-driv­ y

a should, ideally, be the regulatory prising triumphs for democracy since 2 en development programmes. This, in w

e mechanism at the centre of the February 1990 has been the ANC's firm tum, has huge implications for how t

a development matrix; commitment to what is referred to as resources should be deployed in a post­ G • a complex, costly and cumbersome apartheid national development strate­ t the "independence of civil society". e legal system that limits tenurial This principle is written into the draft gy because, as suggested earlier, if this n i

b flexibility, hampers rapid legal economic policy discussion paper and sector fails to deliver the goods for a

S transfers and is incapable of was accepted by an ANC-organized whatever reason, the ANC's growth

y facilitating community-controlled national consultative conference on through redistribution policy will fail. b development; local government and urban policy in Although development NGOs are d e c u d o

156r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Development

fast emerging in the developing world intellectual quality of the leaders of the (v) coordinate training needs and training because they can deliver resources to civic and trade union movement at this resources. the grassroots more efficiently and level. (vi) assist in project and programme design, effectively than the state or for-profit Finally, nobody disputes the interna­ etc. sector (see Urban Edge, vol 13, no 8, tional failure of statist development The advantage of the new role KT October 1989), and although this has strategies. has identified for itself is that it is a become the rationale for their impor­ If these five factors are combined, it response to the call one hears across the tance in South Africa, this is not the is not surprising that the notion of an length and breadth of the country at the only material reason for their promi­ independent civil society with a key moment among community-based orga­ nence on the current policy agenda. role in development has emerged as an nizations: the call to develop the human In reality, five factors have combined attractive policy option. capital and organizational resources to create the space this high on the poli­ Recognizing both the potential roles that will be required to make a non­ cy agenda for this conception of NGOs can play in development, as well statist, community based, non-profit development. as their weaknesses, Kagiso Trust (KT) development strategy work. It remains As already argued, the constitutional met in January 1990 to thoroughly to be seen, however, whether KT will transition is going to place constraints evaluate its role. The primary decision manage to restructure itself in a way on how the state can be used as a devel­ taken was that Kagiso Trust should that makes all this possible. opment tool during the transition and abandon its "welfare role" and become Unfortunately, it suffers from the same during the early stages of the post-tran­ a development agency "that will be organizational deficiencies and skill sition reconstruction period. non-party political". This decision, shortages that it would like to remedy Resistance to apartheid over the last backed up by the current orientation of in the broader society. ten years has revolved around an organi­ the ANC Projects Department, has far­ Unfortunately, there is no major zational form that was typically anti­ reaching implications for development interest in any sector - be it state, cor­ statist, decentralized, community­ and development policy. Bearing in porate, political or community - that and/or worker-controlled, democratic, mind that the KT is institutionally has managed to build up a coalition of non-profit, well organized and excep­ located at the nexus of the largest net­ forces around a coherent human tionally creative. This has socialized work of community-basedllinked orga­ resource development plan. The rea­ significant layers of the society into an nizations and potential development sons for this relate to the powerful cor­ action-oriented self-reliance behaviour­ NGOs, and given its political linkages porate interests that control the bulk of al mode which could be harnessed and into the heart of the anti-apartheid the domestic resources, organizational ) developed0 in order to avoid what the political establishment, this decision incoherence within the democratic 1

Kagiso0 Trust conference in January effectively means that a huge institu­ movement, the underdeveloped state of 2 tional and resource capacity is lining up 1990d called "welfarism" - a process the development debate and the weak­ e whicht reduces the recipients of behind the notion of an NGO develop­ nesses of the unions and civic associa­ a

resourcesd to dependence on those who ment sector. tions that should be leading the debate. (

provider the resources. The KT identified three principle To highlight this argument, it may be e

h Just as apartheid spumed the organi­ functions it sees itself fulfilling: worth focusing on the civics. Every s i zationall form referred to above, it (i) to identify existing genuine and potential­ major interest involved in development simultaneouslyb placed severe con­ ly successful NGO and community net­ - be it the DBSA, UF, ANC or the u

P works as the basis for supporting local straints on black business. Because this civic movement itself - accepts that

e level development initiatives.

effectivelyh prevented the emergence of civics are a crucial link in the develop­ t a bourgeois-led anti-apartheid move­ ment chain. The civics are depicted as y (ii) to strengthen and expand the capacity of b ment, the notion of for-profit develop­ community structures, such as civic the only organizations at grassroots

d organisations, in urban and rural areas, to mente hardly ever appears in the policy level that are in touch with local com­ t develop a policy for participating in debate.n Although this could well change munity dynamics and capable of nego­

a development planning at the local and nowr that these restrictions no longer tiating the terms of development.

g regional level.

exist,e much will depend on whether the Consequently, the civics are being c (iii)to increase the capacity of civic organisa­ pulled at break-neck speed into devel­ non-profitn development sector can

e tions to manage income generating pro­ becomec an effective competitor for the opment projects of many different i

l jects (author's emphasis). potential for-profit development kinds. Nobody, however, is providing r alliancee the Urban Foundation is cur­ them with the back-up required to fulfil d To fulfil these functions, the KT rentlyn in the process of conceiving. these tasks. For example, civics do not

u would: Apartheid has placed severe con­ generally have: offices; basic commu­ y straintsa on the upward mobility of the (i) become a facilitator that would locate nication facilities (phones, faxes and so

w internal and external resources when intellectuallye gifted members of the on); full-time paid personnel; trained t needed. blacka majority. Instead of facilitating development workers; budgets and G their rise out of the underclasses as (ii) help build resources available for local financial resources; skilled negotiators; t woulde happen in a non-racial class­ initiatives, including the creation of an media facilities; reliable and compre­ n

i 'alternative' capital development fund. dividedb society, the intellectual hensive information; or a policy-mak­

a (iii)provide management support. resourcesS of these people have ing capacity relating to development.

remainedy within the ranks of the poor. (iv)evaluate and advise on the viability of The result in many cases is the incor­ b This explains the exceptionally high projects and enterprises. poration of civics into programmes they d e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 157 p e R Oeve/opment ______

do not understand or control. When they the DBSA, IDT, the state and other honest long-term working relationships realize this, they have a choice between private sector sources, each with between donors and the NGOs they boycotting the programme or being co­ annual budgets ranging from support. This could also entail the pro­ opted as rubber stamps. In both cases R200m to R1 billion; vision of financial support for consul­ they lose support and compromise their • small-scale internal funding from tancies which could help indigenous organizational power. The positive sources such as KT, Wilgespruit, NGOs deal with funders. They should alternative would involve creative and South African Council of Churches support indigenous funding agencies critical engagement in development (SACC) and SACBC; which will, in tum, be responsible for which would build organizational power • large-scale international funding the project selection process. They and maximize the benefits of the devel­ from sources such as the World should contribute to the development opment programme. This should be the Bank, ODA, USAID, European debate. aim of a community-based development Commission, Scandinavian and International agencies are an enigma strategy. Canadian agencies. for those who have to deal with them • small-scale funding from the private because they debate policy among foundations based mainly in the themselves and build up huge store­ A role for international USA, with annual budgets of houses of valuable experience and donors between $250 000 to $10 million information without making all this The funding-policy recommendations disbursed in grants ranging from accessible to those they relate to in the that emerged from an "ANC-MDM" $5 000 to $250 000. field. Understandably, these agencies consultative conference on funding The comments that follow relate to do not want to be accused of interven­ policy held in May 1990 in Harare are, the last category. tionism. There are, however, ways to say the least, contradictory in a Given the argument thus far, it around this. Placing short, accessible number of ways. They call for the should be unsurprising that the primary publications and articles in widely-read strengthening of links with internation­ recommendation is that the small-scale journals (Work In Progress, SA Labour al funders, but simultaneously pro­ international donors should concentrate Bulletin, Indicator SA, for example) posed that these agencies should be exclusively on capacity building in two would be extremely useful. It would kept at arm's length. They propose an respects: human resource development also remove the poker-faced image of ANC-controlled national structure to and organizational development. the international funder. co-ordinate funding, which seems to These small-scale international If the human resource and organiza­ contradict the KT notion of a non-par­ donors should not attempt to inject tional development focus is accepted, ) tisan0 development agency. The donors resources directly into physical devel­ then there are really three major areas 1 are0 blamed for dependency relation­ opment programmes. They should, for intervention: civil service person­ 2 ships, with no proposals on how to instead, identify how their resources nel; a professional class of party func­ d e overcomet what Trevor Manuel at the can be used to empower communities tionaries located in government and the a

KTd conference in January identified as to develop the capacity needed to political party machines; and develop­ ( the failure of internal organizations to obtain resources for physical develop­ ment workers. r develope their own self-sustaining ment from within the domestic econo­ Although the following comments h s capacities.i Although the spirit of the my itself. To give effect to this policy,

l apply to the last category, in reality proposalsb is anti-elitist, the effects the following broad principles are pro­ national development will be affected u wouldP be to redirect funding into more posed, followed by suggestions for spe­ by the quality and quantity of personnel establishede initiatives not under ANC cific points of intervention. in all three categories. Over the next ten h t leadership/control (universities, for The most appropriate guidelines for years a corps of development workers y example).b the future role of the small-scale inter­ must be created with its own values,

d There is now little doubt that the national donors are as follows. They

e career paths, esprit de corps, support t

Hararen recommendations are not going should prioritize human resource and networks, meeting times and places, a

to r become generally accepted policy. organizational development projects. professional associations and social g Instead, a more appropriate policy is They should seek out and develop roles. To facilitate a non-statist, com­ e evolving.c The donors' conference long-term committed relationships munity-based development strategy, n plannede for early 1991 under the aus­ with indigenous South African NGOs. c these development workers will be i l pices of the ANC's Projects Depart­ Annual budget cycles are inadequate; required in the following sectors. r mente is going to be where a key policy projects based on five-year plans must d

positionn will be tabled. A consultative be developed to build up a stable cadre Mass-based structures u meeting to plan this conference will be of development workers within the Civic associations: each CIVIC must y helda in early November 1990. The NGO sector. To avoid political oppor­ have an equipped office, well trained w chancese are good that a more pluralistic tunism, a programme approach must be full-time staff, financial control sys­ t anda non-partisan position may emerge encouraged and supported; this is part tems and stabilized organizational pro­ G from this process. of KT's new direction and is replicated cedures. Although civics have begun to t e For the purposes of the argument, it elsewhere in many service organiza­ raise money from members, this is n i

willb be assumed that future funding for tions and within the civic movement. compromised because of ignorance developmenta will come from four main Capacity building, not dependency S about membership systems, financial

sources:y building, should be the primary objec­ control and administrative incapacity. b • large-scale internal funding from tive. This will require creative and Ideally, civics should marry financial d e c u d o

158r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R --______Devewpment

resources derived from the community evident because of the better working commitment to this sector depends on with resources from funders. An conditions on offer in these sectors. how the development debate resolves appropriate formula concerning what More importantly, however, these itself over the next year or two. funders should support to help civics organizations now have the experience Nevertheless, assuming that the current set themselves up will have to be found and expertise that could be deployed attraction to non-statist, community­ - should funders establish the office during the coming transitional period based development survives, then we and leave running costs to the civic? to ensure that the capacities and should be planning for four types of Should funders only pay for communi­ resources they have controlled to date development NGOs. cations? And so on. are transferred into the civics, unions Community-based development Unions: unions want to get involved and development NGOs. The skills organizations, such as co-operatives in development work. It is unclear, they possess that can be transferred and CDCs, which could be involved in however, how they will do this. Unlike include the ability to administer, plan, both consumption and production. One the civics, unions already have a func­ deal with specialist information, com­ immediate need, for example, is for tioning organizational infrastructure. municate information, conduct non-profit housing development com­ Unions will, however, require develop­ research, co-ordinate legal and other panies to co-ordinate physical con­ ment workers located both within and expert assistance, inter-organizational struction on behalf of mass-based outside the unions. The appointment of networking, fund-raising, dealing with organizations. housing officers and co-operative co­ funders and negotiating. Obviously Community ownership systems: the ordinators within some unions is an many mass-based organizations nationalization versus privatization indication that this has already begun. already have many of these skills debate has peaked and given way to a Judging by how over-worked these peo­ (unions, for example). new pragmatism which is exploring ple are and the use they make of service ownership systems that are neither organizations, there is clearly a need Training organizations statist nor "private" in the traditional for support in this area. Although a number of development sense. The search is for community Churches: this author is completely training agencies have emerged over ownership systems that will reinforce ignorant of the development infrastruc­ the last three years (such as the community solidarity and the bargain­ ture that exists within the churches. University of the Witwatersrand-based ing power of communities. A number However, there is clearly a role - Community-Based Development Pro­ of civics have already formulated pro­ which could be extended - for the gramme) and a number of people are posals for how community land trusts,

church) in development. going through these programmes, an electricity co-operatives and housing 0 Other: a range of other organizations overall approach framed by a coherent co-operatives could be established. 1 involved0 in development require human nationally accepted conception of This "third way" needs all the support it 2

resourcesd on a large scale. These development has not yet emerged. can get. e includet women's organizations, rural Obviously the first step will be to bring Non-profit financial institutions: a bodies,d environmental groups, health the existing community development credit unions, national housing funds, (

andr educational organizations. training agencies together, possibly development banks and a wide range e

h with their funders, to debate these of non-profit financial mechanisms and s i

Servicel organizations issues and, it is hoped, formulate a pol­ instruments need to be designed and b

Serviceu organizations are frequently icy. This author's guess is that this pol­ established in order to diminish over P ignored because they are perceived as icy might well include a commitment time the hold on finance currently e

"middleh men" in the development pro­ to establishing a development school enjoyed by the for-profit financial t

cess.y Because of apartheid, a large and which could become the primary institutions. b impressive network of service organi­ national training agency for the new Indigenous funding NGOs: the "new d zationse has emerged to deal with an corps of development workers. The KT" provides a model - on paper at t extremelyn wide range of issues in the advantage of this approach is that it this stage - for what could become the a health,r educational, development, would rationalize existing resources first of many indigenous development g

media,e administrative, literacy, eco­ and provide an institutional point of funders. Using a range of sources c

nomic,n legal and environmental sec­ reference for the nationally linked (including the state), these agencies e tors.c Usually structured as collectives corps of development workers. If this could become an important conduit for i l and composed of highly motivated and national effort fails, however, there linking local community structures to r skillede professionals, these organiza­ will clearly be an urgent need for mas­ funds in a constructive developmental­ d tionsn work for the mass-based organi­ sive resources to upgrade the existing ist way. u zations such as unions, civics or rather small-scale training agencies. y politicala structures. They have been Ideally this upgrading process should w exceptionallye important in pnsmg be co-ordinated with the human Conclusion t loosea from the establishment some of resource and organizational upgrading The argument presented in this paper G

thet country's more creative and gifted of the mass-based structures. can be summarized as follows: e • the state's development capacity professionals.n They will need to be i

retainedb as an asset for civil society, Development NGOs will be limited during both the tran­ a

insteadS of being lost to the state or the The establishment and consolidation of sition and post-transition recon­

newy deracialized liberal corporate sec­ a non-profit NGO sector is going to be struction period; b • there are enough resources within tor.d Both these tendencies are already the most difficult task of all, because a e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 159 p e R Deve/opment ______

the domestic economy to meet our • furthermore, the foundations within The first practical step to implement basic needs; civil society for a robust NGO the above proposals could be a joint • bureaucratic and economic block­ development sector exist; internal-international NGO meeting to ages exist that will prevent the • the need to direct resources into formulate priorities and plan a strategy. resources from finding their way building up the human capital and This should follow the donors confer­ into community development pro­ organizational resources that an ence planned for 1991 because it is here jects capable of meeting basic effective development strategy will that general policy parameters will be needs; require has been widely recognized; formulated. • given the above, a non-statist, com­ • no effective co-ordinated strategy munity-based development strategy exists at the moment for how the will be required which will need to necessary human and organizational be driven by independent develop­ resources should be developed; ment NGOs because it is these orga­ • resources from external donor agen­ nizations that will have to ensure cies will be required and these that resources find their way into should be used primarily (if not development programmes that are exclusively) for human resource and designed and controlled by local organizational development pro­ communities; grammes. ) 0 1 0 2

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160r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Language

Namibia's new language policy

Professor August D de V Cluver, of the Department of Linguistics at the University of South Africa, analyses the Namibian government's decision to adopt English as the country's sole official language.

Namibia became independent on 21 on how the term language is defined Prior to independence there were March 1990 and everyone expects that we can identify 21 languages in two official languages, Afrikaans and the new government will introduce Namibia. Eighteen of these are indige­ English, while German enjoyed the sta­ various changes in the administration nous languages, but most of them con­ tus of a semi-official language (which of the country. One of the reforms that sist of dialect clusters whose speakers meant that some official signs were will be introduced is a new official lan­ can understand each other relatively also in German and one could speak to guage, English. In its election mani­ well. The 21 languages can be divided some government officials in German). festo Swapo stated that it would also into three language families: Afrikaans was effectively the main offi­ accord "equal status and respect to all - Bantu languages (such as Herero, cial language in Namibia and was used locally spoken languages." In this arti­ Wambo, the Kavango and Caprivi by about 90 per cent of the population cle some of the implications of this languages and Tswana). as a second or third language. It served new language policy are analysed and - Khoesaan languages (such as some as the lingua franca of Namibia (a lin­ )

particular0 attention will be given to the of the Bushman languages and the gua franca is used when different 1

future0 of Afrikaans in Namibia. Nama language). speech communities are in continuous 2 In various circles in South Africa the - Indo-European languages (such as contact and need a common language to d possibilitye of a new language policy is Afrikaans, English, German and communicate). As I will point out later, t beinga discussedl and there is general Portuguese).2 the spread of Afrikaans in Namibia is d ( agreement that the change in language The main population groups and largely the result of its having been the r policye in Namibia could also take place their languages are listed below (not all principal medium of education in most h s

ini South Africa. An analysis of the lan­ 21 languages are listed): Namibian schools and having no com­ l guageb policy of Namibia is therefore an The indigenous languages have a rel­ petition from English. u

importantP step in formulating a lan­ atively low status and tend not to be Afrikaans also spread into other

guagee policy for South Africa. used in all cross-cultural contact situa­ domains such as agriculture, the civil h t

After identifying the languages of tions or in dealings with government service and the business sector. This y

Namibia,b I will discuss some of the rea­ officials. Only the larger, regional lan­ resulted in Afrikaans becoming the lan­

sonsd why Namibians have decided to guages have writing systems and are guage of work opportunities and eco­ e t switch from Afrikaans to English as taught in the schools. nomic advancement. 3 With limited n officiala language. Some of the prob­ r g lems that could occur when English is e introducedc as the official language and n Group Size Main languages thee medium of education will be dis­ c i Wambo 680000 Kwanyama, Ndonga, Ovakoanyama cussed.l The position of Afrikaans as a

r Kavango 125000 Kwangali, Vagviriku (Gciriku), Hambukushu non-officiale language in Namibia will thend be analysed. Since a language pol­ Herero 98 000 Ovampandero, Ovatjimba-herero, Ovahimba n

u Damara 98 000 Damara icy concerns the status and use of lan­ y Whites 84 000 Afrikaans, German, English

guagesa in a given country, I will begin w with an overview of the languages and Nama 65 000 Nama (similar to Damara) e t their status in Namibia. Coloureds 56 000 Afrikaans and English a Caprivians 58 000 Lozi, Mafwe, Basubiya G t Khoi (Bushman) 40000 Kung, HeikumlNama-san e n

Thei languages of Namibia Rehoboth Basters 34 000 Afrikaans b Tswana 15000 Setswana Asa is the case in nearly all African S countries, Namibia is characterized by Smaller groups 12 000 unspecified y b its multilingual structure. Depending (Based on figures compiled by Andre du Pisani) d e c u d

Africao Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 161 r p e R Language ______

competition from German and English, secondary school year). Ndonga, insignificant role in the administration Afrikaans became better established in K wanyama, Nama and Herero can now of the country. Namibia than in South Africa. Its domi­ also be taken as university subjects at The decision to use English as the nance grew to the point where it began the University of Namibia. The level at official language has far-reaching influencing the indigenous languages, which these languages are offered in implications and its implementation as is demonstrated by the large number schools and at the university has obvi­ will call for considerable commitment of borrowings from Afrikaans in ously changed since the article by from the Namibians. For many older Herero.4 Harlech-Jones in which it is stated that Namibians it will be the third official As indicated by H W G du Plessis,5 Herero and N amalDamara could not, at language they will have had to acquire Afrikaans was brought into Namibia that stage, be taken as subjects in the this century and many older Namibians even before the German occupation by secondary schoo!. 8 could, as far as interaction with the cen­ so-called Oorlams groups and Basters A further problem that has retarded tral government is concerned, become who moved in from the Cape Province. the development of the indigenous lan­ linguistic foreigners in their own coun­ This form of Afrikaans was a variety of guages is that, largely because of the try. On the basis of similar experiences the Orange River Afrikaans,6 which association of mother-tongue education gained in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria differs in some respects from the with separate development, many par­ when Arabic replaced French as the Standard Afrikaans used by the South ents reject this form of education.9 This language of education, we can predict African administration of Namibia. forms part of a generally negative atti­ that the standard of teaching in Another reason for the spread of tude of parents right throughout Africa Namibia will drop sharply when the Afrikaans in Namibia is its status as a towards mother-tongue education, schools switch to English. 13 fully standardized language with a because they do not think that indige­ In the light of the preceding argu­ complete technical vocabulary and an nous languages offer their children ment one could justifiably ask why extensive literature. It is a language of social and economic mobility.l° Namibians want to move away from a the African continent, with a literature As pointed out, the official language standard language that is an indigenous that describes the African life and of an independent Namibia will be language and a mother tongue for a countryside. The codification of the English. This decision was taken in considerable number of people (about indigenous languages (writing down a principle in Lusaka in 1981 as outlined 100 000 out of a population of about language in dictionaries and grammar in the report of the United Nations 1,5 million) and which serves as lingua books) under the South African admin­ Institute for Namibia: "It is envisaged franca for the majority of the popula­ istration of Namibia was never done that Afrikaans will remain a local lan­ tion. One would also like to consider ) with0 much official enthusiasm. Because guage, but that its role as a lingua fran­ the problems that will be caused by 1

it was0 linked to the promotion of ethnic ca will be taken over by English".l1 implementing this new language policy. 2 consciousness and ethnic division, it This decision was based on one of the The subdiscipline of Linguistics that d

e deals with these questions, is known as wast also regarded with scepticism by most comprehensive language planning somea black Namibians. projects undertaken to date. This lan­ language planning: "Language plan­ d ( The Native Language Bureau was guage policy was used in the struggle ning is concerned with the principled r foundede in 1962, but had insufficient against the South African occupation of and efficient distribution of language h s personneli to codify the indigenous lan­ Namibia. Support for the new official resources at the national leve!."14 This l guages.b 7 It was supposed to develop language and language of education distribution is done according to the u

nineP of the indigenous languages became an indication of the growing dictates of a language policy. The anal­

(Ndonga,e Kwanyama, Gciriku, support for Swapo. ysis of the implications derived from a h t

Mbukushu, Lozi, Herero, Nama/Damara Newly independent African coun­ language policy is therefore one of the y

andb Tswana) so that they could be used tries often decide to use the language of main concerns of language planning.

ford mother-tongue instruction in the the colonial power as their official lan­ A language policy should, ideally, e schools.t The promotion of indigenous guage because there are various indige­ enable every citizen to achieve his full n languagesa formed part of the ethnic nous languages and none have enough human potentia!. In Western countries r g fragmentation proposed by the prestige or sufficient numerical superi­ this statement is taken to mean that e

Odendaalc Commission in 1963. How­ ority to be selected as the official lan­ every citizen can study and work in his n ever,e because of a shortage of posts this guage. The administration of the own language. However, in a multilin­ c i l

bureau could never execute its task country as well as the legal and educa­ gual country there are various reasons r properlye (something later exploited by tion systems are all usually well estab­ why members of minority communities d

Swapon and the United Nations Institute lished in the colonial language. 12 should make some language adjust­ u for Namibia). Countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, ments. It is simply impossible to y

a As a result of this half-hearted Uganda and Zimbabwe therefore acknowledge 500 languages as official approach,w most of the nine languages selected English as their official lan­ languages - as one would have to do e t

thata were identified for educational pur­ guage, while French is the official lan­ in Nigeria - or to offer secondary edu­ G poses cannot be taken further than guage of Senegal, Zaire and the Cote cation in so many languages. Language t

Standarde 5 (the seventh school year). d'lvoire. What makes the selection of planning analyses this type of problem n Thei exceptions to this rule are Ndonga, English in Namibia unique is the fact and makes recommendations to the b

Kwanyama,a Nama, Herero and Lozi, that less than 5 per cent of the popula­ central government or, where the gov­ S

whichy can all be taken as school sub­ tion speak it as a mother tongue and ernment has already decided on a lan­ b jects up to matriculation level (the final before independence it played an guage plan, language planners analyse d e c u d

162o Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 r p e R ______Language

the implications of that plan. In other and offers only limited economic negative aspects of apartheid (as the words, the financial and manpower and political mobility. central ideology of the Party) became implications are identified as well as - Afrikaans has a polarizing rather more obvious, Afrikaans became a stig­ how they will affect the general popula­ than a nation-building effect. matized language, and the language of tion. More particularly, language plan­ the oppressor. The fact that many ners analyse the implications of a Arguments in support of English as the (white) Afrikaans-speaking Namibians language policy for education by deter­ official language: resisted change and the abolition of mining the type of books that are need­ - English will help to bring the vari­ apartheid in Namibia helped to confirm ed (grammar books, dictionaries, ous Namibian communities together this image of the Afrikaner and his spelling rules, translated literature and in one nation.21 language. so on) and the type of training that lan­ - English will promote contact One variety of Afrikaans is, as point­ guage teachers need (for instance, between Namibia and its neigh­ ed out, an indigenous language to English as a second language or bours.22 Namibia, and it cannot, therefore, be English for special purposes). - English is the international language seen as an oppressive language since it When a world language such as of science and technology as well as is spoken as a mother-tongue by people English is selected as an official lan­ the international language of trade who have suffered under apartheid. guage there is little need to develop it, and will therefore give Namibians However, the standard variety used by but the main problem that occurs is that access to the data banks of the the South African administration is an of spreading the language efficiently world and trade routes of the imported language for many throughout the country. English has world.23 Namibians.25 The fact that this lan­ been adapted to serve in many parts of - English is seen by many Namibians guage variety was used to import Bantu the world and there are extensive and as the language of liberation from Education and apartheid into Namibia well-tested programmes for acquiring South African colonialism.24 could not have added to the popularity English as a second language. In this - English is seen as the language of this language.26 Whereas many respect English is one of the cheapest that will give social mobility to the Namibians would have preferred to foreign languages to select as an offi­ population. break down ethnic boundaries, ciallanguage. Standard Afrikaans was used to enforce a separatist policy. Because of Discussion apartheid, Afrikaners could not be iden­ Reasons for selecting Although the language planner can tified as role figures and identification )

0 English analyse this type of motivation, he is with Afrikaans was difficult. 1

0 As has been pointed out, the justifica­ seldom in a position to change a gov­ To my knowledge no attempt was 2 tion for the selection of English as the ernment's language policy. The point made to encourage an indigenous liter­ d e

t official language for Namibia is given of departure of this type of language ature in this language, and Namibian a in the comprehensive report of the planning is often a political decision Afrikaans was also not identified as a d ( United Nations Institute for Namibia. 15 that does not necessarily consider com­ separate dialect. Black school pupils r e In Chapter 5 of the report the various munication and education criteria. could not enter white Afrikaans h s 16 i reasons are listed. These reasons may schools, and if they completed their l b be divided into two groups: Afrikaans school studies (in Afrikaans) they u

P - Arguments against the continued A language is often linked to a specific could not gain entrance to the white e use of Afrikaans as the official lan­ ideology: Arabic is linked to the Afrikaans universities of South Africa. h t guage. Islamic religion and Russian is seen as Standard Afrikaans therefore never y b became a truly Namibian language, - Reasons why English should the language of Marxist communism. If d 17

e become the only officiallanguage. the associated ideology is dynamic and and a large section of the Namibian t

n After identifying these reasons, some expands, the language tends to acquire population is not particularly loyal to a

r of them will be discussed in more more (second-language) speakers, but Afrikaans as a second language. There g detail. if the ideology acquires negative con­ can be little doubt that the decision to e c notations, many speakers prefer not to select English as the official language n e Arguments against selecting Afrikaans be associated with that language. was, to some degree, motivated by a c i l as the official language: Afrikaans was used by language plan­ reaction against the oppressive rule of r e - Afrikaans is "an imposed or colo­ ners to unite a wide variety of speakers Afrikaans-speaking South Africans. d

n niallanguage".ls into one Afrikaner nation. The National However, Afrikaans is also the lan­ u

- "Outside Southern Africa, Party exploited this link between guage in which schools and hospitals y

a Afrikaans has no practical value, Afrikaans and the Afrikaner nation and were built and in which the country w and therefore it serves as an instru­ linked its own ideology to Afrikaans. developed a sophisticated infrastructure. e t

a ment of isolation and insularity."19 This link between Afrikaans and the It is also the language of the Dorsland G

- Afrikaans is "the language of the National Party was to the advantage of Trekkers, who left the old Transvaal t e oppressor" while English "is now the language (and the Party) while the Republic rather than remain under n i considered by many to be the lan­ Party gained popularity. However, British rule. These observations make it b a guage of liberation".2o without any planning on the part of the difficult to state categorically that S

y - Afrikaans does not offer social Party or language planners, Afrikaans Afrikaans serves only as an oppressive b mobility to the Namibian population became the symbol of apartheid. As the language. d e c u d o Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3,1990 163 r p e R Language ______

English acquire English and to use English than not, therefore, be the dominant lan­ Although English is the most important is the rural population. Urbanized citi­ guage of a country, but in Europe it was language of colonialism and capitalism zens therefore have an unfair advantage usually a language that was closely in the world, it was never associated over other citizens and their children related to most of the other languages with these concepts in Namibia. have easier access to good high schools spoken in the country. Nevertheless, Fishman shows that English is also and thus to the universities where fluent European nationalism became associat­ associated with concepts such as knowledge of English is essential. ed with one standard language. democracy, personal freedom, civil These students will be considered for The association between language rights and religious tolerance.27 Today, the top posts in the country. Mansour and nationalism was, furthermore, English is seen as a symbol of an ideo­ makes the following observation on the fo!ged relatively late in the Middle logically neutral concept such as tech­ role of French in Senegal: "French is the Ages in Europe and one need not nological progress. This association only means of access to knowledge for a assume that this link should exist in a makes English a highly acceptable privileged minority and a permanent developing nation. Harlech-lones official language in multilingual coun­ barrier to knowledge for the majority."3! points out that many Namibians do not tries. Because of its neutrality, the It will, therefore, be an interesting chal­ see language as the most important selection of English as the official lan­ lenge for the new Namibian government marker of their identity.35 The fact that guage is also seen as the creation of to prevent English from becoming a a minority dialect (in terms of number common ground on which members of "gate" that prevents social mobility and of speakers) was selected in early different communities can meet each reserves access to the top posts to the Europe as an official language points to other. children of a small influential group.32 the possibility that a minority language The argument that a foreign lan­ The Afrikaans speakers with a high­ such as English in Namibia could, in guage can be seen as a mechanism to ly politicized language which played an time, be accepted as the official lan­ create national consolidation has been important role in the creation of the guage. In other African countries promoted in various multilingual devel­ Afrikaner nation, might find it difficult English did succeed in helping to oping countries. This argument was, for to understand how a foreign language develop a national consciousness, but instance, put forward to justify the can help create a nation. Afrikaner often at the expense of indigenous lan­ selection of French for Cote d'Ivoire.28 nationalism is based on the European guages. Speakers of these languages The opposite side of this argument is assumption that there must be a strong have, in some cases, reacted against that many governments of multilingual link between the ethnic group and a what is seen as a form of cultural impe­ countries are afraid that language and particular language: "the linguistic rialism and are using the indigenous ) ethnic0 differences could lead to a splin­ community was seen as coextensive languages more consciously in new 1 tering0 of the nation and to civil war - with the nation".33 This view implies functional domains. In other words, 2 that the development of a standard nationalism in the developing countries as d was the case in Nigeria. Thus nation­ e buildingt and the development of a com­ national language would promote is not based on the assumption that a

mond patriotism are seen as a high nationalism. This view also led to the there exists a one-to-one correlation ( acceptance of the idea that monolin­ between a speech community and the priorityr and any strategy that could help e gualism, in the sense of knowing only nation state. To remain monolingual in achieveh these ideals is a good one. A s

i the standard language of the nation, uniforml official language has, in princi­ a multilingual country is to isolate b was the norm. We are thus led to yourself without reason.36 This leads to

ple,u the potential to create a common

P 29 believe that one indigenous language nationalism and it should give all citi­ an increase in the status of these lan­ e played an important role in the creation guages so that some of them (particu­ zensh equal chances in life. t The reasoning behind this argument of the European nations and, converse­ larly in Nigeria) are now being used as y b

(which was formulated for the selection ly, that a foreign language could not official languages alongside English.

d serve this purpose. ofe a foreign official language in multi­ That English gives its speakers t

lingualn countries such as Nigeria or Closer analysis shows that these access to the world's information and a

Uganda)r can be found in the following observations reflect a romanticized trade is relevant only to a small section g view of the development of the of the population and can hardly be

statemente by Scotton: c European nations. The national lan­ seen as motivation for why the whole n Choosing English as the official language e guage of today was originally often a nation should acquire a foreign lan­ c is 'unfair' in that it is foreign and must be i l

acquired by every citizen outside his minority language of a small powerful guage. Haugen has denounced this r 37 e home. But the key point is that choosing group that imposed their culture and motivation in strong terms. A solution d English is uniformly unfair; no one ethnic n language on the other communities. to this problem that will not create

u group is favoured. Therefore, no one eth­ The clearest example of this is certainly regional tensions, seems to be the one y nic group can feel that it is a more inte­ a the establishment of French as national gral part of the nation than another group that Swapo has suggested: to promote w

e because of official language policy.3D language of France. What is today some of the indigenous languages to t

a known as Standard French is based on regional official languages. G

The hope that the selection of the dialect of the lIe de France and was As pointed out, the most important t

Englishe will help to create a society in not known by more than 3 million reason for which the population of an n whichi all citizens will have equal speakers (out of a population of 26 mil­ African country chooses to switch to b opportunitiesa seems a little idealistic. lion) when it was declared the official English is the belief that English is the S

They urban population of any developing language of France after the French language of social mobility and eco­ b country is always in a better position to Revolution.34 An official language need nomic advancement. The tendency of d e c u d

164o Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 r p e R ______Language

minority groups to embrace a language this decision by the Owambo Swapo suggested that mother-tongue that has the potential of economic Department of Education was interpret­ instruction should be used in the lower advancement occurs fairly generally. ed as a political victory over South primary schools, while English should Haacke, for instance, shows that the Africa and was seen as symbolic of the be one of the school subjects. In the Oorlams-Nama switched to Afrikaans growing support for Swapo among the higher primary schools pupils will during the previous century because Ovambo population. It was also inter­ switch to English as the language of knowing this language had certain eco­ preted as a political victory by other instruction. There has been consider­ nomic advantages for them. 38 In South Namibian groups and influenced their able discussion in the literature about Africa we can observe how various education departments to similarly the correct age at which minority lan­ minority groups are now switching to introduce English as the education guage children should switch to English for the same reasons. In language. instruction in a foreign language. This Namibia the economic status of English By suggesting that English should be discussion is obviously also applicable was clearly an important reason. why the official language, Swapo introduced to the age at which Namibian children Swapo's language policy was accept­ language into the liberation struggle switched to Afrikaans as the medium of able for the general population and why and, more importantly, mariaged to instruction. There are clear indications parents began agitating for the intro­ introduce the liberation struggle at a that if the child were to switch at a later duction of English as medium of level understandable to school children. age (for example when he is in instruction in the schools. This was essential "since it is in the Standard 6 -- in his eighth school year) schools that the governments of new his general school performance would nations must attempt to win the hearts be noticeably better. This finding is English as the language of and minds of the next generation ... "40 even valid for his competence in the education The decision by the Owambo foreign language which until then was An important aspect of any language Education Department acted as a cata­ taken only as one of the school sub­ policy is its implementation in the lyst for further language change in jects. After prolonged experiments, schools. Until relatively recently many Namibia. The apartheid laws of South Bamgbose came to the conclusion that Namibian children received their Africa created eleven education depart­ the mother tongue was the only realistic school education for the first four ments (one for each major ethnic teaching medium in the primary years in their mother tongue (or a group) in a country in which there are school.41 The only real advantages of closely related regional language). about 340 000 schoolchildren. Apart education through the medium of one Thereafter they switched to Afrikaans from these departments there was still a foreign language is a cheaper education ) as0 the medium of instruction and their type of overhead department (National administration and more uniform train­ 1 mother0 tongue became one of the Education) which, under the apartheid ing of teachers, who can accept 2 school subjects. However, the schools legislation, controlled the schools in the appointments in schools in any part of d e fort the Bushmen use Afrikaans as central part of the country. Because of the country.42 a

mediumd of instruction from the first continued pressure from parents, the One problem of the new language ( Department of National Education policy was that it was interpreted too schoolr year. This form of education has e announced in 1987 that the schools enthusiastically, and various schools in obvioush negative results, partly due to s

i Owambo and even in the Afrikaans thel tremendous cultural shock that a under its jurisdiction would switch to Bushmanb child experiences when English as the medium of instruction. speaking Rehoboth territory began u

P teaching in English from the very first attending a Western school in a totally Just prior to independence education e school year. It is difficult to understand foreignh language. was offered in English as the medium t Liberation movements often attempt of instruction in 25 of the 96 schools why Afrikaans-speaking communities y b to identify symbols for themselves, and under the control of the Department of are not offering mother-tongue instruc­ d

languagee is an obvious candidate to National Education. So as not to make tion (in Afrikaans) in the first school t 39 serven as symbol of nation-building. the switch too unmanageable, the medi­ years. There is certainly strong resent­ a

Swapor identified Afrikaans early in its um of instruction was changed at a rate ment about the political and economic g non-military struggle as a symbol of of one class per year. The rate at which domination of the white Afrikaans­ e apartheidc and of the oppression of the the change to English as the medium of speaking community that is transferred n e

Namibianc people. English, on the other instruction is done is determined by the to the language, but it also seems that i l hand, was identified as the language of availability of teachers who know some political opportunism might have r liberatione and a movement to introduce English and the availability of funds played a role in this decision. This sec­ d

Englishn as the language of education (for instance, to purchase school ond possibility should not be used to u was started amongst the population. In books). hide the fact that this movement away y

Owa ambo a strong feeling against The educational language policy of from Afrikaans forms part of a more w

Afrikaanse was mobilized and in 1981 the Ovambo even influenced the general movement among so-called t

Englisha replaced Afrikaans as the lan­ University of Namibia. The medium of non-white Afrikaans speakers in South G guage of education in Owamboland. instruction at the university (which was Africa as well. t Thise decision by the Owambo open to all races) was Afrikaans. After A further problem that could follow n i from the introduction of English as the Departmentb of Education was impor­ student protests the Board of the tanta for at least two reasons. First, just University decided in May 1988 to official language is that it could create S

overy half of the total population of switch to English as the language of false expectations. For instance, too b Namibia live in Owamboland. Second, instruction. many English-trained pupils leaving d e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 165 p e R Language ______

school could expect to be appointed in to a possible economic growth period Dirk Mudge. the civil service or in industry. In a in Namibia during the next five years. There are clear indications that many country where there are a finite number This growth will mean that new posts Afrikaans-speaking Namibians are in of posts available, there could easily be will be created. Many of the young the first place Namibians and in the an overproduction of English-speaking Namibians who should be able to fill second place, Afrikaans-speakers. They young people who will then be without these posts might be prevented from have welcomed changes that will be to work in the cities.43 doing so because of their insufficient the benefit of Namibia as a whole. The command of English. One of the problem that Harlech-lones seems to be biggest dangers of the interim period addressing is what the reaction of these Problems that might occur between now and the full implementa­ changes in status of Afrikaans will be when switching to English tion of the new language policy is that a on Afrikaans-speakers in South Africa. In most countries where education is generation or two of schoolchildren If Afrikaans is no longer the official offered through the medium of a for­ might not be competent in any lan­ language of the government of Namibia eign language the pass rate is low and guage. This situation would be the its symbolic value will certainly the number of drop-outs is unusually result of teachers being insufficiently change. Whether it will be able to rid high.44 In the previous section one pos­ trained in English and lacking English itself of its association with apartheid is sible reason for this phenomenon was teaching materials. Retraining teachers not clear. Much will depend on the lan­ expounded: that the switch to the for­ should therefore be a high priority of guage attitudes of the indigenous eign language occurs too early in the the new government. During the inter­ Afrikaans-speakers. If they continue to child's education. This phenomenon im period imported English teachers use Afrikaans and if they insist that also took place while Afrikaans was may well be used. However, the their children are taught in Afrikaans the language of education in Namibia. English that they will offer might be (which is, in principle, possible in When English was recently introduced very foreign to Namibian children and terms of Swapo's constitution) the lan­ as the medium of education in many it might be wise therefore to use these guage will continue to exist. Ironically, parts of Namibia, this situation was teachers to retrain Namibian teachers. Afrikaans might well be kept alive by exacerbated because many teachers In a relatively small economy such those speakers who suffered under the had severe problems with English and as that of Namibia, the chances are apartheid laws. there was insufficient education mate­ 'good that spreading the new official Except for private schools where rial available in English. The poor language could make inroads into the Afrikaans (or German) may be used as results of the examinations at the end funds available for the development of the language of education, Afrikaans ) of0 1989 confirm this statement. This the indigenous languages. This means will probably only be a school subject 1 observation0 emphasizes the necessity that work on the elaboration of the in some of the government schools, and 2 of advance planning in which the indigenous languages, as in other coun­ will probably still be offered as one of d e implicationst of a new medium of tries with similar language problems, the subjects at the University of a

instructiond are spelled out in detail. will progress very slowly.47 Namibia. It will gradually disappear (

r A language cannot be acquired by from the civil service, while official e

learningh it at school or at university. To notices will appear only in English.

s The future of Afrikaans i

becomel competent in a second lan­ Although the proposed constitution of guageb there should be opportunities to in Namibia Swapo allowed for the possibility that u P

use that language outside the school The new language policy of Namibia government officials could use minori­ ande university. However, in Namibia ty languages, it is likely that, at least

h implies a change in status as well as a t the use of English is largely restricted change in the symbolic value of during the first few months after inde­ y b

to part of the business community Afrikaans. It would appear that these pendence, many people would be hesi­ d

wheree it is the language mainly of mid­ changes have not been the "blow to tant to use Afrikaans in official t

dlen and top management. Even the Afrikaner pride" that Harlech-lones situations.

a 48

Romanr Catholic Church uses Afrikaans predicted. His statement is based on It seems likely that the few white g in many areas of the country.45 Outside the incorrect assumption that there is a Afrikaans-speaking officials will grad­ e Windhoekc the use of English is limited. close unity between Namibian ually be replaced by officials who have n e

Englishc cannot be imported into these Afrikaans-speakers and supporters of been trained in Lusaka at the United i

l 49 areas and opportunities to use the lan­ the National Party in South Africa. Nations Institute for Namibia. This will r guagee will have to be created. This will This view ignores two facts. First, accelerate the switch to English in the d taken time and one can therefore expect most of the Afrikaans-speakers of civil service and will confirm the new u that the switch to English will be a Namibia are not white, yet this does government's control in this domain. y graduala process that will take at least not mean that they are less proud of Unless the government is going to act w twoe generations. Even in the civil ser­ their language than other Afrikaans­ autocratically, Afrikaans will still be t vicea English might not spread as quick­ speaking groups. Second, many white used in many other domains. Since so G ly as Harlech-lones assumes.46 The one Afrikaans-speaking N amibians belong few Namibians know English, we can t factore that might aid in the spread of to political parties that are not particu­ expect that Afrikaans will remain, in n i

Englishb is the large number of expatri­ larly friendly towards the South the foreseeable future, the lingua franca a

atesS who have been returning to African government - one needs only - particularly in those domains in

Namibiay and who know English. to consider the strong criticism of the which the government's influence is b There are many indications pointing South African government voiced by limited. 50 It is important to note that a d e c u d o

166r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Language

Swapo government will not start an One of the most important problems been discussed. Since English is already anti-Afrikaans vendetta. now requiring attention is how to an official language, its status will not Independence has brought one great switch to English as the language of change much. However, the status of advantage for Afrikaans in Namibia: education. Before independence, offi­ Afrikaans will change, and therefore the association with the National Party cials of the Department of National some attention was given to the position and apartheid will be broken and this education had progressed quite far with of Afrikaans in Namibia since similar may enable Afrikaans to function once the compilation of English courses. changes are possible in South Africa. again as an uncompromised language. Many teachers have already attended What has happened in Namibia shows Fishman indicates clearly that "lan­ crash courses in English. The crucial that a language policy is a variable and guages are not liked in a vacuum, but question remains as to when to switch not a fixed unchangeable entity. rather liked or disliked as symbolic val­ over. If the switchover is too soon In this article it appeared that lan­ ues, of peoples, of ideologies, of (before the education system is ready guage attitudes are often a reflection of behaviours."51 If Afrikaans can be eval­ for it) many Namibians will not experi­ values that have been associated with a uated only in terms of its usefulness in ence the advantages of independence particular language. These values do Namibia, and in terms of the Namibians because they will have dropped out of not necessarily reflect inherent features who speak it, it could be an acceptable the school system. If the switchover is of the language itself, but are rather language for members of other lan­ delayed too long, Afrikaans may reflections of attitudes and perceptions guage groups as well. remain the lingua franca or ethnicity of features of the speakers of that lan­ One of the interesting phenomena to may begin to develop. guage.53 As these perceptions change, analyse in Namibia that is directly rele­ There are clearly two interrelated the attitudes towards a particular lan­ vant to the situation in South Africa, is problems in the implementation of the guage change as well. However, these the attitudes of Afrikaans-speakers to new language policy for education: the values tend to be absolute - in other. these changes in the status of Afrikaans retraining of teachers and the acquisi­ words, all the members of a given and, by implication, to changes in their tion of new English teaching material. speech community are seen to have socio-political status. It is predictable Although retraining programmes are specific characteristics - in this case that a reaction will set in after an initial operational, they need to be extended Afrikaans-speakers are seen to be racist period of restricted use of Afrikaans and provision made for refresher cours­ and oppressive. No community is as and that a natural revival will also es. It is clear that badly trained teachers homogenous as this. The Afrikaans­ occur in which Afrikaans will find a can do much to harm the new language speaking community in particular is more natural position in the Namibian policy. divided into many groups and not all of ) society.0 Non-racial sport and recre­ In an independent Namibia Afrikaans them supported the apartheid policies 1

ational0 clubs and cultural societies will will be able to prove that its continued of the government. As members of the 2 help secure the continued existence of existence is not dependent on laws, but (white) Afrikaans-speaking community d

Afrikaans,e and multiracial Afrikaans that it can exist as a minority language find that life in a non-racial democracy t schoolsa will further help to break down alongside other minority languages. In is not so bad, they will be placed in a d ( racial prejudices. The church will also other words, Afrikaans-speakers will be position to change the symbolic value r playe an important role in maintaining able to show that they have an underly­ of Afrikaans in Namibia, thereby secur­ h s 52 Afrikaans.i ing will to preserve the language. This ing its position. The effects of this on l b Swapo officials have emphasized situation might well help to reduce the the position of Afrikaans in a future u

thatP Afrikaans has an important role to distance between the various Afrikaans­ South Africa are difficult to establish,

playe in the interim period. It is clear speaking groups in Namibia. but one can be sure that it will help to h t that Afrikaans was far better estab­ Language planners in South Africa remove some of the prejudices preva­ y lishedb as a lingua franca than Swapo who are concerned with the future of lent in South Africa at the moment.

anticipatedd and their language policy Afrikaans will now be confronted with The assumption that a foreign world e seemst to have been adjusted to make a situation in which they can prom'ote language has the "capacity to unite n a the language in a foreign country with­ African peoples against divisive ten­

allowancesr for this fact. g out creating the impression that they dencies inherent in the multiplicity of e c are trying to meddle in the internal African languages within the same geo­ n

Conclusione affairs of that country. This promotion graphic state"54 has been questioned in c i l

The new government of Namibia will will have to be targeted at Afrikaans­ this article. This type of policy has the r certainlye try to establish its own identi­ speakers of all races and at no stage potential danger of replacing one form d

tyn as soon as possible. This will should it be seen as an attempt to regain of discrimination with another. It would u include the introduction of various the previous status of Afrikaans. As is seem as if it is only an interim solution y

sociala and economic reform pro­ done in other countries, scholarships to and that African nationalism will soon­ grammes.w One manifestation of the attend South African universities can er or later require that the indigenous e t

desirea to be independent of Pretoria is be made available to the best students languages playa more important role in G the new language policy. The imple­ - but again only on a non-racial basis. local matters. It would appear that t mentatione of this policy will require Language planning is to a large Swapo's language policy has made pro­ n dedicationi from Namibians, but the degree future oriented. In this article vision for this development. It has b euphoriaa of independence will help to some of the implications that follow repeatedly pledged "equal status and S

overcomey some of the problems facing from the introduction of English as the respect to all locally spoken lan­ b them. only official language of Namibia have guages."55 d e c u d

Africao Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 167 r p e R Language ______

References 12 CfR Fasold, The sociolinguistics of society, . 31 G Mansour, op cit, p 286. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984, pp 4-5; R 32 Cf R T Bell, Sociolinguistics, London: Vide N Alexander, Language policy and Wardhaugh, Languages in competition, Batsworth, 1976; C M Scotton, op cit; L T national unity in South Africa, Cape Town: Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp 163-167. Buchu Books, 1989; K Heugh, "Trends in du Plessis, op cit; R Ohly, "Language language medium policy for a post­ 13 S J AI-Toma, "Language education III planning and education in Tanzania", apartheid South Africa", in D Young (ed), Arab countries and the role of the Logos, vol 8, no 2, 1988, P 32 on the mis­ Language: Planning and medium in edu­ academies", in T A Seboek (ed), Current use of language planning to the advantage cation, Cape Town: The Language trends in linguistics 6: Linguistics in of the members of a small elite. South West Africa and North Africa, The Education Unit and SAALA; K P Prinsloo, 33 Vide R J Watts, "Language, dialect and Hague: Mouton, 1970, p 696; B H Jernudd "A proposed agenda for language planning national identity in Switzerland", and J Das Gupta, "Towards a theory of in South Africa", South African Journal of Multilingua, vol 7, no 3,1988, P 314. Linguistics, Occasional Papers, no 2, language planning", in J Rubin and B H 34 Cf R Y Bourhis, "Language policies and 1985; idem, "Taalbeplanning vir Jernudd (eds), Can language be planned? language attitudes: Le mond de la franco­ Afrikaans: Voorstelle op die mikro-vlak" Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, phonie", in E B Ryan and H Giles (eds), Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe, vol 26, 1971, p 202. Attitudes towards language variation, no 4, 1986; J C Steyn, "Die moontlike her­ 14 A Davies, "How language planning theory London: Edward Arnold, 1982, p 37. waardering van die status van Afrikaans", can assist first-language teaching", in 0 M Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe, vol 29, Tomic and R W Shuy (eds), The relation 35 B Harlech-Jones, "An evaluation ... ", op no 4, 1989; P L van den Berghe, of theoretical and applied linguistics, New cit, p 12. "Language and 'nationalism' in South York: Plenum Press, 1987, p 157. 36 Vide R J Watts, op cit, p 314. Africa", in J A Fishman, C A Ferguson 37 E Haughen, "The language of imperialism: and J Das Gupta (eds), Language prob­ 15 Cf United Nations Institute for Namibia, op cit. Unity or pluralism?", in N Wolfson and J lems in developing nations, New York: Manes (eds), Language of inequality, John Wiley, 1968. 16 Cfibid, pp 37-41. Berlin: Mouton, 1985, p 14. 2 W Zimmermann, "Language planning, 17 See H W G du Plessis, Afrikaans en sy 38 W Haacke, op cit, p 190. language policy and education in moontlikhede in SWAINamibie, Windhoek: Namibia", Logos, vol 4, no 1, 1984. 39 Vide A Davies, op cit, p 158 on the sym­ Akademie, 1987, p 3, for a discussion of bolic value of language in times of social 3 Vide G Mansour, "The dynamics of multi­ this paper. change. lingualism: The case of Senegal", Journal 18 Cf United Nations Institute for Namibia, 40 R T Bell, op cit, p 176. of Multilingual and Multicultural op cit, p 3. Development, vol 1, no 4, 1980, on social 41 A Bamgbose, "Mother-tongue medium dominance and the bilingualism of minori­ 19 Cf ibid, P 7. and scholastic attainment in Nigeria", ty groups. Prospects, vol 14, no 1, p 93. 20 Cf ibid, P 8. ) 42 Cf United Nations Institute for Namibia, 4 0 Cf R Ohly, "Afrikaans loan words in

1 21 Cf ibid, pp 48-49; B Harlech-Jones, op cit, op cit, pp 57-58.

0 Herero: The question of folk taxonomy", pI. 2

South African Journal of Linguistics, vol 43 CfR Ohly, "Language planning ... ", op cit,

d 5,n02,1987. pp 25, 31 on jobless pupils with English as

e 22 Cf United Nations Institute for Namibia, t op cit, pp 38, 40. subject in Tanzania. 5 a H W G du Plessis, "Afrikaans as d

( 'imposed' or 'colonial' in SWA/Namibia", 44 CfW Zimmermann, op cit, p 27. 23 Cf ibid, P 40. r South African Journal of Linguistics, vol e 45 Cf D Forson, "The implementation of 24 Cf ibid, P 8. h 3, no 1, 1985.

s English by the Roman Catholic vicariate i l 25 Vide L T du Plessis, "Afrikaans afgedwing of Windhoek, Namibia", unpublished

6 b Vide M C J van Rensburg, et ai, Die

u Afrikaans van Griekwas in die tagtiger­ in SWA/Namibie?", Suid-Afrikaanse paper read at the Annual General Meeting P jare, Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Tydskrif vir Taalkunde, vol 3, no 1, 1985, of the Southern African Applied e pp 58-61. Linguistics Association, Durban, July

h Council, 1984. t

1989.

7 y Vide W Zimmermann, op cit, p 29; F H 26 See also B Harlech-Jones, "An evaluation b Odendaa1, Report of the Commission of of assumptions underlying language in 46 B Harlech-Jones, "Language policy ... ", op d education in Namibia", Logos, vol 7, no 1, cit, P 12. e Enquiry into South West Africa Affairs t 1987, pp 11-12.

n 1962-1963, Pretoria: Government Printer, 47 Cf U Ndoma, op cit, pp 176-177; P G

a 1963, p 261. Djite, op cit, p 216. r 27 J A Fishman, "The spread of English as a g new perspective for the study of 'language 48 B Harlech-Jones, "Language policy ... ", op 8 e B Harlech-Jones, "Language policy in c independent Namibia, with particular ref­ maintenance and language shift"', Studies cit, P 12. n

e erence to Afrikaans", Linguistic Agency, in Language Learning, vol 1, no 2, 1976,

c 49 Ibid, P 2. i p77. l University of Duisberg, Series B, Paper no

r 204, 1989, P 10 50 Ibid, P 14. e 28 Vide P G Djite, "The spread of Dyula and

d 51 J A Fishman, "The spread ... ", op cit, p 84. popular French III Cote d'Ivoire:

9 n Vide W Haacke, "Minority languages in

u Implications for language policy", 52 J C Steyn, "Interkulturele verhoudinge met

the education system of Namibia:

y Fragmentation or unification?" III D Language Planning and Language spesiale aandag aan die toekoms van a Problems, vol 12, no 3, 1988, P 215. Afrikaans (2)", Tydskrif vir Geestes­

w Young (ed), op cit, p 190. e

t wetenskappe, vol 27, no 4, 1987. 10 Vide U Ndoma, "National language policy 29 Vide E Simpson, "Translating for national a III 53 Vide G Mansour, op cit, p 289. G education in Zaire", Language integration", Babel, vol 30, no 1, 1984, pp

t Problems and Language Planning, vol 8, 26-33.

e 54 Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Decolonising the

n no 2,1984, P 174. mind, London: James Currey, 1986, i 30 C M Scotton, "Language in East Africa. b pp 6-7.

11a United Nations Institute for Namibia, Linguistic patterns and political ideolo­ S

Toward a language policy for Namibia, gies", in J A Fishman (ed), Advances in 55 Swapo election manifesto, 1989, p 6; cf y Lusaka: United Nations Institute for b the study of societal multilingualism, The also Namibia Today, vol 6, no I, 1982,

d Namibia, 1981, p 95. Hague: Mouton, 1978, p 730. P 25. e c u d o

168r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Elections

The implementation of the 1988/89 district assembly (local government) elections in Ghana

The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) of Ghana under the leadership of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings conducted district assembly (local govern­ ment) elections from December 1988 to February 1989. Joseph R A Ayee, of the University of Legon, Ghana, interprets the elections as a practical demonstration of the commitment of the PNDC to place power in the hands of the people and give them the opportunity for genuine participation in the government of the country. 1n this article he identifies not only the factors that enhanced the smooth implemen­ ) 0

tation1 of the elections but also the problems encountered. 0 2

d e t

Introductiona Background (GDP) dropped from 21 to 4 per cent.l d (

Perhaps the most ambitious political On 6 March 1957 Ghana became the Furthermore, the domestic savings rate r programmee of Flight Lieutenant Jerry first African state south of the Sahara fell from 12 to 3 per cent, and the h

Rawlings's Provisional National to achieve independence from British investment rate from 14 to 2 per cent of i l

Defenceb Council (PNDC) since it came colonial rule. The new state embarked GDP; finally the government deficit tou power through a coup d' etat on 31 upon political independence with a rose from 0,4 to 14,6 per cent of GDP P

Decembere 1981, was the holding of the legacy of Western structures at the cen­ and by the time of the 1984 mission h t

district assembly (local government) tre and a politically informed, involved represented 65 per cent of total govern­ electionsy from December 1988 to and active populace. But successive ment spending.2 b

Februaryd 1989. These elections were governments so dissociated themselves In order to arrest this economic slide e justifiedt by government officials as a from the values that go with such the PNDC launched an International n

movea in keeping with the ideals of the structures that political instability, eco­ Monetary Fund (lMF)-World Bank r g

"31st December Revolution", set forth nomic recession and the repression of supported Economic Recovery e

byc Rawlings when he came to power, political opposition became the order Programme (ERP) in 1983. The first n

aimede at ensuring that power is exer­ of the day. Since independence, for phase, ERP I (1983-86), was the stabi­ c i

cisedl by the people from grassroots instance, Ghanaians have had to con­ lization phase, that is, it was aimed at

r tend with nine regimes and eight heads halting the economic decline - espe­

level.e

d of state (see Table 1). cially in the industrial and export com­ n

u This article attempts to identify the The PNDC assumed power against a modity production sectors; while the

factorsy that facilitated the smooth hold­ background of serious economic second phase, ERP II (1987-89) was a

ingw of the elections and the constraints decline. According to the World Bank the structural adjustment and develop­ e encountered.t It must be pointed out mission of 1984, income per capita fell ment phase, the special emphasis of a

thatG the 1988/89 district assembly elec­ by 30 per cent and real wages by 80 per which fell upon growth and develop­

t

tionse were not the first to be held in the cent between 1970 and 1982; import ment, particularly .in the social ser­ n

country.i Similar local government volume fell by two-thirds; real export vices. In 1987 one of the main b

electionsa had been held in 1952, 1958 earnings fell by one-half, and the ratio measures taken was the unification of S and 1978. of exports to Gross Domestic Product exchange rates - the dual exchange y b

d e c u

Africad Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 o 169 r p e R Elections ______

Table 1: GHANA'S REGIMES, 1957·1988

Regime Dates in power Head of State Type of government

Convention People's Party March 1951-Feb 1966 Dr K warne Nkrumah civilian, multi-party; (CPP) 1Sl Republic then one party 2 National Liberation Council (NLC) Feb 1966-April 1969 Lt-Gen J A Ankrah military, police 3 National Liberation Council (NLC) April 1960-Sept 1969 Lt Gen A A Afrifa* military, police 4 Progress Party (PP) 2nd Republic Oct 1969-Jan 1972 Dr K A Busia civilian, multi-party 5 National Redemption Council (NRC) Jan 1972-0ct 1975 Gen I K Acheampong military 6 Supreme Military Council (SMCI) Oct 1975-July 1978 Gen I K Acheampong military 7 Supreme Military Council (SMCII) July 1978-June 1979 Lt Gen F W K Akuffo military 8 Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) June 1979-Sept 1979 FIt Lt J J Rawlings military 9 People's National Party (PNP) 3rd Republic Sept 1979-Dec 1981 Dr Hilla Limann civilian, multi-party 10 Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) Dec 198 I-present Fit Lt J J Rawlings military

* Lt Gen Afrifa's assumption of office as Chairman of the NLC and Head of State did nOl change the composition, orientation and policies of the NLC.

rate was terminated in February - Ghanaian society. The National Commission accompanied by a devaluation of the Now the district assembly elections, for Democracy (NCO) currency, the cedi, by 13,2 per cent.3 the cornerstone of the decentralization The 1988/89 district assembly elec­ Public spending was cut, the ranks of programme enunciated by the PNDC in tions in Ghana were administered the civil service were thinned out and 1987, were and are tied to the ERP, and under the control of the National the number of employees in the Cocoa failure to hold the elections "would Commission for Democracy (NCD), )

Marketing0 Board (CMB) and other constitute a breach of faith with the which until 31 December 1981 was 1

state0 enterprises also reduced. peop1e".6 The link between the elec­ known as the Electoral Commission. 2 Ghana has been singled out by the tions and the ERP was further echoed The name was changed to NCD by d

e by Rawlings: PNDC Establishment Proclamation IMFt as a country that has consistently followeda IMF structural adjustment 1981 and further reinforced by PNDC

d Ghanaians should know from the history ( prescriptions, with an accompanying of this country and other countries that Law 42 of 1983. These laws, it must be r improvemente in the economy. In the the greatest enemy of democracy is a noted, were very sketchy in defining h

s weak and chaotic economy.... Democracy wordsi of the United Nations, adjust­ the membership, functions and opera­ l can be secured only on the foundations of mentb efforts in Ghana "produced a tions of the Commission. In an effort

u a strong viable and efficient economy.?

turnaroundP in the economy, which is to add more flesh to the membership,

nowe growing at a commendable rate This link between the ERP and the functions and operations of the NCD h t after years of stagnation and decline".4 decentralization programme in general, the PNDC therefore promulgated the y

Despiteb the supposed "turnaround in and with the elections in particular, National Commission for Democracy

thed economy", however, life has partly explains why it took the PNDC Law, 1988 (PNDC Law 208), which, e becomet unbearable for most six years to formulate and implement a however, took retroactive effect from 1 n

Ghanaians.a In the words of the chair­ decentralization programme. June 1987. The retroactive nature of r g man of the PNDC, Flight Lieutenant As a consequence of its concern for this law was meant to take account of e

Rawlings:c Ghana's political and administrative the activities of the NCD, which began n

e structures, on 1 July 1987 the PNDC with the launching of the "Blue Book". c Statisticians and economists can quote i l

fairly impressive figures to demonstrate promulgated a "Blue Book" on the The NCD is headed by a chairman, r

e the remarkable economic recovery which Creation of District Authorities and Justice D F Annan, who acts as chair­ d has been achieved in the past few years . n Modalities for District Level Elections man of the PNDC and Head of State in

u ... We can see with our own eyes some of on 1st July 1987. The "Blue Book" set the absence of Rawlings. There is also y the tangible results in the form of roads,

a out proposals for the reform of local a member/secretary, who is responsible electricity, boreholes etc. And yet all of w government and the holding of district to the Commission and also for the dis­ e t us know that it is not easy to make ends 8 a meet, much less think about saving.s assembl y elections. These proposals cipline and supervision of its staff. The G

underwent country-wide discussion and chairman presides over meetings of the t

e The structural adjustment pro­ were subsequently revised. On 11 Commission and, in the event of a tied n grammei has been vehemently resisted November 1988, the Local Government vote, he has a second or casting vote. b bya trade unions and other urban inter­ Law embodying the proposals was pro­ Membership of the Commission was S

ests,y who have seen it as a ploy to fur­ mulgated, thus paving the way for the increased from 7 to 20 in December

b 9 ther line the pockets of the rich few in holding of the elections. 1988, not only to take more accurate d e c u d

170o Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 r p e R ------______Elections

account of more interests but also to Table 2: REGISTRATION OF VOTERS (MAIN EXERCISE) give it more weight with which to han­ IN GHANA 1987 dle the forthcoming elections. The chairman and members of the Council Region Estimated population Population registered Percentage of were appointed by the PNDC. aged 18 and above byNCD population 18 Under Section Two, Sub-Sections a, (Nov 1987) and above registered b, and c, the NCD has three main roles: Northern 621 706 498523 81,36 to conduct and supervise all public reg­ Upper East 429355 358523 83,42 istration of voters; to conduct and supervise all public elections and refer­ Upper West 225760 212 192 93,99 endums; and to demarcate electoral Volta 638684 562873 88,13 boundaries. Other functions of the Brong Ahafo 640834 650262 101,47 Commission include the formulation of Greater Accra 844563 792012 93,78 a programme for the more effective Ashanti 1090067 946033 86,79 realization of true democracy in Ghana; Eastern 903056 743068 82,28 the dissemination within Ghanaian Central 591 961 549564 92,84 society of an awareness of the objec­ Western 635769 586398 92,23 tives of the "revolutionary transforma­ tion" being embarked upon by the TOTAL 6612755 5899098 89,21 PNDC in the interest of true democra­ Source: National Commission for Democracy, Accra, 1989 cy; and the winding up of political par­ ties operating before 31 December 1981 and the recovering of all their assets. to registration assistants were permitted country. (Only about 15 per cent of the The NCD was allocated 1,7 billion to register voters in their homes and registered voters in the country visited cedis for the elections, out of the 6 bil­ offices; while in highly urbanized areas the centres of exhibition to inspect lion cedis the PNDC voted for its special centres were set up to which their names.)12 Electoral area informa­ decentralization programme. Of these registerable voters would have easy tion centres that had been opened up 1,7 billion cedis, 85 million went to the access. The registration exercise was mainly in the urban areas of Accra, preparation of a voters' register while also extended to Ghanaians resident Kumasi and Sekondi -Takoradi were

100) million were spent on the printing and exercising diplomatic functions used as centres at which the register 0 of1 ballot papers and so forth. 11 abroad. could be kept for exhibition. 0

2 We can now tum to the preparation A mini-registration exercise was

for,d and holding of, the elections. also conducted from 11-25 April 1988. e t The main exercise had officially ended Election timetable a d

( on 30 November 1987. This mini-exer­ The ten regions in Ghana were grouped

Ther registration exercise cise was organized for two weeks. The into three electoral zones for the pur­ e

Thish lasted from 1 October to 30 register had to be reopened in this way pose of the elections. Regions of Zone s i Novemberl 1987. Unlike previous vot­ to give equal opportunity to some areas One, compnsmg Ashanti, Central, b ersu registration exercises, which had in the Northern, Brong Ahafo, Volta, Eastern and Western, held their elec­ P been backed by strong "politicai party" 'l/estern tions on 6 December 1988; while Zone

e Ashanti, and Eastern Regions h

sentiments,t the registration exercise which it had been impossible to reach Two regions, consisting of Upper West

conductedy by the NCD in 1987 had no during the main exercise because of and Northern, had elections conducted b political party patronage. Would-be floods, poor roads, and the lack of on 31 January 1989. The Zone Three d e voterst knew they were not going to vehicles powerful enough to enable regions, compnsmg Brong Ahafo, voten for any political party or person registration personnel to get there. The Volta and Greater Accra, had their a r

withg any particular political inclina­ mini -exercise brought in 23 917 more elections on 27 February 1989. Three

tion.e The exercise was also to compile voters for the voters register (see factors determined this phasing of the c registersn for district level elections Table 3). elections. The first was the region's e c only.i At the close of the exercise, 89 state of preparedness, as decided by its l

perr cent of the estimated population of logistics and political and geographical e Exhibition of register thed country eligible to do so had regis­ standing during the period just before teredn their names (see Table 2). The In accordance with Legislative the elections. For instance, changes in u

exercisey was relatively successful Instrument (U) 1397 of 1988, the the weather and the economic and becausea of the intensive public educa­ NCD exhibited the voters register in political activities of the different w e tiont programmes expressed in different selected places to enable registered regions were studied by the NCD in printa and news media and in the course voters to check the accuracy of their grouping them for their elections. G

oft lectures and symposia conducted by particulars in the register before the Second, the NCD also determined its e governmentn officials and the NCD. polls. The registers were exhibited own capabilities in logistic support, i

b In order to get large numbers of from 18-31 July 1988 in all regions of electoral personnel and administrative a S people to register their names new the country. A copy of the register was convenience. Thus in the opinion of y

techniquesb were used. For example, placed in every electoral area of the the Commission, "it was wise ... that a

d e c u

Africad Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 171 o r p e R Elections

Table 3: VOTING PATTERNS OF THE DISTRICT ASSEMBLY The elections ELECTIONS IN GHANA 1988/89 Certain features marking a departure from previous elections may be dis­ Region Districts Elec- Polling Nomina Candi Unopp Regis Votes cerned in the 1988/89 elections. First, toral stations tions dates osed tered cast areas they were funded entirely by the state. As we have already noted, 1,7 billion Northern 13 546 1 018 1496 1471 38 508560 308 191 cedis was allocated for the conduct of Upper East 6 270 702 n.a. 822 17 358 174 222068 these elections. This funding of the Upper West 5 198 768 460 458 42 212 192 143017 elections by the state was to enable as Volta 12 498 1 885 1 885 1 343 71 568590 334445 many people as possible, irrespective Brong Ahafo 13 58 2082 1 746 1629 65 650143 391 489 of their status in society, to stand as Greater Accra 5 236 1244 n.a. 693 37 792012 350861 candidates. Even the candidates' basic Ashanti 18 840 2739 2945 2211 154 950222 577 735 publicity was paid for. Second, pic­ tures of candidates rather than symbols Eastern 15 684 2154 1 861 1 825 62 744 160 452449 were used in these elections, ostensibly 1478 1421 7 549564 307668 Central 12 498 n.a. to enable illiterates, who formed the Western 11 452 1 697 n.a. 969 49 589221 328479 majority of voters, to recognize the TOTAL 110 4804 15765 n.a. 12842 532 5922838 3416402 candidates they were voting for. Third, candidates campaigned before their Source: National Commission for Democracy, Accra, 1989. electorates on a common platform organized by the DECs on behalf of the NCD. Fourth, no deposit was required. This differed from the situa­ day's election for the whole country Another 330 people were also engageq tion in the 1978 elections, when a can­ preceded by three weeks of keen and as reserves, to ensure that no vacuum didate was required to pay 500 cedis concurrent electioneering campaigns in would be created in the event of any - the equivalent of a worker's wages all the districts would create untold committee member falling sick or meet­ for a month. hardships during the polls for both the ing with some mishap. Teachers domi­ The 59,1 per cent turnout of regis­ voters and the Commission."13 On the nated the membership of the DECs, tered voters was the highest of the three grounds of lack of resources and logis­ (constituting 85 per cent of it) because, polls held over the last twenty years tic) support, therefore, the elections had in the words of Haizel, "they could lead (see Table 4). In the 1979 parliamentary 0 to 1 be phased in. A third reason behind the local people better" since they could elections only 1,8 million or 35,25 per 0 15 2 read and write. The DECs attended the phasing in of the elections is that cent of the 5 million registered voters theyd were not being held on a party briefing courses in Accra and Kumasi actually voted, while in the November e t

basis.14a It should be pointed out that on 19-20 September 1988. The DECs 1978 district council elections 18,4 per d the( election timetable, once decided teamed up with the district public cent of the electorate voted.

r

upon,e was never changed. education committees in most areas to The low turnout for the 1978 elec­ h

s open information centres in their elec­ tions could be attributed to a number of i l toral areas for effective public education factors. These were the first local gov­ Theb district election u on the process. ernment elections since 1958, and not P committees (DECs)

e only took place during a state of emer­ h

In t order to ensure that the elections gency declared by Lieutenant General The notice of nomination of werey conducted in the most effective Akuffo's Supreme Military Council b and fair manner, the NCD was empow­ candidates (SMC II) government to clamp down d e eredt by Regulation One of the District The first exercise in the election pro­ on a nationwide civil service strike, but n

Assemblya Elections Regulations 1988 cess started with the notice of nomina­ also in an atmosphere of apathy and r

(LIg 1396) to establish a five-member tion of candidates. It was issued on 12 despondency still enveloping voters as

committeee in every district, to be known October 1988 for all three zones. Two a result of General Acheampong's dis­ c as n the district election committee days were set aside in each zone for credited Union Government referen­ e c

(DEC).i The committees were charged the filing of nominations by candi­ dum of March 1978 only a few months l

withr the responsibility for the conduct dates. Nominations so filed with the before. In addition, these 1978 elec­ e andd supervision of public elections and DECs were announced only a week tions were announced and held with lit­ n

referendau within their districts. The can­ thereafter. A further week after these tle prior warning. General Akuffo's

didates'y platforms were created by the nomination announcements was set SMC II government announced on 29 a

DECsw under the general direction and aside in all zones for preparation for September that district council elec­ e supervisiont of the NCD. The commit­ the mounting of platforms. Platform tions would be held on 17 November. teesa were also responsible for the mounting, organized by the DECs, There was, therefore, little advance G receiptt of candidates' nominations and lasted for three weeks in all three publicity; some voters only discovered e n

alsoi ensured that candidates presented zones. In all zones, again, elections who the candidates were at the polling themselvesb and their programmes to the were conducted one day after platform station on election day. a S electorate. The districts were constituted mountings had officially come to an In contrast, the high voter turnout y 16 byb 600 election committee members. end. during the 1988/89 elections could be

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172d Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3,1990 o r p e R ______Elections

attributed to the PNDC's public educa­ Table 4: COMPARATIVE PERCENTAGE VOTES CAST IN ELECTIONS tion campaign. PNDC members and IN GHANA various officials of the NCD, regional and district secretaries (ministers), Region 1978 District 1979 Parliamentary 1989 District members of the Committee of the council elections elections assembly Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) and elections the 31st December Revolution Women's Northern 18,2 32,09 60,6 Movement covered the country making Upper East >Upper* 16,1 32,82 62,0 speeches on the grassroot benefits of the Upper West >Region 67,4 proposed district assemblies. Regional breakdowns indicate that Volta 15,3 33,65 59,4 the regions in Electoral Zone Two Brong Ahafo 18,7 33,16 60,2 (Northern, Upper East and Upper West) Greater Accra 10,2 35,59 44,2 boasted the highest performance - a Ashanti 24,9 41,99 60,8 63,3 per cent turnout (see Table 4). Eastern 16,6 35,95 60,8 These three regions, we must point out, Central 22,2 33,34 59,3 together represent the largest but least Western 20,6 34,04 55,3 densely populated area of Ghana. NATIONAL AVERAGE 18,4 35,25 59,1 Upper West Region recorded the high­ est percentage of voter turnout (67,4) Source: 1978 District and 1979 Parliamentary Elections Results from National Commission for apparently as "a sign of gratitude" to Democracy, Accra, 1989; and the 1988/89 District Level Election Results from Ministry of the PNDC for creating the region in Local Government, Information Digest Special Edition II 5 (Accral Community Development January 1983. Greater Accra Region - Press, 1989), p 3. the region around and including the * In January 1983 the PNDC split the Upper Region into two regions: Upper East and Upper nation's capital, Accra - recorded the West for administrative purposes. lowest turnout, probably through apa­ thy and the fact that the Region con­ tained the cream of the upper middle class opposed to the elections. were tied to the ERP and SAP. Also, At the same time the government

Out) of the 12482 candidates, only and more significantly, the elections believes that the ballot box could bring 0 were seen as a way of legitimizing the out the people who best represent the 5321 (or 4,14 per cent) were returned unopposed,0 compared to 34,9 per cent power base of the PNDC. As we have interests of the community since: 2

in thed 1978 district elections. Of partic­ already noted, the PNDC came to We don't want vain promises and propa­ e ulart interest was the level of womens' power through a coup d' etat and did ganda. We don't want a situation where a participation.d 112 women were elected not plan to return the country to demo­ the largest number of lies leads to the (

largest number of votes. 19 as r assembly members compared to 17 cratically elected civilian government. e

at theh 1978 elections. During the regis­ There was thus much pressure on the This supposed faith in the electoral s i trationl exercise Brong Ahafo Region PNDC, both within and outside Ghana, process was intended to "make the b

scoredu the highest percentage turnout to set in motion some sort of pro­ PNDC redundant, but the PNDC does P

(101,47) (see Table 2). During the elec­ gramme to return the country to demo­ not intend to do so by decreeing artifi­ e

tions,h however, this figure was reduced cratic rule. The 1988 Local cially conceived or borrowed forms of t government. "20 becausey some of the voters registered in Government Law and the subsequent b that region had by that time left for district assembly elections, held to fill The PNDC's commitment to the d theire farms lying beyond the electoral two-thirds of the membership of the elections as a way of legitimation went t boundaries.n These farmers were mainly district assemblies (DAs) - the most to prove once again the contention of a settlersr in the Western Region who, at important tier of the new local govern­ Naomi Chazan that: g

thee time of the registration exercise, ment structure - WOUld, it was hoped, Elections in Ghana have ... been, to a c

whichn coincided with the lean season, be seen as a move by the PNDC large extent, a resp.onse to the crises of e legitimacy experienced by military or hadc come back to their homes in Brong towards democracy. i

l 17 authoritarian rulers. Although spurted by Ahafo. Since it saw these elections as a step r

e to legitimacy, the PNDC sought to the insecurity of those in office, interest d in elections has focused squarely on the n change its previously hostile attitude issue of the bases of regime legitimacy.21 Whatu facilitated the smooth (or at least ambivalence) towards elec­ y electiona process toral processes and had also to explain We should remind ourselves that in w

Thee first fact contributing to the smooth or rationalize this. The PNDC, it was 1960 Kwame Nkrumah sought support t electiona process was the political com­ said, now considered the: for the centralization of power under G mitment the NCD had from the PNDC. his aegis; that in 1969 the National t ...ballot box as the best way of judging Thise commitment was demonstrated by Liberation Council (NLC) tried to insti­ n the electoral process and ... what the i tute a liberal-democratic regime in the theb chairman and members of the PNDC has criticized is the abuse of the PNDCa being openly involved in the country; that Acheampong in .1978 S ballot box by politicians .... We want the

campaign.y This political commitment ballot box to assume its true functions as wished to obtain public endorsement b arose from the fact that the elections the true arbiter of the electoral process. 18 for a no-party system of government; d e c u d

Africao Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 173 r p e R Elections ______

and finally that in 1979 yet another The one week preparation period that election materials; the counting of ballot effort was made to restore democratic preceded the platform mounting could papers in some rural areas being procedures.22 not be used as a vetting period for the deferred until the next morning because A second contribution to the suc­ DECs. Nominations had by then been of insufficient light; the partiality of cessful holding of these elections lay in closed. The platform mounting period some DEC members; and the ineffec­ the assistance provided by supportive of three weeks assigned to all electoral tiveness of security personnel on duty organizations and institutions, such as areas was also too brief. In this short on polling day at some stations.29 the armed forces, the police, the Ghana time it proved difficult for anyone to Private Road Transport Union disqualify a duly nominated candidate. (GPRTU), the Cocoa Marketing Board Since the platform mounting was short Conclusion and the Post and Telecommunication in relation to the amount of work that This article has examined the holding Corporation, to augment the logistics, had to be done by the DECs it became of the 1988/89 district assembly elec­ supplies and efforts of the NCD. For difficult for them to visit many electoral tions in Ghana, the factors assisting the instance, military planes from the areas more than once. The time factor, smooth conduct of these elections and Ghana Air Force were used in air-lift­ coupled with transport constraints, the problems encountered. It should be ing ballot papers to Tamale, Navrongo made the presentation of manifestos by pointed out that these elections attract­ and Wa. They also assisted in reaching candidates very hard to monitor.26 ed the least animosity and enmity (in the inaccessible areas of Walewale in A second series of problems con­ both candidates and voters) ever expe­ the Northern Region and Ntoaboma in cerned single candidates. There were rienced in the country. There was a the Afram Plains District of the Eastern 532 single candidates throughout the more peaceful atmosphere about them Region.23 country (see Table 3). Now it was a altogether. The elections also, once A third contribution to the smooth declared policy of the NCD that, where again, demonstrated the faith of running of these elections was the reno­ there was only one candidate for an Ghanaians in democratic procedures. vation and modernization of the opera­ electoral area at the close of nomina­ For once, the personal and elitist char­ tions room of the NCD. Up-to-date tions, that candidate should go through acter of past electoral processes was two-way radio communication equip­ with the election to "test his populari­ overshadowed by a national, unifying ment was installed and, for the first ty". Some candidates were declared event bringing together the various ele­ time in the life of the Commission, "unopposed" by their own electorate ments of the Ghanaian mosaic. This walkie-talkies were made available to even before the polls. In a few cases was made possible by the political

the) staff working there. The existing there were difficulties in getting people commitment of the PNDC to these radio0 network for the NCD's regional to offer themselves as candidates. The elections in order to legitimize itself. 1 offices0 was maintained and put to effec­ issue of single candidature posed a few One thing is certain: the PNDC and the 2

tived use during the election period. In problems before the polls and even dur­ 1988/89 district assembly elections e somet few cases the police were called ing them. Many people did not have the will be forever remembered by the a

upond to assist the Commission by mak­ necessary enthusiasm to exercise their Ghanaian illiterates, farmers, fisher­ (

ingr available the services of their local franchise in a situation of no choice, men and artisans who, for the first e

communicationsh units.24 and the logic of "testing one's populari­ time, voted or contested seats in an s i l ty" when there was no challenger in elections entirely funded by the state. b sight was often itself questioned. Whatu problems were P

Several questions were raised regarding encounterede h the "popuiariti; of a candidate. it was t One of the most important programmes not, for instance, known exactly how World Bank, Ghana: Policies and program y

b for adjustment, Washington, DC: World embarked upon by the NCD during the many votes would be necessary to d Bank, 1984, p 17. preparationse for the district assembly make a single candidate "popular".27 t 2 Ibid. electionsn was the platform mounting A third problem was the cumber­ a andr presentation of candidates. Soon some legal process for handling elec­ 3 J R A Ayee, "The political implications of g after nominations had been filed by the tion petitions. Part IV of the District the economic recovery programme of the e candidates,c which itself took two days Assembly Elections Regulations of Provisional National Defence Council", n

e Universitas, vol 10, 1989.

toc complete, a week was set aside 1988 stipulated that petitions would in i l 4 United Nations, Survey of economic and preparing candidates and electorate for the first instance be presented to the r social conditions in Africa: 1986-87, New ae three-week period of intensive plat­ DECs. The DECs would then forward d York: United Nations, 1988, p 19. formn mounting. The two-day filing the petitions to the court or tribunal for u 5 Flight Lieutenant J J Rawlings addressing period was expected to be used by the prosecution after they had established a y the 26th Congregation of the University of DECsa in vetting the particulars of nom­ prima facie case for such a step. The Ghana, August 1989. See The People's w ineese - and investigating complaints legal implications created much frustra­

t Daily Graphic (Accra), August 1989, pI. abouta them. It was found that this two­ tion in many a petitioner. This may 6 E A Haizel, Member/Secretary of the G day nomination period was too short have accounted for the low number of t National Commission for Democracy, fore vetting by both the DECs and the petitions - only 27 in number, from

n speaking to the Ashanti Regional i 25 28

electorate.b As we will now discover, the country's 4 840 electoral areas. Consultative Council in September 1988. thea first series of problems encountered Other problems included missing S 7 Flight Lieutenant Rawlings speaking to

ally concerned the time set aside for cer­ names from registers; the misarrange­ the nation in December 1987, on the sixth b tain stages of the election process. ment of names; delays in supplies of anniversary of his coming to power. d e c u d o Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990

174r p e R ______Elections

8 For an extensive analysis of the proposals 12 National Commission for Democracy, 22 See Naomi Chazan, "The politics of par­ of the "Blue Book", see J R A Ayee, "The "The district assembly elections report", ticipation in tropical Africa", Comparative Provisional National Defence Council Summary, (mimeo) Accra, n d, p 3. Politics, vol XIV, no 2, 1982, pp 169-189: 'Blue Book' on district political authority 13 Ibid. Naomi Chazan and Victor Le Vine, and the future of local government in "Politics in a 'non-political' system: The 14 E A Haizel, addressing Ghana", Journal of Management Studies the Ashanti March 30, 1978 referendum in Ghana", (University of Ghana), 3rd Series, vol 4, Regional Consultative Assembly, African Studies Review, vol XXII, no 1, January-December 1988, pp 25-39. September 1988. 1979,pp 177-208. 15 Ibid. 9 For an analysis of the 1988 Local 23 National Commission for Democracy, op Government Law, see J R A Ayee, "Local 16 National Commission for Democracy, op cit, p 7 government reforms in Ghana: Some cit, p 4. 24 Ibid, P 8. reflections on the 1988 Local Government 17 Ibid, P 5. Law", paper presented at the 21 st 25 Ibid, P 9. 18 D F Annan, PNDC member and chairman Congress of the International Institute of of the NCD addressing a seminar of dis­ 26 Ibid, pp 9-10. Administrative Sciences (liAS) held in trict election commission members in collaboration with the government of 27 Ibid, P 8. Accra, October 1988. Morocco and CAFRAD, under the theme 28 Ibid, P 6. 19 Ibid. "Accessibility and sensitivity in public 29 Ibid. administration", Marrakesh, Morocco, 24- 20 See West Africa, 20-26 March 1989, p 456. 28 July 1989. 21 Naomi Chazan, "The anomalies of conti- 10 Ghana, National Commission for Demo­ nuity: Perspectives on Ghanaian elections cracy Law 1988, Section 2(1). since independence", in Fred M Hayford 11 See Ministry of Local Government, (ed), Elections in independent Africa, Information Digest, vol 1, October 1988. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987, p 63. ) 0 1 0 2

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Africao Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 175 r p e R Foreign policy ______

Changing the guard: South African foreign policy into the 1990s

Dr Greg Mills, of the Department of Political Studies, University of the Western Cape, and Dr Simon Baynham, Chief Researcher at the Africa Institute look at the changing direction of South African foreign policy.

South Africa's foreign policy is still regimes in the period before 1974.2 together muster a total of 243 200 men. that if there is a Government which Thus, for various reasons, most of the However, although Angola (in addition it does not like, it does not make war neighbouring states have relied on to the rapidly-diminishing Cuban garri­ against it. As long as that Govern­ South African transport and port facili­ son) has 50 000 reserves and Tanzania ment leaves South Africa in peace, ties for the shipment of much of their some 10 000, South Africa has a well­ South Africa will leave that Govern­ commerce. Moreover, South Africa and organized reserve of around 455 000 )

0 ment in peace. Foreign Minister R F its neighbours are inextricably interde­ men. 4 Despite being at a disadvantage 1

0 "Pik" Botha, 1982.1 pendent economically in terms of trade in terms of access to equipment and 2 revenue; power and water supplies; replacements, and outnumbered in cer­ d e

Int the light of the massive changes in migrant labour supply and remittances; tain types of military hardware, South a

thed Republic of South Africa's interna­ investment and aid; health, tourism, Africa's military superiority and poten­ (

tionalr position over the past twelve education and technology transfer. It tial has been in its qualitative advan­ months,e it would seem reasonable to

h would be difficult to overstate the tage: in the serviceability of its s i

referl now to the start of a "new" period Republic's economic and military pri­ weapons systems, in its technological ofb South Africa foreign policy. The macy in the region. Within Southern innovation, and in the superior adminis­ u P

country is breaking out from the deep­ Africa as a whole, South Africa trative/logistical and strategic bases eninge isolation of the past forty years. accounts for some 80 per cent of total essential to the use of military power. h t We therefore thought it appropriate to GNP; 78 per cent of all motor vehicles Despite its obvious economic impor­ y b

catalogue the shifts in South African (which amounts to some 40 per cent of tance and military superiority in the d

foreigne policy since 1945, thereby those in all Africa); 63 per cent of region, the Republic's political security t

definingn the factors that then shaped - tarred roads; 56 per cent of the rail since 1945 has rested on the stability of a

andr those that are now shaping - the lines; 55 per cent of maize and 86 per its regional environment. Consequently, g process of policy formulation. cent of wheat grown; and 75 per cent of throughout the post-war period succes­ e c That South Africa is the unrivalled the total exports and 68 per cent of the sive South African governments made n economice and military powerhouse of total imports in 1985. South Africa's the creation of a stable regional milieu c i l the Southern African region has been population, however, only amounts to favourable to South Africa's economic r welle documented. The nature of the some 37 million inhabitants out of a and security interests a priority goal of d

economicn integration of Southern total of nearly 90 million (41 per cent) foreign policy. Indeed, the stability of

u 3 Africa is largely a legacy of colonial for the region as a whole. South Africa's domestic political order y appropriationa and development. This Relative to the Frontline States was perceived as critically dependent w

occurrede primarily through the estab­ (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, upon the success of such a policy. Any t lishmenta of a road and rail infrastruc­ Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe - understanding of South African foreign G ture, trade networks, capital and other known as the FLS grouping), South policy thus demands knowledge of the t formse of investment, and in response to Africa has assumed the status of both a Republic's domestic situation and relat­ n thei labour demands of South Africa. In military and economic leviathan. ed forms of state, government and poli­ b morea recent times these links were Compared with the South African tics; the nature and features of the S

strengthenedy by the common political Defence Force's (SADF) total regular region as well as any regional intra- and b interests shared by the white-ruled armed strength of 103 500, these states inter-state activity; and the dynamics of d e c u d

176o Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 r p e R --______Foreign policy

post-1945 world politics. In South between Third World states, which also Smuts enjoyed a reputation as a states­ Africa's case, the very nature of the faced problems of poverty and underde­ man perhaps only now equalled as a Republic's internal order meant that the velopment. The importance of this white South African leader by that of impact of domestic policy upon foreign grouping - as a highly visible and President F W de Klerk. Smuts's policy has been far more pronounced vociferous voting coalition in the UN, acclaim and international standing - than is usua1. 5 Conversely, changes in as markets for Western goods, or as part perhaps not entirely commensurate the regional context were often per­ and parcel of politically expansionist or with the Union's wealth, size or strate­ ceived as posing the gravest danger to global containment strategies - made gic location - peaked during his sec­ the survival of the South African their allegiance a major objective of ond term as Prime Minister (1939-45), regime. Indeed, alterations and devel­ superpower competition. It also gave when he was the only Dominion pre­ opments in the post-war order made it them very special political leverage on mier to attend meetings of the War increasingly difficult for Pretoria to such issues as the racial basis for politi­ Cabinet in London. maintain the distinction between cal power in South Africa. In addition to his contribution to the domestic and foreign policy, an effect Despite these considerations, South formation of the League of Nations at that placed other states at a certain Africa was quick to attribute its related the Peace Treaty of Versailles in 1919, advantage in their dealings with the internal and domestic security problems Smuts played an important role in Republic. to a Cold War scramble for territory drawing up the preamble to the UN For the purpose of analysing the evo­ and influence. Later it elaborated this Charter. His input at the San Francisco lution of South African foreign policy, view into that of a "Total Onslaught" conference proved, however, to be: "a the post-war era has been divided up against South Africa. Portraying itself watershed in South Africa's interna­ into the following periods: 1945-1960; as a natural ally of the West under tional standing; thereafter the country 1961-1974; 1975-1980; 1981-1984; threat of being overthrown by lackeys steadily declined into international 1985-1989; and, 1989-onwards. This of the Soviet Union, the government unpopularity and eventual ostracism."? makes it possible not only to chart the projected the challenges to South In the early post-war years, South evolution of policy, but also to weigh African security as part of a wider glob­ Africa, by virtue of its status as the the influence of individuals, to attribute al struggle. most developed economy in Africa, the South African government's reac­ The post-war era also witnessed entertained the notion of itself as a tion to the changing international and enormous technological improvements, great power having a role to play - regional environment, and to the deteri­ especially in the area of mass commu­ through inter-imperial co-operation - orating internal security situation. It nications. These in turn served to dis­ in shaping the course of events in the ) also0 provides a means of examining the seminate knowledge of South Africa's dependent African territories. However, 1 introduction0 of the government's total political system and stigmatize its poli­ these schemes of a regional or Pan­ 2 mobilization programme - or Total tics. The media revolution internation­ African Union came to naught. d e

Nationalt Strategy - after 1978, togeth­ alized the immorality of South Africa's Although both the Commonwealth and er a with those organizations of the South

d domestic system, strongly influencing the UN remained important internation­ ( African policy-making process that the relations between South Africa and al forums for South Africa, even before r accompaniede this shift. It is necessary other states in the international system. the National Party election victory in h s first,i however, to set South African for­

l 1948 Pretoria was beginning to find eignb policy in the changing internation­ itself isolated from the world communi­ u 1945-1960: Emergence as an al P context that emerged at the end of ty. An opponent of the National Party,

Worlde War II. international pariah Smuts was nevertheless severely criti­ h t Despite a history of resistance to cized in the UN over South West y b

British interference and colonialism, Africa, the mandate over which had

Thed Legacy of World War II

e the Afrikaner leadership has pursued a been ceded to South Africa at the end t

Then post-war world differed profound­ Western-oriented foreign policy and of World War I, and over the Union's a

ly r from that which preceded it. The emphasized its cultural and political treatment of its Indian minority. g systematic persecution and extermina­ alignment with the West. However, the This break from the past in South e tionc of the Jews by Nazi Germany pro­ contrast of South Africa's pre- and Africa's foreign relations was exacer­ n e

motedc a new sensitivity about human immediate post-war position with its bated by the advent of D F Malan's i l rights. In the wake of the Holocaust it decline in international stature is National Party government in 1948, r camee to be regarded as morally inde­ revealing. Before 1945 the then Union which was committed both to the d

fensiblen and politically repugnant to of South Africa was a highly respected achievement of republican status and u create an elaborate and socially divi­ member not only of the British the creation of a new domestic order, y sivea system based purely on racism. Commonwealth, but also of the League apartheid. Apartheid was in part w

Thise rejuvenated concern was clearly of Nations. As such it was regarded as designed to counter feelings of black t reflecteda in the UN Charter. a vital military and industrial base, "a self-determination being espoused else­ G

Concurrent with this international­ link in the Commonwealth chain of where in Africa. Consolidation of the t izatione of morality was the emergence defence whenever Africa was threat­ colonial order in Africa, it was hoped, n ofi anti-colonialist sentiments and a ened by outside powers."6 Seldom, if would safeguard South Africa's domes­ b desirea for self-determination. These ever, was the international spotlight of tic status quo. S

developmentsy provided a common condemnation thrown on the nation's With this in mind, Malan's Africa b denominator and binding political link internal affairs. Field Marshal J C Charter proposed guidelines for the d e c u d

Africao Insight, vo120, no 3, 1990

r 177 p e R Foreign policy ______

development of the continent along the that foreign OpInIOn had an influence states to the north; the Simons town lines of "Western European Christian upon domestic policy, and domestic Agreement of 1955 which assured - in civilization". Pretoria canvassed the policy imposed constraints on the con­ very broad terms - a British defence idea of an African Defence Organi­ duct of external affairs. Further ways commitment against external aggres­ zation for African states in a series of in which apartheid affected South sion; and, at home, a black opposition talks involving the colonial powers, the Africa's foreign relations were in the which remained largely apolitical, "in no Commonwealth and the United States.8 forming of economic and military links position to challenge the state in armed These efforts came to nothing. Instead, with the West. Militarily, there was the confrontation." 12 they further identified South Africa issue of Pretoria's domestic strategies Sharpeville marked a new stage in with the colonial order by encouraging and its efforts to enter into a formal the Union's deteriorating international close links with white communities defence alliance with the West. By pre­ position. The banning of the African elsewhere in Africa, commumties senting the internal and external threats National Congress (ANC) and the Pan­ whose experiences during the transition to South Africa's security as part of an Africanist Congress (PAC), together to black majority rule were to have a international communist offensive, with the imprisonment of their leaders, profound effect on South Africa's Pretoria asserted that it was a major undermined those of South Africa's external policies. bulwark against communism. By mak­ political allies who were prepared to The independence of Ghana in 1957 ing this appeal it sought to make com­ support Pretoria's claim that it was a gave emphasis to South Africa's grow­ mon cause with the Western alliance major force in the maintenance of polit­ ing realization that its future lay not in and thereby enlist the support of its ical order and democratic values in the exclusive identification with the old members in defence of white interests subcontinent. South Africa's moral and colonial order, but rather as an indepen­ in South Africa. Although its pro­ political order became major interna­ dent African power. This acknowledge­ Western credentials had been estab­ tional issues; vigorously debated at the ment that it had to adjust to new realities lished by its participation in both UN and elsewhere, they led to demands within the continent, coupled with the World Wars, the South African govern­ for international economic sanctions need to offset Pretoria's growing inter­ ment further endorsed its solidarity against Pretoria. It was only through national isolation, were evident in H F with the West by taking part in the Verwoerd's "politics of security"13 - Verwoerd's (1958-1966) policy of sepa­ Berlin airlift and in sending an elite the restoration of order through repres­ rate development. By providing for South African Air Force (SAAF) sion and consolidation - that South Bantu "homelands", which might ulti­ squadron to Korea. 11 Africa found a new basis upon which it mately become independent states, However, while Pretoria would have could reconstruct its foreign policy. )

Verwoerd0 tried to identify with the liked Nato to extend its cover into the 1 decolonizing0 trend in Africa. He out­ South Atlantic, either in the form of a 2 lined plans for regional co-operation, broader African alliance, or a South 1961-1974: The outward d e initiallyt focusing on South Africa, the Atlantic Treaty Organization including movement: Vorster's search a

homelands,d and the British High several South American states, Western

( for international acceptance

Commissionr territories of Botswana, antipathy towards apartheid combined

e through detente

Lesothoh and Swaziland (the BLS with other strategic considerations to s i

states),l though he envisaged in time a preclude such an arrangement. Further­ Verwoerd's "politics of security" commonwealth-typeb relationship of more, unlike the situation in the Middle restored white confidence in South u P

economically dependent states covering East, the Western powers did not share Africa through the suppression of inter­ e Pretoria's fears of imminent communist nal violence and a stress on economic theh entire subcontinent as far north as t the Congo (now Zaire).9 This, he penetration of the subcontinent. growth. 14 The mood of optimism y b argued, "was a policy which does pre­ An identical relationship between created during this period of consolida­ d

ciselye what those countries in Africa domestic and foreign affairs can also be tion enabled Prime Minister B J Vorster t

whichn attack us desire to have them­ identified in South Africa's economic to embark on the "outward movement" a

selves".l0r This reformulation of Smuts's links with its major trading partners. phase of South African foreign policy, g ideas on regional co-operation was Again the purpose was to align South which sought rapprochement with e againc expressed in P W Botha's pro­ Africa closely with the West commer­ black Africa. Despite initial fears, this n e

posalsc for a Constellation of Southern cially and industrially. This concept of mood was little altered by the declara­ i l

African States (Consas) in 1979. maximizing integration and stressing tion of South Africa as a Republic in r

e However, these proposals came to the primacy of economic considerations 1961, a change which appeared to do d nothing.n Intensifying international and over political differences was also little further harm to Pretoria's interna­ u domestic pressure over the country's manifest in Verwoerd's policy towards tional relationships. y internala policies and mounting violence black Africa; the hope being that such The South African government w ate home left South Africa in no position an approach would "spill over" to the hoped that by improving relations with t toa launch any major new foreign policy benefit of diplomatic relations. black Africa, it would improve the G initiative. Instead its domestic policies Although its domestic policies consis­ Republic's international posItIon. t weree responsible for frustrating its tently frustrated its foreign policy ambi­ Although the outward movement was n i

long-heldb aspiration to incorporate the tions, South Africa's prospects appeared primarily directed at northern block Higha Commission territories. S relatively secure until the Sharpeville African states, Pretoria hoped to capi­

y Significantly, the reaction to crisis of March 1960. At that time there talize on its economic hegemony in the b Verwoerd's initiatives demonstrated was the cordon sanitaire of white-ruled region. By seeking to maintain close d e c u d o

178r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Foreign policy

economic and technological co-opera­ from the Republic increased from some so hard that they will never forget it", 23 tion among all the countries in the area, US$280 million in 1966 to US$680 the primary role of this increased mili­ Vorster sought the eventual creation of million in 1969. 19 tary capability and growing militariza­ a Southern African economic commu­ Pretoria's efforts to achieve diplo­ tion was internal. Any large-scale nity. Like Verwoerd before him, he matic legitimacy were evident also in its intervention would have irrevocably hoped that this functionalist approach deep reservations about the Smith gov­ damaged South Africa's shaky interna­ would spill over into the political and ernment's unilateral declaration of inde­ tional position, and set back Vorster's diplomatic fields, thereby acquiring the pendence in 1965, and in its willingness search for detente. Though it undoubt­ tacit acceptance of a white-ruled South to enter into negotiations over the ques­ edly provided a measure of external Africa and its internal policy of sepa­ tion of Namibian independence. These deterrence, the military instrument rate development. Yet, while his prede­ reservations, together with South played an "insignificant role"24 in cessor had attempted to provide a Africa's commitment to the mainte­ South African foreign policy up to domestic policy consistent with the nance of economic growth in the region, 1974. It was a period which saw the requisites of South Africa's foreign pol­ meant that the Republic's search for heyday of the Department of Foreign icy, Vorster's initiative "was essentially international acceptability found a cer­ Affairs cut short by the events of the externally oriented and implicitly tain sympathy in Washington and mid-1970s. denied that foreign policy demanded a London. In particular, South Africa domestic corollary." 15 "could fairly claim to be a strong candi­ In the event, the outward movement date for the Nixon doctrine of 1969 1975-1980: The development made little progress towards formaliz­ (NSSM 39) with its emphasis on the of the Total National ing relations with either black Africa, role of regional powers in helping to Strategy or the newly independent states in the defend and assert Western values in the region. Diplomatic relations were contest with Moscow."2o Though this The early years of P W Botha's pre­ established with Malawi in 1967, how­ amounted to tacit acceptance of the miership saw substantial domestic, ever, which even by the 1990s Republic's external policies, it was not regional and international change. The remained the first and only such formal - as Pretoria would have liked - sudden collapse of Portuguese control link with a black state. 16 Closer links translated into a repeal of the voluntary in Mozambique and Angola set in were achieved with the BLS states UN Arms Embargo of 1963.21 motion a chain of events that consider­ through a revision of the Customs The realization that South Africa ably altered Pretoria's foreign policy Union Agreement in 1969, and in the could not count either on Western help options, forcing a policy retreat to ) mid-1970s,0 Presidential summit meet­ in the event of an external attack, or on within the boundaries of Southern 1 ings0 were held with the Ivory Coast, arms purchases, was behind the mas­ Africa. 2 Zambia, Senegal and Liberia. sive programme in the 1960s aimed at

d By the mid-1970s South African for­ e

t Vorster's initiative was lost in the the modernization of the SADF. This eign policy had made little progress a

escalationd of the guerrilla conflicts in received added impetus from a deterio­ towards its ultimate objective of secur­ (

Rhodesiar and the Portuguese colonies, ration in internal security and the dan­ ing international acceptance of the e

forh it was politically disadvantageous gers of a more unstable international white government and its domestic s i

forl any black African regime to be seen environment. The guerrilla wars in policies. The ill-fated military involve­ to b be co-operating with the South Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories ment in the Angolan conflict and the u P

African government, even if - as in threatened to spill over into the subsequent failure of the Anglo­ e

theh case of the joint Vorster-Kaunda Republic. There was, in addition, the American peace initiative for Rhodesia t settlement initiative for Rhodesia - it beginnings of a violent internal struggle were primarily responsible for ending y b was intended for the benefit of the in Namibia. These external develop­ the era of detente which had promised

d 7 blacke states themselves.l Indeed, ments fuelled the growth of a "garri­ to legitimize Pretoria's role in the t

Pretoria'sn attempts at both dialogue son-state" idea, a psychology central to region. a withr black Africa and at regional the evolution of the Total National Encouraged by assurances of g

detentee encountered vociferous rhetori­ Strategy of the late 1970s. The American aid, and assistance from sev­ calc opposition. For example, in April Republic's siege mentality was empha­ eral African states, Prime Minister n e

1975c the Organization of African Unity sized by the forging of close links with Vorster committed an estimated 3 000 i l (OAU) Council of Ministers - an other pariah states, such as Israel, SADF troops in support of non-Marxist r organizatione from which the Republic Paraguay, Taiwan and Chile. The Israeli FNLA (National Front for the d wasn excluded - adopted the Dar es connection in particular was to become Liberation of Angola) and Unita u Salaam Declaration on South Africa essential in providing South Africa (National Union for the Total y whicha included the statement that "any with the technology and equipment Independence of Angola) guerrillas in

w 25 talke with the apartheid regime is such with which to modernize its security Angola. However, South African t 22 nonsensea that it should be treated with forces. troops were forced to withdraw after G the contempt it deserves."18 In addition, Despite substantial economic and having come close to the capital, t thise African bloc was instrumental in military aid to the Smith regime, the Luanda, when US support failed to n i

terminatingb South African membership "occasional and studiously vague out­ materialize. By then, Cuba had rushed a burst" about "putting out one's neigh­ between 15-20000 troops supported by ofS various non-political specialized UN

agencies.y Despite these continuing bours' fires", and the threat voiced by massive supplies of Soviet war b political difficulties, Africa's imports Prime Minister Vorster "to hit [Zambia] materiel to help the Marxist MPLA d e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 179 p e R Foreign policy ______

(People's Movement for the Liberation part of the government's outward society and values. Boycotts, the activ­ of Angola) launch a counter-offensive. movement, designed to discredit South ities of radical anti -apartheid groups, Defence Minister P W Botha, who had Africa's cntIcs and improve the industrial disputes, confrontations with reportedly pressured Vorster into inter­ regime's international image. Exposed the security services and sabotage were vening in the first instance, was espe­ by the Muldergate affair, their efforts all linked in a single grand design: a cially disillusioned by the absence of were shown to be self-defeating and concerted anti-South Africa offensive US support and the vacillations of the only served to aggravate relations with waged through a mix of political, mili­ West in general. The military, for their Western governments, some of whom tary, social and psychological means. part, became dissatisfied with the had themselves been targets of the Although the regime had not aban­ politicians' handling of the war. campaign. doned all hope of developing an anti­ With the independence of Mozam­ These events, the imposition of a communist Western alliance, anti­ bique and Angola came a major escala­ mandatory UN Arms Embargo in 1977, communist rhetoric under the Total tion in the guerrilla wars on the and the increasing antipathy of the Onslaught served a quite different pur­ borders of Namibia and Rhodesia. Carter administration towards South pose. It was devised to achieve the SADF involvement in Angola ended Africa's race policies, heightened mobilization and militarization of soci­ any prospect of enduring co-operation Pretoria's perceptions of vulnerability ety necessary to safeguard white South between South Africa and the Frontline and threat and "set the stage for a fun­ Africa's interests. Furthermore, it was States designed to resolve the damental policy reappraisal. "27 South also intended to placate government Rhodesian issue. The creation of these Africa was faced with a "Total supporters by illustrating that the pariah two new states, together with the Onslaught". Emphasizing that South status of the Republic and its internal SADF's retreat from Angola, arguably Africa was simultaneously vulnerable troubles resulted not from domestic encouraged the civil unrest which to attack from external aggressors and racial policies, but from a global, com­ began in Soweto in June 1976. internal revolutionary forces, the threat munist offensive. After Soweto, rioting spread rapidly to its security became depicted in terms In order to thwart the perceived men­ around the country. The events which of a Marxist-inspired master-plan. ace of a foreign-inspired onslaught, followed, including the death in deten­ From this perspective, the black nation­ Pretoria deemed it necessary to develop tion of the Black Consciousness leader alist groups, especially Swapo and the an integrated plan in which all func­ Steve Biko and the harsh internal secu­ ANC, were each portrayed as con­ tions of the state apparatus were geared rity clampdown in October 1977, scious, or even inadvertent, agents to one overriding security considera­ hastened "the Republic's slide into advancing the aspirations and respond­ tion. Drawing its inspiration from a ) deeper0 international opprobrium and ing to the dictates of international com­ range of post-war counter-insurgency 1 ostracism."260 This deterioration in munism. Conventional external military campaigns, and from the theoretical 2

Southd Africa's relations with the West threats, externally supported domestic and empirical discourses of such men e wast aggravated further by the impasse insurgency, anti-apartheid propaganda, as Andre Beaufre and John J McCuen, a

overd Namibia, and by the threat to eco­ and international economic pressures a "Total Strategy" emerged as the guid­ (

29 nomicr stability and investment derived became projected as a Kremlin-manip­ ing ideology for white survival. It was e

fromh internal and external reactions to ulated war waged against Pretoria. only in the aftermath of the collapse of s i apartheid.l The boom of the 1960s was Furthermore, the conflict in Southern Portuguese authority in Southern succeededb by economic crisis. The Africa was presented not merely as a Africa, however, that this strategy was u P early 1970s brought a wave of strikes regional one but as an element in spelled out in specific terms. In one of e

andh a substantial outflow of foreign Moscow's wider aim of global domi­ the clearest statements describing the t capital and skilled manpower. Western nance. According to South Africa's total response, the White Paper on y b countries realized that important social White Paper on Defence and Defence, 1977 identified the dynamic

d 28 changee was essential if their economic Armaments Supply, 1982: linkage between the military and politi­ t andn political interests were to be The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union and cal dimensions of South Africa's a secure.r In essence this was the basis its allies is to overthrow the present body counter-revolutionary strategy: g upon which the West, and the USA in e politic in the RSA and to replace it with a It is ... essential that a Total National particular,c founded its constructive Marxist-oriented form of government to Strategy be formulated at the highest n

e further the objectives of the USSR, there­ level. The defence of the Republic of engagementc policy of the 1980s: cata­ i

l fore all possible methods and means are South Africa is not solely the responsi­ clysmic political upheaval, they main­ r used to attain this objective. This bility of the Department of Defence. On tained,e could be prevented only through d includes instigating social and labour the contrary... it is the responsibility of politicaln and economic support for unrest, civilian resistance, terrorist every population group.30 u internal reform.

y attacks against the infrastructure of the

a As Vorster was preparing to step RSA and the intimidation of Black lead­ Thus, a successful response w downe as Prime Minister in 1978, his ers and members of the Security Forces. "demands interdependent and co-ordi­ t administrationa was rocked by the This onslaught is supported by a world nated action in all fields - military,

G wide propaganda campaign and the "Muldergate" scandal. This involved psychological, economic, political, t

e involvement of various front organisa­ criminal and political wrong-doing on sociological, technological, diplomat­ n tions and leaders. i

theb part of senior officials in the South ic, ideological, cultural, etc ... ".3! a

AfricanS Department of Information. In short, a whole panoply of instru­ The manifestation of this response

Theyy had been conducting a covert pro­ ments and strategies were perceived as was most evident in the construction of a b paganda and espionage campaign as

d gnawing away at the Republic, its sophisticated National Security e c u d o

180r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Foreign policy

Management System (NSMS), at the changes in the perceived security threat Fund collections for the "Boys on the apex of which stood the State Security discussed earlier, defence expenditure Border", military displays and parades, Council (SSC). The only one of four soared: from R44 million in 1960 to and the manipulation of the media net­ principal cabinet committees to have R120 million in 1962. By the 1964-65 works to sharpen a siege mentality. As been established by law (the Security fiscal year, defence accounted for a one observer put it, "The average South Intelligence and State Security Council fifth of the budget and almost 3 per African is confronted with a veritable Act of 1972), the SSC aroused consider­ cent of GNP. Although spending psychological barrage directly designed able speculation about its role in domes­ declined to 12 per cent of the budget, or to stimulate an emotional climate con­ tic and foreign policy making. The 2,1 per cent of GNP, in 1972-73 (R335 ducive to total strategy."37 These ten­ formation of this "inner cabinet" million), the major deterioration in dencies were especially marked during evolved from the Westminster model of South Africa's strategic position in the the political crisis in the latter half of government in which the executive subcontinent in the mid-1970s saw a the 1980s. branch of government (the cabinet) has a new spurt in the Republic's military While there are considerable diffi­ more powerful role in policy-making spending. By the 1977-78 fiscal year, culties in accurately quantifying these than that of the legislature. While it is defence appropriations (Rl 654 mil­ mutually reinforcing dimensions of known that uniformed officers and heads lion) were just under five times the state militarization, the rapid rise of a of security agencies together made up 1972-73 level - roughly a threefold military-industrial complex provides a half of the SSe's permanent member­ increase in real terms - accounting for more tangible index of the process. ship, even now very little has been 19 per cent of the budget and about 5 International isolation and the UN arms revealed about its inner workings.32 per cent of GNP. These allocations sur­ embargo stimulated a symbiotic rela­ It is generally accepted, however, passed R2 billion in 1980-81, R3 bil­ tionship between private industry and that changes in the government's threat lion in 1983-84, R4 billion in 1985-86, finance on the one hand and the state perceptions remodelled the machinery R5 billion in 1986-87, and R6,6 billion security sector on the other. At the hub and manner in which security-related in 1987-88. The 1989-90 budget of of this complex rested the Armaments decisions were handled. The evolution R9,94 billion was up some 20 per cent Corporation of South Africa Limited and rationalization of the contemporary on the 1988-89 appropriation of just (Armscor), the controlling body of national security system enhanced not over R8 billion.35 weapons research and development and only the public profile but also the Measures taken to bolster the SADF manufacture. At its peak Armscor political influence of the military elite. included the rapid expansion of con­ employed about 25 000 personnel But this centralization and streamlining scripted white manpower the directly and another 130 000 indirectly. ) of0 executive power in the cabinet - to National Service requirement for white It controlled ten affiliated nationalized 1 the0 detriment of both Parliament's and men, for example, was increased from industrial subsidiaries and distributed 2 the National Party's position - had twelve months to two years in the early work to some 1 000 subcontractors in d e beent devised at the behest of the civil­ 1970s. Efforts were launched to enlarge the private sector. From 1977, self-suf­ a

iand politicians, especially P W Botha, the Permanent Force (PF) element of the ficiency became a top priority for (

whoser twelve years as Minister of armed services, as well as various Pretoria's strategic planners. This mili­ e

Defenceh accounted in large part for the schemes to attract white females into tary-capital nexus is now capable of s i

"shiftsl in the institutional setting and uniform. Both politically and militarily, producing a wide range of basic and centreb of gravity for high-level policy however, the most significant element in sophisticated weaponry. Although some u P

making. In each of these shifts, the the expansion of the SADF was the gaps remained in the SADF arsenal, securitye establishment and especially enlistment of black, Indian and coloured

h South Africa became largely self­ t the defense services, gained influence South Africans into combat roles. Today sufficient in modem weapons-systems. y b at the expense of other bodies."33 In the an estimated 30 per cent of the PF are The military-industrial complex centred d

1960se South Africa's armed forces "non-white". The security forces of the on the SADF/Armscor penetrated, and t

weren politically insignificant. In the homelands, especially those designated became an integral part of, the central a

1980sr they became active participants "independent", were also strengthened. 36 machinery of government. 38 g in domestic and foreign policy making With mandatory national service for all Because it is not sound economics to e at c the highest levels of state. white males and a much greater empha­ create an arms manufacturing capabili­ n e

c Further evidence of increased milita­ sis on Citizen Force, commando and ty solely for one's own needs, South i l rization in the Republic is incontrovert­ civil defence organizations, virtually Africa also became a major exporter in r ible.e This was reflected in the size, every white family became enmeshed in its own right. In addition, it was virtual­ d

structuren and sophistication of the the state's security apparatus. ly certain that South Africa possessed u SADF, which depended, in tum, on The insinuation of martial inputs into the potential to produce nuclear war­ y nationala threat perceptions and the scientific, educational and recreational heads. In short, Pretoria's impressive w

healthe of the economy.34 The growth of fields was also an important indicator of technological and logistical achieve­ t defencea expenditure as a proportion of an increasingly militarized polity. This ment in anticipating, and largely over­ G the budget and GNP, as well as in abso­ manifested itself in a wide variety of coming, the arms embargo furnished t lutee terms, provides one of the clearest activities which included defence-ori­ the regime with an essential tool when n indicators.i Before 1960, the SADF ented university research, the Civic confronting its enemies in its hostile b accounteda for less than 7 per cent of Action programme, "youth prepared­ regional environment. S

annualy government spending and under ness" courses in the classrooms, the The vastly altered regional environ­ b 1 per cent of GNP. In response to school cadet system, Southern Cross ment also required a new preoccupation d e c u d

Africao Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990

r 181 p e R Foreign policy ______

with South Africa's neighbours. A new OAU joining a formal association with reflected a mood of defiance and "go-it-alone" strategy, independent of either the non-recognized former intransigence towards the international the West, was evolved. This in essence homelands, Rhodesia, or a South community, so that the National Party had two main objectives: first, the African-controlled Namibia.43 The government was domestically seen to creation of a peaceful Constellation of blunt refusal of participation by the be both strong and determined. It is this Southern African States; and, second, BLS states and the independence of policy which has been so commonly the defence of South Africa against Zimbabwe under the premiership of referred to as "destabilization". external interference in every possible Robert Mugabe in 1980, sounded the way. These policies formed an integral death knell for the constellation and major part of Pretoria's Total scheme. Instead, Zimbabwe - along 1980-1984: Regional National Strategy. with the BLS states, Angola, Zambia, repression and limited Although Prime Minister Botha Malawi and Tanzania - joined forces internal reform inherited the concept of a "constella­ in the Southern African Development tion" from his predecessors, the events Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), Already in the process of re-establish­ of the mid-1970s and the resultant designed to reduce their dependence on ing its presence inside the Republic, break up of the Republic's perceived the South African economy. These the ANC, and to a lesser extent the cordon sanitaire elevated the idea into a developments forced Pretoria to amend PAC, were able to exploit the political major foreign policy initiative. Consas its ideas on a constellation and restruc­ exhilaration generated by the Soweto was to have included the BLS states, ture it to include only the TBVC states. riots to recruit and train dissidents for Malawi, Rhodesia, Namibia and South This "inner constellation" was, howev­ a campaign of sabotage and assassina­ Africa, the TBVC states (Transkei, er, of little relevance to South Africa's tion. Following the first wave of vio­ Bophuthatswana, Venda and CiskeP9); foreign relations, as the homelands lence between June-November 1976, and possibly Zambia and Mozambique have never been recognized interna­ thousands of young blacks left the as well. Economic co-operation would tionally and do not, in effect, constitute country, many of them to enlist in the be formalized into specific areas, a key sovereign states. ANC, which used the neighbouring to the success of this scheme being the Following the failure of these states either as training bases, adminis­ support of private capital from South attempts to create a favourable regional trative centres or conduits into South Africa. Like Verwoerd and Vorster, environment, Pretoria was forced to Africa.46 Botha hoped that economic co-opera­ lower its sights, realising that if the From the late 1970s the scale of tion would acquire a functionalist black states were not to join the Consas infiltration of ANC cadres into the )

0 dynamic, thereby producing regional scheme, relations with them could not country increased markedly. As a 1

0 interaction in the fields of politics and be improved and formalized through result, between 1976-80 nearly seventy 2

d security. Not only would the inclusion elaborate plans for institutionalized co­ attacks and explosions were reported by e t of the TBVC states result in tacit recog­ operation. Then, as domestic and the security forces. In the early 1980s a

d nition of South Africa's homeland poli­ regional threats to South Africa's secu­ the actIVItIes of armed saboteurs (

r cies, but such co-operation would also rity mounted in the early 1980s, "basic expanded dramatically, with attacks on e

h improve the Republic's international considerations for security took prece­ targets of significant strategic, econom­ s i l position as Western nations would find dence over ambitious plans for regional ic and symbolic importance. Between b co-operation."44 If Consas could be 1981-88 there were an estimated 885 u themselves under less pressure from

P 47

black Africa to break off ties with equated with the "soft" aspect of South insurgent attacks. Among the most e

h Pretoria. Africa's regional policy, as the spectacular bombings were those of the t However, this strategy did not rest prospects for a constellation faded, Sasol petroleum complex (June 1980), y b

either on a clear perception of the new Pretoria was already embarking on the a number of electricity stations in the d

e regional realities, or on a realistic "hard", interventionist component of eastern Transvaal (July 1981), the t

n evaluation of South Africa's various this policy. This involved a campaign Koeberg nuclear plant (December a 4o r policy options. Pretoria overestimat­ of pre-emptive and punitive attacks, 1982) and the SADF Headquarters in g

e ed both the attraction of its economic both covert and overt, against those Central Pretoria in May 1983. c strength, which was seen as a sort of neighbouring states that afforded sanc­ Using the favourable climate created n e

c "offensive paternalism", and the extent tuary to anti-government guerrillas. by the Reagan administration's i l to which there was a common regional The military, with its access to the poli­ Southern African policy of constructive r e fear of a Marxist threat. Conversely, it cy-making process, was able to intro­ engagement, to combat the threat posed d n underestimated the potency of the duce this preferred "pragmatic" by the ANC South Africa embarked on u political and ideological factors that approach to ensure a quiescent regional what became the most controversial era y a had previously precluded such co­ context. This was deemed essential to in its relations with Africa: an ala carte w 41 e operation. As Millar points out: "the enable Pretoria to carry out the internal strategy of mainly military and econom­ t a objective of South Africa in protecting reform programme necessary for its ic coercion. Ostensibly, the purpose of G its social system from predatory neigh­ political and economic stability. In con­ t this "destabilization" policy was to keep e bours, and the objective of those trast with the Vorster and Consas eras, the neighbouring states off balance, n i

b neighbours in destroying South in the regional arena diplomacy was especially those that had been used to a

S Africa's social system, have had an now reinforced, and in some instances launch ANC and Swapo attacks against

y irresistible incompatibility."42 In brief, replaced, by military and economic the white regime. Because these coun­ b there was no chance of members of the muscle.45 This militant approach also tries were heavily dependent on South d e c u d o r 182 Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Foreign policy

Africa for their imports, exports and the UN revoked South Africa's man­ Angola's Marxist government with, by communications it was a simple matter date. By the mid-1970s, the situation 1988, its estimated 50000 Cuban for Pretoria to apply economic pressure. concerning Namibia's transItIOn to troops. According to the Pretoria For instance, in 1987, about 90 per cent independence had reached a virtual authorities, this foreign communist of Zimbabwe's external trade and all of impasse. The issues behind this were presence was the main stumbling block Botswana's petroleum supplies depend­ complex, for South Africa's Namibian to a peaceful resolution of the ed on South African transport.48 By policies became hostage to wider Namibian conflict. The US government imposing economic sanctions, Pretoria domestic political, economic and secu­ shared this view, and both its military could wreak havoc throughout the rity considerations. These factors large­ support for Unita and its insistence that region. The Republic's scope for dam­ ly explain South African attempts to South African participation was a aging its black neighbours in this man­ seek an "internal solution": installing a necessary condition for a Namibian set­ ner was best illustrated by the virtual moderate government and moving the tlement, provided Pretoria with an blockade it imposed against Lesotho in country towards independence only on important Western ally in the region. December 1985: within a month the tiny its own terms. As long as Unita could present itself as kingdom had experienced a military South Africa's occupation was sup­ a genuine alternative to the Angolan coup and a tough new approach towards ported by Namibia's estimated 110000 government, it appeared that South any ANC presence in that country.49 white population of ex-German settlers Africa would be able to justify its inter­ This economic stranglehold was augmented by Afrikaners, who consti­ vention. Until the end of the 1980s, the often linked with military measures. tuted about 10 per cent of the total. Angolan and Namibian issues remained Attacks from guerrillas operating from Faced with charges of "selling-out" as inseparable, and as important for border states invariably invited "hot Namibia's whites, it was crucial - South Africa's foreign policy makers, pursuit" (as well as pre-emptive) retali­ especially in light of its own race as ever. ation from the Republic, as in the raid reforms - for Pretoria to adopt a firm During the early 1980s Botha's strat­ across the Lesotho frontier in stand over the independence issue. In egy of regional destabilization and lim­ December 1982.50 A team of South addition, any perceived capitulation ited internal reform appeared to African special forces' commandos would arguably have given encourage­ prosper. The South African Department assassinated "twelve ANC targets" in ment to the Republic's blacks. Second, of Foreign Affairs was able to take Maseru. Within a month, 100 ANC although it was claimed by Pretoria that advantage of the situation made possi­ operatives were reported to have been the costs of staying in Namibia were ble by the adoption of the military's

expelled) from Lesotho. high in financial terms,5l similar white "pragmatic" strategy in the area. Early 0

1 South Africa obviously would not perceptions of Namibia's enormous in 1984, South Africa concluded a 0

have2 admitted to destabilizing its wealth (especially the importance of cease-fire agreement with Angola (The

neighbours.d However, in line with this retaining control of diamond produc­ Lusaka Accord) which provided for the e tit-for-tatt policy Pretoria's spokesmen tion) aggravated this dilemma. joint disengagement out of southern a

acknowledgedd that if the neighbouring Furthermore, since the late 1960s Angola by South African, Cuban and (

statesr continued to harbour anti-South South Africa had been confronted by Swapo forces. In March that same year, e

Africanh forces, they should not be sur­ Swapo (South West African People's South Africa concluded a non-aggres­ s i prisedl if South Africa considered doing Organization) guerrillas. For the most sion pact with Mozambique (The b

theu same to them. These operations, part, these forces operated from bases Nkomati Accord) designed to halt P together with large-scale assistance for in neighbouring Angola. Virtually guar­ SADF support for the MNR in e

pro-Southh African dissident armies anteed strong support because of their exchange for Mozambique denying t

suchy as Unita in Angola and the power-base amongst the majority military bases to the ANC. Two weeks b Mozambique National Resistance Ovambo tribe and their wide recogni­ after Nkomati was signed, it was dis­ d e

(MNRlRenamo)t in Mozambique, tion as the only organization to have closed that South Africa had reached a

underlinedn South African military militantly fought for the departure of similar accord with Swaziland, which a supremacyr in the subcontinent. Because the South Africans, Swapo was by con­ had remained secret since its conclu­ g

ofe the importance of Namibia/Angola trast portrayed by Pretoria as a commu­ sion in 1982. These agreements - par­ c

in n Pretoria's regional foreign policy nist organization and a tool of the ticularly Nkomati - were hailed both e

calculations,c some further elaboration Soviet Union. After Angola's indepen­ within the Republic and Western coun­ i l

is r required on South African activities dence in 1975, the threat posed by tries as major diplomatic coups for the in e these areas. Swapo became considerably more South African government. They were d

n Since the time the territory was effective and demanded the massive certainly a vindication of Pretoria's u

takeny from Germany under a League of use of South African forces against "thump-and-talk" regional approach.

Nationsa mandate in 1919, the Namibian them. In the wake of Nkomati there was a w

issuee was critically linked to the South To prevent Swapo guerrillas seizing significant improvement in South t

Africana one. South Africa subsequently control of the country, a large South Africa's relations both with its neigh­ G

virtuallyt annexed the territory of some African military presence was !!lain­ bours and with Western countries. On e

318n 000 square miles (larger than the tained in Namibia. These forces made the evidence of P W Botha's official i

Unitedb Kingdom, Italy, West Germany numerous raids against Swapo camps in European visit in May 1984, it a

andS the Low Countries combined) and Angola. The SADF also co-operated appeared that Pretoria was at last

refusedy to recognize the UN's claim to with Jonas Savimbi's Unita rebels who emerging from political isolation. b inherit the League trusteeship. In tum, are engaged in a civil war against Western leaders welcomed Botha's d e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 183 p e R Foreign policy ______

efforts both at "regional detente" and could be channelled. and less symbolic than the last.53 his internal reforms. Violence and counter-violence spread From a security perspective the lift­ These changes in the regional milieu throughout the country, and it was not ing of the emergency proved to be also enabled Pretoria to demonstrate to long before the SADF was deployed to counter-productive. 54 There was an the white electorate its resolve towards restore order. In October 1984, 7 000 immediate resurgence of disorder in the a process of reform, at its own pace, troops were sent into the black township black communities, increased violence even in the face of international, of Sebokeng in a "seal and search" in and near "white" areas and a new regional and right-wing domestic pres­ action which provoked widespread wave of explosions. With the approach sures. The support of the white voters protest that the SADF was being thrust of the tenth anniversary commemorat­ found expression in a two-to-one into a central political role. From ing the Soweto uprising on 16 June, majority in a 1983 referendum in September 1984 to mid-July 1985, 450 Pretoria decided to take drastic action. favour of a tricameral parliamentary people died and thousands were injured. On 12 June, President Botha declared a system to include the coloured and Very few of these casualties were sus­ new countrywide state of emergency Indian minorities. However, it was tained by the security forces, but large which included severe media restric­ Botha's cautious pace towards internal numbers of policemens' homes were tions. This followed the visit of the reform and the failure to accommodate destroyed. Damage to shops, factories Commonwealth Eminent Persons the political aspirations of the black and government buildings was massive. Group mission to the Republic, which majority that were to prove the undoing Against this background of civil distur­ had been abruptly terminated following of the Republic's international position bance and local government collapse the a series of SADF raids aimed at the and its domestic stability. administration decided to act. The emer­ ANC in Botswana, Zambia and gency was declared to break the spi­ Zimbabwe. Pretoria would henceforth ralling cycle of violence, to protect the have to give priority to security consid­ 1985-1989: The State regime's black supporters and to reas­ erations and domestic political con­ of Emergency and the sure its white supporters that Pretoria straints, rather than meet any external Angolan/Namibian Accords was determined to respond resolutely to incentives designed to promote black restore order. It also conferred a stamp structural reform. 55 The pressure on the South Africa's internal policies have of legality on the tough action P W West to impose far-reaching sanctions often been viewed as the crucial deter­ Botha wanted to take as an essential intensified. minant of its international foreign poli­ prerequisite if political change and con­ With the success of South Africa's

) cy response. Such a perspective has stitutional reform were to proceed at the efforts at regional diplomacy in 1984, 0

been1 evident in the universal moral "desired pace". there was hope that some sort of 0

condemnation2 of apartheid since the The decision to impose emergency regional modus vivendi might serve to

earlyd 1960s. This was never more evi­ regulations was made only after some stimulate domestic rapprochement e dentt than in the period following the agonizing on the part of the cabinet and within South Africa. However, the vio­ a declarationd of the first State of its security advisers. It is understood lations of the Nkomati Accord and the (

Emergencyr in July 1985, when the that the views of the military and police deterioration in relations with neigh­ e

Southh African authorities faced a major chiefs prevailed against those who felt bouring states after 1985 signalled the s i politicall and security crisis. This mani­ that the declaration would damage for­ failure of Pretoria's regional policy to b

festedu itself in an escalation of orga­ eign investment in South Africa. facilitate internal political accommoda­ P nized and sporadic opposition in both Indeed, these measures aroused tion. Indeed, the declining fortunes of e urbanh and rural black townships. immense international concern, and led South Africa's foreign policy prospects t

y Rioting had broken out initially in to the sharp fall in the value of the rand were directly related to the unrest and b September 1984 in response to what and repeated calls for economic sanc­ violence which erupted from late 1984. d wase later described as "unaffordable tions from Western governments. By the mid-1980s, South Africa's t rentn increases" in some black town­ Given almost unfettered powers of domestic security considerations took a ships.52r The issue, however, was only search, arrest, detention, interrogation precedence over its regional and inter­ g

parte of wider political and economic and censorship under the sweeping national foreign policy aspirations. This c

tensionsn affecting the black population emergency provisions, SADF and compelled a significant change in e asc a whole. The economic recession Police action was ruthless enough to Western attitudes towards South Africa, i l had already reduced black living stan­ curb most instances of violent mass culminating in the imposition of both r dardse to unacceptably low levels rela­ action. As a consequence, and in an "private" and "public" sanctions. 56 d tiven to those of white South Africans. attempt to present a picture of returning President Botha's landslide election u

Furthermore,y Pretoria had made no normality to international and domestic victory on 6 May 1987 demonstrated attempta to accommodate black political audiences alike, the emergency was that the white electorate was firmly w aspirationse in the tricameral parliamen­ lifted on 7 March 1986. This, however, behind the emergency provisions and t tarya system introduced in September did not help South Africa abroad. As the domestic and regional actions of the G

1984.t The establishment of the United the violence continued, and under pres­ security forces. If anything, the emer­ e

Democraticn Front - though at first Sure both from the more radical gence of the ultra-right wing Conser­ i usedb to mobilize various anti-apartheid Frontline States and at home, the EEC vative Party as the official opposition a

organizationsS against the new constitu­ and the US initiated a policy of "creep­ illustrated that Botha's internal reforms

tiony - provided an "umbrella" organi­ ing" sanctions in which each new pack­ were moving too fast for the white pop­ b zation through which these frustrations d age threatened to be more substantial ulation. The use of anti-US rhetoric in e c u d o

184r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Foreign policy

the run-up to the election showed that change. By thwarting such forces, the on capturing the rebels' headquarters at the government was prepared to give process of reform would be held back. Jamba in the south-eastern part of the priority to the stabilization of its Pretoria continued to stress, both as country. Accordingly, South African internal, rather than international, envi­ an argument against sanctions and as a assistance to Savimbi's movement grew ronment, thereby enabling controlled means of highlighting the related threat dramatically. change to take place. The use of this to Western interests, the country's In 1987, after intensive training and anti-Western platform created some geopolitical and strategic importance. careful logistical preparations, which doubt as to the exact role this "interna­ There could certainly be no doubt about included massive Soviet arms ship­ tional equation" might be likely to play the importance of South Africa's miner­ ments, the MPLA launched their largest in determining a future outcome in al wealth. This strategic - as opposed assault in July. Led by a high-ranking South Africa. This in tum raised ques­ to purely economic - significance Soviet general, the government advance tions as to the utility of economic sanc­ rests essentially on four commodities was stopped short of its objectives by a tions. Many observers were profoundly and their alloys: chromium, manganese, combined SADF/Unita force. This was sceptical of sanctions in promoting fun­ vanadium and the platinum group of the first time since 1975-76 that damental change in South Africa's metals. Pretoria argued, with consider­ Pretoria had admitted to intervening to domestic policies. Proponents of sanc­ able statistical backing, that in these prevent a Unita defeat, and this tions, however, stressed that because of strategic materials at least, South acknowledgement had major interna­ South Africa's economic dependence on Africa was more important to the West tional, regional and domestic implica­ it, the West could exert formidable than the West to South Africa. tions for South Africa.58 Faced with an leverage. By curtailing trading and Moreover, the vulnerability of the West increasingly sophisticated air force and investment links, it was argued, was increased by the USSR being more an enlarged Cuban garrison in Angola, apartheid could be undermined and eco­ often than not the main alternative sup­ and mounting economic and political nomic sanctions could also be used as a plier. For South African policy makers, disquiet at home, there was an aware­ means of reducing the regime's military this factor both increased the Soviet ness of limits to Pretoria's ability to power to resist internal insurgency. threat and Western dependence upon project its power in the region. However, the case for punitive eco­ the Republic. For this reason, during Utilizing the framework of negotiation nomic measures was firmly denied by the latter half of the 1980s, it was con­ set up by Chester Crocker, with conces­ those, such as Britain's Margaret tended that it would be in South sions being made on both sides, in Thatcher, who maintained that sanc­ Africa's best interests not to align itself December 1988 agreement was reached tions would have a disproportionately too closely with the West, and instead concerning the implementation of the )

negative0 impact on the black population play the Soviet "card". Namibian independence agreement 1

and0 wreck the economies of neighbour­ Indeed, South Africa earned little (UN435) and the linked withdrawal of 2 ing African states. For the Republic political sympathy from its continued Cuban troops from Angola. Further­ d e

possessedt the capability - if full sanc­ identification with the West. However, it more, Pretoria was able to tie the agree­ tionsa were to be imposed - of crip­ would - the argument went - gain ment (and presumably the termination d ( pling the economies of the both a measure of domestic and regional of its support of Unit a) to the closure of r neighbouringe states, even though such a stability through accommodation with the ANC military bases which were sit­ h s

strategyi would be self-defeating as the USSR. There were many in the uated in central and northern Angola. l

theseb states are amongst the Republic's SADF, for example, who for a long time As a result of the positive climate u

mostP important trading partners. In were ambivalent about South Africa's which emerged from the negotiations,

addition,e this type of measure was like­ pro-Western stance and Western President Botha embarked on a series h t ly to have a negative effect on South motives towards South Africa. of visits to African countries. In y b

Africa's internal security situation. However, the exaggerated polemic sur­ September 1988, his meeting with d

Despitee this, and in the face of mount­ rounding the Total Onslaught would President Joaquim Chissano of t

ingn international pressure and internal have appeared to preclude such a switch Mozambique led to the signing of a a

dissent,r Pretoria did not show con­ from being engineered. Nonetheless, number of agreements between the two g straint in dealing with those who were this did not necessarily rule out indirect countries in respect, inter alia, of secu­ e perceivedc as fomenting violence from co-operation with the Soviet Union rity, labour, transport, power, forestry n

e and health. Other visits were conducted withinc and in the regional area. Counter over, for example, a peace agreement i l

sanctions were thus perceived by with the Angolan government. to Malawi and Mozambique. r

Pretoriae as a means of meeting destabi­ Events in Angola in 1987-88 were to Thus by the end of the 1980s, it was d

lizationn with destabilizationY have a profound effect upon the con­ apparent that Pretoria operated under u It was also argued that the imposi­ duct of both South Africa's domestic constraints imposed by a number of y

tiona of sanctions would exacerbate a and regional policies. By the mid- factors. First, since the declaration of w

laagere mentality on the part of the white 1980s, with substantial South African the State of Emergency, South Africa t

population,a thereby hindering rather backing, Unita's operations had grown had been fighting a losing battle in its G

than promoting the process of reform. It to the point where they posed a consid­ efforts to stave off international sanc­ t

wase also maintained that the increasing erable threat to the security of the tions. A more belligerent regional pos­ n i MPLA government. As a result, from ture would only have added fuel to

dependenceb of the Republic's economy

ona black workers and the growing eco­ 1985 onwards Angolan government these flames. Second, international S

nomicy leverage of the black population forces embarked on what became an sanctions had conversely made the b were the major dynamics for political annual "dry-season" campaign intent country more dependent on its African d e c u d

Africao Insight, vol 20, no 3,1990

r 185 p e R Foreign policy ______

neighbours, which Pretoria was well South Africa's international posihon history of this country is inextricably aware of despite its posturing over the could not be improved without internal enmeshed with this rather than the "threat" of counter-sanctions. Third, political accommodation, De Klerk set Soviet side. South Africa faced an increasingly about to achieve just that. Avoiding the Given the history of the international expensive struggle (both politically and frequent displays of hubris and the stances of both the ANC and the economically) to maintain its pre-emi­ need to placate the conservative ele­ National Party, and bearing in mind the nent military position in the region. ments in his white constituency that implications of the developments with­ Any further demands on the SADF characterized his predecessor's term of in the Soviet Union and Eastern would severely stretch an economy office, the new president embarked on Europe, what then are the foreign poli­ already weakened by sanctions and in the most radical period of political cy options facing South Africa? the depths of a major recession. The reform yet seen in South Africa. This Historically there have been three stress was rather on economic reform has had enormous foreign policy rami­ broad alternatives. First, a pro-Western and savings, which, of course, were fications. His initial actions - the position; second, a pro-Soviet stance; related to and complemented by the composition of his cabinet, the change and, third, one of non-alignment neu­ moribund issue of political reform. And in emphasis towards civilian input into trality. Recent developments have made at the same time that Pretoria faced the NSMS, the reduction in the the first two unlikely. these obstacles, there appeared a National Service period from two years But what exactly is meant by non­ realignment of influence away from the to one, and the trimming of both the alignment? This carries with it connota­ so-called "securocrats" who favoured SADF and Armscor - were followed tions of membership of the Non­ military force as a means of ensuring a by the dramatic unbanning of the liber­ Aligned Movement, but in the past such quiescent regional environment, ation movements (including the ANC neutrality has carried little weight in towards those who preferred diplomatic and South African Communist Party), terms of East-West politics in an orga­ means. the release of political prisoners and, nization that has tended to be at least as Although South Africa's more mili­ very importantly, the freeing of Nelson anti-American as pro-Soviet. tant regional policy did have its suc­ Mandela. These actions confirmed the Non-alignment in South Africa's for­ cesses in the various bilateral realization that internal security could eign policy context can be substituted non-aggression pacts, the Namibian never be achieved either through for the term "regionalism". Even now peace accords and the related closure of regional repression or foreign diplo­ there is talk of a regional economic the ANC's military bases in Angola matic exercises. community structured around SADCC demonstrated both the limits of South Thus, in the light of the advances in and South Africa. The end of apartheid )

African0 military power and the wide South Africa's international position, it would mean for Pretoria that this is no 1 scope0 for diplomacy in the region. seems quite appropriate to consider the longer an ambitious pipe-dream, unlike 2 Furthermore, the agreements also ended foreign policy options facing a post­ d P W Botha's constellation plan. e thet viability of the Total Onslaught apartheid government. But formulating Regionalism holds benefits for all. a

concept,d which had been fed to the these is no easy task. The nature of the For South Africa, it would provide (

whiter South African public since the international order has changed dramat­ ready access not only to regional mar­ independencee of Angola and Mozam­ h ically and irrevocably in the last year. kets, but most probably also to those in s i

bique.l Constructive dealings with the The US-Soviet conflict has been substi­ the EEC through the Lome conven­ Sovietb Union during the course of these tuted by a whole new set of tensions: tions. For the neighbouring states, u P

negotiations discredited the white per­ the extremes of Arab nationalism and access to South African finance and e

ceptionh of it as the mastermind and Islamic fundamentalism, problems (pri­ expertise would assist their economies t sponsor of a black revolution. This was marily economic and social) in Eastern which have suffered from both the rav­ y b confirmed by President Gorbachev's Europe, and the rise of nationalism in ages of mismanagement and the years d

reformse and the sudden developments the Soviet republics. of regional destabilization. It is to be t

inn Eastern Europe in 1989. Thus, para­ The problems facing the foreign pol­ hoped that this would be accompanied a doxically,r by the end of P W Botha's icy analyst do not end there, however. by diplomatic effort to solve the con­ g tenure of office the use of South Any consideration of the future has to flicts in Angola and Mozambique, and e Africa'sc military force in the region recognize the influence of a probable crises elsewhere. n e

wasc likely to endanger rather than pro­ ruling party and its policies. To take the This is not to say that the scrapping i l tect the survival of white power. ANC, for example. Given its history, of apartheid will end regional instabili­ r

e both as one of socialist internationalism ty. This requires also a willingness on d

n and of close allegiance with the the part of South Africa's neighbours to

Intou the 1990s: De Klerk SACP/CPSA, it was likely that until meet these challenges and to shift away y anda Mandela 1989 - when the Berlin Wall came from their own undemocratic practices. w

Ine many ways President F W de Klerk down - an ANC government would These states must realize, too, that a t inheriteda an environment not dissimilar have been firmly entrenched within the new South Africa, given its previous G to that of his predecessor eleven years Soviet camp. Yet since his release Mr

t record of turning investment into profit, earlier.e Although he initially continued Mandela has discounted the widely­ will attract most of the foreign aid to n i

withb the visits to black African states held belief (especially among whites) the region. Of course, South Africa's beguna by Botha in the wake of the S that communists dominated the ANC own future is dependent upon the scale

Namibiany agreements, his approach executive. He has also openly courted of international investment. The b was totally different. Recognizing that Western governments, realizing that the

d chances of attracting this have to be e c u d o

186r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Foreign policy

measured against the level of industrial successfully make the transition from 10 Ibid. unrest and political violence and revolutionaries committed to armed 11 South Africa provided 20 aircrews to help rhetoric in the Republic; and also insurrection to international diplomats. with the Berlin Airlift, and in the Korean against the demands of developing If they can, however, they will con­ War a squadron of SAAF Mustangs, later areas, particularly those in Eastern tribute an expertise alongside that of Sabre jets, flew with distinction as part of the UN force. A total of 826 SAAF per­ Europe. The new government must find the established diplomatic corps essen­ sonnel saw service in Korea, of whom 34 a formula for economic redistribution tial to promote South Africa into the were killed and 8 (including the later that will maintain investor confidence. next century.60 Chief of the SAAF, Lt-General Denis As an establishment British Conserv­ Earp) captured, and 2 groundcrew killed. ative MP put it during a recent visit to See SA Panorama, vol 15, no 5, May this country: "A lot of companies may Notes and references 1970, p 8; and C S Holliday, Springbok take the view that they would rather The authors wish to acknowledge the generous record, Johannesburg: South African financial assistance of the Institute for Museum of Military History, 1987, invest in countries which have been pp 17-18. communist and now wished to become Research Development of the Human Science Research Council and the Nuffield Foundation capitalist, than in a country which has 12 J E Spence, "South Africa's foreign poli­ in the preparation of this paper. Opinions cy", Energos, no 14,1986, p 9. been capitalist but where some of the expressed in this publication and conclusions 13 N M Stultz, "The politics of security: politicians want it to go communist."59 arrived at, are those of the authors and are not South Africa under Verwoerd, 1961-6", necessarily to be attributed to these research Prospective military alliances might Journal of Modern African Studies, vol 7, bodies. also take on this regional flavour. no I, April 1969, pp 3-20. Following Botha's restructuring, the 14 The "Great Boom" years of 1961-65 led to SADF is now tailored to Pretoria's spe­ Republic of South Africa, House of an increase in GNP of some 48 per cent. cific needs rather than its potential con­ Assembly Debates, no 13,4-11 May 1982, cols 6236-6238. 15 D J Geldenhuys, "SA's fruitless quest for tribution to an international alliance. neighbouring friends", Energos, no 14, The Navy, which had a capable anti­ 2 A Seegers, "One world and many worlds: 1986, P 85. submarine element, has been relegated South Africa" in "Southern Africa after 16 Excluding the former "homelands". In to coastal duties. Though emphasis is 1974" (unpublished paper, University of addition, a number of trade missions once again being placed on the Army's Cape Town, 1988), p 4. operating as de facto consulates opened conventional role, until recently it was during the 1980s in, inter alia, Zimbabwe, 3 E Leistner, "Economic interdependence in Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland. tasked mainly with counter-insurgency. Southern Africa", Africa Institute Bulletin, In the region, South Africa and vol 26, no 4, 1986, P 15. See also G M E 17 The "political" problems that black Africa )

Armscor0 could help in keeping down Leistner and P Esterhuysen (eds), South experiences in negotiations with South 1 Africa are well illustrated by the difficul­ increasing0 costs. Low-cost, tough and Africa in Southern Africa: Economic

2 ties that President Kaunda of Zambia had reliable equipment has long been interaction, Pretoria: Africa Institute, d 1988. with President Nyerere of Tanzania in his e

Armscor'st trademark. And the arms (Kaunda's) discussions with Vorster over a 4 International Institute for Strategic

organizationd must be aware that its sur­ the reopening of the railway line between (

Studies, The military balance 1988-9, South Africa and Zambia in August 1975.

vival,r in economic terms, is linked to

e London: IISS, 1989. The SADF's total This intriguing story is told at length in D

theirh ability to export. regular strength will fall below 100 000 s J Geldenhuys, The diplomacy of isolation, i

l South Africa cannot, however, be after 1990 as the cut in the National op cit, p 271. hamstrungb by regionalism if it is to sur­ Service period from two years to one takes u 18 Southern African Record, no 2, June 1975, P effect. Although some ex-members of

vive economically. Major international

e SWATF and Koevoet have been accommo­ p 39.

donorsh are now focusing their atten­ t tions on Eastern Europe, where they see dated in the SADF since Namibia's inde­ 19 L de Villiers, South Africa: A skunk y pendence, at the same time there have among nations, London: International b

higher returns than in an Africa charac­ been over 2 000 retrenchments from the Books, p 37. d

terizede by economic ineptitude, politi­ t SA Navy. 20 J E Spence, "South Africa's foreign caln nepotism and military upheavals. In policy", op cit, P 9. a 5 See D J Geldenhuys, "South Africa's

Africa,r South Africa can, on a much

g regional policy", in M Clough (ed), 21 For a detailed documentation of the 1963 larger scale than at present, offer a sym­ e Changing realities in Southern Africa, and 1973 UN Arms Embargoes, see R patheticc approach, and with specialist n Berkeley: Institute of International Leonard, South Africa at war, Cape Town: e

equipmentc and know-how. Studies, 1982, p 124. AD Donker, pp 132-136. i l

Ironically, since one of the four pil­

r 6 J E Spence, Republic under pressure: A 22 For an excellent expose of how South larse of the ANC's anti-apartheid strate­ study of South African foreign policy,

d Africa succeeded in circumventing the UN

gyn was "international isolation" (the London: Oxford University Press, 1965, embargoes and built up Armscor, see S u others being armed struggle, under­ p 2. Landgren, Embargo Disimplemented: y

grounda structures and mass mobiliza­ 7 D J Geldenhuys, The diplomacy of isola­ South Africa's military industry, Oxford:

w Oxford University Press/Sipri, 1989. See

tion),e cadres might have a lot to offer tion: South African foreign policy making, t also G Mills, "ARMS COR: Quis custodiet

here.a The organization's forty-odd Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1984, p 6. ipsos custodes?", Defense Analysis, vol 6, G

international branches have a useful t 8 M Clough, op cit, p 127. no 4, December 1990. coree of experienced staff, especially n

i 9 See D J Geldenhuys, "South Africa's 23 J E Spence, "South Africa's military rela­

well-versedb in the needs and circum­ regional policy", The Golden Jubilee tions with its neighbours", in S J Baynham stancesa of Africa. It remains to be seen S Conference of the South African Institute (ed), Military power and politics in black

whethery these members, particularly of International Affairs (SAIIA), March Africa, London: Croom Helm, 1986, b those of the post-1976 generation, can 1984, p 6. p 295. d e c u d

Africao Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990

r 187 p e R Foreign policy ______

24 Ibid, P 294. 36 For a discussion of these developments see The World Today, vol 43, no 3, March 25 See W Steenkamp, South Africa's border K W Grundy, "A black Foreign Legion in 1987, pp 52-55. war 1966-1989, Gibraltar: Ashanti, pp 36- South Africa?", African Affairs, vol 80, no 50 For a detailed analysis of the distinction 67, where, with the benefit of previously 318, January 1981, pp 101-114; and C J between pre-emptive and retaliatory raids undisclosed information, the author gives Nbthling, "Blacks, coloureds and Indians in Southern Africa, see C J Botha, the most complete account of the SADF's in the SA Defence Force", South Africa "Anticipatory self-defence and reprisals Angolan foray in 1975-76. International, vol 11, no I, July 1980, pp re-examined. South African attacks on 19-28. 26 0 J Geldenhuys, "Recrossing the Matola ANC bases in neighbouring states: the threshold", South Africa International, vol 37 P Frankel, Pretoria's praetorians: Civil 'Guns of Gaborone' or 'rAIDS Disease'?", 13, no 3, January 1983, p 153. military relations in South Africa, South African Yearbook of International Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Law, vol 11, 1985-1986, pp 138-156. 27 R Jaster, "South Africa and its neighbours: 1984, p 99. The dynamics of regional conflict", 51 In the region of US$I,5 billion per year, of Adelphi Paper no 209, Summer 1986, p 8. 38 Ibid, pp 82-91. which security costs were roughly US$1 million per day. 28 Republic of South Africa, White Paper on 39 Ciskei only became "independent" in Defence and Armaments Supply, 1982, December 1981 and would have joined 52 Rand Daily Mail, 4 January 1985. Pretoria: Department of Defence 1982, p Consas later. 53 J E Spence, South Africa's foreign policy, 2. Quoted in K W Grundy, The militariza­ 40 M Tamarkin, "South Africa's regional op cit, piS. tion of South African politics, London: I B options", paper presented to the Africa 54 For further details, see S J Baynham, Tauris, p II. Seminar, Centre for African Studies, "Political violence and the security 29 See A Beaufre, An introduction to strate­ University of Cape Town, 25 August 1985, response", in J Blumenfeld (ed), South gy, London: Faber and Faber, 1963; and J J p 4. Africa in crisis, London: Croom Helm, McCuen, The art of counter-revolutionary 41 0 J Geldenhuys, "South Africa's regional 1987. war, London: Faber and Faber, 1966. policy", op cit, p 22. 55 J E Spence, South Africa's foreign policy, 30 Republic of South Africa, White Paper on 42 T B Millar, South Africa and regional op cit, piS. Defence, 1977, Pretoria: Department of security, Johannesburg: SAIIA, 1985, P 7. 56 Ibid. Defence, 1977, P 4. 43 See 0 J Geldenhuys, The diplomacy of 57 0 J Geldenhuys, "SA's fruitless quest ... ", 31 Ibid. isolation, op cit, p 41; and also G Mills, op cit, piS. "South Africa ... ", op cit, pp 328-348 for an 32 But see K W Grundy, op cit; A Seegers, 58 See S J Baynham and G Mills, "Angola's "Civil-military relations in South Africa" understanding of the effects of the failure of the Consas scheme. land battle: A post mortem", Front File, and "The National Security Management no 9, December 1987; G Mills, "South System: A description and theoretical 44 0 J Geldenhuys, "South Africa's regional Africa ... " op cit, pp 470-490; W inquiry", unpublished papers, University policy", op cit, p 26. Steenkamp, op cit, pp 147-184, 223-228 ) of Cape Town, 1988; "South Africa: The 0 45 Ibid, P 28. and pp 255-256; and H R Heitman, War in 1 government in the shadows", Africa

0 Angola: The final South African phase, 46 This number is estimated to have been in

2 Confidential, vol 28, no 14, 8 July 1987,

Gibraltar: Ashanti, 1990. the region of 4 000. See T Lodge, "The d pp 17-19; M Hough and M van der e 59 Norman Tebbit quoted in The Cape Times, t Merwe, Selected official South African African National Congress in South a strategic perceptions, 1976-1987, Pretoria: Africa, 1976-83: Guerrilla war and armed 21 September 1990. He added: "So, I think d

( propaganda", Journal of Contemporary the question in many boardrooms will be: ISSUP, 1985; and G Mills, "South Africa: r Why take the risk?" e The Total National Strategy and regional African Studies, vol 3, nos 1/2, October h 1983/ April 1984, p 165. For details on the s policy during the Botha years, 1978- 60 See P Vale, "Starting over: Some early i l 1989", unpublished PhD dissertation, ANC's bases in the neighbouring states, questions on a post-apartheid foreign poli­ b see S M Davis, Apartheid's rebels: Inside u University of Lancaster, 1990. cy", draft paper prepared for the confer­

P South Africa's hidden war, London: Yale 33 K W Grundy, op cit, p 34. ence "Zimbabwe's First Decade of e University Press, 1987, pp 36-75. Political Independence: Lessons for h

34t These and other determinants are dis­ 47 See Star International Weekly, 31 August Namibia and South Africa", Harare, 30 y cussed in Simon Baynham, "Counting the August-l September 1990. For a prelimi­ b 1988; Longreach Report. Short-term fore­ cost of South Africa's defence", The Cape nary discussion concerning a post­ d cast, South and Southern Africa: Labour, e Times, 23 July 1984; and, "The cash t political and security developments, apartheid SADF, see G Mills, "SADF and

n crunch could reshape SA's defence", The Johannesburg, 18 September 1988, pp 20- a post-apartheid South Africa", The Cape a Argus (Cape Town), I April 1985. r 21; and "Terrorism and sabotage in the Times, 28 May 1990; "National service: A g 35 These figures are derived from the white elephant of the nineties?", The Cape e RSA", ISSUP Bulletin, no 4,1986, P I. c Official Yearbooks of the Republic of Times, 18 July 1990; and S J Baynham, n 48 Africa Institute Bulletin, vol 27, no 3, e South Africa, Pretoria: Department of "Security strategies for a future South c 1987, P 43. i Foreign Affairs; White Papers on Defence, Africa", Journal of Modern African l

r Pretoria: Department of Defence; and vari­ 49 See S J Baynham and G Mills, "Lesotho: Studies, vol 28, no 3, September 1990, pp e

d ous press reports. between dependence and destabilisation", 401-430. n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u d o

188r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Nationalization

Nationalization: Lessons from Southern Africa

Sam Kongwa, Researcher at the Africa Institute, presented this paper on Southern Africa's experience of nationalization, at the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Nafcoc) Economic Conference held at the Wild Coast Sun, Transkei, on 2-3 May 1990.

At independence most African coun­ postulated, could only be achieved control of the relevant sectors of the tries, including those in Southern if the state acquired ownership and economy. Africa, inherited deep-rooted problems control of at least the "commanding • In order to control the prices of of underdevelopment and retrogression. heights of the economy". An egali­ essential commodities and to coun­ These manifested themselves in gross tarian and classless society could teract speculation, unfair trading inequalities among the population, not accept private ownership of practices, and hoarding by the pri­

mass) poverty, developmental imbal­ some of the vital economic sectors. vate sector, the government had to 0

ances1 between the urban and rural • The emergence of a small, privi­ direct the marketing and distribution 0

areas,2 food shortages, an inadequate leged capitalist class whose lifestyle of essential consumer goods.

productiond base and unsophisticated and patterns of consumption would • Whenever it was deemed to be in e technology,t unemployment, an indige­ be incompatible with the rest of the national interest, the govern­ a nousd population lacking in skills, defi­ society had to be prevented. ment had to intervene in the econo­ (

cienciesr in basic and social • Private ownership of the means of my to protect a deficient private e infrastructure,h an inadequate human production had to be discouraged, sector enterprise or to take over one s i resourcel base and inappropriate physi­ so that the labour force could not be that had failed. b

calu capital. In addition, foreigners and exploited by wealthy concerns. There was also a hidden agenda, P multinational corporations owned or • It was said that the new public however: the acquisition of resources e controlledh most of the economy. enterprises arising from nationaliza­ necessary to dispense patronage to t

y Nationalization came to be regarded tion would provide the much-need­ important political constituencies and b as the logical solution to these econom­ ed revenue for social investment in state bureaucrats. d ic e and social problems, and as a means such areas as education, housing, t ofn realizing the essence of political health and transport by ensuring that a independence.r profits were retained in the country Forms of nationalization g

e This paper will highlight the major and by strengthening economic Nationalization in Southern Africa has c

nationalizationn programmes in Southern sovereignty, particularly with regard been brought about by direct action or e

Africa,c and Zambia in particular, the to multinational companies. outright seizure, and indirect action or i l

l

justificationsr put forward by these states • It was believed that vital services, partial seizure. Direct nationalization fore greater government involvement in such as public utilities, could not be took place when the government d then economy, and the lessons to be left to market forces without this expropriated a private company or pri­ u

learnedy from their experience. defeating the objective of an -egali­ vate property, often after assurances of

a tarian society. compensation had been given. Direct w

e • National security necessitated the seizure without compensation occurred t

Rationalea for nationalization running of the steel, petrochemical only when property had been aban­ G

Nationalizationt in Southern Africa was and arms industries as public enter­ doned by foreigners who had left the e

justifiedn on the following, familiar, eco­ prises. Furthermore, the realization country, as in Angola and Mozambique i nomic,b ideological and political grounds. of important equity objectives, such soon after independence. In view of the a

• S Political independence also entailed as the redistribution of income, job negative publicity and threats of

y economic independence for the creation and regional development, reprisal by foreign nations always b

d newly sovereign nation. This, it was were thought to require government generated by direct nationalization, e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 189 p e R Nationalization ______

this method was seldom used. Southern Africa reveals a mixed pat­ accord local entrepreneurs privileged The most popular technique involved tern of strategies (direct and indirect access to credit. Retail business various methods of indirect nationaliza­ nationalization) and motives. licences for small and medium enter­ tion, including the creation of state In the case of Zambia, the first phase prises throughout the country (except in monopolies, requirements for obtaining of the nationalization measures were urban central business districts) were licences, and citizenship, taxation and announced by President Kaunda as part reserved for Zambians. Road transport compulsory savings schemes. of the 1968 Mulungushi economic licences and small public works con­ State monopolies were established reforms. The Zambian leader noted that tracts were reserved exclusively for through legislative action that stipulat­ in the four years since independence, Zambians. All foreigners operating in ed the reservation of certain sectors of the country had witnessed a consider­ the specified sectors were directed the economy for state activity, making able economic boom, but that this pros­ either to sell to local entrepreneurs or to it an offence for any private company perity had benefited only the expatriate become Zambian citizens. or individual to engage in similar busi­ business community. He further pointed ness. A state monopoly could assume out that instead of using some of this the guise of a state corporation, a mar­ money to expand their businesses, for­ Nationalization of the keting board or a co-operative. The eign companies had "expatriated Zambian copper industry government would occasionally permit increasingly large portions of their The most far-reaching economic private companies to compete with profits".2 Also, principally because of measure was the 51 per cent national­ established public enterprise, but the the inherited colonial socio-economic ization of the Zambian copper mines in public enterprise would be afforded structure, no local private sector August 1969. special rights and privileges regarding involvement was discernible. It was Copper is the mainstay of the taxation, rent, interest on borrowed imperative therefore that the govern­ Zambian economy. In 1969 it account­ capital, free use of government ment institute certain economic reforms ed for 95 per cent of visible exports, 59 buildings and land, unlimited access to aimed at achieving greater economic per cent of recurrent government rev­ foreign exchange, and umestricted independence for Zambia. enue, 48 per cent of GDP growth and import and export provisions. As a After the nationalization measures of 14 per cent of job opportunities.4 result of these concessions to public 1968,1969,1973,1976 and the 1980s,3 As part of his 1969 Matero economic enterprise, any competing private enter­ the government monopolized or had a reforms, President Kaunda announced prise was quickly marginalized and majority share interest in over 130 that the state would take over 51 per

) ultimately had to cease operations sim­ companies operating under the holding cent of the mining sector. Government 0

1 ply because it could not compete. company, the Zambia Industrial and bonds issued as compensation to the

0 Another subtle method used to Mining Corporation. The companies two mmmg companies concerned, 2

d exclude "alien" businesses from partici­ operated in a number of sectors: min­ Anglo American and Amax, were to be e t pation in certain selected sectors was ing, railways and airways, electricity, repaid over a maximum period of 12 a d for the state to instruct public enterprise coal, agricultural and mineral market­ years and a minimum of 8 years. The (

r management to allow only indigenous ing, breweries, transport, building sup­ government also signed management e

h agents or distributors to tender for cer­ plies, large-scale consumer retailers and marketing contracts with the two s i l tain services. and wholesalers, publishing and the firms. In 1973, these management and b

u Licensing laws not only regulated news media, fertilizers, hotels, marketing contracts were prematurely P

the functioning of the particular eco­ pipelines, farming machinery, maize, terminated by the state, which felt that e

h nomic sectors mentioned above, but tobacco marketing, copper mining, despite the 1969 nationalization move, t banking and insurance, communica­ y also conferred upon state bureaucrats production and investment in mining b

enormous discretional powers of either tions, real estate, hospitals and clinics, had not shown a substantial increase. d e granting or refusing licenses. So-called and motor plants. The government also Once the contracts had been cancelled, t n citizenship laws were meant to exclude had a minority interest in cement, the bonds established as compensation a r non-citizens from participating in spec­ explosives, textiles, sugar, tyres, con­ for the nationalized shares were g

e ified sectors of the economy. However, struction, engineering, pharmaceuticals, redeemed immediately. c

n the ultimate result of this provision was forestry, bakeries and ceramics. e

c that the government monopolized most Prior to nationalization the majority i l businesses in these sectors, because of these companies formed part of 25 r Nationalization measures in e local entrepreneurs lacked the required foreign-owned concerns in building and d Mozambique, Angola, n skills and capital. construction, road transport, retail and u Tanzania and Zimbabwe Another popular method was to wholesale, and breweries. They were y a impose various taxes on private sector directed to sell 51 per cent of their Soon after assuming power in w e companies and to compel them to chan­ shares to the government. Mozambique in 1975, the Frelimo gov­ t a nel a substantial percentage of their A number of additional economic ernment embarked on a series of mea­ G profits into savings. measures were put into effect. t sures aimed at nationalization. At the e Companies owned by foreigners were n conclusion of the Frelimo Third i

b allowed to remit a maximum amount Congress in 1977, a number of sectors a The record of nationalization 5

S equal to 30 per cent of their equity cap­ were taken over by the government:

y in Southern Africa ital or 50 per cent of their net profit. all land, hospitals, schools, the legal b The record of nationalization in Financial institutions were directed to

d profession, privately-owned buildings, e c u d o r 190 Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Nationalization

funeral agencies, hotels and tourist Bank identified some of these causes as al powers and resources at the dis­ facilities, major industrial and com­ "unclear, multiple or contradictory posal of state officials, all of which mercial concerns, and all retail and objectives, bureaucratic meddling, are aimed at reducing foreign con­ wholesale interests. overly centralized decision making, trol and increasing local involve­ In Angola the state began to inter­ inadequate capitalization, managerial ment in the economy, has the effect vene in economic matters in 1975, but ineptitude, excessive personnel costs of encouraging corruption and it was only in 1976 that major decisions and high labour turnover".? nepotism. on nationalization were taken. In the light of these poor financial • Nationalization does not seem to President Neto announced that the and performance records, the following have eradicated economic inequality MPLA government would take over all lessons should be learned from through a more equal distribution of abandoned economic assets as well as experience: wealth. other strategic sectors of the economy. • Nationalization per se does not Invariably, the chief beneficiaries of The nationalized sectors included6 a result in economic efficiency. On nationalization have been the state major steel works, a cement plant, tex­ the contrary, there is often a bureaucrats and the politicians. The vis­ tile and sugar mills, twelve agricultural decrease in efficiency once profes­ ibly opulent lifestyle of the Zambian complexes, all newspapers, all radio sional managers have been replaced elite led President Kaunda to admit in stations, the central bank, all commer­ by political appointees lacking in 1974 that "the reforms have created a cial banks, and the insurance industry. managerial experience. Rapid pro­ form of state capitalism where tremen­ In Tanzania major decisions on motion of inadequately qualified dous power is concentrated in the hands nationalization were communicated in personnel and a high turnover of of a small managerial group who have the 1967 Arusha Declaration, and staff contribute to this poor perfor­ their hands on the important switches involved the sisal, tea and coffee export mance. As a result, very little or no and whose elitist attitudes set social industries, retail and wholesale busi­ additional revenue is generated for patterns far beyond their immediate nesses, commercial banks, the insur­ social and productive investment. realm of command".8 ance industry, most industrial • The timing of the nationalization Marcia Burdette's findings on the companies, including companies in the process often results in weak man­ nationalization of the Zambian copper important shoe manufacturing, brew­ agement in the public sector mines seem to confirm this, and she eries and plastics industries, and the because it is invariably embarked points out that: import trade. upon at a time when there is lack of ... analysis of the Zambian negotiations

) The method of state intervention in managerial, technical and entrepre­ and their aftermath casts doubt on gov­ 0

Zimbabwe1 differed from that in other neurial skills among local people. In ernmental intention. A government may 0 nationalize for many reasons other than African2 countries. In most cases where addition, the business environment

thed state decided to intervene, it took in nationalized enterprises is not to benefit the majority of the population; e onlyt a minority share interest in the one where professional, skilled leaders may nationalize foreign assets to a gain political capital on the domestic enterprised (for example in CAPS, a employees will be encouraged to (

scene, to enjoy the profits themselves, or pharmaceuticalr manufacturer, and in function according to the accepted

e to direct those profits within the econo­

Heinz).h The Zimbabwean method also rules of business - and without my in a different fashion.9 s i involvedl state intervention in the form undue political interference. b

ofu wage restraints, price controls, trade • Political constraints do not allow She also disputes the common P union legislation and measures to pro­ managers of state enterprises either assumption "that the governments are e tecth workers. All these measures con­ to discipline or to motivate subordi­ acting on behalf of the welfare of the t

veyedy to the business sector a strong nates, and promote the uncontrolled population, rather than for a smaller b desire on the part of the state to increase recruitment of staff. State enterpris­ group".lO In conclusion, she points out d

e es are generally considered to be that nationalizations in Zambia, like itst involvement in the economy.

n Despite the good intentions of the extensions of the civil service and those in most other African countries, a governmentsr referred to above, and the the political leadership shows very arose from an internal leadership strug­ g

plausiblee reasons put forward for their little understanding of the need of gle for: c actions,n nationalization's balance sheet these enterprises to function as ... control within the parastatal bodies, e inc Southern Africa can hardly be independent economic entities. ministries, and political parties of the i l

host state. The ideological justification

describedr as favourable. With few • The state always assumes that its exceptions,e nationalized industries in primary function is to initiate and for a nationalization to better the national d welfare can be a chimera in this still cap­ Southernn Africa have performed unsat­ encourage economic growth. ll u italistic change of assets.

isfactorily.y Despite their privileged Instead of limiting its involvement accessa to capital and subsidies and pro­ to creating an environment con­ More recently the Zambian govern­ w tectione from competition, public enter­ ducive to economic growth and pro­ ment has decided to institute major t prisesa have often run at a loss or, viding needed infrastructure and reforms in the field of public enter­ G

att least, have not shown the profit services, it takes on the role of an prise. These include the establishment e

expected.n entrepreneurial manager; of a stock exchange; the sale to the pri­ i

b The financial weaknesses of nation­ • The proliferation of bureaucratic vate sector of 40 of public utilities, a

alizedS enterprises in Africa have been regulations, such as quotas, licens­ such as the ZambiafTanzania Railway

attributedy to a number of causes. A ing and various other controls, and Authority, Zambia Railways, Zambia b

recentd paper published by the World the placing of enormous discretion- Electricity Supply Corporation, the e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 191 p e R Nationalization ______

University Teaching Hospital and the has had only three foreign investments: the problem of work ethic: that human Zambia National Broadcasting in a baked bean factory, a cooking oil beings are inclined to perform better Corporation; the offer to the public of plant and a chewing-gum factory. In when working for themselves. 49 per cent of the equity in state­ May 1989 Zimbabwe established an With hindsight, all Southern African owned mining, industrial and commer­ investment promotion centre to dissem­ countries today are inclined to agree cial enterprises; and the gift of shares inate information about investment that it was unnecessary to embark on to workers in public enterprises as a opportunities in that country. Legal pro­ the road of nationalization in order to productivity incentive. 12 tection for investments is promised. 15 effect control of the "commanding In the cases of Angola and To summarize, it is evident that heights of the economy", retain profits Mozambique, one can hardly find a sin­ nationalization in Southern Africa did in the country, control the prices of gle example where nationalization was bring about effective control of the essential consumer products, regulate to the benefit of the people, not only "commanding heights of the economy", wages and salaries in a more egalitarian because of the ensuing internecine it did realize the expected exponential fashion and achieve a better contribu­ wars, but also on the evidence that revenues in taxes and dividends, and it tion to the economy. They realize that nationalization measures alienated the acted as a positive force in promoting these objectives could have been people to the extent that they turned the development of skills and human achieved more efficiently through fis­ against the very schemes that were resource among the indigenous popula­ cal, monetary and other state policies. meant to benefit them. tions. Indeed, the process of national­ It is on account of this realization At its Fifth Party Congress, Frelimo ization can be credited with instilling a that in a recent document entitled formally committed Mozambique to a sense of urgency and pride and a spirit "Enterprise, skills and productivity", mixed economy, and established a of responsibility in the local labour the Southern African Development Co­ scheme to promote and facilitate for­ force. ordination Conference (SADCC) eign investment. Foreign investors have Evidently, training and career devel­ proposes the strengthening of the pri­ now been guaranteed that their invest­ opment programmes established as part vate sector as one of the major priori­ ments will not be nationalized. of the nationalization schemes enabled ties of the present decade. Southern In Tanzania, the reversal of many of the African labour force to acquire Africa, the paper states, "requires entre­ Julius Nyerere's nationalization mea­ technical skills and industrial experi­ preneurs, skilled people, the creation of sures by his successor, and strong inter­ ence. The acceleration of local human an enabling environment to promote nal opposition to nationalization, resource development facilitated the investment and development, the work

) clearly illustrate that the people felt growth of indigenous enterprise, and ethic and the efficiency required to 0

1 cheated by the political leadership. In established the foundation of present­ compete successfully in the modem 0

2 an important recent study on Tanzanian day entrepreneurship. world."16 It concludes by pointing out

d nationalization, Diane Bolton con­ When all the ideological, political that the controls introduced by most e t cludes that "changes in patterns of and dividend benefits are measured governments of Southern Africa "on a d ownership are generally failing to pro­ against the losses in socio-economic ( almost every sphere of economic life in

r duce a better life and working condi­ terms, however, one is inclined to con­ the last decade have almost all impact­ e h tions for labour,"13 and that in the end clude that nationalization is, after all, ed negatively on productivity."17 s i l nationalization in Tanzania clearly the attainment of the non-economic History consists largely of the study b u symbolized "a transition towards the objective of control of the economy by of mankind's past mistakes. I have no P consolidation of power and privilege by the indigenous population. But this is doubt that as South Africa moves inex­ e h the bureaucratic ruling stratum."14 negated by the realization that control orably towards a free and just society, t

y The continuing economic liberaliza­ of the "commanding heights of the its future leaders will take cognizance b tion policies of the Tanzanian govern­ economy" without the attainment of of the history of the nationalization pro­ d e ment have now confined the concept t economic benefits is absurd. Still, there cess in Southern Africa. n of nationalization to the past in that are those who argue that the poor per­ a r country. formance of nationalized enterprises g

e Evidence from elsewhere in has nothing to do with the type of own­ References c n Southern Africa shows that nationaliza­ ership, but with the rules under which See K C Kocha, "Comparative analysis of e c tion ultimately brought about a finan­ nationalization laws: Objectives and tech­ i these enterprises are made to operate by l

niques", paper presented at the Sixteenth

r cial loss as a result of compensation the state.

e Annual Meeting of the African Studies andd management payments and loss of Therefore, the argument goes, if Association, Syracuse, 31 October-3 potentialn private investment stemming state enterprises were permitted to u November 1973.

fromy a decline in investor confidence. operate freely, like any private enter­ a Although it is true that in prise, they would prove viable. 2 Peter Meyns, "the political economy of w Zambia", in Klaas Woldring (ed), Beyond e

Mozambiquet and Angola the major rea­ Evidence from Southern Africa, and political independence: Zambia's political sona for the lack of investment was a perhaps elsewhere, however, shows that

G predicament in the 1980s, New York;

lackt of security, private investment in although the outcome under these con­ Mouton, 1984, p 15. e

bothn Zambia and Zimbabwe has been ditions would certainly be better, it is i 3 Ibid, pp 15-17; and M L 0 Faber and J G negligibleb because both countries were rather difficult for the ownership of an a Potter, Towards economic independence:

S seen to be moving towards greater state enterprise to be wholly separated from Papers on the nationalization of the cop­ y involvement in the economy. Since its control and from accountability for b per industry in Zambia, Cambridge:

independenced ten years ago, Zimbabwe its performance. Besides, there is still Cambridge University Press, 1971. e c u d o r 192 Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Nationalization

4 Peter Meyns, op cit, p 8. 9 Marcia Burdette, "Nationalization in 14 ibid, P 166. 5 Bertil Egero, Mozambique and Angola: Zambia: A critique of bargaining theory", 15 Republic of Zimbabwe, The promotion of Reconstruction in the social sciences, Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol investment: Policy and regulations, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African 11, no 3,1977, pp 473-474. Harare: Government Printer, 1989. Studies, 1977, pp·15-18. 10 ibid, P 473. 16 Colleen Lowe Morna "What lies ahead 6 T Hodges, Angola to the i990s, London: now for the SADCC countries?", African 11 ibid, P 496. Economist Intelligence Unit, 1987, Business, no 138, February 1990, p 18. pp 31-32. 12 Business Day (Johannesburg), 24 May 17 ibid. 7 Mary M Shirley, "Managing state owned 1990. enterprises", World Development, vol 17, 13 Diane Bolton, Nationalization: A road to no 5, May 1889, p 603. socialism? The lessons of Tanzania, 8 Peter Meyns, op cit, p 17. London: Zed Books, 1985, p 164. ) 0 1 0 2

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Africar Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 193 p e R Nationalization ______

Adequate economic prosperity as a prerequisite for political stability in a post-apartheid South Africa: The relevance of the national ization/privatization debate

Ronnie M J van Wyk, of the Department of Sociology, University of Port Elizabeth, ) 0

argues1 that the process of privatization could damage the spirit of negotiation in 0

South2 Africa.

d e t a d (

Introductionr very important to create the belief or question changes from how to survive e l Thoseh who believe that a democratic myth that the system is working or that to how to improve the quality of life. s i andl free society is a good society it is the best; in other words, that it is Maasdorp argues that there are basi­ b shouldu also acknowledge that democra­ legitimate. This legitimacy test, which cally two types of economic systems: P cy demands equality and fairness. For also applies to post-apartheid South centrally planned and market. e peopleh to be free and happy they must Africa, raises the issue of the achieve­ t In the centrally planned economies

havey a say in their own destiny and be ment of adequate economic prosperity. (CPEs) the state is virtually all-embrac­ b able to co-determine whatever access We can begin to address this issue by ing, characterized by a command system d

e with decisions percolating down the hier­

theret may be for them to life's oppor­ investigating the role of the state in the tunities.n Any attempt to create a demo­ economy. archy. In the market system, the role of a craticr society under conditions of the state today varies widely and this has g

given rise to the mixed economy where economice scarcity or gross inequality c The role of the state in the both market and non-market mechanisms isn doomed to failure and can only exist to allocate scarce resources.2 e

c economy

resulti in exploitation and domination. l

r Regarding the distribution of power At root, economic activity in any soci­ In mixed economies it has become a e

ind a democracy any claim to a legiti­ ety has a dual purpose. First it must common economic function of the state maten title to rule can be maintained solve the problem of survival. Only to provide a physical infrastructure as u

onlyy as long as effectiveness and effi­ when this has been done satisfactorily well as social security through educa­ ciencya are demonstrated. The loyalty of through the provision of the basic needs tion, health, welfare, housing, and so on. w e varioust groups will only be gained and of all members of society - such as The establishment of public corpora­ ensureda if they are convinced that the food, clothing and shelter - can eco­ tions in key economic sectors such as G

systemt is the most effective one. Their nomic activity begin to provide for steel production, coal-mining, banking e testn for legitimacy is very pragmatic: additional needs. Only when the nation­ and transport is another example of gov­ i whatb are the results? Given the "revolu­ al household has been arranged in such ernment involvement in the economy. a S tion of rising expectations", results in a way as to prevent anyone dying can As we move towards a new society they form of access to consumer goods b steps be taken to beautify the house and in South Africa the general socio­

andd an increase in living standards are make it more comfortable. Now the economic debate will have to address e c u d o

194r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Nationalization

the issue of how to blend a free market 4. Whites enjoy far higher standards of educa­ on the one hand and the South African with democracy based on social justice. tion and other services such as health, and government and private sector on receive a disproportionately high share of This debate and the prospect of finding 3 the other - in this privatization/ an appropriate "mix" is complicated, state expenditure on these items. nationalization debate require brief however, by our own peculiar socio­ Since the State President's speech in clarification. economic and political history. It is parliament on 2 February 1990 and the The ANC and its allies are con­ therefore appropriate to turn now to a subsequent opening of the political vinced from their own point of view of discussion of the legacy of apartheid, debate, arguments are being offered in what can be achieved through national­ although for the sake of the argument favour of and against nationalization ization and are also fully aware of the certain descriptions will have to be and privatization. This immediately pressure that will be put on them to somewhat oversimplified. incorporates a further issue into the "produce" in order to maintain legiti­ broader political debate: economic macy in the aftermath of a political set­ restructuring. It is to this debate that we tlement. Although nationalization is The legacy of apartheid now turn. also still part of the ANC's officially In the eyes of many South Africans adopted policy, it is important to bear in who find themselves on the receiving mind that the ANC views nationaliza­ end of apartheid, capitalism is part and The nationalization/ tion as one alternative. In other words, parcel of apartheid. In fact it is argued privatization debate state ownership is only one means of that capitalism was a partner in estab­ A feature of the present debate on the intervention, and if another policy is lishing and maintaining apartheid and economy is an exchange of rhetoric proposed that can achieve the same or has therefore benefitted from it all reflecting certain aspects of the reality better results, the ANC will seriously along. For instance, it guaranteed a of the situation. On the one hand there consider it. Nationalization is on the huge pool of cheap labour and until is the reality of dispossession, suffer­ agenda, it is not a non-negotiable. recently well-paid mining jobs were ing and poverty experienced by many An argument often heard is that pri­ reserved for whites. South Africans for a number of years; vate enterprise or a private corporation For many people in South Africa, on the other hand a different reality is is more efficient than a state corpora­ given their experience of the South experienced by those for whom free tion. David Lewis, offers a counter­ African political economy, capitalism enterprise and capitalism worked to argument: has failed to provide employment and a produce a high standard of living.4 The characteristic argument is that a pri­ decent living for most of its people. Support for socialism and the cry for vately owned corporation is subject to )

Another0 reality is that the acquisition of the nationalization of the "commanding the threat of bankruptcy or takeover and 1 that this will generate the profit maximis­ most0 - though by no means all - heights" of the economy - the mining 2 managerial skills is the prerogative of and banking sectors - are understand­ ing/cost minimising efficiencies that d allegedly evade public sector enterprise. e whites.t Thus it is clear that domination able in terms of a specific experience of However, this has no relevance to the a

ind South Africa, or the inequality char­ South African reality. As Munro privatisation argument in South Africa. ( Those parastatals earmarked for sale in acterizingr our society, are not only of a argues:

e South Africa are too large and produce

politicalh nature but are embedded in Nationalization is rapidly becoming s

i too vital a commodity to be subject to

economicl imbalances. Therefore, even an emotional rallying cry divorced from ifb we find a political settlement along historical reality and from experience either takeover or bankruptcy. ... The u efficiency argument will only hold if the P peaceful lines, while the existing prop­ elsewhere. Yet an understanding of the sale of a public asset generates competi­ e

ertyh relationships are left undisturbed, historical experience of dispossession, tion. There is no reason for assuming that t the vast majority of dominators will past inequalities in wealth, resources this will generally be the case. Many of y

b the parastatals - Escom, for example - still be whites. In other words, libera­ and income based largely though not

d are natural monopolies. In any event tione or a political settlement will have entirely upon race, and the past empha­ t most of the public sector enterprises are littlen meaning and will not bring lasting sis on ethnic identity make the appeal

a 5 very large corporations that enjoy a dom­ peacer and happiness if the existing of nationalization understandable. 6

g inant position in their markets.

structurese which determine access to At the same time, big business argues resources,c as well as the distribution in favour of free enterprise and is more Perhaps it can then be asked whether n e

patternc of wealth and resources, remain than in line with government thinking the government is not busy selling the i l intact. when it comes to privatization. This is proverbial "family silver"? If the words r

e Reviewing the legacy of apartheid, probably a result of business's experi­ of Mr Craig Williamson, NP member of d

Maasdorpn identifies the following main ence of partisan government interven­ the President's Council are anything to u features of South African society: tion in the economy throughout most of go by then one is forced to believe that y

a the period of National Party rule. Big this might well be the case. Mr

1. w Whites control most of the land, only some

e business in South Africa is quite content Williamson has been quoted as saying

t 13,4 per cent being reserved for African a use, mostly on a communal basis of tenure. at the moment with the government's that through privatization the govern­ G support of privatization - which is in ment is making sure that" ... no future 2. t Whites fill most of the skilled, well-paid e line with the "New Right" thinking and government has the power we did".7 n positions in the economy, enjoying per i

b capita incomes on average some 12,9 times the world-wide trend against centrally Big business also argues that new a that of Africans in 1980. wealth can be created only with time, S planned economies.

3. y Whites own and manage almost the entire The positions of the main partici­ whoever governs. Coupled with this is b spectrum of large businesses in the economy. pants - the ANC/UDF/Cosatu/SACP the argument that the only way to d e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 195 p e R Nationalization ______

improve the income and thus the wealth we lack a national identity with a com­ fair deal for all South Africans regard­ of all South Africans is by economic mon vision of the future. We now real­ less of colour, creed or sex. No econom­ growth. The open market in conjunc­ ize that intentional or unintentional ic "new deal" must be developed using tion with a market-based economic sys­ racial domination is no longer accept­ undemocratic structures. South Africa's tem where resources are allocated, able, but on the other hand nationalism economic future will not be stable if it is prices determined, information gath­ among both blacks and whites appar­ not based on democracy, nor will it ered and value judgements made, is ently remains a potent political force in enjoy political stability if economic then offered as the only way to realize our society. emancipation along legitimate lines is this growth. Government must there­ Conflicts over the role of the state not guaranteed. fore avoid temptation and keep well will revolve around three broad issues Negotiations in good faith means that clear of the wealth-creating process. - redistribution of wealth, ownership good faith must be sustained by all par­ Nevertheless, there seems to be com­ of the means of production, and the ties involved. It is ironic, therefore, that mon ground as far as meeting the needs economic upliftment of blacks. Related business and government are upset about of the poor is concerned. Opinions dif­ matters that will need to be addressed nationalization while simultaneously fer about how best to meet these needs are those of landownership and wage continuing with the process of privatiza­ and address inequalities; this indicates policy. tion. I would argue that for the sake of an urgent need to negotiate. The primary challenge is to allocate keeping good faith negotiations going political and economic opportunity what is required is at least a suspension more equitably without sacrificing of the process of privatization, pending The challenge higher per capita incomes and sustained the outcome of real negotiations. Any post-apartheid government will economic growth. Appropriately face enormous demands to match polit­ Munro observes: ical with economic emancipation. The In the final analysis the achievement of References precedent of using the state to engineer economic growth and development the economic upliftment of a group in involves the setting of precisely defined Cf S J Terreblanche, Politi eke ekonomie society has already been created with goals which may well involve social sac­ en sosiale welvaart met toepassing op rifices. Perhaps this is the greatest chal­ Suid-Afrika, Kaapstad: Academica, 1986, the solution of the poor-white problem. pp 14-15. Private capital, domestic and for­ lenge, for the political and social price of economic growth may be too high for all 2 G Maasdorp, "The role of the state in the eign, and participation by those pre­ South Africans to contemplate.8 economy", in R Schrire (ed), Critical pared to contribute their talents and

) choices for South Africa, Cape Town:

acquired0 managerial skills to build a A way must be found to meet black Oxford University Press, 1990, p 188. 1

prosperous0 non-racial South Africa will aspirations, however, and to address 3 Ibid, P 198. 2 undoubtedly be needed. Economic seriously legitimate grievances without d 4 Cf A Irwin, "South Africa's postapartheid e restructuringt will have to go hand-in­ destroying what is left of our economy. economy: Planning for prosperity", South handa with building a new democratic It seems increasingly probable that the d Africa International, vol 20, no 4, April ( state in South Africa and vice versa. To future South African economy will be a 1990, pp 205-210. r arguee that socio-economic development social democracy or a mixed economy. h 5 K Munro, "Japanese industrial develop­ s

musti be removed from the political The solution therefore lies not in ment: Lessons for South Africa?", l

negotiationb process is naive, given the unbridled free market capitalism, nor in Development Southern Africa, vol 7, no 2, u May 1990, p 243. importanceP of legitimacy in any socio­ a centrally planned command economy.

politicale process of change. We will An acceptable balance, perceived by the 6 D Lewis, Supplement to the Weekly Mail h t have to realize, and the sooner the bet­ majority of South Africans to be a legit­ (Johannesburg), March 30-4 April 1990, p y 8. b imate socio-economic and political dis­ ter, that satisfaction of socio-economic expectationsd is central to breaching the pensation, must and definitely can be 7 Ibid. e t

country'sn political impasse. At present found. Policies must focus on creating a 8 K Munro, op cit, p 273. a r g

e c n e c i l

r e d n u

y a w e t a G

t e n i b a S

y b

d e c u d o

196r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R Africa monitor April to June 1990

Jenny Macgregor

NORTH AFRICA problem of mounting foreign debt, which was was reached with the IMF, opening the way estimated at $24 bn (AED 2/4, 7/5; ARB for further loans. In June the government took Algeria 30/4). a major step towards unifying its multi-tiered The World Bank approved a $99,5 mn exchange rate system by devaluing the Marches and outbursts of violence charac­ credit to help restructure three public sector pound from £1,10 to the dollar to £2,00 to terized the country during the months of April manufacturing companies, its first loan to the the dollar. The 1990/91 budget of £E 41,248 and May prior to local and provincial elec­ industrial sector for several years. The suc­ mn introduced on 1 July was 22 per cent tions - the first democratic elections to be cess of the three companies will be seen as a higher than the previous budget, but held since independence in 1962. During test case for economic reforms (WBN 7/6; reflected little increase in real terms because April tens of thousands of young fundamen­ AED 11/6). of an annual inflation rate of 20 per cent (DT talists marched on the presidential palace 4/5; C 7/5; KT 7/5; AED 14/5, 21/5, 4/6, demanding the dissolution of parliament and Chad 25/6). the holding of new parliamentary elections. In Amid rumblings of popular discontent fol­

an) even greater show of force, a loose coali­ Between 18-20 April some of the fiercest lowing the major food subsidy cuts, the tion0 of moderate and leftist parties organized fighting to take place over the past three years Supreme Constitutional Court ruled on 19 1 a 0 nationwide march of some 150000 people broke out between government troops and May that parliament had not been elected in 2 in May, hoping to present an alternative to the rebel forces in eastern Chad, claiming 783 1987 in accordance with the constitution and d increasinglye powerful Front Islamique du lives. Special force reinforcements sent by was therefore "null and void". Nevertheless, t

Saluta (FIS) and to the largely discredited France were withdrawn on 10 May after the the Court accepted the validity of all legisla­ d

Front( de Liberation Nationale (FLN). situation had stabilized (SWB 2/4, 8/5, 15/5; tion passed during the past three years, but

However,r coalitions among the 20-odd politi­ AED 23/4; WA 14/5; JA 14/5; ARB 15/5). after 2 June all laws passed would be legally e

calh parties remained loosely organized and The task of finding a negotiated settlement invalid. In response to the ruling the opposi­ s presentedi no electoral threat to the well-orga­ l to the dispute over the Aouzou strip was tion called for parliamentary elections to be nizedb Islamic fundamentalists. Drawing main­ threatened in early May by the Chadian brought forward from 1992 (C 21/5; DT 23/5; lyonu support from the young and seizure of a convoy of Libyan military lorries TS 23/5; AED 28/5). P

unemployed,e the fundamentalists won a major in Sudan. The 10 drivers captured by Chad h

victoryt on 12 June when the FIS took control were only released on 17 June after both Morocco iny 55 per cent of the districts. The FLN, which countries had appealed to the International b has been in power for 28 years, took only 32 Court of Justice to intervene (AED 21/5; After a year of negotiations, agreement was d

pere cent of the districts, leading to speculation SWB 21/5, 20/6; DT 28/5; ARB 15/5). secured on 10 April with the main creditor t

aboutn its future role in the government. The banks on a new debt rescheduling, making

FLNa blamed its defeat on its failure to adapt Morocco the first African country to conclude r Egypt g

to a new democratic era and promised renova­ a debt reduction agreement with commercial e

tionc of the party, but political analysts also Egypt launched a $49 mn project to rehabilitate banks under the Brady plan. Morocco secured pointedn to growing support for the FlS's aging water pumping stations in agricultural a rescheduling of $3,2 bn of its $22 bn debt e brandc of Islam. The "protest vote" of 35 per

i areas to help sustain production among (AED 23/4). l cent of the population who did not vote was 560 000 smallholders. (Water for agricultural On 2 May the dirham was devalued by r attributede to the failure of the FLN to adopt a use accounts for about 90 per cent of total 9,15 per cent to MD8,85 to the dollar and an d

moren democratic approach (AED 30/4, 28/5, demand.) The World Bank approved a $31 mn amended austerity budget aimed at cutting the u

4/6, 16/6, 25/6; DT 7/5, 16/5, 25/5, 31/5; loan for the programme. Agriculture in Egypt deficit by more than 85 per cent was tabled.

SWBy 12/5, 14/6, 16/6; ARB 15/5, 15/6; JA generates 20 per cent of GDP, 35 per cent of The devaluation was expected to boost 28/5,a 4/6, 13/6, 20/6, 27/6; C 13/6, 19/6; S civilian employment and 25 per cent of mer­ exports after the 1989 trade deficit doubled w e

14/6;t WA 25/6). chandise-export earnings (WBN 17/5; S 25/5; to MD18 bn ($2,25 bn). The measures, which

a At the end of March the National AED 11/6). were adopted in reaction to the poor economic G Assembly approved new legislation opening On 6 May the government announced a results recorded in 1989, served to strengthen t thee door to foreign investment for the first series of price rises covering fuel (a 33 per Morocco's hand in negotiating a new deal n timei since independence. The draft law on cent increase), basic food stuffs and with the IMF. On 26 June the government b

bankinga and investment, which effectively cigarettes, in an effort to reduce its annual announced that it had reached agreement in S made the banks instead of the treasury the subsidy bill of $1,4 bn following talks with principle with the IMF for a new nine-month y

mainb financing vehicle, was heralded as the the IMF on rescheduling part of its $50 bn $130 mn facility prior to a longer and more

keyd to economic recovery and to solving the foreign debt. In late Maya broad agreement comprehensive programme being put into e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 197 p e R Africa monitor ______

place. Agreement with the IMF is an impor­ recent sacking of hundreds of officers from the constitution to the High Council. It recom­ tant prerequisite of the major debt reschedul­ country's already demoralized army, on suspi­ mended muIti-partyism and the installation of ing initiative agreed under the Brady plan cion of being communists or opponents of the a balanced presidential regime: an elected (AED 7/5,14/5,2/6; KT 7/5; ARB 31/5). militant brand of Islam favoured by the gov­ National Assembly, a High Council of the Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are to ernment. Gen al-Bashir reaffirmed his com­ Republic, a constitutional court, a High develop a 6 000 km railway link - designed mitment to Islamic (shari' a) law after the Authority for Audio-Visual Affairs and for speeds of over 200 km per hour - con­ coup attempt (SWB 24/4-27/4, 5/5; S 24/4; Communications, a mediator and an economic necting the countries' rail networks at an esti­ AA 27/4; ION 28/4, 5/5; AED 30/4, 7/5; TWR and social council. The constitution was to be mated cost of $10 bn (AA 25/5). 2/5; C 3/5; WA 7/5; AC 7/5, 14/5; JA 14/5; put to a referendum in August (SWB 19/4; Plans to privatize 112 enterprises, about ARB 15/5). DT 24/4; ARB 15/5; AED 28/5). 40 per cent of state holdings in public sector Sudan began talks with the IMF on 16 The People's Revolutionary Party corporations and parastatals, were outlined in May after being threatened with expulsion. (PRPB), formed in November 1975 and the a royal decree issued in June. The largest con­ It's arrears to the IMF are the largest in sole ruling party until December 1989, decid­ centration of enterprises is in the tourism sec­ Africa. The overall debt is now estimated at ed at its annual congress on 1 May to dissolve tor (AED 25/6). $12 bn, loans having been unserviced since itself and create a new progressive party to be On 8 May more than 2000 Islamic sup­ 1985. In February 1986, the IMF declared called the Union of the Forces of Progress porters of an outlawed Islamic party, Justice Sudan "ineligible to use the general resources (UFP). Mashudi Disudi, an economics lectur­ and Welfare (Adil wal-Ihsan), demonstrated in of the Fund." (AED 12/3,28/5). er, was to lead the new party (SWB 3/5, 16/5; Rabat. The demonstration, Morocco's Three powerful earthquakes on 20, 25 ARB 15/6). biggest since 1984, was a show of support at and 26 May left hundreds dead and more than On 19 May two of Benin's four main the trial of six leaders of the Islamic group 300 000 people in rebel held southern Sudan opposition parties, the National Front for who were sent to jail in March. All were without shelter (S 28/5; DT 6/6; AED 11/6). Democracy and the Democratic Republican arrested by the security forces, but, in an Movement, announced plans to merge (SWB unprecedented step, King Hassan ordered Tunisia 22/5; ARB 15/6). their release and postponed the trial of the six (SWB 10/5; E 12/5; AE 6/90). In April three leftist parties announced a Burkina Faso Thirty-eight tribal leaders from both joint manifesto as an alternative to the ruling Morocco and the Western Sahara, as well as Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique The effective number two of the ruling refugee camps in Algeria, held talks with UN (RCD) and the increasingly popular, but Popular Front, Oumaraou Clement officials in Geneva in early June on a pro­ banned, fundamentalist en-Nahda movement. Ouedraogo, was sacked on 14 April as secre­ posed referendum on the future of the terri­ They said their aim was "to create a new pro­ tary general of the Organisation pour la tory. The main purpose of the meeting was to gressive and democratic force to save the Democratie Populaire-Mouvement de Travail set out details of the referendum and validate country from polarisation", criticizing the gov­ - the dominant group in the Popular Front - electoral lists as the 1974 census has 74000 ernment's failure to fulfill its promise of multi­ and stripped of his political and ministerial people) listed, whereas Polisario estimated in party democracy (JA 30/4; AED 30/4). posts in a 19 April cabinet reshuffle. His 0

19871 that the Saharan population totalled The local elections held on 10 June were dismissal was prompted by "grave short-com­ 207000,0 of whom 150000 were in refugee boycotted by all opposition groups - six ings from the principles and political line of 2 legal parties and the banned Islamic funda­ the movement". He was replaced by ideologue

campsd (DT 5/6; AED 11/6). e

t mentalist en-Nahda party, all of whom took Christian Roch Kabore, as executive com­

a part in last year's legislative elections. The mittee secretary in charge of political affairs

Sudand ( ruling RCD was accused of dominating the (SWB 19/4,21/4; AED 30/4; ARB 15/5).

r civil service and of a lack of neutrality in its Lt-Gene al-Bashir signed a non-aggression pacth with Uganda on 3 April after a two-day administration of the poll. Nevertheless, there s

i Cape Verde officiall visit to the country. Uganda has more was a 79 per cent turnout, the RCD winning thanb 60 000 refugees who have fled from the control of all but one of the 245 municipal The National Council of the country's only u seven-year-oldP war in southern Sudan (SWB councils (DT 8/5, 11/6; E 9/6; SWB 12/6, political party, the African Party for the

5/4,e 10/4; AED 16/4). 13/6; ARB 15/6). Independence of Cape Verde (PAIVC), h

t Pres Ben Ali met Pres Bush on 15 May A government reshuffle on 10 April announced on 13 April that free, multi-party servedy to tighten the Islamic fundamentalists' during his first official visit to the USA (AED elections would be held in December to pre­ b control of the government. The key change 21/5). pare the country for transition to democracy. d wase the appointment of the National Islamic At the end of May the World Bank loan The changes would permit the election of the t

Front'sn leading banker, Abdel Rahim granted Tunisia a $17 mn loan towards the country's president by direct, universal suf­ a

Mahmoudr Hamdi, as finance minister (DN launch of the first phase of a programme to frage (C 16/4; SWB 16/4; ARB 15/5). g

12/4; AC 20/4; ARB 15/5). improve agricultural extension and e

c On 23 April the military government research. The five-year programme will n

claimede to have foiled a coup attempt in result in increased agricultural production c whichi rebel soldiers tried to seize key installa­ nationwide through the upgrading and l

Cote d'ivoire

tionsr in and around Khartoum. The second strengthening of extension services in 15 attempte in less than a month and the third since regions. In particular, the programme will Schools and colleges were closed once again d al-Bashirn came to power in June 1989, it was focus on providing extension services to on 7 April, having been reopened only five u by far the most serious threat to his rule. The women in rural areas and of improving farmer days earlier, following the death of an Ivorian y

nexta day 28 officers, 17 of whom were active access to new agricultural technologies (AED school student during an anti-government andw 11 retired, were executed. Among them 4/6; WBN 7/6). demonstration the day before. The govern­ e weret Maj-Gen Abdul-Kader and Brig Karar, ment then declared the academic year 1989- twoa former senior officers identified as the 90 "blank", a decision affecting some one and G

plott leaders. Eight officers were dismissed half million pupils and students. Nevertheless, e of them also imprisoned WEST AFRICA 21 June in a final effort to save the school

fromn the army, four on i

forb terms ranging from three to fifteen years. A year, the government announced that schools reporta that another six army officers were exe­ would reopen on 3 September (WA 11/4, S Benin cuted on 28 April was denied by Sudanese 23/4,2/7; SWB 25/6). y b

authorities. Political commentators said the On 12 April a 15-man constitutional commis­ The government announced on 17 April disgruntledd officers were motivated by the sion submitted the preliminary text of a draft that it had suspended the economic austerity e c u d o

198r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Africa monitor

measures after public protest and political Ghana monitor the border issue, the most serious of a pressure forced a review of government poli­ number of land, sea and air violations which cy. At the same time it announced the estab­ In April, Ghana and Mozambique agreed to occurred during April and May (SWB 17/4, lishment of a ministerial committee to review establish a permanent joint commission for 8/5, 22/5, 24/5, 25/5, 28/5, 29/5, 1/6, 18/6; the economic austerity programme. On I June co-operation to enhance their relations in the WA 30/4, 11/6,25/6; AED 14/5,28/5, 18/6; S a new economic recovery plan for "stabiliza­ political, scientific, cultural and economic 29/5; AC 1/6; ARB 15/6; AA 22/6). tion and economic relaunch" was unanimous­ fields. A cultural co-operation agreement was signed with Libya in May. Covering the peri­ ly adopted by the government. Seen as a Liberia last-ditch attempt to win back donor support od 1990-92, the agreement was a follow-up of and prevent the downfall of the government, the main cultural and technical agreement The fierce fighting which broke out in Nimba the programme planned to save the state signed with Libya in 1982 (SWB 9/4, 8/5; county during January between government CFAFr90 bn on its administrative expendi­ ARB 15/5). forces and rebels led by Charles Taylor, ture, and to bring in CFAFr40 bn in tax and Ten people detained for "subversive" spread southwards rapidly during April, fol­ other revenues. However, the increasing activities were released on 4 June, the 11th lowing the government's outright rejection of intractability of the country's $13 bn debt anniversary of Flt-Lt Rawlings accession to Taylor's peace overtures. In early May the was seen to be the most serious problem (AA power. They were not among those arrested in Liberian authorities lost control of the iron­ 13/4; SWB 19/4; WA 30/4; ARB 15/5, 31/5, September last year or January this year in ore and logging industries to the rebel 30/6; AED 28/5, 18/6). connection with the alleged 1989 coup National Patriotic Forces (NPF). By the end After the outbreak of the worst public attempt. During the celebrations, Rawlings of May the rebels had taken the strategic port unrest since independence 30 years ago, Pres called for "tolerance of opposing views" of Buchanan, south-east of Monrovia, and the Houphouet-Boigny announced on 20 April (SWB 6/6; DN 6/6). main national airport was under threat. An that he was ready to step down, provided he In May the World Bank agreed to support offer by Pres Doe to hold a snap general elec­ could go "with head held high". He said, how­ the second phase of the education reform tion (in which he would not contest the presi­ ever, that he could not resign during the "pre­ programme with an IDA credit of $50 mn. dency) as a way of resolving the conflict, was sent crisis", but gave no indication as to when The programme, which was to run until 1992, rejected by legislators as unconstitutional and he would step down, or who would succeed called for the reform of senior secondary too costly. On 6 June the world's largest rub­ him (C 21/4; SWB 24/4; JA 7/5, 20/6). school education by reducing the length of the ber plantation - and Liberia's biggest foreign A request by the ruling Democratic Party secondary school cycle, the introduction of a exchange earner - fell to the rebels, giving on 30 April that the government legalize more practical content into the curriculum, new momentum to their bid to overthrow opposition parties was endorsed by Pres the provision of learning and teaching materi­ Doe. Houphouet-Boigny a few days later. Political als and more effective teacher training. The In mid-June, when the rebels were only commentators believed the request to have reforms also supported greater access to edu­ 120 km from the capital, the two sides agreed been timed to pre-empt a resumption of the cation, particularly for children from low to take part in peace talks mediated by the protests which erupted in mid-February and income families (WBN 31/5; AED 11/6). Liberian Council of Churches. However, the lasted) two months. On I June the government talks between Pres Doe and Taylor's represen­ 0 formally1 ended 30 years of one-party rule Guinea-Bissau tatives broke up after five days on 16 June, by0 legalizing nine opposition parties. A fur­ without result, over the rebel demand that 2 ther five political parties were legalized dur­ After holding talks with the IMF in mid­ Doe resign before a cease fire could be agreed. d inge June. On 23 June leaders of four April, the government announced a number of On 18 June Doe lifted a ban on opposition t oppositiona parties formally called for the measures to introduce stricter control of gov­ parties and announced an amnesty for the d ernment administrative costs (AED 30/4; president( to resign. The four parties were the rebel forces in the hope that the NPF would

Ivorianr Popular Front, the Union of Social ARB 31/5). mobilize itself into a political party. The offer e

Democrats,h the Ivorian Workers Party and the On 15 May Pres Vieira affirmed that the was declined. The resumption of peace talks s i

Ivorianl Socialist Party (C 2/5, 8/6; AED 7/5; ruling party was in the process of creating planned for 25 June failed to take place, and SWBb 8/5, 19/6, 27/6; AA 11/5; JA 28/5; S conditions for the installation of a multi­ instead Nigerian leader, Pres Babangida was u party state, despite insisting only the month 2/6;P ARB 15/6). asked to initiate fresh peace talks.

e In late May hundreds of young armed before on the maintenance of the one-party By the end of June Samual Doe's 10 year h forcet conscripts went on the rampage in system. The president explained the necessity

rule of Liberia was hanging in the balance

Abidjany and other urban centres, and some 50 of liberalizing politics in order to bring about with rebel leader Charles Taylor seen to be on b air force conscripts seized Abidjan interna­ the necessary socio-economic changes in the the brink of taking control of the country. The d tionale airport and held it for 12 hours. An country. Pressure to democratize after 16 capital, Monrovia, was under rebel siege, cut t attemptn by national servicemen to take over years of one-party rule has come from the off from the world, with no telephone or telex

a Resistance-Bafata Movement which has ther state-run television station was foiled by links, and no flights whatsoever. Water and g police the same day. The recruits called for repeatedly called for dialogue (SWB 10/4, power supplies were cut off in the last week e re-enlistmentc at the end of their compulsory 17/5,19/6; ARB 15/5). of June, and the capital was completely sur­ two-yearn military service (in the light of high Finance minister dos Santos warned

e rounded by Taylor, who now blocked all land c unemploymenti rates), better living and work­ unprofitable state industrial and commercial routes. Most of Doe's cabinet and senior offi­ l ing conditions, and a substantial salary enterprises in June that they might face priva­ r cials had fled the country, as had many increase.e After the government agreed to their tization, rehabilitation or liquidation. The wealthy Liberians. Many foreign expatriates d

requestsn the recruits returned to their bases (C majority of the 50 state companies are in dif­ have been evacuated or were ready to leave u

17/5, 18/5 19/5; S 17/5; SWB 17/5, 18/5, ficulties (WA 25/6). on the American and British warships stand­ 21/5,y 22/5; AED 21/5; WA 28/5; AE 6/90; Following four days of armed clashes on ing offshore. Only 800 of the 5 000 a

ARBw 15/6). the 18-22 May along the Senegalese border Americans remained in the country, exacer­ e

t which left at least 17 people dead, Guinea­ bating the plight of the country's already shat­ a Bissau appealed to the international commu­ tered economy, as expatriates comprised 95 G

Thet Gambia nity for help. At the ministerial meeting held per cent of all managerial staff (AED 9/4, e in Paris on 22 May, Guinea-Bissau and 16/4, 23/4, 7/5, 21/5, 28/5, 4/6, 11/6, 18/6, n Presentingi the budget for 1990-91, the minis­ Senegal agreed to withdraw troops from the 25/6, 2/7,9/7; WA 23/4, 7/5, 25/6, 2/7; ARB b tera of finance announced several tax measures border, reaffirmed their commitment not to 15/5, 15/6; SWB 4/6, 18/6, 20/6-22/6; AC S to increase revenue. The duty on petroleum harbour each other's subversive movements, 4/6; JA 4/6, 13/6; S 5/6; DT 6/6; H 6/6; WR y productsb was raised and sales tax was also and pledged to strengthen military co­ 8/6; AA 22/6; C 25/6; ACon 18/6, 25/6, 9/7;

increasedd (WA 2/7; AED 2/7). operation. A joint commission was set up to NA 7/90). e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 199 p e R Africa monitor--______

On 19 June Pres 8abangida pledged to explosive (ARB 15/5,2/6; WA 2/6, 2/7). government bowed to growing pressure from work with other countries in the region to A new black opposition group, the unions and students alike and revised the con­ reconvene peace talks between the Liberian United Front for Armed Resistance in stitution to make provision for the introduc­ government and the rebel National Patriotic Mauritania (Furam), announced its creation tion of political pluralism (SWB 11/4, 20/4, Forces. He added that in the spirit of Ecowas, on 1 May. Furam, which said it had opted for 24/4, 11/6, 12/6, 13/6, 15/6, 18/6, 19/6; JA leaders in the region had a responsibility armed struggle, placed the blame for conflict 20/6; AED 25/6; WA 25/6, 2/7). to ensure the situation did not deteriorate between black and Arab-Berber components Government sources reported thirty-one further (WA 28/5, 4/6; SWB 6/6, 21/6; on the government's refusal to acknowledge people killed in clashes between government AED 2/7). black Mauritanian cultural identity. It also troops and Touareg rebels in northern Niger said that a solution to the Senegalese­ on 7 May. (In contradiction a French newspa­ Mali Mauritanian conflict was rooted in solving the per, Le Monde, reported that hundreds of country's internal problems. There are only Touaregs has been killed in the clashes.) Two At a conference held by the UN Development two other opposition movements in the coun­ of the rebel leaders - Mohamed Abdoulaye, Programme during March, the government try: the African Forces of Liberation in a minister until December 1989, and won substantial aid agreements and pledges Mauritania, created in 1986, and the Mohamed Ahmoundou, a former adviser in of which the most important was a $173 mn Resistance Front for Unity, Independence and the president's office - were arrested. The donor package. The meeting was aimed at Democracy in Mauritania, created in Touaregs, many of whom recently returned to raising finance for some 250 employment pro­ September 1989 (ARB 15/6). Niger after having been expelled from Libya motion projects (AED 9/4). IDA support for Mauritania's efforts to and Algeria where they had moved in 1984 to The foundation was laid for greater restructure some public enterprises and close escape a severe drought, had complained that democracy and the eventual installation of a down others was given in June when two the government had done little to facilitate multi-party system at the Bamako regional credits worth $50 mn were granted. The coun­ their reintergration. Since the beginning of the conference of the ruling Democratic Union of try has 80 public enterprises, accounting for year more than 18000 Touareg nomads had the Malian People held on 1 April. more than half of all public investment, but returned to the remote desert area in northern Discussions in the capital focused on multi­ many of them are unprofitable. In terms of a Nigeria (SWB 10/5, DT 11/5; WA 21/5; JA partyism, most participants insisting that public-enterprise reform programme to modi­ 21/5; ARB 15/6; WA 25/6). political pluralism was urgently needed. In fy laws and formulate policies, the govern­ contrast regional conferences held else­ ment will be able to privatize, restructure or Nigeria where in the country focused on internal close a number of public enterprises (WBN matters (JA 9/4; SWB 13/4; WA 23/4; ARB 28/6; AED 9/7). On 22 April the military regime survived an 15/5). attempted coup by junior officers, carried In June the International Development Niger out with the novel participation of civilians at Association granted a loan of $53 mn to help both the planning and execution level. One of the government streamline the state-owned On II April the government adopted immedi­ the bloodiest coup attempts in the country's cotton) corporation and reorganize the cereal ate austerity measures providing for a reduc­ history, it ended only after several hours of 0

marketing1 board, and for investments in rural tion in the number of diplomatic missions and fighting in central Lagos, mainly around the

0 infrastructure. The programme was expected allowances for cabinet members and other radio station and Dodan Barracks. By the fol­ 2 to help farmers increase production of cotton, state officials, and restrictions on the use of lowing day, however, Babangida was firmly d e cereals and other crops and to earn higher water, electricity and telephones. The govern­ in control, senior commanders and other t a incomes (WBN 28/6; AED 7/7). ment appealed to students to end protests, members of the AFRC having pledged their d

( According to the final figures of the which had continued despite a March agree­ support to him.

censusr held in 1987, Mali's population was ment to this end, saying these could jeopar­ Claiming to have the support of lawyers, e h 7,696 mn. Males comprised 49 per cent of the dize the school year. Niger is faced with a students and the National Labour Congress, s i population;l 46 per cent of the population is serious loss of income following the fall in the coup leader, Major Gideon Orkar, gave b less than 15 years old; 22 per cent live in the price of uranium, its main export product, as his main grievance "the oppression and u

urbanP areas; and only 19,4 per cent of the and regular food deficits (SWB 13/4; AED deliberate impoverishment" of people in the

populatione is literate (ARB 15/6). 30/4; ARB 31/5). middle-belt and southern states by the Muslim h t The Niger Federation of Labour Unions north. He called for the exision of the five

y (US TN) called for a multiparty system for core Moslem Hausa-Fulani states from the

Mauritaniab Niger on 1 May, but Pres Saibou warned that Federation of Nigeria. His extravagantly d

Foure ministers were sacked and a civilian was any such reform would be premature and worded manifesto also accused the Babangida t

appointedn to the foreign affairs portfolio in a would require rigorous preparation. The regime of being dictatorial and corrupt. cabineta reshuffle on 29 April, the second this Union also demanded the withdrawal of After the coup attempt, Babangida was r g year. The appointment of the former minister recent budgetary cuts - in particular the quick to assure the public that it would not e

ofc education, Hasni Ould Didi, was notable as freezing of civil service appointments, pay distract the country from its transition to beingn the first appointment of a civilian to the rises and promotions - an end to the privati­ civilian rule by 1992. Concerned that the e c

foreigni affairs post since the 1984 coup (SWB zation of public enterprises that entailed loss regional bias of the coup could renew north­ l 30/4; AED 7/5, 14/5; WA 14/5; ARB 15/5, of jobs, and the resumption of work by the south conflicts, the government also dis­ r e 15/6). liaison committee set up in March to consider missed speculation that the dissidents were d

n Proposals put forward by OAU chairman, student grievances and educational reforms. motivated by religious bias. It further showed u

Egypt's Pres Mubarak, in an attempt to broker Their call for a general strike on II June was reluctance to release casualty figures, in case ay lasting solution to the border conflict, were widely observed in the capital of Niamey. In these should fuel the tension. Since 1986 a

acceptedw in May by Senegal, but rejected by response to the strike action and student when Nigeria was formally admitted into the e

Mauritania,t which demanded the release of protests, the supreme governing body of Organization of Islamic Conference, tensions "300a 000 Mauritanians" held in Senegal Niger, the Council of National Orientation between the (primarily) Islamic north and G

againstt their will. However, a Red Cross (CSON), set up an ad hoc committee to help Christian south had been exacerbated. investigatione found the refugees to be in facilitate dialogue. Following a meeting Babangida, a moderate Muslim, however, n Senegali "willingly". Responding to continued between the USTN and Pres Saibou on 18 comes from the middle-belt. b incidentsa along the border during May and June, the government released 48 students and Of the more than 350 people arrested, S June, the Mauritanian foreign minister two trade unionists arrested in Niamey during more than half were civilians, many of whom y

accusedb Senegal of acts of aggression and the general strike. In return the USTN agreed the government said were "rich and powerful"

warnedd that the situation was potentially to cancel further protests. On 16 June the people who provided active support to the e c u d o

200r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Africa monitor

rebels. Among those captured was Maj Orkar structural adjustment programme designed establishing cost-effective and sustainable and nine other junior officers. A reward was to help halt economic decline, check the means of delivering these services (WBN 5/4; offered for the arrest of the three people - spread of parallel markets, stabilize prices and 31/5; AED 16/4, 11/6; ARB 30/6). Great Ogboru, a high-profile multi-million­ improve fiscal and external balances (AED In April Yondo Black, a lawyer and for­ aire, Maj Saliba Mukoro and Maj GTO Edoja 25/6). mer president of the Cameroonian Bar - thought to be the brains behind the plan, A national teachers strike broke out on 24 Association, and 11 others were sentenced to after they fled the country. May when discontented teachers rioted in between three and five years in prison for On 21 May 10 people went on trial before protest over outstanding salaries. A week later subversion. They were arrested in February a 10-man military tribunal on charges of high four people died in riots in Freetown when for circulating pamphlets "hostile to the treason. By the end of June more than half of security forces dispersed students demanding regime", although newspapers linked the those arrested had been released. overdue pay for their teachers. Tension on arrests to Black's attempt to merge his own In a speech at the end of June, the presi­ campuses was only broken at the end of June fledgling Mouvement national pour la dent said that had the abortive coup succeeded when the government agreed to unban student democratie with a new English-speaking it would have plunged Nigeria into a second unions so as to foster open dialogue (WA organization, the Social Democratic Front civil war. He announced the appointment of a 23/4, 11/6,2/7; SWB 27/4, 1/6, 12/6, 13/6). (SDF). Leader of the SDF, human rights committee to carry out an immediate and Speaking at the opening of parliament on 9 activist Albert Mukong, was acquitted on 5 comprehensive reorganization of the security June, Pres Momoh dismissed recent calls for April on the same charges. The opening of the services as well as a drastic reduction in the multi-party democracy on the grounds that it trial by a military tribunal was preceded by a size of the armed forces (G 24/4, 29/4; TWR would be divisive and lead to conflict. In major lawyers strike. In a nation-wide address 25/4; E 28/4; AED 30/4; WA 30/4, 28/5, 2/7, response, the powerful Bar Association called following the trial, Pres Biya described calls 9/7; JA 7/5; AC 7/5, 14/5; SWB 14/5, for the one-party constitution of 1978 to be for multi-partyism in the country as "manoeu­ 19/6, 25/6, 27/6; ARB 15/5, 15/6; AC 18/5, scrapped and for parliament to adopt a multi­ vres for diversion, intoxication and destabi­ 4/6; C 22/5; NA 6/90, 7/90; AE 6/90; party constitution "without delay" (WA 23/4, lization" (WA 5/3, 26/3, 16/4, 23/4; SWB AA 8/6). 2/7; SWB 27/4, 1/6, 12/6, 14/6,4/7; AED 25/6). 23/2,27/2, 11/4, 13/4; ARB 15/4; AC 20/4). Elections for local government congresses In a "gesture toward national unity" Pres of the two political parties, the National Togo Biya announced on 22 April that all the Republican Convention (NRC) and the detained coup plotters of the April 1984 coup Social Democratic Party (SOP), were held At its national council meeting on 27 May, the attempt would be released (SWB 25/4; WA without incident on 17 June. Each party ruling party, the Rassemblement du Peuple 7/5; ARB 15/5). selected five delegates from each of the Togolais (RPT), unanimously agreed not to Six protesters were shot dead by police 449 local government councils to attend the introduce a multi-party system. It was during a rally by some 20 000 members of the national convention. In contrast, the agreed, nevertheless, to give consideration at banned opposition SDF in the north-west ward elections held in May were reported to the next congress to the president's call for English-speaking city of Bamenda, on 26 be "rowdy and chaotic" (SWB 22/6; WA the cancellation of all legislation that put the May. The demonstration was called by the

25/6).) ruling party above all other institutions, and newly-formed SDF to mark the beginning of 0 Nigeria launched a $483 mn project to urged acceptance of the need for greater free­ its public activities, despite being banned by 1 upgrade0 its telecommunication services with dom of expression. An estimated 5 000 stu­ the authorities. About 300 students arrested at 2 the help of a $225 mn World Bank loan. The dents demonstrated in Togo in favour of the the time were subsequently released. d projecte supported the commercialization of announcement to maintain the RPT as the sole The government's hard-line responses to t

Nigeriana Telecommunications Ltd, a govern­ legal party (SWB 24/5, 29/5, 31/5; E 16/6). events during April and May in the face of d ment-owned( company, to enable it to become growing calls for a multi-party system, pro­

financiallyr viable, and aimed at improving the voked a serious crisis for Pres Biya. At the end e qualityh of telecommunications services and CENTRAL AFRICA of May the French co-operation minister can­ s i

people'sl access to these services (WBN 28/6). celled at the last minute his official visit to

(Nigeriab to playa role in resolving Liberian Cameroon, and on 8 June the vice-president of u Cameroon

crisisP - see Liberia.) the sole party Rassemblement Democratique

e In April the World Bank approved a $21 mn du Peuple Camerounais, John Ngu Foncha, h

t credit to extend agricultural services in order resigned from the party in protest at Biya's Senegal

y to increase farm production and the incomes intransigent attitude towards reform. Foncha, b The foreign ministers of Senegal and Gambia of more than 700 000 small-scale farmers. who is from the north-west city of Bamenda, d mete on 18 April to discuss a new framework The government would provide $7 mn and was vice-president of Cameroon from 1962 to fort co-operation. The move followed the dis­ n bilateral donors $3 mn towards the project. 1970, becoming RPDC vice-president in 1985. solutiona of the Senegambia Confederation last The country's economic growth depends His resignation symbolized the growing loss r g year amid disagreement over the pace of trade heavily on agriculture, which employs 75 per of support for the government from the ande customs' integration (AED 7/5). c cent of the population and generates 25 per English-speaking provinces. At the end of

n For the fourth consecutive year the gov­ cent of export revenues. Nine of 10 farmers June during the ruling party congress, Pres e ernmentc has outlined an austerity budget bal­

i are smallholders, and many of them are Biya in a surprise shift hinted that multi-party l anced at $1 836 mn - a rise of only 1,9 per women - who are the main producers of politics might soon be permitted. Cameroon's r cente on the estimate for 1989/90 (AED 7/5). food crops for home consumption and for the constitution permits rival parties, but since d

(Conflictn with Mauritania - see Mauritania; market. 1966 there has only been one party (SWB u

Border dispute - see Guinea-Bissau.) The World Bank also approved a $21,5 mn 28/5, 31/5; ARB 15/6; AC 15/6; AED 18/6,

y loan towards a special project to protect the 25/6, 9/7; ACon; AA 22/6; WA 25/6; C 30/6). a poor and other vulnerable groups as the coun­ Sierraw Leone e t try undertook reforms to re-establish econom­ Central African Republic Ona 25 April the government announced a new ic growth. Donors committed an additional G floating foreign exchange system to replace $86 mn towards the 4-year project which On 26 April the World Bank approved a $61 t thee fixed rate of $1 to LE 160. The system would support ongoing efforts to design and mn loan for a $139 mn five-year project to n allowedi commercial banks to trade between implement national policies in population, improve transportation links. With economic b

themselves,a or with the central bank at a health, and women in development. The development hampered by the long distances S mutually agreed exchange rate (AED 14/5). policies will be geared toward providing basic between production sites and seaports, the pro­ y

b The government reached agreement with social services to the most disadvantaged ject would repair and maintain roads - which

thed World Bank and IMF in June on a segments of the population and toward carry about 23 per cent of traffic - and will e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 201 p e R Africa monitor ______

look into ways of improving the navigability of estimated at 48 years, with infant mortality at aggravated by tribal divisions which came to the Oubangui River, which carries about 75 per 120 in every 1000. Seventy-two per cent of the fore during the riots, evoking a statement cent of all traffic (WBN 26/4; AED 7/5; ARB the population lived in rural areas (AED 7/5). by the prime minister that "the country was 31/5). on the verge of civil war". The most populous In a sweeping government reshuffle on 5 Gabon Fang tribe which supports the illegal June nine ministers were dismissed, 11 new­ National Renewal Movement, demanded that comers appointed, and one portfolio was The deficit in France's trade with Gabon Bongo's Haut-Ogoue people share political added to the cabinet. Carried out as part of increased threefold in 1989 as against 1988. power with them. Gen Kolingba's "new policy of openness", the Total trade between the two countries reached On 31 May Pres Bongo began negotia­ reshuffle brought the appointment of two min­ FF6,4 bn ($1,1 bn) in 1989, representing a 21 tions with opposition leaders to try to end the isters of state to oversee parliamentary affairs per cent increase on the previous year. violence. He subsequently said that despite and the economy, and Kolingba's relinquish­ Exports to France rose by 39 per cent to FF4,0 the unrest the October multi-party ejection ment of his post as defence minister (SWB bn, while imports fell by 1,4 per cent to FF2,4 would go ahead. Opposition political parties 7/6; ARB 15/6; AED 25/6, 2/7). bn. The increase was due to the 50 per cent had requested their postponement for a year, rise in the volume of oil exports, which cost so as to give them more time to prepare. On 1 Congo France 105 per cent more than the previous June parliamentary speaker Augustin Boumah year. Oil accounted for 64 per cent of exports resigned, after troops raided his home in The World Bank's lending agency, the IDA, to France (AE&M 29/3; AED 9/4; ARB 30/4, search of one of his relatives. By the end of approved a $45 mn loan in support of the 31/5). June calm had been restored in the country third annual programme under the structural The national conference on political (ARB 15/5, 15/6; DN 25/5; C 25/5, 26/5, adjustment facility. The principal objectives reform held on 19-21 April which was 28/5-30/5; S 25/5, 28/5; SWB 25/5, 26/5, of the 1990-92 programme were to achieve a attended by 73 political groupings, agreed to 29/5-1/6, 13/6; AE&M 31/5, 28/6; DT 30/5; growth in real GDP of 3,6 per cent, to help begin a transition to multi-party politics JA 4/6, 11/6, 13/6; AED 11/6; AC 15/6; NA stabilize the economy, strengthen the adminis­ immediately rather than to phase it in over a 7/90; AA 6/7). trative capacity of the government and make five year period. Pres Bongo officially sure the basic needs of the poor were met as announced the establishment of a multi-party Sao Tome & Principe the economy underwent change (IMF S 18/6; system, the immediate amendment of the con­ WBN 28/6; AED 9/7). stitution and the replacement of the cabinet On 30 March the government announced that On 14 March a draft agreement was with a transitional government of 15-20 new legislation would soon be promulgated to reached with the IMF for a standby credit to members. The delegates agreed to a transi­ institutionalize political parties in the coun­ support the second structural adjustment pro­ tional period ending with the general elections try. On 25 April opposition leader Afonso dos gramme after the government agreed to cut in October, and to respect Bongo's mandate to Santos and 35 of his supporters, imprisoned public expenditure and keep strictly within stay in office until 1994. As no agreement in August 1989 for attempting to oust the budget targets. It also agreed to diversify the was reached as to what would constitute a president in 1988, were granted amnesty. The

economy) away from dependence on oil political party; 13 political groupings formed government said the move formed part of the exports,0 which account for more than 70 per a united opposition front, the Front Uni des new policy of setting up a multi-party system 1

cent0 of the annual budget. On 12 April the Associations et Partis de l' Opposition. and calling elections (SWB 3/4, 27/4; ARB 2 budget for 1990 was reduced by CFAFr5,7 bn On 29 April the newly appointed 29-mem­ 15/6). d

(AEDe 2/4, 30/4; ARB 30/4, 31/5). ber cabinet to oversee the transition was t

a At a meeting of the ruling Parti Congolais announced. Casimir Oye-Mba replaced Leon

d Zaire

du( Travail (PCT) in April, Pres Sassou­ Mebiame, who had dominated the political

Nguessor said that questioning the leading role stage for more than 20 years, as prime minis­ A decision by Pres Mobutu in March to con­ e

ofh the party was not "sacrilege", but warned ter and head of government. Eighteen new duct a nationwide sounding of popular opin­ s i

againstl the push for pluralism endangering ministers were sworn in. ion, opened the door to widespread criticism

nationalb unity. In a significant shift, the PCT On 24 May the National Assembly and of his regime and created a climate of expec­ u

agreedP at its central committee meeting held at Gabonese Democratic Party central committee tation. In an attempt to halt the growing and

thee end of June to move towards greater adopted the new Constitution for the four­ widespread unrest that ensued, seen to be the h

democracyt within the party by reducing the month transitional period (SWB 21/4, 1/5, 8/5, worst during his 25-year rule, Pres Mobutu

centraly committee form nine to five members, 22/5, 25/5; JA 23/4; AED 23/4, 30/4, 7/5, then ordered rises (of up to 78 per cent) in b and to the introduction of a multi-party sys­ 21/5; WA 30/4, 7/5; ARB 15/5, 15/6). civil service wages and student grants on 12 d

tem.e Stressing the need for a transition phase, Despite his agreement to democratize the April. In an address to the nation on 24 April t

then president said its introduction would fol­ constitution and hold multi-party elections, he tried to further placate his electorate with

lowa the holding of an extraordinary congress Pres Bongo faced a resurgence of unrest at the announcement of sweeping changes to r g

in 1991 to draw up legislation on multi-party the end of May. Sparked off by the death of the political system: the establishment of a e

politics.c He ruled out at present the holding of Joseph Redjambe, leader of the little-known multi-party system and the creation of three

an national conference to discuss political plu­ Gabonese Progressive Party (PGP) , whose political parties in the first phase; the resigna­ e

ralism.c For nearly three decades the Congo has

i supporters presumed to have been murdered, tion of the government and imminent appoint­ l been under single party rule. The PCT also rioters went on a week-long rampage destroy­ ment of an interim government followed by r

agreede to discard Marxist-Leninist dogma in ing many official buildings, businesses and the formation of a transitional government up d

favourn of a more loosely defined socialism property owned by Bongo. Rioters called for to April 1991; and the appointment of a com­ u

(AED 30/4; SWB 6/7,9/7, iO/7; C 6/7). the resignation of Pres Bongo as well as eco­ mittee to draft a new constitution. Lundu y nomic and political reforms. The army was Bululu, a former legal adviser to the presi­ a

Equatorialw Guinea called in to maintain order and a nationwide dent, was named as prime minister and head e

t curfew was imposed, while 500 reinforce­ of the interim government, although Mobutu Aa political opponent of Pres Mbasogo, Primo ments from the I 000 permanently stationed reaffirmed his own position as head of state. G Jose Esono Mica, who had been in prison French troops had to be called in so that oil On 7 May, when the new government was t

sincee 1988 for having participated in an production by the French oil company, Elf, sworn in, political parties had still not been n attemptedi coup, was released (ARB 15/4). could be resumed at Port Gentil, the country's legalized. When it became apparent that b

a A study carried out for the government by economic capital. Eight hundred of France's Mobutu had reneged on his promises to intro­ S the UN Fund for the Study of World 3 000 citizens were airlifted out by France duce political reforms, insisting instead on a y

Populationsb estimated the country's popula­ from Port-Genti! where a number of deaths gradual phasing in over a two-year period,

tiond to be 350000. Life expectancy was were reported. The volatile situation was disappointed students in Kinshasa took to e c u d o

202r Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 p e R ______Africa monitor

the streets to show their anger. As unrest 21/5, 28/5, 4/6, 6/6, 13/6, 20/6; AC 20/4, Mohammed Taki the leader of the National spread rapidly to other parts of the country, 18/5, 15/6; AED 23/4, 30/4, 7/5, 14/5, 4/6, Union for Democracy, as well as accusations the government reacted by arresting hundreds 18/6,2/7; WA 23/4, 7/5, 28/5, 1116,25/6,2/7; by all seven opposition candidates that Djohar of students and closing down several univer­ BD 25/4; C 26/4, 23/5, 26/5, 13/6; AA 27/4, had rigged the actual vote in his favour, the sities and schools. Teachers then in turn went 11/5, 25/5, 8/6; ANews 30/4, 11/6; E 5/5; elections were endorsed by the supreme court. on strike as a protest against government ARB 15/5, 15/6, 30/6; NA 6/90, 7/90; AE Pres Djohar announced the formation of a repressions and also for better wages. A spiral 6/90; DT 7/6; S 5/6, 21/6; DN 25/6). new cabinet on 22 March, shortly after being of violence was quickly set in motion in the On 24 June Uganda and Zaire signed an sworn in for a six-year term of office. The universities with security-men killing stu­ agreement to explore for oil along their cabinet, which would be transitional govern­ dents, and students in turn killing other stu­ 1 500 km common border. The deal, which ment until the new Constitution had been dent-spies. On 11 May the violence reached a signalled the end of three years of talks, drawn up and a general election called, did climax when Mobutu allegedly sent soldiers detailed terms for the sharing of proceeds not include a single minister from the previ­ of the elite presidential guard, disguised as from oil, which is believed to exist in the ous cabinet. Included were two of the seven civilians, to quell the unrest. After cutting Lake Albert Basin (A ED 2/7, 9/7). candidates who stood against Djohar in the water and electricity supplies at Lubumbashi (Extradition treaty with Uganda and Rwanda presidential elections - Said Ali Kernel who University, the commando force, known as -see Uganda.) took the strategic economy and trade portfolio the "red berets", evidently separated students and was the de facto prime minister, and Ali from Mobutu's Equator Region from the rest, Mroudjae, who was appointed to head the and proceeded to beat and murder students production, industry an handicrafts ministry. from other parts of the country. Unofficial EAST AFRICA Some of ex-Pres Abdallah's ministers who sources estimated that between 50 to 150 stu­ split from his government in recent years dents were slaughtered in a gruesome Burundi made a comeback. massacre. On 27 April the president pledged to revise When news of the killings became public On 5 April 3 000 university students protested the present constitution, which effectively there was a wave of nationwide protest in the capital against reforms to the education made the country a one-party state, to allow activity. Throughout May and June there were system which effectively limited access to the for multi-party democracy. He also demonstrations and strikes by government few secondary schools in the country. announced tighter controls on public spend­ health workers, teachers and mine workers, Significantly the (authorized) demonstration ing, economic reforms and fresh negotiations most notably in the Shaba province. On 11 was the first to take place in the country since with the IMF. On 1 June the government June teachers ended a month-long stoppage 1966, and was without incident. The govern­ voted to abrogate legislation made in 1979 to after the government threatened to close down ment responded by suspending the reforms introduce the single-party system. schools and other institutions and suspend (SWB 10/4; NA 6/90). On 2 May Pres Djohar decreed that all students. On 16 May the draft "charter of national civil servants and agents of the State who On 25 May Belgium announced the sus­ unity" was submitted to the public, a year were suspended or dismissed by former Pres

pension) of all official bilateral assistance and after the commission was charged with the Abdallah because of their political opinions postponed0 a joint commission meeting sched­ task in order to prevent a repeat of the violent be reinstated. However, it excluded supporters 1 uled0 for June, in protest at the brutal repres­ ethnic strife in August 1988. The charter com­ of opposition leader Mohammed Taki (ION 2 sion of students. It was joined by the mitted Barundi to respect human rights and to 31/3,7/4,21/4,5/5, 12/5,26/5,9/6; AED 2/4, d

Europeane Community in their call for a full fight injustice based on ethnicity, region or 7/5; SWB 10/4, 13/4; DT 1114; ARB 15/4, t anda independent enquiry. Despite initially clan. On the same day Pres Buyoya announced 15/5; DT 3/5). d denying( the mass murder, the' gOVernment that the Military Committee for National (Visit by Pres Mitterrand - see Mauritius.)

agreedr to a parliamentary enquiry. On 20 June Salvation (CMSN) would be replaced by a e

theh government reported that it had estab­ Central Committee in Uprona, Burundi's polit­ s Djibouti i

lishedl the "regional character" of the inci­ ical party, and that in early 1991 a commission dentsb and prosecuted the former governor would be set up to write a new constitution. In June two diplomats living in Washington, u

ofP Shaba province and ten other senior local He added that Burundi would even get the DC, USA, announced their defection and

officials.e Nevertheless, Belgium continued its opportunity to decide if they wanted a multi­ decision to join the newly formed opposition h suspensiont of aid because of the government's plicity of parties. The CMSN has been the group, the Union des Mouvements

refusaly to allow an international inquiry. On supreme ruling body since the coup in Democratiques (UMD). Ali' Dahan and b 23 June in retaliation for "interference" in the September 1987 (SWB 18/6; AE 6/90 Abdulkarim Ali Amarkak, who asked for d country'se internal affairs, the government The World Bank supported a project political asylum in Canada and France, t

orderedn the closing of three Belgian con­ designed to boost coffee exports with a $28 denounced "the violations of human rights sulates,a the return of 700 Belgian aid workers mn credit. As coffee exports account for and corruption" in Djibouti (S 18/6; SWB r g and threatened to break relations with almost all of Burundi's export earnings, the 21/6; ION 23/6; AED 25/6). e

Belgium,c which responded by warning project was expected to increase the country's Relations between Djibouti and Somalia

Zairen that it risked losing IMF and World foreign exchange earnings (WBN 12/4; AED deteriorated in early May when the former e

Bankc support. 23/4; ARB 31/5). was accused by Somalia of involvement in i l On 4 June, foreign affairs minister Karl-I­ clashes between the rebel Somali National r

Bond,e who was excluded from the newly Movement and government troops. In the

d Comoro appointed transitional government, announced fighting which took place on 5 May at n theu creation of a new political party, the Party The presidential elections held on 19 Loyada, a small settlement on the border, sev­

ofy Independent Republicans (PRI). A week February - the first free elections to be held eral dozen Somali government troops were latera the diplomatic representative to the UN since independence in 1975 -. were subse­ killed. Djibouti, which .denied that their armed w in e Geneva, Kumbu Kilutete, announced the quently annulled due to wide-scale fraud. In forces had been involved in any way, subse­ t creationa of another new party, the National the second ballot which took place on 11 quently sent major military reinforcements to G

Alliance of Democrats for Reconstruction, March, the relatively unknown Said the area (SWB 10/5, 11/5; ION 12/5, 2/6; t bringinge the number of political parties seek­ Mohamed Djohar, who was previously head ARB 15/6). n ingi registration to eight. In addition to these of the supreme court, becoming interim head On 5 May violent tribal clashes broke out thereb are another four or five small move­ of state in November 1989 following the a between Issas and Gadaburst communities in S ments (SWB 11/4, 19/4, 25/4-27/4, 3/5, 5/5, assassination of Pres Abdallah, was elected the capital, Djibouti. Two people were killed 10/5,y 15/5, 17/5,28/5, 1116, 19/6, 20/6, 21/6, president. Despite an official accusation of and twenty-three injured (SWB 8/5; ION b 25/6, 27/6, 28/6, 29/6; JA 16/4, 30/4, 7/5, fraud by an opposition candidate, 19/5; ARB 15/6). d e c u d

Africao Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990

r 203 p e R Africa monitor ______

Ethiopia On 22 May the former commanders of the French Pres Mitterrand paid a 3-day Land Army and the Police Force and ten other visit to Madagascar on 14 June, the first visit Nine days of talks with the Tigre People's senior officers were executed for their alleged by a French head of state to the country since Liberation Front (TPLF) broke down on 29 roles in the failed coup attempt of May 1989 independence in 1960. His visit was preceded March after the government refused to accede (SWB 24/5; 2/6). by a donation of MFr 1 500 mn worth of mili­ to the rebel demands that Mengistu step down tary engineering equipment. Pressure was put and rejoin a transitional coalition government Kenya on France by the opposition to reschedule the to draw up a new constitution. The Eritrean visit because of apparent fears that it would People's Liberation Front (EPLF) failed to In early May Kenneth Matiba and Charles serve to entrench Pres Ratsiraka's position, at attend peace talks scheduled for 8 April. Rubia, two former ministers who were a time when demands for political reforms During April, as fierce fighting erupted on expelled from Kanu's ruling party in 1988, and an end to the president's 15-year rule are all fronts in the civil war threatening famine called for a multi-party system and the hold­ growing. By the end of June the number of relief supplies to more than four million peo­ ing of fair elections. Pres Moi responded by political parties to register following the lift­ ple in the north, it became apparent that gov­ saying that such systems were a recipe for ing on the ban in March had risen to 12 (ION ernment forces had decisively lost the inter-tribal conflicts, and promised to clamp 28/4, 5/5, 26/5, 2/6; SWB 10/5, 28/5, 7/6, initiative in the war. Troops from the TPLF down on opposition factions. In an apparent 14/6; ARB 15/5; AED 21/5; E 5/6; S 15/6). and an alliance of other opposition move­ reference to the public support shown by the Richard Andriamaholison, a former police ments were advancing on the capital, Addis US ambassador for multi-partyism, Pres Moi chief condemned in 1983 to life imprisonment Ababa, while troops from the EPLF had denounced Matiba and Rubia as "agents of for plotting a coup attempt, was pardoned on 10 000 government troops besieged in foreigners ". 26 June by Pres Ratsiraka as part of celebra­ Asmara, the capital of the disputed region, Their appeal, the strongest yet, served to tions to mark the country's 30 years of inde­ and were firmly entrenched in the port of open up widespread public debate on the pendence (SWB 29/6; ION 30/6; AED 9/7). Massawa. Aggravating the government's issue which had long been stifled. Amid On 13 June the IMF approved a $33,6 mn position was the Soviet Union's reduction of growing calls for political pluralism, which loan in support of the second annual pro­ military assistance and withdrawal of the bulk included those of the Catholic Church, Pres gramme under the enhanced structural of its military advisers. In his May Day Moi adopted a renewed hard-line policy. On adjustment facility (ESAF). Most of the speech Pres Mengistu admitted to serious mil­ 13 June armed men raided Matiba's home, objectives of moving towards an open, mar­ itary setbacks and called for a renewed com­ and on 16 June Moi ordered that any further ket-oriented economy set under the first mitment to the war against the rebel debates about multi-party politics be closed. ESAF were achieved. The new programme movements. He added that popular support Political analysts believed Moi to feel threat­ aims to maintain positive per capita real for his government was waning. ened not only by the debates on pluralism, but growth, a further reduction of inflation, and a In early June the government accepted an also by the growing dissatisfaction about the narrowing of the external current account offer by the EPLF to open up the port of policies and practices of his government (DT deficit while also safeguarding social and Massawa for deliveries of food aid to govern­ 8/5; WR 11/5, 18/5, 29/6; AED 14/5, 21/5, environmental priorities (AED 25/6; IMF

) ment and rebel-held areas. The decision fol­ 4/6, 11/6,25/6; ARB 15/5, 15/6; SWB 18/5, S 2/7). 0

lowed1 the announcement that US Pres Bush 19/5,25/5,26/5, 18/6,25/6; ION 19/5,23/6, (Restoration of economic relations with South and0 Soviet Pres Gorbachev had agreed to co­ 30/6; AA 25/5, 22/6; KT 16/6; E 23/6; TWR Africa - see South Africa.) 2 operate in an airlift to help speed aid deliver­ 27/6; NA 7/90). d ies.e However, because of EPLF accusations t The IDA has supported a $41 mn popula­ Mauritius a that the Soviets were hiding behind inter­ tion programme with a credit of $35 mn. The d

( national relief efforts to deliver fresh arma­ fourth de"mographic control programme pro­ In a visit seen to reaffirm France's interests in r ments to the government, the port remained ject aimed to improve the accessibility of the region, French Pres Mitterrand paid an e closed.h family services and to reinforce existing official visit in June to the four Indian Ocean s i l Following a call by presidents Bush organisms of this kind set up by the govern­ island States of Madagascar, Mauritius, b and Gorbachev for an international peace ment, building on previous programmes Seychelles and the Comoros. It was the first u

conference,P Pres Mengistu met Pres Moi of which had already brought down the growth visit by a French head of state to the region

e Kenya in Nairobi on 10 June to discuss initia­ rate from 3,8 per cent. Kenya's rapid popula­ since their independence. For each of the four h t tives aimed at ending the 29 year-old civil tion growth of 3,6 per cent - one of the states, France is their first trade partner and

y war. Although rejecting the prerequisite of a highest in Africa - has placed strains on the first aid donor (ION 16/6). b ceasefire, the government called for a revival education system, the labour market and the d ofe negotiations with the EPLF. However, environment, and has hindered economic and t Rwanda

hopesn that peace talks with the EPLF (which social development (AED 16/4; ION 12/5; KT a At the end of March the government r broke down in November 1989) could be 23/5). g

resumed were dashed when the rebel group's announced that producer prices for coffee - e c mediator, Jimmy Carter, announced on 14 Madagascar the country's main export - would be cut by Junen that it would not return to peace talks 20 per cent. The minimum price has been e c

andi was demanding instead a UN organized Five people were killed and 20 wounded in a fixed since 1986. Export earnings have fallen l referendum on the future of the disputed terri­ coup attempt on 13 May, in which a 13- from $150 mn in 1986 to $70 mn in 1989 r tory.e The TPLF, on the other hand, offered to strong armed rebel unit seized the national (AED 9/7). d

resumen peace talks with the government on 20 radio station in an attempt to overthrow Pres During his visit to France in early April, u

June, and agreed to an immediate ceasefire if Ratsiraka. The coup plotters, who evidently Pres Habyarimana secured a commitment y the government stepped down. In an address had no popular support, planned to replace the from the French government to help establish a

tow the National Assembly (Shengo) on 21 president with Gen Jean Rakotoharison, an a television broadcasting service within the e

June,t Pres Mengistu said that the country was opposition leader who denied any connection next 3 years. Rwanda is one of the few coun­ ona the verge of collapse and called for imme­ with them. Among those arrested were Joma tries in the world without a national television G diate and all-out mobilization to meet the Ernest and Jean-Jacques Rasalimanana, mem­ service (AED 9/4; AA 27/4). t growinge threat from rebel forces (AED 16/4, bers of the conservative opposition party During May Tanzania expelled more than n 30/4,7/5,28/5,i 18/6; ION 28/4, 5/5, 26/5, 2/6, Vonjy fray Tsy Mivaky who took part in a 5000 Rwandese illegal immigrants who had b

23/6,a 30/6; C 30/4, 9/6, 15/6, 26/6, 27/6; DT "radio coup" attempt in July 1989 (S 14/5; been living in the country since 1986. The S

2/5; SWB 6/5, 12/6, 16/6,22/6,25/6,27-29/6; SWB 15/5, 18/5; C 15/5; ION 19/5, 26/5; Rwandese government was forced to seek y

TWRb 9/5, 6/6, 20/6, 27/6; ARB 15/5, 15/6; AED 21/5; WA 21/5; E 9/6; ARB 15/6; international aid to help resettle the immi­

ANewsd 28/5; NA 6/90; S 6/6). AR 7-8/90). grants (SWB 19/5,21/5,29/5). e c u d o Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3,1990 204r p e R ______Africa monitor

Seychelles Tanzania assistance. A further nine people were killed and thousands of homes destroyed when Speaking on 5 June at the 13th anniversary of On 12 May Pres Mwinyi closed the university flooding also occurred in the coffee-growing his coming to power, Pres Rene reiterated that in Dar es Salaam and sent home more than area around Mount Kilimanjaro in the north he had no intention of changing the island's 3 000 students in an effort to curb intermittent (SWB 12/4, 17/4, 24/4, 30/4; C 16/4; AED one-party socialist system (SWB 7/6; ION student unrest over the previous month. 23/4,7/5; TWR 9/5; ARB 31/5). 9/6). Student grievances focused on corruption (Repatriation of Rwandans - see Rwanda: Revenues from tourism in 1989 were 19 within the country, the declining education Extradition treaty with Zaire and Uganda - per cent higher than the previous year, reach­ budget, terms of service and salaries for aca­ see Uganda.) ing $95 mn. However, a negative effect of the demic staff, and other national issues. Pres tourist boom was that it exacerbated the trade Mwinyi, who is also the chancellor of the uni­ deficit by 11 per cent, a consequence of versity, closed the university after boycotting Uganda increased imports of products for visitors and students refused to return to classes on time. spending on the improvement of infrastruc­ Significantly, the events coincided with the Sudan and Uganda concluded a mutual non­ ture. The number of tourists was forecast to opening up of debates about the introduction aggression pact in early April, obliging each increase by 60 per cent within the next five of a multi-party system (SWB 18/4, 20/4, country not to allow its territories to be used years (ION 26/5, 23/6). 15/5, 16/5, 26/5; ION 21/4, 28/4, 19/5, 26/5; for committing hostile actions against the AA 25/5, 8/6). other. The Sudan-Uganda border had been the scene of mutual recriminations since al-Bashir Somalia In an historic announcement on 29 May, Chairman of the ruling Chama Cha seized power in Sudan in June 1989. Uganda The International Development Association Mapinduzi party, Julius Nyerere, said that he is host to more than 60 000 refugees from the has provided a $26 mn credit towards a seven­ would relinquish the post of party chairman seven year old war between the government year $32,5 mn education project which was by August 1990. The 68 year-old Nyerere and the SPLA, whose leader John Garang, aimed at improving the quality of teaching, continued to hold this powerful post after is a friend of Museveni (AED 23/4; ARB upgrading school facilities, reversing the fall stepping down as president in 1985. His 15/5). in enrolments and increasing supplies of resignation would leave him without any At the end of May, Rwanda, Zaire and teaching materials. The quality of education, leadership role in either party or the govern­ Uganda agreed to enact bilateral extradition which received only 1,5 per cent of the ment. Political observers attributed the move treaties and to initiate legislation in their national budget, is poor and attendance very to Nyerere's ill-health, as well as his need for national legislatures forbidding acts of sub­ low - in 1988 only one in 10 children of pri­ self-respect in the face of demands for multi­ version against each other. They further mary school age was enrolled (WBN 29/3; party politics. Although Nyerere had encour­ agreed to promote and strengthen co­ AED 16/4; ARB 15/5). aged an open debate about multi-partyism, he operation among their security services, and On 20 May the government approved plans had refrained from indicating his own prefer­ to hold regular summit meetings at ministerial for constitutional amendments with a view ence prior to a CCM meeting on 26 June at level (DT 30/5). to introducing a multi-party system by the end which he said that multi-party democracy was More than 2 000 prisoners-of-war from )

of the0 year. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Ali inevitable. In contrast, Pres Mwinyi showed the northeast who had been detained without Samantar1 said that multi-party politics could himself to be strongly against the idea on 3 trial were freed on 27 April. Nevertheless, 0

2 Amnesty International complained to the gov­

not be introduced until there was a ceasefire June when he warned Western countries about withd the Somali National Movement. Pres linking the adoption of pluralistic democracy ernment that thousands of civilians are e Barret promised to legalise opposition parties, to economic assistance. On 11 June it was still being held illegally without trial (AED a

butd no legislation had been passed to abolish announced that parliamentary and presidential 7/5). ( the one-party system and set an election date elections would take place on 28 October

r Opening parliament on 30 April, Pres

(SWBe 5/5, 14/5, 18/5, 25/5; AED 21/5; ION (SWB 31/5, 4/6, 29/6; S 31/5; E 2/6; TWR Museveni said the economy was forecast to h

26/5).s 6/6, 9/6; AA 8/6, 22/6; ION 9/6, 23/6, 30/6;

i grow at 6,1 per cent in 1989-90 and 6,6 per l

Aboutb 70 prominent Somali personalities AC 15/6). cent in 1990-91, a slight drop on the 1988-89 wereu arrested on 11 June after they had pub­ A new investment code giving foreign growth rate of 7,2 per cent. Economists P lished a manifesto on 15 May calling for a and local investors tax incentives and invest­ blamed the projection of slower growth on the e multi-partyh political system and a caretaker ment guarantees, was announced on 9 April. collapse of world prices for coffee. Export t administration to restore human rights and Strong approval was given by the Nordic earnings from coffee fell by 59 per cent in y

b 1989 to $160 mn, despite the crop being public order. The 112 signatories of the mani­ countries, Tanzania's principal donors, during festod were composed of lawyers, politicians, Pres Mwinyi's visit to these countries in the biggest in 14 years. The fall in world e intellectuals,t elders and chiefs, many of April. In May the government announced a prices was particularly serious for Uganda n

whoma were former members of the civilian programme to deal with severe infrastructural as coffee accounts for 95 per cent of export r

governmentg overthrown in 1969. Headed by problems which are seen as likely to deter earnings.

the e country's first president, Aden Abdulle new investors. The poor state of the transport Uganda's steady economic progress was c

Osman,n the newly formed group known as sector has also been cited as one of the major being received favourably by donor countries e

"Destouri"c (the constitutionalists) were obstacles to the successful application of the and agencies. When the ruling National i l strong supporters of the prime minister. government'S economic recovery programme, Resistance Movement took power in 1986, the r

Condemninge the governments repression of costing the country about $200 mn annually. country had a negative economic growth rate anti-governmentd riots and recent arrests of Over the next ten years more than $1,5 bn and inflation stood at more than 370 per cent. oppositionn leaders, Italy threatened in late would be invested, by international organiza­ u In the twelve months up to October inflation

Juney to withhold economic and political co­ tions and assisting countries (AED 9/4, 30/4; was 60 per cent. On 9 May, shortly before the operationa unless its former colony made a MSE 12/4; ION 19/5; ARB 31/5; MSE 1/6; arrival of a joint IMF-World Bank economic w strongere commitment to democracy (DT 8/6; WBN 7/6). commission, the government devalued the t

IONa 9/6, 16/6; AED 11/6, 25/6, 217; SWB Up to 100 people died and an estimated shilling by 1,3 per cent. Only 35 days later it

14-16/6;G AC 15/6; AE 7/90). 142000 made homeless when the worst was devalued again by 4,2 per cent to equal t

e On 29 May two Somali air force officers floods for more than 50 years occurred in the USh400=$1. Economists said the devaluation n flewi a transport aircraft with 49 people on southern coastal area around Lindi and was made in order to increase the local return boardb to Djibouti and asked for political Mtwara in early April. Crop damage was on coffee exports, rather than being a a

S response to inflation (AED 16/4, 7/5, 4/6,

asylum. The two were handed over to the severe and there was widespread destruction

UNHCR,y and the plane returned to Somalia of infrastructure. An appeal was made to the 11/6, 18/6, 25/6; DT 3/5; ION 9/6; A Con b (DT 31/5; AED 4/6; SWB 21/6). international community for $6 mn in foreign 11/6; AA 6/7). d e c u d

Africao Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 205 r p e R Africa monitor ______

SOUTHERN AFRICA ministries of industry and commerce and fish­ government's continued prohibition of politi­ eries 31 days to come up with ideas to re­ cal party activities, the seven registered politi­ establish small-scale business in their sectors. cal parties announced their refusal to Angola In response, the ministry of industry and com­ participate. merce announced the first concrete steps The new constituent assembly, compris­ In early April both the government and Unita towards the privatization of factories, brew­ ing members of the council of ministers, rep­ rebels issued statements proposing direct talks eries, canneries, textile mills, state retail resentatives of police, local government and on resuming the peace process. The moves chains and other manufacturing enterprises, traditional chiefs, was sworn in on 29 June. followed efforts by the Soviet Union and the reviving hope that the economic and financial Under the presidency of an academic, Dr USA to bring the two sides together. Ending a restructuring programme announced in 1987 Teloboho Kolane, the assembly was immedi­ lO-month break in peace talks punctuated by might finally "get off the ground". In a mini­ ately given the task of drafting a new consti­ heavy fighting country-wide, officials of the reshuffle on 14 June Pres dos Santos appoint­ tution. Lesotho had no constitution for the ruling MPLA and Unita forces met on 24-25 ed new ministers of finance and planning, as previous 20 years, following the suspension April in Portugal for "exploratory" talks to well as a new governor and deputy governor of the 1966 independence constitution in 1970 discuss a new ceasefire. Although the two of the central bank. No reasons were given for (C 2/5; DT 3/5; SWB 5/5, 1/6,6/6; ARB 15/6; sides agreed to meet again, there was no firm the changes, but political analysts saw the sig­ DM 28/6; LT 28/6; WM 29/6). peace agreement and fighting broke out nificant restructuring of the government's A civil action against military leader Maj­ almost immediately. A call by Unita on 1 May economic team as confirming the sincerity of Gen Lekhanya for damages amounting to that a ceasefire be signed by June and that the government's efforts to privatize (MSE R500000 was filed on 6 June by exiled King direct talks be held with Pres dos Santos, 10/5; AED 21/5, 25/6; S 21/6; ARB 30/6). Moshoeshoe II. Two weeks later he called for whom they agreed to recognize as the leader On 19 May Angola and Namibia agreed to the establishment of an interim representative of Angola, was rejected by the government. form a joint commission to maintain security government which would make immediate The breakdown resulted in a large-scale along their border (C 22/5; AED 28/5, 11/6; plans for free and fair elections on the basis of MPLA military offensive against Mavinga, ARB 15/6). universal suffrage within six months of its situated in the heart of Unita territory, and In mid-June both the government and UN formation (SWB 21/5,11/6,21/6; C 7/6, 20/6; renewed military offensives by Unita in secretary-general, Perez de Cuellar, appealed S 12/6). northern and central Angola. The fight for the for food and other humanitarian aid for more China broke off diplomatic and trade rela­ control of the strategic town Mavinga which than 2,6 mn people affected by drought. The tions with Lesotho in April after Maseru had been under way since late January, ended call came after reports of increasing deaths in announced that it was re-establishing links with the announcement on 9 May by govern­ the central and southern parts of the country with Taiwan (C 6/4; SWB 10/4; AED 16/4; ment forces that they had withdrawn - as a where rainfall had been inadequate for the past MSE 5/90). "goodwill gesture" towards peace. A further four years. An estimated 11 000 people died in On 4 April university students resumed defeat by the rebels at Mukundi in the south­ Benguela province between September 1989 an indefinite boycott of lectures in protest east highlighted the government's weakened and July 1990. Despite calls in 1989 for against the 300 per cent increase in fees military position and increased pressure on 300 000 tonnes of food aid, the government announced in March. In early June more than )

0 them to revive negotiations. said that "donor insensitivity and security prob­ 5 000 university and school teachers joined 1

0 A meeting held between Unita and the US lems" had resulted in the delivery of only about the strike, demanding salary increases of 2

secretary of state for African affairs, Herman 30000 tonnes of aid. National agricultural pro­ between 100 and 300 per cent (LT 5/4, 12/4; d

e Cohen, in May was described by the Angolan duction was estimated to be down by more than SWB 10/4; WM 15/6). t government as a conspiracy to "overthrow" it. 60 per cent, and cattle losses were thought to a d Continued US support of an estimated Rl30 exceed 62000 (DN 25/4; MSE 5/90; AA 25/5; (

Malawi r mn annually in military aid to Unita, con­ AED 28/5, 25/6; C 26/6; SWB 27/6; WM 29/6; e tributed to government mistrust. S 29/6; ARB 16/8). On 27 April Pres Banda dissolved the cabinet h s i A second round of talks in the search for a with immediate effect, for the second time in l b cease-fire was held in Lisbon on 16-18 June. Botswana four months, as well as the three region u These broke up abruptly after the Unita delega­ committees of the Malawi Congress Party. No P

e tion suspended further talks until "misunder­ Two unarmed civilians were killed in unrelat­ reason was given, but political commentators h standings" had been cleared up. Sticking points ed incidents by Botswana Defence Force sol­ believed that the exclusion of veteran minister t

y remained the MPLA's refusal to extend explicit diers in April. A public apology was Edward Bwanali from the new cabinet b

recognition to Unita, and on how best to subsequently made by the commander of the appointed a week later, was a factor. He was d enforce a ceasefire. A week later Unita said it defence force for the deaths of the two, a also dismissed from his influential post of e t was willing to resume exploratory peace talks. Batswana teenage girl, and a visiting British regional party chairman for Malawi's popu­ n

a After a meeting with Pres Mobutu in late man who took a wrong turn into the road lous southern region. A cabinet minister for r

g June, Unita's Dr Savimbi said that he was leading to the State House in Gaborone (S the past 15 years, Bwanali had been mooted

e ready to hold direct talks with Pres dos 27/4,28/4,7/5; C 30/4). as a possible successor to Banda, who offi­ c

n Santos. He also called on the USA and Soviet Following a high court ruling invalidating cially turned 84 in May (SWB 30/4, 4/5, 6/6; e

c Union to help to end the 15-year civil war and the results in the Mochudi constituency of the DT 3/5; H 4/5; AED 7/5, 14/5). i l

allow emergency food and medical aid to September general elections, the minister of The World Bank approved an IDA loan of r e reach civilians. education Ray Molomo lost his seat. The $38 mn in April for the development of edu­ d On 29 June the government announced the closely contested seat was lost when the two cation. Government expenditure on education n

u release of 60 former Unita members under the opposition parties joined to field one oppos­ is among the lowest in Africa, affecting the

y terms of an amnesty law passed in 1989. The ing candidate (AA 8/6; AED 18/6; NA 7/90). quality and quantity of education. The pro­ a state radio said that 1 800 prisoners had been gramme aimed to increase school attendance w e released in May (SWB 9/4, 3/5, 11/5,7/6,8/6, to 75 per cent of school-age children by 1993, t Leso4tho a 22/6,30/6; WM 12/4,20/4,4/5,25/5; C 12/4, compared with its present rate of under 50 per G

26/4, 2/5, 4/5, 7/5, 10/5, 26/5, 19/6; AED On 30 April the government announced that it cent (AED 30/4; ARB 15/6). t e 16/4, 7/5, 14/5, 28/5, 9/7; JA 16/4, 30/4; DN would establish a 109-member constituent At a meeting of the World Bank co­ n i 30/4; ARB 15/5, 15/6, 15/7, 15/8; WA 11/6; assembly in preparation for returning the ordinated consultative group on 14-16 May, b DM 28/6; AR 7-8/90). country to civilian rule by 1992. Gen donors confirmed $508 mn in development a S

In a move aimed to increase private sec­ Lekhanya said that he expected the civilian assistance for 1990/91 to support the econom­ y tor participation in the economy, the govern­ government to be a combination of US ic adjustment programme, and in particular b ment issued a decree in early May giving the and UK systems. However, because of the the government's strategy to reduce poverty. d e c u d o Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990

r 206 p e R ______Africa monitor

Total external financing requirements for In a significant step towards Southern the most extensive undertaken by a South 1990-95 are estimated at $1,2 bn, if economic African co-operation, Eskom (South Africa's African leader since the National Party came growth is to be sustained and the poverty­ electricity supply commission) won a R2,6 to power in 1948. The tour was seen as an reduction programme successfully imple­ mn training contract from the World Bank, its attempt to hasten South Africa's readmittance mented (DT 11/5; WBN 17/5; AED 28/5; first ever, in late May. The contract formed into the international community following ARB 30/6). part of a multi-million rand project to rehabil­ his government's meeting with the ANC. The A new trade agreement between South itate and upgrade the Maputo thermal power following day Mandela embarked on a tour of Africa and Malawi was signed on 19 June, station (ION 31/5; S 31/5; BD 1/6). seven African countries which focused on providing duty-free entry into South Africa On 4 June the IMF approved a $113 mn maintaining pressure on the government to for all products of Malawian origin. This credit to finance the continuation of the pro­ dismantle apartheid. would put Malawi in a position to reduce the gramme for economic and social recovery On 4 June Mandela departed for a high­ trade imbalance of about R200 mn a year in launched in 1987. The government hoped to level six-week tour of 13 countries, which South Africa's favour (BD 20/6). double the economic growth rate to 6 per cent included meetings with US Pres Bush and in 1990, to cut inflation by half to 9 per cent, British Prime Minister Thatcher. During Mozambique and to contain the budget deficit at 30 per the tour he renewed his calls for the continua­ cent of GNP (DN 6/6; IMF S 18/6; ION 23/6). tion of sanctions. Pres De Klerk announced Peace talks scheduled for mid-April where on 7 June that the four-year old nationwide delayed indefinitely after disagreements arose Namibia state of emergency would be lifted in all but between government and Renamo over the the province of Natal. In what was seen to be venue for peace talks. Renamo, having strong Donald Acheson, the 52-year old Irishman a genuine attempt at removing stumbling links with Kenya, preferred Nairobi as a accused of assassinating the prominent blocks in the way of negotiations, the move venue, while government forces insisted on Namibian nationalist and lawyer, Anton followed the announcement on 15 May that Malawi, a venue which Renamo said was Lubowski, in September 1989, was released the government no longer believed indepen­ unacceptable on "security grounds". on 7 May after charges against him had been dence for the six self-governing states to be On 7 May government forces launched a dropped. The charges were withdrawn after an option, thereby formally abandoning the major offensive against Renamo's headquar­ Namibia had tried but failed to procure four policy of grand apartheid. The government ters in Gorongoza in central Mozambique, crucial witnesses and two co-accused from also announced in Maya three-month indem­ killing about 600 people in bombing raids. South Africa (C 8/5; S 8/5). nity against prosecution, detention, or arrest Renamo estimated that some 3 600 In May Namibia established diplomatic for political activists, including exiles, facing Mozambican and Zimbabwean troops were relations with Libya and Malawi (SWB criminal or civil charges. On 19 June a bill involved in the offensive, the largest yet 11/5; DT 27/5). was passed repealing the 1953 Reservation of against the rebels. In an apparent retaliatory At the first donors' conference for Separate Amenities Act, one of the so-called attack, about 18 people were killed on a pas­ Namibia on 21-22 June, donors pledged a dis­ "pillars" of apartheid. On 26 June in a signifi­ senger train carrying mineworkers from appointing $200 mn towards the first year of cant softening of its position, the European South Africa on 14 May, and a few days later the reconstruction and development pro­ Council (EC) praised De Klerk for his )

some0 3 000 refugees crossed the border into gramme, $70 mn short from that requested. reforms and said that while sanctions would South1 Africa following a rebel attack on a The largest donor, West Germany, pledged be maintained, they would be gradually 0 2

border town. There was also a marked escala­ $60 mn mainly for agriculture and fisheries. relaxed in response to reforms (AED 23/4, l tiond during May of rebel attacks on roads, South Africa pledged $10 mn in aid for 30/4, 7/5, 14/5, 21/5, 28/5, 11/6, 25/6, 2/7; e railwayst and power-lines around the capital, mutually identified projects. Namibia inherit­ SAB 25/5, 22/6; K 4/90, 5/90, 6/90). a

Maputo.d ed debts of about R500 mn on gaining inde­ Intense fighting between ANC supporters ( Despite the final acceptance by Renamo pendence, and expects a R 700 mn deficit in and the (mainly) Zulu Inkatha movement r

representativese of the Malawian venue, and the 1990 (C 6/6, 23/6; AB 6/90; AED 2/7). (led by Mangosuthu Buthelezi) in the h

arrivals of top officials in Blantyre on 15 June, province of Natal, continued during the period i (Angola, Namibia in security pact - see l

preliminaryb talks never actually took place. Angola) April to June, spilling over into townships in

Accompaniedu by their Kenyan mediators, other parts of the country. The heightened P Renamo representatives cancelled the talks unrest in the Natal townships, which claimed e SOl!~h Africa

becauseh of the "security risk". However, the on average six to ten lives per day and caused t reason was thought to be Frelimo's non-accep­ Represt

tanceb of Renamo's new preconditions which in the deployment of a defence force unit in

Congress (ANC) and the government held

includedd the withdrawal from Mozambique of preliminary talks on 2-4 May aimed at the area (AED 9/4; K 6/90). e Zimbabwe'st 10 000 soldiers who are guardjng removing obstacles to future negotiations on a In a significant change of attitude, n Madagascar restored economic relations with thea Beira Corridor. Zimbabwe, which was post-apartheid constitution. It was their first appointedr as Frelimo's mediator last year, was formal encounter since the founding of the South Africa at the end of April (AC 1/6). g

seene by Renamo to be biased (SWB 3/5, 5/5, ANC in 1912. The ANC delegation, which 12/5,8/6,c 13/6, 16/6,20/6; C 11/5, 14/5, 16/5, was led by deputy president Nelson Mandela, n TBVC States 11/6,e 13/6, 18/6; ION 12/5, 9/6, 16/6; ARB included two former political prisoners, Walter c i

15/5;l S 17/5, 13/6; WM 18/5, 15/6; AC 1/6; G Sisulu and Ahmed Kathrada, and five senior Tr~nskei - The draft decree on a proposed

15/6;r AE 7/90). exiled external leaders who the national referendum to be held on the issue of e retu~ed t~

d A South African family of four who had country on 27 April - Joe Slovo, the secre­ Tni.~sk~i;s reincorpo'r~tion i~t~ South Africa, beenn held by Renamo rebels since the end of tary-general of the South African Communist was published on 24 June. The decree gave u citizens of Transkei until September to com­ Aprily when their yacht ran aground off the Party, Alfred Nzo, Thabo Mbeki, Joe Modise

southerna Mozambique coast, where released and Ruth Mampati. In a joint statement issued ment on the referendum proposals, after w which a date would be set for the vote (SWB

unharmede to South African officials on 15 after the historic meeting, it was noted that Junet (C 8/5; SWB 12/5, 16/6; ST 20/5; S both sides had agreed "on a common commit­ 25/4; S 25/6; C 25/6). a

17/6).G ment towards the resolution of the existing cli­

t At a donor's conference held on 27 April, mate of violence and intimidation from Bophuthatswana - Three senior officers of e

$106n mn in emergency aid for Mozambique whatever quarter, as well as a commitment to the army and a member of the local police i

wasb raised, falling $30 mn short of that request­ stability and to a peaceful process of negotia­ force were acquitted on charges of treason on a

ed. S Most of the money will be spent on basic tions." 18 May, bringing to an end the series of trea­

foodstuffsy to the 1,4 mn people worst affected On 8 May Pres de Klerk embarked on an son trials that began after the abortive coup in b

by the civil war (AED 2/4; ARB 30/6). 18-day nine-country tour of Western Europe, February 1988 (C 19/5; SWB 21/5). d e c u

Africad Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 o 207 r p e R Africa monitor ______

Venda - A sit-in at the end of March by civil share market (BD 24/5; AED 4/6; ARB 30/6; An historic bill was passed on 28 June servants, including nurses and policemen, AE 7/90). removing the constraints imposed by Britain who were demanding salary parity with their Under pressure from trade unions and stu­ 10 years ago on changes to the constitution. South African counterparts, and the resigna­ dent bodies, Pres Kaunda announced on 28 In future only the approval by a two-thirds tion of the chief of police on 3 April, preced­ April that he would recommend to the nation­ majority of the single chamber parliament ed a bloodless military coup on 5 April. al council of the ruling United National would be required for a change to the consti­ Second in command of the Venda Defence Independence Party (Unip) that a referendum tution or the Declaration of Rights (S 29/6). Force, Lt-Col Gilbert Ramushwana, forced be held on changing to a multi-party system, Unrest rocked the country during May and the resignation of Pres Frank Ravele and his although he reiterated his personal rejection June, after the government raised prices on cabinet, as well as the return to South Africa of political pluralism. All campaigning for or basic goods by up to 15 per cent as part of of the head of the defence force, Brig against the existing one-party system was reforms to liberalize the economy. More than Steenkamp. A state of emergency was banned. A four-member electoral commission 10 000 teachers and 1 500 civil servants, enforced and a commission of inquiry was appointed in early June to prepare for the demanding more pay and better conditions, appointed to investigate alleged corruption, referendum. stopped work in a series of countrywide nepotism and other irregularities attributed to On 7 June Pres Kaunda reshuffled his cab­ strikes which started on 28 May. However, in the government of former-Pres Ravele. inet, sacking defence minister Fredrick the face of the imposition of emergency pow­ Schools reopened and civil servants returned Hapunda and the mines minister. Their dis­ ers ordering employees back to work, coupled to work after Ramushwana scrapped an annu­ missal along with the demotion of secretary of with unemployment of some 30 per cent, the al tax, suspended the activities of the Allied state for defence, Alex Shapi, was linked by strikers reluctantly returned to work. More Workers' Union and announced a subsidy for political observers to the debate on multi­ than 1 000 teachers were dismissed. electricity. On 5 June the state of emergency party politics. On 30 May at the reopening of the was lifted. Along with the new Ciskein gov­ The price of maize meal was increased by University of Zimbabwe, which had been ernment, South Africa formally recognized over 100 per cent on 19 June, provoking closed for several months following student the new government on 7 June (S 4/4, 8-11/4, widespread discontent, which culminated in unrest, an estimated 2 000 students vociferous­ 20/6; SWB 5/4, 8/6; NA 6/90; C 6/6). violence after a demonstration by some 2 000 ly denounced the imposition of a one-party students in Lusaka on 25 June. About 30 peo­ state (C 25/5, 1/6,2/6,8/6,21/6; FG 1/6, 15/6; Ciskei - The Commissioner of Police, Gen ple were killed in the riots. Kaunda, however, SWB 2/6, 7/6; H 6/6; TWR 6/6; WM 8/6; Madolo, was dismissed in early June in con­ insisted that the economic reforms would go AED 11/6; FM 22/6; AA 22/6; MSE 6/90). nection with an alleged plot to overthrow the ahead, but did respond to the call by rioters military government (C 5/6; SWB 6/6). for the restoration of the price subsidy, the The new military government abolished resignation of the president, and an end to the the death penalty, with immediate effect, in single-party system, by announcing that the mid June, and commuted the death sentences referendum would be held in October. References of 40 prisoners to life imprisonment (SWB Early on 30 June a small group of army A - Afrika; AA - Africa Analysis; AB - 14/6). officers led by Lt Mwamba Luchembe briefly African Business; AC - Africa Confidential; )

0 took control of the national radio and televi­ A Con - Africa Concord; AED - Africa 1 sion service, announcing a military takeover Economic Digest; AE&M - Africa Energy & 0 Swaziland 2

following the food price rises. In response to Mining; AlB - Africa Institute Bulletin; d Eleven people, alleged to be members of the the attempted coup, Kaunda sacked his army AN - Africa Newsfile; ANews - Africa e t under-ground People's Democratic Movement commander Lt-Gen Gary Kalenge, and News; AP - African Preview; AR - Africa a

d (Pudemo), were arrested in June on charges of reshuffled the country's top military leader­ Report; ARB - Africa Research Bulletin; ( sedition and high treason. Accusations of ship (C 30/4, 31/5, 29/6, 2/7, 4/7; DT 1/5; B - Beeld; BD - Business Day; BDN - r e links with the Federation of Trade Unions AED 7/5, 28/5, 7/6, 25/6, 2/7, 9/7; SWB 30/5, Botswana Daily News; C - Citizen; CI - h s

i were denied by the trade union secretary (C 27/6, 28/6; AE 6/90; S 1/6, 2/7; AC 1/6; FT Crescent International; Cr - Crescent; D - l

b 21/5; TS 6/6, 13/6, 14/6, 19/6,28/6; DT 8/6; S 26/6; G 27/6; S 27-30/6; WM 29/6; FM 29/6, Drum; DN - Daily News; DT - Daily u 21/6; AA 22/6, 6/7; SN 23/6). 6/7; BD 29/6, 2/7; E 30/6; ST 1/7; TWR 4/7; Times; E - The Economist; FF - Frontfile; P The threatened closure of Swaziland's old­ ARB 15/7). FG - Financial Gazette; FM - Financial e

h est mine, the 50 year-old Havelock asbestos Mail; F&T - Finansies & Tegniek; G - The t mine, was eased following the discovery in Guardian; H - The Herald; I - The y Zimbabwe b April of high quality asbestos deposits valued Independent; IMF S - IMF Survey;

d at about R200 mn. These will prolong the life In a cabinet reshuffle on 9 April, Pres ION -Indian Ocean Newsletter; JA-Jeune e t of the mine by some 8 years, thus saving the Mugabe trimmed his cabinet from 50 to 40 Afrique; K - Keesing's Record of World n jobs of more than 2 000 workers. The main members, mostly at the junior ministerial a Events; KT - Kenya Times; KN - Kwacha r source of mineral earnings in the country, level, and appointed former Zapu leader News; LT - Lesotho Today; M - The Mail; g

e Havelock brought in R25,5 mn in 1989 (C Joshua Nkomo as co-vice president with veter­ MF - Mozambiquefile; MIO - Mozambique c 11/4; S 17/4). an Zanu-PF Simon Muzenda. A noteworthy Information Office; MNR - Mozambique n e appointment was that of Dennis Norman to News Review; MSE - Market South East; c i l the troubled transport ministry. Norman was N - Namibian; NA - New African; Zambia r replaced as minister of agriculture in 1985 as a NM - Natal Mercury; NN - New Nation; e d At a consultative group meeting held on 9-11 consequence of Mugabe's chagrin with whites R - Rapport; Rep - Republikein; S - Star; n April, donors pledged $450 mn for the next in the country. Two other whites were appoint­ SAB - SA Barometer; SAD - South African u

y twelve months, thereby endorsing the govern­ ed to the cabinet, Timothy Stamps as health Digest; SAE - Southern African Economist; a ment's economic restructuring programme. Of minister, and Chris Anderson as minister of SAN South African Newsletter; w

e this $250 mn was for balance of payments mines. Only three of the 30 appointed mem­ SAT - Southern Africa Today; So - South; t

a support, and the remainder for development bers were former Zapu members, despite pre­ SN - Swazi News; SS - Sunday Star;

G projects (AED 9/4, 23/4, 21/5; WBN 12/4; DT vious assurances by Mugabe that there would ST - Sunday Times; SWB - BBC Summary t

e 18/4; ARB 31/5). be an equitable distribution of portfolios. of World Broadcasts; T - Transvaler; n Making his most profound shift in policy On 18 Maya draft bill was passed provid­ i TS - Times of Swaziland; TWR - Third b direction under the economic recovery pro­ ing for two vice-presidents, placating dissat­ World Reports; U - Uniform; WA - West a

S gramme, Pres Kaunda announced plans on 28 isfied former Zapu members (BD 10/4; S Africa; WBN World Bank News;

y May to partially privatize the country's 10/4, 12/4; SWB 11/4,22/5,22/6; AED 16/4; WM - Weekly Mail; WR - Weekly Review; b unwieldly state-run enterprises and set up a ARB 15/5; AC 18/5). ZN -Zimbabwe News. d e c u d o 208 Africa Insight, vol 20, no 3, 1990 r p e R AF ~CA ) 0 1 0 2 d e t a d ( r e h s i l LEGEND b ~II u P '? e h t y b d e t n a r g e c n e

c 6]1 i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u d o r p e R